

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	From Richard Clarke re: Haiti Steering Group (4 pages)	05/19/1994	P1/b(1)
002. email	From Clarke re: For Berger: On Haiti Migrants (2 pages)	05/24/1994	P1/b(1)
003. email	From Lawrence Rossin re: Haiti and Italy POTUS Points (2 pages)	06/01/1994	P1/b(1)
004. email	From Rossin re: Why So Many Migrants? (4 pages)	06/29/1994	P1/b(1)
005. email	From Rossin re: Haiti FPG Paper for Rocha Completion (3 pages)	07/20/1994	P1/b(1)
006. email	From Melanie Darby re: FW: Paper Sent to Interag (5 pages)	08/12/1994	P1/b(1)
007. email	From Morton Halperin re: Cuba Summary-For CI (3 pages)	09/02/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
A1-Record (Jan 93-Sept 94) ([Schwartz and Cuba...])
OA/Box Number: 570000

FOLDER TITLE:

[05/17/1994-09/09/1994]

2011-1039-F
rs1848

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

17-May-1994 08:49 EDT

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Richard A. Clarke
(CLARKER)

SUBJECT: DRAFT PRESS GUIDANCE: HAITI MIGRATION

The NYT story today on p.1 may feed questions on implementation of the new policy on Haiti migration. Please provide any comments by 1030 for use on the 1100 Haiti press conference call.

Q. Why are you still sending migrants back?

A. As the President said it would take "some weeks" to put a new system into effect. It has been less than two weeks so far. The Administration has had a high intensity effort underway to put a system in place in weeks that would normally take months to design and implement.

The President has been personally involved, meeting with UN High Commissioner for Refugees Mrs. Ogata and communicating personally with other leaders concerned.

Q. What takes so long?

A. There are diplomatic, logistical, and personnel steps that need to be taken for a new system to work. Locations for Migrant Processing Centers must be found. The centers themselves must be located and equipped. Staff must be identified and trained. All of this is now underway on an expedited basis.

Q. Can you confirm that the Migrant Processing Center will be on a Ukrainian boat?

A. We are exploring options that include processing migrants on larger ships.

Q. Isn't it true that several countries have refused to let you use their territory for this screening?

A. No. We have not been refused cooperation by any country. We are still engaged in consultation with several regional states.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By MI NARA, Date 3/28/12
2011-1039-F

Q. When do you expect to have the new system operating?

A. In a few weeks. We can not be more precise than that.

Q. Will you then accept only 5% as refugees?

A. No. There are no numerical quotas. Those who qualify as refugees will be afforded protection. Econmomic migrants will continue to be returned to Haiti.

Q. What happens to those people that you are returning today; don't they risk abuse?

A. Those returned now before screening are encouraged to go to the US in-country processing centers in Haiti, where we have increase our procesisng capacity by a factor of three in the last year.

Distribution:

FOR: Lawrence G. Rossin	(ROSSIN)
FOR: Richard E. Feinberg	(FEINBERG)
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Additional Header Information Follows

Date Created: 17-May-1994 08:36
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VMS Filename: OA\$SHARA22:ZVFMCLJYJ.WPL

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Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO

Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

17-May-1994 08:55 EDT

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MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Lawrence G. Rossin
(ROSSIN)

SUBJECT: RE: DRAFT PRESS GUIDANCE: HAITI MIGRATION

Press guidance looks fine to me but "factor of three" in the last Q/A: this sounds different than the "10-fold increase" in processing and refugee status approvals referred to in earlier statements. What is the difference? Could raise questions.

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Date Created: 17-May-1994 08:54
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DOCNUM: 040501
VMS Filename: OA\$SHARA20:ZVFMCQP5S.WPL
A1 Folder: MAY94
Message Format:

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006

By *ML* NARA, Date *3/8/16**201-1039-F*

Message Status: READ

Date Modified: 17-May-1994 08:54

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Read-Receipt Requested: NO

Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO

Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

17-May-1994 09:54 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Eric P. Schwartz
(SCHWARTZ)

SUBJECT: Haiti migration press guidance

HAITI: Qs and As
Migration: 5/17

Q: Why are you still sending migrants back?

A: The President clearly stated on May 8 that it would take "some weeks" to put a new system into effect. It has been less than two weeks so far. The Administration has had a high intensity effort, interagency effort underway to put a system in place in weeks that would normally take months to design and implement.

The President has been personally involved, meeting with UN High Commissioner for Refugees Mrs. Ogata and communicating personally with other leaders concerned.

Q: Why not implement the new system right away?

A: In humanitarian terms, it would be irresponsible for us to effect a change of policy before it was ready to be implemented. Such action could risk the lives of hundreds if not thousands of Haitians in an unmanaged migration. In this respect, it is worth noting that over the past 18 months, we have documented the deaths at sea of more than 300 Haitians.

Q: What takes so long?

A: The operational challenges are immense. there are diplomatic, logistical, and personnel steps that need to be taken for a new system to work. Locations for Migrant Processing Centers must be found. The centers themselves must be located and equipped. Staff must be identified and trained. All of this is now underway on an expedited basis.

Q: Why did you announce the policy change before being ready to implement it?

A: It is simply not possible to develop fully implementation plans of this magnitude on a contingency basis. Hiring hundreds of contract employees, obtaining commitments from third countries, both to serve as processing sites and to provide resettlement or asylum, contracting ships and constructing facilities -- all these actions can only come after the policy decision has been made.

Q: Can you confirm that the Migrant Processing Center will be on a Ukranian boat?

A: We are exploring and pursuing many options, including those that include processing on large ships.

Q: Isn't it true that several countries have refused to let you use their territory for this screening?

A: No. We have not been refused cooperation by any country. We are still engaged in consultation with several states in the region.

Q: When do you expect to have the new system operating?

A: As the President said, it would take some weeks. We can not be more precise than that.

Q: Will you then accept only 5% as refugees?

A. No. There are no numerical quotas. Those who qualify as refugees will be afforded protection. Economic migrants will continue to be returned to Haiti.

Q: What happens to those people that you are returning today; don't they risk abuse?

A. Those returned now before screening are met by officials of the U.S. Embassy at the pier in Port au Prince. Those who seem to have good claims for refugee status are encouraged to go to the US in-country processing centers in Haiti.

In country processing has proven to be an extremely valuable vehicle for Haitians who need to flee.

The in-country processing system has resulted in refugee status for some 3000 Haitians since 1992 and we have made substantial improvements in the process.

- o In addition to our processing center in Port-au-Prince, we've opened two additional processing centers in provincial cities in Haiti to expand

access to the program.

- o The INS has increased its country-wide weekly processing capacity from 100 to about 280 cases.
- o We have also substantially increased staffing at the processing centers, as well as efforts to work with non-governmental organizations in identifying applicants who should be considered.
- o Moreover, we can and do expedite processing high priority cases to ensure they are brought quickly to the United States.
- o These efforts have paid off.
- o In the first year of the Administration, we admitted about 1700 refugees through our in-country program.
 - o This represents a ten-fold increase from the last year of the previous Administration.

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CC: Richard A. Clarke	(CLARKER)
CC: Lawrence G. Rossin	(ROSSIN)

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Date Created: 17-May-1994 09:54
Deletable Flag: Y
DOCNUM: 040509
VMS Filename: OA\$SHARA22:ZVFME5AH9.WPL
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Read-Receipt Requested: NO
Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO
Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

17-May-1994 18:52 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Eric P. Schwartz
(SCHWARTZ)

SUBJECT: MEMCONS: PHONE CALLS WITH PRESS

MEMORANDUM FOR TARA SOENSHINE
DEE DEE MYERS
DICK CLARKE
RAND BEERS

FROM ERIC SCHWARTZ

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversations: Roberto Sura (Post)
and Elaine Schiolino (Times)

Sura:

Sura asked me whether the President had asked requested use of the Turks and Caicos for processing of asylum-seekers. I acknowledged that the President and the PM had spoken yesterday, that a number of issues including Haiti had been discussed, but that I was not prepared to comment on the nature of the conversation. Sura told me that based on another conversation he had (presumably with an Administration official), he might run a story saying that the Brits are considering a U.S. request for assistance; I told him I couldn't give him anything on that but that I would encourage him to avoid speculation.

I wanted to get Roberto off of this tack and also give him a sense both of the complexity of our task and the vigor with which we are pursuing it. (He seems like a nice guy who is sympathetic to what we are doing.) For this reason, I told him of the White House interagency meeting on migration that took place today and gave him a general idea of the broad range of issues that were on the table. Everything I told him was unclassified.

Schiolino:

Schiolino apparently had her story and called me to tie up loose ends. She asked me whether we had decided to impose the same processing criteria outside of Haiti that we impose inside. (This could be controversial, as that criteria is not strictly the same -- or as broad as the refugee criteria.) I told her that no such decision had been made. On deep background (not for quotation or attribution), I told her I thought it unlikely we would impose such criteria outside Haiti unless we were to expand it to encompass the refugee criteria completely.

I also reaffirmed that no final decisions had been made on ship-board screening; that we continued to pursue all options.

On lawyers, I told her our goal was to craft a procedure which provided adequate opportunities for people to make their claims, but that we were still considering just what kind of procedures to use on this issue.

Distribution:

FOR: Richard A. Clarke	(CLARKER)
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Additional Header Information Follows

Date Created: 17-May-1994 18:51
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VMS Filename: OA\$SHARA26:ZVFMQYLVJ.WPL
A1 Folder: MAY94
Message Format:
Message Status: READ
Date Modified: 17-May-1994 18:51
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Read-Receipt Requested: NO
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Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

18-May-1994 09:41 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Eric P. Schwartz
(SCHWARTZ)

SUBJECT: HAITI MIGRATION: PRESS GUIDANCE

Haiti Migration

Qs and As

Q: The NY Times reports delays in implementing the new migration policy. Any comment?

A: The Times report is wrong.

It is far more accurate to say that we are making steady progress in achieving our goal of implementing a workable and credible system outside of Haiti for interviewing boat migrants.

The President clearly stated on May 8 that it would take "some weeks" to put a new system into effect. It has been less than two weeks so far. The Administration has had a high intensity, interagency effort underway to put a system in place in weeks that would normally take months to design and implement.

The President has been personally involved, meeting with UN High Commissioner for Refugees Mrs. Ogata and communicating personally with other leaders concerned.

Q: Why not implement the new system right away?

A: In humanitarian terms, it would be irresponsible for us to effect a change of policy before it was ready to be implemented. Such action could risk the lives of hundreds if not thousands of Haitians in an unmanaged migration. In this respect, it is worth noting that over the past 18 months, we have documented the deaths at sea of more than 300 Haitians.

Q: What takes so long?

A: The operational challenges are substantial. there are diplomatic, logistical, and personnel steps that need to be taken for a new system to work. Locations for Migrant Processing Centers must be found. The centers themselves must be located and equipped. Staff must be identified and trained. All of this is now underway on an expedited basis.

Q: Why did you announce the policy change before being ready to

implement it?

A: It is simply not possible to develop fully implementation plans of this magnitude on a contingency basis. Hiring hundreds of contract employees, obtaining commitments from third countries, both to serve as processing sites and to provide resettlement or asylum, contracting ships and constructing facilities -- all these actions can only come after the policy decision has been made.

Q: When do you expect to have the new system operating?

A: As the President said, it would take some weeks. We cannot be more precise than that.

Q: Is it true that President Clinton asked Prime Minister Major about use of the Turks and Caicos for refugee processing and that this issue is under consideration?

A: The President and the Prime Minister did speak earlier this week, as they have on many occasions, and discussed a number of issues, including Haiti and options on the issue of refugee processing.

Q: But is the Prime Minister considering a U.S. request for UK willingness to permit the use of the Turks and Caicos for processing?

A: The President did discuss this issue among others with the Prime Minister, and we understand it is being considered by London and the Turks and Caicos Government.

Q: The Times reports that the U.S. has failed to convince any country to process Haitians or permit them asylum or resettlement in their countries. Is this true?

The implication that our discussions have been unsuccessful, or that we have been rebuffed by any country, is simply wrong.

In fact, we are engaged in very productive discussions with many countries on these issues and are hopeful of cooperation.

Q: But have any governments agreed to accept refugees or to serve as processing sites?

A: I'm not prepared to discuss the details of these discussions.

Q: The Times alleges that we use overly restrictive processing criteria in Port au Prince and thereby deny bonafide claimants the chance to make the case for refugee status.

A: In each of the countries where we conduct "in-country" processing, we use processing criteria.

It is worth noting that Haiti is one of only four

countries around the world where people have the chance to make application for refugee status without fleeing. [FYI: The others are the former Soviet Union, Vietnam and Cuba.]

In Haiti, the criteria used is designed to enable us to most quickly identify those persons in greatest need of assistance and move their cases quickly.

[Refer to State for more details on the criteria we use within Haiti.]

Distribution:

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Date Created: 18-May-1994 09:39
Deletable Flag: Y
DOCNUM: 040665
VMS Filename: OA\$SHARA30:ZVFNDU9G7.WPL
A1 Folder: MAY94
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Forward Flag: YES
Read-Receipt Requested: NO
Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO
Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

18-May-1994 20:01 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Lawrence G. Rossin
(ROSSIN)

SUBJECT: Revised General Haiti Points FYI

TO: Addressees

FROM: Larry Rossin

SUBJECT: Haiti Talking Points

For general reference and any use you may care to make of these, here is an updated (as of 5/18 p.m.) set of expanded talking points on Haiti. Comments welcome. (Migrant policy points are not included and can be obtained from Eric Schwartz.)

Larry Rossin

HAITI

Expanded Talking Points

FOUNDATIONS OF AND REASONS FOR OUR POLICY REVIEW

- We have completed a comprehensive review of our strategy to restore democracy and return President Aristide to Haiti.
- This review considered the degeneration of the political, economic, human rights and humanitarian situations within Haiti, including the military leaders' continued flouting of the Governor's Island Accord and rejection of all recent initiatives aimed at ending the crisis.
- It also took into account counsel from President Aristide, views expressed by many members of Congress and our recent experience with Canada, France and Venezuela (the Friends of Haiti) and other UN members.
- The Haitian people are suffering. They are at the mercy of the military and its brutal thugs. We continue to denounce the abuses publicly and privately to the military, but that can have only a limited effect as long as they control power.
- Haiti's economy is disintegrating under the pressure of sanctions and as the military leaders use the distortions sanctions have produced to steal Haiti's resources.

Impact of the Sanctions

- o Critics have focussed on leakage in the fuel sanctions -- a problem we have worked to solve -- but the bottom line is that the previous sanctions, both UN and OAS, hit the economy very severely.
 - o The previous UN sanctions prohibited only petroleum and arms imports. But all trade dropped dramatically because of U.S. application of the more comprehensive OAS sanctions requiring Treasury licensing. Most shipping agents and manufacturers stopped trading with Haiti altogether.
 - o Haiti has a devastating shortfall of 65% to 70% of its normal fuel requirements.
 - o The cost of food has increased in the cities due to the increase in transportation costs.
 - o Inflation is currently running about 60%. Inflation has impacted especially on the urban blue collar and lower classes.
 - o Unemployment, high even before the sanctions were enforced more rigorously last October, is now estimated to be nearly 70%.
 - o An estimated 60-70% of the country's industrial capacity has been idled.
 - o Those few workers with jobs find it next to impossible to get to work because public transportation has all but ceased.
 - o Agriculture has similarly been impacted. For example, coffee is cultivated by 200,000 small farmers; exports, prohibited under the OAS sanctions, have been devastated.
 - o The state-run utility produces about four hours of electricity daily in Port-au-Prince. Almost all other towns and cities have not had electricity for weeks.
 - o The powerful elites, both in the business community and the military command, are the least affected. The military has profited handsomely through skimming off profits from the sale of gasoline, both from contraband and from national stocks. The wealthy business elites also manage to insulate themselves from the effects of inflation and shortages through various means.
 - o The middle and lower classes have suffered the most, losing investments and jobs--many sinking into poverty.
- We have held that a political process is needed to transform the sanctions' impact into a peaceful end of the crisis. We have worked hard to make such a political process a reality, using sanctions, international mediation and support for initiatives by internal Haitian democrats which we believed offered prospects for resolving the crisis.

Summary of Previous Sanctions

- o We have led the world in the imposition, implementation and enforcement of sanctions, beginning with our full adoption of the voluntary OAS trade embargo in 1991.
 - o We imposed our own targeted visa bans and asset freezes on the military in June 1993 which we have expanded over time and which now cover the entire officer corps (some 550) and civilian associates of the military.
 - o We led the UN in enacting the fuel and arms sanctions shortly afterward and in reimposing them after the military broke its Governor's Island commitments in October.
 - o And at that time we joined with other nations in imposing a naval cordon around Haiti to enforce these sanctions, which is still in effect.
- The need for a political process remains, but the fact is that the previous sanctions, while affecting Haiti as a whole, did not succeed in forcing the military to relinquish political power.
- They have rejected and obstructed a series of initiatives aimed at a political settlement of the crisis:

Summary of Military Obstruction

- o They broke their Governor's Island commitments by permitting political violence such as the Izmary and Malary murders, blocking the arrival of U.S. participants in the UN Mission and finally when Cédras did not retire and allow Aristide's return as promised.
 - o They then boycotted a UN effort in November to convene a conclave in Port-au-Prince to get Governor's Island back on track.
 - o They ignored Prime Minister Malval's December effort to convene a National Conference, setting the stage for its collapse.
 - o They refused to meet with a delegation the Friends sent in late December to convey our concerns and warn of the consequences of non-compliance.
 - o They undercut the most recent parliamentarians' initiative by blocking Senate access to its chambers and creating a climate not conducive to progress.
 - o [If pressed] President Aristide was not supportive of some of these efforts. But the military has been the crux of this problem throughout the crisis and that is where our focus must be.
- Instead of cooperating in a political solution the military leaders have turned up the terror and foisted on the Haitian people a new de facto government.

- o Obviously, we will not deal with the Jonassaint "government" which is a creature of the military.
- It was this brutal intransigence of the Haitian military that led us to review our approach to resolving this crisis.

PRESIDENT'S DECISIONS

- The President is determined that Haitian military brutalization of their own people and defiance of the international community must end.
 - o Otherwise there will be a human rights and humanitarian catastrophe and the risk of a migrant exodus to our shores.
- He therefore directed a number of major changes to our Haiti policy, which he announced on May 8.
- Let me outline what we are or will be doing in several areas:
 - o Intensified UN sanctions;
 - o Improved sanctions enforcement;
 - o Support for the UN military and police Mission;
 - o Augmented humanitarian assistance;
 - o Efforts to boost the number of human rights monitors;
 - o Intensified diplomacy/new Envoy.
 - o New procedures for boat migrant asylum requests (NB: Detailed in separate talking points.)

Intensified Sanctions

- The UNSC on May 6 enacted UNSC Resolution 917 significantly enhancing sanctions:
 - o it immediately globalized targeted sanctions against the military and its associates and banned non-scheduled flights;
 - o it directed that comprehensive trade sanctions be brought into force no later than May 21.
 - o The President signed an Executive Order and Proclamation on May 7 giving the first two sanctions U.S. legal force. An Executive Order implementing the trade sanctions will be signed by May 21.
 - o We did not seek to preserve the assembly industry exemption. We concluded that the most comprehensive possible package of sanctions was required to maximize pressure on the military and avoid "mixed signals." We are working with the UNSC sanctions committee to develop procedures which will allow our companies to export their equipment and unprocessed inputs even after sanctions come into force. We have no final decision but are hopeful this will be approved.
- The new sanctions were not dependent on any prior actions by

President Aristide. He told us that he will appoint a new Prime Minister and Commander-in-Chief, invite the UN Mission and request UN/OAS elections assistance at the appropriate time, which is once the military has met our demands.

- We have established a Haiti Sanctions Task Force led by Leon Fuerth (modeled on the successful Serbia task force) to work for the fullest global compliance with the sanctions and to explore additional measures.
- We may impose further sanctions, such as a ban on passenger flights, unilaterally or seek new UN measures.

How We See Sanctions Achieving Our Objectives

- o Many have questioned whether sanctions, even intensified, can work. We believe that they can if accompanied by tough enforcement.
- o Earlier this year the sanctions' pressure was strong and clear and visible movement developed within key sectors of Haitian society to being about the steps needed for an end to sanctions: restoration of constitutional government and Aristide's return.
- o The obstruction of the military was aided by the leakage that subsequently developed in the sanctions.
- o As the international community makes the sanctions comprehensive and improves their enforcement, the internal conditions which produce pressure on the military leadership to leave and to create the conditions for democracy can be restored.
- o This will take a concerted international effort and it will require intensive efforts within Haiti to focus the blame for sanctions on the military leadership.
- o It also is why augmented humanitarian aid is important -- sanctions take time to work. We cannot allow the military to think they can wait for humanitarian deterioration to weaken our resolve and let them off the hook.
- o There are no guarantees and we may need to consider further options. But we should all work together to make these tough sanctions work.

Improved Sanctions Enforcement

- We will press diplomatically for active compliance with the sanctions and especially will work on the Dominican Republic to control smuggling across its border with Haiti.
- In addition to encouraging Dominican-UN cooperation we may send an envoy extremely soon to press for prompt and effective action.

Summary of Efforts with the Dominican Republic

- o Fuel smuggling across the Dominican - Haitian border reached serious dimensions as the demand for and price of fuel skyrocketed in Haiti. Clearly Dominican border controls have been inadequate in spite of periodic crackdowns and their stated commitment to enforcement.
- o We have been in frequent contact with the Dominican government to discuss ways to improve this situation. President Clinton wrote twice to President Balaguer to express his concerns and offer assistance.
- o Balaguer created a high-level Dominican sanctions enforcement commission which requested UN assistance.
- o A UN assessment team is en route to the Dominican Republic. We expect it to recommend a significant international observer presence.
- o We have also enhanced our cooperation with the Dominican Navy to support its ability to control smuggling in coastal waters.

UN Mission

- We will support deployment of the UN Mission to Haiti at the appropriate time (after the military leadership leaves).
- The Mission will have to be reconfigured and our participation in it reviewed to reflect changed circumstances since it was originally designed.
- We have begun to consult with UN partners on reconfiguration of the UNMIH. We will be working with them to develop an agreed Mission concept and to win UNSC endorsement for it.
- We will consult extensively with the Congress on our participation in UNMIH when we have international agreement on its reconfiguration.

Humanitarian Assistance

- We will augment our humanitarian feeding and health assistance to Haiti's poor to cushion the impact on them of the intensified sanctions. AID is consulting with the implementing private voluntary organizations. We believe this augmentation can expand the total beneficiaries from 900,000 to 1.2 million fairly quickly.
- This will build upon the successful humanitarian programs we have had in place since even before the UN sanctions were imposed.

Summary of Humanitarian Assistance Efforts

- o We are currently feeding some 700,000 pregnant women, children and elderly people daily. Programs run by other countries and international organizations bring the total to around 900,000 daily.
- o These totals have fluctuated over time depending

principally on the availability of fuel and the status of school feeding centers.

- o Our medical assistance programs provide basic health care services to one in three Haitians.
- o With our participation the donor community developed a program to supply fuel for humanitarian purposes only. There have been four fuel shipments. This has enabled the private voluntary organizations to maintain beneficiary levels.
- o AID monitors closely the nutritional situation in Haiti. Recently, for the first time since sanctions were imposed, AID has noted some general rise in malnutrition levels (as opposed to spikes related to local conditions).
- o We anticipate that intensified sanctions could increase the incidence of malnutrition. We will be alert to this as we work to expand our programs.

UN/OAS Human Rights Monitors

- We are working for the dispatch of more UN and OAS (International Civilian Mission - ICM) human rights monitors to Haiti as quickly as possible consistent with their operational latitude under prevailing security conditions.

ICM Background

- o After an absence of 3 months due to security concerns, the ICM with our strong encouragement returned in January. As of May 18 there are a total of 69 monitors in Port-au-Prince.
- o We are finding UN and OAS interest in rapid redeployment of the full 250. The OAS is collecting applications from prospective monitors. However, it is not yet recruiting and believes it should reopen its three field offices before adding more monitors. It will do so cautiously given security concerns.
- o The ICM mandate will be renewed by the UN General Assembly in about 10 days.
- o We have contributed \$16 million (\$5.8 million undisbursed) and have a further \$13 million appropriated in FY 1994.

Intensified Diplomacy

- We are intensifying our multilateral and bilateral diplomacy to build support for these measures, press for active compliance with sanctions and encourage broad international support for Haiti once democracy is restored.
- The President's appointment of Bill Gray as his and Secretary Christopher's Special Adviser for Haiti manifests our seriousness. Mr. Gray is the point man for our efforts

to resolve the crisis and a central player in our policy deliberations.

- o [If Asked] He will be travelling widely. However the timing of a trip to Haiti has not yet been determined.

CONCLUSION

- The measures the President has directed demonstrate our determination to end the military assault on the Haitian people's democracy, their livelihood and, too often, their lives.
- At the same time they address humanitarian concerns arising from the military's misrule as well as the impact of sanctions.
- They are substantially similar to what the Black Caucus, Senators Dodd and Harkin and others have advocated.
- We will consider further steps if these measures prove ineffective at moving the military but worsen the suffering of the Haitian people.
- o [If pressed] It is not useful to rule in or out any additional steps the President might direct, including use of force, at this point. The President's focus is on making all the new measures work to achieve our objectives.

Distribution:

FOR: Morton H. Halperin	(HALPERIN)
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CC: Records (RECORDS)
CC: Neal S. Wolin (WOLIN)

Additional Header Information Follows

Date Created: 18-May-1994 19:57
Deletable Flag: Y
DOCNUM: 040831
VMS Filename: OA\$SHARA7:ZVFNSLVW7.WPL
A1 Folder: MAY94
Message Format:
Message Status: READ
Date Modified: 18-May-1994 19:57
Forward Flag: YES
Read-Receipt Requested: NO
Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO
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Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS

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Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	From Richard Clarke re: Haiti Steering Group (4 pages)	05/19/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
A1-Record (Jan 93-Sept 94) ([Schwartz and Cuba...])
OA/Box Number: 570000

FOLDER TITLE:

[05/17/1994-09/09/1994]

2011-1039-F
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RESTRICTION CODES

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b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

20-May-1994 13:59 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Julien D. LeBourgeois (LEBOURGEOIS)
Eric P. Schwartz (SCHWARTZ)

FROM: Lawrence G. Rossin
(ROSSIN)

SUBJECT: Haiti France URGENT

Julien: Here are talking points for France.

Eric, you should let Julien know if you want any changes in the last tick.

Talking Points for France on Haiti

- The new sanctions regime has to be as broad and effective as possible to pressure the military leaders to give up power. Only once they go will a political solution become possible.
- The UN Mission must have the mandate and means to support our policy goals in Haiti once the military leaders give up power. We want to work with you on this in the UN.
- I would be grateful for your help in accepting approved Haitian political refugees. You bear a large burden from elsewhere but small numbers of Haitians are involved. The symbolic importance of your participation would be immense.

CC: Records (RECORDS)

Additional Header Information Follows

Date Created: 20-May-1994 13:58
Deletable Flag: Y
DOCNUM: 041065
VMS Filename: OA\$SHARA20:ZVFPJZPZ1.WPL
A1 Folder: MAY94
Message Format:
Message Status: READ
Date Modified: 20-May-1994 13:58
Forward Flag: YES
Read-Receipt Requested: NO
Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO
Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *M* NARA, Date *3/24/16*
101-1039-F

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

20-May-1994 21:34 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Lawrence G. Rossin
(ROSSIN)

SUBJECT: Revised Haiti Talking Points FYI

TO: Addressees

FROM: Larry Rossin

SUBJECT: Updated Talking Points on Haiti

For your background and use as appropriate. Updated 5/20 to reflect latest information on humanitarian assistance.

HAITI

Expanded Talking Points

FOUNDATIONS OF AND REASONS FOR OUR POLICY REVIEW

- We have completed a comprehensive review of our strategy to restore democracy and return President Aristide to Haiti.
- This review considered the degeneration of the political, economic, human rights and humanitarian situations within Haiti, including the military leaders' continued flouting of the Governor's Island Accord and rejection of all recent initiatives aimed at ending the crisis.
- It also took into account counsel from President Aristide, views expressed by many members of Congress and our recent experience with Canada, France and Venezuela (the Friends of Haiti) and other UN members.
- The Haitian people are suffering. They are at the mercy of the military and its brutal thugs. We continue to denounce the abuses publicly and privately to the military, but that can have only a limited effect as long as they control power.
- Haiti's economy is disintegrating under the pressure of sanctions and as the military leaders use the distortions sanctions have produced to steal Haiti's resources.

Impact of the Sanctions

- o Critics have focussed on leakage in the fuel sanctions -- a problem we have worked to solve -- but

the bottom line is that the previous sanctions, both UN and OAS, hit the economy very severely.

- o The previous UN sanctions prohibited only petroleum and arms imports. But all trade dropped dramatically because of U.S. application of the more comprehensive OAS sanctions requiring Treasury licensing. Most shipping agents and manufacturers stopped trading with Haiti altogether.
 - o Haiti has a devastating shortfall of 65% to 70% of its normal fuel requirements.
 - o The cost of food has increased in the cities due to the increase in transportation costs.
 - o Inflation is currently running about 60%. Inflation has impacted especially on the urban blue collar and lower classes.
 - o Unemployment, high even before the sanctions were enforced more rigorously last October, is now estimated to be nearly 70%.
 - o An estimated 60-70% of the country's industrial capacity has been idled.
 - o Those few workers with jobs find it next to impossible to get to work because public transportation has all but ceased.
 - o Agriculture has similarly been impacted. For example, coffee is cultivated by 200,000 small farmers; exports, prohibited under the OAS sanctions, have been devastated.
 - o The state-run utility produces about four hours of electricity daily in Port-au-Prince. Almost all other towns and cities have not had electricity for weeks.
 - o The powerful elites, both in the business community and the military command, are the least affected. The military has profited handsomely through skimming off profits from the sale of gasoline, both from contraband and from national stocks. The wealthy business elites also manage to insulate themselves from the effects of inflation and shortages through various means.
 - o The middle and lower classes have suffered the most, losing investments and jobs--many sinking into poverty.
- We have held that a political process is needed to transform the sanctions' impact into a peaceful end of the crisis. We have worked hard to make such a political process a reality, using sanctions, international mediation and support for initiatives by internal Haitian democrats which we believed offered prospects for resolving the crisis.

Summary of Previous Sanctions

- o We have led the world in the imposition, implementation and enforcement of sanctions, beginning with our full adoption of the voluntary OAS trade embargo in 1991.
 - o We imposed our own targeted visa bans and asset freezes on the military in June 1993 which we have expanded over time and which now cover the entire officer corps (some 550) and civilian associates of the military.
 - o We led the UN in enacting the fuel and arms sanctions shortly afterward and in reimposing them after the military broke its Governor's Island commitments in October.
 - o And at that time we joined with other nations in imposing a naval cordon around Haiti to enforce these sanctions, which is still in effect.
- The need for a political process remains, but the fact is that the previous sanctions, while affecting Haiti as a whole, did not succeed in forcing the military to relinquish political power.
- They have rejected and obstructed a series of initiatives aimed at a political settlement of the crisis:

Summary of Military Obstruction

- o They broke their Governor's Island commitments by permitting political violence such as the Izmyer and Malary murders, blocking the arrival of U.S. participants in the UN Mission and finally when Cédras did not retire and allow Aristide's return as promised.
 - o They then boycotted a UN effort in November to convene a conclave in Port-au-Prince to get Governor's Island back on track.
 - o They ignored Prime Minister Malval's December effort to convene a National Conference, setting the stage for its collapse.
 - o They refused to meet with a delegation the Friends sent in late December to convey our concerns and warn of the consequences of non-compliance.
 - o They undercut the most recent parliamentarians' initiative by blocking Senate access to its chambers and creating a climate not conducive to progress.
 - o [If pressed] President Aristide was not supportive of some of these efforts. But the military has been the crux of this problem throughout the crisis and that is where our focus must be.
- Instead of cooperating in a political solution the military leaders have turned up the terror and foisted on the Haitian people a new de facto government.
- o Obviously, we will not deal with the Jonassaint

"government" which is a creature of the military.

- It was this brutal intransigence of the Haitian military that led us to review our approach to resolving this crisis.

PRESIDENT'S DECISIONS

- The President is determined that Haitian military brutalization of their own people and defiance of the international community must end.
 - o Otherwise there will be a human rights and humanitarian catastrophe and the risk of a migrant exodus to our shores.
- He therefore directed a number of major changes to our Haiti policy, which he announced on May 8.
- Let me outline what we are or will be doing in several areas:
 - o Intensified UN sanctions;
 - o Improved sanctions enforcement;
 - o Support for the UN military and police Mission;
 - o Augmented humanitarian assistance;
 - o Efforts to boost the number of human rights monitors;
 - o Intensified diplomacy/new Envoy.
 - o New procedures for boat migrant asylum requests (NB: Detailed in separate talking points.)

Intensified Sanctions

- The UNSC on May 6 enacted UNSC Resolution 917 significantly enhancing sanctions:
 - o it immediately globalized targeted sanctions against the military and its associates and banned non-scheduled flights;
 - o it directed that comprehensive trade sanctions be brought into force no later than May 21.
 - o The President signed an Executive Order and Proclamation on May 7 giving the first two sanctions U.S. legal force. An Executive Order implementing the trade sanctions will be signed by May 21.
 - o We did not seek to preserve the assembly industry exemption. We concluded that the most comprehensive possible package of sanctions was required to maximize pressure on the military and avoid "mixed signals." We are working with the UNSC sanctions committee to develop procedures which will allow our companies to export their equipment and unprocessed inputs even after sanctions come into force. We have no final decision but are hopeful this will be approved.
- The new sanctions were not dependent on any prior actions by President Aristide. He told us that he will appoint a new Prime Minister and Commander-in-Chief, invite the UN Mission

and request UN/OAS elections assistance at the appropriate time, which is once the military has met our demands.

- We have established a Haiti Sanctions Task Force led by Leon Fuerth (modeled on the successful Serbia task force) to work for the fullest global compliance with the sanctions and to explore additional measures.
- We may impose further sanctions, such as a ban on passenger flights, unilaterally or seek new UN measures.

How We See Sanctions Achieving Our Objectives

- o Many have questioned whether sanctions, even intensified, can work. We believe that they can if accompanied by tough enforcement.
- o Earlier this year the sanctions' pressure was strong and clear and visible movement developed within key sectors of Haitian society to being about the steps needed for an end to sanctions: restoration of constitutional government and Aristide's return.
- o The obstruction of the military was aided by the leakage that subsequently developed in the sanctions.
- o As the international community makes the sanctions comprehensive and improves their enforcement, the internal conditions which produce pressure on the military leadership to leave and to create the conditions for democracy can be restored.
- o This will take a concerted international effort and it will require intensive efforts within Haiti to focus the blame for sanctions on the military leadership.
- o It also is why augmented humanitarian aid is important -- sanctions take time to work. We cannot allow the military to think they can wait for humanitarian deterioration to weaken our resolve and let them off the hook.
- o There are no guarantees and we may need to consider further options. But we should all work together to make these tough sanctions work.

Improved Sanctions Enforcement

- We will press diplomatically for active compliance with the sanctions and especially will work on the Dominican Republic to control smuggling across its border with Haiti.
- In addition to encouraging Dominican-UN cooperation we may send an envoy extremely soon to press for prompt and effective action.

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- o A UN assessment team is en route to the Dominican Republic. We expect it to recommend a significant international observer presence.
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- We will consult extensively with the Congress on our participation in UNMIH when we have international agreement on its reconfiguration.

Humanitarian Assistance

- We will augment our humanitarian feeding and health assistance to Haiti's poor to cushion the impact on them of the intensified sanctions. AID is consulting with the implementing private voluntary organizations. Already we have raised our beneficiary levels to 920,000 (as of 5/9) and other donors have gone from 212,000 to 350,000 (as of 5/9). We are working on an increase in our own authorized level from 1.04 million to 1.34 million.
- This will build upon the successful humanitarian programs we have had in place since even before the UN sanctions were imposed.

Summary of Humanitarian Assistance Efforts

- o Before the new policy announcement we were feeding some 6-700,000 pregnant women, children and elderly people daily. Programs run by other countries and international organizations brought the total to around 900,000 daily.

- o Those totals fluctuated over time depending principally on the availability of fuel and the status of school feeding centers.
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- o We have contributed \$16 million (\$5.8 million undisbursed) and have a further \$13 million appropriated in FY 1994.

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- The President's appointment of Bill Gray as his and Secretary Christopher's Special Adviser for Haiti manifests

our seriousness. Mr. Gray is the point man for our efforts to resolve the crisis and a central player in our policy deliberations.

- o [If Asked] He will be travelling widely. However the timing of a trip to Haiti has not yet been determined.

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Deletable Flag: Y
DOCNUM: 041146
VMS Filename: OA\$SHARA6:ZVFPUTV1K.WPL
A1 Folder: MAY94
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Message Status: READ
Date Modified: 20-May-1994 21:32
Forward Flag: YES
Read-Receipt Requested: NO
Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO
Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

21-May-1994 16:36 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR:

James A. Carman	(CARMAN)
Richard A. Clarke	(CLARKER)
Eric P. Schwartz	(SCHWARTZ)
Lawrence G. Rossin	(ROSSIN)

FROM: Randy R. Beers
(BEERS)

SUBJECT: VP TPs on Resettle

Background

Following the president's decision to interview haitian boat migrants for possible refugee claims, State sent out two cables asking states in this hemisphere and Europe to consider resettling those migrants which were refugees. States could also agree to grant temporary asylum until conditions in Haiti warranted their return. On Monday, State is hosting a meeting with Ambassadors from the countries to which the requests were made to reiterate the request.

To date, we have in principle agreement from Venezuela, a positive but very tentative response from Nicaragua, and two probable negatives from Honduras and the UK. Honduras had a bad experience with an earlier group of Haitian refugees, about 200. They burned down the refugee camp. Most went back to Haiti, and a small number resettled in Honduras.

POINTS TO MAKE

- As you are aware, President Clinton has changed our policy toward Haitian boat migrants.
- When adequate processing facilities are available, we will begin interviewing boat migrants for possible refugee claims.
- Those who are judged to be refugees will need to be resettled outside Haiti.
- We are prepared to settle a fair number, but we would like other nations to help.
- The US Secretary of State has asked your government(s) to consider resettling or granting temporary asylum to Haitian refugees who have fled Haiti.
- I would like to reinforce this request. We are not talking about large numbers. We are talking about sharing one of the burdens of democracy in the hemisphere.

- The UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Madame Ogata, has agreed to have her agency participate in this process. We, too, will assist.
- In particular, we are prepared to discuss financial assistance for those countries which take refugees.

CC: Records

(RECORDS)

Additional Header Information Follows

Date Created: 21-May-1994 16:35
Deletable Flag: Y
DOCNUM: 041195
VMS Filename: OA\$SHARA9:ZVFQNQERM.WPL
A1 Folder: MAY94
Message Format:
Message Status: READ
Date Modified: 21-May-1994 16:35
Forward Flag: YES
Read-Receipt Requested: NO
Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO
Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

23-May-1994 08:16 EDT

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Richard A. Clarke
(CLARKER)

SUBJECT: HAITI: SANCTIONS DEPLOYMENTS

As sanctions kicked in at mid-night, two AEGIS class heavy cruisers moved into the waters off Haiti. The USS Hue City pulled up off Gonave island.

The two were accompanied by five US Navy frigates.

USCG had ten cutters in Windward and surrounding waters and two more north between Cuba and the Bahamas.

All told 19 ships were enforcing the sanctions and migrant operations, a record deployment at least over the last year.

Distribution:

FOR: Lawrence G. Rossin	(ROSSIN)
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FOR: Eric P. Schwartz	(SCHWARTZ)
FOR: Ernest J. Wilson III	(WILSON)
FOR: Susan E. Rice	(RICE)
FOR: Marcia G. Norman	(NORMAN)
FOR: Sean J. Darragh	(DARRAGH)
FOR: Beverly J. Roundtree	(ROUNDTREE)
CC: Records	(RECORDS)

Additional Header Information Follows

Date Created: 23-May-1994 08:13

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By W NARA, Date 3/28/16
201-1032-F

Deletable Flag: Y
DOCNUM: 041212
VMS Filename: OA\$SHARA8:ZVFSBTRXU.WPL
A1 Folder: MAY94
Message Format:
Message Status: READ
Date Modified: 23-May-1994 08:13
Forward Flag: YES
Read-Receipt Requested: NO
Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO
Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

23-May-1994 14:32 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Eric P. Schwartz
(SCHWARTZ)

SUBJECT: DRAFT RELEASE FOR THE STATE DEPARTMENT, AS DISCUSSED

OFFICIAL TALKS ON REFUGEE PROCESSING FOR HAITIANS

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS MEET WITH
REPRESENTATIVES FROM LONDON AND THE TURKS AND CAICOS ISLANDS

The Administration began talks today with representatives from London and the Turks and Caicos Islands on options for refugee processing of Haitian boat people.

The talks follow an agreement reached last week between the Administration and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, in which the United Nations agency welcomed the Administration efforts to quickly implement the modification of policy and agreed to assist the Administration in implementing the President's modification of policy on Haitian migration.

The UK delegation is lead jointly by Turks and Caicos Chief Minister C. Washington Misick and Gordon Baker of the UK Foreign Office. The U.S. delegation was lead by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Refugee Programs, Brunson McKinley.

Under the modification of policy, Haitians who leave Haiti by boat will be interviewed outside of Haiti and those who qualify for refugee status will not be returned. In preparing an implementation plan, the Administration is consulting with a number of governments on issues relating to processing, asylum and resettlement.

In a statement released after the initial round of discussions, McKinley said:

We deeply appreciate the willingness of officials from London and the Turks and Caicos to come to Washington on such short notice and to engage us on these important issues. We are moving very quickly to implement the announced modification of policy, and welcome this opportunity to review with our friends from the UK and the TCI the nature of cooperation we might be able to forge on this issue. As Chief Minister Misick has indicated, we will seek to ensure that any arrangement reached between our governments would be to the advantage of all interested parties.

Discussions between the delegations will continue tomorrow, to be followed by consultations within respective governments.

Distribution:

FOR: Natalie S. Wozniak	(WOZNIAK)
FOR: Calvin A. Mitchell	(MITCHELLC)
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FOR: Jonathan H. Spalter	(SPALTER)
CC: Records	(RECORDS)

Additional Header Information Follows

Date Created: 23-May-1994 14:32
Deletable Flag: Y
DOCNUM: 041309
VMS Filename: OA\$SHARA13:ZVFSKS6MY.WPL
A1 Folder: MAY94
Message Format:
Message Status: READ
Date Modified: 23-May-1994 14:32
Forward Flag: YES
Read-Receipt Requested: NO
Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO
Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. email	From Clarke re: For Berger: On Haiti Migrants (2 pages)	05/24/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records

NSC Emails

A1-Record (Jan 93-Sept 94) ([Schwartz and Cuba...])

OA/Box Number: 570000

FOLDER TITLE:

[05/17/1994-09/09/1994]

2011-1039-F

rs1848

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

24-May-1994 18:49 EDT

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Richard A. Clarke
(CLARKER)

SUBJECT: HAITI-DR TRIP & MIGRANTS

Larry,

We are not home yet on getting an MPC and Sandy does not want to use Guantanamo unless its absolutely necessary.

Therefore, I would urge you to get Gray to push for an MPC if the meeting is going well.

Here are the main points:

--We would like to rent dock space at Puerto Plata ot, failing that, at Pepillo Salcedo

--We would tie up a cruise ship there.

--The Coast Guard would bring Haitian boat migrants to the cruise ship. They would not be allowed ashore, unless they had been granted permission to come to the US. (in which case we would fly them out).

--The US will pay all costs associated with this operation, including any costs you might incur for extra security, etc.

--We would rent hotels for the US personnel and buy goods locally.

--If you agree in principle, we will send down a team to negotiate details. We would like to start 5 June.

Distribution:

FOR: Lawrence G. Rossin	(ROSSIN)
FOR: Mary C. Emery	(EMERY)
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FOR: Cathy Millison	(MILLISON)

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White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006

By MI NARA, Date 3/28/16

1011-1039-F

FOR: James W. Reed	(REED)
FOR: Neal S. Wolin	(WOLIN)
FOR: Ardenia R. Hawkins	(HAWKINS)
FOR: Allison M. Wright	(WRIGHT)
FOR: Richard A. Clarke	(CLARKER)
FOR: Wanda D. Lindsey	(LINDSEY)
FOR: Rand R. Beers	(BEERS)
FOR: Eric P. Schwartz	(SCHWARTZ)
FOR: Ernest J. Wilson III	(WILSON)
FOR: Susan E. Rice	(RICE)
FOR: Marcia G. Norman	(NORMAN)
FOR: Sean J. Darragh	(DARRAGH)
FOR: Beverly J. Roundtree	(ROUNDTREE)
CC: Records	(RECORDS)

Additional Header Information Follows

Date Created: 24-May-1994 18:41
Deletable Flag: Y
DOCNUM: 041564
VMS Filename: OA\$SHARA1:ZVFTQWOFF.WPL
A1 Folder: MAY94
Message Format:
Message Status: READ
Date Modified: 24-May-1994 18:41
Forward Flag: YES
Read-Receipt Requested: NO
Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO
Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

25-May-1994 11:00 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: George M. Andricos
(ANDRICOS)

SUBJECT: DOD Authorization Bill

Note for Tony Lake, Sandy Berger, Nancy Soderberg

From Mike Andricos

SUBJECT: DOD Authorization Bill

The House continued consideration of the Defense Authorization Bill on Tuesday, May 24, taking the following action:

BASE CLOSURE - Defeated a Hansen amendment to postpone the 1995 round of base closures until 1997. (vote 68y - 362n)

C-17 - Passed a Harman amendment to restore the Administration's request for 6 aircraft vice 4 approved by the Armed Services Committee. (vote 330y - 100n)

HAITI - Passed a Goss amendment (vote 223y - 201n) to establish a safe haven under OAS or UN auspices from where the legitimate Haitian government can govern, where the international community can render humanitarian aid and refugee visa processing, and where Haitians can seek refuge from economic or political hardship. Earlier the House rejected a Dellums substitute amendment (vote 191y - 236n) expressing the Sense of Congress that the US should not undertake military action against Haiti unless there is a clear and present danger to US interests or citizens, that the US should intensify economic pressure on Haiti's military, and that we should make every effort to replace shipboard migrant processing with land-based processing.

PEACEKEEPING - Defeated a Spence (and Republican Leadership) amendment to require the UN to "properly" credit all US contributions in support of UN peacekeeping operations against the US assessed share of UNPK costs and would have limited amounts authorized to be paid for the US share of UNPK costs to only those amounts expended by DOD for direct or indirect support of UN peacekeeping operations. Strong letters from Secretaries Perry and Christopher plus a number of calls from NSC, Deputy Secretary Deutsch, and State helped reverse momentum building in support of this amendment. (Of 12 calls made by NSC, seven members went to the floor to speak in our favor.) (vote 191n - 221y)

In other developments, the House agreed to postpone until June 9 consideration of an amendment to lift the arms embargo on the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The House has about 40 other amendments remaining which could be offered under the rule on the Authorization Bill. Most of these likely will be considered in another en bloc amendment or dropped altogether. It is unclear at present whether the House will return to the bill this week or

wait until after Memorial Day recess to continue debate.

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FOR: Katherine M. Veit	(VEIT)
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FOR: Kristie A. Kenney	(KENNEY)
FOR: M. Brooke Darby	(DARBY)
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FOR: James W. Reed	(REED)
FOR: Neal S. Wolin	(WOLIN)
FOR: Ardenia R. Hawkins	(HAWKINS)
FOR: Allison M. Wright	(WRIGHT)
FOR: M. Brooke Darby	(DARBY)
FOR: Wendy E. Gray	(GRAY)
FOR: Brenda I. Hilliard	(HILLIARD)
FOR: M. Kay LaPlante	(LAPLANTE)
FOR: Cathy Millison	(MILLISON)
FOR: Allison M. Wright	(WRIGHT)
FOR: Ardenia R. Hawkins	(HAWKINS)
CC: Records	(RECORDS)
CC: Records	(RECORDS)
CC: Robert G. Bell	(BELL)
CC: Steven R. Jones	(JONES)
CC: Lawrence G. Rossin	(ROSSIN)
CC: Susan E. Rice	(RICE)
CC: Randy R. Beers	(BEERS)
CC: Richard A. Clarke	(CLARKER)
CC: George M. Andricos	(ANDRICOS)
CC: Christina L. Funches	(FUNCHES)
CC: Jeremy D. Rosner	(ROSNER)
CC: Eric Liu	(LIU)
CC: William C. Danvers	(DANVERS)
CC: Eric P. Schwartz	(SCHWARTZ)

Additional Header Information Follows

Date Created: 25-May-1994 09:33
Deletable Flag: Y
DOCNUM: 041635

VMS Filename: OA\$SHARA10:ZVFUFMDOM.WPL
A1 Folder: MAY94
Message Format:
Message Status: READ
Date Modified: 25-May-1994 10:51
Forward Flag: YES
Read-Receipt Requested: NO
Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO
Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

27-May-1994 10:56 EDT

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Lawrence G. Rossin
(ROSSIN)

SUBJECT: Prep for 6:15 Haiti mtg

Dick, a couple of action items for the 6:15 meeting this evening and lead-up:

1) Sandy asked that I, you and Dobbins coordinate on preparing an agenda. (SB: "Mtgs too diffuse, need sharper focus, decision menu"). As one component of the agenda he wants you to give an update. Also, you had said on Monday that today we would need to make decisions on where to put the MPC at least on an interim basis. He wants the meeting at 6:15 to make those decisions and would like you to present a "crisp plan" for the Deputies to consider.

I will assemble this overall agenda. Can you forward to me ASAP for it the migrant agenda item with, as ticks, the decisions you want made and as necessary little blurbs.

-- Yesterday Sandy and Strobe also asked Dobbins and me to prepare a comprehensive list of items needing decisions in every area. Sandy's idea is that the Deputies this evening would empower the working groups to decide these or frame them for Deputies' decision. Can you give me a list of such items where they are not on the agenda above which I will build into such a comprehensive list?

2) Dobbins is keen to have the Deputies give formal blessing to the radio broadcasting proposal (COMMANDO SOLO). I will put this on the agenda. However in the 9:30 teleconference OSD said it did not have Randy's paper (which Jim mentioned). It asked for it so the discussion could be prepared. Can you get this around before this evening's meeting? (I did not get a copy either.)

3) Dobbins is hosting 3 back to back meetings at State at midday. First at 12:00 noon is on internal politics; second at 12:45 is UNMIH; 3rd at 1:30 is broadcasting. All in Room 7524 at State.

o On UNMIH, he is undertaking to blend the three extant UNMIH papers (yours on UNMIH parameters/sizing and on recruitment and his with recruitment talking points) into a single paper removing some of the sensitive issues from the first which we could then base our recruitment planning and efforts on. He wants to get such a paper prepared in time for this evening's meeting so it can be blessed. I can work with Jim on this, it would be mostly cut and paste but please give me any views you want me to convey. One big caveat: POTUS has made no decision yet on UNMIH parameters per the decision memo I prepared.

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E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006

By *MI* NARA, Date *3/28/16**Roll- 624 F*

o On broadcasting, as far as I am concerned the decision has been made. The issue is getting it going.

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CC: Carlos A. Burgos	(BURGOS)

Additional Header Information Follows

Date Created: 27-May-1994 10:32
Deletable Flag: Y
DOCNUM: 042005
VMS Filename: OA\$SHARA28:ZVFWFJZO1.WPL
A1 Folder: MAY94
Message Format:
Message Status: READ
Date Modified: 27-May-1994 10:53
Forward Flag: YES
Read-Receipt Requested: NO
Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO
Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003. email	From Lawrence Rossin re: Haiti and Italy POTUS Points (2 pages)	06/01/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
A1-Record (Jan 93-Sept 94) ([Schwartz and Cuba...])
OA/Box Number: 570000

FOLDER TITLE:

[05/17/1994-09/09/1994]

2011-1039-F
rs1848

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

01-Jun-1994 19:15 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Eric P. Schwartz

(SCHWARTZ)

FROM:

Natalie S. Wozniak
(WOZNIAK)

SUBJECT:

Press Request: Mark Matthews

Tara asked that you return a phone call to Mark Matthews, Baltimore Sun. He also asked for Sandy. Perhaps you can say you are returning the call for both you and Sandy.

Anyway, he wants to talk about Haiti. Refugee in-processing could be underway as early as next week. Will this relieve some of the pressure or are we still looking at the option of military activity?

He is writing this piece for this weekend. He needs to hear from you before Friday.

On background, of course.

His phone number is 416-0252.

Thanks,
Natalie
x62947

CC: Records

(RECORDS)

Additional Header Information Follows

Date Created: 01-Jun-1994 18:57
Deletable Flag: Y
DOCNUM: 042405
VMS Filename: OA\$SHARA4:ZVGBRF9VA.WPL
A1 Folder: JUN94
Message Format:
Message Status: READ
Date Modified: 01-Jun-1994 18:57
Forward Flag: YES
Read-Receipt Requested: NO
Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO
Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

02-Jun-1994 22:54 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Lawrence G. Rossin
(ROSSIN)

SUBJECT: Haiti Points for Peter Jennings Meeting June 3

NOTE FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

FROM: LARRY ROSSIN

SUBJECT: Meeting with Peter Jennings Producers, June 3,
11:30 a.m.

Tara indicated that the major theme they will pursue is why the U.S. has gotten bogged down in Haiti in the past and whether that is not inevitable again. I gather they want to come with an open mind and historical perspective. The approach below may be helpful. These do not attempt to duplicate our policy points.

- Many question the President's interest in resolving Haiti's crisis, why we need be involved.
- The President has cited several national interests at stake in Haiti today. They go to basic principles of American foreign policy -- both democracy and human decency -- as well as to specific interests including the burden a migrant exodus could create.
- He has also noted the characteristics of Haiti which make constant interaction between our two countries inevitable, notably geography and personal ties (nearly a million Haitian-Americans; thousands of Americans in Haiti with many more interested here -- missionary support groups, etc.)
- These factors have contributed to close involvement throughout our history. It has always been complex, inevitable given our vastly different national experiences.
- Our engagement has fluctuated this century. The 1915-34 occupation was led by a military administration which expanded infrastructure and services but -- typical of the time -- was insensitive politically and socially and exacerbated mulatto vs. noir (black) cleavages.
 - o The occupation disbanded the Haitian army and created a "modern" military.
- The occupation lost meaning and support in the U.S. as the years went by while Haitians grew increasingly restive. Corrupt mulatto governments followed our departure. The infrastructure and military deteriorated. We had modest

relations with these governments and the noir military regime of Paul Magloire which ended mulatto political dominance in the early 1950s.

- Critics of the U.S. role charge we rigged François Duvalier's 1957 victory in a multi-candidate field. The evidence is sparse. However, "Papa Doc" was seen at the time as the highly qualified tribune of poor noirs. We continued economic and military aid in his early years.
- After his election Duvalier revealed a brutal face, terrorizing both the mulatto elite and the general populace. He eviscerated the military and created the Tontons Macoutes as his enforcers. By the mid-1960s thousands of elite Haitians were in exile.
- Deteriorating relations led us to terminate bilateral cooperation by the early 1960s. The regime was xenophobic; ports were closed and de facto sanctions were self-imposed.
- Papa Doc's lackluster son Jean-Claude inherited the Presidency in 1970. He initiated cautious reforms. Brutality moderated. We sought to encourage change through heavily conditioned aid, encouragement of assembly investment and diplomatic prodding -- an early case of "constructive engagement."
- The effectiveness of this policy was always arguable. Duvalier's wife and advisers were famously corrupt. Eventually this led to the dechoukage (uprooting) -- a leaderless mass rejection of the Duvaliers. We worked with the French to fly Duvalier into exile in February 1986.
- The years since are the latest example of Haitian political instability after long stagnation. Hopeful interludes have alternated with breakdown and repression. The period since the 1990 coup has been the most brutal and corrupt.
- Haitians have always worked for freedom and democracy, forming countless parties and "popular groups," enacting a hyper-democratic constitution, insisting on free elections, spawning a rowdy and vibrant media. We have sought to nurture their hard-won, sporadic progress. The free 1990 election -- first ever -- was the high point of that effort.
- Aristide is not Haitian democracy but he is its current scion. His ouster, whatever his faults, was an assault on Haitians and the democracy they were struggling to build. We cannot claim to support democracy but reject its legitimate expression.
- We deal with Haiti within that reality but also without illusions.
- Some quibble over the term "restoring" democracy. We are: Aristide was freely elected.
- But more important is giving Haitians' democratic instinct a fighting chance. While they strive for democracy, Haitians are far from knowing how to implement it. Polarization is

profound and corruption ingrained, the result of historical experience. Institutions are atrophied. Human and physical capital is depleted.

- That is why our policy has stressed safeguards, reconciliation and development from the ground up. Aristide must return for legitimacy's sake, but we and the international community are committed to helping the Haitian people build real, functioning institutions and giving them hope in their own country so they do not take to the sea.
- Those who say this is hopeless -- often citing past history -- denigrate the international community's capabilities after a half-century of assisting economic and political development in the third world. And they underestimate the foundation that genuine democratic striving can provide for foreign assistance.
- The key to accomplishing these objectives is to get rid of the current military leadership and break the political stalemate. They have blocked successive Haitian initiatives to restore Aristide within a constitutionally-legitimate framework allowing for democratic consolidation over time and with foreign assistance. Thus our focus on tight sanctions until they leave.
- Aristide has also been rigid but this is ultimately less important. His record as President was mixed. We can expect some of the problems from his brief tenure to recur when he returns. Aristide is a product of Haiti and Haiti will not change overnight. But his return within a constitutional framework and a strong international assistance effort can channel him toward reconciliation.
- Haiti is a hard case and we approach it with caution. But we diminish our own capabilities and surrender to history if we presume we cannot help Haitians succeed. We would betray our principles and interests if we did not try.

Distribution:

FOR: Mary C. Emery	(EMERY)
FOR: Wilma G. Hall	(HALL)
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FOR: M. Brooke Darby	(DARBY)
FOR: Cathy Millison	(MILLISON)
FOR: James W. Reed	(REED)
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FOR: Calvin A. Mitchell (MITCHELLC)
FOR: Tara D. Sonenshine (SONENSHINE)
FOR: Thomas B. Ross (ROSS)
FOR: Jonathan H. Spalter (SPALTER)
CC: Records (RECORDS)
CC: Richard E. Feinberg (FEINBERG)
CC: Eric P. Schwartz (SCHWARTZ)
CC: George M. Andricos (ANDRICOS)
CC: William C. Danvers (DANVERS)

Additional Header Information Follows

Date Created: 02-Jun-1994 22:48
Deletable Flag: Y
DOCNUM: 042553
VMS Filename: OA\$SHARA12:ZVGCWMALL.WPL
A1 Folder: JUN94
Message Format:
Message Status: READ
Date Modified: 02-Jun-1994 22:48
Forward Flag: YES
Read-Receipt Requested: NO
Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO
Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

13-Jun-1994 17:14 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Richard A. Clarke (CLARKER)
Eric P. Schwartz (SCHWARTZ)

FROM: Richard E. Feinberg
(FEINBERG)

SUBJECT: Cuba Contingency Planning

I know that your migrant work has inevitably been focused on Haiti, but ARA is wondering what happened to the Cuba contingency plans that they rushed over here a while back. Please provide me with talking points!

CC: Records (RECORDS)

Additional Header Information Follows

Date Created: 13-Jun-1994 16:24
Deletable Flag: Y
DOCNUM: 043522
VMS Filename: OA\$SHARA8:ZVGNOH4TN.WPL
A1 Folder: JUN94
Message Format:
Message Status: READ
Date Modified: 13-Jun-1994 16:24
Forward Flag: YES
Read-Receipt Requested: NO
Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO
Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS

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E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006

By MI NARA, Date 2/28/16

bolt 1034-F

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

16-Jun-1994 10:52 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Morton H. Halperin (HALPERIN)
Kathleen H. Cooper (COOPER)

FROM: Lawrence G. Rossin
(ROSSIN)

SUBJECT: Haiti telconferences

Of interest to you too

CC: Records (RECORDS)

Additional Header Information Follows

Date Created: 16-Jun-1994 10:51
Deletable Flag: Y
DOCNUM: 043994
VMS Filename: OA\$SHARA22:ZVGQFJ6K9.WPL
A1 Folder: JUN94
Message Format:
Message Status: READ
Date Modified: 16-Jun-1994 10:51
Forward Flag: YES
Read-Receipt Requested: NO
Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO
Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

16-Jun-1994 10:56 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Lawrence G. Rossin
(ROSSIN)

SUBJECT: Haiti 9:30 daily teleconferences

Dobbins chairs these every morning and runs a tight show, they rarely go over 1/2 hour. Issues frequently arise re sanctions/UNMIH/migrants/public affairs/political strategy. If possible it would be helpful to have people from each office there every day as business can get done in this setting. Just a reminder.

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E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006

By *M* NARA, Date *3/18/16*

201-1039-F

Distribution:

FOR: Richard E. Feinberg	(FEINBERG)
FOR: Richard A. Clarke	(CLARKER)
FOR: Randy R. Beers	(BEERS)
FOR: Eric P. Schwartz	(SCHWARTZ)
FOR: Leon S. Fuerth	(FUERTH)
FOR: Ann E. Woolston	(WOOLSTON)
FOR: James A. Carman	(CARMAN)
FOR: Sean J. Darragh	(DARRAGH)
FOR: Natalie S. Wozniak	(WOZNIAK)
FOR: Calvin A. Mitchell	(MITCHELLC)
FOR: Tara D. Sonenshine	(SONENSHINE)
FOR: Thomas B. Ross	(ROSS)
FOR: Jonathan H. Spalter	(SPALTER)
CC: Records	(RECORDS)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

16-Jun-1994 15:57 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Eric P. Schwartz

(SCHWARTZ)

FROM:

Lawrence G. Rossin
(ROSSIN)

SUBJECT:

more haiti fyi

Eric, Q/A's for POTUS w/bipartisan leadership. Larry

HAITI

SANCTIONS

Q: How do you expect sanctions to force out the Haitian military leadership?

A: Sanctions create an environment where a peaceful solution to the crisis through diplomacy and political efforts becomes more possible.

The military leaders have blocked all political efforts. Tighter sanctions aim to convey that they have no future unless they step down so democracy can be restored. I am determined that they will leave.

Q: Are the sanctions working yet? How long will you give them?

A: We're seeing signs of growing tension in the military and elite but it's still early days. I won't fix an artificial deadline that would distract from our main goals. We will constantly review the sanctions' effectiveness and humanitarian impact and adjust our approach if needed.

USE OF FORCE/UN MISSION

Q: Are you contemplating or preparing for use of force?

A: I haven't excluded any option including use of force, but my focus is on making the sanctions work.

Q: What about the beefed-up UN Mission? Is it a stalking horse for an invasion?

A: The UN Mission needs a broader mandate and composition to be ready to function safely and effectively after the military leaders depart. The OAS, Friends of Haiti and President Aristide all agree.

We all envisage such a reconfigured UN Mission

deploying in Haiti in a permissive environment, after the military leaders have stepped down, to assist the restoration of constitutional government.

Q: Are other countries willing to join a stronger UN Mission?

A: Strobe Talbott and Bill Gray found broad support for a stronger UN Mission. Many countries have indicated willingness to participate. We are talking to them while we seek UN approval of the revised UN Mission.

Q: Will you seek Congressional approval for the new UNMIH?

A: We will consult fully with the Congress on our participation in the UN Mission.

NEW HAITIAN MIGRANT PROCEDURES

Q: When will you start processing migrants in Jamaica?

A: In next few days, when the last pending arrangements are finalized.

Q: Why have you been returning migrants to Haiti since you announced the new procedures?

A: When I announced the new procedures I said it would take several weeks to set up the needed facilities. I also said we would continue to return interdicted migrants until the facilities were ready so as to discourage a dangerous mass departure.

CC: Records

(RECORDS)

Additional Header Information Follows

Date Created: 16-Jun-1994 15:50
Deletable Flag: Y
DOCNUM: 044058
VMS Filename: OA\$SHARA18:ZVGQMNK4E.WPL
A1 Folder: JUN94
Message Format:
Message Status: READ
Date Modified: 16-Jun-1994 15:50
Forward Flag: YES
Read-Receipt Requested: NO
Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO
Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

16-Jun-1994 16:07 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Eric P. Schwartz (SCHWARTZ)

FROM: Lawrence G. Rossin
(ROSSIN)

SUBJECT: more haiti

Eric, these are rather out of date but have a lot of the underlying arguments. I don;t have time to update them now but the subsequent developments include the passenger air and financial transaction sanctions, the DR agreement to a multilateral force, whatever on migrants, UNMIH recruitment kickoff, drawdown of our personnel, etc. Larry

TO: Addressees

FROM: Larry Rossin

SUBJECT: Updated Talking Points on Haiti

For your background and use as appropriate. Updated 5/20 to reflect latest information on humanitarian assistance.

HAITI

Expanded Talking Points

FOUNDATIONS OF AND REASONS FOR OUR POLICY REVIEW

- We have completed a comprehensive review of our strategy to restore democracy and return President Aristide to Haiti.
- This review considered the degeneration of the political, economic, human rights and humanitarian situations within Haiti, including the military leaders' continued flouting of the Governor's Island Accord and rejection of all recent initiatives aimed at ending the crisis.
- It also took into account counsel from President Aristide, views expressed by many members of Congress and our recent experience with Canada, France and Venezuela (the Friends of Haiti) and other UN members.
- The Haitian people are suffering. They are at the mercy of the military and its brutal thugs. We continue to denounce the abuses publicly and privately to the military, but that

can have only a limited effect as long as they control power.

- Haiti's economy is disintegrating under the pressure of sanctions and as the military leaders use the distortions sanctions have produced to steal Haiti's resources.

Impact of the Sanctions

- o Critics have focussed on leakage in the fuel sanctions -- a problem we have worked to solve -- but the bottom line is that the previous sanctions, both UN and OAS, hit the economy very severely.
- o The previous UN sanctions prohibited only petroleum and arms imports. But all trade dropped dramatically because of U.S. application of the more comprehensive OAS sanctions requiring Treasury licensing. Most shipping agents and manufacturers stopped trading with Haiti altogether.
- o Haiti has a devastating shortfall of 65% to 70% of its normal fuel requirements.
- o The cost of food has increased in the cities due to the increase in transportation costs.
- o Inflation is currently running about 60%. Inflation has impacted especially on the urban blue collar and lower classes.
- o Unemployment, high even before the sanctions were enforced more rigorously last October, is now estimated to be nearly 70%.
- o An estimated 60-70% of the country's industrial capacity has been idled.
- o Those few workers with jobs find it next to impossible to get to work because public transportation has all but ceased.
- o Agriculture has similarly been impacted. For example, coffee is cultivated by 200,000 small farmers; exports, prohibited under the OAS sanctions, have been devastated.
- o The state-run utility produces about four hours of electricity daily in Port-au-Prince. Almost all other towns and cities have not had electricity for weeks.
- o The powerful elites, both in the business community and the military command, are the least affected. The military has profited handsomely through skimming off profits from the sale of gasoline, both from contraband and from national stocks. The wealthy business elites also manage to insulate themselves from the effects of inflation and shortages through various means.
- o The middle and lower classes have suffered the most,

losing investments and jobs--many sinking into poverty.

- We have held that a political process is needed to transform the sanctions' impact into a peaceful end of the crisis. We have worked hard to make such a political process a reality, using sanctions, international mediation and support for initiatives by internal Haitian democrats which we believed offered prospects for resolving the crisis.

Summary of Previous Sanctions

- o We have led the world in the imposition, implementation and enforcement of sanctions, beginning with our full adoption of the voluntary OAS trade embargo in 1991.
 - o We imposed our own targeted visa bans and asset freezes on the military in June 1993 which we have expanded over time and which now cover the entire officer corps (some 550) and civilian associates of the military.
 - o We led the UN in enacting the fuel and arms sanctions shortly afterward and in reimposing them after the military broke its Governor's Island commitments in October.
 - o And at that time we joined with other nations in imposing a naval cordon around Haiti to enforce these sanctions, which is still in effect.
- The need for a political process remains, but the fact is that the previous sanctions, while affecting Haiti as a whole, did not succeed in forcing the military to relinquish political power.
 - They have rejected and obstructed a series of initiatives aimed at a political settlement of the crisis:

Summary of Military Obstruction

- o They broke their Governor's Island commitments by permitting political violence such as the Izmero and Malary murders, blocking the arrival of U.S. participants in the UN Mission and finally when Cédras did not retire and allow Aristide's return as promised.
- o They then boycotted a UN effort in November to convene a conclave in Port-au-Prince to get Governor's Island back on track.
- o They ignored Prime Minister Malval's December effort to convene a National Conference, setting the stage for its collapse.
- o They refused to meet with a delegation the Friends sent in late December to convey our concerns and warn of the consequences of non-compliance.
- o They undercut the most recent parliamentarians' initiative by blocking Senate access to its chambers and creating a climate not conducive to progress.

- o [If pressed] President Aristide was not supportive of some of these efforts. But the military has been the crux of this problem throughout the crisis and that is where our focus must be.
- Instead of cooperating in a political solution the military leaders have turned up the terror and foisted on the Haitian people a new de facto government.
- o Obviously, we will not deal with the Jonassaint "government" which is a creature of the military.
- It was this brutal intransigence of the Haitian military that led us to review our approach to resolving this crisis.

PRESIDENT'S DECISIONS

- The President is determined that Haitian military brutalization of their own people and defiance of the international community must end.
- o Otherwise there will be a human rights and humanitarian catastrophe and the risk of a migrant exodus to our shores.
- He therefore directed a number of major changes to our Haiti policy, which he announced on May 8.
- Let me outline what we are or will be doing in several areas:
 - o Intensified UN sanctions;
 - o Improved sanctions enforcement;
 - o Support for the UN military and police Mission;
 - o Augmented humanitarian assistance;
 - o Efforts to boost the number of human rights monitors;
 - o Intensified diplomacy/new Envoy.
 - o New procedures for boat migrant asylum requests (NB: Detailed in separate talking points.)

Intensified Sanctions

- The UNSC on May 6 enacted UNSC Resolution 917 significantly enhancing sanctions:
 - o it immediately globalized targeted sanctions against the military and its associates and banned non-scheduled flights;
 - o it directed that comprehensive trade sanctions be brought into force no later than May 21.
 - o The President signed an Executive Order and Proclamation on May 7 giving the first two sanctions U.S. legal force. An Executive Order implementing the trade sanctions will be signed by May 21.
 - o We did not seek to preserve the assembly industry exemption. We concluded that the most comprehensive

possible package of sanctions was required to maximize pressure on the military and avoid "mixed signals." We are working with the UNSC sanctions committee to develop procedures which will allow our companies to export their equipment and unprocessed inputs even after sanctions come into force. We have no final decision but are hopeful this will be approved.

- The new sanctions were not dependent on any prior actions by President Aristide. He told us that he will appoint a new Prime Minister and Commander-in-Chief, invite the UN Mission and request UN/OAS elections assistance at the appropriate time, which is once the military has met our demands.
- We have established a Haiti Sanctions Task Force led by Leon Fuerth (modeled on the successful Serbia task force) to work for the fullest global compliance with the sanctions and to explore additional measures.
- We may impose further sanctions, such as a ban on passenger flights, unilaterally or seek new UN measures.

How We See Sanctions Achieving Our Objectives

- o Many have questioned whether sanctions, even intensified, can work. We believe that they can if accompanied by tough enforcement.
- o Earlier this year the sanctions' pressure was strong and clear and visible movement developed within key sectors of Haitian society to being about the steps needed for an end to sanctions: restoration of constitutional government and Aristide's return.
- o The obstruction of the military was aided by the leakage that subsequently developed in the sanctions.
- o As the international community makes the sanctions comprehensive and improves their enforcement, the internal conditions which produce pressure on the military leadership to leave and to create the conditions for democracy can be restored.
- o This will take a concerted international effort and it will require intensive efforts within Haiti to focus the blame for sanctions on the military leadership.
- o It also is why augmented humanitarian aid is important -- sanctions take time to work. We cannot allow the military to think they can wait for humanitarian deterioration to weaken our resolve and let them off the hook.
- o There are no guarantees and we may need to consider further options. But we should all work together to make these tough sanctions work.

Improved Sanctions Enforcement

- We will press diplomatically for active compliance with the

sanctions and especially will work on the Dominican Republic to control smuggling across its border with Haiti.

- In addition to encouraging Dominican-UN cooperation we may send an envoy extremely soon to press for prompt and effective action.

Summary of Efforts with the Dominican Republic

- o Fuel smuggling across the Dominican - Haitian border reached serious dimensions as the demand for and price of fuel skyrocketed in Haiti. Clearly Dominican border controls have been inadequate in spite of periodic crackdowns and their stated commitment to enforcement.
- o We have been in frequent contact with the Dominican government to discuss ways to improve this situation. President Clinton wrote twice to President Balaguer to express his concerns and offer assistance.
- o Balaguer created a high-level Dominican sanctions enforcement commission which requested UN assistance.
- o A UN assessment team is en route to the Dominican Republic. We expect it to recommend a significant international observer presence.
- o We have also enhanced our cooperation with the Dominican Navy to support its ability to control smuggling in coastal waters.

UN Mission

- We will support deployment of the UN Mission to Haiti at the appropriate time (after the military leadership leaves).
- The Mission will have to be reconfigured and our participation in it reviewed to reflect changed circumstances since it was originally designed.
- We have begun to consult with UN partners on reconfiguration of the UNMIH. We will be working with them to develop an agreed Mission concept and to win UNSC endorsement for it.
- We will consult extensively with the Congress on our participation in UNMIH when we have international agreement on its reconfiguration.

Humanitarian Assistance

- We will augment our humanitarian feeding and health assistance to Haiti's poor to cushion the impact on them of the intensified sanctions. AID is consulting with the implementing private voluntary organizations. Already we have raised our beneficiary levels to 920,000 (as of 5/9) and other donors have gone from 212,000 to 350,000 (as of 5/9). We are working on an increase in our own authorized level from 1.04 million to 1.34 million.
- This will build upon the successful humanitarian programs we

have had in place since even before the UN sanctions were imposed.

Summary of Humanitarian Assistance Efforts

- o Before the new policy announcement we were feeding some 6-700,000 pregnant women, children and elderly people daily. Programs run by other countries and international organizations brought the total to around 900,000 daily.
- o Those totals fluctuated over time depending principally on the availability of fuel and the status of school feeding centers.
- o Our medical assistance programs provide basic health care services to one in three Haitians.
- o With our participation the donor community developed a program to supply fuel for humanitarian purposes only. There have been four fuel shipments. This has enabled the private voluntary organizations to maintain beneficiary levels.
- o AID monitors closely the nutritional situation in Haiti. Recently, for the first time since sanctions were imposed, AID has noted some general rise in malnutrition levels (as opposed to spikes related to local conditions).
- o We anticipate that intensified sanctions could increase the incidence of malnutrition. We will be alert to this as we work to expand our programs.

UN/OAS Human Rights Monitors

- We are working for the dispatch of more UN and OAS (International Civilian Mission - ICM) human rights monitors to Haiti as quickly as possible consistent with their operational latitude under prevailing security conditions.

ICM Background

- o After an absence of 3 months due to security concerns, the ICM with our strong encouragement returned in January. As of May 18 there are a total of 69 monitors in Port-au-Prince.
- o We are finding UN and OAS interest in rapid redeployment of the full 250. The OAS is collecting applications from prospective monitors. However, it is not yet recruiting and believes it should reopen its three field offices before adding more monitors. It will do so cautiously given security concerns.
- o The ICM mandate will be renewed by the UN General Assembly in about 10 days.
- o We have contributed \$16 million (\$5.8 million undisbursed) and have a further \$13 million

appropriated in FY 1994.

Intensified Diplomacy

- We are intensifying our multilateral and bilateral diplomacy to build support for these measures, press for active compliance with sanctions and encourage broad international support for Haiti once democracy is restored.
- The President's appointment of Bill Gray as his and Secretary Christopher's Special Adviser for Haiti manifests our seriousness. Mr. Gray is the point man for our efforts to resolve the crisis and a central player in our policy deliberations.
 - o [If Asked] He will be travelling widely. However the timing of a trip to Haiti has not yet been determined.

CONCLUSION

- The measures the President has directed demonstrate our determination to end the military assault on the Haitian people's democracy, their livelihood and, too often, their lives.
- At the same time they address humanitarian concerns arising from the military's misrule as well as the impact of sanctions.
- They are substantially similar to what the Black Caucus, Senators Dodd and Harkin and others have advocated.
- We will consider further steps if these measures prove ineffective at moving the military but worsen the suffering of the Haitian people.
 - o [If pressed] It is not useful to rule in or out any additional steps the President might direct, including use of force, at this point. The President's focus is on making all the new measures work to achieve our objectives.

CC: Records

(RECORDS)

Additional Header Information Follows

Date Created: 16-Jun-1994 15:59
Deletable Flag: Y
DOCNUM: 044062
VMS Filename: OA\$SHARA22:ZVGQMUF2L.WPL
A1 Folder: JUN94
Message Format:
Message Status: READ
Date Modified: 16-Jun-1994 15:59
Forward Flag: YES
Read-Receipt Requested: NO
Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO
Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

17-Jun-1994 10:43 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Carlos A. Burgos (BURGOS)
James A. Carman (CARMAN)

FROM: Lawrence G. Rossin
(ROSSIN)

SUBJECT: Haiti 6:15: Migrants/HIV papers

Carlos, FYI Eric Schwartz gave to Bill Wise copies of the papers
on HIV/Migrants and on in-country processing for today's 6:15
HAiti mtg.

CC: Records (RECORDS)
CC: William M. Wise (WISE)
CC: Tyler S. Beardsley (BEARDSLEY)

Additional Header Information Follows

Date Created: 17-Jun-1994 10:34
Deletable Flag: Y
DOCNUM: 044166
VMS Filename: OA\$SHARA1:ZVGRF6F0G.WPL
A1 Folder: JUN94
Message Format:
Message Status: READ
Date Modified: 17-Jun-1994 10:34
Forward Flag: YES
Read-Receipt Requested: NO
Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO
Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

18-Jun-1994 16:23 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Richard A. Clarke (CLARKER)
Eric P. Schwartz (SCHWARTZ)

FROM: Lawrence G. Rossin
(ROSSIN)

SUBJECT: HIV Haitian migrants

I am holding the paper you sent for inclusion then dropped from the agenda of the Friday Haiti Deputies meeting. Please let me know if and when you want this on the agenda and if you will provide a revised paper.

CC: Records (RECORDS)

Additional Header Information Follows

Date Created: 18-Jun-1994 16:18
Deletable Flag: Y
DOCNUM: 044280
VMS Filename: OA\$SHARA6:ZVGSNBE45.WPL
A1 Folder: JUN94
Message Format:
Message Status: READ
Date Modified: 18-Jun-1994 16:18
Forward Flag: YES
Read-Receipt Requested: NO
Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO
Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By M1 NARA, Date 2/16/11
201-1034-f

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

24-Jun-1994 12:26 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Lawrence G. Rossin
(ROSSIN)

SUBJECT: crosshatches

Larry Rossin clears the following crosshatches for the
Inter-American Affairs Directorate without changes:

6116 - Cable to Port-au-Prince re Movement of approved refugees
from Haiti after June 24

6137 - Cable to Port au Prince re Federal Benefits - Payments to
Haiti

6136 - Cable to Kingston re USG commitments toward HAiti efforts

6131 I need to talk to OVP about before I can respond.

Distribution:

FOR: M. Brooke Darby	(DARBY)
FOR: Wendy E. Gray	(GRAY)
FOR: Brenda I. Hilliard	(HILLIARD)
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Additional Header Information Follows

Date Created: 24-Jun-1994 12:14
Deletable Flag: Y
DOCNUM: 044856
VMS Filename: OA\$SHARA3:ZVGYHKBMT.WPL
A1 Folder: JUN94
Message Format:
Message Status: READ
Date Modified: 24-Jun-1994 12:17
Forward Flag: YES
Read-Receipt Requested: NO
Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *WV* NARA, Date *2/28/16*
2011-1031-F

Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

28-Jun-1994 13:06 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Lawrence G. Rossin
(ROSSIN)

SUBJECT: Haiti migrants press guidance

Sandy, Calvin:

Here is suggested Haiti migrants guidance. Cleared with Eric Schwartz. Can be altered later today as decision on how to proceed in short term is made. Larry.

HAITI

Q: Why are you getting this sudden surge of migrants from Haiti?

A: The situation in Haiti grows steadily more difficult as the military leaders continue their stubborn refusal to step down and permit the restoration of democracy and return of President Aristide.

The worsening human rights situation led the President to afford all interdicted Haitians the opportunity to apply for refugee status. The human rights situation continues to deteriorate.

Now the tighter UN and U.S. sanctions are increasing the pressure in Haiti. We have increased humanitarian assistance and are now feeding 1.4 million Haitians daily but the economic contraction obviously is an impetus to departure.

The military leaders bear full responsibility for the sanctions.

Under these circumstances, we anticipated that our provision of a humane arrangement for interdicted Haitians to apply for refugee status would likely lead to an increase in departures.

We encourage Haitians to avoid the risky sea voyage and utilize our in-country refugee processing centers, which continue to operate at full capacity. In-country processing remains the safest and most effective route available to those with refugee claims.

Q: What are you going to do about it? Can you handle these numbers?

The sudden increase in departures over the last couple

of days clearly will test our new arrangements.

We will adjust our procedures as needed to cope with the flow in a manner consistent with the new policy the President announced in May.

[IF PRESSED] I do not want to get into specifics of new procedures we might implement. We will announce these if and when necessary.

Distribution:

FOR: Mary C. Emery	(EMERY)
FOR: Wilma G. Hall	(HALL)
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FOR: Natalie S. Wozniak	(WOZNIAK)
FOR: Calvin A. Mitchell	(MITCHELLC)
FOR: Tara D. Sonenshine	(SONENSHINE)
FOR: Thomas B. Ross	(ROSS)
FOR: Jonathan H. Spalter	(SPALTER)
CC: Records	(RECORDS)
CC: Eric P. Schwartz	(SCHWARTZ)
CC: Richard A. Clarke	(CLARKER)
CC: George M. Andricos	(ANDRICOS)
CC: William C. Danvers	(DANVERS)
CC: James A. Carman	(CARMAN)
CC: Richard E. Feinberg	(FEINBERG)
CC: Randy R. Beers	(BEERS)

Additional Header Information Follows

Date Created: 28-Jun-1994 12:59
Deletable Flag: Y
DOCNUM: 045170
VMS Filename: OA\$SHARA20:ZVHCIKUCL.WPL
A1 Folder: JUN94
Message Format:
Message Status: READ
Date Modified: 28-Jun-1994 12:59
Forward Flag: YES
Read-Receipt Requested: NO
Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO

Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

29-Jun-1994 10:52 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Lawrence G. Rossin
(ROSSIN)

SUBJECT: Lat night's Gtmo guidance OK'd by Berger/Gergen

HAITI - Refugee Processing at Guantanamo

Q: Why are you getting this sudden surge of migrants from Haiti? What are you doing about it?

A: The military leaders' refusal to permit the restoration of democracy and return of President Aristide has led to steadily worsening conditions in Haiti.

The human rights abuses that led the President to conclude that the United States must afford all interdicted Haitians the opportunity to apply for refugee status.

The only way to get at the root causes of emigration by sea -- those abuses and economic suffering -- lies in ending illegitimate military rule and restoring democracy.

That is why the President has led the international community in intensifying sanctions aimed at making the military leaders step down -- sanctions which have visibly increased the pressure on those leaders.

The number of Haitians leaving now reflects the continued abuses of the military and the pressure this creates on innocent Haitians faced with intolerable living conditions due to military intransigence.

Our planning to implement the President's new refugee processing directive took into account the possibility of an outflow which would strain the capacity of the ships at Jamaica.

We provided for overflow at Guantanamo and given the current departure rate are activating that facility.

We will use it while the processing center at Grand Turk is set up -- it will be open in two weeks or less -- and other arrangements to increase overall capacity are made.

As the President reiterated today, we urge Haitians not to leave in boats but rather to apply at the in-country processing centers, the safest and best route to the U.S., where operations continue at normal levels.

Distribution:

FOR: Eric P. Schwartz	(SCHWARTZ)
FOR: Randy R. Beers	(BEERS)
FOR: Natalie S. Wozniak	(WOZNIAK)
FOR: Calvin A. Mitchell	(MITCHELLC)
FOR: Tara D. Sonenshine	(SONENSHINE)
FOR: Thomas B. Ross	(ROSS)
FOR: Jonathan H. Spalter	(SPALTER)
CC: Records	(RECORDS)

Additional Header Information Follows

Date Created: 29-Jun-1994 10:44
Deletable Flag: Y
DOCNUM: 045301
VMS Filename: OA\$SHARA28:ZVHDFCBNB.WPL
A1 Folder: JUN94
Message Format:
Message Status: READ
Date Modified: 29-Jun-1994 10:44
Forward Flag: YES
Read-Receipt Requested: NO
Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO
Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004. email	From Rossin re: Why So Many Migrants? (4 pages)	06/29/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
A1-Record (Jan 93-Sept 94) ([Schwartz and Cuba...])
OA/Box Number: 570000

FOLDER TITLE:

[05/17/1994-09/09/1994]

2011-1039-F
rs1848

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

07-Jul-1994 18:24 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Lawrence G. Rossin
(ROSSIN)

SUBJECT: Haiti for POTUS Press Conf

NOTE FOR SANDY BERGER
NANCY SODERBERG
TARA SONENSHINE

FROM: LARRY ROSSIN

SUBJECT: Haiti Overall Themes for POTUS Press Conference

The following tries to synthesize our Haiti policy as discussed in this morning's meeting. It has been cleared by Tara and Eric and builds in the latest development.

HAITI

COMMITMENT, LEADERSHIP AND INTERESTS

- We have taken a very aggressive leadership role in confronting the crisis in Haiti. We are mobilizing a worldwide effort to restore democracy and in the meantime give safe haven to Haitians in need of protection.
- We have a moral stake in democracy and human rights everywhere. Our capacity to uphold our principles varies but when gross abuses take place nearby we can and must act.
- I've stated before our compelling interests in Haiti:
 - o We are close neighbors, with up to one million people of Haitian descent here and several thousand Americans working and living there;
 - o Worsening human rights abuses, the denial of democracy for which Haitians worked so hard and economic decline, all results of the coup, are intolerable in themselves and drive Haitians to flee in boats for America.
 - o Haiti and Cuba are the only two countries in our hemisphere now where democracy is denied. The coup in Haiti cannot prevail.
 - o Drugs are coming to the United States from Haiti and that must be stopped.

AN ACTIVE STRATEGY

- We have worked with the international community to restore democracy. For more than a year we sought to achieve that goal by fostering a settlement between the Haitian parties. The military leaders blocked every initiative.
- Since May we have tightened the noose on the military leaders. We led the UN in imposing full trade sanctions, then focussed the pressure by banning air traffic and financial transactions, blocking assets and revoking visas. We're acting to seal the Dominican border.
- With human rights abuses worsening and knowing that sanctions are a blunt instrument, I took steps to protect innocent Haitians.
 - o We have increased our humanitarian feeding and health care programs in spite of adverse conditions.
 - o We have increased in-country refugee processing, the best and safest route to political refugee status.
 - o We have supported the international human rights monitors.
 - o And we have put into place procedures which offer all Haitians who leave by boat protection if they need it.

PROTECTING HAITIANS FLEEING BY BOAT

- Military violence against the Haitian people and increasing economic distress are driving boat departures. The coup leaders bear sole responsibility.
- Massive outflows have challenged our handling capability. We are coping with the flow. I'm speaking to foreign leaders and have emissaries hammering out cooperative arrangements. The UN is by our side.
- Panama's retraction of our agreement was a disappointment. But the safe haven policy will continue. We will keep working to establish sites for those in need of protection.
- We are keeping my May 8 pledge to help all Haitians in need of protection. We are respecting America's basic values.

OUR DETERMINATION TO PREVAIL

- I will spare no effort to make the sanctions work to achieve our goals -- restoration of democracy, return of President Aristide. I am convinced that, if universally respected and enforced, they can.
- At the same time, I will set aside no option which I may need to protect American interests and achieve our goals.
- I have deployed Marines off Haiti. They give us the capability to evacuate Americans if necessary.
- Given that I have not ruled out the use of force, it would be irresponsible not to be prepared should we reach that

point. I will not comment on specific readiness measures.

- My message is clear: The military leaders must step down. The pressure will keep building until they do. Our determination to prevail is getting across to them. Tensions among the leaders and their supporters are growing, creating conditions for an end to their theft of democracy.

FOLLOW-THROUGH

- We must be ready to assist the restored democratic Haitian government. We will join the world community in a major aid program to help Haitians rebuild their country.
- We must also ensure that the UN Mission is able to support the return to democracy. We are working with the UN and other countries toward that end. Many countries are signalling their support for the stronger UN Mission and readiness to participate in it.

CONCLUSION

- This Administration has put teeth and energy into America's commitment to democracy in Haiti. Our policy can achieve our goals while respecting our humanitarian ideals. Vigorously pursued from the top down, it is bringing the end of the crisis and renewal of hope nearer every day.

Distribution:

FOR: Richard A. Clarke	(CLARKER)
FOR: Eric P. Schwartz	(SCHWARTZ)
FOR: Richard E. Feinberg	(FEINBERG)
FOR: Morton H. Halperin	(HALPERIN)
FOR: George M. Andricos	(ANDRICOS)
FOR: William C. Danvers	(DANVERS)
FOR: James A. Carman	(CARMAN)
FOR: Mary C. Emery	(EMERY)
FOR: Wilma G. Hall	(HALL)
FOR: Kristen K. Cicio	(CICIO)
FOR: Katherine M. Veit	(VEIT)
FOR: William H. Itoh	(ITOH)
FOR: Kristie A. Kenney	(KENNEY)
FOR: M. Brooke Darby	(DARBY)
FOR: Cathy Millison	(MILLISON)
FOR: James W. Reed	(REED)
FOR: Neal S. Wolin	(WOLIN)
FOR: Ardenia R. Hawkins	(HAWKINS)
FOR: Allison M. Wright	(WRIGHT)
FOR: Natalie S. Wozniak	(WOZNIAK)
FOR: Calvin A. Mitchell	(MITCHELLC)
FOR: Tara D. Sonenshine	(SONENSHINE)
FOR: Thomas B. Ross	(ROSS)
FOR: Jonathan H. Spalter	(SPALTER)
CC: Records	(RECORDS)

Additional Header Information Follows

Date Created: 07-Jul-1994 18:12
Deletable Flag: Y
DOCNUM: 046080
VMS Filename: OA\$SHARA17:ZVHLQ2D8H.WPL
A1 Folder: JUL94
Message Format:
Message Status: READ
Date Modified: 07-Jul-1994 18:12
Forward Flag: YES
Read-Receipt Requested: NO
Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO
.
Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

19-Jul-1994 12:32 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Lawrence G. Rossin
(ROSSIN)

SUBJECT: Haiti pts for Demo Leadership

Here are talking points for the Democratic Leadership, as requested.

Haiti

(Our Interests)

- We have a moral stake in democracy and human rights everywhere, and this is particularly true when brazen violence takes place in our back yard.
- We have several compelling interests in Haiti:
 - o We are close neighbors;
 - o Up to one million people of Haitian descent live here;
 - o Several thousand Americans work and live there;
 - o Worsening human rights abuses, the denial of democracy and economic decline, all results of the coup, are intolerable and drive Haitians to flee in boats.
 - o Haiti and Cuba are the only two non-democracies left in our hemisphere. The repression in Haiti disrupts the entire region and cannot be tolerated.

(Intervention)

- I'm focussed on making sanctions effective to end the crisis peacefully. We've increased the pressure and the impact is being felt by the military leaders.
- There are no artificial deadlines for sanctions. But our patience has limits when important interests are at stake.
- No option I might require to end the Haitian crisis, including use of force, is excluded.
- We have Marines ready off Haiti to evacuate Americans should the need arise. They exercised last week in the Bahamas.
- Other military exercises to maintain preparedness for any eventuality are occurring. Readiness is essential as long as the force option remains open.

(UNSYG Report on UNMIH)

- We are pleased that Boutros Ghali supports an international force of much the size and composition we have proposed.

- He shares our sense of urgency about early, effective action to restore the legitimate authorities in Haiti.
- One of his options, a two-phased approach with a UN-sanctioned coalition force followed by a UN peacekeeping force, has merit. We are considering it.
- An international peacekeeping effort with broad participation will be needed to support the return to democracy in Haiti.
- We will work closely with the UN and other member nations to bring about an agreed approach.

(Dole "Haiti Commission" Amendment)

- I am pleased that the Senate rejected the amendment.
- It would have hampered our efforts to restore democracy to Haiti. The Administration could not stand down while a commission deliberated.
- Such a commission would simply have bought time for the Haitian coup leaders. General Cedras himself supported it.

(Haitian Boat Migrants)

- I'm pleased to see the numbers down. We're not sure why but hope the word of our new safe haven policy is getting out.
- Military violence and economic distress are driving boat departures. The coup leaders bear sole responsibility.
- Massive outflows challenged our handling capability. We are coping.
- We've made safe haven arrangements with two countries, have agreements in principle with three more and are talking with others. The UN is with us.
- We are averting a mass influx of migrants to Florida while keeping my pledge to help Haitians in need of protection. We are respecting America's basic values.

(Expulsion of UN/OAS Human Rights Monitors)

- We are outraged. The military and their allies are guilty of murders, rapes and kidnappings of innocent Haitians. Now they seek to hide their crimes from the eyes of the world.
- We will not be deterred from our determination to restore democracy to Haiti. Only that can end the human rights abuses the UN/OAS monitors so courageously documented.

(Radio Democracy)

- Our cooperative program with the Haitian (Aristide) government using DoD aircraft began Friday.

- Each side reviews the other's material since it our plane, their airspace.
- Aristide's first message is forward-looking, stresses reconciliation.
- (IF ASKED) We decided not to press for "stay-at-home" messages. We and Aristide differ on migrants and we wanted this project to build cooperative relations with him.
- We have ample, better channels for those messages on VOA retransmissions and local radio advertising.

Distribution:

FOR: Christina L. Funches	(FUNCHES)
FOR: William C. Danvers	(DANVERS)
FOR: George M. Andricos	(ANDRICOS)
CC: Records	(RECORDS)
CC: Richard E. Feinberg	(FEINBERG)
CC: V. Manuel Rocha	(ROCHAV)
CC: Eric P. Schwartz	(SCHWARTZ)
CC: Natalie S. Wozniak	(WOZNIAK)
CC: Calvin A. Mitchell	(MITCHELLC)
CC: Tara D. Sonenshine	(SONENSHINE)
CC: Thomas B. Ross	(ROSS)
CC: Jonathan H. Spalter	(SPALTER)

Additional Header Information Follows

Date Created: 19-Jul-1994 12:30
Deletable Flag: Y
DOCNUM: 046881
VMS Filename: OA\$SHARA24:ZVHXHVVN4.WPL
A1 Folder: JUL94
Message Format:
Message Status: READ
Date Modified: 19-Jul-1994 12:30
Forward Flag: YES
Read-Receipt Requested: NO
Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO
Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005. email	From Rossin re: Haiti FPG Paper for Rocha Completion (3 pages)	07/20/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
A1-Record (Jan 93-Sept 94) ([Schwartz and Cuba...])
OA/Box Number: 570000

FOLDER TITLE:

[05/17/1994-09/09/1994]

2011-1039-F
rs1848

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

02-Aug-1994 08:35 EDT

MEMORANDUM FOR:

RECORDS

(RECORDS@A1@OEOB)

FROM: Cicio, Kristen K.

(ciciok@NSCSTF@OEOB@MSGATE@VAXB)

SUBJECT: :UNCLASSIFIED: FW: Cuba Migration DC

Message Creation Date was at 2-AUG-1994 08:23:00

Eric,

Sandy Berger has approved your participants list for subject DC. Exec Sec will do the inviting.

Thanks,

Kris

From: Schwartz, Eric P.

To: Blakeman, Earle C.; Clarke, Richard A.; Feinberg, Richard E.; @UP - APNSA Special Assistants; @CROSS - Cross Hatches

Subject: Cuba Migration DC

Date: Monday, August 01, 1994 10:33 AM

Kris:

My recommendations for Cuba Migration DC participants:

Justice plus one (INS)

OSD plus one

JCS plus one

State plus two*

DOT plus one (US Coast Guard)**

CIA plus one

OVP plus one

*State should be permitted to send two Assistant Secretaries (i.e., principal plus 2), from ARA and PRM, as this is both a regional and a migration DC.

Other agencies need not have two Assistant Secretaries, but the migration

**US Coast Guard needs to be there, but if Coast Guard is there, we need to have DOT as the principal, as Coast Guard is a subordinate agency to DOT.

Additional Header Information Follows

Date Created: 02-Aug-1994 08:23

Deletable Flag: Y
DOCNUM: 048150
VMS Filename: OA\$SHARA22:ZVILC8R3X.TXT
A1 Folder: AUG94
Message Format:
Message Status: READ
Date Modified: 02-Aug-1994 08:23
Forward Flag: YES
Read-Receipt Requested: NO
Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO
Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

03-Aug-1994 11:23 EDT

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Darby, Melanie B. (darbym@NSCSTF@OEOB@MSGATE@VAXB)

SUBJECT: :UNCLASSIFIED: FW: THE PRESIDENT'S EVENT

Message Creation Date was at 3-AUG-1994 11:05:00

To be added in Haiti Qs and As.

From: Schwartz, Eric P.
To: Darby, M. Brooke; Soderberg, Nancy E.
CC: @GLOBAL - Global Affairs
Subject: THE PRESIDENT'S EVENT TONIGHT
Date: Wednesday, August 03, 1994 10:41 AM

NANCY:

ONE ADDITIONAL SUGGESTED "TICK" FOR THE PRESIDENT'S LIST OF HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES:

And on Monday, armed men arrived at our refugee processing center in Port-au-Pirince, held several refugee applicants on the ground and beat them, took away three applicants.

Distribution:

FOR: Calvin A. MitchellFOR: Thomas B. RossFOR: Tara D. SonenshineFOR: Jonathan H. Sp

Additional Header Information Follows

Date Created: 03-Aug-1994 11:05
Deletable Flag: Y
DOCNUM: 048295
VMS Filename: OA\$SHARA29:ZVIMG9QWA.TXT
A1 Folder: AUG94
Message Format:
Message Status: READ
Date Modified: 03-Aug-1994 11:05
Forward Flag: YES
Read-Receipt Requested: NO
Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO
Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

10-Aug-1994 16:05 EDT

MEMORANDUM FOR:

RECORDS

(RECORDS@A1@OEOB)

FROM: Feinberg, Richard E.

(feinberr@NSCSTF@OEOB@MSGATE@VAX

SUBJECT: RE: Cuba memo

Message Creation Date was at 10-AUG-1994 15:46:00

Before you send this, perhaps the three of us should talk. Sandy did ask me where we stood with regard to long-term Cuba policy, and I noted that for various reasons there had been very little work, especially on paper. He recognized that the issue is very sensitive.

We have our paper on Track II and Sandy already has my e-mail recommending that we move that forward. Before we propose something more ambitious, I'd like to have a clearer sense of what it might entail.

From: Halperin, Morton H.

To: Feinberg, Richard E.; Schwartz, Eric P.

Cc: /R, Record at A1

Subject: Cuba memo

Date: Wednesday, August 10, 1994 3:07PM

Comments on the following, please. thanks.

MEMO FOR SANDY BERGER

FROM: Mort Halperin

Richard Feinberg

Eric Schwartz

Re: Cuba Planning

Recent events in Cuba suggest the need to both accelerate and consolidate our planning. We need to develop solutions to the current and potential refugee problems which are consistent with and supported by more general planning for a political crisis in Cuba. We also need to develop a plan for actions now to seek to promote an evolution to democracy in Cuba consistent with track II of the Cuban Democracy Act, and with our plans to deal with an emergency.

As you know State is resisting holding on IWG on Track II on the grounds that the time is not ripe. Rather than press them to do so, we suggest that we prepare an NSC memorandum which deals with the full range of Cuban policy issues and that you then hold a DC.

As we envision it the memorandum would lay out an aggressive policy to seek to promote a transition to democracy in Cuba while dealing with the

short run refugee issues. We would also make plans to deal with various possible crisis scenarios. The memorandum would seek to lay out options and identify any differences of view within the bureaucracy.

Additional Header Information Follows

Date Created: 10-Aug-1994 15:46
Deletable Flag: Y
DOCNUM: 048849
VMS Filename: OA\$SHARA3:ZVITMZFX6.TXT
A1 Folder: AUG94
Message Format:
Message Status: READ
Date Modified: 10-Aug-1994 15:46
Forward Flag: YES
Read-Receipt Requested: NO
Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO
Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006. email	From Melanie Darby re: FW: Paper Sent to Interag (5 pages)	08/12/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
A1-Record (Jan 93-Sept 94) ([Schwartz and Cuba...])
OA/Box Number: 570000

FOLDER TITLE:

[05/17/1994-09/09/1994]

2011-1039-F
rs1848

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

15-Aug-1994 08:15 EDT

MEMORANDUM FOR:

RECORDS

(RECORDS@A1@OEOB)

FROM: Millison, Cathy L.

(millisoc@NSCSTF@OEOB@MSGATE@VAXB)

SUBJECT: :~~CONFIDENTIAL~~:

Message Creation Date was at 15-AUG-1994 07:53:00

I am holding package #6550 - memo to President on Cuba Migration Policy Issues which I understand needs edits (due to a phone call you received from Justice on Saturday). Prior to making any changes, please be sure you get the diskette from our office and coordinate with Eric Schwartz (since he originally prepared the package). Thanks.

Additional Header Information Follows

Date Created: 15-Aug-1994 07:53
Deletable Flag: Y
DOCNUM: 049065
VMS Filename: OA\$SHARA16:ZVIYBSKXF.TXT
A1 Folder: AUG94
Message Format:
Message Status: READ
Date Modified: 15-Aug-1994 07:53
Forward Flag: YES
Read-Receipt Requested: NO
Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO
Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006

By MI NARA, Date 3/25/16

1011-1034 F

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

31-Aug-1994 17:40 EDT

MEMORANDUM FOR:

RECORDS

(RECORDS@A1@OEOB)

FROM: Halperin, Morton H.

(halperim@NSCSTF@OEOB@MSGATE@VAXB

SUBJECT: FW: [CONFIDENTIAL]

Message Creation Date was at 31-AUG-1994 17:18:00

See the attached.

From: Rossin, Larry

To: @NSA - Nat'l Security Advisor

CC: /R, Record at A1; Clarke, Richard A.; Halperin, Morton H.; Rocha, Victor M.; Schwartz, Eric P.; Simon, Steven N.; Wilhelm, Richard J.; @PRESS - Public Affairs

Subject: [CONFIDENTIAL] Haiti: Refugees Out, Fuel Released

Date: Wednesday, August 31, 1994 05:09 PM

NOTE FOR SANDY BERGER

FROM: LARRY ROSSIN

SUBJECT: Approved Refugees Out of Haiti; Fuel Released

Vicki Huddleston called to confirm that the two busloads of approved in-country refugees, totaling 91, had crossed into the Dominican Republic and were en route to Santo Domingo where they will fly tonight to the U.S. for resettlement. There were a fair number of hassles even in spite of Immigration Director Col. Denis' presence and assistance, but she attributed this to general Haitian hassling and inefficiency, not calculation.

She said we can now discuss it with the press. I've alerted Tom Ross.

Next week (hopefully Tuesday) they will try to move another 100; the following week and each week thereafter a further 150.

NEW ISSUE: FUEL: The de factos took the seals off the fuel at noon today, and by 1 pm it was being distributed to humanitarian groups. Tom Ross also is aware of this, and a U.S. TV crew was there to witness the distribution.

Additional Header Information Follows

Date Created: 31-Aug-1994 17:18

Deletable Flag: Y

DOCNUM: 050117

VMS Filename: OA\$SHARA19:ZVJOP8UG9.TXT

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006

By *ML* NARA, Date *7/28/06**611-1039-F*

A1 Folder: AUG94

Message Format:

Message Status: READ

Date Modified: 31-Aug-1994 17:18

Forward Flag: YES

Read-Receipt Requested: NO

Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO

Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007. email	From Morton Halperin re: Cuba Summary-For CI (3 pages)	09/02/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
A1-Record (Jan 93-Sept 94) ([Schwartz and Cuba...])
OA/Box Number: 570000

FOLDER TITLE:

[05/17/1994-09/09/1994]

2011-1039-F
rs1848

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

06-Sep-1994 08:49 EDT

MEMORANDUM FOR:

RECORDS

(RECORDS@A1@OEOB)

FROM: Rocha, Victor M.

(rochav@NSCSTF@OEOB@MSGATE@VAXB)

SUBJECT: RE: ~~[SECRET]~~

Message Creation Date was at 6-SEP-1994 08:34:00

Steve: I clear on this. Manuel

From: Norman, Marcia G.

To: Danvers, William C.; Kreczko, Alan J.; Rocha, Victor M.; Schwartz, Eric P.

CC: /R, Record at A1; Funches, Christina L.; Hunerwadel, Joan S.; Simon, Steven N.

Subject: FW: ~~[SECRET]~~

Date: Monday, September 05, 1994 03:40 PM

I cannot tell if this was forwarded to addressees. Steve Simon would like your concurrences on the attached. Please forward them to him ASAP with cc to me. Thank you (signed) Marcia

From: Norman, Marcia G.

To: Schwartz, Eric P.; Rocha, Victor M.; Kreczko, Alan J.; Danvers, William C.

CC: Simon, Steven N.

Subject:

Date: Monday, September 05, 1994 03:34 PM

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THROUGH: THE EXECUTIVE CLERK

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Determination Pursuant to Section 2(b)(2) of the Migration and Refugee Assistant Act of 1962, as amended (the MRAA)

Purpose

To designate persons fleeing from and repatriating to Cuba and Haiti as eligible for assistance under section 2(b)(2) of the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1993, as amended.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006

By MI NARA, Date 3/28/16

121-1039-F

Background

U.S. assistance to Cubans and Haitians through international organizations is authorized by section 2(b)(1) of the MRAA. Under section 2(b)(2) of the MRAA we can only provide bilateral assistance and direct contributions to non-governmental organizations if the President designates persons fleeing from and repatriating to Cuba and Haiti as eligible for direct assistance and determines that such assistance will contribute to the foreign policy interests of the United States. (The July 1994 determination for assistance to Haitians applied only to funds from the Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance Fund.) This designation also is required to cover the reimbursement to the Department of Defense for its Haitian safe haven costs. This does not change the status of the current effort to gain Congressional approval of a proposed FY 1994 reprogramming of Migration and Refugee Assistance funds for this purpose.

In light of the recent outflows from Cuba and Haiti, the U.S. policy of taking Cubans and Haitians interdicted at sea to a safe haven site, and the return of over 5,700 Haitians (at their request) from Guantanamo to Haiti, we believe this designation is fully justified on both foreign policy and humanitarian grounds. Similar determinations authorize assistance to Afghan, Indochinese, African, and Palestinian refugees. This authority will ensure maximum U.S. Government flexibility to respond to the needs of those fleeing Haiti and Cuba.

The Department of State therefore recommends that the President sign the attached Presidential Determination,

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the determination at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Presidential Determination

Tab B Incoming Correspondence

Presidential Determination
No. _____

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: Determination Pursuant to Section 2(b)(2) of the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1962, as Amended

Pursuant to Section 2(b)(2) of the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1962, as amended, 22 U.S.C. 2601(b)(2), I hereby designate persons fleeing from or repatriating to Cuba and Haiti as qualifying for assistance and determine that such assistance will contribute to the foreign policy interests of

the United States.

You are authorized and directed to inform the appropriate committees of the Congress of this determination and the obligation of funds under this authority, and to publish this determination in the Federal Register.

Additional Header Information Follows

Date Created: 06-Sep-1994 08:34
Deletable Flag: Y
DOCNUM: 050530
VMS Filename: OA\$SHARA29:ZVJUCLPN1.TXT
A1 Folder: SEP94
Message Format:
Message Status: READ
Date Modified: 06-Sep-1994 08:34
Forward Flag: YES
Read-Receipt Requested: NO
Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO
Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

08-Sep-1994 15:25 EDT

MEMORANDUM FOR:

RECORDS

(RECORDS@A1@OEOB)

FROM: Baker, James E.

(bakerja@NSCSTF@OEOB@MSGATE@VAXB)

SUBJECT: RE: AGENDA: HCMTF [UNCLASSIFIED]

Message Creation Date was at 8-SEP-1994 15:04:00

When is this meeting?

From: Schwartz, Eric P.

To: @GLOBAL - Global Affairs; @LEGAL - Legal Advisor; @DEMOCRACY - Democracy Affairs

Subject: AGENDA: HCMTF

Date: Thursday, September 08, 1994 02:33 PM

CUBA/HAITI MIGRANT TASK FORCE
MEETING SEPTEMBER 8

12:30 PM

AGENDA

1. UPDATE ON NUMBERS.....COAST GUARD

2. MOVEMENT OF CUBANS TO PANAMA.....JCS

3. STATUS REPORT ON SURINAME.....STATE/JCS

4. NORFOLK.....NSC

DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSIBILITIES

5. MIGRATION TALKS UPDATE.....NSC

5. VISITORS TO GTMO.....NSC

6. OTHER ISSUES.....NSC

LONG TERM MEDICAL CARE

RADIOS AT GTMO

TELEPHONES

INTERVIEWS

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Additional Header Information Follows

Date Created: 08-Sep-1994 15:04
Deletable Flag: Y
DOCNUM: 051038
VMS Filename: OA\$SHARA27:ZVJWM1CL1.TXT
A1 Folder: SEP94
Message Format:
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Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

08-Sep-1994 16:15 EDT

MEMORANDUM FOR:

RECORDS

(RECORDS@A1@OEOB)

FROM: Schwartz, Eric P.

(schwarte@NSCSTF@OEOB@MSGATE@VAXB)

SUBJECT: [CONFIDENTIAL]: AGENDA FOR TOMORROW

Message Creation Date was at 8-SEP-1994 15:56:00

CUBA/HAITI MIGRANT TASK FORCE
MEETING SEPTEMBER 9

TELECONFERENCE

4 -5 PM

ANNOTATED AGENDA

1. UPDATE ON NUMBERS.....COAST GUARD/JCS

2. MOVEMENT OF CUBANS TO PANAMA.....JCS

Please report on current and planned movements. Please indicate what percentage of the population are moving voluntarily -- i.e., how many have been surveyed, how many have agreed to go.

JCS should be working with USACOM to devise a means to move large numbers of Cubans if we are not going to get sufficient volunteers.

3. STATUS REPORT ON SURINAME.....State

4. PLANNING FOR PANAMA AND SURINAME.....State/Justice

State and Justice should be prepared to discuss who they plan to deploy and when.

5. TELEPHONES AT GTMO.....OSD/JCS

6. VISITORS POLICY FOR GTMO.....NSC

7. OMBUDSMAN AT GTMO.....JCS/OSD

JCS AND OSD should be prepared to report back on the JTFÉs reaction to this idea.

8. VISIT BY THE DE JURE GOVERNMENT OF HAITI.....All agencies

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006

By NARA, Date 3/28/06

2011-1031-F

9. MIGRATION TALKS UPDATE.....NSC

Additional Header Information Follows

Date Created: 08-Sep-1994 15:56
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Read-Receipt Requested: NO
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Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

09-Sep-1994 17:32 EDT

MEMORANDUM FOR:

RECORDS

(RECORDS@A1@OEOB)

FROM:

Rossin, Larry

(rossinl@NSCSTF@OEOB@MSGATE@VAXB)

SUBJECT:

FW: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~: Carnegie Meeting on H

Message Creation Date was at 9-SEP-1994 17:10:00

FYI

From: Schwartz, Eric P.

To: Rossin, Larry, @GLOBAL - Global Affairs; @DEMOCRACY - Democracy Affairs

Subject: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~: Carnegie Meeting on Haiti

Date: Friday, September 09, 1994 03:34 PM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

September 9, 1994

MEMORANDUM FROM ERIC SCHWARTZ

SUBJECT:

Issues raised at Carnegie meeting on Haiti

Carnegie hosted a meeting on migration issues after the transition in Haiti with a number of smart guests. Natsios and Peter Hakim were there, along with other Haiti and refugee specialists. Administration officials were there (myself included) but basically listened without describing any planning.

I found the session useful.

They did not restrict their comments to migration, and made a number of points. I have included what struck me as the most important ones.

Natsios said that if there is an intervention, we should watch out for lots of revenge killings -- score settling, etc. -- that might not take place in the first 48 hours but will take place afterwards.

Natsios said be ready for a trashing of US businesses that might be there (are there any there?).

Natsios said get people to work quickly and have cash to pay civil servants.

Natsios said open schools very quickly, get kids off the street and return to return. Don't wait on this.

ICM now has only 20 people -- need to build it up and get them in.

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E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006

By *W* NARA, Date *3/8/16**2016-1034-F*

Evans Paul and church and business community may play a role after intervention. They should not be excluded.

There are scores/thousands of individuals within and outside of Haiti who will play a major role in what happens and the response to an invasion. We should be finding out who those people are. We should use people like Jonny McCalla to find out who they are.

People who return will first seek to find their families, resume their lives. This suggests you might not want to task them with intervention-related responsibilities.

The large majority of Haitians at Guantanamo (98% according to a DOJ/CRS official) will want to go back; forced return will not be needed for most.

Before contemplating forcible return, let UNHCR determine that return is safe and give those who still fear return some chance to make a claim for continued protection.

We will have fiduciary responsibilities with respect to some returnees, such as unaccompanied minors.

We need to do a lot of planning, such as UNHCR counseling for return, an assessment of the GTMO population to determine where people are from, consideration of quick-impact projects for returnees, sending Aristide Government officials to Guantanamo to talk to the Haitians, etc.

We need also deal with the internally displaced in Haiti, who are more numerous and worse off than the refugees.

We should not go back to forced repatriation without any assessment of claims to refugee status.

We need to deal with the end of the interdiction agreement.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Additional Header Information Follows

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