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- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
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- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

SUMMIT OF THE AMERICAS

PRESS BACKGROUND INFORMATION

The White House
December 7, 1994

The following materials are provided to news organizations for background purposes only. Please note that this information is tentative and subject to change.

SUMMIT OF THE AMERICAS

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BUILDING A PARTNERSHIP FOR PROSPERITY

The Summit of the Americas will bring together 34 democratically elected leaders in the largest such meeting in the Hemisphere's history. President Clinton has convened this historic meeting to build upon opportunities created by the region's dramatic surge toward democracy and open markets.

This Summit comes at a time of remarkable hope and opportunity for the people of the Hemisphere. Since the last hemispheric summit in 1967 in Punta del Este, Uruguay, an unstoppable wave of political freedom has swept the region. Today, all nations in the Hemisphere but one are governed by elected leaders.

At the Summit, the leaders will chart a course for achieving economic growth and prosperity for all their nations. President Clinton has supported reducing trade barriers throughout the region because of the positive effects of free trade on job creation and business expansion. It is expected that the leaders will -- for the first time -- call for a Free Trade Area for the entire Hemisphere and agree on concrete steps toward that goal.

The leaders will also address shared political and social challenges. Attention will focus on building a strong community of American democracies, with effective governments and vibrant civil societies. Leaders will also discuss efforts to improve the quality of life for all peoples and preserve the hemisphere's natural resources for future generations.

SCHEDULE OF EVENTS

(Please refer to the White House Press Schedule for information on press coverage of the following events.)

Friday, December 9

Arrival Address by President Clinton. Noon. Jackie Gleason Theater for the Performing Arts.

Official Greeting of Heads of State. 6:45pm-7:30pm. Biltmore Hotel, Coral Gables.

Reception for Official Delegations. 7:45pm-8:30pm. Biltmore Hotel.

Dinner for Heads of State, hosted by President Clinton. 8:45pm. Biltmore Hotel.

Dinner for Leaders' Spouses, hosted by the First Lady. 8:45pm. Biltmore Hotel.

Saturday, December 10

Working Sessions for Heads of State and Government. 8:00am-4:00pm. Vizcaya Museum and Gardens.

The leaders will meet privately to address the economic, political, and social challenges facing the Western Hemisphere. Issues to be discussed:

- economic integration and trade liberalization
- strengthening democratic institutions
- assuring sustainable development.

Spouses' Program, hosted by the First Lady. 9:00am-2:30pm. Biltmore Hotel.

First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton has invited the spouses of all hemispheric leaders to join her in a program on the Summit initiatives as they relate to the

welfare of children. The spouses will focus on health care and education and will discuss ongoing efforts to bring about progress in these critical areas.

Summit Gala. 7:30pm-9pm. James Knight Center.

The Summit Gala -- *Concert of the Americas* -- will feature performing artists from across the hemisphere in celebration of the diverse cultures of the Americas.

Dinner for Leaders and Spouses, hosted by President Clinton. 10:00pm. Vanderbilt Mansion, Fisher Island.

Dinner for Official Delegations, hosted by Vice President Gore. 9:30pm. Brickell Key.

Sunday, December 11

Final Plenary Session. 9:30am-11:30am. James Knight Center.

The 34 delegations will conclude their work with consideration of a Declaration of Principles and Plan of Action for the future. Remarks by President Clinton and other leaders.

Presidential Statement. 12:15pm. James Knight Center.

SUMMIT OF THE AMERICAS

Growing Economic Interdependence Across the Hemisphere

The Summit of the Americas presents a momentous opportunity to advance the common goal of increased trade and prosperity within the Western Hemisphere. A year ago, President Clinton stated that the North American Free Trade Agreement "set the stage for moving to embrace all of Latin America -- 700 million people strong -- in a trading unit that will bring prosperity to them and to us." In December, the leaders gathering in Miami will launch the process for making that vision of hemispheric free trade a reality.

The Hemispheric Market

- The Western Hemisphere is projected to be the biggest market in the world: a \$13 trillion market with more than 850 million people by the year 2003.
- The Hemisphere is the second fastest growing region in the world economy behind Asia.
- The region has undertaken considerable economic reform and trade liberalization efforts, and almost all governments now support the principle of a market-oriented economy.
- The Hemisphere's economies are growing stronger. Capital has returned to the Hemisphere after the debt crisis of the 1980s. Stock market prices in the region are rising faster than those in the U.S. and Asia. From 1990 to 1992, Latin American countries (excluding Brazil) reduced their annual inflation rates from 920% to 25%; Brazil has seen a significant decline in inflation, as well.

U.S. Exports and Jobs

- The Western Hemisphere is the United States' most important export market, responsible for 60% of U.S. export growth over the past year -- almost \$18 billion of a \$32-billion export growth between 1993 and 1994 (based on figures from the first nine months of each year).
- U.S. trade to the Hemisphere represents over 38% of total U.S. exports and supports about 3 million jobs.
- If trade trends continue, the Western Hemisphere soon will become a larger customer for U.S. exports than Western Europe. The United States today

sells more to Brazil than to Russia and more to Ecuador than to Hungary and Poland combined.

- Direct U.S. investment in Latin America rose nearly 400% between 1983 and 1993, from \$24 billion to \$102 billion. U.S. companies have invested in Latin America at twice the rate they have invested in Europe in recent years.
- With greater trade liberalization and continued high growth, U.S. exports to the hemisphere could nearly double over the next decade, creating over 2.5 million high-paying jobs in the U.S.
- NAFTA has shown that reduction of trade barriers means more trade, and more trade means more jobs. Since NAFTA went into effect in January 1994, the U.S. exported 22% more to Mexico and 11% more to Canada than it did during the same nine-month period in 1993 (January-September). This increased trade activity has generated more than 130,000 high-skill, high-paying jobs for U.S. workers.


Impact on U.S. Competitiveness

- Future trade liberalization would strengthen the U.S. position as Latin America's most important trading partner. The United States already supplies 43% of the region's imports, up from 30% ten years ago. That means that of every dollar spent by Latin American consumers on imports, 43 cents is spent on U.S. products.
- Most U.S. exports to the region are high-technology goods, involving high-wage jobs. Further economic integration would solidify the comparative advantage of U.S. competitors from outside the Hemisphere.



U.S. Trade with the Western Hemisphere More Than Doubles Over Ten Years

Billions of Dollars




Not adjusted for inflation




Latin America Buys More From U.S. Than Any Other Trading Partner

U.S. Share of Imports by Latin America

1983
\$71.6 Billion



1993
\$178.9 Billion




Latin American Imports, by Partner




Importance of U.S. Market for Latin America Grows

1983
\$98.7 Billion



1993
\$153.5 Billion



Latin American Exports, by Partner

SUMMIT OF THE AMERICAS

The Sweep of Democracy

The Summit of the Americas is the first regional summit in more than a generation. This historic meeting will recognize and promote the Americas as a hemisphere of democratic societies with shared values and convergent interests capable of bold cooperative endeavors.

Historical Context

The Summit of the Americas is only the third hemispheric summit in history, following Panama (1956) and Punta del Este, Uruguay (1967). The hemisphere has changed dramatically in the 27 years since Punta del Este, and the agenda for the Miami meeting will reflect the new economic, political, and social challenges the region faces.

All 34 leaders who will participate in the Summit of the Americas are democratically elected -- their mandates deriving from ballots, not bullets. At the Panama summit (1956), eleven countries in the hemisphere were under authoritarian rule; in 1967, ten countries were non-democratic. Today, Fidel Castro is the hemisphere's last dictator. President Clinton's decision not to invite Castro to the Summit of the Americas sends a clear message that authoritarian rule violates hemispheric norms.

Miami will be the first hemispheric summit which Canada will attend. In recent years, Ottawa has assumed an increasingly important role in affairs of the region, as seen in their participation in the North American Free Trade Agreement and the Organization of American States.


Vision for the Future

At the Summit of the Americas, hemispheric leaders will adopt a consensus Declaration of Principles and Plan of Action. These documents will establish mechanisms to ensure continuous high-level attention to the Summit's objectives. The leaders will launch a process of regular dialogue among the nations and support the creation of a new "architecture" to foster increased cooperation across the hemisphere into the next century.


Democracy Sweeps the Western Hemisphere

Status of Democracy at Time of Hemispheric Meetings


1994 Summit of the Americas in Miami, Florida



1967* Hemispheric Summit in Punta del Este, Uruguay



1956* Hemispheric Summit in Panama



* In 1967 and 1956, many of the Caribbean islands that are now independent nations were under colonial rule. These charts only include countries that were independent at the time.

SUMMIT OF THE AMERICAS

Protecting the Hemisphere's Future through Sustainable Development

The Summit of the Americas recognizes that the leaders of the Western Hemisphere share the common challenge -- and vision -- to provide for the economic and social development of the region while preserving our life-sustaining natural resources. The Summit will initiate partnerships to focus concrete, cooperative actions in the following areas:

Education -- eradicating illiteracy by improving access to primary education and eliminate illiteracy;

Health -- increasing access to basic health care, especially for children, by advancing public/private sector collaboration;

Women -- Expanding and strengthening the role of women in society;

Microenterprise -- fostering the development of small businesses to increase employment and strengthen the fabric for economic growth;

Emergency Response -- Creating national corps of volunteers to respond rapidly to emergency needs;

Energy -- promoting investments in energy efficiency, non-conventional renewables and natural gas;

Biodiversity -- expanding and using knowledge and scientific understanding from some of the world's richest biological resources through cooperative exchange; and

Pollution Prevention -- confronting challenges associated with urban industrial growth and reducing environmental health hazards;

The Hemisphere's leaders have affirmed that investing in these critical areas is necessary to ensure the vitality of our democratic societies and the continued growth of our economies. The actions agreed upon in Miami to realize the opportunities of sustainable development will require coordinated efforts by all nations.

WHY THE SUMMIT MATTERS TO THE U.S.

SUMMIT INAUGURATES NEW ERA OF COOPERATION

With the end of the Cold War, the U.S. is defining new diplomatic and economic relationships around the globe. Our nation has found strong partners close to home who share our democratic principles and our desire for open markets. The Summit of the Americas is a celebration of this convergence of interests and values. In Miami, we will forge a new Partnership for Prosperity to promote democracy and free trade throughout the region.

TRADE CREATES JOBS AND RAISES WAGES

Reduction of trade barriers leads to increased exports, which means more U.S. jobs.

- In the first nine months of 1994, after the implementation of NAFTA, the U.S. exported 22 percent more to Mexico and 11 percent more to Canada than it did during the first nine months of 1993. This growth in exports has generated more than 100,000 high-skill, high-paying jobs for U.S. workers.
- At the Summit, President Clinton will promote the bold vision of free trade across the Hemisphere. Last year, he stated that NAFTA "set the stage for moving to embrace all of Latin America -- 700 million people strong -- in a trading unit that will bring prosperity to them and to us."

The Western Hemisphere is fast becoming the world's largest single market.

- The Hemisphere is projected to be a \$13 trillion market with 850 million people by 2003.

It is already the United States' largest customer.

- U.S. exports to our neighbors (Latin America, the Caribbean, and Canada) totaled about \$180 billion in 1993, 38 percent of all U.S. sales abroad. By comparison, 1993 U.S. exports to Japan were \$48 billion.
- Latin America is the only area of the world with which we currently enjoy a substantial trade surplus -- more than \$4 billion.
- The U.S. sells more today to Brazil than to Russia and more to Ecuador than to Hungary and Poland combined.

Trade within the Hemisphere means jobs for U.S. workers.

- In 1993, U.S. exports to Latin America alone totaled \$80 billion, employing 1.3 million Americans.

MORE THAN JUST TRADING PARTNERS: SHARING A COMMITMENT TO DEMOCRACY AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

Today, the Americas share a commitment to government that represents the will of the people.

- Today, 34 out of the 35 nations of the region have democratically elected leaders. This represents a remarkable transformation. At the time of the last regional summit in Punta del Este, Uruguay in 1967, ten countries were under authoritarian rule.

Democracy across the Hemisphere means peace and stability for the United States. At the Summit, leaders will address ways to make our democracies more efficient and accountable, combat corruption and money laundering, and make it easier for citizens to form private civic associations and public advocacy groups.

In addition, the nations of the Hemisphere are committed to enhancing the quality of life of all people in the Americas and protecting the region's precious natural resources. Investment in the process of sustainable development will lay the foundation for our community of open economies and democratic governments to thrive. For the U.S., benefits include stability in the region, expanded export opportunities and job growth, and an improved environment for future generations.

COOPERATION ABROAD HELPS SOLVE PROBLEMS AT HOME

The U.S. faces a number of domestic challenges that can only be resolved through joint efforts with our partners in the Hemisphere.

- Collective action in the defense of democracy, as in Haiti, can alleviate the flow of political refugees and the burdens they place on U.S. resources.
- Stimulating economic opportunity across the Hemisphere will create more jobs in every country and limit the influx of illegal immigrants to the U.S.
- Fighting the scourge of drug abuse in this country requires continued close cooperation with our neighbors to stop the flow of narcotics into the U.S., as we work at home to reduce demand.

During their meetings in Miami, Summit leaders will address these and other issues of importance to the American people. All nations will agree to specific action plans to bring about progress in the future.

OPENING MARKETS

THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION'S RECORD ON TRADE

The Summit of the Americas caps the most successful two years in the history of U.S. trade policy. The Clinton Administration has mounted a sustained campaign to reduce barriers to trade and open foreign markets to our goods and services.

Opening World Markets – the GATT: The Administration successfully negotiated the Uruguay Round of the GATT, which passed the Congress last week. The agreement will create hundreds of thousands of new, high paying jobs in the U.S. -- jobs that pay 13% higher than non-trade related jobs. The Uruguay Round is the largest international tax cut in history (\$744 billion). When fully implemented, the agreement will add \$100-\$200 billion each year to U.S. GDP.

Opening Trade Next Door – NAFTA: One year ago, the Administration won passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), tearing down trade barriers between the U.S., Canada, and Mexico. The Clinton Administration negotiated pathbreaking side agreements protecting worker rights and the environment. In NAFTA's first nine months, exports to Mexico were up 22% over 1993, three times the growth rate of U.S. exports outside of NAFTA. This increased trade activity has generated more than 100,000 high-skill, high-paying jobs for U.S. workers.

Opening Trade with Asia – the APEC: The Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) is an organization of 17 Pacific economies. President Clinton took the lead in urging APEC leaders to achieve the goal of free and open trade in the region by 2020. Between now and the year 2000, Asia will account for one-third of the global growth of imports, the world's fastest growing region. Increasing our market share by just 1% would create over 100,000 new U.S. jobs.

Opening Japanese Markets -- A year-and-a-half of intense negotiations produced landmark agreements to open Japanese markets to U.S. products. In October, 1994, the two nations reached agreements containing quantitative indicators to measure progress, opening Japanese markets to U.S. telecommunications, medical technology and insurance firms. We also concluded an agreement in principle on flat glass.

Removing Outmoded Restrictions -- The Administration liberalized export restrictions on \$37 billion worth of computers, telecommunications equipment and other products.

Export Promotion -- The Administration's "National Export Strategy" is helping competitive U.S. firms break in to foreign markets. Despite slow economic growth

in Europe and Japan, U.S. global exports over the past year have grown to approximately \$659 billion. The Administration's goal is to increase U.S. exports to more than \$1 trillion by the year 2000.

SUMMIT OF THE AMERICAS

THE CONSULTATION PROCESS

The Summit of the Americas was first announced by Vice President Gore in Mexico City on December 1, 1993. In his statement on President Clinton's decision to convene the democratically elected heads of state of North America, Central America, South America, and the Caribbean, the Vice President noted that President Clinton believed strongly that "thinking through a new relationship (in the Hemisphere) should be a joint enterprise."

During the first half of 1994, senior-level U.S. officials consulted throughout the Hemisphere to decide collectively on the main Summit themes. Out of these consultations, a consensus emerged that the following themes should be addressed:

- Preserving and Strengthening the Community of Democracies of the Americas
- Promoting Prosperity through Economic Integration and Free Trade
- Eradicating Poverty and Discrimination in Our Hemisphere
- Guaranteeing Sustainable Development and Conserving Our Natural Environment for Future Generations

From late August through early October, senior U.S. officials, including the Vice President, met with governments and regional groups throughout the Hemisphere to discuss the draft agenda. Meetings were held with: Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, the Caribbean nations, Canada, Central America, Mexico, and the Rio Group (which includes the nations of South America plus Mexico and representative states from the Caribbean and Central America).

Further talks were held in late October and early November with subregional groups or on specific issues: in Mexico City on counternarcotics; in Quito, Ecuador on the environment and ethics; in Port-of-Spain, Trinidad on microenterprises; and in Peru, Jamaica, Brazil, and Venezuela on general issues.

Additional consultations were also held in late October, late November, and early December by the U.S. Trade Representative with every country in the Hemisphere on the economic and trade issues to be addressed in Miami.

On November 27-29, representatives from all participating countries met at Airlie House outside of Washington, D.C. to conduct a final review of the draft Summit documents, a Declaration of Principles and a Plan of Action identifying specific activities which implement those principles. In Miami, the Hemisphere's leaders will review and sign the documents.

Many countries included the private sector and other non-governmental organizations in their consideration of the Summit agenda. Furthermore, regional organizations such as the Organization of American States and the Inter-American Development Bank have been involved in many stages of the planning process; these entities will be called upon to assist in the implementation of the Summit Plan of Action and will be observers at the Miami meeting.

It should be noted that many of the initiatives to be approved at the Summit originated in Latin America, including those on human rights, women, culture, corruption and terrorism. All the initiatives are the product of extensive consultations and consensus-building.

SYMPOSIUM ON CHILDREN OF THE AMERICAS

HOSTED BY FIRST LADY HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON

First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton has invited the First Ladies of the hemisphere to join her in addressing the agenda of the Summit of the Americas as it relates to the needs of children. On Saturday morning, December 10, the spouses will gather to discuss efforts underway to enhance children's lives. The First Ladies will hear from international experts, as well as from each other, about important developments affecting the health and education of children.

The Symposium's focus on young people targets a large percentage of the hemisphere; today, half of the hemisphere's population is under 23 years of age. In convening this program, Mrs. Clinton remarked, "Ensuring that our children are healthy and educated must be a priority as we work to shape a brighter future for our region. Investing in our children will help us achieve the common goal of a free and prosperous hemisphere."

Symposium Agenda

Mrs. Clinton will open the meeting and introduce a UNICEF video presentation created for the Symposium. Dr. George Alleyne, Director-designate of the Pan American Health Organization, will follow with an overview of the challenges in health and education facing the hemisphere's children. The following First Ladies will then make brief remarks relating examples of successful programs for children from their nations: Mrs. Josette Altmann de Figueres of Costa Rica; Mrs. Hazel Manning of Trinidad and Tobago; and Mrs. Ximena Iturralde de Sanchez de Lozada of Bolivia.

Following the formal program, the First Ladies will break into three working groups:

1. Children's Health Issues, chaired by Mrs. Janet Jagan of Guyana
2. Children's Education Issues, chaired by Mrs. Nilda Patricia Velasco de Zedillo of Mexico
3. Challenges Facing Today's Adolescents, chaired by Mrs. Marta Larraechea de Frei of Chile

The Symposium will conclude with a working luncheon.

CONCERT OF THE AMERICAS

Saturday evening, President and Mrs. Clinton will host a tribute to the cultures of the Western Hemisphere at the James Knight Center.

The gala concert will feature renowned artists Liza Minnelli, Morgan Freeman, Jimmy Smits, Celia Cruz, Tito Puente, and the poet Maya Angelou, among others. The 90-minute program, "The Kennedy Center Presents: Concert of the Americas," is scheduled to air nationwide over PBS on Wednesday, December 14 at 9 pm EST.

Other artists scheduled to appear include: Maria Conchita Alonso, Paul Anka, the Gran Ballet Folklorico de Mexico, Adam Beach, Ruben Blades, Sonia Braga, Cachao, Vikki Carr, Christina, Raul Di Blasio, Luis Enrique, Sheila E, Don Francisco, Daisy Fuentes, Ana Gabriel, Rita Marley, Daniela Mercury, The Mighty Sparrow, Pat Morita, Luis "Perico" Ortiz, Paul Rodriguez, Hilton Ruiz, Arturo Sandoval, Adriana Verela, and BeBe & CeCe Winans.

U.S. CABINET ACTIVITIES

The following Cabinet officials will be in Miami for the Summit of the Americas and will be available at the International Media Center at various times throughout the Summit:

Secretary of State Warren Christopher
Secretary of the Treasury Lloyd Bentsen
Secretary of Commerce Ronald Brown
Secretary of Labor Robert Reich
Secretary of Housing and Urban Development Henry Cisneros
Secretary of Transportation Federico Pena
Attorney General Janet Reno
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency Carol Browner
United States Trade Representative Mickey Kantor
Chairperson of the Council of Economic Advisors Laura Tyson
Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy Dr. Lee Brown
United States Information Agency Director Joe Duffy

On Saturday, December 10, several Cabinet members will meet with business, government, and community leaders from around the United States at the Hotel Inter-Continental. Secretaries Christopher, Bentsen, and Brown will host a breakfast at which they will present an overview of challenges facing the Hemisphere. Later in the day, four separate luncheon meetings will be held focusing on major issues on the Summit agenda: economic integration and trade liberalization, strengthening democratic institutions, and assuring sustainable development. Luncheon hosts will be: Secretaries Ron Brown and Federico Pena, Ambassador Mickey Kantor and Administrator Carol Browner, Secretary Robert Reich and Counselor to the President Mack McLarty, and Secretary Lloyd Bentsen and Chair of the Council of Economic Advisors Laura Tyson.

SUMMIT OF THE AMERICAS

LEADERS AND ATTENDING SPOUSES

Antigua & Barbuda	Prime Minister Lester Bird Mrs. Patricia Bird
Argentina	President Carlos Menem
The Bahamas	Prime Minister Hubert A. Ingraham Mrs. Delores Ingraham
Barbados	Prime Minister Owen Arthur Mrs. Beverly Arthur
Belize	Prime Minister Manuel Esquivel Mrs. Kathleen Levy Esquivel
Bolivia	President Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada Mrs. Ximena Iturralde de Sanchez de Lozada
Brazil	President Itamar Franco
Canada	Prime Minister Jean Chretien Mrs. Aline Chretien
Chile	President Eduardo Frei Mrs. Marta Larraechea de Frei
Colombia	President Ernesto Samper Mrs. Jacquin Strauss de Samper
Costa Rica	President Jose Maria Figueres Mrs. Josette Altmann de Figueres
Dominica	Prime Minister Eugenia Charles
Dominican Republic	President Joaquin Balaguer
Ecuador	President Sixto Duran Ballen Mrs. Josefina Villalobos de Duran Ballen
El Salvador	President Armando Calderon Sol Mrs. Elizabeth de Calderon Sol

Grenada	Prime Minister Nicholas Brathwaite Mrs. Pansy Brathwaite
Guatemala	President Ramiro De Leon Carpio Mrs. Maria Eugenia de De Leon Carpio
Guyana	President Cheddi Jagan Mrs. Janet Jagan
Haiti	President Jean-Bertrand Aristide
Honduras	President Carlos Roberto Reina Mrs. Bessy Watson de Reina
Jamaica	Prime Minister P.J. Patterson
Mexico	President Ernesto Zedillo Mrs. Nilda Patricia Velasco de Zedillo
Nicaragua	President Violeta Chamorro
Panama	President Ernesto Perez Balladares Mrs. Dora Boyd de Perez Balladares
Paraguay	President Juan Carlos Wasmosy Mrs. Maria Teresa Carrasco de Wasmosy
Peru	President Alberto Fujimori
St. Kitts & Nevis	Prime Minister Kennedy Simmonds Mrs. Mary Simmonds
St. Lucia	Prime Minister John Compton Mrs. Janice Compton
St. Vincent & the Grenadines	Prime Minister James F. Mitchell
Suriname	President Ronald Venetiaan Mrs. Liesbeth Anita Maria Venetiaan
Trinidad & Tobago	Prime Minister Patrick Manning Mrs. Hazel Manning
United States	President William Jefferson Clinton Mrs. Hillary Rodham Clinton

Uruguay

President Luis Alberto Lacalle
Mrs. Maria Julia Pou de Lacalle

Venezuela

President Rafael Caldera
Mrs. Alicia Pietri de Caldera

PARTICIPANTS IN SUMMIT WORKING SESSIONS

Antigua & Barbuda	Prime Minister Lester Bird
Argentina	President Carlos Menem
The Bahamas	Prime Minister Hubert A. Ingraham
Barbados	Prime Minister Owen Arthur
Belize	Prime Minister Manuel Esquivel
Bolivia	President Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada
Brazil	President Itamar Franco President-Elect Fernando Henrique Cardoso
Canada	Prime Minister Jean Chretien
Chile	President Eduardo Frei
Colombia	President Ernesto Samper
Costa Rica	President Jose Maria Figueres
Dominica	Prime Minister Eugenia Charles
Dominican Republic	President Joaquin Balaguer
Ecuador	President Sixto Duran Ballen
El Salvador	President Armando Calderon Sol
Grenada	Prime Minister Nicholas Brathwaite
Guatemala	President Ramiro De Leon Carpio
Guyana	President Cheddi Jagan
Haiti	President Jean-Bertrand Aristide
Honduras	President Carlos Roberto Reina
Jamaica	Prime Minister P.J. Patterson

Mexico	President Ernesto Zedillo
Nicaragua	President Violeta Chamorro
Panama	President Ernesto Perez Balladares
Paraguay	President Juan Carlos Wasmosy
Peru	President Alberto Fujimori
St. Kitts & Nevis	Prime Minister Kennedy Simmonds
St. Lucia	Prime Minister John Compton
St. Vincent & the Grenadines	Prime Minister James F. Mitchell
Suriname	President Ronald Venetiaan
Trinidad & Tobago	Prime Minister Patrick Manning
United States	President William Jefferson Clinton Vice President Al Gore
Uruguay	President Luis Alberto Lacalle
Venezuela	President Rafael Caldera

PREVIOUS INTER-AMERICAN SUMMITS

Two hemispheric meetings of heads of government have been held prior to the 1994 Summit of the Americas: Panama City, Panama in 1956 and Punta del Este, Uruguay in 1967. These were predated by the Pan-American Conference of 1889.

Pan-American Conference of 1889

The Pan-American Conference, attended by delegates of 17 countries, was the first hemispheric meeting hosted by the United States. At the conference, the U.S. made two proposals: the establishment of a hemispheric customs union and an international mediation mechanism. Neither proposal was approved, but the delegates agreed to form the International Union of American Republics, a predecessor of the Organization of American States (OAS).

Meeting of the Presidents of the American Republics, 1956

Leaders of 19 countries of the Western Hemisphere met in Panama City July 21-22, 1956, under the auspices of the OAS to commemorate the 130th anniversary of the Congress of Panama convened by Simon Bolivar. President Eisenhower hoped to use the meeting to make the OAS a driving force for economic and social development in the region. However, the Declaration of Panama was largely hortatory, calling for a cooperative effort to promote human liberty and raise standards of living for the people of the Americas.

The Inter-American Meeting of Presidents, 1967

Twenty leaders met in Punta del Este, Uruguay, April 12-14, 1967, at the request of Latin American governments seeking to evaluate the success of the Alliance for Progress, President Kennedy's initiative to promote development and peaceful relations in the Americas. Although the United States held extensive meetings to develop the agenda, the OAS guided the consultative process and co-hosted the event with Uruguay.

The summit was a combination of public and private sessions in which the leaders read mainly from prepared texts. President Johnson held private bilateral meetings with each of his counterparts during the conference. In the end, 19 of 20 leaders signed the Declaration of the Presidents of America (Ecuador abstained due to dissatisfaction over U.S. conditions on

foreign assistance). The declaration and action plan called for the creation of a Latin American Common Market (excluding the US) by 1980 and sought multilateral cooperation in infrastructure development, agriculture, arms control and education. The United States pledged \$1.5 billion in conditional aid to help implement the plan, which was never fully realized.

Historic Firsts in Miami

The Summit of the Americas is the first hemispheric summit to be hosted by the United States and the first attended by Canada, which joined the OAS in 1990. The Summit will include many more heads of state and government than the earlier meetings, and for the first time, all the leaders attending were democratically elected.

Fact Sheet

Summit of the Americas Participants

Antigua and Barbuda

Area: Antigua—281 sq. km.
(108 sq. mi.) Barbuda—161 sq. km.
(62 sq. mi.)
Population: 64,000
GDP: \$411 million
Per capita GDP: \$6,500
Head of Government: Prime Minister
Lester Bird

Republic of Argentina

Area: 2.8 million sq. km.
(1.1 million sq. mi.)
Population: 33 million
GDP: \$255 billion
Per capita GDP: \$7,600
Head of Government: President
Carlos Menem

The Commonwealth Of The Bahamas

Area: 13,939 sq. km. (5,382 sq. mi.)
Population: 269,300
GDP: \$3.1 billion
Per capita GDP: \$11,610
Head of Government: Prime Minister
Hubert A. Ingraham

Barbados

Area: 431 sq. km. (166 sq. mi.)
Population: 264,000
GDP: \$1.64 billion
Per capita GDP: \$6,200
Head of Government: Prime Minister
Owen Arthur

Belize

Area: 22,963 sq. km. (8,867 sq. mi.)
Population: 205,000
GDP: \$414 million
Per capita GDP: \$2,073
Head of Government: Prime Minister
Manuel Esquivel

Republic of Bolivia

Area: 1.1 million sq. km.
(425,000 sq. mi.)
Population: 6.95 million
GDP: \$7.1 billion
Per capita GDP: \$1,017
Head of Government: President
Gonzalo SANCHEZ DE LOZADA

Brazil

Area: 8,511,965 sq. km.
(3,290,000 sq. mi.)
Population: 155 million
GDP: \$456 billion
Per capita GDP: \$3,000
Head of Government: President
Itamar Franco

Canada

Area: 9.9 million sq. km.
(3.8 million sq. mi.)
Population: 29 million
GDP: \$611 billion
Per capita GDP: \$21,800
Head of Government: Prime Minister
Jean Chretien

Republic of Chile

Area: 756,945 sq. km.
(302,778 sq. mi.)
Population: 13.8 million
GDP: \$43.6 billion
Per capita GDP: \$3,200
Head of Government: President
Eduardo Frei

Republic of Colombia

Area: 1.2 million sq. km.
(440,000 sq. mi.)
Population: 36 million
GDP: \$50 billion
Per capita GDP: \$1,390
Head of Government: President
Ernesto SAMPER Pizano

Republic of Costa Rica

Area: 51,032 sq. km. (19,652 sq. mi.)
Population: 3.2 million
GDP: \$6 billion
Per capita GDP: \$1,864
Head of Government: President Jose
Maria FIGUERES

Commonwealth of Dominica

Area: 754 sq. km. (290 sq. mi.)
Population: 72,000
GDP: \$170 million
Per capita GDP: \$2,400
Head of Government: Prime Minister
Eugenia Charles

Dominican Republic

Area: 48,442 sq. km. (18,704 sq. mi.)
Population: 7.6 million
GDP: \$8.7 billion
Per capita GDP: \$1,065
Head of Government: President
Joaquin Balaguer

Republic of Ecuador

Area: 283,600 sq. km.
(109,483 sq. mi.)
Population: 11.2 million
GDP: \$16.6 billion
Per capita GDP: \$1,480
Head of Government: President Sixto
DURAN BALLEEN

Republic of El Salvador

Area: 21,476 sq. km. (8,260 sq. mi.)
Population: 5 million
GDP: \$7.6 billion
Per capita GDP: \$1,494
Head of Government: President
Armando CALDERON Sol



Grenada**Area:** 344 sq. km. (133 sq. mi.)**Population:** 94,000**GDP:** \$174 million**Per capita GDP:** \$1,800**Head of Government:** Prime Minister
Nicholas Brathwaite**Republic of Guatemala****Area:** 108,780 sq. km. (42,000 sq. mi.)**Population:** 10 million**GDP:** \$11 billion**Per capita GDP:** \$1,100**Head of Government:** President
Ramiro DE LEON Carpio**Co-operative Republic of Guyana****Area:** 214,970 sq. km. (82,980 sq. mi.)**Population:** 735,000**GDP:** \$440 million**Per capita GDP:** \$570**Head of Government:** Executive
President Cheddi Jagan**Republic of Haiti****Area:** 27,750 sq. km. (10,714 sq. mi.)**Population:** 6.9 million**GNP:** \$1.5 billion**Per capita GNP:** \$320**Head of Government:** President
Jean-Bertrand Aristide**Republic of Honduras****Area:** 112,100 sq. km.

(43,270 sq. mi.)

Population: 5.2 million**GDP:** \$2.8 billion**Per capita GDP:** \$540**Head of Government:** President
Carlos Roberto REINA Idiaquez**Jamaica****Area:** 10,991 sq. km. (4,244 sq. mi.)**Population:** 2.5 million**GDP:** \$3.8 billion**Per capita GDP:** \$1,543**Head of Government:** Prime Minister
P. J. Patterson**United Mexican States****Area:** 1,972,500 sq. km.

(761,600 sq. mi.)

Population: 90 million**GDP:** \$356 billion**Per capita GDP:** \$4,124**Head of Government:** President
Ernesto Zedillo**Nicaragua****Area:** 130,000 sq. km. (50,000 sq. mi.)**Population:** 4.3 million**GDP:** \$1.8 billion**Per capita GDP:** \$414**Head of Government:** President
Violeta Chamorro**Republic of Panama****Area:** 77,381 sq. km. (29,762 sq. mi.)**Population:** 2.54 million**GDP (real):** \$6.6 billion**Per capita GDP:** \$2,500**Head of Government:** President
Ernesto Perez Balladares**Paraguay****Area:** 406,750 sq. km.

(157,047 sq. mi.)

Population: 4.2 million**GDP:** \$7.2 billion**Per capita GDP:** \$1,550**Head of Government:** President
Juan Carlos Wasmosy**Republic of Peru****Area:** 28 million sq. km.

(496,222 sq. mi.)

Population: 22.9 million**GDP:** \$27.7 billion**Per capita GDP:** \$1,207**Head of Government:** President
Alberto Fujimori**Federation of St. Kitts and Nevis****Area:** St. Kitts—168 sq. km. (65 sq. mi.); Nevis—93 sq. km. (36 sq. mi.)**Population:** 40,400**GDP:** \$142 million**Per capita GDP:** \$3,500**Head of Government:** Prime Minister
Kennedy Simmonds**Saint Lucia****Area:** 619 sq. km. (238 sq. mi.)**Population:** 138,150**GDP:** \$476 million**Per capita GDP:** \$3,500**Head of Government:** Prime Minister
John Compton**St. Vincent and the Grenadines****Area:** 340 sq. km. (130 sq. mi.)**Population:** 114,000**GDP:** \$200 million**Per capita GDP:** \$1,730**Head of Government:** Prime Minister
James F. Mitchell**Suriname****Area:** 163,265 sq. km. (63,037 sq. mi.)**Population:** 438,000**GDP:** \$545 million**Per capita GDP:** \$1,200**Head of Government:** President
Ronald Venetiaan**Republic of Trinidad and Tobago****Area:** 5,128 sq. km. (1,980 sq. mi.)**Population:** 1.2 million**GDP:** \$4.6 billion**Per capita GDP:** \$3,850**Head of Government:** Prime Minister
Patrick Manning**United States of America****Area:** 9 million sq. km.

(3.6 million sq. mi.)

Population: 258 million**GDP:** \$6 trillion**Per capita GDP:** \$23,400**Head of Government:** President
William J. Clinton (Host)**Oriental Republic of Uruguay****Area:** 176,000 sq. km. (68,000 sq. mi.)**Population:** 3.2 million**GDP:** \$13.1 billion**Per capita GDP:** \$4,200**Head of Government:** President Luis
Alberto LACALLE**Republic of Venezuela****Area:** 912,050 sq. km.

(352,143 sq. mi.)

Population: 20.6 million**GDP:** \$58.5 billion**Per capita GDP:** \$2,800**Head of Government:** President
Rafael Caldera ■

Organization of American States

Background

The Organization of American States (OAS) is the world's oldest regional organization. It dates back to the First International Conference of American States, which was held in Washington, DC, in April 1890. This conference founded the International Union of American Republics and also established a Commercial Bureau, which acted as the Union's secretariat. In 1910, the International Union became the Union of American Republics and the Commercial Bureau, the Pan American Union.

The OAS Charter was signed in Bogota, Colombia, in 1948 and entered into force December 1951. It has been amended twice: first, through the Protocol of Buenos Aires in 1970, and later by the Protocol of Cartagena de Indias in November 1988. The latter marked the beginning of modernizing and strengthening the organization.

The OAS has 35 member states. It has granted permanent observer status to 32 states. The Holy See and the European Union also are permanent observers.

U.S. Policy

The U.S. is committed to strengthening and working with the OAS as the pre-eminent hemispheric institution. This reflects the U.S. Government's determination to make optimal use of multilateral diplomacy to resolve regional problems and to engage its neighbors on topics of hemispheric concern.

The most elemental and historic U.S. interest in the Western Hemisphere—shared by virtually all hemisphere states—is to prevent military, political, or other intervention by states outside the hemisphere. A second fundamental interest shared by the U.S. and other nations is the maintenance of peace among the states of the hemisphere. The OAS provides a means to promote the consolidation of democracy with due regard for the charter principle of non-intervention.

All OAS members share a common concern for democracy, economic development, and human rights. Major U.S. interests and objectives in the hemisphere coincide with the goals and work of the OAS:

- The promotion and strengthening of democracy and human rights;
- Drug control;
- Environmental protection;
- Legal development;
- Economic assistance and technical cooperation;
- Trade; and
- Economic integration and development.

Since 1990, the U.S. has paid its full assessed quota to the OAS. For FY 1996, the Administration seeks full funding of the U.S. quota assessment to the OAS.

OAS Objectives

The OAS is a natural forum for the Western Hemisphere's dialogue on political, economic, social, educational, cultural, scientific, and technological matters. Its objectives are to:

- Strengthen the peace and security of the continent;

OAS Members¹

Antigua and Barbuda
Argentina
Bahamas
Barbados
Belize
Bolivia
Brazil
Canada
Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica
Cuba
Dominica
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
El Salvador
Grenada
Guatemala
Guyana
Haiti
Honduras
Jamaica
Mexico
Nicaragua
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
St Kitts and Nevis
St. Lucia
St. Vincent and the Grenadines
Suriname
Trinidad and Tobago
United States
Uruguay
Venezuela

¹With the entry of Canada (1980), Belize (1991), and Guyana (1991), all sovereign states of the Western Hemisphere are OAS members. Cuba is a member, although its present government has been excluded from participation since 1962 for incompatibility with the principles of the OAS Charter. □



- Promote democracy, with due respect for the principle of non-intervention;
- Seek solutions to hemispheric political, juridical, and economic problems;
- Promote cooperative economic, social, and cultural development; and
- Fight drug-trafficking and abuse.

Maintaining Peace

The OAS has a long, prestigious tradition of defending and maintaining peace in the hemisphere. For example, the OAS helped demobilize more than 22,000 members of the former Nicaraguan Resistance. Currently, it is repatriating 18,000 relatives of former combatants and providing conditions that will enable them to be fully incorporated into civilian life.

Promoting Democracy

The OAS plays a constructive role in promoting democracy in the hemisphere. Since 1989, upon explicit requests from respective governments, the Secretary General has established civilian OAS missions to observe electoral processes in Nicaragua, Haiti, El Salvador, Suriname, and Paraguay. OAS observers also were present at elections in Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Panama, and the Dominican Republic.

The OAS strongly condemned the September 1991 coup, which interrupted the democratic political institutional process in Haiti. It forged hemispheric and world consensus on the need to restore democracy in Haiti and called for a commercial embargo, dispatched human rights monitors, coordinated humanitarian assistance, and consistently strove to negotiate a peaceful solution.

Development Cooperation

The OAS is a forum through which the hemisphere discusses the following development issues:

- Reducing poverty and unemployment;
- Defending social justice;
- Incentives for investment and economic growth;
- Liberalizing trade; and
- Alleviating the external debt burden.

The General Secretariat supports national and multinational development programs and projects in member states. OAS-supported projects are requested by the respective governments. ■

Organization

The OAS accomplishes its objectives through the following organs:

- General Assembly;
- Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs;
- Councils—Permanent Council, Inter-American Economic and Social Council, and Inter-American Council for Education, Science and Culture;
- Inter-American Juridical Committee;
- Inter-American Commission on Human Rights;
- General Secretariat;
- Specialized organizations—Inter-American Commission of Women, Inter-American Children's Institute, Inter-American Indian Institute, Pan American Institute of Geography and History, Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture; and the Pan American Health Organization; and
- Other entities—Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission, Inter-American Defense Board, Inter-American Defense College, Inter-American Development Bank, and the Pan American Development Foundation, Inter-American Commission on Telecommunications. □

The Inter-American Development Bank

The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) will play a major role in funding activities resulting from the Summit of the Americas, which will be held in Miami, Florida, December 9-11, 1994.

It was founded in 1959 as a hemispheric organization with 19 members. The bank opened to non-regional donors in 1976 and now has 46 member countries, 28 in the Western Hemisphere, 16 in Europe, plus Israel and Japan. Of the bank's membership, 26 are borrowing country members, and 20 are non-borrowing members.

The Board of Governors, which meets annually to review IDB operations and to make major policy decisions, is the bank's highest authority. The Board of Executive Directors conducts IDB operations. The bank's president is chosen by the governors for a five-year term. President Enrique V. Iglesias, of Uruguay, was elected in 1988 and re-elected in 1993. The current U.S. Governor is Treasury Secretary Lloyd Bentsen. The Alternate Governor is the Under Secretary of State for Economic, Business, and Agricultural Affairs Joan E. Spero. L. Ronald Scheman is the U.S. Executive Director. The United States receives a large share of IDB-related foreign procurement—about 44% in 1993, totaling \$936 million.

The IDB fosters the economic and social development of its member countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. It is funded by ordinary capital resources—paid-in and callable capital contributions, reserves, and funds raised through borrowings—

and trust funds established through voluntary contributions by individual member countries.

Fund for Special Operations (FSO)

The Fund for Special Operations is the IDB's concessional lending window and offers low-interest loans to less developed member countries. It is funded by separate paid-in capital contributions. Currently, only five countries may borrow from these funds: Bolivia, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Honduras, and Nicaragua.

Inter-American Investment Corporation (IIC)

The Inter-American Investment Corporation, an autonomous IDB affiliate, was created in 1989 to stimulate small and medium-scale private enterprise via loans, guarantees, equity investments, and advisory services. It is funded by paid-in capital contributions, reserves, and funds raised through borrowings. It has 34 members. The United States is actively involved in negotiations on the future of the IIC, which requires new funds to continue its lending program.

Multilateral Investment Fund (MIF)

The IDB also administers the Multilateral Investment Fund for Latin America and the Caribbean, which was launched in 1993 to promote investment reform in the region via small-scale loans and grants. It is funded by paid-in contributions and is intended as a five-year program.

The MIF's basic agreements were signed in 1992 by 13 Latin American and eight industrialized countries.

IDB Members in the Western Hemisphere

Argentina
Bahamas
Barbados
Belize
Bolivia
Brazil
Canada
Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
El Salvador
Guatemala
Guyana
Haiti
Honduras
Jamaica
Mexico
Nicaragua
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Suriname
Trinidad and Tobago
United States
Uruguay
Venezuela □

Since then, another eight Latin American and Caribbean countries have joined this fund.

Financing

From 1961 to 1993, the Inter-American Development Bank has approved loans totaling \$63 billion for projects representing a total investment of \$170 billion in energy, agriculture and



fisheries, transportation and communications, industry and mining, environment and public health, economic reform, urban development, education, science and technology, export financing, tourism, and microenterprises.

During this period, FSO accounted for \$11.8 billion of all approved loans. In addition, the IDB provided \$1.1 billion in grants for technical cooperation over this same period.

In 1993, the IDB approved more than \$6 billion in new loans—\$423 million under the FSO—and disbursed \$3.7 billion. That year, 21% of the approved loan amount was used for energy projects, 21% for environment and public health, and 20% for transportation and communications. Major projects approved in 1993 ranged from improving road systems in Argentina and Mexico, through promoting hydroelectric power in Colombia and Venezuela, to strengthening health services in Peru.

During 1989-93, the IIC approved 93 projects in 22 countries for a total of \$384 million in loans and equity operations. In 1993, the IIC approved 31 operations, for a total of \$124 million in new investments, and disbursed \$88 million.

In 1993, the MIF approved its first three operations, totaling \$7 million.

The Eighth Replenishment

Members pledged \$41 billion in new capital at the bank's eighth capital increase, or replenishment, completed in April 1994. This raises the IDB's total capital to more than \$110 billion, making it the largest of the regional development banks. The replenishment will allow the bank to sustain annual lending of \$6-\$7 billion.

The replenishment also broke new ground in lending priorities. The bank will commit 40% of its funds—50% of

Cumulative Total Cost of IDB Projects: 1961-1993

(\$millions)			
Borrowing Country	Total Cost	IDB Loans	Latin American Contributions
Argentina	18,333.7	7,026.2	11,307.5
Bahamas	274.3	178.3	96.0
Barbados	407.0	251.2	155.8
Bolivia	3,395.7	2,037.8	1,357.9
Brazil	42,009.3	9,679.7	32,329.6
Chile	9,546.2	4,380.2	5,165.9
Colombia	14,689.5	5,770.3	8,919.3
Costa Rica	3,481.6	2,143.4	1,338.1
Dominican Republic	1,867.7	1,278.9	588.8
Ecuador	5,283.2	2,615.4	2,667.8
El Salvador	2,336.2	1,575.4	760.9
Guatemala	2,415.0	1,285.2	1,129.8
Guyana	579.7	449.6	130.1
Haiti	509.9	356.2	153.6
Honduras	2,949.3	1,486.8	1,462.5
Jamaica	1,772.5	1,092.3	680.1
Mexico	24,391.5	8,095.9	16,295.6
Nicaragua	1,531.0	823.6	707.4
Panama	2,237.6	1,221.2	1,016.3
Paraguay	1,574.7	1,122.7	451.9
Peru	5,320.6	2,667.2	2,653.5
Suriname	29.7	17.6	12.1
Trinidad and Tobago	778.7	573.8	204.8
Uruguay	2,278.4	1,229.0	1,049.4
Venezuela	11,332.5	3,581.3	7,751.2
Regional	10,404.4	2,032.6	8,371.8
TOTALS	169,729.9	62,971.8	106,757.7

Source: Inter-American Development Bank

total projects—to social sector- and poverty-alleviation programs. Members also authorized up to 5% of the IDB's lending to the private sector, without a government guarantee. Other priorities will be the environment, government modernization, and development of economic reform and regional integration.

Under the eighth replenishment, the relative voting shares set out in the IDB Charter were amended to allow

greater participation by non-regional members. The U.S. share dropped from 34.5% to 30% but remains the largest of any country in any multilateral development bank. Regional borrowers reduced their share to 50%. Canada retained a 4% voting share, and Japan increased its share to 5%. The remaining 11% is divided among 17 non-regional members. ■

SUMMIT SITES

THE JACKIE GLEASON THEATER OF THE PERFORMING ARTS

The Jackie Gleason Theater of the Performing Arts is a 2,705-seat theater located in the heart of the Miami Beach Art Deco District. The original structure was built in 1951. It has hosted everything from sporting events to opera, and for many years was the home of the Jackie Gleason Show. Currently, the theater plays host to the Acura Broadway Series, the Concert Association of Florida, the Florida Philharmonic, the Miami City Ballet, the Community Concert Association and myriad individual contemporary, ethnic, and family programs. The theater and the adjacent Miami Beach Convention Center are managed by SMG, the world's largest company for public assembly functions.

VIZCAYA MUSEUM AND GARDENS

The Vizcaya Museum and Gardens is the Italian Renaissance-style villa built between 1914 and 1916 by industrialist James Deering as his winter "cottage." It took about ten percent of the young city of Miami's work force to begin building the 70-room house. An ardent collector, Deering decorated the home with European furniture, tapestries and collectibles from the 15th to the 19th centuries.

A path cutting through a grove of tropical hardwood trees leads to the villa, set on 10 acres of formal gardens. The grounds are decorated with statuary, restored fountains, and manicured gardens. The Great Stone Barge is a private island just offshore that Deering built as a breakwater and boat dock. Guided tours are offered daily.

THE BILTMORE HOTEL AND GOLF RESORT

The Biltmore Hotel opened its doors in 1926 and was the center of Miami's social and cultural life until it was taken over as a military hospital in 1942. Placed on the National Register of Historic Places in 1972, it was given over to the City of Coral Gables by the federal government as part of the Historic Monument Act. The property underwent extensive restoration that cost more than \$55 million and re-opened its doors to guests in 1987. The Biltmore was forced to close its doors again four years later. Present management restored it and reopened it again in September 1992.

The Biltmore Hotel and Golf Resort is located in the heart of Coral Gables, four miles south of Miami International Airport and five miles from downtown Miami.

JAMES L. KNIGHT CENTER

The James L. Knight Center is located in the heart of downtown Miami's business/banking district. It is a fully equipped theater-style auditorium that seats up to 5,000 and provides an uninterrupted view of the 16,000 square foot staging area. It is used for general sessions, sporting and special events, and staged entertainment. The Center has hosted presidential candidates and artists such as Tina Turner and Luciano Pavarotti. It has also served as the home for television shows and media events, including the Wheel of Fortune and the Miss Universe Pageant.

VANDERBILT MANSION/FISHER ISLAND

In the 1920's, William and Rosamund Vanderbilt created a winter estate on a 206-acre island bounded by Biscayne Bay and the Atlantic. Through the years, the Vanderbilts' estate entertained the luminaries of the time. The mansion is now called Fisher Island in honor of Miami Beach pioneer developer Carl Fisher. It has been restored, and today serves as a private residential and recreational community.

SUMMIT HOST COMMITTEE

As the eyes of the world focus on Miami, Florida, they will discover a New World city -- a city often described as the "Crossroads of the Americas." Miami's multi-ethnic diversity and geographic location put it at the forefront of business, commerce, trade, and cultural exchange with Latin America and the Caribbean.

The responsibility of planning the historic Summit of the Americas has been managed by the Summit Host Committee. The Host Committee includes many of Florida's leading government, civic, and corporate leaders.

Co-Chairs of the Committee are Governor Lawton Chiles, Lt. Governor MacKay, Metro-Dade County Manager Joaquin Avino, attorney Marilyn Holifield, *Miami Herald* publisher David Lawrence, and businessman Jorge Perez. The Host Committee has collaborated with the Metro-Dade County Commission, Miami-area municipal governments, and the State legislative leadership in organizing the Summit. Key roles have been played by Summit Executive Director Luis Lauredo, Chief of Operations Susan Vodicka, and Communications Director Julie Simon.

ANNOUNCEMENT OF PLANS FOR THE SUMMIT OF THE AMERICAS BY PRESIDENT BILL CLINTON

The White House
March 11, 1994
(Excerpts)

Thank you very much, Mr. Vice President, ladies and gentlemen. Today's announcement is good for our nation and good for our hemisphere. This has been a very important year and a couple of months for this hemisphere. Late last year, in an historic choice, the American people and the Congress embraced NAFTA, which will establish the world's largest free trade zone, create jobs and bolster the growth of democracy in market economies.

In December, right after the NAFTA vote, the Vice President went to Mexico City, as he said, and announced my intention to host a meeting of democratically elected heads of state and government in this hemisphere.

Today, I am pleased to announce that the Summit of the Americas will be held in early December in the City of Miami...

Let me say a word about why this summit matters so much to us here at home in the United States. Our nation has a major stake in the prosperity and freedom of the entire hemisphere. Our exports to Latin America and the Caribbean have more than doubled in just seven years, rising to nearly \$80 billion in 1993. That has generated hundreds of thousands of new jobs for American workers. If we can continue to bring down hemispheric trade barriers, we can create a million new jobs by the turn of the century. At the same time, the rising tide of democracy in this hemisphere helps make us more secure. Democracies tend not to fight one another; they make better partners in trade and diplomacy. And, as we work with our neighbors to build more free, prosperous and secure relations throughout this hemisphere, this summit will advance our common efforts and our shared interests...

We've arrived at a moment of very great promise and great hope for the Western Hemisphere. Democratic values are ascendant. Our economies are growing and becoming more intertwined every day through trade and investment. Now we have a unique opportunity to build a community of free nations, diverse in culture and history, but bound together by a commitment to responsive and free government, vibrant civil societies, open economies and rising living standards for all our people.

So as we prepare for this Summit of the Americas, let us think boldly and set forth a vision of progress for all our people. Let us begin the work of building a genuine new community for all of us in this hemisphere. Thank you very much.

**REMARKS AS DELIVERED
BY VICE PRESIDENT AL GORE
TO
THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES
NOVEMBER 17, 1994**

One of the pleasures of being Vice President is that you can invite brilliant and talented people to come to your house for dinner they will often accept. Last week saw one such occasion. Tipper and I were honored to host a gathering of men and women who have been deeply involved in the affairs of our Hemisphere for most of their lives.

It was a rich, important -- and absorbing -- discussion. We had sought a range of opinion and that's what we got, whether we were listening to Beatrice Rangel, the Venezuelan scholar-politician, or Francisco Weffort, the Brazilian political pundit ... or Mexican-American poet, Dagoberto Gilb, or Rex Nettleford, the artist and teacher from Jamaica. Or any of the other 35 poets, intellectuals, playwrights, and writers throughout the hemisphere.

And while we disagreed on some things, we agreed on one major idea: that there is right now what some have called a "New Moment in the Americas" -- a point in history that offers more hope than any other in our long history.

We felt this way not only because of the flourishing of democracy in the Americas but because the United States has changed. In 1826, when Simon Bolivar brought together a Congress of Spanish American states, he invited this country the United States to take part. John Quincy Adams appointed two delegates. But there was so much political bickering about their appointments, the two delegates from the United States arrived at the Conference only after it was over.

Since then it has sometimes seemed like my country has chosen to involve itself too little -- or too much.

By contrast, President Clinton's decision to convene the Summit of the Americas and to issue invitations to all nations represented in this hall today -- the first such hemispheric gathering in 27 long years -- reflects our firm belief that we have a historic opportunity to forge a new, cooperative partnership among our countries.

We believe, too, that The Organization of American States -- the oldest, most successful regional organization in the world -- has a crucial role to play in this endeavor. My purpose in speaking to you this morning is to set forth our ideas on what the Summit of the Americas means for the OAS, and what the OAS can do to promote the spirit and the achievements of the Summit.

We in the Western Hemisphere must create a bold strategy for the future. Political, social, and economic trends have already brought our countries closer than ever. But we cannot rest on our laurels. We need to accelerate that momentum.

We will have that opportunity at the Summit of the Americas. And in the Organization of American States and other regional organizations we can focus our energies on a united approach to issues that concern us all -- an approach that can be as unified as the design of this building -- this "House of Americas," which blends the architectural styles of North and South America.

It is a building that has been witness to many key events of hemispheric history. Just 17 years ago it saw the signing of the Panama Canal Treaties.

Two years ago, it was the site where the historic North American Free Trade Agreement was signed.

NAFTA, with the active and resourceful leadership of President Clinton, prompted a vigorous national debate in my country, and that debate culminated in a most dramatic vote -- which took place exactly one year ago today -- when the U.S. House of Representatives passed the NAFTA legislation.

NAFTA was more than just a trade agreement among three neighbors. It is perhaps the most striking example of a fundamental change taking place in the hemisphere, one in which the political issues dividing us are being replaced by the joint pursuits of common goals.

Such partnership has evolved in the OAS as well. It is a relatively recent development; the OAS Charter commits all members to representative government, but for years the organization suffered from internal contradictions and these walls reverberated with recrimination. Debates dragged on sometimes seemingly endlessly. Consensus -- and therefore, decisive action -- eluded us.

But by 1991 when the Santiago General Assembly was convened, all 34 delegations represented governments with a claim to democratic legitimacy. The result was revolutionary: the unanimous adoption of Resolution 1080, calling for automatic OAS consideration of the interruption of the democratic political institutional process in any member country.

One year later, the OAS approved the Washington Protocol, which, when ratified, will allow for the suspension from the OAS of a state whose democratic government has been overthrown by force. We are encouraged that many countries, including the U.S., have ratified the Protocol. We look forward to the day it goes into effect -- and fervently hope its provisions will never have to be implemented.

But the OAS is much more than resolutions, protocols, and diplomatic negotiations. Some of the organization's best work is carried out beyond these walls. OAS personnel have observed elections in the farthest corners of the hemisphere; human rights monitors have labored under tense and sometimes life-threatening conditions. Their tools are technical expertise and moral suasion. These people are the unsung heroes of the OAS, and they deserve our special recognition and everlasting gratitude.

The OAS has never been more prepared to carry out its responsibilities. The member states, through the Permanent Council, and Secretary General Gaviria are leading a political and managerial renaissance. Dr. Gaviria has challenged all of us to think more about how the OAS can collectively address the pressing problems of the 1990s -- and how it can adapt to meet the challenges of the 21st Century.

The United States welcomes these efforts. The Clinton Administration is firmly committed to the OAS. We have helped finance technical assistance and activities to promote democracy and human rights.

Today, I am particularly pleased to join with our representative, Hattie Babbitt, on the entry into force of the OAS Headquarters Agreement. This agreement recognizes the full legal privileges and immunities of the OAS Secretariat in exercising its functions here in the United States. The recent ratification of the Headquarters Agreement represents a renewed expression of the commitment of the my country to the OAS and to regional cooperation. For the United States it is a matter of great pride to be the official host of the OAS -- as well as a steadfast friend.

The United States' commitment to the OAS reflects a broader commitment to hemispheric cooperation on a broad range of issues -- reducing trade barriers, strengthening our democratic institutions, improving health and education for all our people, and wisely managing our natural resources.

All will be underscored when we host the Summit.

As I speak we are continuing a series of consultations with our hemispheric neighbors on the Summit agenda. My friend Mack McLarty left this morning for Jamaica to consult with our friends. These consultations have also involved significant contributions from business groups and non-governmental organizations as well as governments.

The Summit will be a landmark for the United States -- which was why I took such pleasure announcing it last December in Mexico City. It will be the first hemispheric gathering we have ever hosted and the largest single summit ever held in this country.

With the Summit just three weeks away, it might be appropriate to reminisce briefly about the last such gathering of our countries, in Punta del Este, Uruguay, in 1967.

What a different world it was then. At that April meeting in Uruguay, ten countries of the 24 then in the OAS were headed by non-democratic governments; ideology and rhetoric separated many of us in the American family.

More than a quarter of a century later, our world looks radically different. The United States has new leadership committed to economic competitiveness and reinventing government. All over the globe, encrusted ideologies and command economies have been replaced by democratic and free-market practices.

Especially in this hemisphere. All but one of the states in the now 35-member OAS have elected governments, a development unprecedented in this hemisphere's history. The countries of this hemisphere are today on a more equal, mutually respectful footing than they were 27 years ago.

We have seen the successful conclusion of the Cold War. We have reaffirmed the virtue of democracy and rejected anti-democratic ideologies. And we have recognized that we must live and work together to survive and prosper. It is this almost palpable expectation for our future that makes the upcoming Summit so full of promise.

The leaders who meet in Miami will have a broad agenda. That's not surprising after such a long hiatus. We are confident that the Summit will be productive. We are convinced that the OAS will have a prominent role implementing the Summit's accomplishments.

Although our countries have pursued different paths to democracy and economic reform, we largely agree on the steps we must take from here: economic growth; wise use of natural resources; government institutions that are accountable to our peoples.

And an issue that involves all of those steps.

Trade.

President Clinton is committed to expanding trade in this Hemisphere. We will of course deal with this matter extensively at the Summit.

His commitment is shared by world leaders who look to a future of regional cooperation and increased economic integration. Take, for example, the results of this week's meeting among APEC leaders. While separated by vast geographic distances and different cultural traditions, the APEC members have nonetheless committed themselves to a far-reaching plan of action to expand trade.

The U.S. Congress has in its hands right now a trade measure that would greatly affect the future of my country's economy and the world's economy. Passage of the Uruguay Round implementing legislation would both show a commitment to global economic openness and set an example for other states to follow.

We are working hard with our Congress to ensure passage of this legislation before the Summit.

As soon as the new Congress is seated in January, President Clinton and key members of that body will press, not only for new fast track authority, but for passage of the Interim Trade Program, an initiative of particular interest to our Central American and Caribbean neighbors.

We look to the leaders in Miami to endorse the goal of free trade in the Western Hemisphere and to adopt concrete measures toward its realization. We foresee the OAS and its special committee on Trade playing an important role in this process.

What an opportunity for the Summit to stimulate cooperation on trade and investment in the Americas!

We can get a hint of such potential by looking at what NAFTA has achieved. The agreement has been in effect less than a year. But it's been a winner for everyone involved.

How do we measure the benefits to the United States? Look at exports from my country.

U.S. exports to our NAFTA partners over the first six months of 1994 are up 11.6 percent over the same period in 1993. That's twice the rate of our export growth to the rest of the world.

Those burgeoning U.S. exports have so far created an estimated 100,000 jobs -- in every sector of our economy -- while job displacements due to the trade pact are many times less.

How do we measure the benefits to my country's neighbors to the North and South? Look at their exports.

Over the same six months, for example, exports from Canada and Mexico to the U.S. rose by approximately 10 percent and 21 percent, respectively. And the citizens of all three countries have gained enormously in the lower prices they pay for the quality goods we supply each other.

Many of you have seen similar benefits from other sub-regional agreements. In Miami, our leaders will have the historic potential to galvanize this process of economic integration. We can promote the already vast and varied ties among our nations, economies, and markets, and to make sure the fruits of economic growth reach all our citizens.

To realize this, we need to spur investment by our private and public sectors and to eliminate barriers to commerce and facilitate trade and other exchanges. This means interweaving the strands of our financial, transportation, rail, aviation, energy, and telecommunications systems.

For example, we can envision creating a hemispheric capital movements code that would make capital markets more open, unified, and liberal, and thereby reduce the cost of capital necessary to finance growth.

We can envision agreement on basic principles that will give private investors the confidence and assurances that they need to invest in the large-scale, long-term infrastructure our hemisphere needs.

Strengthening the hemisphere's telecommunications infrastructure is an especially critical part of building hemispheric integration. I spoke to the International Telecommunications Union earlier this year in Buenos Aires about my own strong belief that the citizens of this hemisphere must have access to the information technology exploding all around us.

We need to collectively ensure that every major hospital, library, and educational institution in the Americas has access to the Internet. The OAS and its Inter-American Telecommunications Commission can play a role in this crucial enterprise.

As important as economic integration is to the Americas, this singular Summit should also offer recognition of another singular story: the resounding success of democracy in this hemisphere.

One recent event in our hemisphere has underscored the potency of the democratic idea.

Just over one month ago, we all witnessed the heartening return to Port-au-Prince of Haiti's elected President, Jean-Bertrand Aristide. Without the hemispheric consensus forged by the OAS, the eventual world consensus on the need to restore democracy to Haiti would not have been achieved. The Organization called for a commercial embargo, dispatched human rights monitors, coordinated humanitarian assistance, and strove consistently to negotiate a peaceful solution.

This restoration of democracy in Haiti was an enormous triumph. But it should not let us gloss over the fact that maintaining democracy requires persistence and rigor.

Here, too, there is a pivotal role for the Organization of the American States to play.

After all, if democracy falls in most other parts of the world, the foreign ministers do not convene in emergency session to confront the challenge. Perhaps they should. Perhaps one day they will. But for now, democracy is our watchword and our pride.

The challenge for the OAS now is to direct even more effort towards preventing crises and strengthening democratic institutions throughout the hemisphere. To further promote democracy, Summit leaders should look to this organization to enhance even further its capacity.

We must help countries strengthen their electoral organizations. We must also facilitate contact among democratic institutions -- such as legislatures -- of member states throughout the hemisphere.

There are many other contributions for the OAS to make when asked by member states. It could play an even greater role in political reconciliation; it could act as a consultant and adviser on government reform.

There are also other ways for OAS to help fortify our democracies. We all agree, for example, that we must improve government performance, making it more efficient and accountable and less subject to corruption and less vulnerable. Every OAS member has come to fully acknowledge the true costs of corruption to purse and polity. We agree that a hemispheric-wide commitment to combat it would benefit us all.

The draft declaration prepared by the OAS Working Group on Public Ethics contains many important elements that we hope the Summit will endorse.

We strongly support the notion of outreach through the Working Group to other organizations active in this area, such as the OECD. We also support the concept of an inter-American anti-corruption agreement. I wish to express my thanks to the member states this was it did not come from the United States in the first instance.

There are several areas of social policy which we have discussed where cooperative efforts could bear fruit and where the OAS can spur such cooperation.

Let us never forget the importance of social justice as we work to raise the prosperity of our region. First, the economic pie must be made larger if our peoples are to have any realistic chance at happiness. But how the pie is divided also matters.

It was not an accident that the OAS chose to make the elimination of extreme poverty one of its "essential purposes" as an organization, right along with strengthening democracy in the reforms of the Washington and Managua Protocols.

Democracy and respect for the needs and aspirations of ordinary people must go together. People want and deserve honest government that collects taxes from those who are able to pay and spends them wisely.

We can make progress on social issues at the Summit. All of us share concerns about money laundering and the drug trade that feeds it. At the Summit, we could urge the assembled nations to ratify the Vienna Convention, making it illegal to launder the proceeds of serious crime. Such legislation could be based on the model of the CICAD regulations.

The theme of environmental protection, so important to me and to our entire Administration, also emerged in our consultations as a topic worthy of discussion by our leaders.

The Summit is a logical forum to frame mutually agreed-upon environmental standards for the Americas, to instill better compliance regimes, and to intensify efforts to maintain the amazingly rich living resources of our hemisphere. These follow consistently from the commitments we all made at the 1992 Rio Conference, which I was privileged to attend along with many of you here.

One significant such step has already been taken in our hemisphere with the launching of the Central American Alliance for Sustainable Development.

I was honored to be at the Central American Ecological Summit in Managua October 12 and to express the commitment of my country to this exciting new endeavor. Together with the Central American nations, we plan to sign the CONCAUSA declaration on cooperation in sustainable development at the Summit of the Americas.

This hemisphere has made tremendous progress in recent years as we all know and recognize.

While there have been dramatic changes around the world, we can take special pride that the democratic revolution in our Hemisphere happened first. Democracy was re-established in our hemisphere even before the great democratic movement liberated Eastern Europe. The historic process of reconciliation in the Middle East has its counterparts in this hemisphere as well, notably in the process that has brought peace to Central America.

Never in history have Latin America, the Caribbean, Canada and the United States been in such close agreement on all the fundamental economic political and social values that are important to free peoples.

Never in its history has our hemisphere been so close to a universal family of democratically elected governments.

Never have we been more genuinely neighbors, determined to devote ourselves to making a neighborhood marked by the social and economic prosperity of all its peoples.

My government welcomes this historic moment as an opportunity to work toward foreign and economic policies with the hemisphere rather than merely toward the hemisphere.

We want to help create a region not of donors and recipients, but one in which all contribute, and in which all are respected. We seek the consolidation of an even more democratic hemisphere to provide the political foundation for all we want to achieve.

In his famous speech at Angostura, in 1819, Simon Bolivar looked ahead to what the Latin American independence movements could mean. Here is what he said:

"Flying through the ages yet to come, my imagination fixes itself on future centuries -- and observing from that vantage point ... I see it serving as the link, the focus, the emporium of the human family; I see it seated on the Throne of Liberty, clasping the scepter of Justice, crowned by Glory, displaying to the Old World the majesty of the modern world."

We now live in the time envisioned by Bolivar. We are the Organization of American States, yes. But we are also a community of American democracies. Let us strengthen the ties among us at the Summit.

Our languages will be different. But in our beliefs, our commitment and our dedication, we are one.

Nos vemos in Miami!

EXCERPTS FROM REMARKS BY PRESIDENT CLINTON
TO THE 75TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE
EDMUND J. WALSH SCHOOL OF FOREIGN POLICY
November 10, 1994

When I came to this hall as a candidate for president in 1991, I said . . . that we had to tear down the wall in our thinking between domestic and foreign policy, and forge a new economic policy, rooted in our own security interests, that would serve ordinary Americans by launching a new era of global growth. I argued then that all our efforts to lead the world would fail if we weren't strong at home, but that if we withdrew from the emerging global economy, our workers and our families would inevitably be hurt. And from the day I took office, we have acted on those beliefs.

Our economic strategy embraces change and prosperity, growth and security. We are pursuing this strategy because it promotes peace and prosperity around the world, but also because it is clearly in the interest of our working people and their families. It's good for American families. It produces high-wage jobs. It's a strategy that enables the United States to keep leading the fight to open markets worldwide; a strategy to promote free trade and the growth that undergirds democracies and helps to ensure peace; a strategy to help every American, family, every American worker, every American farmer, benefit from the world-wide growth and the prosperity it will yield.

The center, the heart of our economic policy must be an unbreakable link between what we do to open the global marketplace and what we do to empower American workers to deal with that marketplace. Understandably, at the end of the Cold War when the nuclear threat is receding, when we have so many pressing problems here at home and when people are clearly worried about their own personal circumstances, and when the government itself faces serious financial constraints because of years and years and years of piling up massive deficits, there are those on both the traditional left and traditional right in our country who would like us to withdraw more from the world -- politically, strategically, economically -- to stay more within our own borders.

* * *

Long before the Cold War was over, a new global economy was emerging -- an economy which started 20 years ago to put great pressures on the wages and benefits of our working people, to put great pressure on many of our companies to compete and win, to make internal changes in order to survive and prosper.

Now, this has helped to prompt a serious question about what our country should want and about whether government should act or should retreat in this area of our national life. I think what we have to want is a strong America -- a strong America in terms of national security and national defense, but also in terms of stronger families, better education, higher paying jobs, and safer streets. Strong at home, strong abroad; two sides of the same coin.

* * *

For too many of our people, trade still appears to be a gale-force wind, just another threat ready to blow away the prospects of a stable job at a good wage; just another problem adding to the already unstable, uncertain condition of their lives.

I believe that if we continue to work together on this trade issue -- Democrats, Republicans and independents -- as Americans, we can agree on ways to help all our people make their way in the new economy. We must help workers whose jobs are threatened by changing the workplace; by doing what we have to do to help them deal with imports or shifting winds. They'll have to retool; they'll have to reengage. But we can do that.

* * *

So our ultimate goal has to be to both spur the growth and provide the skills and create the package of high-wage jobs that will reverse the trend and increase the ability of our people to feel secure in the face of all this change, to see the changes that are going on as our friend and not our enemy. Of course, I believe very strongly that the only way we can do it is to keep breaking down barriers and keep expanding our exports. Every billion dollars in exports creates about 16,000 jobs in America, and on average, those jobs pay much better than other jobs in our work force.

Look at NAFTA. Our trade agreement with Mexico and Canada that provided our greatest moment of bipartisan cooperation in the last Congress. Thanks to NAFTA, new exports to Mexico and Canada have helped our businesses create as many as 100,000 jobs. In the six months after the treaty's adoption, exports from the United States to Mexico increased by nearly 20 percent -- about three times the rate of our overall export growth in this time of economic expansion. And the future looks brighter still and will be even brighter as the growth rate in Mexico picks up.

* * *

In the coming weeks, we have the opportunity to continue pursuing our economic strategy and to put in place three more crucial building blocks for American success in the 21st century. Next week as part of our strategy to develop regional initiatives that put the United States at the center of emerging and dynamic regions, I'll be in Indonesia to meet with leaders of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum. I'll be following that up with meeting with 33 democratically-elected leaders of our hemisphere at next month's Summit of the Americas down in Miami. And in the midst of these meetings, as Congress reconvenes, we'll be engaged in an historic effort to pass GATT, the largest most comprehensive trade agreement ever.

* * *

While we work to pass GATT, I'll also be looking ahead to continue to cement our relations with two of the fastest growing regions in the world, Asian and Latin America. For decades, our sights have been set on traditional economic

relationships, the large, mature economies of Europe and Japan. These nations will remain close allies, key competitors and critical markets for us. But the new century demands a new strategy, and it is clear that the young, vigorous economies of Asia and the Western Hemisphere offer enormous untapped potential for our people to prosper.'

* * *

One month from now, leaders from South and Central America, the Caribbean and North America will be in Miami at our invitation to discuss the future of our hemisphere and to celebrate the spread of freedom and democracy. Think of it: 33 leaders, including President Aristide of Haiti will attend the Summit of the Americas, the first such hemispheric gathering in almost three decades; all democratically-elected leaders.

There, we'll be able to work to strengthen the roots of those democracies through sustainable development, we'll be able to take crucial steps to increase trade, to maintain growth in the region, to lay concrete plans to open markets, to expand trade. We'll have a partnership for prosperity that stretches from Canada to the tip of South America. It means more jobs and higher incomes. It also means more peace, more freedom and more security.

As with GATT and APEC, the Summit of the Americas will move us toward a future of greater prosperity. It will tie us to new partners. And if we follow through, historians will look back at these events and see that our generation reached across the oceans and the borders to cement relationships with nations that will rank among the economic and political powers of the 21st century. We will have demonstrated that the American people have learned the lessons of the past, have learned the lessons of the present, and are ready for all the challenges that lie ahead.

Thirty years ago in this hall, [Professor] Carroll Quigley told the class of freshman that I was a part of that our greatness rested on the extraordinarily American belief that we could make the future better than the past. Many Americans today don't believe it, but the evidence is there, the future is there. We have to have the courage to act on that belief, to seize that future, and to keep our people optimistic, outward-looking and strong. If we are strong in our convictions, the reality is that our future will be strong as well.

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Democratic Leadership Council
10th Anniversary Gala Celebration
December 6, 1994



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
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POLICY FORUM
9:00 AM - 3:00 PM

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6:30 PM - 8:00 PM

ANNIVERSARY
GALA BALL
7:30 PM - 10:00 PM

Tenth Anniversary



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Number of Pages (Including Cover) 3

To: Karen Nussbaum

Fax: 219 5529

Phone: _____

Date: 11/28/94

From: Ruby Moy for Alexis Herman

Message: Karen: Alexis would like to know if
you are available to go and bring greetings
from W'House to the Wider Opportunities for
Women event on 12/6. Thanks

Ruby

Dolores
Crockett
will go &
attend WH
grtg's.
Hattie Dorman
said it would
be nice if
you could
drop by
as
you
are to
be on the
Board.



Wider Opportunities for Women

September, 1994

Dear Friend:

On Tuesday, December 6, 1994, the National Commission on Working Women will host a very special **Women at Work Awards** at the lovely **Shakespeare Theatre** at 450 7th Street, NW in Washington, DC. It's our 30th Anniversary, and we will honor a group of remarkable women who have changed history for working women. We know you'll want to be with us.

We ask you to hold the date — **December 6** from 5:00 to 8:00 p.m. — and plan to attend this year's gala event even if you are not from the Washington area. We are thrilled to announce the confirmed presentation of the Commissioners' Award to businesswoman, producer, actress Jane Fonda. Joining us in presenting the Awards will be Commissioners Linda Lavin and Maureen Bunyan.

More immediately, we are preparing a **30th Anniversary Journal** to be distributed at the gala and to our Women's Workforce Network serving 300,000 women each year. As a friend and supporter, we are asking you to join us as a contributor to the Women at Work Awards or to place an ad or message in our 30th Anniversary Journal. We offer options that permit nearly all of our supporters to help honor our 30 years of work to improve the lives of women and girls.

Our work has made a difference for women in our own community and across the country. From helping the woman on welfare in D.C. build her literacy skills and secure a union apprenticeship paying her a \$22,000 income to changing the laws to make more opportunities available to women in this country and beyond, we have made a difference. And you have helped make it possible. As a supporter and friend in the past, you have shown that you, too, value this work.

Please take some time to review the attached information which outlines different levels of participation in our 30th Anniversary event. If you have any questions or would like to know more about the National Commission on Working Women and Wider Opportunities for Women, you may contact Trudy Perry at (202) 638-3143 or Hattie Dorman, our 30th Anniversary Journal Chair at (202) 726-4681.

We hope you'll be a part of our 30th year celebration and help us launch an exciting fourth decade of work for working women. Begin today.

Sincerely,

Irene Natividad
Chairperson
National Commission
on Working Women

Anna Padia
Chairperson
Wider Opportunities
for Women

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Cynthia Marano, *Executive Director*

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MOMENTS FROM PAST WOMEN AT WORK AWARDS

Former Congresswoman Lindy Boggs presents 1993 Broadcast Journalism Award daughter Cokie Roberts.



1992 Women at Work awardees Janine Turner, Entertainment; Dona Atwood, Individual Leadership; and Robin Roberts, Broadcast Journalism.



Congresswoman Connie Morella accepts 1992 Public Policy Award from Chair



1993 Entertainment Awardee Kathy Najimy with WOW Board Chair Anna Padia.

**THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON WORKING WOMEN
OF
WIDER OPPORTUNITIES FOR WOMEN
30TH ANNIVERSARY WOMEN AT WORK AWARDS
DECEMBER 6, 1994, THE SHAKESPEARE THEATRE**



Name: _____

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I am interested in contributing to the Women at Work Awards, please reserve my place as a:

_____ Partner (\$5,000 - 10,000) • 8 reservations, VIP seating, introduction by an Awards host, full page journal ad, crediting in the invitation and program.

_____ Patron (\$2,000 - \$4,000) • 7 reservations, half page journal ad, crediting in the invitation and program.

_____ Sponsor (\$1,000) • 5 reservations, quarter page journal ad, crediting in the invitation and program.

_____ Donor (\$500) • 3 reservations, quarter page journal ad, crediting in the invitation and program.

_____ Friend (\$200) • 2 reservations, business card ad, crediting in the invitation and program.

_____ Gala Guest (\$150) • 1 reservation, business card listing, crediting in the invitation and program.

_____ Please send me an invitation for a \$60.00 ticket.

_____ Please send an invitation to my colleague _____
name and address

Contributors, please respond by October 7 for your name to appear in the invitation.

I am unable to attend the Awards, but please reserve an ad for me in the 30th Anniversary Journal.

_____ Center Spread	\$6,000
_____ Back Cover	\$4,000
_____ Inside Front Cover	\$4,000
_____ Inside Back Cover	\$4,000
_____ Full Page	\$1,000
_____ Half Page	\$ 500
_____ Quarter Page	\$ 250
_____ Business Card	\$ 100
_____ One Line Listing	\$ 25

The 30th Anniversary Journal page is 8.5 X 11 inches. Final ad deadline is November 1, 1994.
Please send camera-ready ad with payment to:

Wider Opportunities for Women
815 15th Street, N.W., Suite 916
Washington, D.C. 20005 (202) 638-3143
Checks should be made payable to Wider Opportunities for Women.

FULL PAGE 8"X 10"

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QUARTER PAGE 3 3/4" X 5"

BUSINESS CARD SIZE 3 3/4" X 2 3/8"

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 5, 1994

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: CAREN WILCOX
BARBARA WOOLEY

SUBJECT: BACKGROUND ON SENIOR EXECUTIVES - SCHOOL TO WORK
COMMITTEE MEETING - DECEMBER 6, 1994

You will find below information regarding the individuals with whom you will be meeting. You know Mr. Trotman of Ford. Mr. Featherstone was a Business Leader for Clinton/Gore in the campaign.

Roger H. Ballou
President
American Express
New York, New York

Appointed President, Travel Services Groups, U.S., in May 1989, Mr. Ballou is responsible for all domestic Travel and Corporate businesses for American Express TRS, including Business and Consumer Travel, Corporate Card, US Government Card and Purchasing Card. He began his career at American Express in 1979 holding various positions throughout the company. His interest in advanced education and continued industry research is evidenced by his support for the White House Conference on Travel & Tourism.

American Express Company, a diversified travel and financial services company founded in 1850, is a world leader in charge cards, Travelers Cheques, travel, financial planning and international banking. They are a sponsor of the Kennedy Center Gala for the Summit of the Americas in Florida this week.

Mitchell S. Fromstein
Chairman, President and CEO
Manpower Inc.
Milwaukee, WI

Mr. Fromstein heads the world's largest supplier of temporary help, operating 2,000 offices in 36 countries, employs approximately 1.2 million people each year. He took over the management of Manpower Inc. in 1976, and it has grown from \$300 million in sales to over \$3 billion in worldwide sales operating in 36 countries. Mr. Fromstein is very interested in skills measurement and training. Mr. Fromstein supported your health care principles and spoke out at a press conference at the Senate as well as on other occasions.

Alex Trotman
Chairman and CEO
Ford Motor Company
Dearborn, Michigan

Mr. Trotman was elected CEO of Ford in November 1993, having served previously as president and chief operating officer, Ford Automotive Group. A native of Great Britain, he joined Ford as a student trainee there in 1955. He came to the United States in 1969 as an special assignment. Mr. Trotman was president of Ford Asia-Pacific; president and chairman of Ford of Europe.

Mr. Trotman supported the principles of your health care plan, and recently signed a letter to you with other leaders of the auto industry regarding the U.S. Department of Transportation action against General Motors, (a case, which was settled this last week.) Ford is sponsor of the Kennedy Center Gala for the Summit of the Americas this week.

Harry E. Featherstone
Chairman & CEO
Will-Burt Company
Orrville, Ohio

Mr. Featherstone is CEO and Chairman of the Board for the Will-Burt Company. Mr. Featherstone is very active in the National Association of Manufacturers. He was a Business Leader for Clinton/Gore during the campaign. He has had a lifelong interest in educating young people, and has a personal track record of identifying young people and working with them to reach their potential best effort.

Jerome H. Grossman
Chairman & CEO
New England Medical Center
Boston, MA

Dr. Jerome H. Grossman came to the New England Medical Center as President in 1979 and became Chairman of its holding company in 1984. He was also promoted to Professor of Medicine at Tufts University School of Medicine in 1989. Dr. Grossman is known for his leadership in the evolving role of the academic health center and has been very active at both the local and national level in reforming the health care system.

Albert Hoser
President & CEO
Siemens Corporation
New York, New York

In 1991, Albert Hoser became President and CEO of Siemens Corporation. Prior, he was President and CEO of Siemens India Ltd., Bombay since 1984. He has been with Siemens since 1954. Siemens has an interest and much experience in school to work programs in Europe.

Heidi Jacobus
President
Cybernet
Ann Arbor, Michigan

Larry A. McVey
President
Thom McAn Shoe Company
Worcester, MA

Mr. McVey has been president of the company since 1980, and has been in the shoe business all of his life, having been a salesman, distributor and buyer. He is involved in the Footwear Distributors and Retailer of America and is active in its Foundation.

Thom McAn has nearly 800 stores located in 600 communities across the United States. It is part of the Melville Corporation which has 13 retailing divisions and one manufacturing division.

Melia Peavy
President
Peavey Electronics Corporation
Merida, Mississippi

Mrs. Peavey has been with Peavey Electronics since 1972 and now is its President. She has been dedicated to literacy in the workplace and works with abused children. She has addressed the Southern Governor's Association, and others on these important topics.

Peavey Electronics employs over 2100 people in 24 manufacturing facilities in Mississippi and Alabama. They have international operations in England and Canada. Their primary business is in the production of public address systems, power amplifiers and solid body electric guitars and other related commercial sound equipment.

Edward H. Rensi
President & CEO
McDonald's
Oak Brook, Illinois

Edward Rensi was named president and chief operating officer in 1984 and became President and CEO in 1991. He has been a member of the board since 1982. He joined McDonald's in 1966 as a grill man in Columbus, Ohio, and has served in various positions in the company since.

McDonald's and its franchisees create jobs for more than a half million people worldwide. It employs people in 14,000-plus restaurants around the world with forty regional offices and 25 market offices throughout the U.S.

Mitchel Sayare, Ph.D.
Chairman & CEO
ImmunoGen, Inc.
Cambridge, MA

Dr. Mitchel Sayare joined ImmunoGen in 1986 as President/CEO and currently serves as Chairman and CEO. As the first employee, Dr. Sayare was responsible for the development and execution of the Company's business plan, leading to commercialization of four anti-cancer drugs which are currently in clinical testing. He has raised over \$120 million to conduct the operation of this 190-person biopharmaceutical company and has brought the Company's lead product into Phase III clinical trials.

Lawrence J. Stupski
Vice Chairman
The Charles Schwab Corporation
San Francisco, CA

Mr. Stupski has been with Charles Schwab since 1980, and participated in its growth from revenues in 1980 of \$41 million to more than \$960 million last year. Mr. Stupski is an attorney, and worked for many years in banking and other brokerage businesses.

Mr. Stupski is a graduate of Yale Law School and received his B.A. from Princeton. He was born in Texas and raised in Jacksonville Florida.

Charles Schwab serves over 2.6 million active investor accounts across the United States.

Iva M. Wilson
President
Philips Display Company
Ann Arbor, Michigan

In 1983, Dr. Wilson joined Philips Display Components Company as Vice President of Engineering. Three years later, she was promoted to President, a position which she has held ever since.

Philips Display Components Company (PDC) is an operating company of Philips Electronics North American Corporation (one of the 100 largest manufacturers in the US with 40,000 employees and annual sales of more than \$6 billion), and manufacturers direct view color TV picture tubes and monochrome monitor display picture tubes.

**Master List of Attenders of School-to-Work event
December 6, 1994**

National Employer Leadership Council

Alexander Trotman
Chairman, CEO and President
Ford Motor Company

Roger H. Ballou
President
Travel Services Group
USA
American Express

Harry E. Featherstone
Chairman and CEO
Will-Burt Company

Mitchell Fromstein
Chairman of the Board
President and CEO
Manpower Corporation

Albert Hoser
President and CEO
Siemens Corporation

Heidi N. Jacobus
President
Cybernet Systems Corporation

Larry McVey
President
Thom McAn Shoe Company

Melia Peavey
✶ President
Peavey Electronics

Edward H. Rensi
President and CEO
McDonalds USA

Mitchel Sayare, Ph. D.
Chairman and CEO
ImmuGen Inc.

Lawrence J. Stupski
Vice Chairman
The Charlesa Schwab Corporation

Dr. Iva Wilson
President
Phillips Display Company

Jerome H. Grossman, M.D.
Chairman and CEO
New England Medical Center

National Employer Leadership Council Senior Staff

Linda Peresky
Senior Vice President
Education and Policy Development
American Express

Edward J. Farley
Vice President of Human Resources
The Charles Schwab Corporation

Peter J. Pestillo
Executive Vice President, Corporate Relations
Ford Motor Company

Renee Lerche
Director of Education, Training and Development
Ford Motor Company

Marcus Clarke
Manager of External and Governmental Education and Training Relations
Ford Motor Company

John M. Rauschenberger
Manager of Organizational Psychology and Development
Ford Motor Company

Frank Pocher
Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
ImmunoGen, Inc.

Stanley Stein
Sr. Vice President, Human Resources
McDonald's USA

Stephanie Skurdy
Home Office Director of Communications
McDonald's

Emanuel D. Berger
Vice President of Human Resources
New England Medical Center

Jere Hess
Director of Public Relations and Education
Peavey Electronics

April T. Flanagan
Vice President of Human Resources
Phillips Display Company

John Tobin
Director, Vocational and Technical Training
Siemens Corporation

Robert Weaver
Vice President, Human Resources Administration
Thom McAn

School-to-Work Team from Departments of Labor and Education

Jody Franklin
Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs
Department of Labor

Stephen Gaskill
Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs
Department of Labor

Thomas Glynn
Deputy Secretary of Labor

Jondel Hoye
National Director, School-to-Work Opportunities Act
Department of Labor

Kathryn S. Kahler
Director, Public Affairs
Department of Education

Augusta Kappner
Assistant Secretary, Vocational and Adult Education
Department of Education

Anne Lewis
Assistant Secretary, Vocational and Adult Education
Department of Education

Dennis Lieberman
Special Assistant, School-to-Work Office
Department of Labor

Patricia McNeil
Deputy Assistant Secretary, Vocational and Adult Education
Department of Education

Kerry Morgan
Special Assistant, Office of the Secretary
Department of Education

Stephanie J. Powers
Director, Communications
Department of Labor

Douglas Ross
Assistant Secretary, Employment and Training Administration
Department of Labor

Sally Sachar
Chief of Staff, Office of Assistant Secretary
Department of Labor

Gail Schwartz
Chief, Office of Correctional Education
Department of Education

Margariter Colmenores
Director, Corporate Liaison
Department of Education

Kevin J. Sullivan
Special Assistant, Office of the Secretary
Department of Education

Carole Wacey
Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary
Department of Education

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Dec 6 1994
1045
Roosevelt

December 5, 1994

School-to-Work National Employment Leadership Council Meeting

DATE: December 6, 1994
LOCATION: Cabinet Room/Roosevelt Room
TIME: 11:45 am
FROM: Stephen Silverman

I. PURPOSE

You will meet with the School-to-Work National Employer Leadership Council to express the Administration's commitment to this program and to thank them for their support of the School-to-Work Opportunities program.

II. BACKGROUND

The School-to-Work National Employer Leadership Council consisting of 23 CEO's of the major corporations implementing the School-to-Work Opportunities Act. The Council has been formed under the Chairmanship of Alexander Trotman, CEO of the Ford Motor Company (As you know, both Ford Motor Company and American Express, who will also be present at the meeting, will be major co-sponsors of the Summit of the Americas Gala). Today is the Council's first meeting. The self-defined mandate of the Council is 1) to be an advocate of the School-to-Work Opportunities program 2) to run and support "flagship" School-to-Work programs, and 3) to develop work-based opportunities for young people nationwide. After the Council meets with you, it will meet with Secretaries Reich and Riley to discuss their first-year work plan and goals of the Leadership Council.

On May 4, 1994, you signed the School-to-Work Opportunities Act into Law on the South Lawn using a desk built specifically for the occasion by students from the Manufacturing Technology Project in Flint, Michigan. Since then, the Departments of Labor and Education have awarded \$78 million in venture capital grants to implement the School-to-Work Opportunities Act nationwide (the grant descriptions are attached). A team of existing staff from the Departments of Labor and Education has been administering the program with the Department of Labor's J.D. Hoyer as the National Director.

This National Employer Leadership Council is a personal effort on the part of these CEOs reflective of their commitment to sponsor flagship School-to-Work programs and to undertake a major national business recruiting campaign --- all critical to this important systemic change effort.

The vision for School-to-Work Opportunities Act is broad -- it is not just a "program for non-college bound students" but rather about educational system reform which provides work-based learning opportunities for ALL students to prepare for their transition to the workforce, directly after high school graduation or after post-secondary education or training.

School-to-Work provides real, on-site experience to high school students across the country and gives them a clear picture of the opportunities available to them. For example, you may remember Chris Brady, the student speaker at the Bill Signing on May 4, 1994. Chris is a 20-year-old senior at Boston High School involved in the ProTech School-to-Work program in Boston, Massachusetts, where he spends his afternoons conducting currency transactions at the Fleet Bank. He has been accepted into a two-year business administration program at Newbury College, and will be the first in his family to attend college. Were it not for School-to-Work, Chris says he would spend his time bagging groceries.

As another example, Veronica Poleacu from Dearborn, Michigan, spent a summer interning with the Ford Academy of Manufacturing Services, where she was given, as she puts it, "the opportunity to appreciate teamwork". Both Chris and Veronica credit the School-to-Work program for enhancing their career opportunities.

III. PARTICIPANTS

The President

Secretary Robert Reich

Secretary Richard Riley

J.D. Hoyer, National Director, School-to-Work Team

Alexander J. Trotman, Chairman, National Employer Leadership Council and President,
Ford Motor Company

13 CEO's from the National Employment Leadership Council

Attached is a list of members of the National Employer Leadership Council, their Senior Staff and the School-to-Work Team from the Departments of Labor and Education.

IV. PRESS PLAN

Pool Spray during your opening remarks.

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

- **YOU** enter Cabinet Room, greet CEO's individually, and are seated.
- **YOU** make brief remarks. (Press Pool Spray)
- **YOU** ask Mr. Trotman for his comments.
- Mr. Trotman makes brief opening remarks.
- **YOU** and CEO's discuss School-to-Work implementation.
- **YOU** conclude meeting and exit with Mr. Trotman.

12:20 pm

- **YOU** proceed to Roosevelt Room with Mr. Trotman for brief thank you to the senior staff of the companies of the National Employer Leadership Council.
- **YOU** depart.

VI. REMARKS

Brief Talking Points and Q&A subjects provided by speechwriters. In addition, potential questions and answers are attached.

SCHOOL-TO-WORK OPPORTUNITIES GRANTS

as of 11/21/94

DEVELOPMENT GRANTS AWARDED:

50 States, District of Columbia, Puerto Rico \$15M

IMPLEMENTATION GRANTS AWARDED:**to STATES (5 yr. grants)**

Kentucky	\$ 4,000,000	New Jersey	\$ 6,000,000
Maine	\$ 2,000,000	New York	\$10,000,000
Massachusetts	\$ 5,500,000	Oregon	\$ 3,000,000
Michigan	\$ 8,000,000	Wisconsin	\$ 4,500,000

to LOCALITIES (1 yr. grants, subject to renewal)

Austin, TX	\$ 816,900	Tulare County, Visalia, CA	\$ 655,549
Boston, MA	\$ 1,200,000	So. N. H., Nashua, NH	\$ 562,120
Coos Bay, OR	\$ 428,814	New Haven, CT	\$ 494,773
Dade County, Miami, FL	\$ 675,000	NW Wisc., Ashland, WI	\$ 797,931
NE Minn., Cloquet, MN	\$ 256,082	Omaha, NE	\$ 649,822
Fox Valley, Appleton, WI	\$ 358,112	Rochester, NY	\$ 950,608
Marshalltown, IA	\$ 643,400	Saginaw, MI	\$ 577,500
San Diego, CA	\$ 946,405		

to URBAN/RURAL HIGH POVERTY AREAS (1 yr. grants, subject to renewal)

Cincinnati Youth Collab., OH	\$ 559,075	Uptown/Edgewater, Chicago, IL	\$ 474,128
RR 2000, Portland, OR	\$ 359,909	Dade County, Miami, FL	\$ 650,000
Coll.E. Utah, Blanding, UT	\$ 448,984	Project Riverbank, Modesto, CA	\$ 650,000
Compton, CA	\$ 536,086	Fort Worth, TX	\$ 650,000
CUNY, Bronx, NY	\$ 650,000	Craftmanship 2000, Tulsa, OK	\$ 527,160
Am. Ind. OIC, Minneapolis, MN	\$ 455,393	Durant, OK	\$ 184,280
Panhandle Area, Hayden, ID	\$ 431,328	Furr H.S., Houston, TX	\$ 594,107
Baltimore, MD	\$ 482,504	Phenix City, AL	\$ 571,340
Black Hills Partnership, Sturgis, SD	\$ 386,530	Highland Park, Detroit, MI	\$ 516,078
Coos County, OR	\$ 200,000	Mid-Valley, Yakima, WA	\$ 435,571
Austin, TX	\$ 237,527		

PLANNED TO BE AWARDED:

- December 1994 - Development grants to the Territories
- March 1995 - Development grants to Indian tribes and organizations
- 1995 and beyond - Implementation grants to remaining states, DC, PR, & Territories
 - Additional local, urban/rural high poverty area, and Indian grants



SPECIAL GUEST REGISTRATION FORM

DEMOCRATIC LEADERSHIP COUNCIL 10TH ANNIVERSARY GALA CELEBRATION TUESDAY, DECEMBER 6, 1994

You are invited to join the Democratic Leadership Council (DLC) as our special guest at the DLC 10th Anniversary Gala Celebration to be held on Tuesday, December 6, at the Sheraton Washington Hotel. The DLC 10th Anniversary Gala Celebration will begin with a day-long policy forum, at which the DLC will unveil a new agenda of radical New Democrat reforms to get America back on track. In the evening, there will be a special Leadership Dinner with President Clinton for PPI Trustees, members of the PPI Roundtable, and Patrons of the 10th Anniversary Gala. The day will conclude with a Gala Ball at which we'll toast "The DLC Decade" and look ahead to even greater successes in the future. It promises to be a day to remember, and we hope you will be there.

Name _____

Title _____

Address _____

City _____ State _____ Zip _____

Office Phone _____ Fax _____

SPECIAL EVENTS

- | | | |
|--|-------------------------------------|--|
| ☐ I will | ☐ I will not | attend the Policy Forum to be held from 9:00 a.m to 3:00 p.m. on Tuesday, December 6. |
| ☒ I will | ☐ I will not | attend the Leadership Dinner to be held from 6:30 p.m to 8:00 p.m. on Tuesday, December 6. |
| ☐ I will | ☐ I will not | attend the DLC 10th Anniversary Gala Ball to be held from 7:30 p.m. to 10:00 p.m. on Tuesday, December 6. |

Please return this form to the DLC in the enclosed envelope, or fax it to Debbie Boylan at (202) 544-5002, by Tuesday, November 15, 1994.

Dec 6 1994

11a

Roosevelt

**WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF PUBLIC LIAISON
BRIEFING MEMORANDUM**

TO: Alexis Herman
FROM: Caren Wilcox
Barbara Woolley
THROUGH: Steve Hilton
DATE: November 30, 1994

MEETING: School-to-Work CEO Event

DATE/TIME: Tuesday, December 6, 1994
11:00 am - 3:00 pm

LOCATION: Roosevelt Room, West Wing

PARTICIPANTS: 24 CEOs; their 24 Senior Staff; Secretary Robert Reich; Secretary Richard Riley; Assistant Secretaries

PURPOSE: To demonstrate to the business community the President's strong, personal commitment to building a school-to-work opportunities system in the Nation; to recognize the leadership and commitment of some of the Nation's top CEO's in creating a school-to-work system; to highlight the high level of business involvement in one of the President's education, economic and legislative accomplishments.

BACKGROUND: The School-to-Work Opportunities Act was signed into law by the President on May 4. High profile business involvement is the linchpin to successful school-to-work opportunities systems nationwide. Leading CEOs have agreed to form a National Employer Leadership Council to spearhead employer recruitment efforts. Alex Trotman, CEO of the Ford Motor Company will chair the Council, which will include CEOs from BellSouth, Siemens, American Express Travel Related Services, and McDonalds.

Fifty states, the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico have received school-to-work planning grants. Eight states have received implementation grants totaling \$43 million; 15 sites have been awarded local partnership grants. The Council will set employer recruitment goals and commit to sponsoring flagship school-to-work initiatives in their firms.

AGENDA:

11:00 am - 11:20 am **Roosevelt Room**

Alexis Herman - Welcome CEOs to White House

Robert Rubin - Tentative Drop By

Carol Rasco - Tentative Drop By

Gene Sperling - Tentative Drop By

11:30 am - 12:30 pm **Cabinet Room**

CEOs only proceed to Cabinet Room for meeting with POTUS

11:45 am - 12:30 pm **Cabinet Room**

POTUS enters and works room, makes brief opening remarks,
opens dialogue with CEO's

12:20 pm - 12:40 pm **Cabinet Room**

Corporate staff joins meeting in Cabinet Room

1:00 pm - 3:00 pm **Indian Treaty Room**

CEO's, CEO Staff, Secretaries, Deputy Secretaries move to Indian
Treaty Room (lunch and meeting)

Attachment: National Employer Leadership Council, Sequence of Events.

National Employer Leadership Council

December 6
Sequence of Events

10:30a-10:45a	CEO's, Corporate Staff, Administration arrive at Northwest White House Gate
10:45a-11:00a	Gather in west wing escort to Roosevelt Room
11:00a-11:30a	"Warm up": Welcome to White House
11:30a	Proceed to Cabinet Room for CEO only meeting
11:45a	POTUS joins, works the room
11:55a	POTUS: Brief opening remarks (Press Pool Spray)
12:00p	Trotman: Brief opening remarks
12:05p-12:20p	Dialogue between CEO's and POTUS
12:20p	Corporate staff (one per CEO) join meeting
12:20p-12:30p	Thank you and brief exchange between POTUS and corporate staff
12:30p	CEO's, CEO Staff, Secretaries, Deputy Secretaries, Assistant Secretaries return to Roosevelt Room
2:30p	Press availability (?)

PRESIDENT'S BOARD OF ADVISORS ON HISTORICALLY BLACK COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES

**Sheraton City Centre Hotel & Towers
1143 New Hampshire Ave. N.W.
Washington, D.C.**

AGENDA

Tuesday, December 6, 1994

9:00 a.m.	Opening Remarks and Introduction of Speaker	Dr. Lloyd V. Hackley
	Goals 2000, School Reform and HBCUs	Dr. Marshall Smith Under Secretary U.S. Department of Education
9:30 a.m.	Presentation & Discussion: National Association for Equal Opportunity in Higher Education (NAFEO)	Dr. Samuel Myers President, NAFEO
10:30 a.m.	***** BREAK *****	
10:45 a.m.	Presentation & Discussion: Office for the Advancement of Public Black Colleges (OAPBC)	Dr. Joyce Payne Director, OAPBC
11:45 p.m.	***** LUNCH *****	
1:15 p.m.	Discussion & Finalization of Recommendations	Board
3:00 p.m.	***** BREAK *****	
3:15 p.m.	Board Discussions (Continued)	
4:30 p.m.	Public Comments	
5:00 p.m.	Closing Comments & Adjournment	Dr. Lloyd Hackley

**FAYETTEVILLE STATE UNIVERSITY**

**1200 Murchison Road
Fayetteville, N.C. 28301-4298**

Transmittal Sheet

Office Of The Chancellor

Date: 11/7/94

Deliver To:

Ms. Alexis Herman
Assistant to the President
The White House

From: LLOYD V. HACKLEY Chancellor

No. of Pages 2 (Including this cover sheet)

Message

For responses to this transmission
Our telephone number is (910) 486-1141
Our fax number is (910) 486-4732



Dec 5
230-430
WH

November 3, 1994

Ms. Alexis Herman
Assistant to the President
Director of Public Liaison
Old Executive Office Building
Room 122
Washington, DC 20500

speech MP
230-430

Dear Ms. Herman:

Last week a sub-committee of the President's Board of Advisors on Historically Black Colleges and Universities met on the Fayetteville State University campus in North Carolina. This meeting was a good opportunity to review the charter of Executive Order 12876 and develop the agenda items and means to advise President Clinton about HBCUs.

To help bring clarity to the expectations and the envisioned relationship with the President's office and staff, the Board of Advisors invites you to attend the next White House Initiative meeting to be held on December 5-6, 1994, in Washington, DC. We would like for you to address the group on the morning of December 5, 1994, during our first day of deliberations. However, we will adjust our agenda to accommodate your availability.

The White House Initiative staff is preparing the agenda for the meeting, and as Chair of the Board of Advisors, I will greatly appreciate your contacting me at your earliest convenience so that appropriate arrangements can be made. Thank you for your continued support.

Sincerely,


Lloyd V. Hackley
Chancellor

cc: President William J. Clinton
Ms. Catherine LeBlanc

White House Initiative on Historically Black Colleges and Universities

NEWSLETTER

Issue No. 2

January 1995

U.S. Department of Education

Editor's Corner:



Happy New Year!

National Historically Black Colleges and Universities Week 1994 Proclamation by the President of the United States

A Proclamation

From Spelman to Fayetteville State, from Talladega to Texas Southern, historically Black colleges and universities continue to play an essential role in our Nation's heritage. For too many years in America, these schools were the only institutions of higher learning open to young African Americans. With their steadfast dedication to excellence in education, these proud schools help to nurture our country's greatest resource - the intelligence and imagination of our youth.

Historically Black colleges and universities quickly earned distinguished reputations, both for the quality of their scholarship and for their commitment to guaranteeing equal opportunity for all. Their invaluable contributions are evident in the countless students, past and present, who have benefitted from the rich educational experience these institutions provide. Their graduates have become accomplished participants in every aspect of society, have raised new generations to respect the values of knowledge and discovery, and, with the unique perspective of their schooling, have immeasurably enriched the lives of their communities and of our entire Nation.

As we pause this year to recognize the continuing importance of these outstanding schools, we have new cause for optimism that such academic communities will remain vibrant and enduring leaders in American education. On November 1, 1993, I was proud to sign an Executive Order committing greater Federal attention to strengthening historically Black colleges and universities. This order establishes a commission comprised of representatives from those schools, along with business leaders and other educational officials. Guided by the high standards set by our Goals 2000: Educate America Act, this commission will explore new ways to enhance the infrastructure of these institutions and to facilitate future planning and development. Working together, we can prepare these colleges and universities, some of America's finest, to meet the challenges of the twenty-first century and beyond.

To heighten awareness of that crucial goal and to recognize the critical role that historically Black colleges and universities have played in the lives of African Americans throughout the land, the Congress, by Senate Joint Resolution 21, has designated the week beginning September 18, 1994, as "National Historically Black Colleges and Universities Week" and has authorized and requested the President to issue a proclamation in observance of this commemoration.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, WILLIAM J. CLINTON, President of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim the week of September 18 through September 24, 1994, as National Historically Black Colleges and Universities Week. I call upon the people of the United States, including government officials, educators, and volunteers, to observe this week with appropriate programs, ceremonies, and activities.

IN WITNESS, WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this twentieth day of September, in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and ninety-four, and of the Independence of the United States of America the two hundred and nineteenth.

WILLIAM J. CLINTON

103d Congress - Joint Resolution

Designating the week beginning September 18, 1994 as "National Historically Black Colleges and Universities Week".

- ◆ Whereas there are 104 historically black colleges and universities in the United States;
- ◆ Whereas such colleges and universities provide the quality education so essential to full participation in a complex, highly technological society;
- ◆ Whereas black colleges and universities have a rich heritage and have played a prominent role in American history;
- ◆ Whereas such institutions have allowed many underprivileged students to attain their full potential through higher education; and
- ◆ Whereas the achievements and goals of the historically black colleges and universities are deserving of national recognition: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the week beginning September 18, 1994, is designated as "National Historically Black Colleges and Universities Week" and the President of the United States is authorized and requested to issue a proclamation calling upon the people of the United States and interested groups to observe each such week with appropriate ceremonies, activities and programs, thereby demonstrating support for historically black colleges and universities in the United States.

Senator Strom Thurmond

Senator Floyd Spence


Approved October 27, 1993

To honor Historically Black Colleges and Universities' Week, on September 20, 1994, Secretary of Education Richard Riley and Secretary of Labor Robert Reich hosted a reception at the Department of Labor, to celebrate the contributions made by Historically Black Colleges and Universities to this country. The reception and exhibits were sponsored by Mr. George David, CEO, United Technologies. Among those in attendance were the following members from the U. S. Congress: Representative Robert Scott (VA), Representative Donald Payne (NJ), Representative Melvin Watt (NC) and Representative Don Johnson (GA). Special activities to highlight HBCU Presidents and staff to federal opportunities were held during HBCU week at the following agencies:

National Aeronautics & Space Administration
Corporation for National Services
Department of Labor
Department of State - Agency for International Development
Department of Education - Student Financial Assistance
United States Information Agency
National Endowment for the Humanities
Department of Housing & Urban Development

Twenty Members Named to the Presidents Board of Advisors on Historically Black Colleges and Universities.

President Clinton recently appointed twenty members to serve on the President's Board of Advisors on HBCUs (PBA). Those named to the Board are: *Dr. Lloyd "Vic" Hackley*, Chancellor of Fayetteville State University and



Chairman of the President's Board of Advisors;
Ms. Lucille Ish, Chairperson of Talledega Colleges' Board of Trustees

and Vice Chair of the PBA; *Dr. Robert Albright*, Executive Vice President for Programs, Research, Development, Field Services, and Teaching and Learning with the Educational Testing Service (ETS); *Dr. Oswald P. Bronson, Sr.*, President of Bethune Cookman College; *Dr. Ramona Edelin*, President and CEO of the National Urban Coalition; *Dr. Sebetha Jenkins*, President of Jarvis Christian College; *Dr. Arthur E. Johnson*, Loral Federal Systems; *Dr. Adib Akmal Shakir*, President of Tougaloo College; *Dr. Dolores Spikes*, President of Southern University System; *Dr. Arthur E. Thomas*, President of Central State University; *Dr. Valora Washington*, Vice President-Program for the W. K. Kellogg Foundation; *Dr. Bernard C. Watson*, President and CEO of William Penn Foundation; *Ms. Barbara D. Wills-Duncan*, North Carolina University System's Board of Governors; *Mr. Ralph B. Everett*, Managing Partner of the Washington office of Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker; *Dr. Burnett Joiner*, President of LeMoyne Owen College; *Dr. Earl S. Richardson*, President of Morgan State University; *Dr. Myer L. Titus*, President of Philander Smith College; *Dr. Frederick Humphries*, President, Florida A&M University; *Mr. Thomas Farrington*, President and CEO of Farrington and Associates; *Mr. William Walker*, Executive Director, The King Center; *Dr. Kassie Freeman*, Assistant Professor of Education, Vanderbilt University; and, *Ms. Catherine W. LeBlanc*, Executive Director, White House Initiative on HBCUs as the Designated Federal Officer to the Advisory Board.

The President's Board of Advisors on Historically Black Colleges and Universities advises the President and Secretary of Education on ways to increase educational policy as it relates to HBCUs. **All meetings**

are opened to the public. Meeting dates will be published in the Federal Register.

HBCU HIGHLIGHTS

The Honorable Dan Blue, Speaker of the North Carolina House of Representatives was the guest speaker at **Fayetteville State University's** Fall Convocation on Thursday, September 15, 1994.

Dr. Leo Edwards, Jr., Professor of Mathematics and Director of the Mathematics & Science Education Center at **Fayetteville State University** was honored with the *W. W. Rankin Award of Excellence in Mathematics, Education*. The annual award is presented to individuals who have made outstanding contributions to mathematics education by the North Carolina Council of Teachers of Mathematics.

Nima Warfield, Phi Beta Kappa, **Morehouse College**, became the first Rhodes scholar from a historically Black college. He was selected from among 1,200 applicants - competing on the basis of academic achievement, integrity, leadership ability and athletic prowess. The 21 year old student, with a grade point average of 4.0 (on a 4.0 scale) was awarded one of only 32 international Rhodes Scholarships designated for the U.S. last December.

Dr. Maurice S. Holder, Associate Professor in the College of Pharmacy and Pharmaceutical Sciences at **Florida A&M University** was chosen by the White House's Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) to become the new National Association of State Universities and Land Grant Colleges (NASULGC) Council on Research Policy and Graduation Education (CRPGE) fellow in the Office of Science and Technology Policy.

FEDERAL AGENCIES

HIGHLIGHTS

The **U. S. Department of Education** selected Howard University, a historically Black college and university in Washington, D. C., and John Hopkins University, a major private research university in Baltimore, to receive \$4.7 million in the coming year and a total of \$27.7 million over the next five years to establish a Center for Research on the Education of Students Placed At Risk (CRESPAR). The center will conduct rigorous, large-scale studies to help policymakers.¹

Florida A&M University received \$3.8 million from the **U. S. Department of Energy** to fund an Environmental Biotechnology Program that will provide scholarships and funding for post-doctoral minority environmental research scientists, and help to establish bachelor's and master's degree programs in environmental science.² The institution also received an award totaling \$892,416 to increase the number of minorities in careers related to radiation protection from the **Savannah River Operations Office and Oak Ridge National Laboratories**.

Other grant recipients from the **Department of Energy** were:

- **Paine College**, \$20,904 to establish a pre-freshman program for 25 high achieving minority students to instill in them the desire to pursue careers in science, math, or engineering;
- **South Carolina State University** \$99,600 to train 50 technically skilled Westinghouse Savannah River Company personnel (engineering/sciences) in the entrepreneurial process, enabling them to enhance their chances to become entrepreneurs based upon technology

development at the Savannah River Site; and,

- **North Carolina A&T State University** \$262,070 for Infrastructure Support for a Waste Management Institute (WMI)

The recipients of a \$14.4 million grant awarded by the **U. S. Department of Energy**, to establish endowed Chairs of Excellence to enable the universities to increase opportunities for minorities in engineering and environmental technologies were:

- **Tuskegee University**
- **Tennessee State University**
- **Southern University @ Baton Rouge**
- **Prairie View A&M University**
- **North Carolina A&T State University**
- **Morgan State University**
- **Howard University**
- **Hampton University**
- **Florida A&M University**

The Chairs to be named after *Dr. Samuel P. Massey*, will emphasize and nurture the environmental disciplines at the institutions.

A consortium of sixteen HBCUs entered into a \$4.25 million cooperative agreement with the **Department of Health and Human Services** to design, develop, implement and test a series of models aimed at reducing levels and incidence of violence, alcohol and other drug abuse among minority individuals, families and communities.

The **U. S. Department of Housing and Urban Development** awarded \$13.4 million to 28 HBCUs to stimulate economic development, promote neighborhood revitalization, and foster anti-poverty strategies within America's minority communities.

Hampton University was the recipient of a \$3.75 million award from the **U. S. Department of Defense (Air Force)**, to establish an Aeroscience Institute to train

¹ October 3, 1994, U. S. Department of Education Press Release
² September 29, 1994 Press Release - Florida A&M University

minorities, women, and displaced defense workers for critical commercial aviation disciplines with existing or expected personnel shortages.

Black History Month

Please address all inquiries and requests for additional copies to:

The White House Initiative on Historically
Black Colleges and Universities
600 Independence Avenue, S. W.
Room
Washington, D. C. 20202-
Telephone:
Fax:

STRATEGY SESSION

I. How can the White House Initiative on HBCUs serve the needs of the President?

- Increase the positive visibility and awareness of his achievements to the black community.
- Provide a vehicle for him to reach directly into the black community using a subject that has widespread bi-partisan and community support - education.
- Embrace his desire to have an impact on the violence affecting African American young people through a major initiative.

II. What can we do to solidify the President's base of support among the black college community?

- Give the Presidents access to him through his Board of Advisors.
- Ensure that the HBCU Initiative has clout and visibility.
- Get him on some strategic campuses.
- Support strong voter registration drives.

III. Who is that community?

- Every black college graduate in the country
- Every black college graduate's immediate and extended family
- Every black college student in the country
- The neighborhoods and cities where the colleges are located
- Black churches who support those colleges and send their students to those colleges
- In short, a significant segment of the black community in this country.

IDEAS:

---Provide immediate support to strengthen the HBCU Initiative from the White House and OMB;

---Use the colleges to promote the President's social agenda for the black community: improvement of educational opportunities, support of black entrepreneurship, violence prevention, housing renovation;

---Schedule meeting between the President and his Board of Advisors;

---Develop a brochure on the Administration's involvement and achievements with black colleges.

LESSONS LEARNED

1. Many believe that Nixon had the most success with Minority Business development because he gave Bob Brown, an African American, presidential authority in the the White House to handle all minority business issues. Nixon reportedly created a Minority Business Council, composed of Cabinet Secretaries (who often delegated authority to their Deputies), and appointed Brown as Chairman. The Council met monthly with Brown at the White House and reported on their progress to date. (We have been told that he was pretty relentless in his push).

2. The current implementation of the President's Executive Order on Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCUs) has been uneven across agencies because there was no push from the White House to the agencies after the highly successful ceremonial signing which was attended by the President, Vice President, and Education Secretary. The right signal was sent from the President with the ceremony and he did acknowledge that I would be in place to implement the Order. A key missing element of the process, however, was a push from him to the Cabinet that this was a continuing expansion of his politics of inclusion and diversity, and that he would expect the same kind of effort that was devoted to producing diversity in the workforce to be exhibited in this area.

3. Reflecting upon the success of the White House Personnel process in generating a diverse workforce, the following elements emerge as having been crucial:

- (a) commitment from the President that it would happen;
- (b) persons were put in place to ensure that the President's commitment was complied with;
- (c) little to no deviation from the process which was put in place was tolerated;
- (d) constant monitoring and gatekeeping activities (hourly, daily, weekly) which yielded baseline data for constant comparisons;
- (e) serious outreach was a critical component of surfacing candidates of color who met qualifications criteria.

4. Once the President sets the tone, it is crucial that the Secretaries and agency heads model his commitment through implementation of the spirit and letter of both Executive Orders. Crucial elements that are designed to strengthen his orders over prior ones have to be implemented in order to produce more tangible results. These elements include the establishment of goals, the designation of a senior official who reports to the agency head to oversee implementation and monitoring, and (for HBCUs), OMB's involvement in monitoring performance.

Based on these lessons learned, the following is recommended to ensure that minority businesses and Black colleges receive their fair share of business and grant opportunities:

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. A position be established immediately in the White House, preferably in the Chief of Staff's office, to oversee and monitor implementation of the latest Executive Order (attached).
2. The President make a major announcement in an appropriate setting of his support of this effort and talk about the infrastructure that he has put in place to make it happen.
3. The President announce to his Cabinet his commitment to this area and its importance to his overall diversity and inclusion agenda and his expectations relative to concurrence.
4. The position developed in the White House should be filled by an African American male to give some balance to current voids.

RELEVANT TALKING POINTS

-At the rate in which we are headed, the President's legacy in both these areas (minority business and HBCU participation) may be less than prior Administrations if something is not done. Cite recent FY '93 data on participation of HBCUs in federal programs which indicate a downward thrust in some agencies such as DOD, which went from \$51 million in FY'92, to \$46 million in FY'93, almost a 10% drop; and EPA, from \$11 million in FY'93, to \$4 million in FY'92, a 61% drop.

-African American businesspeople are growing more and more disenchanted with the Administration and they provide the bulk of financial support for the President's fundraising efforts. They would be a prime group for the Republicans to target. The President could neutralize that threat with this effort.

-Even though the SBA and the MBDA have their functions targetted in this area, there is really no one overseeing government-wide activity. The person in this new position could not only interface with agency heads and their designees, he could also help to disseminate information on initiatives that are working (like the programs that Secretary O'Leary has put in place; see attached testimony delivered on the Hill on their program).

-Reinvention activities give us an opportunity to review and remove some of the current barriers that prevent effective participation.

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December 1, 1994

Dec 5, 1994
515-715
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MEMORANDUM TO [DISTRIBUTION LIST]

FROM: Linda Moore, Political Affairs

RE: DLC State Chapter Leaders Reception -- Monday, November 5th

Our office will be hosting a reception for the Democratic Leadership Council's State Chapter Leaders in the Indian Treaty Room on November 5th from 5:15 - 7:15 p.m. The Vice President is planning to drop by at about 5:30. We would like to invite you to attend.

Please give me or Joe Trahern a call if you have any questions. We can be reached at ext. 6-6257.

I hope you can make it.

DISTRIBUTION:

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2p Leave WH
Sheraton City Centre**PRESIDENT'S BOARD OF ADVISORS ON
HISTORICALLY BLACK COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES****Sheraton City Centre Hotel & Towers
1143 New Hampshire Ave. N.W.
Washington, D.C.****AGENDA****Monday, December 5, 1994**

9:00 a.m.	Welcome, Opening Comments	Dr. Lloyd V. Hackley Chairman
	Swearing-In Ceremony	Ms. Catherine LeBlanc Executive Director White House Initiative Office
9:30 a.m.	Presentation & Discussion: Recommendations of the Strategic Planning Task Force	Ms. Bettie Eubanks Consultant Viewpoint Group, Inc.
10:30 a.m.	***** BREAK *****	
10:45 a.m.	Discussion of Task Force Recommendations	Board
12:00 p.m.	***** LUNCH *****	
1:15 p.m.	Reconvene & Introduction of Speaker	Dr. Lloyd V. Hackley
1:30 p.m.	Presentation & Discussion: United Negro College Fund, (UNCF)	The Hon. William Gray President and CEO, UNCF
2:30 p.m.	Overview: The White House Initiative on Historically Black Colleges and Universities	Ms. Catherine LeBlanc Executive Director
3:30 p.m.	A View from the White House	The Hon. Alexis Herman Assistant to the President and Director, Office of Public Liaison
4:30 p.m.	Presentation & Discussion: State Postsecondary Review Entity (SPRE) Advisory Council	Dr. Edward A. Johnson Chairman, State Higher Edu- cation Executive Officers (SHEEO), SPRE Technical Assistance Network
5:00 p.m.	Closing Comments & Adjournment	Dr. Lloyd V. Hackley

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION**White House Initiative on HBCUs****Phone (202) 708-8667****Fax (202) 708-7872****FAX TRANSMISSION**


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Date: 12-4-94
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PLEASE CALL THIS OFFICE IMMEDIATELY**

Message: D Agenda for tomorrow's meeting.

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Summit of the Americas 1994

For to Merge

A Note to Florida Business Leaders:

I wanted to give you some early information on events taking place throughout Florida over the next few months. As a leader in Florida's business community, you may have a special interest in attending any of the conferences described below. Elected officials, prominent business persons, and community leaders are expected to attend these meetings. On behalf of the Summit of the Americas 1994, we would like the opportunity to include you in some special Pre-Summit events:

1. On Friday, September 16, from 2:00 pm to 3:30 pm, a conference will be held in Orlando at the Presidential Parlour, Church Street Station. Secretary of the Treasury Lloyd Bentsen is expected to discuss the upcoming Summit of the Americas.
2. During October 26-27, a Western Hemispheric Transportation Initiative will take place in Tampa at the Tampa Convention Center. Secretary of Transportation Federico Peña will participate. Transportation Ministers from the Americas are also expected to attend various high level meetings and receptions during this two day event.
3. During October 27-29, a Western Hemispheric Tourism Ministerial Meeting will be held in Orlando at the Hyatt Regency Hotel, at the Orlando International Airport. The Secretary of Commerce, The Honorable Ron Brown will be speaking, along with Tourism Ministers from throughout the Americas. Greg Farmer, the Undersecretary of Commerce for International Tourism will also participate.
4. During December 4-6, a Customs Trade Symposium will be held in Miami. This event is being sponsored by the U.S. Customs Service, the Greater Miami Chamber of Commerce, the World Trade Center of Miami, and the Port of Miami.

Summit briefings will take place in conjunction with these conferences. For more details about the upcoming events, or to R.S.V.P., please contact Patrick Gorman at 579-7671. We hope you can attend!

Regards,

Luis Laureda
Executive Director

WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF PUBLIC LIAISON
BRIEFING MEMORANDUM

TO: Daniel Fried
Carlos Pasquale

FROM: Marilyn DiGiacobbe

THROUGH: Alexis Herman

DATE: December 2, 1994

Am
Rev Bertalan
Chen

EVENT: Briefing for the Hungarian American Coalition

DATE AND TIME: Friday, December 2, 1994
4:30 pm - 6:00 pm

LOCATION: Indian Treaty Room (Room 474)
Old Executive Office Building

PARTICIPANTS: 50-60 individuals, including board members
and corporate sponsors of the Hungarian
American Coalition from throughout the
country. See attached list.

PURPOSE: To brief this group on the accomplishments of
our foreign policy toward Hungary and other
CEE countries.

BACKGROUND: The Hungarian American Coalition is an
organization of Hungarian-Americans whose
goal is to focus the resources of its
members, to inform them, the press, and the
general public about developments in Hungary,
and to promote contact between Hungary and
the United States in culture, education and
business.

The organization was founded three years ago
by Edith Lauer (of Shaker Heights, Ohio) and
Peter Ujvagi (Democratic City Councilman of
Toledo, Ohio and early supporter of the
President). In forming the organization,
Edith Lauer and Peter Ujvagi saw the need for
a more moderate voice in the Hungarian-
American community, which has a tendency in
its activists to be more conservative.

Members of the Hungarian American Coalition,
have participated in a dialogue with the
White House over the past 2 years on foreign

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policy issues including the Partnership for Peace and NATO expansion. Edith Lauer and Peter Ujvagi attended the Milwaukee meetings in January with Vice President Gore and Edith Lauer met with the President here at the White House in March. They have been carrying our message to the Hungarian-American community. See attached articles.

The upcoming Budapest trip makes it very good timing to address this group. Following are some of the questions and concerns the group will most likely raise:

- 1) what do the problems with Bosnia mean to the future of NATO and NATO expansion;
- 2) will Hungary be excluded from the first round of NATO expansion;
- 3) minority rights issue;
- 4) how will the new government in Hungary effect US aid programs;
- 5) how will the new US Congress effect US aid and foreign policy toward CEE;
- 6) CSCE vs. NATO, what role does CSCE play.


AGENDA:

Alexis Herman - Welcome and Introduction

Daniel Fried - Overview of US Policy toward CEE countries and goals of President's trip to CSCE

Carlos Pasquale - Description of US foreign aid to Hungary and CEE countries

Additional briefer - being determined



Meeting at the White House on March 2, 1994



Members of the Hungarian American Coalition with President Clinton: Edith Lauer, Dr. András Ludányi, László Hámos, Rev. Imre Bertalan, László Papp. Also Shown: Andrew Rajec, Slovak League of America; Ms. Alexis Herman, Assistant to the President and Director, Office of Public Liaison; Daniel Fried, Director, European Affairs, National Security Council; Jan Nowak, National Director, Polish American Congress.

The Clinton Administration continued its dialogue with leaders of the East Central European ethnic community by inviting to the White House the same 20 participants who met with Vice President Gore in Milwaukee two months before. President Clinton, in the course of a 20 minute long visit, noted that he has made a conscious decision to clearly establish the importance of U.S. policy toward East Central Europe.

He stressed the positive role Partnership for Peace will play in strengthening the forces of reform not only in the Visegrad Countries, but also in Russia and Ukraine. In response to the Wall Street Journal articles critical of the waste and ineffectiveness of aid to the ECE, the President plans to issue new directives through the National Security Council on how to improve the efficacy of U.S. programs. In addition, he asked those present to communicate the administration's concerns on both domestic and foreign policy issues to those in their community who question the necessity for foreign aid.

Deputy Secretary of State, Strobe Talbott, attempted to reassure the group that U.S. foreign policy, specifically its support for equal access to the Partnership for Peace, remains the best response to the constantly changing situation in Russia, and, at the same time, offers an arena for cooperation and a sense of security for the Visegrad Countries. However, he acknowledged a basic difference in opinions: "The Question is, what kind of Russia will we have in the 21st century? You feel Russia will revert to type and foresee a dangerous scenario; we see Russia more positively and do not want to undercut those forces which are building a benign democratic system."

Sandy Berger, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security, advised the conference participants that the concerns expressed at the January Milwaukee meeting have caused the Administration to reorganize those who deal with ECE matters. The new appointments are: Richard Schifter, Senior Director for East Central Europe, National Security Council, and Peter Tarnoff, Undersecretary of State for East Central Europe at the State Department. Former U.S. Ambassador to Hungary, Charles Thomas, will also be involved in coordinating U.S. policy in the region.

Milwaukee Conference on NATO Membership for the Visegrad Countries

President Clinton invited the leaders of Central Europe's American ethnic organizations to meet with him in Milwaukee, Wisconsin on January 5-6, 1994. The twenty invited representatives from Polish-American, Hungarian-American, Czech-American, and Slovak-American groups stressed the importance of NATO membership for the Visegrad Countries.

Hungarian-American organizations were represented by Rev. Imre Bertalan and Edith Lauer (Hungarian American Coalition), Laszlo Papp (American Association of the Hungarian World Federation), Andrew Ludanyi (Hungarian Communion of Friends), and Peter Ujvagi (City Councilman for Toledo, Ohio).

President Clinton's speech, delivered by Vice President Gore, emphasized that the United States' initiative, called Partnership for Peace would be the first step toward the eastern expansion of NATO, eventually leading to membership for the Visegrad Countries.

Following the speech, at a private roundtable conference the above mentioned attendees thanked Vice President Gore for United States' efforts to work for NATO membership for the Visegrad. On behalf of Hungarians both in Hungary and abroad, Edith Lauer thanked Vice President Gore for attending Prime Minister Jozsef Antall's funeral. She reminded those present that Jozsef Antall must be remembered for his historic initiative in bringing together the Visegrad Countries.

Laszlo Hamos conveyed the concerns of the Hungarian-American community regarding the threatened status of ethnic Hungarians in Vojvodina. Additionally, he urged the United States administration to promote international legal protection for ethnic minorities and to include this in the Partnership for Peace program. Vice President Gore responded positively by stating that one aim of Partnership for Peace is to resolve ethnic conflicts.

Peter Ujvagi summarized the proposals which were discussed during the hour-long conference, emphasizing that the Partnership for Peace should determine both the criteria and timetable for the admission of new NATO members. He also recalled the deep disappointment and tragic consequences which resulted from the broken promises of Western support during the 1956 Hungarian Revolution. He asked Vice President Gore that the U.S. not make any promises to the Visegrad Countries that it cannot keep.

A three hour long preliminary briefing, held on the previous evening provided an excellent opportunity for the 20 ethnic leaders to engage in an intensive discussion with the President's foreign policy advisors: Sandy Berger, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security; Daniel Fried, Director for East Central Europe, National Security Council; as well as the moderator of the meeting, Ms. Alexis Herman, Assistant to the President and Director of Public Liaison, whose office organized the conference.

A unanimous stance was taken by the 20 ethnic leaders regarding the following three issues:

- U.S. interests are well served by assuring stability in Europe through a revitalized NATO Alliance with rapid membership for the Visegrad Countries;
- The Administration's proposed Partnership for Peace will be effective only if it is a first step in a well-defined strategy, which includes criteria and a timetable for NATO membership;
- U.S. foreign policy and NATO must deal with the security of East Central Europe as a separate issue from the progress of democratic reforms in Russia.

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Coalition Project Updates	pages 4-5
News from our Members	pages 6-10
About the Coalition	page 11

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Budapest Liaison	Dr. Stephen Benko
Board of Directors	
Judy Balogh	Hungarian Club of Toledo
Dr. Eniko Molnar Basa	American Hungarian Educator's Association
Dr. Stephen Benko	
Rev. Imre Bertalan	
Ildiko Bodoni, Esq.	Hungarian American Human Rights Council
Laszlo Bojtos	Magyar Club of Cleveland
Dr. Edward Chaszar	Hungarian Scouts Assoc. Abroad
Paul Fekete	
Laszlo Hamos	Hungarian Human Rights Foundation
Bishop Andrew Harsanyi	Hungarian Reformed Church of America
Geza Kadar, Jr., Esq.	
Frank Koszorus, Jr., Esq.	American Hungarian Federation of Metropolitan Washington, D.C.
Rev. Paul Kovacs	Bosnian Home
Edith Lauer	
Dr. Andrew Ludanyi	
Rev. Istvan Mustos	American Hungarian Catholic Clergy Assoc.
Dr. Karoly Nagy	Hungarian Alumni Assoc. Bessanyei Assoc.
Dr. Peter Pastor	Atlantic Research and Publications, Inc.
George Pogan	F.A.C.H.E. Cleveland Hungarian Development Panel
Dr. Paul Rupprecht	Minnesota Hungarian Inc.
Dr. Imre Schiff	American-Hungarian for Human Rights in Delvidok
Dr. Balazs Somogyi	Hungarian Communion of Friends
Helen Szablya	Comprehensive Health Education Foundation
Zsolt Szekeres	
Bishop Dr. Francis Vitez	Calvin Synod of the United Church of Christ
Sandor Taraszovics	Committee for Danubian Research
Dr. Paul Teleki	
Peter Ujvagi	
Paul Varga	Hungarian (Magyar) Club Chicago, IL
Suzanne Virgulak	Hungarian Reformed Federation of America

The possibility of shaping history

By EDITH K. LAUER

When the possibility of extending NATO membership to the Visegrad countries was first mentioned last fall, many of us in Cleveland's large Hungarian-American community felt justice was being done. Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic were all newly democratic states and would surely welcome accession to NATO enthusiastically.

Hadn't they fought a courageous battle to defeat Communism for just such a chance, to be reintegrated into Western Europe, where countries like Hungary and Poland had belonged for over a millennium?

Wouldn't NATO membership strengthen their hard-earned democratic gains, fill the power vacuum created by the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, and through extended cooperation, speed up their economic development?

But soon, we were disappointed to learn, the initial plan for the eastward expansion of NATO gave way to something called the Partnership for Peace. This new concept, without criteria or timetable for acceptance into NATO seemed to say: "New members need not apply."

Why was this new approach substituted for the initial plan, which in a bold, decisive act of leadership could have defined a new, post-Cold War role for NATO? Because, apparently at the advice of Strobe Talbott, Ambassador at Large to the former Soviet Republics, President Bill Clinton made a "judgment call." He chose to yield to Russian fears of isolation and of rising nationalism, rather than promote an immediate partnership with the Visegrad countries, which have made the most progress in implementing democratic reforms. This choice, we feared, may have sent a dangerous message by appearing to make the security of

The Partnership for Peace must deal with the security of East Central Europe as a separate issue from the progress of democratic reforms in Russia.

East Central Europe contingent upon instability in Russia.

Thus, when twenty leaders of East Central European ethnic organizations received an invitation to discuss this foreign policy issue with Clinton, we travelled to Milwaukee anxious to communicate our communities' doubts about the potential effectiveness of the Partnership for Peace.

In the course of long discussions with senior national security advisers, the consensus among the ethnic leaders was remarkable, although few of us had met each other before. Our dialogue with administration members showed that we viewed these issues from very different perspectives. What was "reality" to the administration, was perceived very differently by us.

For example, they said the partnership was a logical beginning; we felt the partnership could only be successful, if it had criteria and a timetable for the eastern expansion of NATO. They stressed the importance of not "drawing a new line in Europe"; we pointed out that by not differentiating among potential partners, NATO would, in effect, cement the very same Cold War divisions the Visegrad countries had worked so hard to erase. They warned that early admission of the Visegrad countries would almost lead to the resurgence of nationalist danger with Russia; we argued that a failure to give preference to countries that have already built working democracies is just

as likely to encourage the extremes, on both the right and left, and thereby weaken the stable, centrist political forces.

Although we were unable to reach agreement on these issues, we commended Clinton for having put NATO membership for the Visegrad countries on the agenda of the Brussels Summit. We were also grateful for the opportunity to express our deeply felt concerns to the administration. When Vice President Gore delivered the president's foreign policy speech, we were heartened by these words: "The security of the states that lie between Russia and Western Europe affects the security of America."

Here at last was something that showed a definite convergence of U.S. and East Central European interests. If we agreed on a common goal — securing the stability of East Central Europe — then disagreement remained only on how to reach that goal.

Clearly, an important requirement for European stability in the post-Communist era is protecting the human rights of national minorities. We need to look no further than the tragic events in Bosnia to see the consequences of government-provoked, extremist nationalism. Of greatest concern to the Hungarian American community is the fate of one third of all Hungarians: nearly 3.5 million of whom live as ethnic minorities outside Hungary, including 350,000 under especially precarious circumstances in Voivodina, inside Serbia.

Because long-term stability in the region is clearly dependent on the protection of human rights of such minorities, we posed the question: "Is the administration prepared to create a new, comprehensive, international set of standards within the Partnership for Peace for protecting the rights of national minorities?" Gore's answer was very definite: "Yes, one area of focus for the Partnership for Peace will be ethnic conflict resolution."

Thus, the Partnership for Peace, which the administration has repeatedly described as "only a first step in a constantly evolving process," can indeed develop into a most effective strategy if it incorporates two important principles. First, it must deal with the security of East Central Europe as a separate issue from the progress of democratic reforms in Russia. Second, it must establish criteria that once fulfilled lead to certain acceptance into NATO in the foreseeable future.

We have listened carefully to the president's statements, and we feel confident that the administration will pay serious attention to suggestions voiced by leaders of the Visegrad countries and by ethnic leaders in the American community.

Seeing the image of Clinton in Prague and Moscow brings to mind the question of my favorite history professor:

"Does history create great men or do men create history?"

I remember arguing passionately then as I believe today, that political leaders like Clinton, with understanding, foresight and true courage can mold history to the benefit of mankind.

Lauer is president and one of the founders of the Hungarian American Coalition.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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001. list	[Personally Identifiable Information] [partial] (7 pages)	12/00/1994	b(6)
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COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

WHITE HOUSE BRIEFING
Friday, December 2, 1994

	Social Security #	Birth Date	Attendance
Mr. Joseph Bader & Mrs. Anne Bader			2
Rev. Imre Bertalan			1
Ms. Laura Biesecker			1
Mr. Laszlo Bojtos			1
Dr. Edward Chaszar Mrs. Edward Chaszar			2
Dr. Jozsef Debreczeni			1
Mr. George Dozsa			1
Mr. Paul Fekete Mrs. Paul Fekete			2
Mr. Robert Gabor			1
Mr. Laszlo Hamos			1
Ms. Judit Haracsek			
Mr. John Hutchins & Mrs. Linda Hutchins			2
Mr. Steve Jaszenszky	(b)(6)		1
Mr. Geza Kadar, Jr.			1
Dr. Elmer Kiss & Mrs. Elmer Kiss			2
Mr. Frank Koszorus, Jr. & Mrs. Marianne R. Koszorus			2
Mr. John Lauer Mrs. Edith Lauer			2
Prof. Andrew Ludanyi			1
Ms. Victoria Mangiardo			1
Dr. Daniel F. McDonald & Mrs. Maria McDonald			2
Mr. Eugene F. Magyary, Jr. Mrs. Eugene Magyary			2
Mrs. Csilla Myers			1
Mr. George Pogan			1
Ms. Emese Komjathy-Pring			1
Dr. Paul Rupprecht			1

Mr. Peter Soltesz
& Mrs. Peter Soltesz

Mr. János Strohmayr
& Ms. Sofia Verykios

Dr. John Szablya
& Mrs. John Szablya

Mr. Janos Szekeres
& Mrs. Judith Szekeres

Mr. Zsolt Szekeres
Ms. Kathleen Avvakumovits

Ms. Reka Szemerkenyi

Mr. Sandor Taraszovics

Mr. Max Teleki

Mr. Paul Toldalagi
Mrs. Marianne Toldalagi

Dr. Istvan Toth

Mr. Peter Ujvagi
& Ms. Krisztina Ujvagi

Mr. Charles Vamossy

Mr. Julius Varallyay

Dr. László Varjú

Mr. Ernest P. Virgulak
& Mrs. Suzanne S. Virgulak

Ms. Eva E. Volsin

Mr. Frederick L. Webber

Mr. David Witte
& Mrs. Lillian Scott Witte

2

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

AGENDA

*That was
right on
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HUNGARIAN AMERICAN COALITION BRIEFING

FRIDAY, DECEMBER 2, 1994
INDIAN TREATY ROOM
4:30PM

WELCOME AND INTRODUCTION

Alexis Herman
Assistant to the President and Director
Office of Public Liaison

BRIEFING

Daniel Fried
Director of Central and Eastern European Affairs
National Security Council

*

Carlos Pascual
Deputy Assistant Administrator
Bureau for Europe and the Newly Independent States
Agency for International Development

*

↓ Stephen Flanagan
Associate Director of the Policy and Planning Staff
Department of State

*And to
Ante*

DANIEL FRIED
DIRECTOR FOR EAST CENTRAL EUROPE
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL, THE WHITE HOUSE

Daniel Fried, a career Foreign Service Officer, joined the National Security Council Staff in July, 1993. His responsibilities include U.S. policy toward the countries of East Central Europe -- Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and other countries in the region.

Mr. Fried served as Political Counselor at the U.S. Embassy in Warsaw from 1990-1993. He was Polish Desk Officer at the State Department from 1987-1989, where he helped formulate the U.S. response to the advent of democracy in Poland and elsewhere in East Central Europe. From 1985-1987, Mr. Fried was the Regional Affairs officer on the Soviet Desk, responsible for supporting dialogue with the Soviet Union on the Middle East Peace Process, Afghanistan, Central America and other regional questions.

He served as a Political officer in the U.S. Embassy in Belgrade from 1982-85, where he covered developments in Serbian internal politics and in Bosnia and Montenegro. From 1980-1981, Mr. Fried served at the Consulate General in (then) Leningrad, with responsibilities for reporting internal political developments in the Leningrad region and the Baltic States, plus maintaining contacts with dissidents and "refueniks." As a junior officer, Mr. Fried worked from 1977-79 in the East-West Trade office of the State Department's Economic and Business Bureau. He joined the Foreign Service in 1977.

Born on [REDACTED] (b)(6) Fried received a B.A. from Cornell University (magna cum laude in History, Soviet Studies) in 1974 and an M.A. from Columbia University's School of International Affairs (Russian Institute) in 1977. He has been given several group and individual Superior and Meritorious Honor Awards in his career.

Mr. Fried is married to Ms. Olga Karpiw. They have two daughters, Hannah (11) and Sophie (5). They live in Washington, D.C.

OPTIONAL FORM 89 (7-90)

FAX TRANSMITTAL

of pages 1

To <i>Marilyn Di Maccione</i>	From <i>G. Halm/AID</i>
Dept./Agency	Phone # <i>647-9109</i>
Fax # <i>456-6218</i>	Fax #

NSN 7540-01-317-7388

5098-101

GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION

PERSONAL INFORMATION

[*Chief Deputy to* **CARLOS E. PASCUAL** *Tom-Dyne of AID*]

PRESENT POSITION

March 1994

Deputy Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Europe and the New Independent States

OTHER EXPERIENCE

1992-94	Director, Office of Program Analysis and Coordination, New Independent States, Task Force
1991-92	Supervisory Program Officer, Policy, Strategy, Evaluation Division, Office of Development Planning, Bureau for Africa
1989-91	Program Officer, USAID/Mozambique
1988-89	Long-Term Language Training, Washington, D.C.
1986-88	Program Officer, USAID/South Africa
1985-86	Assistant Project Development Officer, USAID/Sudan
1983-85	International Development Intern (Project Development), USAID/Sudan
1983	International Development Intern (Project Development), Washington, D.C.
1981-82	Chairman, Third World Conference Committee, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA

EDUCATION

1982

Harvard University (Public Policy/Economic Development)

M.P.P.

1980

Stanford University (International Relations)

B.A.

LANGUAGES

Portuguese

S-3+, R-3 (Tested, 1989)

Spanish

S-3+, R-3+ (Tested, 1983)

Italian

S-2, R-2+ (Tested, 1983)

DATE OF BIRTH

(b)(6)

AWARDS

W. Jump Award, 1994

Distinguished Honor Award, 1994

Superior Unit Award, 1994

Cash Award - 1993

Quality Increase - 1992, 1991

Performance Award - 1990, 1988

C. Herbert Rees Memorial Award - 1988

Distinguished Unit Citation - 1987

Sept. 1994

11276

TOTAL P.01

Professional Background

STEPHEN J. FLANAGAN is Associate Director of the Policy Planning Staff of the U.S. Department of State. In that capacity, he oversees the Staff's work on European, Eurasian, and security affairs.

Dr. Flanagan joined the Policy Planning Staff in February 1989, as a specialist on European affairs. He has previously served as a Senior Fellow in the Strategic Concepts Development Center and a member of the National War College faculty at the National Defense University, (1987-89); Executive Director of the Center for Science and International Affairs and a member of the faculty at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government (1984-87); Professional Staff Member of the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (1978-83); Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellow and Research Associate of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London (1983-84); and Visiting Scholar, Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington (1984).

Born in Boston and raised in Medford, Massachusetts, he earned his A.B. in political science from Columbia University in 1973 and his Ph.D. in international relations from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University in 1979.

Dr. Flanagan has published widely on European security, arms control, and intelligence issues. He is the author of NATO's Conventional Defenses, (1988), and co-editor of Securing Europe's Future, (1986) and NATO in the Fifth Decade, (1990). He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

October 1994

OPTIONAL FORM 99 (7-90)

FAX TRANSMITTAL

of pages 1

To	Marilyn DiGiuseppe	From	Judy CHRONISTER
Dept./Agency	WH Liaison	Phone #	640-5171
Fax #	456-6682/6218	Fax #	640-1579

NSN 7540-01-317 7388

5089-101

GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

AGENDA

HUNGARIAN AMERICAN COALITION BRIEFING

FRIDAY, DECEMBER 2, 1994
INDIAN TREATY ROOM
4:30PM

WELCOME AND INTRODUCTION

Alexis Herman
Assistant to the President and Director
Office of Public Liaison

BRIEFING

✓ Daniel Fried
Director of Central and Eastern European Affairs
National Security Council

*

5:00
/ Carlos Pascual
Deputy Assistant Administrator
Bureau for Europe and the Newly Independent States
Agency for International Development

*

5:30
✓ Stephen Flanagan
Associate Director of the Policy and Planning Staff
Department of State

DANIEL FRIED
DIRECTOR FOR EAST CENTRAL EUROPE
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL, THE WHITE HOUSE

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NSN 7540-01-317-7388 5000-101 GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION	

PERSONAL INFORMATION**CARLOS E. PASCUAL****PRESENT POSITION**

March 1994

Deputy Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Europe and the New Independent States

OTHER EXPERIENCE

1992-94	Director, Office of Program Analysis and Coordination, New Independent States, Task Force
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1980	Stanford University (International Relations)	B.A.

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October 1994

*Printed version
of original memo
presented to
to report status
has to review
the file*

OPTIONAL FORM 99 (7-90)

FAX TRANSMITTAL

of pages 1

To: Marilyn DiGiuseppe	From: Judy CHRONISTER
Dept./Agency: WH Liaison	Phone #: 640-5171
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NSN 7540-01-317 7368

5098-101

GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION

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I 7th - Commencement

II 19th 20th

Elected Leadership

III m3

IV Chair - Phone calls

V main Election night

23th

work on Group Leadership

14th

Salon

- People Fair Days / Low Drama
Ethical Court
- Elections, Tying, Tying
- Leadership Days
- Legislative Support
- Section next - Issues 7 others
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 - Trial Blk + this

neighborhood
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June 1st

Carlos Pasquel

U.S. Aid programs are extremely
important to our efforts to supporting
the economic development in ~~the~~ Hungary and the ^{entire region}
Carlos is the Chief Deputy to Tom Dyne
~~who many of you know~~

Do you know I'm going
to Miami tomorrow morning! (AH!)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

AGENDA

HUNGARIAN AMERICAN COALITION BRIEFING

FRIDAY, DECEMBER 2, 1994
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Carlos Pascual
Deputy Assistant Administrator
Bureau for Europe and the Newly Independent States
Agency for International Development

*

Stephen Flanagan
Associate Director of the Policy and Planning Staff
Department of State

**** SPECIAL BALKAN DISCUSSION ****

Forum on the Crisis in the Former Yugoslavia
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Friday, December 2, 8:30 am

Danielle Sremac, the Emissary of the Republika Srpska (the Bosnian Serb Republic headed by Radovan Karadzic) to the United States and Canada, has just returned from a visit to Pale. She will offer her perspective on the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. Born in Belgrade and educated in the United States, Ms. Sremac is a member of the Serbian-American Affairs Council and since May 1994 has served as an emissary to this country. Throughout the war, she has advised the Bosnian Serb government, and appeared on numerous television shows in the U.S. and abroad.

The meeting will be held at the Carnegie Conference Center on the eighth floor of the Endowment at 2400 N Street, NW. It will begin promptly at 8:30 am. Please respond as soon as possible to Georgia Levenson on (202) 862-7930.

**Carnegie Endowment for Peace
Speech, December 2, 1994, 8:30 am
Danielle Sremac**

I. Introduction

I would first like to thank the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace for allowing me this opportunity to present the perspectives and positions of the Bosnian Serbs. It speaks very well for this institution to allow the presentation of all perspectives of this very complicated issue. I hope that by explaining the Bosnian Serb perspective, this would perhaps help provide a more comprehensive view of the Bosnian conflict. I recently returned from Pale where I talked at great length with President Karadzic and the Bosnian Serb military leadership about some of the issues that I am sure many of you are concerned about, and I hope that my insights will help me answer any of your questions that you may have at the end of my presentation.

To provide a brief background of my work, since September 1992, I have been speaking on behalf of the Serbian American community. In May of this year, I was designated as the Bosnian Serbs representative to the United States and Canada. While I am not officially a member of the government of Republika Srpska, I am able to speak on their behalf. My funding comes from American and Canadian Serbs who feel that the perspective of the Bosnian Serbs has often been lacking from the public forum.

Currently, the war in Bosnia continues, and the international community is still struggling to find a solution. With this in mind, I would first like to discuss some of the obstacles that are preventing a peaceful resolution of the crisis, then I would like to outline some of the causes of these problems, and finally, I will present what the Bosnian Serbs hope is a

solution to this tragic war.

II. What is the problem ?

The most immediate concern at this time is the escalation of the war in Bihac. This resulted from the Bosnian Muslim offensive launched a month ago against the Serbs, causing a Serbian counter offensive. Unfortunately, the current increase in hostilities is also threatening the distribution of food for civilians this winter. When the Muslims launched an offensive, about 12,000 Serbian refugees were forced to flee from the area. Subsequently, with the Serbian counter offensive, Muslim refugees were displaced. As a result, more people have been displaced and killed on all sides, and now we're back to relatively the same front lines as before.

The unity of NATO has also been threatened as a result of the Muslim offensive and Serb counter offensive in Bihac. As the NATO allies clash over how to solve the Bosnian war, relations between the United States and Russia are suffering as well. In addition, the current situation is bringing the war dangerously close to drawing in Croatia and Serbia.

III. What is causing the problem ?

At this point, the obstacles that are preventing a peaceful resolution of the crisis are very clear at least from the Serbian perspective. The Bosnian Serbs primarily see United States policy of siding with the Muslims throughout the past two years as a main obstacle to a resolution to the conflict.

The U.S. approach from the beginning has been to recognize the administrative borders between republics in former Yugoslavia, as set by Tito, to be the legitimate borders of newly created states. Spearheaded by Germany and hastily accepted by the European Community and United Nations, the issue of Bosnia became one of

protecting the inviolability of borders, even though the borders of former Yugoslavia were not protected with any vigor by the very same international community.

However, attempts to impose Muslim government in Bosnia-Herzegovina were unsuccessful, since the Serbian population was not willing to accept a primarily Muslim rule. The United States government decided early on to choose sides in the war. The United States recognized the Muslim government of Alija Izetbegovic under the rhetoric that the US accepted the democratic vote of Muslim and Croat representatives even though the Serbs boycotted the vote. The Bosnian Muslim government had an extremely effective public relations campaign that captured the sympathies of the United States and the media. It was an effective campaign, but it was essentially a propaganda from one warring party in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was often not balanced by opposing points of view.

But the Serbs who lived in Bosnia-Herzegovina obviously did not accept this propaganda. The Serbs were willing to fight not because they hated the Muslims, but because they did not trust them. This mistrust resulted partially from their experiences in World War II when Croatian nazi forces, assisted by the Muslims, committed atrocities against the Bosnian Serbs. Nevertheless, the Serbs were able and willing to live with Muslims within Yugoslavia. What the Serbs were fighting against since 1992 was the radical Muslim government of Alija Izetbegovic, which they did not trust. They felt that the new Muslim government would make their lives very difficult, they would have no political power, they would be harassed, their religious and cultural rights would be denied, and they would ultimately have to leave Bosnia-Herzegovina or accept total domination. The United States chose to ignore these Serbian concerns.

Compounding shortcomings in the U.S. policy, are some major misconceptions about what is really going on in Bosnia.

First is the issue of multiethnicity. The Bosnian Muslim government has repeatedly claimed that their leadership represents all ethnic groups in Bosnia-Hercegovina, and that the Serbs are some radical nationalists who really do not reflect the beliefs of the Serbian people in Bosnia. However, in reality, only Yugoslavia was truly multiethnic, and Serbs were willing to live in Yugoslavia, and under a similar arrangement of political power-sharing in Bosnia-Hercegovina.

The Bosnian Muslims claim that Izetbegovic is the democratically elected leader of Bosnia-Hercegovina. Yet in reality, Izetbegovic, Abdic who is a Muslim now fighting against Muslims in Bihac, Koljevic and Plavsic who are two prominent leaders in Republika Srpska, along with Croatian representatives, were all elected before the war. Therefore, any claims of being a democratically elected leader are no stronger for Izetbegovic than for any other of these elected representatives.

Izetbegovic's Muslim government was not multiethnic. It was staffed with subservient Serb or Croat politicians who had no following among the Serb or Croat population in Bosnia-Hercegovina. Now, as in the beginning of the war, the overwhelming majority of Serbs support President Karadzic of the Republika Srpska, not the Izetbegovic government.

Another often repeated term in the Bosnian war has been "aggression" used to describe the Bosnian Serb role in the war. However, the Bosnian conflict was quite clearly a civil war from the very beginning. The term

"aggression" designates an outside force coming over a specific border. The Serbs fighting in Bosnia were neither an outside force, nor did they cross any border as far as they were concerned. It is important to note that the vast majority of Bosnian Serbs did not recognize the new arbitrary borders hastily set by the European Community and the United Nations.

Serbs are not aggressors for another reason. Serbs lived in Bosnia-Herzegovina for centuries. They owned 64% of the land before the war began, and comprised 37% of the population. Serbs were far greater in number in Bosnia-Herzegovina before the extermination of up to one million Serbs from that area during World War II. Also, the soldiers that have been fighting on the Serbian side in Bosnia are Bosnian Serbs, not some outside force.

The terms like "radical nationalists" or "ultra nationalists" have also been used to describe the Serbs. But the Serbs who are currently fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina are not radical nationalists. They are, of course, nationalistic, and staunchly hold to their beliefs, but just as much as the Croats or the Muslims. The Bosnian Serb government of Republika Srpska has a fully functioning state, a parliament representing all districts, and their positions reflect the majority of the Bosnian Serb population. Their policies are created according to what the Bosnian Serb people want. The Bosnian Serb population in Republika Srpska held several referendums where they clearly rejected peace plans which did not offer them a viable state.

On top of these general misconceptions about the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, a major obstacle to settling the war is the fact that the Bosnian Muslim government still continues to initiate military attacks in the hopes of reversing their fortunes. This is why they launched an offensive around Bihac which has been repulsed by the Serbs.

Now, they still do not want to end the war, rather they are asking for

a 3 month cease which will only prolong the war. The Serbs are not going to accept this because such a cease fire would merely get the Muslims through the winter without fighting, and it would give them time to regroup, obtain more weapons, and strengthen their positions. What the Serbs want is a complete ending of hostilities on all fronts, an end to the war, and to resume negotiations.

In Bihac, the Bosnian Serbs are content with having Abdic's Muslim forces to take over parts of the area as they have already done. Abdic's Muslims are going to continue siding with the Serbs because they want to end the war, and because they believe that their lives will be better within Republika Srpska.

The contact group plan is another obstacle at this point because it is simply not a feasible option for the Serbs.

IV. What is the solution ?

At this point, the solution lies to a great extent with the United States. U.S. policy is key to resolving the crisis because much of the Bosnian Muslim government's belief that it can win territories from the Serbs and ultimately control all of Bosnia comes from a strong U.S. backing.

Instead of backing the Bosnian Muslim government with promises of military aid or intervention, the United States should recognize the Bosnian Serb government of Republika Srpska as the legitimate representational body of the Bosnian Serb people, the U.S. should encourage negotiations, construct a new peace plan which addresses Serbian requirements. Namely, the Bosnian Serbs would like to see the issue of Sarajevo to be resolved, such as a division of the city to reflect Serbian populated areas, they want the plan to allow a contiguity of Bosnian Serb territories, the ability to link with Serbia or right to self-determination, just as was offered to the Muslim-Croat confederation, and a fair distribution of the land

allowing the Serbs control over some of the wealthy industrial cities.

In essence, the United States should listen more closely to Britain, France, and Russia, and revamp U.S. policy to coincide with its allies. In contrast to the U.S. position, European policies have been more successful in Bosnia, pursuing a low-key approach to U.N. peacekeeping, emphasizing successful delivery of humanitarian aid, and preventing the conflict from spreading.

The recent decision to send 2,000 U.S. troops to the area is very alarming. Although the U.S. administration claims that these troops would be used to either rescue downed pilots or assist in a withdrawal of the U.N., the Serbs would clearly view any U.S. troop involvement in a pull-out as a hostile force. The reason why Bosnian Serbs would view this as a hostile force is that it would appear that U.S. troops would be possibly replacing UN troops, but not as a neutral, peace keeping force, but rather as one that would fight alongside the Muslims. Karadzic correctly pointed out that this scenario would lead to another Vietnam for the United States. I hope that the Clinton Administration weighs any decision to put U.S. troops on the ground in Bosnia very carefully given this perception that the U.S. is siding with the Muslims.

Conclusion:

To conclude, the Serbs have wanted to end the war a long time ago, and so did the Europeans. It seems that only the Muslims are determined to keep fighting. Now, it appears that the Clinton administration is changing its position, and this is a good sign for peace in Bosnia. A U.S. policy change which recognizes the rights of Bosnian Serb people as well as others is a step in the right direction. I strongly believe that this is the only way all three ethnic groups in Bosnia can move towards peace.



The Trip of President Clinton to the CSCE Summit

**Budapest, Hungary
December 5-6, 1994**

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THE TRIP OF PRESIDENT CLINTON TO THE CSCE SUMMIT

KEY SPEECHES

President Clinton

The U.S. and the Future Of European Security

*Excerpt from a press conference
following APEC meetings, Jakarta,
Indonesia, November 15, 1994.*

Q. Mr. President, your administration is in the process of changing its policy—or developing its policy on expanding NATO and strengthening CSCE. Will you be going to the CSCE summit in Budapest? And when you look at your foreign travel—your past foreign travel—in recent weeks, you have gone to the Middle East; you spent several days here; you are going to be hosting the Summit of the Americas; you have an ambitious foreign agenda next year. Are you becoming, in essence, a foreign policy president?

A. Well, let me answer both questions. First of all, I plan to make a very brief but, I think, quite critical trip to the CSCE. I decided to do it after having communications with both

Chancellor Kohl and President Yeltsin and looking at what is at stake there in terms of the future of European security. After all, the United States played a strong leadership role in the Partnership for Peace and encouraging the growth of the European Union and European security arrangements.

What I have sought to do is create a stronger Europe that is more independent but also more closely allied with us and that at least creates the possibility that there would not be another dividing line in Europe just moved a few hundred miles east. We have a big stake in that. So I will go quickly and come back quickly, but I think I should go.

Second, on the question of foreign policy versus domestic, let me say this: If you look at what happened in the last two years, we had only the third Congress since World War II to give a

president more than 80% of his domestic initiatives as well as the foreign policy initiative—including sweeping education reform, the family leave law, the Brady bill, the crime bill, and a number of other very important issues.

So I have no intention of withdrawing from the domestic field. But we had an unusual number of responsibilities this year, and an unusual number of opportunities. Americans are both more prosperous and more secure because of these efforts, and they will be more so in the future. So if I were to give up one in favor of the other, I would be doing a disservice to the American people. I have to try to pursue both courses.

It has been somewhat more busy on the foreign front than I could have anticipated in the last few months because of the unusual developments. ■



President Clinton

Partnership for Peace: Building a New Security for the 21st Century

Intervention at the North Atlantic Council summit, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium, January 10, 1994.

Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary General and distinguished leaders. I am deeply honored to represent my nation at the North Atlantic Council this morning, as eight previous Presidents have done before me.

Each of us came here for the same compelling reason: The security of the North Atlantic region is vital to the security of the United States. The founders of this alliance created the greatest military alliance in history. It was a bold undertaking. I think all of us know that we have come together this week because history calls upon us to be equally bold once again in the aftermath of the Cold War. Now we no longer fear attack from a common enemy. But if our common adversary has vanished, we know our common dangers have not. With the Cold War over, we must confront the destabilizing consequences of the unfreezing of history which the end of the Cold War has wrought.

The threat to us now is not of advancing armies so much as of creeping instability. The best strategy against this threat is to integrate the former communist states into our fabric of liberal democracy, economic prosperity, and military cooperation. For our security in this generation will be shaped by whether reform in these

nations succeeds in the face of their own very significant economic frustration, ethnic tensions, and intolerant nationalism.

The size of the reactionary vote in Russia's recent election reminds us again of the strength of democracy's opponents. The ongoing slaughter in Bosnia tallies the price when those opponents prevail. If we do not meet our new challenge, then most assuredly, we will once again—someday down the road—face our old challenges again. If democracy in the East fails, then violence and disruption from the East will once again harm us and other democracies.

I believe our generation's stewardship of this grand alliance, therefore, will be judged most critically by whether we succeed in integrating the nations to our east within the compass of Western security and Western values. For we have been granted an opportunity without precedent: We really have the chance to recast European security on historic new principles—the pursuit of economic and political freedom. I would argue to you that we must work hard to succeed now, for this opportunity may not come to us again.

In effect, the world now wonders whether we have the foresight and the courage our predecessors had to act in our long-term interests. I am confident that the steel in this alliance has not rusted. Our nations proved that by joining together in a common effort in

the Gulf War. We proved it anew this past year by working together, after seven long years of effort, in a spirit of compromise and harmony to reach a new GATT agreement. And now we must do it once again.

To seize the great opportunity before us, I have proposed that we forge what we have decided to call the Partnership for Peace, open to all the former communist states of the Warsaw Pact, along with other non-NATO states. The membership of the partnership will plan and train and exercise together and work together on missions of common concern. They should be invited to work directly with NATO both here and in the Coordination Cell in Mons.

The partnership will prepare the NATO Alliance to undertake new tasks that the times impose upon us. The Combined Joint Task Force Headquarters we are creating will let us act both effectively and with dispatch in helping to make and keep the peace and in helping to head off some of the terrible problems we are now trying to solve. We must also ready this alliance to meet new threats, notably from weapons of mass destruction and the means of delivering them.

Building on NATO's creation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council two years ago, the Partnership for Peace sets in motion a process that leads to the enlargement of NATO. We began this alliance with 12 members; today there are 16—and each one has



strengthened the alliance. Indeed, our treaty always looked to the addition of new members who shared the alliance's purposes and who could enlarge its orbit of democratic security. Thus, in leading us toward the addition of these Eastern states, the Partnership for Peace does not change NATO's original vision—it realizes that vision.

So let us say, here, to the people in Europe's east that we share with you a common destiny, and we are committed to your success. The democratic community has grown, and now it is time to begin welcoming these newcomers to our neighborhood.

As President Mitterrand said so eloquently, some of the newcomers want to be members of NATO right away, and some have expressed reservations about this concept of the Partnership for Peace. Some have asked me in my own country, well, is this just the best you can do? Is this sort of splitting the difference between doing nothing and full membership, at least for the Visegrad states? And to that, let me answer—at least for my part—an emphatic no, for many of the same reasons President Mitterrand has already outlined.

Why should we, now, draw a new line through Europe just a little further east? Why should we, now, do something which could foreclose the best possible future for Europe? The best possible future would be a democratic Russia committed to the security of all its European neighbors. The best possible future would be a democratic Ukraine—a democratic government in every one of the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union, all committed to market cooperation, to common security, and to democratic ideals. We should not foreclose that possibility.

The Partnership for Peace, I would argue, gives us the best of both worlds. It enables us to prepare for and to work toward the enlargement of NATO when other countries are capable of fulfilling their NATO responsibilities. It enables us to do it in a way that gives us the time to reach out to Russia and to these other nations

of the former Soviet Union, which have been almost ignored through this entire debate by people around the world, in a way that leaves open the possibility of a future for Europe that breaks totally from the destructive past we have known.

So I say to you: I do not view this as some sort of half-hearted compromise. In substance, this is a good idea. It is the right thing to do at this moment in history. It leaves open the best possible future for Europe and leaves us the means to settle for a future that is not the best but is much better than the past. And I would argue that that is the course we ought to pursue.

I think we have to be clear in doing so about certain assumptions and consequences. First, if we move forward in this manner, we must reaffirm the bonds of our own alliance. America pledges its efforts in that common purpose. I pledge to maintain roughly 100,000 troops in Europe, consistent with the expressed wishes of our allies. The people of Europe can count on America to maintain this commitment.

Second, we have to recognize that this new security challenge requires a range of responses different from those of the past. That is why our Administration has broken with previous American administrations in going beyond what others have done to support European efforts to advance their own security and interests. All of you have received our support in moving in ways beyond NATO. We supported the Maastricht Treaty. We support the commitment of the European Union to a common foreign and security policy. We support your efforts to refurbish the Western European Union so that it will assume a more vigorous role in keeping Europe secure. Consistent with that goal, we have proposed making NATO assets available to WEU operations in which NATO itself is not involved.

While NATO must remain the linchpin of our security, all these efforts will show our people and our legislatures a renewed purpose in European

institutions and a better balance of responsibilities within the transatlantic community.

Finally, in developing the Partnership for Peace, each of us must willingly assume the burdens to make it succeed. This must not be just a gesture—it is not just a forum. This Partnership for Peace is also a military and security initiative, consistent with what NATO was established to achieve. There must be a somber appreciation that expanding our membership will mean extending commitments that must be supported by military strategies and postures. Adding new members entails not only hard decisions but hard resources. Today those resources are not great but, nonetheless, as the Secretary General told me in the meeting this morning, they must be forthcoming in order for this to be taken seriously by our allies and our friends who will immediately subscribe to the partnership.

Let me also say, in response to something that President Mitterrand said and that is on all of our minds—the problem in Bosnia—that when we talk about making hard decisions, we must be prepared to make them. And tonight I have been asked to talk a little bit about the work I have been doing with Russia and what I believe we all should be doing to support democracy and economic reform there. But I would like to make two points about Bosnia.

First, I want to reaffirm that the United States remains ready to help NATO implement a viable settlement in Bosnia voluntarily reached by the parties. We would have to seek, of course, the support of our Congress in this, but let me say I think we can get it—if such an operation would be clearly under NATO command, the means of carrying out the mission would be equivalent to its purposes, and these purposes would be clear in scope and in time.

Second, I welcome the reassertion by the alliance in this declaration of our warning against the strangulation of Sarajevo and the safe areas. But if we

are going to reassert this warning it cannot be seen as mere rhetoric. Those who attack Sarajevo must understand that we are serious. If we leave that sentence in the declaration, we have to mean it. Those of us gathered here must understand that, therefore, if the situation does not improve, the alliance must be prepared to act. What is at stake is not just the safety of the people in Sarajevo and any possibility of bringing this terrible conflict to an end but the credibility of the alliance itself. And that—make no mistake about it—will have great ramifications in the future in other contexts.

Therefore, in voting for this language, I expect the North Atlantic Council to take action when necessary. And I think if anyone here does not agree with that, you should not vote for the language. I think it is the appropriate language, but we have to be clear when we put something like this in the declaration.

Let me say finally that I ran across the following quotation by a distinguished and now deceased American political writer, Walter Lippman. Three days after the North Atlantic Treaty was signed, Lippman wrote this—prophetically:

The pact will be remembered long after the conditions that have provoked it are no longer the main business of mankind. For the treaty recognizes and proclaims a community of interest which is much older than the conflict with the Soviet Union, and come what may, will survive it.

Well, this meeting will prove him right. The Soviet Union is gone, but our community of interest endures. And now it is up to us to build a new security for a new future for the Atlantic peoples in the 21st century. ■

Secretary Christopher

Transforming the NATO Alliance To Meet New Security Needs

Intervention before the ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Istanbul, Turkey, June 9, 1994.

It is a pleasure to reconvene in the North Atlantic Council. I want to thank our Turkish hosts and express our appreciation for this spectacular meeting site on the banks of the Bosphorus. I also want to thank our distinguished Deputy Secretary General, Sergio Balanzino, who will lead our discussion.

Our thoughts today also are with Secretary General Woerner. President Clinton and I offer our best wishes for Manfred's full and rapid recovery. His strength, resilience, and courage inspire us all. His contribution to the renewal of this alliance has been remarkable.

Over the last week—in Italy, Britain, and France—President Clinton made clear once again that America's commitment to Europe is resolute. Before the French National Assembly on Tuesday, President Clinton set forth our shared strategic challenge in building a stronger and more integrated Europe based on security cooperation, market economies, and democratic institutions.

The President will reaffirm his vision of a broader Europe when he travels to Italy, Germany, and Poland next month. As the most hopeful chapter in European history is being written, the United States will continue to stand with the peoples of an undivided, democratic continent.

This past week, President Clinton reiterated the pledge he made at the Brussels summit to maintain roughly 100,000 American troops in Europe. He reaffirmed that our political engagement will continue to be reinforced by our military deployment. Our presence remains necessary to safeguard America's vital interests as well as Europe's.

The NATO alliance will remain the core of American engagement in Europe and the heart of European security. Since the Athens ministerial last June, we have renewed our efforts to reinforce the trans-Atlantic bond that NATO embodies. As we move ahead with the landmark decisions taken at the summit, we are transforming the alliance to meet the security needs of the post-Cold War world.

The threat now is not invasion from the East but instability in the East. In Central Europe, new market democracies are consolidating freedom and showing promising signs of economic growth. But democracy remains vulnerable in many countries that have emerged from the Soviet empire. Demagogues have played on ethnic divisions and economic dislocation to fuel aggression. Left unchecked, such tensions will frustrate the region's progress toward reform and ultimately threaten wider European security.

As President Clinton said last January in Brussels: "This period may decide whether the states of the former Soviet bloc are woven into the fabric of

trans-Atlantic prosperity and security, or are simply left hanging in isolation." We must actively embrace the opportunity to help new democracies emerge as stable partners in security and trade.

At the Brussels summit, the alliance set two central, mutually reinforcing goals. The first was to design more flexible command structures and to address new security threats, such as weapons proliferation. The second and historic goal was to deepen our ties with the emerging democracies to the east. We invited them to participate in a broad range of political and military activities with alliance members, thereby paving the way for eventual expansion of the alliance.

We have made progress toward both these goals. Indeed, 1994 has been a year of immense significance for the alliance.

To achieve the first goal of increasing effectiveness, NATO has taken important decisions to support the efforts of allies to develop a more capable European Security and Defense Identity. That identity should maintain and build popular support in Europe for meeting European commitments and responsibilities and strengthen our collective capacity to respond to future security needs. It should also reinforce the trans-Atlantic relationship. We continue to look to our allies for a more balanced sharing of responsibilities.



Another important summit decision to achieve the first goal was to create Combined Joint Task Forces. We are making a promising start as we work to make this innovative concept a reality. Our objective remains to renew the alliance and to strengthen the Western European Union. We hope efforts in NATO and the WEU will enable us to take concrete decisions about CJTF at the December ministerial.

As part of advancing the same goal of improving alliance effectiveness, we are taking significant steps to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means of delivering them. NATO must address this threat, both to complement other international efforts and to meet our solemn commitment to protect the security of alliance members.

I am pleased by the early work of the senior political-military and defense groups formed as a result of this initiative. We will affirm that progress today by approving an alliance policy framework on non-proliferation. This framework lays the political foundation for improving allied capabilities to protect against the threat, or use, of weapons of mass destruction. The defense group has agreed to examine threats, defense planning, military doctrine and capabilities.

To achieve the second goal, the most significant decision reached at the NATO summit was the creation of the Partnership for Peace. The Partnership, proposed by President Clinton and adopted by the alliance, reaches out to the East in order to reassure new democracies and strengthen European security. In five short months, we can recognize a remarkable achievement: The Partnership has moved from a bare concept to become a working reality, a series of concrete relationships. Twenty countries have joined. I want to highlight two among the many steps we have taken thus far to make the Partnership operational.

First, Partner states are actively engaged at NATO Headquarters in Brussels, and will soon be present at the Partnership Coordination Cell at Mons working side by side with NATO

military planners. The previously unimaginable is on the way to becoming routine.

Second, we will fulfill the summit's call for Partnership peacekeeping exercises to begin in 1994. These exercises represent a remarkable transformation. Think of it: Troops that for half a century faced off against each other in the Cold War will come together in joint military exercises.

This fall, the Netherlands will host a field exercise, and Poland will host the first exercise on the soil of a partner country. SACLAN is organizing a Partnership maritime exercise, which will be held before the end of the year. In addition, the United States and other allies and partners will use already scheduled exercises to advance the Partnership's goals. We expect at least 14 activities of this kind to occur before the end of the year. We are also developing a robust schedule of exercises for 1995.

These exercises of NATO units with their former adversaries will send a powerful message that the old East-West division of Europe is dead. These are real, concrete steps toward the integrated and strengthened Europe that President Clinton called for at the summit and again this past week.

We will also involve partners in many NATO committee and training activities. Together, alliance members and partners will develop practical means for addressing new threats to regional security. We will enable non-NATO countries to develop the habits of cooperation, such as defense planning, that are the lifeblood of the alliance.

We are committed to NATO's expansion. Effective cooperation is a critical step in preparing partners for NATO membership. I want to underscore today what the President told East European leaders in Prague last January: "The Partnership changes the entire dialogue about enlarging NATO's membership. Now the question is no longer whether NATO will take on new members, but when and how we will do so."

Mr. Deputy Secretary General, as we consider NATO's relationship with nations to the east, Russia will figure prominently in our deliberations. Russia is undertaking a difficult transformation that will have profound implications for the world. Whatever course its internal evolution may take, Russia is and will remain a vital actor in European security affairs. It is in our interest—and Russia's—to develop broad, constructive interaction between NATO and Russia. The Partnership for Peace is central to that process.

We welcome Defense Minister Grachev's recent statement that Russia will participate in the Partnership for Peace without preconditions. As NATO has said, each partner will sign the same framework document. But each partner will design its own presentation document and each will develop its unique independent Partnership program. Clearly, Russia has significant capabilities and inherent strengths upon which it can draw in developing a Partnership cooperation program that will serve the Partnership's interests and enhance European security.

At the same time, Russia's size, broad interests, resources, and military capabilities provide the basis for a productive relationship with NATO in addition to the Partnership for Peace. Properly designed and conducted, this relationship can serve the interests of all European countries. We recently welcomed Minister Grachev to NATO headquarters for an extremely valuable session. Where Russia can and is prepared to make a constructive contribution, periodic consultations and practical cooperation outside the Partnership would be natural and mutually beneficial.

For example, Russia's nuclear capabilities establish an obvious basis for a dialogue on nuclear issues such as safe and secure weapons dismantlement. Cooperation between NATO and Russia to stem the proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction would advance our shared interests.

Of course, other European states also may have interests or capabilities that would warrant "16-plus-one" consultations or cooperation with them outside the Partnership as appropriate. We should welcome those possibilities.

Bilateral relationships between Russia and individual allies complement Russia's relationship with NATO. The United States and other allies are developing bilateral political and military cooperation that will complement the work of the alliance.

Let me turn briefly to two important matters that have far-reaching implications for Russia's relations with NATO and for the overall course of European security. First, European stability depends on respecting the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of all the states that emerged from the Soviet empire. We recognize Russia's legitimate concerns in this region, but we have made it clear that no country has a right to assert a role that is inconsistent with international norms.

A second key feature of Europe's stability and security is the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe. The United States is committed to maintaining the integrity of the treaty over the long term. We welcome discussion of any implementation questions among CFE signatories in the forum created by the treaty—the Vienna Joint Consultative Group.

An important area where Russia and members of the alliance have cooperated productively is in working to bring peace to the former Yugoslavia. This alliance—indeed, all nations concerned with the future of Europe and standards of human decency—remains deeply concerned about the continued fighting in Bosnia. That brutal and tragic conflict, the most savage fighting in Europe since 1945, cries out for resolution.

We remain convinced that this conflict can be resolved only through negotiations. We know that NATO cannot impose a solution. Since our last meeting, NATO has supported UN

efforts to bring peace to the former Yugoslavia. Without question, our efforts have decreased the level of violence and destruction. NATO's February 9 ultimatum ended the shelling of Sarajevo. We enforced the no-fly zone over Bosnia. NATO's April 22 decision ended the brutal attacks on civilians in Gorazde. We all recognize the leadership of the Government of Italy in providing bases for allied operations in these vital endeavors.

These and previous NATO actions, including sanctions enforcement, demonstrate our ability to make difficult decisions as 16 allies. NATO's firm actions show, as President Clinton has said, that the alliance "can still be a credible force for peace in the post-Cold War era." Those actions continue to provide crucial support to the United Nations and to save innocent lives. NATO has demonstrated in Bosnia that it is the only international institution with that capability.

We are now at a critical point in our efforts to find a negotiated solution. Working together, the EU, the UN, Russia, and the United States have made good progress in putting together a territorial proposal that we believe could serve as a reasonable basis for a settlement. Our hope is that this proposal will be accepted by both sides, and that yesterday's cease-fire agreement is a step toward a nationwide cessation of hostilities. If these efforts succeed, we can turn our attention and resources to the task of implementing a peace agreement and helping reconstruct war-torn Bosnia. We must expect, however, that the compromises necessary for peace will not come easily. The alliance must stand ready as before to back up the diplomatic process. And NATO allies must remain engaged in this effort.

The international community, and NATO in particular, are powerful forces helping to resolve this conflict. We must stay at it until we get the job done. We can contain the conflict. We can facilitate talks. We can help shape solutions. We can volunteer the mili-

tary forces essential for implementing a final agreement. And I want clearly to reaffirm the commitment of the United States to participate in this vital task.

The war in Bosnia remains a grave threat to our goal of an integrated Europe. It threatens to draw other fragile democracies into a wider war. And violent nationalism undermines the security of all European nations.

The United States is committed to greater integration among European democracies, East and West. We are determined to extend to the East the benefits—and obligations—of the same liberal trading and security order that have been pillars of strength for the West. That is the best way to secure the gains of democracy in the East. That is the best way to ensure that a wider war never engulfs Europe again.

Yesterday in Paris, many of us were present when the OECD decided to start membership negotiations with the Visegrad countries. We decided to intensify OECD activities in other Central and Eastern European countries. The OECD also signed a cooperation agreement with Russia.

We have sought to extend economic institutions to the East because we understand that the quest for security in Europe cannot rely on security institutions alone. It also must rely on the political and economic reconstruction of newly democratic nations. Our experience in Western Europe after the Second World War taught us that economic integration is essential to anchor stability among rebuilding nations. That is why we must lower the remaining trade barriers that limit the East's exports and its potential for lasting growth.

With the Cold War past, the doors of the West must be open to open societies and open markets to the East. By widening the reach of NATO and of organizations like the OECD, the EU, and the GATT, we will strengthen the prosperity of an undivided Europe and bolster the security that this alliance continues to preserve. ■

The New Geopolitics: Defending Democracy in the Post-Cold War Era

Deputy Secretary Talbott

*Address at Oxford University,
Oxford, England, October 20, 1994.*

I have three reasons for being pleased to appear before you this afternoon. The first is personal; the second is political; the third, historic.

You are, I am sure, used to your transatlantic cousins wearing their hearts on their sleeves, so I won't disappoint you: I love this place—this city and this university. They were good to me for three of the best years of my life. I'm delighted to be back.

Then there are the ties that bind your country to mine. Granted, we've had our bad moments, such as that time in 1814 when you folks set fire to my hometown. But for the most part, the U.S.-British relationship has defied Lord Palmerston's famous dictum: In some rare cases, permanent interests do make for permanent friendships or at least special relationships between nations. The United Kingdom was our principal partner in the single-most important transformation of American foreign policy: the U.S.'s emergence, a little more than a half-century ago, from a posture of not-so-splendid isolation to one of active engagement with the wider world. That shift was triggered by the Anglo-American alliance in World War II, then rendered a permanent part of the way Americans think and act during the two generations that followed.

Now, for the third reason I welcome your invitation to speak to you today: It gives me a chance to discuss why the Clinton Administration believes it has a historic opportunity in U.S. foreign policy.

A Historic Opportunity

While every period is, by definition, a passage in human history, some mark the beginning of new chapters, even of new volumes. This is one. We are now living through the third great defining moment of this turbulent century. What brings us to this point is, of course, the end of the great struggle that has lasted for over 40 years—the global rivalry between two camps clustered around two superpowers.

The end of the Cold War is, in one respect, similar to the periods of transition that have occurred when earlier, hot wars ended. Out of the combatants' exhaustion comes a new resolve to establish new attitudes, arrangements, and structures. Some of those then become fixtures on the international landscape. Others evolve, others wither away, and still others blow up in our faces.

For example, in the 17th century, the Thirty Years' War ended in the Treaty of Westphalia, which sought to impose order on the wreckage of the Holy Roman Empire. Westphalia is often cited as the inception of the

modern nation-state, in which people who spoke one language or worshipped one religion could band together under one flag within one set of boundaries: not a bad idea but not a perfect one, either. Today, we are still coping with its more extreme imperfections, particularly in the disaster zone that used to be known as Yugoslavia.

In the 19th century, the Napoleonic Wars ended with the Congress of Vienna, which enshrined balance-of-power as the guiding principle of international order. The Concert of Europe was based on the premise that no one state on the continent should become too strong. Again, not a bad idea but it, too, has its shortcomings. The balance-of-power concept and, therefore, diplomacy based on it tend to be value-free. Proponents of balance-of-power hold that what matters about a state or its government is primarily its size and strength, not so much its nature. The implication is that the difference between a democracy and a dictatorship is less important than whether they balance each other in brute strength.

This view fosters the notion that the international community has an interest only in preserving equilibrium between and among states rather than in what happens inside those states. If applied too narrowly, that can become a standard for tolerance of the intolerable. The obvious example from our century is the Holocaust. It should



have mattered to the world if Hitler's only victims had been German Jews. But one wonders: Would the world have ever done anything to stop him if Hitler had not combined genocide against Germany's citizens with aggression against Germany's neighbors, if he had been just as murderous at home but more restrained abroad? Those questions haunt the balance-of-power school of international relations; they underscore the need for statecraft to incorporate principles drawn from ethics as well as those drawn from physics.

Over the last 100 years, we have seen two world wars and two attempts at orchestrating world peace. World War I was in many ways a double disaster. It resulted not only in the slaughter of a generation but also in the squandering of the opportunity for peace that came at Versailles.

My country, which contributed to success on the battlefields of that war, also contributed to the failure that followed. The U.S. Congress rejected American participation in the League of Nations and then enacted the Smoot-Hawley Act, a monument to protectionism. That legislation, it has often been said, helped put the "Great" in the Great Depression. These and other follies of the interwar period created an international climate conducive, it turned out, to the rise of fascism and thus to another conflagration.

The leaders of the great coalition that triumphed in the Second World War learned several, if not all, of the lessons from the aftermath of the first. This time, instead of humiliating and impoverishing their defeated enemies, the victors helped rebuild Japan and Germany. Through the Marshall Plan, GATT, and the international financial institutions born at Bretton Woods, those statesmen who were present at the creation of the post-World War II world established the basis for a community of Western democracies and for an increasingly interdependent and prosperous global economy.

World War II also spurred another attempt to establish an institution dedicated to international law, collective security, and the enforcement of peace. The result—the United Nations—was a distinct improvement over the League of Nations, although it still has a long way to go before it fulfills the aspirations of its founders—and of its current members.

Yet, in a very real sense, the peace that followed the Allied triumph over the Axis was not a real peace at all. As Clausewitz might have put it, with the end of World War II, international politics became, for nearly half a century, the conduct of war by other means.

Just as the Cold War was waged by different means—propaganda campaigns, proxy struggles in the Third World, nuclear rivalry—it was also waged over different issues from those that had traditionally pitted nations against one another. Throughout previous eras, the cause of war and the spoils of victory were usually some combination of land and power. Even in wars fought in the name of religion, the question almost always was: Who would plant what flag on what piece of real estate?

The *casus belli* of the Cold War was different—not entirely different but significantly so. The central issue over which Britain, America, and the West waged the Cold War against the Soviets and their satellites did, to be sure, involve land and power. The map of the world—certainly of Europe—was largely color-coded in blue—our side, and red—theirs.

But the Cold War was not just about land and power. It was also a conflict—protracted, ruthless, and, in fact, quite often rather hot—between competing concepts of how to organize the political and economic lives of individual human beings, of individual states, and of the planet as a whole. Power, of course, played its part. NATO, as is often said, proved to be the most successful military alliance in history. The signature Western policies of deterrence and containment succeeded spectacularly.

But this was not just a case of one group of states banding together to defeat another. Rather, it was one set of ideas winning out over another. There were adherents and proponents of those victorious ideas on both sides of the battle lines—or, more to the point, on both sides of what used to be the Iron Curtain. The liberal values that unite the NATO member states have taken hold, in varying degrees, from Estonia on the Baltic to Albania on the Adriatic to Kyrgyzstan and Mongolia on the frontier of China and to Vladivostok on the Pacific.

To be sure, there are still a few countries that continue to decorate their flags with red stars and pay lip service to Marx, Engels, and Lenin. They include the most populous country on earth—China. But these holdout communist states, too, offer reason for what might be called strategic optimism—albeit tempered with tactical patience, prudence, and firmness.

One reason for optimism is the communications revolution—the permeability of even the most heavily fortified borders to radio and television broadcasts, as well as to subversively interactive influences such as telefax and e-mail. Among the forces that tore holes in the Iron Curtain was the steady bombardment by the Voice of America, Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, and the BBC. The communications revolution has not just permitted the transmission of news—it has helped bring about the single-most important and pervasive good news of our time: the decline of dictatorship and the rise of democracy.

A Consensus for Democracy And Free Markets

As the peoples of the world approach the 21st century, they are arriving at an unprecedented consensus about how we should organize ourselves within as well as among states. There is an increasingly universal sense—shared and championed by people on every continent—that democracy is the best

form of political organization and the free market is the most successful form of economic organization.

To be sure, elections are neither a panacea for social ills nor a guarantee of enlightened government. Hitler's National Socialist Party, it is often pointed out, won at the polls in 1932. Vladimir Zhirinovskiy's grotesquely misnamed Liberal Democratic Party did all-too well for anyone's comfort except its own in the Russian parliamentary elections of last December. Nonetheless, as a general proposition, democracy helps bring prosperity to its people and peace to its neighbors.

As evidence, let me cite developments on my side of the Atlantic. As recently as 15 years ago, most of the nations in Latin America were ruled by military dictatorships. Now, every government except Cuba's has a genuine claim to democratic legitimacy. As these states have moved toward democracy, they have also moved away from statist economic policies. Democratically elected leaders in Mexico, Argentina, Chile, and Brazil have been able to push through comprehensive economic reforms.

South Asia, too, has moved decisively toward democracy and markets. In the past decade, 260 million people in Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Nepal have regained the right to vote in free and fair elections. In India, where democratic institutions are firmly established, Prime Minister Rao and Finance Minister Manmohan Singh are in the midst of an impressive series of reforms that will transform their country's economy—they have made the rupee a convertible currency, sharply reduced import barriers, and they are in the process of a sweeping overhaul of the banking sector and the privatization of state-owned industries. There are similar success stories in Asia and Africa—in nations as diverse as South Korea, South Africa, and Malawi.

In all these cases, there is a close linkage between democratic politics and free-market economics. All over the world, democratically elected

leaders have shown themselves more inclined than their authoritarian or totalitarian predecessors to choose the economic and social policies that will best benefit their people.

This is the case even in the world's poorer regions. Harvard economist and Oxford don Amartya Sen has noted that no substantial famine has ever occurred in a country with a democratic form of government and a relatively free press. India, for example, continued to have famines right up to the time of independence in 1947. The last famine—and one of the largest—occurred in 1943, when an estimated 2-3 million people died. Since independence and the founding of a multiparty democratic system, there has been no substantial famine, even though severe crop failures and food scarcities have occurred all-too frequently.

Similarly, famine prevention programs run by democratically elected governments in Botswana and Zimbabwe enabled these nations to withstand severe crop failures in the early 1980s. During the same period, Sudan and Ethiopia—with comparatively smaller declines in food production but with the huge disadvantage of anti-democratic regimes—suffered major famines.

The rise of democracy has also contributed to a dramatic reduction in acts of aggression by one state against another. Latin American states, for instance, skirmished regularly among themselves for most of this century. There were full-scale wars between Costa Rica and Panama, Bolivia and Paraguay, Peru and Ecuador, and Honduras and El Salvador. But here is the point: At the time those conflicts occurred, all the nations involved were governed by dictatorships. Since democracy began to spread rapidly through the Western Hemisphere in the early 1980s, no Latin American nation has gone to war with any other. The one case of a Latin American country that started a war against a European power is instructive in

more ways than one. I am referring, of course, to the fate of Argentina's military rulers after their misadventure in the Falklands. They were subsequently convicted of human rights abuses and succeeded by democratically elected civilians.

With each passing year, it becomes increasingly apparent that the proposition "democracies don't go to war with one another" is not just a bromide—it is as close as we are likely to get in political science to an empirical truth.

Partly for that reason, as Secretary of State Christopher has noted, we are now living in a unique historical moment, when none of the great powers views any other as an immediate military threat.

To be sure, the United States still has disputes with Russia and with China—and, for that matter, on certain issues with your government, as well as with France, Germany, and Japan. But there is, for the first time, no defining polarization of world politics; no match-up between two giants whose own zero-sum game establishes the rules for the rest of the world—contestants and bystanders alike. There is no equivalent, say, to Sparta versus Athens, or Rome versus Carthage, or Britain versus Spain in the 16th century—or any of the other titanic rivalries that have provided so much of the plot of history.

This state of affairs is in large part the result of an increasingly widespread, increasingly uncontested commitment to democracy, free trade, and free markets. For the first time in human history, virtually all of the world's leading economic and military powers are multi-party, free-market democracies. So, too, are most of the allies of the great powers.

That is why President Clinton believes that our generation has a historic opportunity to shape our world. He believes that since it is, above all, the triumph of democracy and markets that has brought us victory in the Cold War, it must be, above all, the defense of democracy and markets that should guide us now.

Sustaining Democracy

It is overwhelmingly in our best interests to sustain the trend of democratization. If that trend is reversed, our well-being will suffer. A military rivalry among the great powers is far more likely to arise should one or more of those powers abandon its commitment to free trade, open markets, and open society and slip back into totalitarian politics and command economics. By the same token, it is significant that we face menaces to our common security today from Iraq and North Korea, two states that have resisted the global tide of democracy.

While democracy and market economics are ascendant, they are not everywhere established—far from it. In many nations that have begun the transition, the necessary institutions—the political and economic cultures—are in their infancy. As Secretary Christopher has said on a number of occasions, it is precisely the newborn democracies that are most in need of international support.

That, in essence, is why your government and ours have joined forces with 28 other nations in Haiti, making possible last Saturday's extraordinary celebration in Port-au-Prince of the restoration of that country's democratic government. United Nations Security Council Resolution 940, authorizing the deployment of the multinational coalition, was a watershed. For the first time, the UN gave the defense of democracy standing as justification to use "all necessary means"—in other words, military force.

The UN mission in Haiti establishes that the international community can take action not just when regimes attack their neighbors but when they savage their own people as well. There are—and will always be—disagreements about how far the international community's responsibility runs and in what cases it applies. But there can be no doubt that we are in the process of redefining geopolitics.

At the same time, we have not by any means abandoned traditional concepts of sovereignty or security, nor have we foreworn the traditional means to deter and if necessary rebuff those who would jeopardize or violate the peace.

Witness the UN's response to Saddam Hussein's latest aggressive mobilization. In this episode, we have acted upon geopolitical considerations of a more conventional sort than in Haiti. In Iraq, the international community has backed down a bully who was threatening his neighbor and endangering global energy supplies. Yet this confrontation, too, contains dramatic evidence of how the world has changed for the better with the end of the Cold War—after some initial reluctance, Russia joined the U.S., U.K., and the rest of the UN Security Council in Resolution 949, which further limits Saddam's ability to deploy his army in a threatening manner.

Europe and the New Geopolitics

Let me now say a few words about how the new geopolitics—our attempt to redefine national and international security—applies to this region of the world, Europe. The European continent, after all, was the primary battleground of the Cold War. This is where that struggle was won. This is where we must consolidate the gains of victory. It is here in Europe, as much as anywhere on earth, that we must apply the principle of defending democracy where it is most fragile and vulnerable.

We in the community of established market democracies need to stay with the post-communist reformers. We must be as persistent as they are. It would be a terrible mistake to assume, complacently, that without our help democracy and markets will succeed everywhere they now have a foothold. An even worse mistake would be to succumb, fatalistically, to the fear that even with our help, reforms in these countries are doomed to fail.

Throughout the Cold War, Western resolve had indispensable allies in Eastern reformers and in the people themselves—a fact often lost in the smug and triumphalist rhetoric of some in the West. The victims of communism became the victors over communism—and we must include them in our planning for the post-Cold War world.

This is a first principle of the American Government's policy toward Europe. It is a large part of the reason why, when he came to Europe three times earlier this year, President Clinton stressed his commitment to the goal of integration: to work within the Transatlantic Partnership to build an undivided Europe—a Europe united by a shared commitment to democracy, free-market economies, and mutual respect for borders.

What does this mean in practical terms? It means bringing Eastern states into Western economic institutions—into the GATT, into the European Union, and into the OECD. If the countries of Central Europe and the former Soviet Union have the courage to take the painful but necessary steps of economic reform, then we must be prepared to do our part as well. As President Clinton has said, "it will make little sense for us to applaud their market reforms on the one hand while offering only selective access to our markets on the other."

Integration also means that we must continue to develop the first post-Cold War security structure—the Partnership for Peace. Two weeks ago, Armenia became the 23rd nation to join. Since its launching at the NATO summit in January, the Partnership has taken on practical content, coherent shape, and promising direction. Already it has produced the remarkable spectacle of former adversaries from NATO and the old Warsaw Pact exercising together in Poland. A second such exercise will take place in the Netherlands later this month.

NATO itself is also evolving. As President Clinton, Vice President Gore, Secretary of State Christopher,

and Secretary of Defense Perry have all vowed, NATO will, in due course, take in new members. It will do so on a case-by-case basis, in accordance with the interests and the will of the member states, and no other power will have a veto over the process.

If handled properly—and it will be handled properly—NATO expansion can serve the larger cause of European integration, security, and political stability. Or, to put the same point differently: NATO's evolution can help guide the evolution of Europe itself. The addition of new members to NATO need not—and indeed must not—lead to new divisions between East and West.

In this regard, we must also continue to develop other avenues of security cooperation which—like the Partnership for Peace—can or do encompass all the nations of the Euro-Atlantic world. Right now, in Budapest, the 52 nations that participate in the CSCE—the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe—are exploring how the CSCE can be made a more effective instrument for regional conflict management and for establishing a common security space based on shared values and principles of behavior. The United States will work hard to ensure the success of this effort.

But this effort will be all-the-more difficult if we do not meet the challenge of the former Yugoslavia. The situation in that benighted corner of Europe remains dire. The Bosnian Serbs are still committing atrocities and defying the will of the international community. Bosnian Muslims and Croats face a terrible winter under siege. If the fighting spreads, we could, with gruesome symmetry, close out this century with a sequel to the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913.

Moreover, Bosnia dramatizes a global problem—of nationalistically inspired separatism and civil war, feuds among tribes that fly the banner of self-determination—in other words, a new world disorder, a phenomenon that might be called Westphalia and

Versailles run amok. We have seen failed states in Rwanda and Somalia; we've seen ethnic conflict stir regional instability in the Transcaucasus. This kind of disintegration within states poses a major obstacle to the goal of integration among states, all of which is an additional reason why we cannot ignore the conflict in Bosnia. In the days and weeks ahead, we will be working closely with our colleagues in the Contact Group—the U.K., France, and Russia, and Germany, which represents the European Union. We shall work to strengthen the still-fragile Federation in Bosnia. We shall seek ways to seal the border between Serbia and Bosnia more tightly. We shall urge stricter enforcement of UN-protected exclusion zones.

There may even be glimmers, however tentative, of good news amidst the horror of the former Yugoslavia. The effort to end the conflict has seen the UN Security Council for the first time use NATO as an instrument to enforce the will of the United Nations. UNPROFOR—the United Nations Protection Force—has brought together many members of the Partnership for Peace, including not only the United Kingdom, Canada, and France but also former Warsaw Pact states such as Poland, Ukraine, and Russia. Russia's willingness to join forces—diplomatic and military—with the West in the common cause of ending the conflict is among the more striking pieces of evidence that we are indeed living in a new world.

This leads me, in closing my remarks, to say a bit more about Russia—the country whose language, literature, culture, and history I studied while I was a student here.

Many in Moscow are worried that their country will end up being excluded from an expanded and integrated European security structure. More specifically, they are concerned that the Partnership for Peace and the intention to expand NATO are, in their essence, directed against Russia. Last month, Vice

President Gore sought to allay this concern. Addressing an audience in Berlin, he explained why the expansion of NATO would not be incompatible with the security interests of Russia. He noted that “instability in Central Europe, that seedbed of European wars, has twice in this century brought tragedy to the continent.” The Russian people, who suffered greatly from those tragedies, have as much reason as any to fear further instability in Central Europe. Therefore, Russia has as much reason as any to want to see stability in Central Europe—and that is precisely the goal of an expanded NATO. Expansion, when it comes, should be viewed not as an action directed against anyone but as an important component of regional security and stability.

But, one might ask—and many do—what about the stability of Russia itself? Quite simply, we do not know for sure what kind of state Russia will be in the 21st century. That vast, proud, rich, accomplished, troubled land is in the process of redefining itself, and it will be doing so for some considerable time to come. But we do know, very much for sure, what kind of state we want Russia to be: We want it to be a strong, prosperous democracy; we want it to be integrated into the economic and political life of the rest of the world; we want it to be secure in its current borders and respectful of the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of its neighbors, notably including those neighbors who were, like Russia itself, republics of the U.S.S.R.

That is not just our hope for Russia—it is many Russians' wish for their own country. That includes many leaders of Russia today and many who aspire to be its leaders in the future. Theirs, of course, are not the only aspirations at play in the rough-and-tumble of the Duma and the Federation Council—and on the hustings, now that real politics has finally come to that country. There are forces very much in the open, as well as behind the scenes

and underground and in the dark alleys, that are ugly, threatening, retrograde, and worse.

There is, in short, a great struggle underway in Russia for its future, its identity, its soul, and its place in Europe. As President Clinton has put it, the Russian people must ask themselves "what does it mean to be a great power in this 21st century? Will they define it in yesterday's terms, or tomorrow's?" Or, to put it most starkly: Will they choose imperialism and repression or integration and freedom?

What we must do is everything in our power to encourage the forces that we want to see prevail, over time, in that struggle. Those are the same

forces that will, if they do prevail, allow Russia to achieve genuine security and prosperity.

What we must not do is prejudice the outcome of that struggle—and especially we must not base our prejudgment on prejudice, on historical stereotypes, on warmed-over Cold War ideology—lest we commit the fallacy of the self-fulfilling prophecy. We must heed Voltaire, who warned against mistaking our nightmares for premonitions of the future.

To put it bluntly, if we were to base our policies on the pessimistic presumption that Russia will regress rather than evolve, then we would

have committed, in the final years of this century, a strategic blunder equal to the one committed in the opening years, at Versailles and afterward.

But let me also put the same point more positively—more in the spirit of strategic optimism that Bill Clinton believes should inform American foreign policy in the post-Cold War era. We can seize the opportunities in this period of transition. We are more likely to do so if we understand why all those earlier attempts at lasting peace — Westphalia, Vienna, Versailles, Munich, and Yalta—failed or fell short. We can learn from the lessons and build on the legacies of our past as we develop a strategy for our future. And this time, we can get it right. ■

American Power and American Diplomacy

Anthony Lake

Address by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs at Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, October 21, 1994.

I want to speak with you about the relationship between power and diplomacy—particularly American power and American diplomacy—in a dramatically changed world.

This is an extraordinary moment in world affairs. The single, overarching threat of the Cold War has vanished. The international environment is starkly new—a far cry from the old strategic landscape, in which every move and every alteration was interpreted in relation to the Soviet threat. But even in this new era there are some old truths.

Old Truths

The first is that divisions and debates about our role in the world are as old as our Republic. On one side stand severely limited forms of foreign engagement and protectionism; on the other, active American engagement abroad on behalf of democracy and on behalf of expanded trade.

After World War II—thanks in large part to the threat posed by the Soviet Union—that debate was resolved in favor of active engagement. Today, as in the late 1940s, we face again the old impulse to retrench. And today, as in the late 1940s, our interests demand that we check that impulse. But our task is more difficult now, because we undertake it in circum-

stances not of the late 1940s but of the 1920s: Much of our society now, as in the 1920s, seeks a rest from the rigors of international activism, and there is no single threat against which to rally public opinion.

A second old truth is this: Ideas matter. They are at stake in most of the daily struggles we see around the world. As the President has said,

We face a contest as old as history—a struggle between freedom and tyranny; between tolerance and isolation. It is a fight between those who would build free societies governed by laws and those who would impose their will by force. Our struggle today, in a world more high-tech, more fast-moving, more chaotically diverse than ever, is the age-old fight between hope and fear.

This brings me to the third old truth in this new era: Power still matters. We are not the world's police officer. But in this struggle between hope and fear, our power will make the critical difference, as it did in two world wars and the Cold War. And at the heart of American power lies the threat or use of military force. Without it, Haiti would not today be at the dawn of a difficult but exciting democratic opportunity. And without it, Iraq would today be threatening its neighbors with a dangerous military deployment on the borders of Kuwait.

Negotiating From a Position of Strength

In short, diplomacy disconnected from power usually fails. At the same time, power without diplomacy is dangerously lacking in purpose.

This, I know, is not a novel thought. In antiquity, Thucydides set out with graphic horror in the Melian dialogue the weakness of diplomacy without the backing of force. The sound arguments of the Melians for preserving their independence provided no defense against an Athens bent on subjugation. Without the power to back their positions, Melos's men were put to the sword; women and children were sold as slaves.

The same arguments many centuries later in Europe in the late 1930s were resolved by Hitler and his policy by panzer, and in the Pacific by Pearl Harbor. Following World War II, far-sighted statesmen like Dean Acheson worked to keep that lesson in the American mind. Acheson and other wise men knew that the United States needed all the instruments of diplomacy and power to defend vital interests and prevail over the long haul in the Cold War. It was Acheson who coined the phrase, "negotiate from a position of strength."

The New Global Economy

Today, of course, American diplomacy draws considerable strength from its economic power and the power of our example.



It is not only that our global economic reach makes the American voice an important one on almost every global issue that we can think of. The new global economy may also be causing a small revolution in the nature of diplomacy. As the economy of every nation depends increasingly on participation in the single world marketplace, most economies thus become more vulnerable also to the effects of economic isolation.

This means that they may be more susceptible to both economic inducement and economic penalties. South Africa presents a wonderful example of this. And we have seen just how effective both incentives and sanctions can be in our negotiations with North Korea over their nuclear weapons program. We welcome, of course, the North Korean decisions that led to the agreement being signed today. I think it is a hell of a deal. The agreement is in their interest, as well as ours, for it can help end their economic and political isolation. But it may not have been accidental that real progress in the talks occurred last summer when it became clear we were about to take a sanctions resolution to the United Nations Security Council.

We also see the power of sanctions in the case and behavior of Serbia. Indeed, you can draw a direct line from the dramatic effects of the isolation of the Serbian economy to the evolving policy of Slobodan Milosevic.

Military Force: The Threat Of America's Power

But at the very heart of America's power is military force. This is why President Clinton has vowed that our armed forces will remain the best trained, the best equipped, and the best prepared military in the world. I say "remain" the best, because the efficient and rapid way in which our military conducted their recent operations in the Gulf and Haiti can leave no doubt about their current readiness and strength.

The Cassandras attacking our readiness are simply wrong. We have prepositioned arms in hot spots like the Persian Gulf, expanded our sea- and airlift capabilities, and increased

funding for operations and maintenance in fiscal year 1995 by over 5%. There are indeed readiness and mobility concerns for the future that we must and will address, but our troops' rapid and highly effective successive deployments to Haiti and Iraq confirmed our confidence: We remain prepared to fight and win two major regional conflicts almost simultaneously.

Our challenge is not only a matter of maintaining our military might. We also need a new national debate today on the critical questions of when, where, and how to use military force. In the late 1940s and 1950s, there was just such a wide-ranging discussion on questions of nuclear doctrine and limited war. I believe we desperately need a similar exchange today, and you in this room have a central role to play in shaping the debate and thereby shaping our common future.

When will we use force? The short answer remains what it always has, or should have been—when our interests require us to do so. What are these American interests?

Defining National Interests

During the Cold War, our interests were defined overwhelmingly in terms of the threat to the United States posed by Soviet nuclear weapons. That led to the policy of nuclear deterrence. Thanks, in part, to that policy, we are free and alive and assembled here today.

The policy of containment also flowed from America's definition of interest in light of the Soviet threat. The national consensus behind containment helped produce victory in the Cold War. But as Vietnam showed, the relationship between means and ends in fighting limited wars was never satisfactorily defined.

Today, with an ever-increasing choice of possible missions in a rapidly changing world, our thinking needs still finer resolution than it has ever had before.

Just as in the promotion of democracy and open markets we concentrate on those areas where our interests are most deeply engaged, so we must be as

clear as possible on when and where we will use military force. For there is no more important decision a President makes.

No matter how clear our military doctrine, that decision has and should always come down to a judgment that weighs the importance of a particular mission—defined in terms of our interests—against its presumed costs.

Here, in general if not perfect order of priority, are the seven national interests, taken in some combination or even alone, that this Administration believes can merit the use of our military, especially in areas of greatest strategic significance:

- To defend against direct attacks on the United States, its citizens at home and abroad, and its allies.
- To counter aggression, which is central to preserving a peaceful world.
- To defend our most important economic interests, because it is here that Americans see their most immediate personal stake in our international engagement.
- To preserve, promote, and defend democracy, which, in turn, enhances our security and the spread of our values.
- To prevent the dangerous proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, to prevent acts of terrorism, and to combat the deadly flow of drugs.
- To maintain our reliability. When the U.S. makes commitments to other nations, we must keep our promises.
- And for humanitarian purposes, such as combating famine and other natural disasters and in cases of overwhelming violations of human rights.

Setting Priorities

An array of interests need not mean disarray in setting our priorities. By itself, none of the interests in this general hierarchy—with the certain exception of attacks on our nation and its allies and the possible exception of aggression elsewhere—should automatically lead to the use of force. But the wider the range of these interests at stake, the more likely that we will call again on our military. That is why, in Haiti, when we saw democracy

denied, our borders threatened, our reliability on the line, and a reign of brutality so close to our own shores, we saw a compelling case for intervention.

It is not our interests alone that decide when and where to use force. Against the interests at stake we must measure the costs and benefits of each specific operation, and answer such questions as: Is there a clearly defined, achievable mission? What is the environment of risk we are entering? What are the prospects for success? What is needed to achieve our goals? What are the potential costs—both human and financial—of the engagement? Do we have a realistic exit strategy?

There is no algorithm here—no simple formula that asks us only to fill in the numbers in calculating the risks and the requirements of each mission. But we do know that those are the factors we must consider as we decide when and where to send our young men and women into danger. There is also a set of guidelines that help shape how we use force, and its likely utility when we do.

When we send American troops abroad, we will send them with a clear mission and the means to prevail. And when we use force, we must be prepared to use it unflinchingly. To do otherwise endangers the interests we seek to safeguard, as well as the troops we send.

We should never delude ourselves: Deploying our military often will not solve underlying problems, and we must carefully limit the missions we choose. Force can defeat an aggressor, but it will not conjure democracy into existence or flip the switch on to prosperity. It may only begin to make a solution possible farther down the road. When we do act, we will do so with others when we can, but alone when we must. In some cases, in which we should not act unilaterally, we may choose to join in multilateral action as we share the burdens and spread the risks. The United States has consistently led the effort to build coalitions to meet the needs of the international

community. Joining together in common cause makes us all stronger, and deepens our moral authority.

The more deeply our interests are threatened, of course, the more inclined we are to act alone. That is why we have said that we will act by ourselves in the Persian Gulf, if necessary—and did so earlier when the Iraqis plotted against the life of a former American President and thus against our whole people, as well.

Finally, a cautionary note on another potential guideline. Some have argued for a simpler policy: That we should assert a sphere of influence in our own hemisphere and in limited areas beyond, leaving to others the task of maintaining stability and order in their own spheres. This view, I believe, is dangerously wrong.

Certainly, proximity counts. Had Haiti not been so close to our shores, we would have been less likely to act. The dramatic advance of democracy in this hemisphere is one of the truly stirring developments of our time, and we have an obvious interest in preventing any unraveling of that achievement.

We recognize that all nations have greater concerns for their immediate surroundings than they do for distant regions. But as a great nation whose interests and ideals are global in scope, we cannot—and will not—cede to others a right to intervene as they wish in the affairs of their neighbors without regard to international norms of behavior. Specifically, we must expect of others that they will respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of their neighbors, just as we do.

These, then, are the calculations of interest and cost that have produced our past uses of military power and will guide us in the future.

Putting Power Behind Diplomacy

Every time we have used force, we have balanced interests against costs. And in each case, our use of our military has put power behind our diplomacy, allowing us to make progress we would not otherwise have achieved.

Iraq poses a threat of aggression in which a broad range of American interests are engaged. So we are leading a coalition under the authority of the United Nations—but are prepared to act alone if we must. The result of the President's decisive action has been not only the near-resolution of the current crisis, but a new injunction by the Security Council against future Iraqi aggression.

In Haiti, where lesser but nonetheless important interests are at stake, we also acted—but at a potentially lower cost. Over three years, we had exhausted all avenues of negotiation and the use of economic sanctions in our efforts to redeem the pledges of two administrations to restore the democratically elected government there. But in the end it was only the use of force that could finally bring success. When the Haitian generals received the news that the 82nd Airborne Division was, in fact, airborne and headed their way—they gave way. As a result, we achieved peacefully what we were prepared to do under fire. I recall that Sunday afternoon vividly when it looked like we might have to use force. If you are prepared to use force you may “subdue the enemy without fighting,” to use Sun Tzu's words. The ancient strategist called that “the acme of skill.”

In Bosnia, we have not seen all the progress that we would like, but when diplomacy has been married to military power, positive movement has been the result. For example, the Sarajevo ultimatum succeeded primarily because the threat of NATO air strikes was concrete. NATO's decision on the use of air power substantially eased the pressures on Sarajevo, prevented the fall of Gorazde, and provided the foundation for last spring's agreement between the Bosnians and Bosnian Croats to end their conflict and form a federation. The recent NATO decision to seek greater clarity and flexibility from the United Nations in Bosnia is a step in the right direction.

In Rwanda and Somalia, our missions were primarily humanitarian, our interests more narrow. Only the American military could have done

what it did, saving hundreds and hundreds of thousands of lives, and we are very proud of that. But over the longer run, our interests did not justify more than support for multilateral peace-keeping efforts once our own missions were concluded. And there, as elsewhere, international peace-keeping efforts can only give a fractured society a window of opportunity—a time of relative security—in which to heal its own wounds. No outside force can impose on any society what is, in the end, its own responsibility.

Cooperation and Understanding

A final point: Policy, of course, does not succeed or fail in a vacuum. Public opinion and the Congress rightfully play central roles in how the United States wields its power abroad. Perhaps the outstanding lesson we learned during Vietnam was the importance of what Les Gelb once called "the essential domino": public opinion. That conflict taught us to think more carefully about costs, more carefully about willpower as well as firepower, and more carefully about the length of engagement. But above all, it taught us that the United States cannot long sustain a fight without the support of public opinion.

Public opinion is formed in our era in even more perplexing ways than during the Vietnam years. This is especially true for humanitarian and other non-traditional interventions. The quantum leap in coverage brought about by CNN and the other networks means that almost every day, every American must be beset by a painful ambivalence.

Images of violence, misery, and brutality naturally call up the impulse to intervene. The television screen transforms a particular incident into an apparently universal condition in that foreign society. The camera, unfortunately, does not have peripheral vision. My country and perhaps my country alone—the viewer feels—can do something about this carnage and must do something about this carnage.

But when images of casualties—our casualties—appear, everything can

change instantly. The costs become painfully obvious, and the question arises: Can this possibly be worth even one American life?

Neither of these sentiments should surprise or dismay us. Both reactions are expressions of the high value Americans place on human life, and we are a better people for it.

But while as individuals we all may share this painful ambivalence, it is the responsibility of government to make real choices and to act—distinguishing between the essential and the tangential, acting on the basis of what is right, and then, when action is taken, doing so without hesitation or vacillation.

To do this, there must be better understanding and cooperation between the Executive and the Congress. We both, of course, must ultimately be responsible to the public for our decisions. And this means a necessary and proper caution about incurring the costs of military action. It is, after all, the American people who bear the burdens and pay the price.

But we also know, from our most recent experience in the Persian Gulf, that the American people are not so averse to the use of force as some might think, especially if classic interests like security in Europe or Asia or the Middle East are in question. And as a new Rand study indicates, they want to see our troops succeed once they are committed.

Congress, we have seen, also supports the use of force whenever the nation's classic interests are at stake. That is a great advantage, since it is imperative that the Executive branch and Congress work together on these issues.

But in the post-Cold War world, we must also have the capacity for the limited use of force in new circumstances. And too often in such cases, some in Congress react by emphasizing only the cautionary notes, seeing only costs and casualties rather than benefits and opportunities.

And when we use force—to repeat—we must use it unflinchingly. Otherwise, we risk our objectives and we endanger our troops, both in the

specific mission at hand and around the world. When Congress almost automatically considers resolutions calling for an early withdrawal of our forces when deployed in non-traditional settings, it undermines our objectives and it compounds the risk for our troops. It is virtually an invitation for the thug of the month to see if he can force our departure from some difficult corner of the world by attacking our soldiers there. For this reason, among others, President Clinton opposed a hasty withdrawal from Somalia last fall. That would have been the wrong way out and sent the wrong message around the world. Instead, he raised our troop level before successfully drawing it down, over time, on schedule and without further casualties.

This issue transcends the daily work we do in dealing with Congress. And recognizing Congress' role, this Administration has consulted with it in unprecedented ways—75 times alone in the case of Haiti.

But what is needed is a war powers mechanism and system of consultations that work. Next year, we will hold serious discussions with Congress on amending the War Powers Resolution in an effort to ameliorate a struggle between these branches of government that has lasted two centuries. It will never be resolved, and perhaps never should be. But the terms and tone of the competition over the making of national security policy must be improved, and must lose some of its current partisan cast, or our nation and troops could pay an unnecessary price for it.

Conclusion

Americans know that the passing of the Cold War, reassuring as that is, does not mean we live in a world of true safety. We also know that we have before us an opportunity to build a world of more democracy, more tolerance, and more pluralism. It is the kind of opportunity that comes, at most, once in an era. To defeat the dangers and seize the day, we must summon our creativity and all of our diplomatic skill. And to that skill, we must always harness our power. So let

us keep fixed in our minds the precept of one of the Enlightenment's great realists, Frederick the Great, who said: "Diplomacy without arms is music without instruments."

And let us remain alert to the danger of slippage and retreat. We must reject the calls from the left and the right, as well as the rhetoric of neo-know-nothings of no particular view, to

stay at home rather than engage. You in this room may not believe that we are fighting a new round of the old struggle between engagement and retrenchment. The debate is less clearly defined than it was in the period between the two world wars. But every time a foreign aid bill is slashed, a troop deployment opposed on ideological rather than practical grounds, or a good trade agreement is attacked, it

is part and parcel of that same traditional argument. The impulse to retreat from the world, like the fog, comes in on little cat feet. So I ask you to join in efforts to keep our nation from becoming befogged in the face of a new world of continuing danger. For it is also a time of immense and wonderful opportunity. I think we will seize it. ■

THE TRIP OF PRESIDENT CLINTON TO THE CSCE SUMMIT

FACT SHEETS

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)

From Vancouver to Vladivostok, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) brings a new kind of diplomacy—one built on respect for human rights and regional cooperation as the bases for security among Atlantic, European, and Eurasian countries.

While its most prominent characteristic is furthering European security and cooperation by defining and protecting human rights, CSCE also fosters these goals through programs centered on press and culture, economics, conflict prevention, and military security. CSCE is committed to developing democratic institutions at the grass-roots level, through local officials and activities, and through non-governmental organizations.

Evolution of the CSCE

CSCE began during the Cold War as a way to promote dialogue and decrease tensions between East and West. In August 1975, 35 nations signed the Helsinki Final Act, a politically binding declaratory understanding of the democratic principles governing relations among nations. The act contained a provision to continue regular discussions on a broad range of concerns—from migration and military security to the environment and media relations—in what became known as the "Helsinki process."

During the 1980s, follow-on meetings in Madrid, Stockholm, and Vienna reviewed implementation of CSCE agreements and continued the opportunity for discussion. Although CSCE had no permanent headquarters and no

enforcement capability, important progress was made to establish firm standards for the protection of human rights and to increase confidence through the advance notification of military activities and the exchange of military information.

With the end of the Cold War, all CSCE states for the first time accepted the principles of pluralism and free markets as the basis for their cooperation. This made it possible for CSCE to explore ways to act on its rigorous principles and to ensure that they were upheld. To do this, CSCE in 1990 established the Secretariat in Prague, Conflict Prevention Center in Vienna, and Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights in Warsaw. A decision to create an office of Secretary General was made at the December 1992 Stockholm meeting of CSCE Foreign Ministers.

During 1992, the decision to move from principle to action was most marked in a new Helsinki document which established a number of practical tools that help CSCE work with NATO, the EU (European Union), and other international bodies to defend human rights and manage the unprecedented changes now taking place in Europe. In particular, it sets out an ambitious role for the CSCE in conflict resolution and "preventive diplomacy."

CSCE is also an important framework for conventional arms control in Europe. The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, signed in November 1990, limits non-nuclear ground and air forces from the Atlantic to the Urals. A separate political

CSCE Participating States

Albania	Liechtenstein
Armenia	Lithuania
Austria	Luxembourg
Azerbaijan	Malta
Belarus	Moldova
Belgium	Monaco
Bosnia-Herzegovina	Netherlands
Bulgaria	Norway
Canada	Poland
Croatia	Portugal
Cyprus	Romania
Czech Republic	Russia
Denmark	San Marino
Estonia	Slovak Republic
Finland	Slovenia
France	Spain
Georgia	Sweden
Germany	Switzerland
Greece	Tajikistan
The Holy See	Turkey
Hungary	Turkmenistan
Iceland	Ukraine
Ireland	United Kingdom
Italy	United States
Kazakhstan	Uzbekistan
Kyrgyzstan	Yugoslavia*
Latvia	

* Excluded from all CSCE meetings □

agreement, concluded in July 1992, covers personnel in the same region. Through continued negotiation, confidence-building measures have been extended and higher expectations for treaty compliance and verification have been set. A new security negotiation—the Forum for Security Cooperation—opened in Vienna on September 22, 1992.



CSCE and European Conflicts

The civil war in the former Yugoslavia has been an early test of the CSCE's ability to take an active part in conflict prevention. On August 6, 1992, the U.S. Government called on the CSCE to help monitor the human rights situation in the Balkans and inhibit the spread of the conflict.

The CSCE quickly sent fact-finding and rapporteur missions to the region and supported the sanctions and humanitarian measures taken by the UN and the EU. The CSCE then established a completely new kind of presence in the areas adjacent to the conflict. These "missions of long duration" provided an early warning system for any spill-over of the hostilities into the regions of Serbia and Montenegro—Kosovo, Vojvodina, and Sandzak—and into The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Until the missions in Serbia and Montenegro were expelled in July 1993 by Belgrade authorities, they made a significant contribution to stability, as the mission in The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia continues to do. Missions also have been sent to Serbia and Montenegro, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina to investigate alleged violations of CSCE principles.

In August 1992, the London Conference on the Former Yugoslavia asked the CSCE to assist in monitoring sanctions compliance. There are now missions in Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Ukraine, and Albania. The post of Sanctions Coordinator was created to oversee the CSCE-EU sanctions missions in the countries around Serbia and Montenegro.

The CSCE is in the forefront of conflict resolution in other parts of the region as well:

- Under CSCE auspices, the Minsk Group—11 nations (including Azerbaijan and Armenia)—is the focus of international efforts to solve the crisis in Nagorno-Karabakh.

- The CSCE mission in Georgia is assessing the political and human rights situations in the Abkhazia and South Ossetia regions of Georgia, as well as monitoring peace-keeping forces and participating in political negotiations in South Ossetia.

- Rapporteur missions have been sent to the new Central Asian republics to assess the governmental and human rights situations.

- In February 1993, CSCE agreed to send a long-term, conflict-prevention CSCE mission to Moldova and a mission to Estonia to promote integration and better understanding between communities there.

- In October 1993, the CSCE agreed to send a mission to Latvia to monitor Latvian-Russian minority issues.

- The previous Chairman-in-Office (Sweden) sent a personal representative to investigate the situation in Tajikistan, which led to a December 1993 decision to send a mission there. The Tajikistan mission has a mandate to foster confidence-building, democracy, and human rights.

- In 1994, the CSCE established preventive diplomacy missions in Ukraine and Bosnia.

As a charter member of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the United States has been central in the promotion of uncompromising humanitarian standards and their practical implementation. From the beginning, CSCE has embodied America's hopes for a unified, democratic, and prosperous Europe. Americans continually have worked to ensure that the CSCE process remains flexible, innovative, and unbureaucratic. The United States established the first permanent delegation to the CSCE in Vienna in August 1992, charting a course for other nations to follow. ■

Fact Sheet

CSCE Structure

The Charter of Paris, signed in November 1990, committed Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) member states to a substantial enhancement of CSCE decision-making bodies, mechanisms, and institutions in order to give permanence and strength to a 16-year-old process of ad hoc political consultations. Since the signing of that document, CSCE has gained several new institutions and a number of expanded consultative mechanisms geared toward intensifying the pan-European discussions commonly referred to as the Helsinki process.

Council of Ministers (COM). CSCE members agreed at the Paris summit to establish a Council of Ministers (COM)—comprised of foreign ministers—as its highest decision-making body which would meet at least annually. The Charter of Paris set a broad mandate for the COM to deal with any issues relevant to security and cooperation in Europe. The state hosting a COM meeting assumes the chairmanship of CSCE and holds the position until the opening of the next ministerial; Italy is the current CSCE Chairman-in-Office.

Committee of Senior Officials (CSO). The Charter of Paris also established a subsidiary working group/executive body at the ambassadorial/political director level. The Committee of Senior Officials (CSO), acting as the agent of the ministers, is charged with preparing for meetings of ministers, carrying out their decisions, reviewing current issues, and considering future work of the CSCE, including its relations with other international organizations. CSO meetings are held at least quarterly. Several additional meetings have been called to deal with the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and Nagorno-Karabakh. The state chairing the COM also heads CSO meetings.

Secretary General. The Stockholm COM agreed to establish the position of Secretary General as the CSCE's chief administrative officer to manage CSCE structures and operations, work closely with the Chairman-in-Office in the preparation and guidance of CSCE meetings, and ensure implementation of CSCE decisions.

CSCE Secretariat. The CSCE Secretariat opened in Prague in February 1991. It is charged with administrative support of the COM and CSO; the maintenance of archives; and the dissemination of information to the public, non-CSCE states, and other international organizations.

Parliamentary Assembly. Legislators from CSCE states have agreed to meet on an annual basis. The first session was held in Helsinki in July 1993. The assembly has a consultative role in the CSCE process.

Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR). The Office for Free Elections (OFE) started operations in April 1991, with a general mandate to collect and disseminate information on elections within CSCE states. In 1992, CSCE states agreed to expand the OFE into an Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. In addition to its original OFE duties, the office now serves as a central information source for all aspects of democratic institution-building and organizes seminars on specific topics in this area. It is responsible for organizing periodic meetings to review CSCE human dimension commitments. It also supports use of the expanded Human Dimension Mechanism (HDM) and the activities of the newly created High Commissioner for National Minorities.

High Commissioner on National Minorities. Acting under CSO aegis as an instrument of conflict prevention, the High Commissioner on National Minorities will provide "early warning"

and, as appropriate, "early action" on tensions involving national minority issues which have the potential to affect peace, stability, or relations between participating states.

Conflict Prevention Center (CPC). The first CSCE institution to open—in Vienna in January 1991—was the Conflict Prevention Center, which is charged primarily with overseeing the sharing of data on military forces in Europe and hosting annual implementation meetings and those called under the Unusual Military Activities mechanism. The CPC is in charge of supporting implementation of the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes mechanism. In February 1993, the CSO approved a plan to have the CPC provide operational support for the CSCE's ever-growing diplomatic, conflict-prevention, and peace-keeping missions.

Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC). At the 1992 Helsinki summit CSCE established this forum as the only pan-European forum for security dialogue and arms control negotiations. The Helsinki summit also established a program of immediate action which includes development of further confidence- and security-building measures, and exchange of global military information, cooperation on non-proliferation, and cooperation on regional measures. The FSC convened in September 1992 in Vienna and will continue to meet in semi-permanent session.

Permanent Committee. Created by the Rome Council in 1993, the Permanent Committee is responsible for the day-to-day operational tasks of the CSCE. It conducts comprehensive and regular consultation and when the CSO is not in session it takes decisions on all issues pertinent to the CSCE. It meets in Vienna. ■



CSCE: Major Conferences and Meetings, 1989-1994

In addition to institutional activity, the CSCE pursues its goals through a regular series of meetings and seminars. These meetings focus on practical application of CSCE commitments and feature participation by experts and non-governmental organizations actually working on the subject being discussed. CSCE commitments also provide for regular meetings of foreign ministers and for periodic reviews of implementation.

1989

April-May: Information forum—London

May-June: Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension—Paris

October-November: Meeting on the protection of the environment—Sofia

1990

March-April: Conference on economic cooperation in Europe—Bonn

June: Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension—Copenhagen

September-October: Meeting on the Mediterranean—Palma de Mallorca

October: Meeting of CSCE Foreign Ministers—New York

November: CSCE summit—Paris

1991

January-February: Meeting of experts on the peaceful settlement of disputes—Valletta

May-June: Symposium on cultural heritage—Krakow

June: Meeting of the CSCE Council of Ministers—Berlin

July: Meeting of experts on national minorities—Geneva

September-October: Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension—Moscow

November: Seminar of experts on democratic institutions—Oslo

1992

January: Meeting of the CSCE Council of Ministers—Prague

March: Preparatory meeting—Helsinki

March-June: Follow-up meeting—Helsinki

July: CSCE summit—Helsinki

September: Forum for Security Cooperation convenes—Vienna

October: Meeting on peaceful settlement of disputes—Geneva

November: Tolerance seminar—Warsaw

December: Council of Ministers meeting—Stockholm

1993

March: Economic forum—Prague

April: Migration seminar—Warsaw

May: National minorities seminar—Warsaw

May: Mediterranean seminar—Valletta

July: CSCE parliamentary assembly—Helsinki

September: Boreal and temperate forests seminar—Montreal

September-October: Implementation review meeting—Warsaw

November: Free media seminar—Warsaw

November 30-December 1: Council of Ministers meeting—Rome

1994

January: Early warning seminar—Warsaw

February: Creating small and medium-sized businesses seminar—Bishkek

March: Economic Forum—Prague

March: Migrant workers seminar—Warsaw

April: Human dimension seminar—Almaty

May: Local democracy seminar—Warsaw

May: Regional security seminar—Ashgabat

July: CSCE Parliamentary Assembly—Vienna

September: Business and environment seminar—Tallinn

September: Roma issues seminar—Warsaw

September: CSCE issues seminar—Tashkent

October-December: Review Conference—Budapest

December 5-6: CSCE Summit—Budapest ■



Confidence- and Security-Building Measures

Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs) are designed to enhance transparency and increase mutual understanding about military forces and activities. CSBMs foster contacts, cooperation, and consultation among participating states through agreed mechanisms for sharing and verifying military information. The flexibility of CSBMs makes them especially helpful for building confidence in the new, more fluid European security environment.

Over the past two decades, the array of confidence-building measures has expanded steadily. Within the framework of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the Stockholm Document in 1986 and the Vienna Document in 1990 established a politically binding regime of CSBMs. While not explicitly linked to the CSBM regime, nor to various European arms control agreements, the Open Skies Treaty, signed in 1992, introduced into CSCE detailed procedures for aerial observation and established a new framework for contacts, cooperation, and consultation among the treaty's participants.

The present CSBM regime, contained in "Vienna Document 1992," was the result of negotiations held from November 1990 to March 1992. CSCE

members adopted the document on March 4, 1992. Key provisions include:

- An annual exchange of military data on personnel and equipment holdings, major weapons and equipment systems, and defense budgets;
- Risk reduction measures including mandatory consultations in the case of unusual military activities, cooperation on hazardous military incidents, and voluntary visits to dispel concerns about military activities;
- A framework of military-to-military contacts, including air base visits, cultural, sporting, and educational contacts, and demonstrations of new weapons and equipment following their deployment;
- The right to observe military activities meeting certain size and type thresholds;
- Provision of an annual calendar forecasting military activities of a certain size and type for the following year;
- Constraints on the frequency of military activities involving more than 40,000 troops or 900 battle tanks;
- Visits to evaluate and verify data on forces and weapons systems; and
- An annual implementation assessment meeting held in Vienna to discuss the annual exchange of information and other security topics as agreed by CSCE members.

A revised version of the Vienna Document, adopted by the Review Conference in preparation for the December 1994 CSCE Summit in Budapest, further strengthened the CSBM regime. Notable changes include:

- A new provision to provide greater transparency in states' defense planning, which includes information on states' intentions regarding the size, structure, training, and equipment of their armed forces and their defense policy, doctrines, and related budgets;
- Increased opportunities for military-to-military contacts among CSCE states, including expanded contacts between members of the armed forces at all levels and between military units and exchanges of visits of naval vessels and air force units; and
- Steps to enhance the operation of the CSCE communications network, including specifying use of standard operating procedures and establishing a communications group that will address issues concerning the viability and effectiveness of the network. ■



The North Atlantic Treaty Organization

O Today

NATO remains the core of American engagement in Europe and at the heart of European security. It is the members' most effective instrument for coordinating defense and arms control, maintaining stability throughout Europe. The collapse of the Soviet Union, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, and the progress of European integration have not ended the need for NATO's essential commitment to safeguard the freedom and security of its members by political and military means in accordance with UN principles. The London Declaration on a transformed North Atlantic Alliance, issued after the summit meeting of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) in July 1990, signaled the vitality of the alliance in adapting to security needs in a post-Cold War world. At that meeting, NATO allies announced a fundamental review of strategy and invited the Soviet Union and the countries of Central Europe to establish regular diplomatic liaison and to develop a new partnership.

The November 1991 Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation further underlined NATO's intention to redefine its objectives in light of changed circumstances. The declaration took account of the broader challenges to alliance security interests, such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional instability, and terrorism. It outlined its future tasks in the context of a framework of interlocking and mutually reinforcing institutions, including the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the Western European Union (WEU), the European Community (now the European Union), and the Council of Europe, working together to build a new European security system. The "New Strategic Concept" announced at the meeting stressed the alliance's mis-

NATO Background

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was formed against the backdrop of emerging post-war tensions engendered by the threat of Soviet expansionism and concern over political and economic instability in Western Europe. On April 4, 1949, in Washington, DC, the Foreign Ministers of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, United Kingdom, and United States signed the North Atlantic Treaty, the political framework for an international alliance designed to prevent aggression, or, if necessary, to resist attack against any alliance member. In 1952, Greece and Turkey acceded to the treaty, fol-

lowed by the Federal Republic of Germany in 1955 and by Spain in 1982.

This alliance of sovereign states pledges, through a combination of political solidarity and military force, to preserve its mutual security. Reaffirming faith in the principles of individual and collective self-defense embodied in the UN Charter, the parties to the treaty pledge to defend the common heritage and civilization of their peoples and to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area. While recognizing the need to maintain adequate military strength to safeguard the security of its members, the alliance also resolves to work toward the establishment of a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe. □

sion in crisis management and mandated a more flexible force structure and reduced reliance on nuclear weapons. The Rome meeting also created the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) to develop an institutional relationship of consultation and cooperation on political and security issues between NATO and its former adversaries. This initiative culminated in the participation of Foreign Ministers and representatives from the 16 NATO countries, six Central European countries, and the three Baltic states at the inaugural meeting of the NACC in December 1991. At the second NACC meeting in March 1992, the new independent states of the former Soviet Union became members, except Georgia, which was admitted the following month. Albania joined the NACC in June 1992.

NATO Foreign Ministers affirmed their readiness to support peace-keeping activities under the auspices of the CSCE on a case-by-case basis in June 1992. The following month, the North Atlantic Council agreed on a NATO

maritime operation in the Adriatic, in coordination with the WEU, to monitor compliance with the UN embargo against Serbia and Montenegro (upgraded to enforcement in November 1992 following UN Security Council resolutions to tighten economic sanctions). On June 8, 1993, agreement was reached to place the NATO/WEU Adriatic task force under the operational command of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe.

On December 17, 1992, NATO foreign ministers agreed that NATO would be prepared to support a UN Security Council resolution on enforcement of the ban on military flights over Bosnia and Herzegovina. NATO has been enforcing the no-fly zone over that country since April 12, 1993. In the spring of 1993, NATO planned for a peace settlement in Bosnia under UN auspices once an equitable agreement is reached by all of the parties and put into effect.

On September 2, 1992, the NAC approved UN humanitarian relief efforts in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In



NATO's role as a forum for political consultation and an association of nations committed to collective defense remains unchanged, even as its new responsibilities in the areas of peace-keeping and crisis management continue to evolve.

U.S.-NATO Relations: The Trans-Atlantic Partnership

The decision of the United States after World War II to participate in a regional peacetime, defensive alliance represented a fundamental change in American foreign policy. The United States recognized that its interests no longer could be confined to the limits of the Western Hemisphere: U.S. security was linked inextricably to the future of the West European democracies. Concepts of individual liberty and the rule of law, coupled with those of a common heritage and shared values, provided the foundation for the NATO alliance. These ideals, as well as the ongoing goal of each member country to achieve a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe, continue to link the fate of America to that of its NATO allies.

The history of U.S. engagement in NATO has been one of commitment by America and its allies to reduce tensions in Europe and to improve East-West relations. They have pursued a series of initiatives designed to lower levels of personnel and equipment and increase mutual confidence, while adhering to a policy of political cohesion and military strength. Arms control measures aimed at enhancing stability have included the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 1987 and the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) in 1990.

The CFE Treaty between the allies and the nations and successor states of the former Warsaw Pact provides for an unprecedented level of transparency in the security field through an information exchange and obligatory inspections. Most importantly, it mandates a sharp reduction in conventional weapons throughout Europe. The NATO allies coordinate closely to meet their own obligations under the treaty and to ensure full compliance in its information, verification, and reduction provisions.

NATO has played a leading role in developing far-reaching proposals for CSCE's Forum for Security Coopera-

tion (FSC). Alliance proposals on force planning, non-proliferation, and harmonization of existing arms control commitments already are being developed.

The United States supports the development of a greater European security identity and defense role as a means of strengthening the integrity and effectiveness of NATO. At the NATO summit in Rome, the alliance welcomed the prospect of a European political union with a greater security and defense dimension but underlined that this would not diminish the need for NATO. The alliance's "New Strategic Concept" also reaffirmed the essential nature of the trans-Atlantic partnership, recognizing as a basic principle the indivisibility of security of all its members. The U.S. proposed, and the January 1994 NATO summit agreed, that "separable but not separate" European capabilities be made available to undertake independent European missions, drawing as necessary on NATO collective assets when NATO-wide actions are not necessary.

The North Atlantic alliance and the American presence in Europe have helped keep peace for more than 40 years. Having helped to forge successful policies toward the former Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact since the foundation of NATO, the U.S. with its European allies must play a central role in building the framework of the new Euro-Atlantic architecture.

NATO Strategy

NATO collective security strategy was mainly based on the principle of deterrence. Defense capabilities were created to deter military aggression or other forms of pressure. Parties to the treaty agreed to consult whenever the territorial integrity, political independence, or security of any party was threatened. They further pledged to maintain their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack and, should such deterrence fail, to defend the territory of the alliance. As a purely defensive alliance, NATO maintained only a level of military strength sufficient to be credible. Given the marked inferiority of allied conventional strength in Europe, the NATO guarantee rested primarily on the nuclear superiority of the United States.

At the conclusion of a 1967 comprehensive review of NATO strategy, the alliance adopted a revised approach to

the common defense, based on a balanced range of responses, conventional and nuclear, to all levels of aggression or threats of aggression. This reassessment of the nature of the potential threat to member countries prompted the realization that the alliance must increasingly look to the dangers of more limited forms of aggression beyond the possibility of a massive Soviet attack. The basis of the new concept of "flexible response" was the belief that NATO should be able to deter and counter military force with a range of responses designed to defend directly against attack at an appropriate level, or, if necessary, to escalate the attack to the level necessary to persuade an aggressor to desist.

At the same time, the alliance accepted the recommendations of the report written by former Belgium Foreign Minister Pierre Harmel and titled "Future Tasks of the Alliance," which outlined the need to work toward the achievement of disarmament and balanced force reductions. The maintenance of adequate military forces would be coupled with efforts at improving East-West relations.

Soviet deployment of new mobile theater nuclear missiles (SS-20s) called into question the accepted NATO strategy of deterrence based on the concepts of forward defense and flexible response and led to a decision in 1979 to modernize its defensive capability. The resulting "dual-track" decision by the alliance combined pursuing arms control negotiations with responding appropriately to the increased imbalance created by the new Soviet systems. Alliance governments agreed to deploy U.S. ground-launched cruise missiles in Western Europe.

The successful conclusion of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 1987, while eliminating all Soviet and U.S. land-based, intermediate-range missiles, required a new appraisal of NATO policy. In response, the alliance developed its "Comprehensive Concept of Arms Control and Disarmament," which provided a framework for alliance policy in nuclear, conventional, and chemical fields of arms control and tied defense policies to progress in arms control.

In July 1990, the NAC issued the "London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance" to adapt to the new realities in Europe. The ministers pledged to intensify political and

military contacts with Moscow and with Central and East European capitals and to work not only for the common defense but to build new partnerships with all the nations of Europe. They underlined the need to undertake broader arms control and confidence-building agreements to limit conventional armed forces in Europe. In recognition of the radical political changes in Europe and the improved security environment, the ministers mandated a fundamental review of the alliance's political and military strategy.

The "New Strategic Concept" was outlined at the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in November 1991. The threat of a massive full-scale Soviet attack, which had provided the focus of NATO's strategy during the Cold War,

had disappeared after the end of the political division of Europe. The alliance acknowledged that the risks to its security, such as proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and acts of terrorism and sabotage, were now less predictable and beyond the focus of traditional concerns. The new strategy adopts a broader approach to security, centered more on crisis management and conflict prevention. It assumes completion of the planned withdrawal of military forces from Central Europe and the Baltics and the full implementation of arms control agreements limiting conventional forces in Europe.

In the context of changed circumstances, the alliance will maintain a mix of nuclear and conventional forces based in Europe, although at significantly lower levels. To ensure effectiveness, alliance forces will be increasingly

mobile to respond to a range of contingencies. Forces will be organized for flexible buildup to react to regional instability and crises. Collective defense arrangements will rely increasingly on multinational forces within the integrated military structure. Nuclear forces will continue to play an essential role in allied strategy but will be maintained at the minimum level sufficient to preserve stability.

The new strategy reaffirms the principle of common commitment and mutual cooperation in support of the indivisibility of security for all alliance members and underscores the essential political and military link between European and North American members provided by the presence of nuclear forces in Europe. ■

The North Atlantic Cooperation Council

NACC Today

The North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) joins the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies and the newly free and independent states of Central and Eastern Europe, the Baltics, and the former Soviet Union in a program of political-security dialogue, partnership, and cooperation. Subjects discussed in regular meetings between allies and partner states include defense planning and budgeting, democratic concepts of civil-military relations, defense conversion, and scientific and environmental topics. Members also discuss current political issues of common concern. In this way, the NACC complements the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), NATO, the European Union, and the Council of Europe in building a Euro-Atlantic community of stable, democratic, and market-oriented societies from Vancouver to Vladivostok.

NACC's Origins

As the advent of *glasnost* and *perestroika* in the Soviet Union and the crumbling of communist control in Eastern Europe changed the nature of the European security challenge, NATO turned from a posture of confrontation with the East to one of dialogue and cooperation. The June 1990 Turnberry North Atlantic Council ministerial and July 1990 London NATO summit extended the hand of friendship to NATO's former adversaries and called for the alliance to institute a liaison program with the Warsaw Pact states. The June 1991 Copenhagen North Atlantic Council ministerial developed this theme in its statement on "Partnership with the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe."

In their October 3, 1991, joint statement, Secretary of State Baker and German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher proposed the institutionalization of the NATO liaison program in a North Atlantic Cooperation Council. The following month, the Rome NATO summit formally established the NACC as a forum in which allies could offer their experience and expertise to partner countries on security and related issues.

Ongoing Projects

In its first year, NACC developed a solid basis of cooperation and dialogue. The first NACC ministerial, held on December 20, 1991, in Brussels, brought together representatives of the 16 NATO allies, the Baltic states, the U.S.S.R., Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania. Participants pledged to uphold CSCE principles, support arms control efforts, and work together in building a Europe whole and free.

The second NACC ministerial held on March 10, 1992, in Brussels, admitted all the states of the former Soviet Union except Georgia (which joined the following month). Ministers adopted the first NACC work plan, which spelled out a program of intensified consultations and cooperative activities focused on security and related issues, including political, military, economic, scientific, and environmental subjects. Specific topics for cooperation included defense planning, conceptual approaches to arms control, democratic concepts of civilian-military relations, civil-military coordination of air-traffic management, defense conversion, and enhanced participation in NATO's "Third Dimension" scientific and environmental programs. Ministers also

pledged to cooperate in disseminating information about NATO in the partner countries and gave their support to the NACC's ad hoc High Level Group charged with facilitating entry-into-force of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty.

With the admission of Albania in June 1992 and the Czech-Slovak split in January 1993, membership in the NACC now stands at 38. Finland, Slovenia, and Sweden have attended recent ministerial meetings as observers.

A major step forward in NACC cooperation came at the December 1992 ministerial in Brussels. Ministers adopted a work plan for 1993 that included for the first time a provision for joint planning and training for peace-keeping. Subsequently, the NACC established an Ad Hoc Group on Cooperation in Peace-keeping to coordinate activities in this area. The NACC has welcomed the participation in Ad Hoc Group deliberations of three non-NACC states with extensive peace-keeping experience—Finland, Sweden, and Austria. A representative from the CSCE also attends.

Building on the momentum of cooperation created by the NACC, NATO established in January 1994 a program within the framework of NACC called the Partnership for Peace (PFP). PFP activities complement other activities undertaken in the framework of the NACC and are designed to intensify political and military cooperation between the Alliance and members of the Partnership. The PFP is open to states participating in NACC and other CSCE states able and willing to contribute to the Partnership.

At their next meeting, in Brussels in December 1994, ministers will review progress on implementing the



PFP, hold extensive consultations on regional issues, and exchange views on the evolution of European security architecture, including the mutually reinforcing relationships between NATO, NACC, and the CSCE.

The 1995 work plan, expected to be adopted by ministers on December 2, 1994 in Brussels, continues and expands NACC/PFP work on peacekeeping and other topics.

As it concludes its third year, NACC already has established itself as an important element in post-Cold War

Europe's security architecture. It will continue to develop as a complement to other European and trans-Atlantic organizations forging the links of a peaceful, democratic, and prosperous Euro-Atlantic community of nations. ■

THE TRIP OF PRESIDENT CLINTON TO THE CSCE SUMMIT

COUNTRY BACKGROUND NOTE

November 1994



Official Name:
Republic of Hungary

PROFILE

Geography

Area: 93,000 sq. km. (36,000 sq. mi.); about the size of Indiana.
Cities: *Capital*—Budapest (est. pop. 2 million); Debrecen (220,000); Miskolc (208,000); Szeged (189,000); Pecs (183,000).
Terrain: Much of Hungary is flat, with low mountains in the north and northeast and north of Lake Balaton.
Climate: Temperate. January average temp. 0°C (32°F); July 20°C (70°F).

People

Nationality: *Noun and adjective*—Hungarian(s).
Population (est.): 10 million.
Ethnic groups: Magyar 92%, Romany 3% (est.), German 1%, Slovak 1%, Jews 1%, Southern Slav 1%, others 1%.
Religions: Roman Catholic 68%, Calvinist 20%, Lutheran 5%, others, including Jewish, Baptist, Adventist, Pentecostal, Unitarian 5%.
Languages: Magyar 98%, other 2%.
Education: Compulsory to age 16.
Attendance—96%. **Literacy**—99%.
Health: *Infant mortality rate*—15/1,000.
Life expectancy—67 yrs. men, 75 yrs. women.
Work force (5 million): *Agriculture*—19%. *Industry and commerce*—49%. *Services*—27%. *Government*—5%.
Official language: Magyar (Hungarian).

Government

Type: Parliamentary democracy.
Constitution: August 20, 1949. Substantially revised in 1989, amended in 1990.
Branches: *Executive*—Council of Ministers. *Legislative*—Hungarian National Assembly (386 members, four-year term). *Judicial*—Supreme Court and Constitutional Court.
Administrative regions: 19 counties plus capital region of Budapest.
Principal political parties: Socialists (MSZP, reform communists) 32%; Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ center-left) 19%; Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF center) 12%; Independent Smallholder's

Party (FKGP center right) 9%; Federation of Young Democrats (FIDESZ center-left) 7%; Christian Democratic People's Party (KDNP center-right) 7%.

Economy (1993)

GDP: \$38 billion.
Annual growth rate: -2.3%.
Per capita income: \$3,700.
Natural resources: Fertile land, bauxite, brown coal.
Agriculture/forestry (7.3% of 1993 GDP): *Products*—meat, corn, wheat, potatoes, sugar beets, vegetables, fruits, sunflower seeds.
Industry/construction (33% of 1993 GDP): Machinery, buses, and other transportation equipment; precision and measuring equipment; textiles; medical instruments; and pharmaceuticals.
Trade: *Exports*—\$8.9 billion: machinery, buses, and other transportation equipment; medical instruments; pharmaceuticals; textiles; other consumer manufactures; and agricultural products. *Major markets*—Germany, Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Austria, Italy, U.S., France. *Imports*—\$12.5 billion: energy, raw materials, machinery, and transportation equipment. *Major suppliers*—CIS, Germany, Austria, Italy U.S., France.
Exchange rate (1993): About 100 forints=U.S.\$1. ■



HISTORY

Since its conversion to Western Christianity before AD 1000, Hungary has been an integral part of Europe. Although Hungary was a monarchy for nearly 1,000 years, its constitutional system preceded by several centuries the establishment of Western-style governments in other European countries.

Sharing defeat of the Austro-Hungarian Dual Monarchy (1867-1918) at the end of World War I, Hungary lost two-thirds of its territory and nearly as much of its population. It experienced a brief but bloody communist dictatorship and counter-revolution in 1919, followed by a 25-year regency under Admiral Miklos Horthy. Although Hungary fought in most of World War II as a German ally, following an unsuccessful attempt to switch sides on October 15, 1944, it fell under German military occupation until the end of the war. In January 1945, a provisional government concluded an armistice with the Soviet Union. It also established the Allied Control Commission, under which Soviet, American, and British representatives held complete sovereignty over the country. The Commission's chairman was a member of Stalin's inner circle and exercised absolute control.

Communist Takeover

The provisional government, dominated by the Hungarian Communist Party (HCP), was replaced in November 1945 after elections which gave majority control of a coalition government to the Independent Smallholders' Party. The government instituted a radical land reform and gradually nationalized mines, electric plants, four heavy industries, and some large banks.

The communists ultimately undermined the coalition regime by discrediting leaders of rival parties and by terror, blackmail, and framed trials. In elections tainted by fraud in 1947, the leftist bloc gained control of the government. Post-war cooperation between the U.S.S.R. and the West collapsed, and the Cold War began. With Soviet support, Moscow-trained Matyas Rakosi began to establish a communist dictatorship. By February 1949, all opposition parties had been forced to merge with the HCP to form the Hungarian Workers' Party. In 1949, the

communists held a single-list election and adopted a Soviet-style constitution which created the Hungarian People's Republic. Rakosi became Prime Minister in 1952.

Between 1948 and 1953, the Hungarian economy was reorganized according to the Soviet model. In 1949, the country joined the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA)—a Soviet-bloc economic organization. All private industrial firms with more than 10 employees were nationalized. Freedom of the press, religion, and assembly were strictly curtailed; the head of the Roman Catholic Church, Cardinal Jozsef Mindszenty, was sentenced to life imprisonment.

Forced industrialization and land collectivization soon led to serious economic difficulties, which reached crisis proportions by mid-1953, the year Stalin died. The new Soviet leaders blamed Rakosi for Hungary's economic situation and began a more flexible policy in Eastern Europe called the "New Course." Imre Nagy replaced Rakosi as prime minister in 1953 and repudiated much of Rakosi's economic program of forced collectivization and heavy industry. He also ended political purges and freed thousands of political prisoners.

However, the economic situation continued to deteriorate, and Rakosi succeeded in disrupting the reforms and in forcing Nagy from power in 1955 for "right-wing revisionism." Hungary joined the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact Treaty Organization the same year. Rakosi's attempt to restore Stalinist orthodoxy then foundered as increasing opposition developed within the party and among students and other organizations after Khrushchev's 1956 denunciation of Stalin. Fearing revolution, Moscow replaced Rakosi with his deputy, Erno Gero, in order to contain growing ideological and political ferment.

1956 Revolution

Pressure for change reached a climax on October 23, 1956, when security forces fired on Budapest students marching in support of Poland's confrontation with the Soviet Union. The ensuing battle quickly grew into a massive popular uprising. Gero called on Soviet troops to restore order on October 24. Fighting did not abate until the Central Committee named Imre Nagy as prime minister on October 25, and the next day Janos Kadar

replaced Gero as party first secretary. Nagy dissolved the state security police, abolished the one-party system, promised free elections, and negotiated with the U.S.S.R. to withdraw its troops.

Faced with reports of new Soviet troops pouring into Hungary despite Soviet Ambassador Andropov's assurances to the contrary, on November 1, Nagy announced Hungary's neutrality and withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact. He appealed to the United Nations and the Western powers for protection of its neutrality. Preoccupied with the Suez Crisis, the UN and the West failed to respond. The Soviet Union launched a massive military attack on Hungary on November 3. Some 200,000 Hungarians fled to the West. Nagy and his colleagues took refuge in the Yugoslav Embassy.

Kadar, after delivering an impassioned radio address on November 1 in support of "our glorious revolution" and vowing to fight the Russians with his bare hands if they attacked Hungary, defected from the Nagy cabinet; he fled to the Soviet Union and on November 4 announced formation of a new government. He returned to Budapest and, with Soviet support, carried out severe reprisals; thousands of people were executed or imprisoned. Despite a guarantee of safe conduct, Nagy was arrested and deported to Romania. In June 1958, the government announced that Nagy and other former officials had been executed.

Reform Under Kadar

In the early 1960s, Kadar announced a new policy under the motto of "He who is not against us is with us." He declared a general amnesty, gradually curbed some of the excesses of the secret police, and introduced a relatively liberal cultural and economic course aimed at overcoming the post-1956 hostility toward him and his regime. In 1966, the Central Committee approved the "New Economic Mechanism," through which it sought to overcome the inefficiencies of central planning, increase productivity, make Hungary more competitive in world markets, and create prosperity to ensure political stability. However, the reform was not as comprehensive as planned, and basic flaws of central planning produced economic stagnation.

Over the next two decades of relative domestic quiet, Kadar's government responded to pressure for political and economic reform and to counter-pressures from reform opponents. By the early 1980s, it had achieved some lasting economic reforms and limited political liberalization and pursued a foreign policy which encouraged more trade with the West. Nevertheless, the New Economic Mechanism led to foreign debt in pursuit of economic stimuli for unprofitable industries.

Transition to Democracy

Hungary's transition to a Western-style parliamentary democracy was the first and the smoothest among the former Soviet bloc, inspired by a nationalism that long had encouraged Hungarians to control their own destiny. By 1987, activists within the party and bureaucracy and Budapest-based intellectuals were increasing pressure for change. Some of these became reform socialists. Others began movements which were to develop into parties. Young liberals formed the Federation of Young Democrats (FIDESZ); a core from the so-called Democratic Opposition formed the Association of Free Democrats (SZDSZ); and the neopopulist national opposition established the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF). Civic activism intensified to a level not seen since the 1956 revolution. In 1988, Kadar was replaced as prime minister, and Reform Socialist leader Imre Pozsgay was admitted to the Politburo. That same year, the parliament adopted a "democracy package," which included trade union pluralism; freedom of association, assembly, and the press; a new electoral law; and a radical revision of the constitution, among others.

A Central Committee plenum in February 1989 endorsed in principle the multiparty political system and the characterization of the October 1956 revolution as a "popular uprising," in the words of Pozsgay, whose reform movement had been gathering strength as communist party membership declined dramatically. Kadar's major political rivals then cooperated to move the country gradually to democracy. The Soviet Union reduced its involvement by signing an agreement in April 1989 to withdraw Soviet forces by June 1991. National unity culminated in June 1989 as the country

reburied Imre Nagy, his associates, and, symbolically, all other victims of the 1956 revolution. A roundtable, made up of representatives of the new parties and some recreated old parties (such as the Smallholders and Social Democrats), the communist party, and different social groups, met in the summer and fall of 1989 to discuss major changes to the Hungarian constitution and the steps in the transition to a fully free and democratic country. In October 1989, the communist party convened its last congress, which ended with a substantial victory for the party's reform faction and a change in name to the Hungarian Socialist Party.

In a historic session on October 16-20, 1989, the parliament adopted legislation providing for multiparty parliamentary elections and a direct presidential election. The parliament aimed to transform Hungary from a people's republic into the Republic of Hungary, to protect human and civil rights, and to ensure separation of powers among the judicial, executive, and legislative branches of government. It asserted the "values of bourgeois democracy and democratic socialism" and gave equal status to public and private property as a prerequisite for moving toward a market economy.

National Security

Hungary spearheaded the move leading to the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact Treaty Organization by its 17% reduction of defense expenditures and the 30% reduction of its armed forces between 1989 and 1992 to a level of 100,000. This latter figure includes 26,000 civilian employees of the Hungarian Home Defense Forces (HHDF). The military HHDF (or Honvedseg) is undergoing major restructuring in organization, orientation, and training. Hungary is also coping with severe budget constraints while attempting to adopt a Western-style defense force that can be integrated into NATO. Both the previous and the present governments have declared a desire to join NATO, and Hungary has welcomed the "Partnership for Peace" initiative. The Honvedseg includes the army, which is the largest, followed by the air force and a small naval contingent that patrols the Danube River.

On March 11, 1989, Hungary and the Soviet Union concluded an agreement under which the latter withdrew all 65,000 troops from the country in June 1991 and asked that Hungary compensate the former Soviets for the military bases they

relinquished. Hungarian counter-claims charge that some of the bases were built without permission and do not conform to Hungarian building codes. Toxic wastes and other Soviet materials left behind at these bases constitute a serious environmental hazard. The zero option of no claim for compensation by either side was finally worked out. As compensation for a portion of state debt to Hungary, both sides—Hungary and Russia—agreed that a sum of up to \$800 million in military equipment would be made available to Hungary.

Principal Government Officials

President—Arpad Goncz
Prime Minister—Gyula Horn (MSZP)
Minister of Foreign Affairs—
Laszlo Kovacs (MSZP)
Ambassador to the U.S.—Gyorgy Banlaki
Ambassador to the UN—Istvan Nathom

The Hungarian embassy is located at 3910 Shoemaker St. NW, Washington, DC 20008 (tel. 202-362-6730).

POLITICAL CONDITIONS

The prime minister selects the ministers in the cabinet. Under a system of checks-and-balances, each cabinet nominee appears before four parliamentary committees in open hearings. The unicameral Hungarian National Assembly is the highest organ of state authority and initiates and approves legislation sponsored by the prime minister. A 15-member constitutional court has power to challenge legislation on grounds of unconstitutionality.

Hungary's first free, multiparty elections in more than 40 years were a milestone in the move toward a parliamentary democracy. In 1990, the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) won 43% of the vote to 24% for the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ). As a result, the MDF leader, Jozsef Antall, became prime minister and formed a center-right coalition government—with the Independent Smallholders' Party (12%) and the Christian Democratic People's Party (6%)—to command a 60% majority in the parliament. In addition to a small number of independents, the other parties represented in the parliament were the HSP, who gained 8%, and the Young Democrats (FIDESZ), who received 6%. Upon the death of Josef Antall in December 1993, Peter Boross succeeded to the post of Prime Minister.

The Antall/Boross coalition governments achieved a reasonably well-functioning parliamentary democracy and laid the foundation for a free market economy.

In May 1994, four years after it peacefully surrendered power, the reformed Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) came back to win a plurality of votes and 54% of the seats in parliamentary elections focused largely on economic issues and the substantial decline in living standards since 1990. A heavy turnout of voters swept away the right-of-center coalition but soundly rejected the extremists on the right and the left. Although it has a majority, the MSZP, which has announced its intention to continue economic reform and privatization, to preserve political rights, and to seek a historical reconciliation with Hungary's neighbors, formed a broader based coalition with the left-of-center Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ), which took second place with 18% of the seats. This coalition, which assumed power on July 15, commands the two-thirds majority required to pass certain key legislation such as a law on electronic media and constitutional amendments.

ECONOMY

Before World War II, Hungary had a predominantly agricultural economy. Following the standard Stalinist pattern, industrialization was forced on Hungary in the post-war period. Under communism, most economic activity was conducted by state-owned enterprises or cooperatives, although various small businesses were allowed to operate. Agriculture was collectivized, undoing the immediate post-war division of large estates among small peasant owners. Today, farms are being privatized, both to small holders and to agribusiness firms.

In 1950, more than 50% of the labor force worked on the land; in 1993, slightly less than 7% engage in agricultural activity. Recently, Hungarian agriculture has been generally self-sufficient and an important source of export earnings. Both the agricultural and industrial sectors have suffered from a lack of investment since the late 1970s. In the 1970s and 1980s, Hungary accumulated a huge foreign debt, largely to finance subsidies to consumers and to unprofitable state enterprises. Net foreign debt rose from about \$1 billion in

1972 to about \$15 billion in 1993, giving Hungary the highest per-capita debt in Central Europe. Its repayment record, however, has been excellent.

Changes introduced by the communist regime, particularly during its last two years, eased the transformation to a market economy. When Antall took office, 150 state enterprises already had been privatized under a "business transformation" law. Private firms had rights equal to those of state enterprises under a law on corporate association. A joint venture law was in place, and foreign companies had begun to invest in Hungary. A little-used bankruptcy law was in place. A value-added tax and a progressive personal income tax had largely replaced the former arbitrary levies on profits of state enterprises. The 1990 budget passed by the communist parliament had slashed the annual deficit by cutting subsidies while raising charges on fuel, cigarettes, and liquor.

The Hungarian Government has encouraged the founding of private businesses and moved forward on privatization of state enterprises. In 1993, the private sector generated about 50% of GDP.

The 1993 federal budget ended with a deficit of 6% of GDP, stalling a three-year program with the IMF, as revenue shortfalls exceeded budget cuts. The government cut all consumer subsidies and reduced the real value of subsidies to the remaining state enterprises. Subsidy cuts led to increases in the price of medicines, bakery products, sugar, rice, railroad and bus transportation, postage, telephone calls, water and sewerage services, electricity, coal, and gas. Charges on concessionary home mortgages were increased substantially.

The deregulation of prices begun under the communist regime was extended by the Hungarian Government; more than 95% of prices have been decontrolled. The reform effort incurs painful, immediate costs to achieve more productive use of economic resources and higher incomes in the longer term. Phasing out uneconomic activities and reducing exports to the former Soviet bloc helped lead to a decline in the gross domestic product (GDP) in 1992 that amounted, in real terms, to 2.3%. Unemployment rose from 1.7% of the labor force in 1990 to an average of about 12% in 1993.

Foreign Trade

Hungary has shifted much of its trade from its former Soviet-bloc partners to Western countries. In 1993, 70% of Hungary's trade was with Western countries; Germany now is Hungary's principal trading partner, providing more trade with Hungary than with all of the former Soviet republics. Trade with Russia has been further reduced because of declining oil exports to Hungary. Trade with the United States is increasing; total trade has risen to more than \$800 million in 1993. The U.S. has extended to Hungary most-favored-nation status, Generalized System of Preferences concessions, Overseas Private Investment Corporation insurance, and access to the Export-Import Bank. The two countries have concluded a bilateral intellectual property rights agreement and are negotiating a bilateral investment treaty.

Foreign concerns have invested over \$7 billion in Hungary—more than half of all foreign investment in Central and Eastern Europe. The United States is the largest investor, with about \$3.6 billion invested by mid-1994, followed by Germany and Austria. Foreign capital is attracted by low wages for highly skilled workers, generous tax incentives, favorable geographic location, fertile land, and knowledge of the market of the former Soviet bloc.

Any Hungarian person or enterprise may engage in international trade now, and about 90% of imports have been freed from license restrictions.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

Except for the short-lived neutrality declared by Imre Nagy in November 1956, Hungary's foreign policy generally followed the Soviet lead from 1947 to 1989. During 1948-49, Hungary maintained treaties of friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance with the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Bulgaria. In 1950, it concluded a friendship treaty with the then-German Democratic Republic. It was one of the founding members of the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact and CEMA, and it was the first Central European country to withdraw from those organizations, both now defunct.

Along with other European associates of the former Soviet Union, Hungary has been participating in East-West cooperation agreed upon at the 1975 Helsinki

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). It has signed all of the CSCE follow-on documents since 1989. Hungary's record of implementing CSCE Helsinki Final Act provisions, including those on reunification of divided families, remains among the best in Eastern Europe.

Hungary has been a member of the United Nations since December 1955. As with any country, Hungarian security attitudes are shaped largely by history and geography. For Hungary, this is a history of more than 400 years of domination by great powers (the Ottomans, the Habsburgs, the Germans during World War II, and the Soviets during the Cold War) and a geography of regional instability and separation from Hungarian minorities living in neighboring countries.

Hungary's current foreign policy, a direct response to these factors, has three equal priorities: integrating rapidly with the West and its institutions, improving relations with neighboring countries—particularly those with ethnic Hungarian minorities—and supporting the rights of Hungarian minorities abroad. Currently, the Hungarians view ethnic instability as the greatest threat to European security.

U.S.-HUNGARIAN RELATIONS

Relations between the United States and Hungary following World War II were affected by Soviet armed forces' occupation of Hungary. Full diplomatic relations were established at the legation level on October 12, 1945, before the signing of the Hungarian peace treaty on February 10, 1947.

After the communist takeover in 1947-48, relations with Hungary were increasingly strained by the nationalization of U.S.-owned property, unacceptable treatment of U.S. citizens and personnel, and restrictions on the operations of the American legation. During the difficult period following the Hungarian national uprising in 1956, relations continued to erode.

Embassies were opened in 1966, and bilateral relations slowly but steadily improved after ambassadors were exchanged. In 1972, a consular convention was concluded to provide consular protection to U.S. citizens in Hungary. In 1973, a bilateral agreement was reached under which Hungary settled the nationalization claims of American citizens. In 1976, Hungary paid its debt arrearages to the U.S. Government in full, including those dating back to the post-World War I era. In 1977, an agreement on exchanges and cooperation in culture, education, science, and technology was concluded.

In January 1978, the United States returned to the people of Hungary the historic Crown of Saint Stephen and other Hungarian coronation regalia that had been safeguarded by the United States since the end of World War II. Symbolically and actually, this event marked the beginning of excellent relations between the two countries. A 1978 bilateral trade agreement included extension of most-favored-nation status. Cultural and scientific exchanges were expanded. Major U.S. official cultural exhibits have been well received. In 1989, the United States and Hungary renewed a civil air agreement providing for direct service between New York and Budapest.

As Hungary began to pull away from the links forged by Soviet communism, the United States offered assistance and expertise to help establish a constitution, a democratic political system, and a plan for a free market economy. Between 1989 and 1993, the Support for East European Democracy (SEED) Act provided more than \$136 million for economic restructuring and private-sector development. The Hungarian-American Enterprise Fund, capitalized at \$65 million, offers loans, equity capital, and technical assistance to promote private-sector development of Hungarian-American joint ventures.

In 1991, the U.S. and Hungary initiated a security assistance relationship that is now active in both the International Military Education and Training Program (\$700,000) and the \$13-million Foreign Military Sales Program.

Additional U.S. assistance includes a \$10 million energy-sector grant and other technical assistance. Grants to the International Executive Service Corps, MBA Enterprise Corps (composed of recent recipients of Master of Business Administration degrees), and the Center for International Private Enterprise help these non-governmental organizations provide expertise directly to private enterprises.

The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and the Environmental Law Institute assist the Ministry of Environment and the Hungarian Parliament in drafting the country's first environmental legislation. Other issues receiving attention include health care, employment, housing, education, and small business development. About 140 Peace Corps volunteers throughout Hungary work to improve English-language training and environmental awareness.

Principal U.S. Embassy Officials

Ambassador—Donald M. Blinken
Deputy Chief of Mission—

James I. Gadsden

Press/Cultural Affairs Officer—

Donna Culpepper

Political Officer—William Siefkin

Economic Officer—Charles English

Commercial Officer—Patrick Hughes

Science Attache—Lawrence Cohen

Administrative Officer—

Martha L. Campbell

Consul—Arnold Haskin Campbell

Defense Attache—

Col. John Concannon, USA

USAID Director—David Cowles

The U.S. embassy in Hungary is located at Szabadsag Ter 12, Budapest (tel. 112-6450). ■

Dec 1, 1994
ifp

**SWANEE HUNT
500 EAST 8TH AVENUE
DENVER, COLORADO 80203
303/839-9781 TEL. 303/839-1013 FAX**

FACSIMILE

**TO: Ruby Moy
202/456-6218**

and

**Nicole Robner
202/456-6244**

FROM: Sheryl Glaser

RE: Carol Edgar

DATE: November 30, 1994

Ruby and Nicole:

I was not sure if you both needed this information on Carol or not.
So I thought I best cover all my bases.

Carol Anita Edgar

DOA

SS#

(b)(6)

Carol will meet Swanee and Melanne at the OEOB Rm. 100 at 1:15 on
Thursday, December 1, 1994.

If you have any questions for me, I will be in the office by 7:30
a.m. Denver time Thursday.

Thanks!