

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

1931

March 29, 1993

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: *Eileen* EILEEN CLAUSSEN

SUBJECT: Pacific Salmon Treaty Negotiations with Canada

Although I do not think that this subject, the U.S. - Canada Pacific Salmon Treaty, should reach the President, I do know that Canadian concerns have already reached the Prime Minister, and that an information memorandum was sent to the Secretary of State. In light of this, I thought it might be useful for you to understand the issue and where I believe we are headed.

Background

Salmon that originate in U.S. rivers are often caught (intercepted) in Canadian fisheries and vice versa. While the U.S. and Canada have often argued about the balance of these interceptions, the U.S. - Canada Pacific Salmon Treaty was concluded in 1985 to establish management and allocation schemes from Southeast Alaska to Oregon. Most of the regimes established by the Treaty have now expired, and are being renegotiated within the Commission created by the Treaty. However, the U.S. side of the Commission operates by consensus, and there is a wide range of opinion between U.S. northern interests (Alaska) and U.S. southern interests (Washington, Oregon, Idaho and the Treaty Tribes). The result has been a process that has essentially stalemated, and a request from the Congressional delegations of Oregon and Washington to initiate government to government discussions to break the deadlock. Ambassador Fortier from Canada briefed Katie McGinty and I Friday morning, expressing his concerns about the Treaty and what will ensue if no agreement is reached. He also favors intervention on a government to government basis.

Discussion

We agree with Canada that the Salmon Treaty is important, and that we need an agreement for 1993. It is also important that we establish an improved and equitable management scheme with the Canadians, as well as a habitat enhancement protocol to help us with our Endangered Species Act problems with west coast salmon.

A possible compromise with the Canadians would be a roll over of existing regimes for 1993, coupled with a government to government exploration of an equitable management scheme and a habitat protocol. The only additional short term requirement would be for the Canadians to give us some relief from their west coast coho salmon fishery, an economic necessity for some

Washington State fisheries. This can probably be negotiated, and Katie and I have discussed this with our Ambassador, David Colson, who will proceed with this agenda in mind.

In the longer term, it appears that reaching agreement on a management scheme with Canada will require us to negotiate among the different U.S. interests on this issue, and to make some decisions this fall that affect the economic interests of Idaho, Oregon, Washington, Alaska and the tribes.

cc: Katie McGinty
Barry Lowenkron

- Process

- We agree with Canada that the Salmon Treaty is important and that we need an agreement for 1993. We also need to get agreement on where we are going over the long-term.

- Substance

- On fishing regimes, we can probably live with a roll-over of the status quo for one year (the Tribes are the uncertain factor) if Canada gives us some relief in their West coast coho fishery (a must for Washington State). We need a Canadian coho catch of 1.4 million instead of 1.8.
- What Canada gets for this is a promise to begin serious negotiations on an "equity process" -- a process to ensure that salmon interceptions remain in balance in some agreed way.
- I have told Fortier that I am seeking authority to proceed with "equity" negotiations government to government outside the PSC framework if the Commission can not get its act together. This is a big deal for Canada and our concession to get into a negotiation is worth something.
- We also want Canada to agree with us on a general habitat and enhancement protocol to the Treaty. The implementing legislation for such a protocol would give us the opportunity to develop a region wide salmon plan that could help with west coast salmon ESA problems. (A habitat protocol would give us a handle with Canada on such issues as Windy Craggy).
- The ESA problem with Snake River Fall chinook is manageable for 1993 if the PSC does not agree on a chinook package; the Canadians will restrain their fishery that impacts this stock for their own reasons; we will use ESA regs to manage our fishery.

It would help me if you:

- Suggest that west coast fish managers get together immediately (like the next day) to begin planning to manage responsibly for 1993;
- stress the importance of Canada providing us with some relief on west coast Vancouver Island coho and mention the need for a 1.4 million catch ceiling;
- indicate you support a government to government exploration of the equity issue if the PSC can not get its act together;
- indicate strong interest in a habitat protocol; perhaps one to be negotiated within the next few months.

*relief on
coho + status
quo*

*Apr. 9
State take
plan to
commence*

Congress of the United States
Washington, DC 20515

March 24, 1993

Secretary Warren Christopher
Department of State
2201 C Street NW
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Mr. Secretary:

We have been following closely the Pacific Salmon Treaty (PST) negotiations with Canada. We already have expressed to you the importance of these negotiations toward positive actions to restore the health of Northwest salmon stocks and avoid future listings under the Endangered Species Act (ESA) while maintaining viable Indian and non-Indian fisheries on Fraser River stocks.

We are concerned about a lack of progress. Nothing has been done within the Pacific Salmon Commission to address the 1993 conservation concerns for chinook stocks listed under the ESA or for coho stocks returning to Northwest streams.

While we would have preferred action within the Commission, we do not share the conclusion that the lack of progress is the inevitable outcome of the voting requirements of the U.S. Section to the Commission. We believe you and U.S. Commissioner Ambassador David Colson have been provided ample authority to address conservation concerns and U.S. Treaty obligations.

While we are convinced that a bilateral agreement through the Commission is in the best interest of both countries, it is imperative that the United States provide the required leadership that results in an acceptable agreement with Canada. Moreover, we believe that the structure of the Commission and the U.S. Section were never intended to allow the frustration of international commitments by the U.S. or serious domestic conservation efforts.

We urge you to use your authorities, including government-to-government action if necessary, to break any impasse so that an acceptable 1993 regime on stocks returning to the Northwest is in place prior to completion on April 9, 1993, of our domestic management process.

We understand that the U.S. Section is discussing a promising long-term and comprehensive approach to salmon management under the Treaty. Such an approach would include commitments to improve the productivity of natural stocks thereby addressing future ESA concerns, development of harvest regimes that respond to changes in abundance of stocks, and needed changes in the process of decision-making with the Commission. We are prepared to consider favorably reasonable proposals requiring Congressional action to put into place a long-term, comprehensive regime. However, we will be very disturbed if the opportunity to address 1993 concerns is lost due to inaction of the Commission or the United States.

Sincerely,

Orig Wash.
del. etc

on
habitat
protection
protocol.
Alaska
on this, too.
Alaska
about going
outside the

Fatty Munn
John Dicks
Marin Cantwell
Jim McDermott

Thomas S. Foley
Mike Kreidler
11 1 11 11

process

Considers wld have difficulty w/ habitat potential
'Cause of BC/fed.

↑ production in Wash & Or. Can't come
from agriculture - monoculture...
↑ pressure.

December 3, 1992

PLENARY STATEMENT REGARDING THE CANADIAN POSITION

1. The intent of this paper is to explain the basic philosophy underlying Canada's approach to the Pacific Salmon Treaty and to summarize Canadian proposals for renegotiation of expiring provisions of Annex IV of the Pacific Salmon Treaty. This past year has been a difficult one, in large part as a consequence of the dispute over the Fraser River, which has diverted us from our main course of creating a dependable and workable system for improving salmon fisheries on a coast-wide basis. I believe we must quickly solve the short-term problems so that we can resume our quest for creation, in the long term, of a positive environment for restoration and expansion of our valuable salmon resources.
2. The Treaty is based on two principles. The first is aimed at conservation and management of shared stocks. The second provides for each Party to derive benefits from Pacific salmon stocks equivalent to their production. 1
3. The commitment of both countries to the first principle, conservation, is well exemplified by our joint efforts in the chinook rebuilding program, which, though not perfect, have provided a vastly improved framework for both of us to restore badly depleted stocks. Canada remains strongly committed to such joint efforts.
4. Cooperation is a two-way street and our joint efforts must result in a fair distribution of benefits - that is what the "Equity" principle is all about. The Treaty simply won't work if one side or the other considers the results of Treaty implementation to be unfair.
5. It is Canada's fundamental belief that both principles of the Treaty are made more achievable if each side works toward depending on their own resources rather than on salmon bound for rivers in the other country. Over the years, this position, which we believe is shared by the United States, has been the centrepiece of Canadian international policy regarding fisheries on both coasts. Moreover, it is an obligation of the Parties under the Treaty to reduce interceptions.
6. This position is firmly based in customary international law. The 1982 Law of the Sea Convention makes it clear that the state of origin should be the principal recipient of benefits accruing from use of their own salmon, providing that such States "... shall have the primary interest and responsibility for [stocks originating in their rivers]". The Convention also provided for a de facto ban on development of new fisheries for salmon on the high seas.
7. This "ownership" concept has received its most emphatic and specific expression in the present Pacific Salmon Treaty which provides for "... each Party to receive benefits equivalent to the production of salmon originating in its waters". The Treaty recognized that it was not practical for the two Parties to completely eliminate all interceptions, but that for those unavoidable interceptions, there should be a balance of interceptions to both sides.

8. Based on the fundamental principles of the Treaty, supported by emerging international law, the Canadian position favours efforts to reduce the extent of interception by both Parties, provided it is done in a manner that is consistent with the equity principle.

9. In Canada's view reducing interceptions has many advantages:

- fishermen of the producing country directly receive the benefits of production from their own rivers, encouraging sound management;
- attention is focused on the need to protect the aquatic environment. Thus a premium is provided for maintaining habitat in fit condition for salmon production; and,
- domestic harvest allocation is facilitated when the needs of the other Party do not have to be taken into account. Reducing interceptions provides flexibility for both sides in developing improved allocation schemes, particularly with respect to new sharing arrangements with native Indian communities which by tradition and practice harvest salmon near the streams of origin.

10. Canada believes that the United States, as a signatory to the PSC Treaty, fundamentally shares Canada's approach. In this regard, we note that:

- With Canada, the United States spearheaded the negotiation of the "ownership" Article dealing with anadromous species in the Law of the Sea Convention;
- elimination of interception of salmon is the centrepiece of United States and Canadian initiatives within the North Atlantic Salmon Conservation Organization;
- the United States has strong reasons to allow greater escapements inshore and up the rivers to meet the needs of native Indian communities; and,
- the United States considers the management of chinook and coho salmon bound for United States rivers to be rendered much more difficult because of the impact of intercepting Canadian fisheries. The U.S. sees a reduction in this intercepting fishery as a significant way of improving the well being of U.S. stocks.

11. Accordingly, it should be absolutely clear that Canada's position in the forthcoming negotiations will strongly oppose increases in interceptions and will not accept proposals that do not move towards providing each Party with *"benefits equivalent to [each country's salmon] production"*.

12. It is our understanding that the United States wants to harvest significantly increased numbers of Fraser sockeye, will be pressing for alternative arrangements for chinook and coho which would have the effect of reducing harvests by Canadian fishermen, and is opposed to making any adjustments to fisheries regimes in S.E. Alaska to address Canadian concerns for northern fisheries. At the same time, in Canada, we are undertaking a difficult transition to address our obligations to Aboriginal people. This imposes new requirements for allocation and harvest of Canadian fish stocks. In this context, Canada intends to advance the following positions:

NORTHERN BOUNDARY

13. Renegotiation of the northern boundary provisions is not due until 1993-94. However, we believe that the present situation of the northern boundary fisheries is clearly inconsistent with the Treaty, and that the northern boundary chapter should be reopened in order to permit actions to be taken during the 1993 season.

14. Canada is extremely concerned by the escalation of interceptions by Alaskan fisheries harvesting salmon bound for Canadian rivers. Specifically, we are concerned about:

- United States interceptions of sockeye from the Nass and Skeena Rivers are at record levels;
- the increased emphasis on the winter troll fishery has resulted in increased interceptions of Canadian origin stocks;
- the shortened summer troll fishery for chinook has shifted the troll effort on to coho salmon, increased the interceptions of northern British Columbia stocks and has greatly increased incidental mortalities of chinook;
- increased interception of steelhead, early coho and northern chum stocks have contributed to conservation problems in the area; and,
- the full accounting for U.S. interceptions of Fraser River sockeye wherever caught.

Increased interceptions in Alaska have required Canada to place restrictive constraints on important Canadian fisheries, particularly in years of low stock abundance.

15. Canada believes that Alaska can better control its interceptions of Canadian sockeye salmon while at the same time fully harvesting its own abundant pink stocks. In this regard, Canada is seeking alterations to the early season District 104 annex arrangement to include one additional week (week 31). Canada also proposes implementation of a "clockwork" management approach which would establish management rules that would restrict the duration of District 104 fisheries based on the ratio of sockeye to total salmon catch.

16. The United States has expressed concern about the catch of pink salmon in Canada's Area 3 fishery. In this regard, we would point out that there have been very large parallel increases in production on both sides of the boundary with consequent increases in harvest. These have resulted in an escalation of Alaskan interceptions of Canadian pinks. In our judgement, these have exceeded Canadian interceptions of Alaskan pinks in Area 3 and elsewhere. As a part of the overall negotiation, Canada is proposing to discuss the Area 3 annex arrangements in order to address concerns of both the U.S. and Canada. Discussions must include the adjacent Area 101 (Tree Point) fishery, as it is Canada's position that the arrangements in U.S. Area 101 and Canadian Area 3 are linked.

17. Canada has been disappointed in the past with an apparent unwillingness on the part of the U.S. to consider changes in its fisheries management plans in Alaska to respond to Canadian concerns. At last year's plenary session, we expressed views on the significance of the "undue

disruption" qualifying clause in Article III (para. 3b), pointing out that the qualifying clause exhorting the Parties to reduce interceptions (Article III, para. 3a) had every bit as much force as the "undue disruption" clause. We also pointed out that the United States has from time to time made major changes in the structure of its fisheries for domestic purposes. We remain strongly of the view that the implementation of the principles of the Treaty regarding conservation and equitable sharing must not be frustrated by unwillingness to implement changes to fisheries as required. If the U.S. is prepared to make allocative changes in its southeast Alaska fisheries between gears and areas, Canada would be prepared to consider ways of augmenting production to particular Alaskan fisheries in order to help resolve some important management problems, in return for limitation of Alaskan intercepting fisheries.

18. Canada has increasing conservation concerns about the condition of steelhead stocks in northern British Columbia. In this regard, in cooperation with industry, we have launched a program requiring Canadian fishermen to release steelhead caught incidentally in important northern British Columbia commercial fisheries. We are encouraged that this season these measures have contributed to a significant increase in steelhead escapements. To follow up on this program, we will seek your cooperation in developing a process to initially document and then reduce steelhead interceptions.

TRANSBOUNDARY RIVERS

19. With regards to the Transboundary Rivers, Canada believes that current catch sharing arrangements do not provide Canada with a reasonable share of Canadian production. Canada attaches particular importance to improved economic opportunities for aboriginal peoples and other fishermen on the Taku, Stikine and Alsek Rivers.

20. To effect such improvements Canada proposes adjustments to the management regimes on the Stikine and Taku Rivers that would allow higher catches of coho, directed fisheries for chinook when there are demonstrable surpluses, and on the Taku River greater sockeye harvest shares. In addition, Canada wishes to settle the outstanding issue of deeming.

CHINOOK AND COHO SALMON

21. Improved chinook conservation is a principal goal of the Pacific Salmon Treaty. The rebuilding program that was agreed to in 1984 has been successful for some stocks, but not for others. Our technical experts are concerned that at current rates of recovery some stock groups will not rebuild by 1998. Under these circumstances, Canada can see no basis for considering any increases to the chinook ceilings that are identified in the annex. Indeed, the U.S. needs to take measures in their S.E. Alaska all-gear chinook fishery to reduce its harvest rate on chinook.

22. The United States is calling on Canada to develop limitations more stringent than are already imposed by the Treaty in the chinook and coho fisheries on the west coast of Vancouver

Island. These fisheries are of great importance to the people of the west coast of Vancouver Island and are fundamental to Canada as a counterbalance to U.S. interception fisheries.

23. Canada understands the United States desire to implement alternative approaches for chinook coastwide and coho on the west coast of Vancouver Island. We are prepared to consider United States requests for changes in Canadian fisheries, even though in the case of chinook Canada has effectively lowered harvest rates to target levels. As we have stated repeatedly in the past, however, we cannot be expected to reduce our catches without offsetting compensation. Any United States proposals must contain not only a mechanism for the United States to compensate Canadian fishermen for further sacrifices but also a parallel U.S. actions to expedite stock rebuilding.

24. I would like to expand on our concerns regarding the issue of compensation. We believe that in the near term there is little likelihood that United States stocks from Washington, Oregon and Idaho, both enhanced and wild, will rebuild. Thus an abundance driven approach for managing west coast fisheries is unlikely to provide tangible benefits to Canada in the foreseeable future. If survivals continue to decline, disruption of Canadian fisheries will worsen, and the balance of benefits accruing to the two countries from intercepting fisheries will tilt overwhelmingly to the United States side. This is the reason why Canada insists that any changes to current arrangements for the west coast of Vancouver Island fisheries must be directly tied to compensatory reductions in interceptions by United States fisheries.

25. Although we are sympathetic to United States concerns about chinook and coho stocks of the northwest States, we must point out that the present conservation problems are not of Canada's making and the implication that Canada is the cause of the declines is without factual basis. Nonetheless, Canada is prepared to assist the United States in addressing their stock conservation problems subject to our stipulation about compensation.

26. Canada also has great concern for the high interception of northern B.C. coho salmon stocks in South East Alaska, especially in light of conservation problems in recent years by upper Skeena coho. Canada proposes that both countries endorse the recommendations of the Coho Technical Committee with respect to additional technical work to be done to develop new management approaches.

CHUM SALMON

27. Canada believes that the current arrangements for southern chum stocks are working reasonably well. While we have some specific concerns regarding current management regime on Fraser River chum salmon stocks, Canada will propose to extend existing arrangements at this session. We are prepared to explore alternative management arrangements within the Joint Objectives and Goals process.

FRASER SOCKEYE AND PINK SALMON

28. Canada believes that the present arrangements on Fraser sockeye and pink salmon are more than generous for the U.S. In the eight years since the Treaty was signed United States fishermen have intercepted over 15 million Fraser sockeye, one of the highest eight year totals for the United States since 1913. These interceptions reflect the favourable terms of the Treaty with respect to the United States interest in Fraser stocks. Such terms are less limiting than those that have been applied by the Treaty to west coast of Vancouver Island fisheries. First, Canada agreed that the U.S. would share proportionately in Fraser production from 1985 to 1988 in recognition of past United States involvement in the International Pacific Salmon Fisheries Commission (IPSFC). Second, Canada provided higher escapements in the first four years of the Treaty. As a consequence, the United States had greater assurance of achieving (and in fact exceeding) its 1989-92 cap of 7 million sockeye.
29. We are aware that there are sectors in Washington State who are demanding increases in the level of United States harvest of Fraser sockeye and pink salmon. We would remind those demanding more that the present increases in production are due to Canadian management efforts over the past eight years, to Canadian investment to maintain the environment in fit condition for the production of salmon, to Canadian willingness to forego the use of the watershed for other purposes, and to sacrifices by Canadian fishermen who have foregone catch to increase escapement.
30. To make matters worse, the poor returns of United States chinook stocks have resulted in Canada failing to reap comparable rewards from its intercepting west coast of Vancouver Island fishery. The calls from certain elements within the United States fishing community for increased shares of Fraser fish are totally unjustified and it is Canada's position that the U.S. catch should be reduced.
31. Furthermore, Canada intends to obtain compensation in 1993 for the 1992 U.S. overage of 337,000 in excess of the negotiated ceiling. Canada reminds the U.S. that the specified limits for harvest by United States fishermen of Fraser sockeye include all sockeye caught by the United States, regardless of area of capture. All United States catches of Fraser bound sockeye must be taken into account.
32. It is Canada's view that new catch sharing arrangements for Fraser sockeye and pink salmon must have harvest rates that are more closely integrated. The U.S. catch objective for Fraser pink salmon stocks should be consistent with the U.S. Fraser sockeye catch objective so that management plans can be developed that are feasible for both species. In light of these concerns, Canada is considering options that would reprofile the U.S. catch of sockeye stocks to meet the U.S. pink catch objective.
33. This returns us to the "Equity" principle. Canada realizes that the Commission has not yet reached conclusions regarding the extent of benefits being provided under the terms of Article 3 para. 1b. On the basis of our technical analyses, we are convinced that, under present

Treaty arrangements, the United States is currently receiving benefits exceeding those equivalent to its own production. Accordingly, a further shift in the balance of benefits in the United States' favour is unacceptable to Canada. This is why we are concerned about the escalation of Alaskan interceptions of both Fraser sockeye and of sockeye bound for other Canadian rivers, and why we are only willing to entertain measures for changes in the management of fisheries on United States-bound chinook if their are balancing changes to U.S. interceptions. Reductions in United States sockeye interceptions on both the north and south boundaries will be required.

CONCLUSION

34. I have outlined Canada's position in the forthcoming negotiations with some frankness. Canada recognizes that United States difficulties with the protection and management of its southern chinook and coho resources have caused internal problems. We stand ready to do what we can to help you grapple with these problems, problems which, as I said earlier, were not of Canada's making. While expressing willingness to cooperate, it seems to us that solutions will be slow in coming. Under such circumstances, it is obvious that to ask Canadian fishermen to make adjustments, we will have to have means for compensating them. The United States should be prepared to make internal adjustments and trades, in order that Canada can be provided with fair compensation through specific and limited reductions in United States interceptions.

35. Although we realize the present stage of Treaty implementation create difficulties for both sides we are convinced that, in both the long and the short term, both Parties are far better off with a Treaty than without one. The impact of failure of the Treaty: competitive overfishing such as that occurring in pre-treaty days prior to 1985, would surely be unacceptable to us both.

36. Keeping the Treaty alive and progressive to ensure our joint aspirations are met will be hard work but with pragmatism, willingness to consider each other's problems and compromise we are sure progress will be possible. We invite you to join us in stepping back from present controversies, to review the problems both of us have and, together to attempt to formulate options for practical solutions.



United States Department of State

Washington, D. C. 20520

FEB 12 1993

OES
DFA
log

INFORMATION MEMORANDUM
S/S

UNCLASSIFIED

RW

4302673

93 FEB-12 9:12 AM

TO: The Secretary
FROM: OES - Curtis Bohlen
SUBJECT: U.S. - Canada Pacific Salmon Treaty

KEY POINTS

- o Interested groups in the Pacific Northwest are calling upon their congressional delegations to urge the Department to adopt their particular perspective of fairness regarding salmon allocation issues now under negotiation.
- o However, these matters are not decisions for the Department of State or other federal agencies, but rather for the U.S. Section of the Pacific Salmon Commission.
 - The U.S. Section consists of representatives of the states of Alaska, Oregon, Washington, the Treaty Indian tribes and the Federal Government. The Federal representative has no vote and plays a conciliatory role among the various U.S. interests.

SUMMARY

- o Salmon which originate in U.S. rivers are often caught ("intercepted") in Canadian fisheries before returning to U.S. waters, and vice versa.
- o The U.S. and Canada have argued for many years about the balance of these interceptions.
- o The U.S. - Canada Pacific Salmon Treaty was concluded in 1985 to reconcile and balance interceptions by establishing agreed management and allocation regimes from Southeast Alaska to Oregon.

- o Most fishing regimes established by the Treaty in 1985 have expired and are being renegotiated within the Commission created by the Treaty.
- o There is a wide range of differences between U.S. Northern (Alaska) and U.S. Southern (Washington, Oregon, Idaho and the Treaty Tribes) interests.
- o Under U.S. law, decisions within the U.S. Section of the Commission are reached by consensus; the Federal Government does not have a vote.
- o U.S. differences with Canada are no less than those that exist within the U.S. Section.

DISCUSSION

The Pacific Salmon Treaty between the United States and Canada entered into force in 1985 after 14 years of negotiation. The Treaty established bilateral cooperation in management, research and enhancement of salmon stocks that originate in one country but pass through the fisheries of the other. The Pacific Salmon Commission is the decision-making body for matters covered by the Treaty.

The Commission's deliberations for 1993 are particularly contentious because: 1) almost all the rules established in the Treaty expired at the end of 1992 and are open for negotiation; and 2) Snake River fall chinook salmon have been listed as a "threatened" species under the Endangered Species Act.

It is the latter fact which is drawing inordinate political attention to the Commission. The stock is caught coast-wide, particularly in Canadian fisheries off the West Coast of Vancouver Island. U.S. interests (fishermen, power companies, and forest and agricultural industries) want Canada to make substantial reductions in its fisheries so that U.S. interests need not do as much to protect the threatened stock. Canada has said it would help but it wants something in return, and there is the rub.

Canada firmly believes that the equity balance strongly favors the U.S., and is not prepared to do more for the U.S. unless we make moves in its direction. We contest Canada's views, but they are a reality in our negotiations.

At present, no U.S. interest is prepared to pay the price for Canada's apparent willingness to reduce the take from its fisheries. The issue may not be resolved through the spring, putting at risk the management regimes governing salmon harvests along the Pacific coasts of both nations.

Drafted:OES/OFA:JJFinnegan, Jr.
02/09/93 SEOFAA 3160 x7-2883

Cleared:OES/O:DAColson
L:AKreczko
EUR/CA:JBauman
H:CRAether
S/TT:DHarrowood (info)
C:KVolker (info)





United States Department of State

*Bureau of Oceans and International
Environmental and Scientific Affairs*

Washington, D.C. 20520

DATE 3/9/93 TIME

TELEFAX COVER SHEET

NUMBER OF PAGES TO FOLLOW: 3

TO: Mr. David Cottingham TEL.# 456-6224

OFFICE: White House Ofc. on
Environmental Policies FAX#: 456-2710

FROM: Mr. David Colson TEL.# 647-2396

OFFICE: Oceans & Fisheries Affairs FAX#: 647-0217

MESSAGE:

1. Attached is a briefing memo we sent to the Secretary on Pacific Salmon Commission (PSC) issues. FYI

2. Be mindful of the fact that there is a relationship between PSC and Windy Craggy in which the VEEP is said to be very interested. Alsek River Salmon management is covered by the PSC since it is a transboundary river. A habitat protocol could be a back-door way of getting at the Windy Craggy issue. If I have my way, I'd also try to bring Victoria's dumping of raw sewage into the Strait into the ambit of a habitat protocol. I'd like to see the White House push Canada on these issues.

3. I plan to see Fortier briefly on the 19th, and I have several conference calls with the U.S. Commissioners scheduled including today. If Katy is inclined to Fortier, it would be better done during the week of the 22nd than earlier. The issue will have ripened a bit by then. I'd like an opportunity to sit-in on a meeting or, at least, brief her. The State and tribal politics are fierce.

12:00 mtg w/ David Colson
to brief you for Fri mtg
w/ Amb. Yves Fortier.

Canadian Embassy



Ambassade du Canada

501 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001
U.S.A.

ENVIRONMENT SECTION/SECTION DE L'ENVIRONNEMENT

FACSIMILE/TELECOPIE

Date: 05 March 1993 No. _____
To/A: Mr David Cottingham From/De: David Angell
White House Office of Second Secretary
Environmental Policy
City/Ville: _____ City/Ville: Washington, D.C.
Fax No./ Fax No./
No. de télécopie: 456-2710 No. de télécopie: (202) 682-7792
Number of pages including cover/Nombre de pages avec couvert: 08

COMMENTS/COMMENTAIRES: Canada's opening statement on the PST
negotiations follows, for your reference. All good wishes.

Fourtier is pvt citizen, former UN ambassador.

3/19/93

If there is any problem with the receipt of this fax, please
call/S'il ya des problèmes à la réception de cette télécopie,
prière d'appeler le: (202) 682-1749.