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Chlopak Memo - Recommendations for Forest Summit Scope and Process December 10, 1992

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MEMORANDUM

TO: Katie McGinty

FROM: Bob Chlopak

RE: Recommendations for Forest Summit Scope and Process

DATE: December 10, 1992

Under separate cover we have prepared an options document that lays out the organizational components of the summit and provides an analysis of several alternatives for each. This memo ties together all of our recommendations for the summit, giving you a sense of how the summit would look if you followed our counsel from start to finish. If you consider our other memo a Chinese menu, the following describes what your meal would be.

First, in developing the options memo, a number of principles emerged that guided our own thinking and could be useful in steering the summit through its many twists and turns. They include:

1. De-politicizing the summit by focusing the debate as much as possible on science, economics and related expertise.
2. Introducing new people into the decision-making process both to inject fresh thinking and enhance the likelihood of a meaningful result. A new Administration and some newly elected officials in the Northwest is a great start, but other people of stature and with expertise should be included as well.
3. Nationalizing the debate (not its scope), venue and participation because the stakes in this debate transcend the region.
4. Making the summit forward-looking and solution oriented.
5. Giving the Clinton Administration maximum control over the summit while minimizing the risk that failure will be laid at its door.
6. Trying to expedite the process while not moving so fast that we force a solution based on politics instead of sound science and policy

Recommendations

We favor a summit that covers the full scope of Northwest old growth issues but does not address any of the national environmental or land management laws. Thus, the summit would cover all of the Oregon, Washington and California old growth forests; it would deal with all species, not just the owl; it would cover National Forest and BLM lands; and it would consider the issue of log exports.

The summit should begin with a serious and aggressive information gathering component that would start with outreach to the key interest groups and public officials to build up trust, and meetings with outside experts in the fields of science, rural development, and economics. Public hearings in the Northwest and in Washington, D.C. can play a useful role during this stage, but they should be scheduled at a time when they can be focused on key issues. This will help minimize the risk of the hearings becoming a polarizing step in the summit process.

During the second stage of the summit a Blue Ribbon Commission (BRC) would establish the major economic and scientific parameters for further analysis. This is important because we don't want the summit to spend its time determining how many owls remain, or drawing comparisons to timber employment at the height of production in the 1980s. The summit needs to look forward and focus on solutions.

The BRC would then analyze the information from the public hearings, interested parties, and experts and prepare its own expert report modeled in many respects around the Portland Panel Study, except that it would deal with a wider range of issues. The report could present a number of options for solutions but it should develop a recommendation of its own.

The BRC report would then be presented to Vice-President Gore as Chairman of the Cabinet Level Forest Summit Resolution Team. Vice-President Gore's team would include the Secretaries of Agriculture, Interior and Labor, the Administrators of EPA and NOAA, and the Chairs of CEQ and the new National Security Council. If some Northwest representation becomes a political necessity, the best course may be to include the Governors from the three affected states. Over the course of about one month, this team would consult with all interested parties, including key Committee leaders on the Hill and Northwest elected officials, and then issue its final report. Consultation at this stage will be critical to keep interested parties feeling involved and so that the process has the feel of a summit. At the same time, we want to limit the

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decision-making to the Administration. The Gore team would accept, amend or reject the BRC recommendations, and include a legislative prescription that would be sent to the Hill.

Vice-President Gore would have the lead Administration role throughout. He would pick the Chairperson and members of the Blue Ribbon Panel, and also appoint a leading economist, scientist and public figure to lead its three major sub teams: economics, science and public participation. The Vice-President would then Chair the Cabinet Level Resolution Team. Our suggestions for Chair of the Blue Ribbon Commission are all from outside the Northwest, including current EPA Director Bill Reilly, former President Jimmy Carter, and Senator Tsongas. Otherwise, the BRC should be made up of respected figures in the fields of science and economics.

We know that there is pressure to get started. Once you decide on the basic outlines of the scope and process, we suggest the Governor Clinton issue a statement to the media that would cover the following points:

- Vice-President Gore will lead the summit effort.
- The process will have 3 basic steps that will marry public input, expert analysis and deliberation by the range of Administration officials with jurisdiction.
- Interested parties including the Northwest and Congress, labor, industry and environmentalists will be involved and consulted throughout.
- Name of the Chair of the Blue-Ribbon Commission.
- Timetable (see last section of options document)

Potential Pitfalls

The Northwest delegation wants to be at the decision-making table. Their involvement at this level will stymie and politicize the process and should be avoided at all costs. Similarly, the interest groups should not be at the decision-making table. The Section 318 summit tried these kind of approaches and the results were disastrous. If you need any further evidence, consider that the Northwest delegation has met regularly for years to discuss solutions and never has come up with a credible, consensus approach. And, when ancient forest legislation stalled in the House committees this year, their leaders tried to negotiate with the Northwest delegation and failed.

The delegation also may try to influence the scope of issues under discussion, especially log exports. The labor-industry timber coalition opposes any changes in export provisions despite the fact that most of labor has historically supported restrictions that save American jobs. (Discouraging raw log exports would increase logs available to American mills and create more jobs in the processing of wood products, many of which are union jobs. Big timber companies like Weyerhaeuser oppose export restrictions because the Japanese pay a higher price for American logs than U.S. buyers.) The export issue, however, is vital to the success of the summit because of its political and economic ramifications. Pushing the issue could split labor off from their unholy alliance with the industry. And, export restrictions will create jobs, offsetting losses that may result from protecting old growth forests.

Similarly, labor and their advocates like Rep. Dicks and Nick Ashmore (Speaker Foley's office) continue to talk about a solution that offers certainty. What they want is a guaranteed timber supply, and the only way they can get it is by overriding existing environmental laws and court injunctions. This supply side timber policy is as outmoded as trickle down economics. Suspending laws and/or court orders is a non-starter with our community and support for this approach in the Congress has all but evaporated. As you may recall, Sen. Gorton's effort this year to attach a salvage program with these provisions to the Interior Appropriations bill was defeated by a 2-1 margin.

MEMORANDUM

TO: Katie McGinty

FROM: Bob Chlopak
Kevin Kirchner, Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund
Brock Evans, National Audubon Society
Debbie Scase, Sierra Club
Jim Owens, Western Ancient Forest Campaign
Mike Francis, The Wilderness Society
Fran Hunt, National Wildlife Federation

RE: Scope/Process for the Clinton Forest Summit

DATE: December 10, 1992

This memorandum responds to your request for a description of the scope and procedural options for the forest summit. While there may be only a few distinct summit models from a conceptual point of view, there appear to be countless variations when it comes to the implementation of the many specific elements of the summit process.

So, to accommodate flexibility and specificity, we've organized the memo around the organizational components of the summit process rather than the conceptual approaches. The memo provides a number of options for each of the components, and briefly discusses their strengths and weaknesses to help you make decisions.

The components covered include:

- I. Scope of issues
- II. Structure
- III. Product/Outcome
- IV. Leadership
- V. Participants
- VI. Venue
- VII. Timing

I SCOPE OF ISSUES

We have divided the scope into two subcategories: the first addresses the land areas and range of species to be included; the second discusses the issue of log exports.

1. Lands and Species Covered

- a) Northwest Old Growth Forests, including eastern Washington and Oregon and the Sierran Forests in California: This regional focus encompasses the major concentrations of old growth forests on both national forests and BLM lands, all the species that inhabit them and the ecosystems that support them. It would not limit the debate only to old growth forests that contain spotted owls, nor would it expand the debate nationally to put national laws like the National Forest Management Act (NFMA) and the Endangered Species Act on the table.

Strengths: It lends itself to a comprehensive regional solution for logging in sensitive and endangered old growth forests. It would be more likely to focus on protection of ecosystems since the geographic focus would not be limited to owl forests. By addressing management of old growth throughout the region, it also avoids the unintended consequence of increasing pressure for logging in unprotected old growth forests.

Weaknesses: Including the eastern Washington forests puts the Speaker's forests into play. It also increases the potential acreage and numbers of species that must be considered for protection.

- b) Owl Forests Only in the Northwest: This plan excludes eastern Oregon and Washington and the Sierran forests in California. The forests included are those west of the Cascades in Oregon and Washington and a small number of owl forests in Northern California.

Strengths: It cuts down the acreage under discussion and limits the debate to the forests where logging is enjoined by the Courts. It excludes forests in the Speaker's district.

Weaknesses: It makes the summit essentially an owl vs. timber supply summit rather than a discussion about sound ecosystem management. It would tend to ignore the problems of other species threatened by the

destruction of their habitat. It omits old growth forests in the region which are not protected now by Court injunctions yet are threatened by over-logging and disease brought about by poor management practices.

- c) All National Forests and possibly BLM Lands: Even if the focus is largely regional, the summit could make changes in national environmental laws that would have profound impacts on public lands across the entire country. This past year, for example, one ancient forest bill proposed changes in NFMA that would have made timber production the dominant value in all National Forests.

Strengths: It could be vehicle for making needed reforms in national public lands management.

Weaknesses: This option is usually favored by industry as a means of using the crisis in the Northwest to make wholesale changes that favor increased timber production across the entire National Forest and BLM systems. It significantly increases political opposition to any solution since it significantly increases the number of states and congressional districts affected.

2. Exports

A second important scope issue is whether any changes in export policy, either through tax or trade policy, will be considered in the summit. In recent years as much as 3 billion board feet of timber have been exported from the Northwest annually. Though most of this timber comes from private lands, export limitations would redirect this timber to American markets and substantially reduce the pressure to log public lands. In addition, it would divert raw logs to American mills, creating new jobs in timber-dependent communities in the Northwest.

Strengths of including exports: It creates jobs and reduces pressure to log on public lands. It potentially divides the timber industry-labor coalition. Repeal of the raw log export subsidy would raise roughly \$100 million annually that could be used to fund worker retraining and other community development activities.

Weaknesses: It will generate strong opposition from the major timber producers and possibly from the coalition opposed to limits of any type on

agricultural exports. It compounds the jurisdictional issues in Congress, bringing in the tax committees.

II STRUCTURE

This is probably the key issue. The structure utilized will have direct impacts on all the other issues outlined here. In addition, the structure also will affect the tone of the summit -- whether it is political or Blue Ribbon in flavor, for instance. Importantly, the structure of the summit also will dictate the degree of control the White House has over the process. Generally, White House control will be inversely related to how public and political the structure is.

To facilitate the discussion of structure, we've divided the presentation into several subcategories:

1. Information Gathering/Public Participation

Under any structure there needs to be a mechanism for soliciting or obtaining input from interested parties and perhaps the public at large. We assume that the Administration would want to appear inclusive, so we recommend that, whatever the mechanisms, input be invited from at least the following interests and constituencies: Northwest elected officials, leaders of Congressional Committees with jurisdiction, labor, forest products industry, environmentalists, fishing industry, Native Americans, scientists and economists. Mechanisms include:

- a) Public Meeting(s) or Hearing(s): A Chair or panel could preside over one or more public meetings or hearings in the Northwest and in Washington, D.C. to gather information from various affected/interested groups and individuals. It would be important to hold at least one such event outside the Northwest to show that this is not just a regional issue. Participation could be handled like a hearing -- with some witnesses invited and other slots open to the public. Or, the meeting could follow the model of the economic summit and be by invitation only.

Strengths: It would show that the Clinton Administration is using an "inclusive" process to give everyone an opportunity to have their voices

heard. It would give the Administration an early public event to show that it was acting on its summit promise.

Weaknesses: It would provide a platform for various interest groups to pander to the media and, in all likelihood, further polarize the issue rather than achieve the announced goal of bringing people together.

- b) Task Force(s): One or more Task Forces could be appointed to meet with the interests identified above. The Task Forces would include the spectrum of interested parties and interests -- public officials, interest groups and experts. (Separate Task Forces could address different issues -- rural infrastructure/diversity, ecosystem protection/restoration, etc. -- but it would probably make more sense to have a single Task Force perhaps with subcommittees looking at all of the issues. The single Task Force also has the symbolic advantage of showing that ecosystem management is an integrated issue worthy of an integrated solution.) These meetings would not be secret but would take place away from the glare of the media.

Strengths: It would be an "inclusive" process but its lower public profile could minimize the pandering and polarization that would likely result from the public meeting approach. It would also likely lead to more rational advice and recommendations from the various groups and individuals since they would be meeting in a much more personal context with the task force members. It also shows that the Clinton administration is taking a serious, deliberative approach to the issue. Finally, it would give Clinton more control over the process, and outcome, than if the information were gathered at big media events.

Weaknesses: It could take longer to gather the information (though not necessarily a lot longer) and might be a bit more expensive since there would be more travel/hotel expenses for more people (the Task Force members). The process may also be vulnerable to criticism that the public is shut out and that the fix is in. Task force members that represent the issues at stake in the debate are likely to encounter division and posturing as they maneuver to advance their points of view.

- c) Blue Ribbon Commission(s): One or more Blue Ribbon Commissions could be appointed to gather the information needed to develop a solution. The Commissions would operate just like the task forces, but unlike them, members would be chosen expressly for their impartiality on the issues. The Commission would be chaired by a prominent public figure and its members

would be leaders in relevant technical disciplines, e.g., economists and scientists.

Strengths: This option shares many of the strengths of the Task Force approach, particularly as they relate to the more technical issues (population viability, trade policy, rural economic diversification). The stature and composition of the Commission would tend to de-politicize the process and show that Governor Clinton is being both serious and fair in dealing with the issue. It would also put pressure on all of the interest groups to be persuasive in a more technical tense and minimize their posturing.

Weaknesses: It smacks a bit of an ivory-tower approach, thereby detracting from the "inclusiveness thing." It may also be criticized by Northwesterners for letting outsiders determine the fate of the region.

- d) Combination of Task Force and Blue Ribbon Commission: The White House could announce formation of a Task Force to oversee information gathering and simultaneously form a Blue Ribbon Commission (or two) to pull together the latest scientific and economic information and report back to the Task Force in some fixed time period (90 days?). Meanwhile, the Task Force could hold meetings with the various interest groups, community leaders, etc.

Strengths and Weaknesses are obvious from (b) and (c).

2. Fact Resolution

Once the input is received, the summit must process the information and make decisions. The intermediate step of processing information need not produce a product -- i.e., the decision-makers can deliberate and simply announce their decision. Or, the processors can be charged with the responsibility of resolving disputes -- whether over science, economics, etc. -- and preparing an expert report and recommendations. The report and recommendations could be prepared by the same entity overseeing the information gathering: a chairperson or committee holding the hearings or meetings, Task Force or Blue Ribbon Commission. However, if a fact resolution process is employed, the Blue Ribbon Commission would be the most qualified to carry it out.

Strengths of using fact resolution process: It would give greater emphasis to the role of facts and hard information in the process, encourage interested parties to be more substantive and less vitriolic, and could further de-

politicize the summit process and outcome. The report and recommendations would likely set the parameters for legislative and administrative action, making it more likely that action would occur. The blessing of experts also would provide political cover to those who need it. Finally, it would demonstrate that the White House is not only interested in action, but is committed to finding the right course.

Weaknesses: It would slow down the process -- a report could take several months to prepare. It will subject the process to criticism from those who want it politicized -- e.g., "the last thing we need is more studies." It may require some relinquishing of control: you can choose the people but you may not completely control what they say or write. It may be portrayed as too academic and not sufficiently inclusive.

3. Decision-Making

There are several options for making final decisions in the summit.

- a) Report to the President: If the interim step discussed above is used, the report and recommendations may suffice as a report to the President. The President can then transmit them to Congress as is or with legislation developed by the Administration that executes the Commission's recommendations. The President could even wait until he sees the report before deciding whether to submit legislation.

Strengths: The process gives the Administration significant influence over the direction of the summit while also giving it some flexibility to modify the report if needed. The product is likely to be sound from a scientific and economic viewpoint and should stand up to technical and media scrutiny. Regardless of whether legislation is ever signed into law, the Administration will have a product to point to.

Weaknesses: The product won't necessarily be viable politically without the involvement of elected officials in the decision stages. It may not look like a summit if the final step is a report to the President, even with follow-up legislation.

- b) Roman Circus: Whether the summit has a fact resolution process or not (but more likely if not), a representative group may be assembled to make the final decisions. The group would be led by a chairperson appointed by the

President, and would include representatives of each of the interested parties -- Northwest delegation, leaders of key committees, labor, industry, environmentalists, community leaders, etc. The group would essentially be locked in a room and not allowed out until they have a consensus on some package.

Strengths: If a consensus were reached it would likely be implemented since every party to the dispute would have agreed to the solution.

Weaknesses: It somewhat resembles the old Hatfield (Section 318) summit, which failed to come up with a workable solution, further polarized the issue by sowing seeds of mistrust among affected interests, and tromped all over environmental laws and judicial review. It would be extremely difficult to come to some consensus. It would likely lead to political solutions, not necessarily outcomes that can be justified by science or economics.

Even if the participants reached a consensus, there would be many interested parties left out (e.g. not all environmentalists would be there, nor presumably all affected elected officials) who would likely be dissatisfied with (and oppose) the product. And even if there were a consensus, there's little likelihood that it would really be a solution. In fact, there would be fights over some other species down the road because this model tends to produce a least common denominator. It also does not give the Clinton Administration (or the Northwest delegation) the kind of control over the outcome that they'd like to have.

- c) Roman Circus II: This is similar to the Roman Circus model except that the only participants are Northwest delegation members, some Clinton Administration officials, the Governors, and perhaps Chairs of key Congressional Committees. This is the process Rep. Dicks has advocated.

Strengths: It may be easier to reach consensus with this model rather than the approach above. Any agreement would be likely to pass since all of the key legislative and executive branch players would be there and they could overcome the opposition of any and all interest groups.

Weaknesses: This approach would likely magnify all of the weaknesses cited under the Roman Circus option. It is the most political of all decision-making models and the least likely to decide on the basis of facts and science. It could leave key constituencies feeling hostile and left out. Limiting the decision-making to public officials probably has the greatest potential to

maximize the influence of the Northwest delegation (the reason why Rep. Dicks supports it). This has certainly been the case within the Congress. Along these lines, it could significantly weaken the White House's control over the process and result. It would also effectively undercut the Clinton campaign promise to break from the mistakes of the past and would increase the chances of getting something resembling Section 318 (timber targets, minimal old growth protection, and sufficiency language).

- d) Cabinet Level Team: The White House could establish a cabinet level team, similar to the God Squad. In this model, Clinton would be making the Secretaries of Interior, Agriculture, and Labor; Administrators of NOAA and EPA; Chair of CEQ and Chair of his new Economic Security Council his official summitteers and direct them to prepare final report recommendations and legislation. If ensuring representation for the Northwest states is critical, it also is possible to appoint the governors of Washington, Oregon, and California to this team. This model would work well if coupled with the Blue Ribbon Commission, giving the White House one level of insulation between the experts' report and the Administration's own position. Vice-President elect Gore would be an obvious candidate to chair the special cabinet team.

Strengths: It sends a signal that this is a high-level priority for the Administration. If this model is coupled with an information-gathering approach and consultation along the way, it maximizes both inclusiveness and Administration control of process and result. It expressly avoids having (some of) the opposing interests in the same room bitterly arguing over a least common denominator package. It also avoids giving this process over to the Northwest delegation.

Weaknesses: The proposals of the cabinet level team (with or without the President's imprimatur) still will have to get through Congress. That will require the Speaker's and NW delegation's support (or commitment not to oppose), which might be more difficult if they're not involved. Similarly, some key Committee Chairs may not be sanguine about rubber stamping the package that Clinton's Cabinet Team comes up with. Some of these potential pitfalls could be addressed by making sure that Congressional players are consulted/briefed early and often by the Task Force(s)/Cabinet Team (and, of course, including some of their recommendations in the package).

III PRODUCT/OUTCOME

The summit process could produce a useful product (expert report and recommendations) before the issue ever gets to the White House. Nevertheless, as Clinton has promised a "legislative solution," the final outcome of the process must be a legislative package, a combination of legislative and administrative actions, or at a minimum, a specific statement of principles and position and a Clinton pledge to work with Congress. (The expert report actually could fulfill this last option.) The choice essentially comes down to whether the summit proposes specific government actions or merely states its own consensus or majority position. That choice should be made before the start of the summit process so that expectations are consistent with the planned outcome of the summit.

a) Proposing Legislative and/or Administrative Action:

Strengths: Clearly fulfills Clinton campaign promise. More likely than a statement of position to leverage a bill through the Congress. A detailed proposal, compared with principles and positions, also minimizes the opportunities for Northwesterners to do mischief by developing their own interpretation of what was intended. Also, if it is based on sound science and economics, it may lead to strongest/greenest bill.

Weaknesses: It is more difficult to get agreement on specifics than on a broader set of principles. If legislation doesn't pass, it may look as if Clinton failed. It gives opponents a bigger and more specific target to shoot at. It may engender some ill will if Congress feels its legislative prerogative is being usurped (unlikely unless Congress feels it was shut out of the process entirely).

b) Proposing principles and a statement of position:

Strengths: It is easier to reach agreement. The Administration has less on the line if the Congress fails to produce. It gives Congress more flexibility and responsibility.

Weaknesses: Based on Congress' track record, the issue is likely to die on the last day of the summit if this model is used -- i.e., Congress can't succeed without a stronger push. If it fails, Clinton may look as if he failed to keep

his promise. The product also may look small against campaign promise of a legislative solution.

IV LEADERSHIP

- a) Number of leaders: There could be a number of leaders involved in the summit process depending, in part, on the number of stages involved. For instance, under a three step process (information gathering, expert report and recommendations and cabinet level determination of a final solution), you could have a Chair of the Blue Ribbon Commission or Task Force (for both information gathering and the expert report/recommendations) and a separate Chair for the Cabinet level panel. Such a model would give the Administration some flexibility while also ensuring a fair degree of control over the process and outcome. If you don't use a fact resolution process and simply gather information and decide, you could use just one Chair for the entire process. Since the number of Chairs/Leaders seems to be largely a function of the structure of the summit, we do not discuss the strengths and weaknesses of each option here.
- b) Using Subcommittee Chairs or Team Leaders: A second issue is whether you appoint subcommittee chairs or team leaders to handle specific subject areas for the summit. For example, if you use a fact resolution process you may want to appoint team leaders for the economic and scientific issues. Choosing well known individuals for these prominent roles in the summit would be another way of stressing the substantive nature of the summit. Even if you don't use the fact resolution process, you could still name team leaders to synthesize the data from the information gathering phase but this role would not be as elevated as the former duty.

Strengths of Team Leaders: This model gives the summit a more substantive flavor and helps to limit the posturing of interested parties. It gives the Chairperson two companions to help manage the workload and speak for the summit leadership.

Weaknesses: Depending on the choices of people, the Administration could sacrifice a little control. It may make the summit look academic, removed from the Northwest and/or not inclusive.

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- c) NW or National Leaders: Where the Chair(s) is from will be a contentious issue for many of the interested parties. There are two options: a Chair from the Northwest; or a National Chair.

Northwest -- Strengths: This model may play well with the Northwest delegation if someone like former Rep. Les AuCoin is chosen. Someone like Gov. Roberts could be a good choice but the last time she stuck her neck out the timber industry tried to recall her. This choice could play well with some of the press, although the *Seattle P-I* has already editorialized calling for Gore to chair the summit. It clearly sends a signal that the Administration is sensitive to the problems of the Northwest.

Weaknesses: If there was any leadership in the Northwest capable of forging an agreement on this issue it would have happened long before now. The congressional delegation is a major part of the problem. There is no consensus among them. Anyone from the delegation chosen to Chair the summit is more likely to use it to posture at home than they are to solve the problem. It would also seem to emphasize politics over substance.

National Chair -- Strengths: A national chair would have more freedom to consider objective information and would be less likely to be consumed by regional politics. This model would position the issue as nationally significant even though it is regional in geographic focus (similar to Alaska, for example). It would provide cover to the elected officials from the Northwest, allowing them to be advocates instead of having to be responsible leaders. Vice-President elect Gore is the obvious choice to lead the summit and chair the Cabinet level decision-making if that option is selected. Suggestions to lead a Blue-Ribbon Commission include current EPA Director Bill Reilly, former President Jimmy Carter (he fishes in the Northwest almost every summer), Paul Tsongas if he is sufficiently healthy (Tsongas was one of the Alaska Lands bill leaders).

Weaknesses: It may look as if outsiders are trying to force a solution on the Northwest or cause problems with the Speaker or others in the delegation.

V PARTICIPANTS

Participation will be a function of the structure. In the first stage of information gathering, we assume that more is better. Whatever the mechanism, every conceivable interested party should be encouraged to participate and make their views known. The principle participants should include elected officials from the Northwest, leaders of key Congressional Committees, labor, industry and environmentalists, the fishing industry, rural community leaders, Native Americans, and such other groups which have demonstrated interest in this issue -- religious organizations, women's health groups, doctors, and lawyers.

Participation in later stages of the summit should be considered in two ways: who needs to be in the room; and who needs to be consulted. At the very least, the Clinton Administration, Northwest elected officials, key Congressional Committees, and labor, industry and environmentalists should be consulted throughout the process. Who's in the room will vary somewhat with the structure. A model like Roman Circus that is supposed to represent the parties to the dispute would need to include at least the six constituencies just identified. Roman Circus II would exclude labor, industry and environmentalists from this group. A Blue Ribbon Commission would probably exclude all but the Clinton Administration from the room, creating a greater responsibility to consult the remaining parties on an ongoing basis. And, the Cabinet Level decision body would similarly exclude everyone but the Clinton Administration.

The strengths and weaknesses of who is included are covered under the discussion of the subparts of the structure.

VI VENUE

Like everything else, it depends on the structure. Some aspect of the information gathering, whether hearings, public meetings or more private meetings should occur in the Northwest. The summit should give those with the greatest passions an opportunity to have input. Otherwise, they are likely to criticize the process and participants endlessly.

The key question is where the actual decision-making occurs. The options are the Northwest, probably Portland or Seattle so that it is conveniently accessible; or, Washington, D.C.

a) Northwest:

Strengths: This selection may appear to show greater sensitivity to the region. It is likely to maximize regional press coverage, and it adds political pressure to get something done.

Weaknesses: It is likely to be inconvenient for many participants including the delegation unless decisions are made while Congress is out of session. It tends to make the summit even more political than it already is. It reinforces, if not strengthens, the regional nature of the issue and the role of regional politicians. It will likely make the summit a major media spectacle.

b) Washington, D.C.:

Strengths: This venue is more convenient for the majority of participants. It reinforces the national nature of summit. It reduces somewhat the media show. It gives participants a little more freedom to deal with substantive issues outside of the regional political pressures.

Weaknesses: This choice probably lessens political pressures to get something done. It could contribute to perception that Northwest is not included.

VII TIMING

The first stage involves decisions about scope and structure/process and could culminate with a Clinton Administration announcement covering the timetable and process. It should be possible to make decisions on these issues and make an initial statement from the transition even before the new Administration takes office. Assume January 20 as the outside date.

The information gathering stage could be completed in one to two months, allowing time for notice, scheduling of meetings, preparation of papers and/or testimony. Figure March 20 as the outside date to gather all of the information. Then allow 1 month more if the product is just a compendium of input. Allow at least 3-4 months if a Blue Ribbon Commission is asked to prepare an expert report and recommendation. That creates a window ranging from April 20 to July 20, before the final stage of the process would commence. The final decisions could be made in a month, making it May 20 at the earliest, or August 20 at the latest, before the summit process is completed.