

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. list	RSVP List for Youth at Risk Dinner (partial) (1 page)	07/30/1998	P6/b(6)
002. list	Contact list for Discussion Around the Root Causes of School Violence (partial) (1 page)	n.d.	P6/b(6)
003. list	Event contact list (partial) (2 pages)	07/30/1998	P6/b(6)
004. list	RSVP List for Youth at Risk Dinner (partial) (2 pages)	07/31/1998	P6/b(6)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
Domestic Policy Council
Eric Morse (Events)
OA/Box Number: 21192

FOLDER TITLE:

At-Risk Dinner 8/3/1998

2011-0619-S

rc289

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]


P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.



THE WHITE HOUSE

OFFICE OF CAPRICIA PENAVIC MARSHALL

SOCIAL SECRETARY

The White House

TELEPHONE NUMBER: (202) 456-7136

FAX NUMBER: (202) 456-6771

NUMBER OF PAGES, INCLUDING THIS PAGE 5

DATE _____

TO: Marcia

FAX NUMBER: _____

FROM: Sharon

MESSAGE: _____

Please callx62878

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President's List

YOUTH AT RISK DINNER - Monday AUG 3 1998 - 7:00 PM White House - Business - East Appointment Entrance

THE PRESIDENT AND FIRST LADY

Page 1

REPORT DATE: July 31, 1998
REPORT TIME: 5:10 PM

Accepts and No Responses

- A **Mr. Shay Bilchik**
Department of Justice
- A **M Sissela Bok**
Harvard University Dept. of Population Studies
- A **M. Rahm Emanuel**
- A **Mr. William Finnegan**
New Yorker Magazine
- A **Mr. James Fox**
Northwestern University College of Criminal Justice
- A **Ms. Sylvia Ann Hewlett**
National Parenting Association
- A **Dr. Steven Hyman**
Director, National Institute of Mental Health
- A **M. Robin Karr-Morse**
Portland, OR
- A **Mr. David Kennedy**
Harvard University JFK School of Government
- A **Mrs. Jennifer Klein**
Special Assistant to the President for Domestic Policy, The White House
Washington, DC
- A **Ms. Nicole Rabner**
Office of the First Lady
Washington, DC
- A **Hon. Bruce N. Reed**
Assistant to the President for Domestic Policy and Director of the Domestic Policy Council, Domestic Policy Council
Washington, DC
- A **Hon. Janet Reno**
U.S. Attorney General, Department of Justice
Washington, DC
- A **Rev. Eugene Rivers**
Director, Ella J. Baker House in Dorchester, MA
- A **Mr. Robert Sampson**
- A **Dr. Howard Snyder**
National Center For Juvenile Justice
Pittsburgh, PA
- A **Mr. Ron Suskind**
Wall Street Journal

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Page 2

REPORT DATE: July 31, 1998
REPORT TIME: 5:10 PM**Accepts and No Responses**

- A **Ms. Neera Tanden**
- A **Ms. Leslie M. Thornton**
Chief of Staff, US Department of Education
Washington, DC
- A **Mr. James Tierney**
- A **Hon. Melanne Verveer**
Assistant to the President & Chief of Staff to the First Lady, First Lady's Office
Washington, DC
- A **Dr. Cornel West**
Department of Religion, Harvard University
Cambridge, MA

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Page 3

REPORT DATE: July 31, 1998
REPORT TIME: 5:10 PM**Regrets**

- R **M Fox Butterfield**
The New York Times
- R **Dr. Bruce Perry**
Senior Fellow, CIVITAS Initiatives
Houston, TX
- R **Hon. (Dr.) Deborah Prothrow-Stith**
Boston, MA
- R **Hon. Richard W Riley**
Secretary of Education, Department of Education
Washington, DC

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Page 4

REPORT DATE: July 31, 1998
REPORT TIME: 6:10 PM**TOTAL COUNTS**

Number of Accepts:	24
Number of Regrets:	4
Number of No Responses:	0
Number of Unknown Guests:	0
Number of Expected Attendees:	24

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FACSIMILE COVER SHEET

To: Neera Tanden
Office of the First Lady

Fax: 202-456-2878

From: Peggy Shiller

Date: July 31, 1998

Pages: 2, including this cover page

Message:

Following is a bio for **Cornel West**, a participant at the dinner/discussion of August 3rd.

If you have any questions or need additional information, you can call me directly at 516-759-9005.

Also, Dr. Hewlett and Dr. West are interested in who else will be attending (you may covered this with Dr. Hewlett in your conversation this morning). If possible, could you fax a list to 516-759-9039 so that I can alert them to the other participants? And finally, if you could tell me the details of when and where they should present themselves if they don't already have this information. Thanks very much for your assistance.

Cornel West**Biography**

Cornel West was born in Tulsa, Oklahoma in 1953. When he was four years old the West family settled in a black, blue-collar neighborhood on the outskirts of Sacramento. His father was a civilian Air Force Administrator, and his mother, an elementary school teacher who would later become principal. He has three siblings, an older brother and two younger sisters. West views the unconditional unstinting love, given to him by his parents, as the most fundamental element of his life—supported his spirit, soothing his soul.

After attending public school in Sacramento, West went to Harvard University where he graduated *magna cum laude* in 1973. Martin Kilson, one of West's professors recalls him as "the most intellectually aggressive and highly cerebral students I have taught in my 30 years here." West then went on to Princeton University where he received his M.A. in 1975 and his Ph.D. in 1980. He returned to Princeton in 1987 as professor of religion and director of the Afro-American Studies Department. After helping build that department, West moved to Harvard where he now serves as Professor of Afro-American Studies and Philosophy of Religion. Henry Louis Gates, Jr., chairman of Harvard's Department of Afro-American Studies, describes West as "one of America's most important public intellectuals, and a formidable scholar by any measure." A recent *New York Times* profile of the department characterized West as one of "Harvard's big three."

A well respected and charismatic speaker Cornel West has spoken to organizations as diverse as: the Black Congressional Caucus, the National Association of Newspaper Publishers, Sing Sing prison, Time Warner Inc., the National Council of Black Churches, Million Man March, the Black Barristers Association and the Intellectuals and Labor Alliance. He has been a guest lecturer and visiting scholar on many campuses. Cornel West has received fifteen honorary degrees. Television appearances have included *Firing Line*, *Nightline*, *Geraldo*, *Good Morning America*, *the Today Show*, *CNN Talk*, *ABC World News Tonight* and *Charlie Rose*.

Heavily involved in community-based political action Cornel West has worked with the following individuals: Bill Bradley, the Rev. Jim Forbes, President Vaclav Havel, Jesse Jackson, Ruth Messinger, Kweisi Mfume, Al Sharpton, John Sweeney, and Bishop Desmond Tutu. West is currently part of President Clinton's new National Conversation on Race. Since 1994 he has co-chaired, along with Sylvia Ann Hewlett, the National Parenting Association's Task Force on Parent Empowerment.

Cornel West has written numerous articles and twelve books, including *Prophecy Deliverance: An Afro-American Revolutionary Christianity* (Westminster Press, 1982), *Prophetic Fragments* (Africa World Press, 1988), *The American Evasion of Philosophy* (University of Wisconsin Press, 1989), *The Ethical Dimensions of Marxist Thought* (Monthly Review Press, 1991), *Breaking Bread* (South End Press, 1991), *Prophetic Reflections* (Common Courage Press, 1993), *Prophetic Thought in Postmodern Times* (Common Courage Press, 1993), and *Keeping Faith: Philosophy and Race in America* (Routledge, 1993). His book, *Race Matters* (hardcover, Beacon Press, 1993/ softcover, Vintage Press, 1994) quickly achieved best-seller status in both editions and gained the attention of *Time* magazine and *Newsweek*, causing both publications to run extensive profile articles about West in June 1993. His most recent books include *Jews and Blacks* (Plume/Penguin, 1995) co-written with *Tikkun Magazine* editor Michael Lerner; *The Future of the Race* (Vintage, 1996) co-written with Henry Louis Gates (Vintage, 1996); and *Restoring Hope* (Beacon, 1997). His forthcoming book, *The War Against Parents*, co-written with Sylvia Ann Hewlett, is to be the lead title of Houghton Mifflin in the spring of 1998.

Cornel West lives in Boston with his wife Ellen. His son Clifton (20) attends college. His current academic interests include: problems facing the African-American urban underclass in America; the development of an ongoing dialogue between Blacks and Jews; and the creation of a nationwide parents' movement across race and class that responds to the desperate needs of mothers and fathers.

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RSVP LIST

YOUTH AT RISK DINNER - Monday AUG 3 1998 - 7:00 PM White House - Business - East Appointment Entrance

Accepts, Regrets and No Responses
THE PRESIDENT AND FIRST LADY

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Page 1

REPORT DATE: July 30, 1998
REPORT TIME: 6:12 PM

NAME	A/R	CLEARANCE TYPE	SSN	DOB
BILCHIK, Shay (Mr.) (H) [REDACTED] P6/(b)(6) <i>likely/A</i>				
BOK, Sissela (M) (B) (617) 495-3012	A			
EMANUAL, Rahm (M.) <i>likely/A</i>				
FINNEGAN, William (Mr.) (H) [REDACTED] P6/(b)(6) (B) (212) 536-5621	A			
FOX, James (Mr.) (H) [REDACTED] P6/(b)(6) (B) (202) 307-6112 (B) (312) 908-7937 (B) (617) 373-3296	A	[001]		
HEWLETT, Sylvia Ann (Ms.) (H) [REDACTED] P6/(b)(6) (B) (212) 362-7575 (B) (516) 759-9005	A			
HYMAN, Steven (Dr.) (B) (301) 436-4670 (B) 301/443-3673	A			
KARR-MORSE, Robin (M.) (H) [REDACTED] P6/(b)(6) (B) (503) 227-6091				P6/(b)(6)
KENNEDY, David (Mr.) <i>likely/A</i> (B) (617) 495-7533				
REED, Bruce N. (Hon.) <i>likely/A</i> (B) 202-456-6515		WH PASS		
RENO, Janet (Hon.) (B) (202) 514-2001 (B) (202) 514-4195 CHERYL MONTGOMERY (B) (202) 638-4516	A	CABINET		
RIVERS, Eugene (Rev.) <i>likely/A</i> (B) (617) 282-6704				
SNYDER, Howard (Dr.) (H) [REDACTED] P6/(b)(6) (B) (412) 227-6950	A			

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LEVEL 1 - 3 OF 3 STORIES

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The San Francisco Chronicle

DECEMBER 9, 1994, FRIDAY, FINAL EDITION

SECTION: NEWS; Pg. A1

LENGTH: 2836 words

HEADLINE: NEW EVIDENCE THAT QUAYLE WAS RIGHT
Young Offenders Tell What Went Wrong at Home

SERIES: GENERATION OF RAGE

BYLINE: Ramon G. McLeod, Chronicle Staff Writer

BODY:

One in a series of articles

David Nunez is a big kid with a fast grin, but when talk turns to his father, his expression turns cold and fierce. Nunez is doing time for trying to kill a rival gang member, and in his view, his father is at least partly to blame.

'My mom raised six of us in L.A.,' he recalls during a tense conversation recently in a classroom at the California Youth Authority in Stockton. 'I never met him. He was never around when I needed him.'

'He left it all up to my mom, and she did OK until I was 10 -- she could control me up to then.'

'But then I went to the gangs, like my brothers and sisters,' Nunez, now 20, says. 'It might have mattered if he was around, but he never was.'

Teenage inmates in the room with Nunez nod. Most of them come from single-parent families, too.

In fact, state records show, nearly 73 percent of the young men in California's massive juvenile prison system grew up in single-parent and broken families.

This is no coincidence, according to a small but growing group of criminal behavior experts and social scientists. They are finding intriguing evidence that the epidemic of youth violence is related to the breakdown of the two-parent family.

Children in single-parent families, they say, are more likely to have emotional and behavioral problems, to drop out of school, to get pregnant out of wedlock and -- in the most extreme cases -- to commit violent crime. Their studies also suggest that the rising number of unsupervised latchkey children, most of them from two-earner families, may also be playing a role in the spread



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of juvenile violence.

Researchers say it is simplistic to suggest that family change alone can account for the teenage murder arrest rate, which has doubled in 10 years.

Instead, they describe family life as just one gear in a complex social mechanism -- a gear that can mesh with poverty, lack of education, racism, drugs, media violence, the proliferation of guns and other factors to produce an act of violence.

'What is clear is that the dynamics for kids are getting worse,' says Barbara Dafoe Whitehead, director of the Institute for American Values, a politically moderate think tank in New York City that specializes in family issues. 'Two-parent families are spending less time with their kids, and it's even worse for single-parent kids.'

'But almost no one wants to really look at what's happened to families and how that is affecting the social fabric.'

Recent demographic data show that the fabric of family has been torn and tattered by three major changes in American family structure over the past 30 years: divorce, dual-earner families and single parenthood.

Divorce rates are stable, but have doubled since the late 1960s, with about half of all marriages ending in divorce.

The increase in two-earner families also has slowed greatly since about 1984. Approximately 58 percent of all families include two earners, double the 1960 rate.

The number of single-parent families continues to grow rapidly. In 1993, about 27 percent of families with children were headed by a never-married, divorced or widowed person, most of them women. That was more than double the 1970 rate and up by three points just since 1990.

Because so many Americans are affected and because of the moral, racial and feminist issues surrounding it, the question of single-parent families is as sensitive as an exposed nerve.

During the 1992 presidential campaign, then-Vice President Dan Quayle attacked the television show 'Murphy Brown' because a single woman's decision to raise her baby was shown in a positive light. The reaction was visceral.

Many moderate and left-of-center critics saw Quayle's remarks as a general attack on single mothers and on the rights of women to make reproductive choices.

But the issue was almost as volatile 30 years ago, says Princeton University sociologist Sarah McLanahan, author of the just-published book 'Growing Up With a Single Parent.'

In 1965, as an assistant U.S. labor secretary, Daniel Patrick Moynihan issued a report concluding that single motherhood was a growing problem in poor, urban communities and posed a threat to the future of black culture.



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Moynihan, now a Democratic U.S. senator from New York, "was absolutely lambasted for 'blaming the victim' for conditions they didn't control, even though his point was that this was all happening because of black male unemployment," McLanahan said. "The stink over Dan Quayle and Murphy Brown was just an extension of that old controversy.

"But since then, a lot of us have been rethinking Quayle. He was clumsy and had an agenda, but he was right that the realities for most single mothers and their children are nothing like those of a fictional six-figure-a-year TV newswoman."

In the past decade, as single parents and out-of-wedlock births have spiraled and youth violence has become epidemic, researchers have begun to examine the relationship more closely.

They are careful to qualify their findings. Some evidence is circumstantial or inconclusive, they say. And McLanahan, like others, emphasizes that "single parents are not bad parents."

Still, they say, the data make clear that children from single-parent families are at higher **risk** because they are more likely to be poor, live in bad neighborhoods and have less supervision than youngsters from two-parent families.

In a 1987 study of 171 cities, University of Chicago sociologist **Robert Sampson** found the "strongest predictor" of violent juvenile crime, specifically murder and robbery, was that the child grew up in a female-headed household. Not surprisingly, he also found that **risks** of violent behavior went down when neighborhood incomes rose and male employment increased.

Although his work focused on black communities, Sampson found risks for white children rose or fell based on the same factors.

"It isn't that single parents are inferior parents or that black kids are bad kids," Sampson says. "It is a question of the total context these kids are in -- poverty, bad neighborhoods and the rest."

"

WORRISOME DIFFERENCES

McLanahan, in her research, found that there were significant -- and worrisome -- differences between children from single-parent families and those from two-parent families. And, she says, some of the effects cannot be explained by income differences.

For example, federal surveys have disclosed that 13 percent of children from two-parent families drop out of high school, while about 29 percent of children from single-parent families do so.

When income differences are accounted for, the gap between the groups is cut in half but not eliminated, McLanahan found.

There are also behavioral differences, according to a 1988 survey done by the



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National Center for Health Statistics.

That survey found that one-fourth of the teenagers raised in single-parent families had serious emotional or behavioral problems that required professional intervention, more than double the rate of children living with both their biological parents.

For psychologists or researchers who study single-parent families, one concern is most prevalent: the absence of the father.

Whether it results from abandonment or divorce, the father's absence has a profound economic and emotional impact for any child, says Dr. Thomas J. Brady, medical director of child and adolescent psychiatry at St. Mary's Medical Center in San Francisco. It is especially tough on boys.

"It is a stereotype, but the father teaches the role of how to succeed in the world, how to get along in sports, how to get things done," says Brady, who has worked extensively with troubled youth.

At the same time, Brady suggests, the absent father also can become a fantasy hero, while the mother becomes a victim, a figure unworthy of respect.

"The kid can be both angry because the father isn't there and be idealizing him," he said. "If that father also happens to be a ne'er-do-well, and there is no other reality contradicting him, the kid will idealize that as what a man is.

"Then, when the kid gets to a certain age, usually about 10 or 11, the mother starts to lose her control," he said. "She doesn't command respect because the kid starts seeing her as a victim, a loser. That's why an anti-woman, misogynistic attitude can be very much a part of the way these boys operate."

Charles Cruz was convicted of rape while still a teenager. His father, too, had a history of violence against women.

Cruz said his father treated his mother with disrespect and cruelty. Yet Cruz idolized the man.

"My father was always in and out of jail," Cruz recalled. "But I still looked up to him, even though he used to come home drunk all the time and hit me and my mom. He had girls, though. He had things. I looked up to that."

Cruz, 21, is a father himself now. He claims to understand how dishonorable his father was -- and how horrible his own crime was. During the past year, Cruz took classes in parenting with Nunez and other inmates who also have families of their own.

"You got to have a decent role model when you grow up," Cruz says. "Both my parents were involved in gangs when I was a kid. How you going to learn the value of an education with that?"

Last month, Cruz was released from the California Youth Authority and reunited in Fresno with his girlfriend and 4-year-old son.



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Youths like Cruz and Nunez need the security of a family, but when such youths do not find it at home, some researchers say, some seek it in gangs.

But, says Brady, gangs are "the most dysfunctional families of all. They'll give you brotherhood and common purpose, but if you step out of line, they'll hurt you. And if you're disloyal, they'll kill you."

Some family-behavior specialists say the gang-as-family model applies to only a small number of children. Of greater concern, they say, is the more general decline in child-rearing skills.

Charles Ewing, author of a book on teenage murderers, contends that too much concern is focused on single-parent families. Like many researchers, Ewing believes that single parents can and do raise children successfully. The real issue, he says, is parental supervision and guidance.

"One parent, two parents -- it doesn't matter much if they're bad parents or they aren't around," says Ewing, a forensic psychologist at the University of Buffalo.

The numbers seem to back him up. A 1991 federal study found that 1.6 million children ages 14 and younger were coming home to a house after school and during summer vacation where there was no adult supervision. That was four times the number of latchkey kids found just three years earlier.

Curtis Rey's parents were hardly ever around, and their absence was a prescription for disaster. He landed in juvenile prison originally for shooting into a house during a gang dispute.

"My parents are good people but they were always working, always, always," said Rey, 20, who attended the fatherhood class with Cruz and Nunez in the California Youth Authority.

"Both my mother and dad worked from the time I was 7 or 8, but they would leave us alone with my older sister. She was a teenager and couldn't have cared less. She was always out having a good time so no one was really watching us."

He continued: "I started getting in trouble with people in the neighborhood, doing all kinds of bad things. After a while my parents figured it out so they put me in with relatives. But they couldn't control me then. It was too late."

PARENTAL RESPONSIBILITY

Neither broad social trends nor demographic details suggest that the risks will diminish in the immediate future.

"We all know our kids are getting shortchanged, and it scares us, because we don't know what kind of values they have anymore," says Whitehead. "This is why people think society is cracking up."

In Washington, D.C., the family has become one of the galvanizing political issues of the era. But for all of its partisan intensity, the debate generates few practical solutions. Some conservatives seem wistful for the family ideal of the 1950s. Liberals often advocate ambitious social programs



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that taxpayers aren't willing to finance.

For some experts, the search for a practical solution begins with a discussion of responsibility -- the responsibility of parents to raise their children well and to dedicate themselves to the task.

'I think the scariest thing I'll ever hear from a parent is, 'I got a life, too,' ' says Carl Taylor, a University of Michigan criminologist who lives and studies in a tough black neighborhood in Detroit. 'You hear it from parents who are rich, poor, middle-class.

'Everyone thinks they are entitled to something . . . and the kids are paying for it.'

CHART: FAMILIES, KIDS AND VIOLENCE

New research is exploring links between changes in American family life and juvenile crime.

Adult inmates (National)

* People lived with mostly while growing up

Single parent only 43%

Both parents 40%

Neither parent 17%

25% of the parents abused drugs or alcohol

Juvenile inmates (California)

* Parents' marital status at time of contact with system (1992)

Parents no longer married 53%

Parents married 26.4%

Parent never married 20.6%

37% had at least one family member who had been incarcerated

Sources: U.S. Department of Justice and California Youth Authority

COMPARISON OF JUVENILE OFFENDER FAMILY BACKGROUNDS

In 3 separate counties, studies show that few young offenders come from two-parent families

Milwaukee Co. (Wisconsin)

One parent 57.4%

Both parents 15.9%

Guardian/relative 2.7%

Other 24%

Multnomah Co. (Oregon)

One parent 48.8%

Both parents 12.3%

Guardian/relative 7.8%

Other 31.1%

Sacramento Co.

One parent 39.8%



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Both parents	18.5%
Guardian/relative	9.4%
Other	32.4%

Source: National Council on Crime and Delinquency

SURVEYS OF PARENTS AND CHILDREN

	Single-parent family	Two-parent family
Asked of adults		
In past year have you:		
Talked to child's teacher?	84%	82%
Gone to a school meeting?	66%	71%
Gone to a school event?	73%	82%
Helped with school project?	50%	62%
Worked with club, group or team?	33%	46%
Does your family:		
Quarrel very often?	36%	14%
Confide very often in each other?	61%	77%
Hug or kiss very often?	67%	78%

Does your child have a discipline problem?

(% saying yes)	31%	9%
----------------	-----	----

Is your child disrespectful of adults?

(% saying yes)	16%	10%
----------------	-----	-----

Source: Princeton Survey Research, 1990-93

Has your child had an emotional or behavior problem that lasted 3 months or more and required professional intervention

(% saying yes)	26%	12%
----------------	-----	-----

Source: National Center for Health Statistics

Studies have found that children from single-parent families have higher risks of:

Dropping out of high school	29%	13%
Idleness (no job or school)	17%	12%
Becoming teen mother	27%	11%

Source: U.S. National Longitudinal Survey of Youth.

Responses by children 10-17

Want more time with mother	21%	14%
Want more time with father	45%	23%
Cares for self after school	25%	15%
Mother misses important things a lot	13%	5%
Father misses important things a lot	32%	10%

Source: Princeton Survey Research

CHRONICLE GRAPHIC

EC:

GRAPHIC: PHOTO, CHART, Charles Cruz, 21, embraced his son at the California Youth Authority in Stockton; he has taken a parenting class, BY DEANNE FITZMAURICE,



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FOLDER TITLE:

At-Risk Dinner 8/3/1998

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personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
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financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
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Lucky Cedric

How a deserving teen-ager from a ghetto school got into a brand-name college, and why it's not an inspirational story.

A HOPE IN THE UNSEEN

An American Odyssey From the Inner City to the Ivy League.

By Ron Suskind.

372 pp. New York:

Broadway Books \$25.

By Sara Mosle

EDUCATORS, reporters and more than a few Hollywood screenwriters have been telling, and retelling, the same story about American education for nearly half a century. Its elements — in books like "Up the Down Staircase," "36 Children," "Death at an Early Age," "The Way It Spozed to Be," "Lives on the Boundary," "Small Victories," "Will My Name Be Shouted Out?" and, most recently, "On the Outside Looking In" — are so familiar they've become clichés. Liberal teacher or reporter ventures into ghetto school, meets students resembling the sweat-hogs — the charmingly delinquent, ethnically diverse, underachieving teen-agers depicted in the 1970's sitcom "Welcome Back, Kotter" — and witnesses inspirational scenes of learning.

That this story bears repeating is a testament to how little the prospects of the nation's most impoverished students have changed since Brown v. Board of Education. But it's also indicative of the narrowness of the debate about education as a whole. To judge from these books, one would think that most classrooms are in terrible urban neighborhoods, when in fact a majority of American students — including a majority of black students — now live outside the city, where they attend public schools that their parents, at least according to polls, regard as good. Indeed, after reading Ron Suskind's extraordinary, formula-shattering book about Cedric Jennings, a poor black teen-ager at a blighted Washington high school who strives to attend the Ivy Leagues, one can't help concluding that we are no longer one country divided between black and white, but two nations even among blacks: the first increasingly middle-class and suburban, the second poor and disastrously isolated in our ghettos.

Almost everything about "A Hope in the Unseen" goes against type. Most books of its kind have the air of a travelogue; typically told in the first person, they are usually as much about the journey of the writer as they are about the students' experiences. By becoming a part of the narrative, the author — who is almost invariably white — operates as a kind of proxy for the race and class biases of the reader. Suskind, by contrast, is completely absent from his story. In a subversive twist on the genre, he allows Cedric to appeal directly to middle-class notions of merit. A nerdy, driven youth, whose grade-grubbing inten-

sity would almost certainly annoy a laid-back teacher like Kotter, he is the very antithesis of a sweat-hog and is no different in his goals from many upper-class students in Greenwich, Conn.

Yet in the topsy-turvy world of the ghetto, his ambition exacts enormous costs. His single mother briefly goes on welfare to provide her son with the intellectual stimulation he needs before entering kindergarten. Even her steady Federal job can't keep the eviction notices at bay. Many nights Cedric must study without benefit of food, heat or

mess with his hair and beat him up between classes. After one awards assembly, a student accosts him with a gun. Terrified, Cedric flees to the bathroom, but fails to report the incident for fear of retaliation. With the exception of a chemistry teacher who takes Cedric under his wing, adults at the school are hardly more encouraging. When a girl taunts him with sexual gibes, it's Cedric who gets ejected from the classroom; the principal describes him as "too proud" for his own good. Teachers seem to resent his brash and boastful intellec-

cover that he, the "king of the Ballou nerds," has suddenly attained an "imprimatur of coolness" because of his ghetto background. Academically, however, he suffers a similar reversal. Although the top student at Ballou, he soon learns that his similarity to the "suburb-bred minority kids" who constitute most of the program is only skin deep. As the director concedes, "It would take two years of tutoring, not six weeks, to bring some of the inner cities' brightest up to a level where they might be accepted to M.I.T." Cedric returns to Ballou in despair.

Most "year in the life" books would end here, but Suskind relates all of the above in a stunningly economical 100 pages. Cedric remains almost irrationally determined to attend a brand-name school — despite a combined S.A.T. score of just 960 (some 400 points below the average at most Ivy League schools). On a whim, he applies to Brown University for early acceptance and miraculously gets in. When Cedric and his mother arrive on campus, they spot "a tall, thin Caucasian girl with ... a row of earrings and a shaved head." "Isn't that awful," his mother murmurs. "Must be chemotherapy," Cedric nods sympathetically. It's a comic moment of cultural confusion — indicative of the greater academic and social disorientation he will initially suffer.

A trip through the bookstore leaves him dizzy with apprehension. Authors and subjects like Plath, Hemingway, Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson sound only "vaguely familiar" or "draw a blank." He spots a biography of Winston Churchill. "Oh, God," he thinks, "I should know who he is," and tries to commit the name to memory. The point isn't that Cedric needs more rote learning, as "cultural literacy" is often misunderstood. Rather, he has no context in which to incorporate new information. In class, there are so many "references he doesn't understand — he often feels like a foreigner." His failure is not a matter of effort or ability; he has simply never been exposed to much of the material.

SIMILARLY, when assigned a research paper in his education course, he panics and turns it into "an epic poem" about his own schooling; it's the kind of self-expressive exercise that typically invites raves from inner-city teachers. But Cedric's professor is not so patronizing. Although he praises Cedric's creativity, he insists that he master the analytical skills that he'll need to escape the ghetto. When Cedric acs a calculus midterm, his success is all the more sweet for being genuine.

Suskind underscores the crudeness of many discussions of diversity at identity without ever minimizing Cedric's very real struggles. College, Suskind rightly sees, is a time of experimentation and growth for just about everyone. The fierce antagonism that develops, for instance, between Cedric and Rob, his affluent white roommate, has much to do with personal differences



electricity. Far from applauding these efforts, his father, a convicted drug dealer who spends most of the book in jail, thinks of his son as "a straight-A momma's boy who gets no respect from any of the kids."

In this sense, "A Hope in the Unseen" has more in common with memoirs of black aspiration such as Brent Staples's "Parallel Time" than with most of the literature of urban schooling. Although most education writers show greater sympathy for those left behind than for those who make it, Suskind suggests a far more troubling thesis: that at a ghetto school like Frank W. Ballou Senior High, a smart kid like Cedric may have it worse.

Cries of "nerdboy," "whitey" and "geek" rain down on him in the hallways. Gang members steal his books,

realism. Real self-esteem — as opposed to the kind taught in courses — is frowned on. Even Cedric's sole friend at Ballou, an obese girl who is as much a pariah as he is, scoffs at his dreams of attending an Ivy League school. "What kind of fool spends his life trying to go somewhere he ain't even seen?"

It's Cedric's profound belief "in the unseen" that sustains him. He and his mother are fervent members of a black Pentecostal church — although even here the bishop warns him against trusting too much in his own abilities instead of in God. Nonetheless, mother and son pin their hopes on a summer school program for minority-group students at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology before Cedric's senior year. At first, he is thrilled to be among other smart black teen-agers and is amazed to dis-

Sara Mosle is an editor at the Book Review.

Looking for Love

In Rose Tremain's novel, an English boy searches for a vanishing Russian novelist.



ILLUSTRATION BY NATALIA DOROL

THE WAY I FOUND HER

By Rose Tremain.
359 pp. New York:
Farrar, Straus & Giroux. \$25.

By Claire Messud

PROUST observed that to say a novelist was intelligent was like saying a man loved his mother — meaning that it was both a given and an irrelevance. In the case of the English novelist Rose Tremain, however, it seems a pertinent comment: one is struck, before her fine and diverse fictions, not merely by the pleasures of their prose but by the rigor of Tremain's literary risk-taking and by the virtuosic acuity with which she inhabits her characters — in short, by the formidable mind behind her work.

Tremain's remarkable last novel, "Sacred Country" (1993), tackled the psyche of a female-to-male transsexual, from childhood in the 1950's in a small English town to Nashville in 1980, from life as Mary to life as Martin. In "The Way I Found Her," Tremain takes on a different challenge: the voice of a 13-year-old boy. What impresses most about this highly enjoyable novel is the accuracy with which she captures the reflections of a precocious intelligence on the cusp of adulthood. Alternately fantasizing about sex and retreating to the solace of childhood toys, the novel's narrator is

Claire Messud is the author of a novel, "When the World Was Steady."

caught in that moment of adolescence when he presumes understanding in order to seem grown up rather than asking, as a child would, for explanations.

Lewis Little, champion chess player, hails from Devon, where his father, Hugh, is a schoolteacher. His mother, Alice, is a translator, and is summoned to Paris by the imperious romance novelist Valentina Gavril to work, for the summer, on Valentina's latest book. Lewis accompanies Alice to France, where they are installed in Valentina's grand apartment and are entertained by her. As is perhaps inevitable, Lewis falls in love with Valentina, a flamboyant 41-year-old, a passion only reinforced by his mother's increasingly fractious relations with her employer. When Valentina disappears without explanation, it is Lewis who immediately imagines the worst, while Alice seems to be off in a world of her own — a world, Lewis suspects, of adulterous trysts.

In the tradition of juvenile detectives from François Seurel of "Le Grand Meaulnes" to Harriet the Spy, Lewis takes it upon himself to retrieve his beloved: "I like mysteries. Unfinished knowledge. Most people have to be told everything straight away, get it all explained and wrapped up. But I like trying to work it out for myself, like in a chess game." But he is still a child, or certainly not an adult, and his sleuthing lands him in far graver trouble than he has bargained for.

In his observations, Lewis is a charmingly unreliable narrator: through his eyes, we see the world as a faintly surreal dance of unlikely events. His partial

knowledge leads him along false paths as well as true ones, to apparently wild assumptions. If anything, it is surprising how often his most outlandish hypotheses prove correct, just as it is surprising with what frequency the characters, in the vast hustle of Paris, happen upon one another in markets and bookstores around the city. We never learn for certain whether Alice is having an affair, just as we never quite understand, when Lewis finds Valentina, why he is led to her.

But this does not matter, because for all its consuming plot, "The Way I Found Her" is ultimately an interior novel, an exploration of being 13, when one is more ready to reach for answers than to ask questions. Lewis still takes serendipity for granted, as children do; but, like an adult, he wants desperately to control his destiny. "I didn't have any secrets," he says at the outset. "I felt like I was waiting and waiting for the day when my first secret was going to appear. And... this feels like the kind of place where this famous day might happen." Having come to Paris in search of mystery, he is unfazed when it finds him; but to what degree it is fated, and to what degree willed, remains ambiguous.

On another level, "The Way I Found Her" is a highly literary exercise, an appropriation of genre. "Le Grand Meaulnes," Alain-Fournier's famous novel of adolescence, plays a major role not only in Lewis's life during his Paris summer (he undertakes its translation into English) but in the shape of the narrative and in its themes. So too does "Crime and Punishment": "I am Porphyry Petrovich: I am François Seurel," Lewis declaims. "I never give up." Indeed, his Paris, as it emerges, is a literary one, of novelists and used-book stalls and literary signings, and also of landmarks: the Salpêtrière Hospital is linked to Zola's novel "L'Assommoir"; when Lewis and Alice visit a market near the Bastille, he notes, "This was where Inspecteur Maigret supposedly lived."

BUT "Le Grand Meaulnes" — a unique and uniquely French novel — remains this book's primary literary forerunner. "The Way I Found Her" resonates with its predecessor in its mysteries and implausibilities, its grand tragedies, and its honoring of adolescence. Just as Lewis has undertaken a translation of that novel, so too, in a more abstract fashion, has Tremain. Questions of translation, in regality and identity are delicately interwoven here, and Tremain, through Lewis, probes their subtle and complex overlap in the course of the novel.

"The Way I Found Her" is at once a mystery story, a psychological exploration and a novel of ideas. That it should succeed and provoke on these various levels pays high tribute to Tremain's intellect; that it should do so while remaining as apparently weightless and as thoroughly engaging as any precocious adolescent's account of his summer holiday is a testament to Rose Tremain's superlative storytelling gifts.

THE NEW YORK TIMES BOOK REVIEW

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[003]

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
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THE NEW YORKER

20 WEST 43RD STREET
NEW YORK, N. Y. 10036-7441



July, 1998

William Finnegan has been a staff writer at *The New Yorker* since 1987. He has filed stories for the magazine from Bosnia, Somalia, South Africa, Mozambique, Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Spain. His reporting on youth, race, and poverty in the United States has twice won the John Bartlow Martin Award for Public Interest Magazine Journalism. He was a National Magazine Award finalist in both 1990 and 1995. He is the author of *A Complicated War: The Harrowing of Mozambique*; *Dateline Soweto: Travels with Black South African Reporters*; and *Crossing the Line: A Year in the Land of Apartheid*, about a year he spent teaching in a black high school in South Africa, which was named one of the ten best nonfiction books of 1986 by *The New York Times Book Review*. Mr. Finnegan lives in New York City with his wife, Caroline Rule, who is a lawyer.

WILLIAM FINNEGAN

C O L D

Growing Up

N E W

in a Harder Country

W O R L D



Random House · New York

When I first started going to New Haven, I was taken on a tour of the city's neighborhoods by two black residents. Their conversation reminded me of others I've heard—in countries suffering from chronic guerrilla war.

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The Project on
Human Development in
Chicago Neighborhoods

INTRICATE PATHWAYS

"Who was that waved hello to you?"

"He was the guy that was with that girl who got shot in the eye."

"The fourteen-year-old?"

"That's right."

"How's she doing?"

"She gettin' better."

"Who did the shooting?"

"The Ville got blamed for it, because some of their boys was following that guy around, because he's KSI, so it's another beef now. But the Ville say they didn't do it."

"That don't make no difference."

Virtually every black person in New Haven knew someone who had been shot. One of my guides, a college student home on vacation, told me about a friend of hers, a twenty-two-year-old man, who had just been shot to death on the street by a sixteen-year-old dealer. On Newhall Street, not far from his grandmother's house, Terry Jackson heard shots one afternoon, ran out, and found a seventeen-year-old friend lying on the sidewalk. "It was my boy Gary," he told me, with even more than his usual dissociation. "He wasn't moving, but he was still alive. If I had a car, I would've throwed him in it and drove him to the hospital. The ambulance came and took him, but he died anyway. He was shot right here." Terry indicated a spot just below his left eye and he kept his finger there, drilling abstractedly into his cheek, for a full minute.

An inordinate number of the people getting shot in New Haven were teenagers—a fact clearly connected to the number of teenagers selling drugs. This connection could be overdrawn, however. It was the booming underground economy—primarily cocaine money—that financed the proliferation of guns, but once guns are in circulation they take on a life of their own. Among teenage boys, especially, they become status items. They get endlessly traded around. They signify power, safety, glamour, excitement, manhood. And they end up settling petty disputes that previously were settled with fists. In several visits to New Haven public high schools, I heard little talk about drug abuse (the drug of choice among students remained, overwhelmingly, alcohol; cocaine abuse had, if anything, declined in recent years) but a great deal of talk about who was "packing," and who might have a "death wish," issued by some enemy, hanging over his head. In such an atmosphere, as a school counselor put it to me, "every young man is mainly concerned with survival, with being the biggest beast on his block, which means being down with the baddest posse."

I caught a glimpse of this type of natural selection at work one December afternoon at Wilbur Cross High in New Haven. I was sitting in a second-floor classroom talking to a social studies teacher. School was just letting out. A series of sharp pops erupted outside and we looked out and saw two cars parked

at odd angles in the street. The boys inside the cars—at least three of them turned out to be Wilbur Cross students—were firing pistols at each other. Students were running, diving behind hedges and snowbanks. One of the cars started backing up very fast, then roared off up a side street. The other car squealed away in another direction. The scene had a heavy, panic-edged quality as people began to pick themselves up and look around to see who, if anyone, had been hit. Nobody seemed to be hurt. But then the car that had left by the side street—a large, muddy, dark blue Buick—came barreling back out and slid to a halt in front of the school. People began to run again as the Buick lurched around, bumped over the curb, and then sped off in the direction the other car had taken. That was the end of the excitement. A white motorist who had been forced to a stop by the shoot-out sat banging on his steering wheel and shouting. The principal of Wilbur Cross High later reported that the motorist was yelling, "Drugs are killing this city!"

But the shoot-out was not about drugs. It seemed that a girl at Wilbur Cross had made fun of a disabled boy, calling him a cripple. He "illed" her in return. She telephoned her boyfriend, who was a member of the Ghetto, a small posse based in a housing project in east New Haven. He came to the school with some of his friends. The handicapped boy was a member of the Island Brothers, who were, along with the Ville, one of the dominant posses at Wilbur Cross, so this promised to be a serious confrontation. Many students knew it was coming. One even walked into a classroom, pointed to a girl whose boyfriend was down with the Island, and announced, "Your baby's father goin' be killed." I heard this from a self-possessed twelfth-grade girl who went on to explain, "This school's affiliated with the Island. The Ghetto, only their little piss boys go here. Also, the Island is cute. You know, the Ghetto, they're ugly, they're from the projects, they stink. So they want to show everybody they're on top." The Ghetto had put on a great performance on the street after school, she said. "They was profilin'." She imitated them: boys walking around with arms akimbo, a little like gunfighters ready to quick-draw, but with exaggerated side-to-side steps that suggested extremely fat men waddling. I had seen the walk before; it was both frightening and very funny. The Island, she said, had matched this display and things had quickly escalated to gunfire.

The social studies teacher with whom I watched the shoot-out had her own theory. She thought that it might be the beginning of a race war. She said that a white boy at the school (Wilbur Cross was less than one third white; Hillhouse High, New Haven's other comprehensive public high school, was 94 percent black) had been threatened recently by one of the posses. This was a first, she said, and very ominous, particularly since a white man had been murdered in the projects the same week. (The white man in question—he was twenty years old and well known locally as a champion swimmer—had been, according to witnesses, trying to steal drugs. He had gone to Rockview Cir-

cle—possibly the most dangerous housing project in town—to score, and had there been accused of having fled, a few days earlier, without paying for the drugs he took. The dealer's "beatmaster," whose job it was to make sure such things didn't happen, shot the accused thief in the head as he and a companion drove their pickup truck out of Rockview Circle.)

While the social studies teacher was telling me her theory—this was immediately after the shoot-out—three boys ran into her classroom. It seemed that they all lived in the projects where the Ghetto was based, and they were afraid they might be the Island's next targets. We shut the door and made them sit on the floor while we watched the corridor and the street. We tried to find out more from the boys. Each wore a ski cap. All denied being involved with the posses. Other than that, we learned nothing. The boys were obviously not pleased to find themselves being interrogated by a couple of white adults. The word "niggers" occurred in every sentence fragment they muttered. Afterward, I tried to imagine what the world felt like to those boys, and what I would do if I were in their place—if I felt myself in mortal danger, with no help coming from adults—and had to go home to the projects that night. And I knew: I would get down with a posse; I would get myself a gun.

THREE

"We believe in Hitler's ways," Tim Malone, of the Nazi Low Riders, explained. "But that don't mean we worship him. He was smart, but he was a homosexual. I think what he did with the Jews was right, mainly. They was coming into Germany, buying up the businesses, treating the Germans like slaves. I think he killed more than six million. That was just all they could find."

Chris Runge, another NLR, told me that Hitler had actually been working for the Vatican. "That's why the Jews were put in the concentration camps. The Pope went to Hitler and said, 'These people aren't giving in. We'll give you weapons, we'll give you ammunition.'"

It took me some time to get past the NLRs' mistrust of strangers bearing notebooks, but once I did I found them garrulous, even fascinating, expounders of misinformation and sulfurous opinion. Chris Runge seemed to be the theorist of the Lancaster clique. He was nineteen, hairless, blue-eyed, pale-skinned, with an athlete's physique and an odd manner that, at least with me, alternated between an exaggerated serenity and a worried seriousness—an alternation occasionally interrupted by big, goofy smiles. "I'm basically what you call a political Nazi," he said. "A lot of these Nazis out here are unorganized. They're mostly street skins, like Storm Troopers, doing the dirty work. I want to start getting them organized. I'm not down for the government, but I'm interested in military service, because that's really getting inside the political system. I want to know how to use weapons, and get inside the government, so I can help bring it down and start my own. You saw what happened in North Carolina? We're already in there."

Chris was referring to the discovery, in late 1995, of a group of violent white-supremacist paratroopers at Fort Bragg.

"People don't really understand what Nazism is about," he went on. "They think it's all just Adolf Hitler. But Nazism is about a society with no upper class, no lower class. We'd have equality. We wouldn't have homelessness—because we keep the factories going and everybody has a place. It's like a ma-

chine, a robot. Democracy doesn't work. As you can see right now, it's falling apart. With a Nazi government, we'd just take out all the unwanted and start over again—even whites, if they're doing the same thing as the niggers are. . . . I'm here for the future. I'm for a lot of restrictions. You can't let too much freedom in." Chris gave me one of his big, blue-eyed smiles.

He grew serious again. "White supremacism just comes from growing up and seeing what's happening in society," he said. "We're going down. I mean, what's up with all this United Negro College Fund? Why is there no United White College Fund? We're just all sitting out here on the corner while they're getting all the scholarships." He frowned. "I haven't seen any of them yet show me they really deserve to be in this society. They deserve to be taken out—any way possible."

Chris was trying to change his own ways, he said. "Before, I was just like a street thug. 'Fuck you, nigger!' I see 'em in an alley, say, 'Hey, you're in the wrong neighborhood,' and beat 'em down. But our superiority is a superiority of the mind. You can't kill 'em all. You gotta be smarter. Whites are more civilized, so you should act more civilized—present yourself in a good manner, so people respect you."

Chris credited a recent eight-month stint in jail for his new insight. He had been convicted for participating in the same drive-by shooting that sent Jaxon Stines, who was his best friend, to jail. And he had "found the Lord" in his cell, he said, an experience that seemed to be the source of his beatific grins. It may have also softened some of his judgments. Of Mundy, for instance, Chris merely said, "She's confused. She's young." This was notably gentler than the pronouncements of other NLRs on the subject. Chris even showed some self-awareness when he talked about his life. He told me that his mother's ex-husband used to beat her so badly when he was drunk that she would come lie in bed with Chris in the hope that it would make him stop. It didn't. "And that's a lot of the hate I got inside me now," Chris said quietly.

Chris's mother was, by all accounts, a serious tweaker. (His grandfather was an executive with the Xerox Corporation. Chris said—a point of reference, perhaps, for his bitter assessment, "We're going down.") She and he had moved to the Antelope Valley when he was thirteen. He had dropped out of school in the ninth grade, and had largely been on his own since. For a while, he was a Deadhead, following the band around California, and he had lived for a patch in Oakland. When we met, he was working at a Burger King and living with the Malones.

The Malones' house was still the NLR hangout. Though I stopped by many times, day and night, I never saw Mrs. Malone there. She worked in a plastics factory in Pasadena, more than an hour's drive away, and, according to Tim, she left the house at dawn and got home only late in the evening. When I first met Tim, who was seventeen, he had just spent two months in jail; he had

been locked up as a suspect in the Todd Jordan stabbing, but had been released for lack of evidence. He was wiry and well built, with close-cropped dark hair and, tattooed on the back of his neck, an Iron Cross. He described himself as "more of the Gestapo Storm Trooper type than a political Nazi—the type that's ready to go to war over things. There's gonna be a race war around the year 2000."

I asked Tim how he had become a Nazi. He said that his father had been a Hell's Angel, "so it was kind of inherited." His dad drank, did speed, and abused his mother—that was why his parents broke up. The family had lived in a black neighborhood in Montclair, east of Los Angeles, where Tim, at the age of ten, joined a local Crips set for self-protection. He was the middle brother of three, and his joining a black gang did not please his brothers. "Both my brothers was punk rockers, into speed metal, and they used to beat me up, trying to teach me a lesson," he said. "I thank them for it now. I was on the wrong road. You gotta stick with your own race. Now ain't nothing I hate more than a wigger." (This charming term means "white nigger.") The news that Tim was an ex-Crip helped explain why he often sounded like a white thug doing a flawless imitation of a black thug. He even had a set of elaborate hand and arm gestures that I had never before seen a white kid use—the same moves gangsta rappers use in performance.

Tim and his brothers, Jeff and Steve, became skinheads after moving to the Antelope Valley, in 1992, and meeting the local neo-Nazis. They were, however, no longer calling themselves Nazi Low Riders, he said. I was surprised: that was what everyone, including the police and the press, called them. But it seemed that Willie Fisher, the leader of the Lancaster NLRs, had been beaten up when he arrived in prison claiming NLR. "It's a prison gang," Tim explained to me. This had obviously been news to the Lancaster set. "You gotta be in prison to be a member. That's why they jumped Willie, because he never been in prison before. See, NLRs are a clique off of Aryan Brotherhood, and Aryan Brotherhood ain't recruiting no more. Now it's just everybody white in prison. But Willie's been talking to the older homeboys, so now it's cool. But we're under his wing, so if we mess up, the older homeboys will take it out on him. So we gotta jump up and take the blame for any brothers in trouble, jump up if anybody disses NLR, back it up a hundred percent. See, you can be down for NLR but not claim it yet, because you're not eligible."

Stints in juvenile detention—Tim had twice done time for methamphetamine possession—evidently didn't count toward NLR eligibility. "But the real NLRs can always just call on us if they need something taken care of," Tim said. "They just say, 'Hey, brother,' and we take care of it." The once and future NLRs of Lancaster were, in any case, eagerly awaiting, as Mindy said, the release of their leader, Willie. "When he gets out, he might take us all to Idaho," Tim said wistfully. "That's a white-power state."

In the meantime, they were a warm little nest of vipers. "We're all family," Tim said. "Even the little kids. Trouble's son, who's only, like, nine months old, already knows how to Sieg Heil." Tim imitated an infant giving a Nazi salute, and laughed. (Trouble was the street name of Robert Jones, one of the three NLRs, as I shall continue to call them, charged with firing into a parked car full of black people, including a baby, in Lancaster in 1995. Jones was convicted and sentenced to twelve years. One of his companions, Chris Parkon, fondly known around the Malones' house as Evil, was the shooter; he got twenty-two years.)

There were certain limits that even Tim acknowledged, though. "Like my little sister, we don't want to get her into it too bad yet," he said. His sister, who was always parked in front of a TV playing video games when I came by the house, was, Tim estimated, approximately ten. (He really had no idea.) "She knows how to salute, and throw up a W"—that's a white-power gang sign, done with crossed fingers—"but one day she got down to it with some black kid at school, called him a nigger, and the school called my mom, and she got mad at us, because she knew where my sister picked it up."

The ranks of the boneheads were swelling, Tim said. Everywhere he went in the Antelope Valley, guys were throwing Nazi salutes at him. "Some of them I don't even know," he said. "We get hooked up that way." Standing in the Malones' front yard, talking with Tim and his friends, I did notice a startling number of passing cars honking in greeting, with white arms often jutting out the windows. The NLRs would respond with quick, stiff-armed salutes and the occasional deep shout, "White power!" Then they would grin. This, I thought, was why the local Sharps called their hometown Klancaster.

"When we first come up here, there was hardly any blacks," Tim told me. "So there wasn't much trouble. But then they started hearing about this place, wanting to come up here, starting stuff, thinking they're hard. So we're just trying to push 'em back."

The NLRs' main enemies, however, were the Sharps. "Most all Sharps are straight pussies," Tim said vehemently. "They're just a bunch of preppy white boys who want to run with the blacks because they're afraid to fight them."

The one Sharp who most infuriated Tim and his friends was, of course, Darius Houston. "There's no such thing as a black skinhead," Tim fumed. "Skinheads are white. Everybody knows that. Darius is bullshit."

I asked Tim if he knew where skinhead originated.

"Germany," he said. He wasn't sure when.

I asked if he had ever read anything about skinheads.

"There really ain't no book about skinheads," he said. (There are many.) He had heard about a magazine, though, a neo-Nazi "skinzine" called *Blood and Honor*, published in Long Beach, California. He asked if I could help him find some copies. "They'll hold some concerts out here for us, we heard."

On the whole, the neo-Nazi skinheads I met in the Antelope Valley seemed to have only vague, subpolitical connections to the white-supremacist world beyond their turf—through the methamphetamine trade, through prison gangs and outlaw motorcycle gangs, through racist music (white-power punk bands like Skrewdriver and Rahowa—for "Racial Holy War"—and country-and-western lynch-mob nostalgists like the Coon Hunters). They knew and admired groups like the Ku Klux Klan and White Aryan Resistance but, as far as I could tell, had little or no contact with such organizations.

I did meet one young man at the Malones' who was clearly not from the valley. He said his name was Scott Larson (I doubted that), that he was nineteen (he seemed older), and that he came from Ventura, a town on the coast north of Los Angeles, where he belonged to a gang called the Ventura Avenue Skinhead Dogs. Scott was wound extremely tight; he could not sit still while we talked. He was barechested and prison-yard fit, with a swastika tattooed on his chest and swp (for Supreme White Power) on one shoulder. He told me that all his older male relatives were Klansmen, and that he had just served eight months in jail, "for stabbing a nigger." Before that, he said, "My girlfriend got killed by four niggers. They knew my truck—it had a big swazi on the back—and we were coming home from a movie, just sitting at a light, and they just started capping. They were aiming at me, but they got her, twice. Now all them niggers is six feet under. But I'll be with her soon!"

Scott didn't think too much of the Antelope Valley. "This is all petty here," he said. "But I'm trying to get these guys organized. That's why I'm here."

Scott reckoned the American race war would be with us "in about ten years. And after that it'll be all segregated. Each city will be, like—Lancaster will be white, L.A. will be Mexican, New York and San Francisco will be niggers." In the meantime, he said, "We're against everything about blacks. We're against black gangs, black kids, everything. Fuck niggers!"

There were always kids at the Malones' house, and I noticed a number of them gathered around now, listening to Scott. "We're just like the Nazis," he went on, grinning intently. "We're the Storm Troopers, trying to get everybody out."

Trying to get who out of where? I asked.

"Trying to get all the niggers and Mexicans out of existence."

Among the kids who were usually around the Malones' were some who could not have been more than ten. I wondered if their parents had any notion what kinds of things their children were seeing and hearing there. Not all the older kids were skinheads—one regular, Tom Forney, who was perhaps seventeen, and who always seemed to be fiddling with an electric guitar, had a long red ponytail—and not all the NLR skinheads were willing to talk to me. Tim's older half-brother, Jeff, whose gang name was Demon, was polite to me but kept his distance. Angela Jackson, one of Mindy's tormentors, was often

around but elusive. I sometimes heard her mention Mindy—loudly refusing to use a stick of lip balm, say, that she thought Mindy might have touched. She once sat in the kitchen and told me a few things about herself—that she lived with her grandmother, that her father had died of a heroin overdose, that the Antelope Valley had used to be all white people but was now full of "loads"—but mostly she stayed in front of the TV with the Malones' little sister.

Angela, who was seventeen, struck me as intelligent but eerily immature. She was chunky, wore boys' clothes, and, whenever I was around, seemed to be wearing a strange, sweet, dissociated smile. The NLRs called her La La, and Tim Malone told me that even he had to defer to her passion for taking revenge on the defector Mindy. "I'd really just like to work with Mindy, and get her back this way," he said. "But my brothers and sisters think she should be punished, so I keep quiet."

The attractions of the Malones' house as a hangout were not mysterious. The illicit atmosphere was exciting—all the in-your-face racism, the edge of violence, the skinhead outrageousness, the sex-and-drugs-and-rock-and-roll. The house was like a child's idea of a pirate's den: scruffy and run by tattooed brigands. I even got the feeling sometimes that a rough, retrograde, neo-communal sort of social experiment was being conducted. A boy would be opening a can of beans to heat up on the stove. Someone would bellow, "Only bitches cook in this house!" The boy would drop the can, while onlookers guffawed. Angela would tear herself away from the TV and finish opening the can, declaring herself "a skin bitch, a Featherwood." Someone at the window would shout, "Check out this Fender!" And the others would rush to the window to study two young Latinos walking past the house carrying a guitar. The questions in the air were charged and clear: Can they be robbed? Right here and now? In front of this reporter guy from New York? What can we not get away with?

Antelope Valley officials tended to say that white-supremacist skinheads were less of a problem than they seemed. Deputy Chris Haymond, head of the sheriff's gang detail in the Antelope Valley, told me that, while there were perhaps a hundred neo-Nazi skinheads in the valley, they were dwarfed in number by the thousands of black and Latino gang members who had moved up from Los Angeles in recent years. Whites accounted for less than 10 percent of the valley's gang membership, Haymond said, and white-power gangs for far less than 10 percent of the gang-related felony crimes. A local anticrime panel, ordered by the county's Commission on Human Relations to report on racist skinhead activity after a series of violent incidents, agreed that the problem was insignificant, and blamed the press for "over-reporting certain events."

Latino and African American activists disputed this view. George Salas, a retired civil engineer and president of a coalition called Latinos for Social Justice,

told me story after story of racist harassment and assaults in the valley that had led to arrests not of the perpetrators but of the Latino complainants. "The white racist problem has been growing tremendously here," Salas said. "The police are simply in denial about it." Linda Thompson Taylor, president of the local chapter of the NAACP and a nine-year valley resident, told me, "This has become a frightening community." Pete MacEachern, a juvenile probation officer for the county, said, "I see lots of white-power kids, and the problem has been steadily growing for the last five to seven years." When he first got to the valley, MacEachern said, "I thought the Palmdale Peckerwoods were ornithologists, kids with monocles looking at birds." He knew better now.

The Sharps thought they knew why the police played down the racist skin-head problem—"because the cops are haters themselves." And the NLRs, while quick to complain of police harassment, also loved to tell stories about sympathetic officers. Tim Malone told me, "One deputy who arrested me for speed possession apologized to me later on. He said, 'I'm white-power, too, but there's a time to be racist and a time not to be racist. I need a job to support my family, and if I'm all racial I'll lose my job.'" Chris Runge said, "I've had police officers tell me they believe whites are superior. They say, 'I share your views, so stop running around out here on the street like these other people. I'm white and I'm doing my job: getting the unwanted off the streets.'" These tales may have been fantasies, of course, but the record of both active and passive sympathy for white supremacism in American law enforcement is long, and Southern California has contributed more than its share to this tradition.

Certainly some of the descriptions I heard of local white-power gangs from Antelope Valley officers were odd. One gang expert told me that the Peckerwoods were "kind of hippies revisited: free love and dope." Another sergeant at the sheriff's office told me that Sharps had been responsible for the stabbing of Todd Jordan, and when I asked about the NLRs—six of whom his office was then holding as suspects in the Jordan stabbing—he said, "I would say they have very strong beliefs as far as race is concerned." They also had strong screwdrivers. This sergeant, for what it was worth, more than doubled Deputy Haymond's estimate and said there were two hundred active Peckerwoods in the valley.

Billy Pricer, a former deputy and a preacher at a valley fundamentalist church, ran the only local gang prevention center. His clients were sent to him by the juvenile courts, and roughly half of them, he said, were white. "Our white-power counselees often have involvement with the occult," he told me. "They're the most frightening group we see. Virtually all were abused, sexually and otherwise, as kids, and they hate the world. They talk about 'the power.' They like the ability to intimidate, to control."

Beverly Louw, then the principal of Lancaster High School, reported similar experiences. "The most serious problems I ever have with kids are with

white supremacists. I'd take any black gang or Hispanic gang or Asian gang over white supremacists. They appear to have absolutely no conscience. Our strategies for working with gang kids just don't work with white-supremacist kids. They won't be part of a discussion group or counseling. It's almost like a religion. They're reading Nazi stuff. They have more material with which to pattern their hostility, their opinions, more references. They're into power. Some are very socialistic. They're not into possessions; they just want to control people's minds."

Whatever the felony crime figures for gangs of different hue, the white-supremacist aroma filled the valley with a special pungency. I found, and not only among kids. Christian Identity—an apocalyptic, racist, and virulently anti-Semitic doctrine that enjoys great sway among far-right militias today—was extensively promulgated in the Antelope Valley by a Klansman named Wesley Swift, who founded a still-influential sect called the Church of Jesus Christ Christian in Lancaster in the late 1940s. Crackpot populism and paranoia were still flourishing locally. At the time I started visiting, a group associated with the Freeman—the racist cult that came under FBI siege in Montana in 1996—was holding bimonthly seminars at the best hotel in Lancaster. The object of the seminars was, essentially, to teach people how to secede financially from the United States, and they were reportedly hugely popular, despite being quite expensive. Larry Grooms, the editor of the *Antelope Valley Press*, told me he thought the same desperation that drove adults to such seminars drove their children into white-power gangs.

The police might have been right—the Bloods and Crips might have been feuding, quietly, somewhere in the valley—but the gang tension you could not miss was between the Sharps and the boneheads. If you went to Brunswick Sands Bowl, a bowling alley on the Sierra Highway in Lancaster, the jacket that caught your eye, worn by a spike-haired teenage punk, was the one with a huge patch on the back snarling NAZI PUNKS FUCK OFF. Watching the boy in the jacket bowl with his friends, your major concern would be whether the boneheads might dare to attack him right there on Family Night. If you went to the only real teen hangout in Lancaster, a coffee shop called Hang 'n Java, which had a pool table, music, and an Internet connection, the tense conference taking place at the counter would be between the owner and a group of Sharps. When I went, I found her throwing them out. She supported them, she maintained, but she could not risk their business, because if the boneheads saw them in there, they'd come back at night and shoot out her windows. "And I can't pay the insurance," she said tightly.

Larry Grooms told me about a white boy who, in 1993, as a sophomore at Antelope Valley High, began hearing from racist skinheads that he had to break off his friendships with black and Latino kids. When he refused, they threatened him. Finally, a death threat was followed by a drive-by shooting

that missed. The boy's terrified parents went to the police about the shooting. The police did nothing. The parents reluctantly sent the boy to Texas to stay with an uncle. The boy finished the last two years of high school there, while his parents back in California cried themselves to sleep at night.

I seemed to run across variations of this grim tale wherever I went. Some of them made even less sense. After interviewing one school administrator, I asked in passing about his plans. He said that he was thinking of moving his family out of the Antelope Valley, that he was no longer comfortable there. I asked why, and he told me about a fearsome beating that one of his sons, a high school senior, had recently received as he was leaving a party. The attack had been totally unprovoked, he said. Then the administrator mentioned that his son had been a successful child actor on television, and that his assailants had been white supremacists. The attack suddenly didn't seem so inexplicable. The victim, I thought, had simply been too bright and shiny for the boneheads to let pass. But the part that had most disturbed his father was the police response. His son could identify several of his assailants, but the police were not interested. They didn't even want the names for future reference. I asked for the names. The administrator declined to give them to me. They had decided just to let the incident go. His son was graduating in a few weeks and would then go off to college. I mentioned the names of some of the white-power kids I knew. When I got to Jaxon Stines, the man's face colored. "That's one of them," he said quietly.

**SCHOOL VIOLENCE DINNER
PROSECUTOR / POLICE "REPRESENTATIVES"**


My very strong preference is for Jim Tierney. He brings a policy gravitas to this issue not found in the other two. He is also a credible representative of both law enforcement, prosecutors and local elected officials, without being a current practitioner. Finally, he has great communications skills and will provide a huge depth for the President and First Lady:

James E. Tierney - is the former (10-year) elected Democratic Attorney General of Maine. He currently practices law and his practice is primarily focused on advising state attorneys general. He has a bipartisan client base and is widely respected. As Maine's Attorney General, he was the state's chief law enforcement officer and thus can fill the role of both "prosecutor" and "police officer" for purposes of rounding out the guest list. He is very thoughtful, has dealt with complex issues such as this from both an academic and a practical position. He is well-spoken and can also give great assistance on background for the event should a communications strategy call for this. Finally, as a former elected official, he can be said to represent another constituency missing from the dinner.

2. Charles "Chuck" Wexler - is the Executive Director of the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF). Although not a law enforcement officer, he represents the intellectual side of law enforcement, although he has little to do with prosecution. He is well-spoken and thoughtful, although both he and Jamie Fox will tend to dominate any conversation.

3. Ruben Ortega - is the Chief of Police for Salt Lake City, Utah. He is the senior latino law enforcement official and current Chair of the Major Cities Chiefs, the organization which represents the 50 largest cities in the country. Ortega is crime prevention-oriented and speaks well, but he definitely has a conservative police orientation and a limited view.

Nick Gess



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THE PRESIDENT AND FIRST LADY

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AUTHOR-ABSTRACT:

It is hypothesized that collective efficacy, defined as social cohesion among neighbors combined with their willingness to intervene on behalf of the common good, is linked to reduced violence. This hypothesis was tested on a 1995 survey of 8782 residents of 343 neighborhoods in Chicago, Illinois. Multilevel analyses showed that a measure of collective efficacy yields a high between-neighborhood reliability and is negatively associated with variations in violence, when individual-level characteristics, measurement error, and prior violence are controlled. Associations of concentrated disadvantage and residential instability with violence are largely mediated by collective efficacy.

BODY:

For most of this century, social scientists have observed marked variations in rates of criminal violence across neighborhoods of U.S. cities. Violence has been associated with the low socioeconomic status (SES) and residential instability of neighborhoods. Although the geographical concentration of violence and its connection with neighborhood composition are well established, the question remains: why? What is it, for example, about the concentration of poverty that accounts for its association with rates of violence? What are the social processes that might explain or mediate this relation (1-3)? In this article, we report results from a study designed to address these questions about crime and communities.

Our basic premise is that social and organizational characteristics of neighborhoods explain variations in crime rates that are not solely attributable to the aggregated demographic characteristics of individuals. We propose that the differential ability of neighborhoods to realize the common values of residents and maintain effective social controls is a major source of neighborhood variation in violence (4, 5). Although social control is often a response to deviant behavior, it should not be equated with formal regulation or forced conformity by institutions such as the police and courts. Rather, social control refers generally to the capacity of a group to regulate its members



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according to desired principles--to realize collective, as opposed to forced, goals (6). One central goal is the desire of community residents to live in safe and orderly environments that are free of predatory crime especially interpersonal violence.

In contrast to formally or externally induced actions (for example, a police crackdown), we focus on the effectiveness of informal mechanisms by which residents themselves achieve public order. Examples of informal social control include the monitoring of spontaneous play groups among children, a willingness to intervene to prevent acts such as truancy and street-corner "hanging" by teenage peer groups, and the confrontation of persons who are exploiting or disturbing public space (5, 7). Even among adults, violence regularly arises in public disputes, in the context of illegal markets (for example, prostitution and drugs), and in the company of peers (8). The capacity of residents to control group-level processes and visible signs of social disorder is thus a key mechanism influencing opportunities for interpersonal crime in a neighborhood.

Informal social control also generalizes to broader issues of import to the well-being of neighborhoods. In particular, the differential ability of communities to extract resources and respond to cuts in public services (such as police patrols, fire stations, garbage collection, and housing code enforcement) looms large when we consider the known link between public signs of disorder (such as vacant housing, burned-out buildings, vandalism, and litter) and more serious crime (9).

Thus conceived, neighborhoods differentially activate informal social control. It is for this reason that we see an analogy between individual efficacy and neighborhood efficacy: both are activated processes that seek to achieve an intended effect. At the neighborhood level, however, the willingness of local residents to intervene for the common good depends in large part on conditions of mutual trust and solidarity among neighbors (10). Indeed, one is unlikely to intervene in a neighborhood context in which the rules are unclear and people mistrust or fear one another. It follows that socially cohesive neighborhoods will prove the most fertile contexts for the realization of informal social control. In sum, it is the linkage of mutual trust and the willingness to intervene for the common good that defines the neighborhood context of collective efficacy. Just as individuals vary in their capacity for efficacious action, so too do neighborhoods vary in their capacity to achieve common goals. And just as individual self-efficacy is situated rather than global (one has self-efficacy relative to a particular task or type of task) (11), in this paper we view neighborhood efficacy as existing relative to the tasks of supervising children and maintaining public order. It follows that the collective efficacy of residents is a critical means by which urban neighborhoods inhibit the occurrence of personal violence, without regard to the demographic composition of the population.

What Influences Collective Efficacy?

As with individual efficacy, collective efficacy does not exist in a vacuum. It is embedded in structural contexts and a wider political economy that stratifies places of residence by key social characteristics (12). Consider the destabilizing potential of rapid population change on neighborhood social organization. A high rate of residential mobility, especially in areas of decreasing population, fosters institutional disruption and weakened social



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controls over collective life. A major reason is that the formation of social ties takes time. Financial investment also provides homeowners with a vested interest in supporting the commonweal of neighborhood life. We thus hypothesize that residential tenure and homeownership promote collective efforts to maintain social control (13).

Consider next patterns of resource distribution and racial segregation in the United States. Recent decades have witnessed an increasing geographical concentration of lower income residents, especially minority groups and female-headed families. This neighborhood concentration stems in part from macroeconomic changes related to the deindustrialization of central cities, along with the out-migration of middle-class residents (14). In addition, the greater the race and class segregation in a metropolitan area, the smaller the number of neighborhoods absorbing economic shocks and the more severe the resulting concentration of poverty will be (15). Economic stratification by race and place thus fuels the neighborhood concentration of cumulative forms of disadvantage, intensifying the social isolation of lower income, minority, and single-parent residents from key resources supporting collective social control (1, 16).

Perhaps more salient is the influence of racial and economic exclusion on perceived powerlessness. Social science research has demonstrated, at the individual level, the direct role of SES in promoting a sense of control, efficacy, and even biological health itself (17). An analogous process may work at the community level. The alienation, exploitation, and dependency wrought by resource deprivation act as a centrifugal force that stymies collective efficacy. Even if personal ties are strong in areas of concentrated disadvantage, they may be weakly tethered to collective actions.

We therefore test the hypothesis that concentrated disadvantage decreases and residential stability increases collective efficacy. In turn, we assess whether collective efficacy explains the association of neighborhood disadvantage and residential instability with rates of interpersonal violence. It is our hypothesis that collective efficacy mediates a substantial portion of the effects of neighborhood stratification.

Research Design

This article examines data from the Project on Human Development in Chicago Neighborhoods (PHDCN). Applying a spatial definition of neighborhood--a collection of people and institutions occupying a subsection of a larger community--we combined 847 census tracts in the city of Chicago to create 343 "neighborhood clusters" (NCs). The overriding consideration in formation of NCs was that they should be as ecologically meaningful as possible, composed of geographically contiguous census tracts, and internally homogeneous on key census indicators. We settled on an ecological unit of about 8000 people, which is smaller than the 77 established community areas in Chicago (the average size is almost 40,000 people) but large enough to approximate local neighborhoods. Geographic boundaries (for example, railroad tracks, parks, and freeways) and knowledge of Chicago's neighborhoods guided this process (18).

The extensive racial, ethnic, and social-class diversity of Chicago's population was a major criterion in its selection as a research site. At present, whites, blacks, and Latinos each represent about a third of the city's



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population. Table 1 classifies the 343 NCs according to race or ethnicity and a trichotomized measure of SES from the 1990 census (19). Although there are no low-SES white neighborhoods and no high-SES Latino neighborhoods, there are black neighborhoods in all three cells of SES, and many heterogeneous neighborhoods vary in SES. Table 1 at once thus confirms the racial and ethnic segregation and yet rejects the common stereotype that minority neighborhoods in the United States are homogeneous.

Table 1. Racial and ethnic composition by SES strata:

Distribution of 343 Chicago NCs in the PHDCN design.

Race or ethnicity	SES		
	Low	Medium	High
[is greater than or equal to] 75% black	77	37	11
[is greater than or equal to] 75% white	0	5	69
[is greater than or equal to] 75% Latino	12	9	0
[is greater than or equal to] 20% Latino	6	40	12
and [is greater than or equal to] 20% white			
[is greater than or equal to] 20% Latino	9	4	0
and [is greater than or equal to] 20% black			
[is greater than or equal to] 20% black	2	4	11
and [is greater than or equal to] 20% white			
NCs not classified	8	15	12
above			
Total	114	114	115



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To gain a complete picture of the city's neighborhoods, 8782 Chicago residents representing all 343 NCs were interviewed in their homes as part of the community survey (CS). The CS was designed to yield a representative sample of households within each NC, with sample sizes large enough to create reliable NC measures (20). Hence forth, we refer to NCs as "neighborhoods," keeping in mind that other operational definitions might have been used.

Measures

"Informal social control" was represented by a five-item Likert-type scale. Residents were asked about the likelihood ("Would you say it is very likely, likely, neither likely nor unlikely, unlikely, or very unlikely?") that their neighbors could be counted on to intervene in various ways if (i) children were skipping school and hanging out on a street corner, (ii) children were spray-painting graffiti on a local building, (iii) children were showing disrespect to an adult, (iv) a fight broke out in front of their house, and (v) the fire station closest to their home was threatened with budget cuts. "Social cohesion and trust" were also represented by five conceptually related items. Respondents were asked how strongly they agreed (on a five-point scale) that "people around here are willing to help their neighbors," "this is a close-knit neighborhood," "people in this neighborhood can be trusted," "people in this neighborhood generally don't get along with each other," and "people in this neighborhood do not share the same values" (the last two statements were reverse coded).

Responses to the five-point Likert scales were aggregated to the neighborhood level as initial measures. Social cohesion and informal social control were closely associated across neighborhoods ($r = 0.80$, P [is less than] 0.001), which suggests that the two measures were tapping aspects of the same latent construct. Because we also expected that the willingness and intention to intervene on behalf of the neighborhood would be enhanced under conditions of mutual trust and cohesion, we combined the two scales into a summary measure labeled collective efficacy (21).

The measurement of violence was achieved in three ways. First, respondents were asked how often each of the following had occurred in the neighborhood during the past 6 months: (i) a fight in which a weapon was used, (ii) a violent argument between neighbors, (iii) a gang fight, (iv) a sexual assault or rape, and (v) a robbery or mugging. The scale construction for perceived neighborhood violence mirrored that for social control and cohesion. Second, to assess personal victimization, each respondent was asked "While you have lived in this neighborhood, has anyone ever used violence, such as in a mugging, fight, or sexual assault, against you or any member of your household anywhere in your neighborhood" (22). Third, we tested both survey measures against independently recorded incidents of homicide aggregated to the NC level (23). Homicide is one of the most reliably measured crimes by the police and does not suffer the reporting limitations associated with other violent crimes, such as assault and rape.

Ten variables were constructed from the 1990 decennial census of the population to reflect neighborhood differences in poverty, race and ethnicity, immigration, the labor market, age composition, family structure, homeownership, and residential stability (see Table 2). The census was independent of the PHDCN



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CS; moreover, the census data were collected 5 years earlier, which permitted temporal sequencing. To assess whether a smaller number of linear combinations of census characteristics describe the structure of the 343 Chicago neighborhoods, we conducted a factor analysis (24).

Table 2. Oblique rotated factor pattern (Loadings [is greater than or equal to] 0.60) in 343 Chicago neighborhoods. (Data are from the 1990 census)

Variable	Factor loading
----------	----------------

Concentrated disadvantage

Below poverty line	0.93
On public assistance	0.94
Female-headed families	0.93
Unemployed	0.86
Less than age 18	0.94
Black	0.60

Immigrant concentration

Latino	0.88
Foreign-born	0.70

Residential stability

Same house as in 1985	0.77
Owner-occupied house	0.86

Consistent with theories and research on U.S. cities, the poverty-related variables given in Table 2 are highly associated and load on the same factor. With an eigenvalue greater than 5, the first factor is dominated by high loadings ([is greater than] 0.85) for poverty, receipt of public assistance,



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unemployment, female headed-families, and density of children, followed by, to a lesser extent, percentage of black residents. Hence, the predominant interpretation revolves around concentrated disadvantage--African Americans, children, and single-parent families are differentially found in neighborhoods with high concentrations of poverty (25). To represent this dimension parsimoniously, we calculated a factor regression score that weighted each variable by its factor loading.

The second dimension captures areas of the city undergoing immigration, especially from Mexico. The two variables that define this dimension are the percentage of Latinos (approximately 70% of Latinos in Chicago are of Mexican descent) and the percentage of foreign-born persons. Similar to the procedures for concentrated disadvantage, a weighted factor score was created to reflect immigrant concentration. Because it describes neighborhoods of ethnic and linguistic heterogeneity, there is reason to believe that immigrant concentration may impede the capacity of residents to realize common values and to achieve informal social controls, which in turn explains an increased risk of violence (1-5, 7).

The third factor score is dominated by two variables with high ([is greater than] 0.75) loadings: the percentage of persons living in the same house as 5 years earlier and the percentage of owner-occupied homes. The clear emergence of a residential stability factor is consistent with much past research (13).

Analytic Models

The internal consistency of a person measure will depend on the intercorrelation among items and the number of items in a scale. The internal consistency of a neighborhood measure will depend in part on these factors, but it will hinge more on the degree of intersubjective agreement among informants in their ratings of the neighborhood in which they share membership and on the sample size of informants per neighborhood (26). To study reliability, we therefore formulated a hierarchical statistical model representing item variation within persons, person variation within neighborhoods, and variation between neighborhoods. Complicating the analysis is the problem of missing data: inevitably, some persons will fail to respond to some questions in an interview. We present our hierarchical model as a series of nested models, one for each level in the hierarchy (27).

Level 1 model. Within each person, $[Y_{sup.ijk}]$, the i th response of person j in neighborhood k , depends on the person's latent perception of collective efficacy plus error:

(1) [MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]

Here $[D_{sup.pijk}]$ is an indicator variable taking on a value of unity if response i is to item p in the 10-item scale intended to measure collective efficacy and zero if response i is to some other item. Thus, $[[\alpha]_{sub.p}]$ represents the "difficulty" of item p , and $[[\pi]_{sub.jk}]$ is the "true score" for person jk and is adjusted for the difficulty level of the items to which that person responded (28). The errors of measurement, $[e_{sub.ijk}]$, are assumed to be independent and homoscedastic (that is, to have equal standard deviations).

Level 2 model. Across informants within neighborhoods, the latent true



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scores vary randomly around the neighborhood mean:

$$(2) \quad [\pi]_{jk} = [\eta]_{k.} + [r]_{jk}, \quad [r]_{jk} \sim N(0, [\tau]_{\pi})$$

Here $[\eta]_{k.}$ is the neighborhood mean collective efficacy, and random effects $[r]_{jk}$ associated with each person are independently, normally distributed with variance $[\tau]_{\pi}$, that is, the "within-neighborhood variance."

Level 3 model. Across neighborhoods, each neighborhood's mean collective efficacy $[\eta]_{k.}$ varies randomly about a grand mean:

$$(3) \quad [\eta]_{k.} = [\gamma] + [u]_{k.}, \quad [u]_{k.} \sim N(0, [\tau]_{\eta})$$

where $[\gamma]$ is the grand mean collective efficacy, $[u]_{k.}$ is a normally distributed random effect associated with neighborhood k , and $[\tau]_{\eta}$ is the between-neighborhood variance. According to this setup, the object of measurement is $[\eta]_{k.}$. The degree of intersubjective agreement among raters is the intraneighborhood correlation, $[\rho] = [\tau]_{\eta} / ([\tau]_{\eta} + [\phi]_{\pi})$. The reliability of measurement of $[\eta]_{k.}$ depends primarily on p and on the sample size per neighborhood. The entire three-level model is estimated simultaneously via maximum likelihood (26).

The results showed that 21% of the variation in perceptions of collective efficacy lies between the 343 neighborhoods (29). The reliability with which neighborhoods can be distinguished on collective efficacy ranges between 0.80 for neighborhoods with a sample size of 20 raters to 0.91 for neighborhoods with a sample size of 50 raters.

Controlling response biases. Suppose, however, that informant responses to the collective efficacy questions vary systematically within neighborhoods as a function of demographic background (such as age, gender, SES, and ethnicity), as well as homeownership, marital status, and so on. Then variation across neighborhoods in the composition of the sample of respondents along these lines could masquerade as variation in collective efficacy. To control for such possible biases, we expanded the level 2 model (Eq. 2) by incorporating 11 characteristics of respondents as covariates. Equation 2 becomes

$$(4) \quad [\text{MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII}]$$

where $[\chi]_{qjk}$ is the value of covariate q associated with respondent j in neighborhood k and $[\delta]_{q.}$ is the partial effect of that covariate on the expected response of that informant on the collective efficacy items. Thus, $[\eta]_{k.}$ is now the level of efficacy for neighborhood k after adjustment for the composition of the informant sample with respect to 11 characteristics: gender (1 = female, 0 = male), marital status (composed of separate indicators for married, separated or divorced, and single), homeownership, ethnicity and race (composed of indicators for Latinos and blacks), mobility (number of moves in past 5 years), years in neighborhood, age, and a composite measure of SES (the first principal component of education, income, and occupational prestige).

Association Between Neighborhood Social Composition and Collective Efficacy



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The theory described above led us to expect that neighborhood concentrated disadvantage (con. dis.) and immigrant concentration (imm. con.) would be negatively linked to neighborhood collective efficacy and residential stability would be positively related to collective efficacy, net of the contributions of the 11 covariates defined in the previous paragraph. To test this hypothesis, we expanded the level 3 model (Eq. 3) to

$$(5) \quad [[\text{Eta.sub.k}] = [[\text{Gamma.sub.0}] + [[\text{Gamma.sub.1}] (\text{con. dis.})[\text{sub.k}] + [[\text{Gamma.sub.2}] (\text{stability}[\text{sub.k}] + [[\text{Gamma.sub.3}] (\text{imm. con.})[\text{sub.k}] + [\text{u.sub.k}], [\text{u.sub.k}] \text{N}(0, [[\text{Tau.sub.}[\text{Eta}]]]$$

where $[[\text{Gamma.sub.0}]$ is the model intercept and $[[\text{Gamma.sub.1}]$, $[[\text{Gamma.sub.2}]$, and $[[\text{Gamma.sub.3}]$ are partial regression coefficients.

We found some effects of personal background (Table 3): High SES, homeownership, and age were associated with elevated levels of collective efficacy, whereas high mobility was negatively associated with collective efficacy. Gender, ethnicity, and years in neighborhood were not associated with collective efficacy.

Table 3. Correlates of collective efficacy.

Variable	Coefficient
Intercept	13.523
Person-level predictors	
Female	-0.012
Married	-0.005
Separated or divorced	-0.045
Single	-0.026
Homeowner	0.122
Latino	0.042
Black	-0.029
Mobility	-0.025
Age	2.09 x [10.sup.-3]
Years in neighborhood	0.64 x [10.sup.-3]
SES	3.53 x [10.sup.-2]



Neighborhood-level predictors

Concentrated disadvantage	-0.172
Immigrant concentration	-0.037
Residential stability	0.074

Variance components

Within neighborhoods	0.320
Between neighborhoods	0.026

Percent of variance explained

Within neighborhoods	3.2
Between neighborhoods	70.3

	SE	t ratio
Intercept	0.013	263.20
Person-level predictors		
Female	0.012	-0.76
Married	0.021	-0.25
Separated or divorced	0.026	-1.72
Single	0.024	-1.05
Homeowner	0.020	6.04
Latino	0.028	1.52
Black	0.030	-0.96
Mobility	0.007	-3.71
Age	0.60 x [10.sup.-3]	3.47
Years in neighborhood	0.82 x [10.sup.-3]	0.78
SES	0.76 x [10.sup.-2]	4.64

Neighborhood-level predictors



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Concentrated disadvantage	0.016	-10.74
Immigrant concentration	0.014	-2.66
Residential stability	0.130	5.61
Variance components		
Within neighborhoods		
Between neighborhoods		
Percent of variance explained		
Within neighborhoods		
Between neighborhoods		

At the neighborhood level, when these personal background effects were controlled, concentrated disadvantage and immigrant concentration were significantly negatively associated with collective efficacy, whereas residential stability was significantly positively associated with collective efficacy (for metric coefficients and *t* ratios, see Table 3). The standardized regression coefficients were -0.58 for concentrated disadvantage, -0.13 for immigrant concentration, and 0.25 for residential stability, explaining over 70% of the variability across the 343 NCs.

Collective Efficacy as a Mediator of Social Composition

Past research has consistently reported links between neighborhood social composition and crime. We assessed the relation of social composition to neighborhood levels of violence, violent victimization, and homicide rates, and asked whether collective efficacy partially mediated these relations.

Perceived violence. Using a model that paralleled that for collective efficacy (Eqs. 1, 4, and 5), we found that reports of neighborhood violence depended to some degree on personal background. Higher levels of violence were reported by those who were separated or divorced (as compared with those who were single or married), by whites and blacks (as opposed to Latinos), by younger respondents, and by those with longer tenure in their current neighborhood. Gender, homeownership, mobility and SES were not significantly associated with responses within neighborhoods. When these personal background characteristics were controlled, the concentrations of disadvantage ($t = 13.30$) and immigrants ($t = 2.44$) were positively associated with the level of violence (see Table 4, model 1). The corresponding standardized regression coefficients are 0.75 and 0.11. Also, as hypothesized, residential stability was negatively associated with the level of violence ($t = -6.95$), corresponding to a standardized regression coefficient of -0.28. The model accounted for 70.5% of the variation in violence between neighborhoods.

Table 4. Neighborhood correlates of perceived neighborhood



violence, violent victimization, and 1995 homicide events.

Model 1: social composition

Variable

Coefficient SE t

Perceived neighborhood violence (*)

Concentrated disadvantage	0.277	0.021	13.30
Immigrant concentration	0.041	0.017	2.44
Residential stability	-0.102	0.015	-6.95
Collective efficacy			

Violent victimization [dagger]

Concentrated disadvantage	0.258	0.045	5.71
Immigrant concentration	0.141	0.046	3.06
Residential stability	-0.143	0.050	-2.84
Collective efficacy			

1995 homicide events [double dagger]

Concentrated disadvantage	0.727	0.049	14.91
Immigrant concentration	-0.022	0.051	-0.43
Residential stability	0.093	0.042	2.18
Collective efficacy			



Model 2: social composition
and collective efficacy

Variable

Coefficient SE t

Perceived neighborhood violence (*)

Concentrated disadvantage	0.171	0.024	7.24
Immigrant concentration	0.018	0.016	1.12
Residential stability	-0.056	0.016	-3.49
Collective efficacy	-0.618	0.104	-5.95

Violent victimization ([dagger])

Concentrated disadvantage	0.085	0.054	1.58
Immigrant concentration	0.098	0.044	2.20
Residential stability	-0.031	0.051	-0.60
Collective efficacy	-1.190	0.240	-4.96

1995 homicide events ([double dagger])

Concentrated disadvantage	0.491	0.064	7.65
Immigrant concentration	-0.073	0.050	-1.45
Residential stability	0.208	0.046	4.52
Collective efficacy	-1.471	0.261	-5.64



(*) Estimates of neighborhood-level coefficients control for gender, marital status, homeownership, ethnicity, mobility, age, years in neighborhood, and SES of those interviewed. Model 1 accounts for 70.5% of the variation between neighborhoods in perceived violence, whereas model 2 accounts for 77.8% of the variation.

([dagger]) Neighborhood-level coefficients are adjusted for the same person-level covariates listed in the first footnote. Model 1 accounts for 12.3% of the variation between neighborhoods in violent victimization, whereas model 2 accounts for 44.4%.

([double dagger]) Model 1 accounts for 56.1% of the variation between neighborhoods in homicide rates, whereas model 2 accounts for 61.7% of the variation.

Next, collective efficacy was added as a predictor in the level 3 model (Table 4, model 2). The analysis built in a correction for errors of measurement in this predictor (30). We found collective efficacy to be negatively related to violence ($t = -5.95$), net of all other effects, and to correspond to a standardized coefficient of -0.45 . Hence, after social composition was controlled, collective efficacy was strongly negatively associated with violence. Moreover, the coefficients for social composition were substantially smaller than they had been without a control for collective efficacy. The coefficient for concentrated disadvantage, although still statistically significant, was 0.171 (as compared with 0.277). The difference between these coefficients ($0.277 - 0.171 = 0.106$) was significant ($t = 5.30$). Similarly, the coefficients for immigrant concentration and for residential stability were also significantly reduced: The coefficient for immigrant concentration, originally 0.041 , was now 0.018 , a difference of 0.023 ($t = 2.42$); the coefficient for residential stability, which had been -0.102 , was now -0.056 , a difference of -0.046 ($t = -4.18$). The immigrant concentration coefficient was no longer statistically different from zero. As hypothesized, then, collective efficacy appeared to partially mediate widely cited relations between neighborhood social composition and violence. The model accounted for more than 75% of the variation between neighborhoods in levels of violence.

Violent victimization. Violent victimization was assessed by a single binary item ([Y.sub.jk] = 1 if victimized by violence in the neighborhood and [Y.sub.jk] = 0 if not). The latent outcome was the logarithmic odds of victimization [[Pi].sub.jk]. The structural model for predicting [[Pi].sub.jk] had the same form as before (Eqs. 4 and 5) (31). Social composition, as hypothesized, predicted criminal victimization, with positive coefficients for concentrated disadvantage and immigrant concentration and a negative coefficient for residential stability (Table 4, model 1). The relative odds of victimization associated with a 2-SD elevation in the predictor were 1.67, 1.33, and 0.750, respectively. These estimates controlled for background characteristics associated with the risk of victimization. When added to the model, collective efficacy was negatively associated with victimization (Table 4, model 2). A 2-SD elevation in collective efficacy was associated with a relative odds ratio of about 0.70 which indicated a reduction of 30% in the odds of victimization. Moreover, after collective efficacy was controlled, the coefficients associated



with concentrated disadvantage and residential stability diminished to nonsignificance, and the coefficient for immigrant concentration was also reduced.

Homicide. To assess the sensitivity of the findings when the measure of crime was completely independent of the survey, we examined 1995 homicide counts ($[Y.sub.k]$ is the number of homicides in neighborhood k in 1995). A natural model for the expected number of homicides in neighborhood k is $E([Y.sub.k]) = [N.sub.k] [[\Lambda].sub.k]$, where $[[\Lambda].sub.k]$ is the homicide rate per 100,000 people in neighborhood k and $[N.sub.k]$ is the population size of neighborhood k as given by the 1990 census (in hundreds of thousands). Defining $[[\Eta].sub.k] = \log ([[\Lambda].sub.k])$, we then formulated a regression model for $[[\Eta].sub.k]$ of the type in Eq. 5. This is effectively a Poisson regression model with a logarithmic link with extra-Poisson variation represented by between-neighborhood random effects (32).

Although concentrated disadvantage was strongly positively related to homicide, immigrant concentration was unrelated to homicide, and residential stability was weakly positively related to homicide (Table 4, model 1). However, when social composition was controlled, collective efficacy was negatively related to homicide (Table 4, model 2). A 2-SD elevation in collective efficacy was associated with a 32.7% reduction in the expected homicide rate. Moreover, when collective efficacy was controlled, the coefficient for concentrated disadvantage was substantially diminished, which indicates that collective efficacy can be viewed as partially mediating the association between concentrated disadvantage and homicide (33).

Control for prior homicide. Results so far were mainly cross-sectional, which raised the question of the possible confounding effect of prior crime. For example, residents in neighborhoods with high levels of violence might be afraid to engage in acts of social control (9). We therefore reestimated all models controlling for prior homicide: the 3-year average homicide rate in 1988, 1989, and 1990. Prior homicide was negatively related (P [is less than] 0.01) to collective efficacy in 1995 ($r = -0.55$) and positively related ($P < 0.01$) to all three measures of violence in 1995, including a direct association ($t = 5.64$) with homicide (Table 5). However, even after prior homicide was controlled, the coefficient for collective efficacy remained statistically significant and substantially negative in all three models.

Table 5. Predictors of neighborhood level violence, victimization, and homicide in 1995, with prior homicide controlled. For violence and victimization as outcomes, the coefficients reported in this table were adjusted for 11 person-level covariates (see Table 3), but the latter coefficients are omitted for simplicity of presentation.

Violence as outcome

Variable

Coefficient SE t



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Intercept	3.772	0.379	9.95
Concentrated disadvantage	0.157	0.025	6.38
Immigrant concentration	0.020	0.016	1.25
Residential stability	-0.054	0.016	-3.39
Collective efficacy	-0.594	0.108	-5.53
Prior homicide	0.018	0.014	1.27

Between-

neighborhood

variance

0.030

Percent of variance

explained

between

neighborhoods

78.0

Victimization as outcome

Variable

	Coefficient	SE	t
Intercept	-2.015	0.042	-49.24
Concentrated disadvantage	0.073	0.060	1.22
Immigrant concentration	0.098	0.045	2.20



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Residential stability	-0.029	0.056	-0.56
Collective efficacy	-1.176	0.251	-4.69
Prior homicide	0.017	0.049	0.34

Between-

neighborhood

variance 0.091

Percent of variance

explained

between

neighborhoods 43.8

Homicide in 1995 as outcome

Variable

	Coefficient	SE	t
Intercept	3.071	0.050	62.01
Concentrated	0.175	0.072	2.42
disadvantage			
Immigrant	-0.034	0.044	-0.77
concentration			
Residential stability	0.229	0.043	5.38
Collective efficacy	-1.107	0.272	-4.07
Prior homicide	0.397	0.070	5.64

Between-

neighborhood



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variance	0.207
Percent of variance	
explained	
between	
neighborhoods	73.0

Further Tests

Although the results have been consistent, there are still potential threats to the validity of our analysis. One question pertains to discriminant validity: how do we know that it is collective efficacy at work rather than some other correlated social process; (34)? To assess competing and analytically distinct factors suggested by prior theory (4, 5), we examined the measure of collective efficacy alongside three other scales derived from the CS of the PHDCN: neighborhood services, friendship and kinship ties, and organizational participation (35). On the basis of the results in Tables 3 to 5 and also to achieve parsimony, we constructed a violent crime scale at the neighborhood level that summed standardized indicators of the three major outcomes: perceived violence, violent victimization, and homicide rate.

Consistent with expectations, collective efficacy was significantly (p [is less than] 0.01) and positively related to friendship and kinship ties ($r = 0.49$), organizational participation ($r = 0.45$), and neighborhood services ($r = 0.21$). Nonetheless, when we controlled for these correlated factors in a multivariate regression, along with prior homicide, concentrated disadvantage, immigrant concentration, and residential stability; by far the largest predictor of the violent crime rate was collective efficacy (standardized coefficient = -0.53 , $t = -8.59$). Collective efficacy thus retained discriminant validity when compared with theoretically relevant, competing social processes. Moreover, these results suggested that dense personal ties, organizations, and local services by themselves are not sufficient; reductions in violence appear to be more directly attributable to informal social control and cohesion among residents (36).

A second threat stems from the association of racial composition with concentrated disadvantage as shown in Table 2. Our interpretation was that African Americans largely because of housing discrimination, are differentially exposed to neighborhood conditions of extreme poverty (15). Nonetheless, a counterhypothesis is that the percentage of black residents and not disadvantage accounts for lower levels of collective efficacy and, consequently, higher violence. Our second set of tests therefore replicated the key models within the 125 NCs where the population was more than 75% black (see the first row of Table 1), effectively removing race as a potential confound. Concentrated poverty and residential stability each had significant associations with collective efficacy in these predominantly black areas ($t = -5.60$ and $t = 2.50$, respectively). Collective efficacy continued to explain variations in violence across black NCs, mediating the prior effect of concentrated disadvantage. Even when prior



homicide, neighborhood services, friendship and kinship tie's, and organizational participation were controlled, the only significant predictor of the violent crime scale in black NCs was collective efficacy ($t = -4.80$). These tests suggested that concentrated disadvantage more than race per se is the driving structural force at play.

Discussion and Implications.

The results imply that collective efficacy is an Important construct that can be measured reliably at the neighborhood level by means of survey research strategies. In the past, sample surveys have primarily considered individual-level relations. However, surveys that merge a cluster sample design with questions tapping collective properties lend themselves to the additional consideration of neighborhood phenomena.

Together, three dimensions of neighborhood stratification--concentrated disadvantage, immigration concentration, and residential stability--explained 70% of the neighborhood variation in collective efficacy. Collective efficacy in turn mediated a substantial portion of the association of residential stability and disadvantage with multiple measures of violence, which is consistent with a major theme in neighborhood theories of social organization (1-5). After adjustment for measurement error, individual differences in neighborhood composition, prior violence, and other potentially confounding social processes, the combined measure of informal social control and cohesion and trust remained a robust predictor of lower rates of violence.

There are, however, several limitations of the present study. Despite the use of decennial census data and prior crime as lagged predictors, the basic analysis was cross-sectional in design) causal effects were not proven. Indicators of informal control and social cohesion were not observed directly but rather inferred from informant reports. Beyond the scope of the present study, other dimensions of neighborhood efficacy (such as political ties) may be important, too. Our analysis was limited also to one city and did not go beyond its official boundaries into a wider region.

Finally, the image of local residents working collectively to solve their own problems is not the whole picture. As shown, what happens within neighborhoods is in part shaped by socioeconomic. and housing factors linked to the wider political economy. In addition to encouraging communities to mobilize against violence through "self-help" strategies of informal social control, perhaps reinforced by partnerships with agencies of formal social control (community policing), strategies to address the social and ecological changes that beset many inner-city communities need to be considered. Recognizing that collective efficacy matters does not imply that inequalities at the neighborhood level can be neglected.

REFERENCES AND NOTES

- (1.) For a recent review of research on violence covering much of the 20th century, including a discussion of the many barriers to direct examination of the mechanisms explaining neighborhood-level variations, see R. J. Sampson and J. Lauritsen, in *Understanding and Preventing Violence: Social Influences*, vol. 3, A. J. Reiss Jr. and J. Roth, Eds. (National Academy Press, Washington DC, 1994), pp. 1-114.



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(2.) J. F. Short Jr., *Poverty, Ethnicity, and Violent Crime* (Westview, Boulder, CO, 1997).

(3.) For a general assessment of the difficulties facing neighborhood-level research on social outcomes, see S. E. Mayer and C. Jencks, *Science* 243; 1441 (1989).

(4.) R. Kornhauser, *Social Sources of Delinquency* (Univ. of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL, 1978); R. J. Bursik Jr., *Criminology* 26, 519 (1988); D. Elliott et al., *J. Res. Crime Delinquency* 33, 389 (1996).

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(6.) M. Janowitz, *ibid.* 81, 82 (1975).

(7.) E. Maccoby, J. Johnson, R. Church, *J. Social Issues* 14, 38 (1958); R. Taylor, S. Gottfredson, S. Brower, *J. Res. Crime Delinquency* 21, 303 (1983); J. Hacker, K. Ho, C. Ross, *Social Problems* 21, 328 (1974). A key finding from past research is that many delinquent gangs emerge from unsupervised spontaneous peer groups [F. Thrasher, *The Gang: A Study of 1,313 Gangs in Chicago* (Univ. of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL, 1963); C. Shaw and H. McKay, *Juvenile Delinquency and Urban Areas* (Univ. of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL, 1969), pp. 176-185; J. F. Short Jr. and F. Strodbeck, *Group Process and Gang Delinquency* (Univ. of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL, 1965)].

(8.) For example, about half of all homicides occur among nonfamily members with a preexisting relationship: friends, neighbors, casual acquaintances, associates in illegal activities, or members of a rival gang. illegal markets are especially high-risk settings for robbery, assault, and homicide victimization, whether by an associate or a stranger [A. J. Reiss Jr. and J. Roth, Eds. *Understanding and Preventing Violence* (National Academy Press, Washington, DC, 1993), pp. 18, 79; A. J. Reiss Jr., in *Criminal Careers and "Career Criminals,"* A. Blumstein, J. Cohen, J. Roth, C. Visher, Eds. (National Academy Press, Washington, DC, 1986), pp. 121-160].

(9.) W. Skogan, *Disorder and Decline: Crime and the Spiral of Decay in American Neighborhoods* (Univ. of California Press, Berkeley, CA, 1990).

(10.) J. Coleman, *Foundations of Social Theory* (Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, MA, 1990); R. Putnam *Making Democracy Work* (Princeton Univ. Press, Princeton, NJ, 1993).

(11.) A. Bandura, *Social Foundations of Thought and Action: A Social Cognitive Theory* (Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1986).

(12.) See, generally, J. Logan and H. Molotch, *Urban Fortunes: The Political Economy of Place* (Univ. of California Press, Berkeley, CA, 1987).

(13.) See also J. Kasarda and M. Janowitz, *Am. Sociol. Rev.* 39, 328 (1974); R. Sampson, *ibid.* 53, 766 (1988).

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(15.) D. Massey and N. Denton, *American Apartheid: Segregation and the Making of the Underclass* (Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, MA, 1993); D. Massey, *Am. J. Sociol.* 96, 329 (1990).

(16.) J. Brooks-Gunn, G. Duncan, P. Kato, N. Sealand *Am. d. Sociol.* 99, 353 (1993); F. F. Furstenberg Jr., T. D. Cook, J. Eccles, G. H. Elder, A. Sameroff, *Urban Families and Adolescent Success* (Univ. of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL, in press), chap. 7. Research has shown a strong link between the concentration of female-headed families and rates of violence [see (1)].

(17.) D. Williams and C. Collins, *Annul Rev. Sociol.* 21 349 (1995).

(18.) Cluster analyses of census data also helped to guide the construction of internally homogeneous NCs with respect to racial and ethnic mix, SES, housing density, and family organization. Random-effect analyses of variance produced intraclass correlation coefficients to assess the degree to which this goal had been achieved; analyses (37) revealed that the clustering was successful in producing relative homogeneity within NCs.

(19.) For purposes of selecting a longitudinal cohort sample, SES was defined with the use of a scale from the 1990 census that included NC-level indicators of poverty, public assistance, income, and education (37). Race and ethnicity were also measured with the use of the 1990 census, which defined race in five broad categories: "white," "black," "American Indian Eskimo, or Aleut," "Asian or Pacific Islander," and "other." We use the census labels of white and black to refer to persons of European American and African American background, respectively. We use the term "Latino" to denote anyone of Latin American descent as determined from the separate census category, of "Hispanic origin." "Hispanic" is more properly used to describe persons of Spanish descent (i.e., from Spain), although the terms are commonly used interchangeably.

(20.) The sampling design of the CS was complex. For purposes of a longitudinal study (37), residents in 80 of the 343 NCs were oversampled. Within these 80 NCs, a simple random sample of census blocks was selected and a systematic random sample of dwelling units within those blocks was selected. Within each dwelling unit, all persons over 18 were listed, and a respondent was sampled at random with the aim of obtaining a sample of 50 households within each NC. In each of the remaining NCs ($n = 263$), nine census blocks were selected with probability proportional to population size, three dwelling units were selected at random within each block, and an adult respondent was randomly selected from a list of all adults in the dwelling unit. The aim was to obtain a sample of 20 in these 263 NCs. Despite these differences in sampling design, the selected dwelling units constituted a representative and approximately self-weighting sample of dwelling units within every NC ($n = 343$). ABT Associates (Cambridge, MA) earned out the data collection with the cooperation of research staff at PHDCN, achieving a final response rate of 75%.

(21.) "Don't know" responses were recorded to the middle category of "neither likely nor unlikely" (informal social control) or "neither agree nor disagree" (social cohesion). Most respondents answered all 10 items included in the combined measure; for those respondents, the scale score was the average of the responses. However, anyone responding to at least one item provided data for the analysis; a person-specific standard error of measurement was calculated on the



basis of a simple linear item-response model that took into account the number and difficulty of the items to which each resident responded. The analyses reported here were based on the 7729 cases having sufficient data for all models estimated.

(22.) Respondents were also asked whether the incident occurred during the 6 months before the interview; about 40% replied affirmatively. Because violence is a rare outcome, we use the total violent victimization measure in the main analysis. However, in additional analyses, we examined a summary of the prevalence of personal and household victimizations (ranging from 0 to four) restricted to this 6-month window. This test yielded results very similar to those based on the binary measure of total violence.

(23.) The original data measured the address location of all homicide incidents known to the Chicago police (regardless of arrests) during the months of the community survey.

(24.) The alpha-scoring method was chosen because we are analyzing the universe of NCS in Chicago and are interested in maximizing the reliability of measures [H. F. Kaiser and J. Caffry, *Psychometrika* 30, 1 (1965)]. We also estimated an oblique factor rotation, allowing the extracted dimensions to covary. A principal components analysis with varimax rotation nonetheless yielded substantively identical results.

(25.) For a methodological procedure and empirical result that are similar but that used all U.S. cities as units of analysis, see K. Land, P. McCall, L. Cohen, *Am. J. Sociol.* 95, 922 (1990).

(26.) S. W. Raudenbush, B. Rowan, S. J. Kang, *J. Educ. Stat.* 16, 295 (1991).

(27.) D. V. Lindley and A. F. M. Smith, *R. Stat. Soc. J. Ser. B Methodol.* 34, 1 (1972).

(28.) Although the vast majority of respondents answered all items in the collective efficacy scale, the measurement model makes full use of the data provided by those whose responses were incomplete. There is one less indicator, [D.sub.pijk], than the number of items to identify the intercept [[Pi].sub.jk].

(29.) This degree of intersubjective agreement is similar to that found in a recent national survey of teachers that assessed organizational climate in U.S. high schools [B. Rowan, S. Raudenbush, S. Kang, *Am. J. Educ.* 99, 238 (1991)].

(30.) The analysis of collective efficacy and violence as outcomes uses a three-level model in which the level 1 model describes the sources of measurement error for each of these outcomes. The level 2 and level 3 models together describe the joint distribution of the "true scores" within and between neighborhoods. Given the joint distribution of these outcomes, it is then possible to describe the conditional distribution of violence given "true" collective efficacy and all other predictors, thus automatically adjusting for any errors of measurement of collective efficacy. See S. Raudenbush and R. J. Sampson (paper presented at the conference "Alternative Models for Educational Data," National Institute of Statistical Sciences, Research Triangle Park, NC, 16 October 1996) for the necessary derivations. This work is an extension of that of C. Clogg, E. Petkova, and A. Haritou [*Am. J. Sociol.* 100, 1261 (1995)]



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and P. Allison (*ibid.*, p. 1294). Note that census blocks were not included as a "level" in the analysis. Thus, person-level and block-level variance are confounded. However, this confounding has no effect on standard errors reported in this manuscript. If explanatory variables had been measured at the level of the census block, it would have been important to represent blocks as an additional level in the model.

(31.) The resulting model is a logistic regression model with random effects of neighborhoods. This model was estimated first with penalized quasi-likelihood as described by N. E. Breslow and D. G. Clayton [*J. Am. Stat. Assoc.* 88, 9 (1993)]. The doubly iterative algorithm used is described by S. W. Raudenbush ["Posterior modal estimation for hierarchical generalized linear models with applications to dichotomous and count data" (Longitudinal and Multilevel Methods Project, Michigan State Univ., East Lansing, MI, 1993)]. Then, using those results to model the marginal covariation of the errors, we estimated a population-average model with robust standard errors [S. Zeger, K. Liang, P. Albert, *Biometrics* 44, 1049 (1988)]. Results were similar. The results based on the population-average model with robust standard errors are reported here.

(32.) The analysis paralleled that of criminal victimization, except that a Poisson sampling model and logarithmic link were used in this case. Again, the reported results are based on a population-average model with robust standard errors.

(33.) Although the zero-order correlation of residential stability with homicide was insignificant, the partial coefficient in Table 4 is significantly positive. Recall from Table 3 that stability is positively linked to collective efficacy. But higher stability without the expected greater collective efficacy is not a positive neighborhood quality according to the homicide data. See (14).

(34.) T. Cook, S. Shagle, S. Degirmencioglu, in *Neighborhood Poverty: Context and Consequences for Children*, vol. 2, J. Brooks-Gunn, G. Duncan, J. L. Aber, Eds. (Russell Sage Foundation, New York, in press).

(35.) "Neighborhood services" is a nine-item scale of local activities and programs (for example, the presence of a block group, a tenant association, a crime prevention program, and a family health service) combined with a six-item inventory of services for youth (a neighborhood youth center, recreational programs, after-school programs, mentoring and counseling services, mental health services, and a crisis intervention program). "Friendship and kinship ties" is a scale that measures the number of friends and relatives that respondents report are living in the neighborhood. "Organizational participation" measures actual involvement by residents in (i) local religious organizations; (ii) neighborhood watch programs; (iii) block group, tenant association, or community council; (iv) business or civic groups; (v) ethnic or nationality clubs; and (vi) local political organizations.

(36.) Similar results were obtained when we controlled for a measure of social interaction (the extent to which neighbors had parties together, watched each other's homes, visited in each others' homes, exchanged favors, and asked advice about personal matters) that was positively associated with collective efficacy. Again the direct effect of collective efficacy remained, suggesting that social interaction, like friendship and kinship ties, is linked to reduced violence through its association with increased levels of collective efficacy.



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(37.) R. J. Sampson, S. W. Raudenbush, F. Earls, data not shown.

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HEADLINE: The political economy and urban racial tensions.

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Recent books such as Andrew Hacker's *Two Nations* (1992) and Derrick Bell's *Faces at the Bottom of the Well* (1992) promote the view that racial antagonisms are so deep seated, so primordial that feelings of pessimism about whether America can overcome racist sentiments and actions are justified. The events surrounding the recent rebellion in Los Angeles, the worst race riot in the nation's history, aggravated these feelings. However, in this atmosphere of heightened racial awareness we forget or overlook the fact that racial antagonisms are products of situations - economic situations, political situations, and social situations.

To understand the manifestation of racial antagonisms during certain periods, is to comprehend, from both analytic and policy perspectives, the situations that increase and reduce them. As revealed in the title I have chosen for this paper ("The Political Economy and Urban Racial Tensions"), I shall try to demonstrate this important point by showing how the interrelations of political policies and economic and social processes directly and indirectly affect racial tensions in urban America. In the tradition of the Seidman Award, this paper integrates insights from economics and the other social sciences not only in the analysis of urban racial tensions, but in the presentation of policy options as well.

Political Policies, Economic Processes and the City-Suburban Racial Divide

Since 1960, the proportion of whites inside central cities has decreased steadily, while the proportion of minorities has increased. In 1960 the nation's population was evenly divided between cities, suburbs, and rural areas (Weir 1993). By 1990, both urban and rural populations had declined, leaving suburbs with nearly half of the nation's population. The urban population dipped to 31 percent by 1990. As cities lost population they became poorer and more minority in their racial and ethnic composition. Thus in the eyes of many in the dominant white population, the minorities symbolize the ugly urban scene left behind. Today, the divide between the suburbs and the city is, in many respects, a racial divide. For example, whereas 68 percent of all the residents in the city of Chicago were minority in 1990 - blacks (1,074,471), Hispanics (545,852), and Asian & others (152,487) and whites (1,056,048) - 83 percent of all suburban



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residents in the Chicago metropolitan area were white. Across the nation, in 1990, whereas 74 percent of the dominant white population lived in suburban and rural areas, a majority of blacks and Latinos resided in urban areas.

These demographic changes relate to the declining influence of American cities and provided the foundation for the New Federalism, an important political development that has increased the significance of race in metropolitan areas. Beginning in 1980, the federal government drastically reduced its support for basic urban programs. The Reagan and Bush administrations sharply cut spending on direct aid to cities, including general revenue sharing, urban mass transit, public service jobs and job training, compensatory education, social service block grants, local public works, economic development assistance and urban development action grants. In 1980 the Federal contribution to city budgets was 18 percent, by 1990 it had dropped to 6.4 percent. In addition, the most recent economic recession sharply reduced urban revenues that the cities themselves generated, thereby creating budget deficits that resulted in further cutbacks in basic services and programs, and increases in local taxes (Caraley 1992).

The combination of the New Federalism, which resulted in the sharp cuts in federal aid to local and state governments, and the recession created for many cities, especially the older cities of the East and Mid-West, the worst fiscal and service crisis since the Depression. Cities have become increasingly under-serviced and many have been on the brink of bankruptcy. They have therefore not been in a position to combat effectively three unhealthy social conditions that have emerged or become prominent since 1980: (1) the outbreaks of crack-cocaine addiction and the murders and other violent crimes that have accompanied them; (2) the AIDS epidemic and its escalating public health costs; and (3) the sharp rise in the homeless population not only for individuals, but for whole families as well (Caraley 1990).

Fiscally strapped cities have had to watch in helpless frustration as these problems escalated during the 1980s and made the larger city itself seem like a less attractive place in which to live. Accordingly, many urban residents with the economic means have followed the worn-out path from the central city to the suburbs and other areas, thereby shrinking the tax base and further reducing city revenue.

The growing suburbanization of the population influences the extent to which national politicians will support increased federal aid to large cities and to the poor. Indeed, we can associate the sharp drop in federal support for basic urban programs since 1980 with the declining political influence of cities and the rising influence of electoral coalitions in the suburbs (Weir 1993). Suburbs cast 36 percent of the vote for President in 1968, 48 percent in 1988, and a majority of the vote in the 1992 election.

In each of the three presidential elections prior to the 1992 election, the Democratic presidential candidate scored huge majorities in the large cities only to lose an overwhelming majority of the states where these cities are located. This naked reality is one of the reasons why the successful Clinton Presidential campaign designed a careful strategy to capture more support from voters who do not reside in central cities.

However, although there is a clear racial divide between the central city and



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the suburbs, racial tensions in the metropolitan areas continue to be concentrated in the central city. They affect the relations and patterns of interaction between blacks, other minorities, and the whites who remain, especially lower income whites.

Racial Tensions in the Central City

Like inner-city minorities, lower-income whites have felt the full impact of the urban fiscal crisis in the United States. Moreover, lower-income whites are more constrained by financial exigencies to remain in the central city than their middle-class counterparts and thereby suffer the strains of crime, higher taxes, poorer services, and inferior public schools. Furthermore, unlike the more affluent whites who choose to remain in the wealthier sections of the central city, they cannot easily escape the problems of deteriorating public schools by sending their children to private schools, and this problem has grown with the sharp decline in urban parochial schools in the United States.

Many of these people originally bought relatively inexpensive homes near their industrial jobs. Because of the deconcentration of industry, the racially changing neighborhood bordering their communities, the problems of neighborhood crime, and the surplus of central-city housing created by the population shift to the suburbs, housing values in their neighborhoods have failed to keep pace with those in the suburbs. As the industries that employ them become suburbanized, a growing number of lower-income whites in our central cities find that not only are they trapped in their neighborhoods because of the high costs of suburban housing, but they are physically removed from job opportunities as well. This situation increases the potential for racial tension as they compete with blacks and the rapidly growing Latino population for access to and control of the remaining decent schools, housing, and neighborhoods in the fiscally strained central city.

Thus the racial struggle for power and privilege in the central city is essentially a struggle between the have-nots; it is a struggle over access to and control of decent housing and decent neighborhoods, as exposed by the black-white friction over attempts to integrate the working-class ethnic neighborhoods of Marquette Park on Chicago's South Side; it is a struggle over access to and control of local public schools, as most dramatically demonstrated in the racial violence that followed attempts to bus black children from the Boston ghettos of Roxbury and Dorchester to the working-class neighborhoods of South Boston and Charlestown in the 1970s; finally, it is a struggle over political control of the central city, as exhibited in cities like Chicago, Newark, Cleveland, and New York in recent years when the race of the mayoralty candidate was the basis for racial antagonism and fear that engulfed the election campaign.

In some cases the conflicts between working-class whites and blacks are expressed in ethnic terms. Thus in a city such as Chicago white working-class ethnics are stressing that their ethnic institutions and unique ways of life are being threatened by black encroachment on their neighborhoods, the increase of black crime, and the growth of black militancy. The emphasis is not simply that blacks pose a threat to whites but that they also pose a threat to, say, the Polish in Gage Park, the Irish in Brighton Park, the Italians in Cicero, or the Serbians, Rumanians, and Croatians in Hegewich. These communities are a few of the many ethnic enclaves in the Chicago area threatened by the possibilities of a



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black invasion, and their response has been to stress not only the interests of whites but the interests of their specific ethnic group as well. The primary issue is whether neighborhood ethnic churches and private ethnic schools can survive if whites leave their communities in great numbers and move either to other parts of the cities or to the suburbs. The threatened survival of ethnic social clubs and the possible loss of ethnic friends are also crucial issues that contribute to the anxiety in these communities.

Although the focus of much of the racial tension has been on black and white encounters, in many urban neighborhoods incidents of ethnic antagonisms involve Latinos. According to several demographic projections, the Latino population, which in 1990 had exceeded 22 million in the United States, will replace African-Americans as the nation's largest minority group between 1997 and 2005. They already outnumber African-Americans in Houston and Los Angeles and are rapidly approaching the number of blacks in Dallas and New York. In cities as different as Houston, Los Angeles, and Philadelphia "competition between blacks and Hispanic citizens over the drawing of legislative districts and the allotment of seats is intensifying" (Rohter 1993, p. 11). In areas of changing populations, Latino residents increasingly complain that black officials currently in office cannot represent their concerns and interests (Rohter 1993).

The tensions between blacks and Latinos in Miami, as one example, have emerged over competition for jobs and government contracts, the distribution of political power, and claims on public services. It would be a mistake to view the encounters between the two groups solely in racial terms, however. In Dade County there is a tendency for the black Cubans, Dominicans, Puerto Ricans, and Panamanians to define themselves by their language and culture and not by the color of their skin. Indeed, largely because of the willingness of Hispanic whites and Hispanic blacks to live together and mix with Haitians and other Caribbean blacks in neighborhoods relatively free of racial tension, Dade County is experiencing the most rapid desegregation of housing in the nation (Rohter 1993).

On the other hand, native-born, English speaking African-Americans continue to be the most segregated group in Miami. They are concentrated in neighborhoods that represent high levels of joblessness and clearly identifiable pockets of poverty in the northeast section of Dade County (Rohter 1993). Although there has been some movement of higher income groups from these neighborhoods in recent years, the poorer blacks are more likely to be trapped because of the combination of extreme economic marginality and residential segregation.

Race and the New Urban Poverty

The problems faced by blacks in poor segregated communities are even more severe in the older cities of the East and Midwest. Indeed, there is a new poverty in our nation's metropolises that has far ranging consequences for the quality of life in urban areas, including race relations. By the "new urban poverty," I mean poor segregated neighborhoods in which a substantial majority of individual adults are either unemployed or have dropped out of the labor force. For example, in 1990 only one in three adults (35%) ages 16 and over in the twelve Chicago community areas with poverty rates that exceeded 40 percent held a job. (1) Each of these community areas, located on the South and West sides of the city, is overwhelmingly black. We can add to these twelve high jobless areas three additional predominantly black community areas, with rates



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of poverty of 29, 30 and 36 percent respectively, where only four in ten (42%) adults worked in 1990. Thus, in these fifteen black community areas, representing a total population of 425,125, only 37 percent of all the adults were gainfully employed in 1990. By contrast, 54 percent of the adults in the seventeen other predominantly black community areas in Chicago, with a total population of 545,408, worked in 1990. This was close to the city-wide figure of

57 percent. Finally, except for one largely Asian community area with an employment rate of 46 percent, and one largely Latino community area with an employment rate of 49 percent, a majority of the adults held a job in each of the forty-five other community areas of Chicago. (2)

To repeat, the new urban poverty represents poor segregated neighborhoods in which a substantial majority of the adults are not working. To illustrate the magnitude of the changes that have occurred in inner-city ghetto neighborhoods in recent years, let me take the three Chicago community areas (Douglas, Grand Boulevard and Washington Park) featured in St. Clair Drake and Horace Cayton's Classic book entitled *Black Metropolis*, published in 1945. These three community areas, located on the South Side of the city of Chicago, represent the historic core of Chicago's black belt.

A majority of adults were gainfully employed in these three areas in 1950, five years after the publication of *Black Metropolis*, but by 1990 only four in ten in Douglas worked, one in three in Washington Park, and one in four in Grand Boulevard. In 1950, 69 percent of all males 14 and over worked in the Bronzeville neighborhoods of Douglas, Grand Boulevard, and Washington Park, by 1990 only 37 percent of all males 16 and over held jobs in these three neighborhoods. (3)

Upon the publication of the first edition of *Black Metropolis* in 1945, there was much greater class integration in the black community. As Drake and Cayton pointed out, Bronzeville residents had limited success in "sorting themselves out into broad community areas designated as 'lower class' and 'middle class' . . . Instead of middle class areas, Bronzeville tends to have middle-class buildings in all areas, or a few middle class blocks here and there" (pp. 658-660). Though they may have lived on different streets, blacks of all classes in inner-city areas such as Bronzeville lived in the same community and shopped at the same stores. Their children went to the same schools and played in the same parks. Although there was some class antagonism, their neighborhoods were more stable than the inner-city neighborhoods of today; in short, they featured higher levels of social organization.

By 'social organization' I mean the extent to which the residents of a neighborhood are able to maintain effective social control and realize their common values. There are two major dimensions of neighborhood social organization: (1) the prevalence, strength, and interdependence of social networks; and (2) the extent of collective supervision that the residents direct and the personal responsibility they assume in addressing neighborhood problems (Sampson 1992).

Both formal institutions and informal networks reflect social organization. In other words, neighborhood social organization depends on the extent of local friendship ties, the degree of social cohesion, the level of resident participation in formal and informal voluntary associations, the density and



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stability of formal organizations, and the nature of informal social controls. Neighborhoods that integrate the adults by an extensive set of obligations, expectations, and social networks are in a better position to control and supervise the activities and behavior of children, and monitor developments - e.g., the breaking up of congregations of youth on street corners and the supervision of youth leisure time activities (Sampson 1992).

Neighborhoods plagued with high levels of joblessness are more likely to experience problems of social organization. The two go hand-in-hand. High rates of joblessness trigger other problems in the neighborhood that adversely affect social organization, ranging from crime, gang violence, and drug trafficking to family break-ups and problems in the organization of family life. Consider, for example, the problems of drug trafficking and violent crime. As many studies have revealed, the decline of legitimate employment opportunities among inner-city residents builds up incentives to sell drugs (Fagan 1993). The distribution of crack in a neighborhood attracts individuals involved in violence and other crimes. Violent persons in the crack marketplace help shape its social organization and its impact on the neighborhood. Neighborhoods plagued by high levels of joblessness, insufficient economic opportunities, and high residential mobility are unable to control the volatile drug market and the violent crimes related to it (Fagan 1993, Sampson 1986). As informal controls weaken in such areas, the social processes that regulate behavior change (Sampson 1988).

A more direct relationship between joblessness and violent crime is revealed in recent longitudinal research by Delbert Elliott (1992) of the University of Colorado, a study based on National Youth Survey data from 1976 to 1989, covering ages 11 to 30. As Elliott (1992) points out, the transition from adolescence to adulthood usually results in a sharp drop in most crimes, including serious violent behavior, as individuals take on new adult roles and responsibilities. "Participation in serious violent offending (aggravated assault, forcible rape, and robbery) increases from ages 11 to 12 to ages 15 and 16 then declines dramatically with advancing age" (Elliott 1992, p. 14). Although black and white males reveal similar age curves, "the negative slope of the age curve for blacks after age 20 is substantially less than that of whites" (p. 15).

The black-white differential in the percentage of males involved in serious violent crime, although almost even at age 11, increases to 3:2 over the remaining years of adolescence, and reaches a differential of nearly 4:1 during the late twenties. However, when Elliott (1992) only compared employed black and white males, he found no significant differences between the two groups in rates of suspension or termination of violent behavior by age 21. Employed black males experienced a precipitous decline in serious violent behavior following their adolescent period. Accordingly, a major reason for the substantial overall racial gap in the termination of violent behavior following the adolescent period is the large proportion of jobless black males, whose serious violent behavior was more likely to extend into adulthood. (4) The new poverty neighborhoods feature a high concentration of jobless males and, as a result, experience rates of violent criminal behavior that exceed those of other urban neighborhoods.

Also, consider the important relationship between joblessness and the organization of family life. Work is not simply a way to make a living and



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support one's family. It also constitutes the framework for daily behavior and patterns of interaction because of the disciplines and regularities it imposes. Thus in the absence of regular employment, what is lacking is not only a place in which to work and the receipt of regular income, but also a coherent organization of the present, that is, a system of concrete expectations and goals. Regular employment provides the anchor for the temporal and spatial aspects of daily life. In the absence of regular employment, life, including family life, becomes more incoherent. Persistent unemployment and irregular employment hinder rational planning in daily life, the necessary condition of adaptation to an industrial economy (Bourdieu 1965). This problem is most severe for a jobless family in a low employment neighborhood. The family's lack of rational planning is more likely to be shared and therefore reinforced by other families in the neighborhood. The problems of family organization and neighborhood social organization are mutually reinforcing.

Factors Associated with the Increase in Neighborhood Joblessness and Decline of Social Organization

Although high jobless neighborhoods also feature concentrated poverty, high rates of neighborhood poverty are less likely to trigger problems of social organization if the residents are working. To repeat, in previous years the working poor stood out in neighborhoods like Bronzeville. Today the non-working poor predominate in such neighborhoods. What accounts for the rise in the proportion of jobless adults in inner-city communities such as Bronzeville?

An easy explanation is racial segregation. However, as we shall soon see, a race-specific argument is not sufficient to explain recent changes in neighborhoods like Bronzeville. After all, Bronzeville was just as segregated in 1950 as it is today, yet the level of employment was much higher back then.

Nonetheless, racial segregation does matter. If large segments of the African-American population had not been historically segregated in inner-city ghettos we would not be talking about the new urban poverty. The segregated ghetto is not the result of voluntary or positive decisions of the residents to live there. As Douglas Massey and Nancy Denton (1993) have carefully documented, the segregated ghetto is the product of systematic racial practices such as restrictive covenants, redlining by banks and insurance companies, zoning, panic peddling by real estate agents, and the creation of massive public housing projects in low-income areas. Moreover, urban renewal and forced migration uprooted many urban black communities. Freeway networks built through the hearts of many cities in the 1950s produced the most dramatic changes. Many viable low-income communities were destroyed. Furthermore, discrimination in employment and inferior educational opportunities further restricted black residential mobility.

Segregated ghettos are less conducive to employment and employment preparation than other areas of the city. Segregation in ghettos exacerbates employment problems because it embraces weak informal employment networks, contributes to the social isolation of individuals and families and therefore reduces their chances of acquiring the human capital skills that facilitate mobility in a society. Since no other group in society experiences the degree of segregation, isolation, and poverty concentration as African-Americans, they are far more likely to be at a disadvantage when they have to compete with other groups in society, including other "discriminated against" groups, for resources



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and privileges.

But, to repeat, neighborhoods like Bronzeville were highly segregated decades ago when employment rates were much higher. Given the existence of segregation, one then has to account for the ways in which other changes in society interact with segregation to produce the recent escalating rates of joblessness and problems of social organization. Several factors stand out.

Prominent among these is the impact of changes in the economy, changes that have had an adverse effect on poor urban blacks, especially black males. In 1950, 69 percent of all males 14 and over worked in the Bronzeville neighborhoods of Douglas, Grand Boulevard, and Washington Park, and in 1960, 64 percent of this group were employed. However, by 1990 only 37 percent of all males 16 and over held jobs in these three neighborhoods. (5)

Thirty and forty years ago, the overwhelming majority of black males were working. Many of them were poor, but they held regular jobs around which their daily family life was organized. When black males looked for work, employers considered whether they had strong backs because they would be working in a factory or in the back room of a shop doing heavy lifting and labor. They faced discrimination and a job ceiling, but they were working. The work was hard and they were hired. Now, economic restructuring has broken the figurative back of the black working population.

Data from our Urban Poverty and Family Life Study show that 57 percent of Chicago's employed inner-city black fathers (aged 15 and over and without bachelor degrees) who were born between 1950 and 1955 worked in manufacturing industries in 1974. By 1987 that figure fell to 27 percent. Of those born between 1956 and 1960, 52 percent worked in manufacturing industries as late as 1978. By 1987 that figure had declined to 28 percent. (6)

The loss of traditional manufacturing and other blue-collar jobs in Chicago has resulted in increased joblessness among inner-city black males and a concentration in low-wage, high-turnover laborer and service-sector jobs. Embedded in segregated ghetto neighborhoods that are not conducive to employment, inner-city black males fall further behind their white and their Hispanic male counterparts, especially when the labor market is slack. Hispanics "continue to funnel into manufacturing because employers prefer" them "over blacks, and they like to hire by referrals from current employees, which Hispanics can readily furnish, being already embedded in migration networks" (Krogh, p. 12). Inner-city black men grow bitter about and resent their employment prospects and often manifest or express these feelings in their harsh, often dehumanizing, low-wage work settings.

Their attitudes and actions create the widely shared perception that they are undesirable workers. The perception then becomes the basis for employer decisions to deny them employment, especially when the economy is weak and many workers are seeking jobs. The employment woes of inner-city black males gradually grows over the long term not only because employers are turning more to the expanding immigrant and female labor force, but also because the number of jobs that require contact with the public continues to climb. Because of the increasing shift to service industries, employers have a greater need for workers who can effectively serve and relate to the consumer. Our research reveals that they believe that such qualities are lacking among black males from



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segregated inner-city neighborhoods.

The position of inner-city black women in the labor market is also problematic. Their high degree of social isolation in poor segregated neighborhoods, as reflected in social networks, reduces their employment prospects. Although our research indicates that employers consider them more desirable as workers than the inner-city black men, their social isolation decreases their ability to develop language and other job-related skills necessary in an economy that rewards employees who can work and communicate effectively with the public.

The increase in the proportion of jobless adults in the inner city is also related to the outmigration of large numbers of employed adults from working and middle-class families. The declining proportion of nonpoor families and increasing and prolonged joblessness in the new poverty neighborhoods make it considerably more difficult to sustain basic neighborhood institutions. In the face of increasing joblessness, stores, banks, credit institutions, restaurants, and professional services lose regular and potential patrons. Churches experience dwindling numbers of parishioners and shrinking resources; recreational facilities, block clubs, community groups, and other informal organizations also suffer. As these organizations decline, the means of formal and informal social control in the neighborhood become weaker. Levels of crime and street violence increase as a result, leading to further deterioration of the neighborhood.

As the neighborhood disintegrates, those who are able to leave do so, including many working and middle-class families. The lower population density created by the outmigration exacerbates the problem. Abandoned buildings increase and provide a haven for crack dens and criminal enterprises that establish footholds in the community. Precipitous declines in density also make it more difficult to sustain or develop a sense of community or for people to experience a feeling of safety in numbers. (Jargowsky 1994:18)

The neighborhoods with many black working families stand in sharp contrast to the new poverty areas. Research that we have conducted on the social organization of Chicago neighborhoods reveals that in addition to much lower levels of perceived unemployment than in the poor neighborhoods, black working and middle class neighborhoods also have much higher levels of perceived social control and cohesion, organizational services and social support.

The rise of new poverty neighborhoods represents a movement from, what the historian Allan Spear (1967) has called an institutional ghetto - which duplicates the structure and activities of the larger society, as portrayed in Drake and Cayton's description of Bronzeville - to an unstable ghetto, which lacks the capability to provide basic opportunities, resources, and adequate social controls.

New Poverty Neighborhoods and Urban Racial Tensions

The problems associated with the high joblessness and declining social organization (e.g., individual crime, hustling activities, gang violence) in inner-city ghetto neighborhoods often spill over into other parts of the city, including the ethnic enclaves. The result is not only hostile class antagonisms in the higher income black neighborhoods near these communities, but heightened



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levels of racial animosity, especially among lower income white ethnic and Latino groups whose communities border or are in proximity to the high jobless neighborhoods.

The problems in the new poverty neighborhoods have also created racial antagonisms among some of the higher income groups in the city. The new poverty in ghetto neighborhoods has sapped the vitality of local business and other institutions, and it has led to fewer and shabbier movie theaters, bowling alleys, restaurants, public parks and playgrounds, and other recreational facilities. Therefore residents of inner-city neighborhoods more often seek leisure activity in other areas of the city, where they come into brief contact with citizens of different racial, ethnic, or class backgrounds. Sharp differences in cultural style and patterns of interaction that reflect the social isolation of neighborhood networks often lead to clashes.

Some behavior of residents in socially isolated inner-city ghetto neighborhoods - e.g., the tendency to enjoy a movie in a communal spirit by carrying on a running conversation with friends and relatives during the movie or reacting in an unrestrained manner to what they see on the screen - offends the sensibilities of or is considered inappropriate by other groups, particularly the black and white middle classes. Their expression of disapproval, either overtly or with subtle hostile glances, tends to trigger belligerent responses from the inner-city ghetto residents who then purposefully intensify the behavior that is the source of middle-class concerns. The white, and even the black middle class, then exercise their option and exit, to use Albert Hirschman's (1970) term, by taking their patronage elsewhere, expressing resentment and experiencing intensified feelings of racial or class antagonisms as they depart.

The areas left behind then become the domain of the inner-city ghetto residents. The more expensive restaurants and other establishments that serve the higher income groups in these areas, having lost their regular patrons, soon close down and are replaced by fast-food chains and other local businesses that cater to the needs or reflect the economic and cultural resources of the new clientele. White and black middle-class citizens, in particular, complain bitterly about how certain conveniently located areas of the central city have changed following the influx of ghetto residents.

Demagogic Messages

I want to make a final point about economic, political and social situations that have contributed to the rise of racial antagonisms in urban areas. During periods of hard economic times, it is important that political leaders channel the frustrations of citizens in positive or constructive directions. However, for the last few years just the opposite frequently occurred. In a time of heightened economic insecurities, the negative racial rhetoric of some highly visible white and black spokespersons increased racial tensions and channeled frustrations in ways that severely divide the racial groups. During hard economic times people become more receptive to demagogic messages that deflect attention from the real source of their problems. Instead of associating their declining real incomes, increasing job insecurity, growing pessimism about the future which failed economic and political policies, these messages force them to turn on each other - race against race.



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As the new urban poverty has sapped the vitality of many inner-city communities, many of these messages associate inner-city crime, family breakdown and welfare receipt with individual shortcomings. Blame the victim arguments resonate with many urban Americans because of their very simplicity. They not only reinforce the salient belief that joblessness and poverty reflect individual inadequacies, but discourage support for new and stronger programs to combat inner-city social dislocations as well.

What Must Be Done?

I have outlined some of the situations that inflate racial antagonisms in cities like Chicago - namely those that involve the interrelation of recent political policies and economic and social processes (including the emergence of the new urban poverty). Let me conclude this paper with some thoughts on social policy that build on this situational perspective.

I believe that it will be difficult to address racial tensions in our cities unless we tackle the problems of shrinking revenue and inadequate social services, and the gradual disappearance of work in certain neighborhoods. The city has become a less desirable place in which to live, and the economic and social gap between the cities and suburbs is growing. The groups left behind compete, often along racial lines, for the declining resources, including the remaining decent schools, housing, and neighborhoods. The rise of the new urban poverty neighborhoods exacerbates the problems. Their high rates of joblessness and social disorganization create problems that not only affect the residents in these neighborhoods but that spill over into other parts of the larger city as well. All of these factors aggravate race relations and elevate racial tensions.

Ideally it would be great if we could restore the federal contribution to the city budget that existed in 1980, and sharply increase the employment base. However, regardless of changes in federal urban policy, the fiscal crisis in the cities would be significantly eased if the employment base could be substantially increased. Indeed, the social dislocations caused by the steady disappearance of work have led to a wide range of urban social problems, including racial tensions. Increased employment would help stabilize the new poverty neighborhood, halt the precipitous decline in density, and ultimately enhance the quality of race relations in urban areas. The employment situation in inner-city ghetto neighborhoods would improve if the United States' economy, which is now experiencing an upturn, could produce low levels of unemployment over a long period of time.

I say this because in slack labor markets employers are - and indeed, can afford to be - more selective in recruiting and in granting promotions. They overemphasize job prerequisites and exaggerate experience. In such an economic climate, disadvantaged minorities suffer disproportionately and the level of employer discrimination rises. In contrast, in a tight labor market, job vacancies are numerous, unemployment is of short duration, and wages are higher. Moreover, in a tight labor market the labor force expands because increased job opportunities not only reduce unemployment but also draw into the labor force those workers who, in periods when the labor market is slack, respond to fading job prospects by dropping out of the labor force altogether. Accordingly, in a tight labor market the status of disadvantaged minorities improves because of lower unemployment, higher wages, and better jobs (Tobin 1965).



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Moreover, affirmative action and other anti-bias programs are more successful in tight labor markets than in slack ones. Not only are sufficient positions available for many qualified workers, but also employers, facing a labor shortage, are not as resistant to affirmative action. Furthermore, a favorable economic climate encourages supporters of affirmative action to push such programs because they perceive greater chances for success. Finally, non-minority workers are less resistant to affirmative action when there are sufficient jobs available because they are less likely to see minorities as a threat to their own employment.

However, a rising tide does not necessarily lift all boats. Special additional steps to rescue many inner-city residents from the throes of joblessness should be considered, even if the economy remains healthy. Such steps might include the creation of job information data banks in the new poverty neighborhoods and subsidized car pools to increase access to suburban jobs. Training or apprenticeship programs that lead to stable employment should also be considered.

Nonetheless, because of their level of training and education, many of the jobs to which the inner-city poor have access are at or below the minimum wage and are not covered by health insurance. However, recent policies created and proposed by the Clinton Administration could make such jobs more attractive. By 1996, the expanded Earned Income Tax Credit will increase the earnings from a minimum-wage job to \$ 7-an-hour. If this benefit is paid on a monthly basis and is combined with health care, the condition of workers in the low-wage sector would improve significantly, and the rate of employment would rise.

Finally, given the situational basis of much of today's racial tensions, I think that there are some immediate and practical steps that the President of the United States can take to help create the atmosphere for serious efforts and programs to improve racial relations. I am referring to the need for strong political and moral leadership to help combat racial antagonisms. In particular, the need to create and strongly emphasize a message that unites, not divides racial groups.

It is important to appreciate that the poor and the working classes of all racial groups struggle to make ends meet, and even the middle class has experienced a decline in its living standard. Indeed, Americans across racial and class boundaries worry about unemployment and job security, declining real wages, escalating medical and housing costs, child care programs, the sharp decline in the quality of public education, and crime and drug trafficking in their neighborhoods. Given these concerns, perhaps the President ought to advance a new public rhetoric that does two things: focuses on problems that afflict not only the poor, but the working and middle classes as well; and emphasizes integrative programs that contribute to the social and economic improvement of all groups in society, not just the truly disadvantaged segments of the population. In short a public rhetoric that reflects a vision of racial unity.

The President of the United States has the unique capacity to command nationwide attention from the media and the general public, the capacity to get them to consider seriously a vision of racial unity and of where we are and where we should go.

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I am talking about a vision that promotes values of racial and inter-group harmony and unity; rejects the commonly held view that race is so divisive in this country that whites, blacks, Latinos, and other ethnic groups cannot work together in a common cause; recognizes that if a message from a political leader is tailored to a white audience, racial minorities draw back, just as whites draw back when a message is tailored to racial minority audiences; realizes that if the message emphasizes issues and programs that concern the families of all racial and ethnic groups, individuals of these various groups will see their mutual interests and join in a multi-racial coalition to move America forward; promotes the idea that Americans across racial and class boundaries have common interests and concerns including concerns about unemployment and job security, declining real wages, escalating medical and housing costs, child care programs, the sharp decline in the quality of public education, and crime and drug trafficking in neighborhoods; sees the application of programs to combat these problems as beneficial to all Americans, not just the truly disadvantaged among us; recognizes that since demographic shifts have decreased the urban white population and sharply increased the proportion of minorities in the cities, the divide between the suburbs and the central city is, in many respects, a racial divide and that it is vitally important, therefore, to emphasize city-suburban cooperation, not separation; and, finally, pushes the idea that all groups, including those in the throes of the new urban poverty, should be able to achieve full membership in society because the problems of economic and social marginality are associated with inequities in the larger society, not with group deficiencies.

If the President were to promote vigorously this vision, efforts designed to address both the causes and symptoms of racial tensions in cities like New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, Miami, and Los Angeles would have a greater chance for success.

Notes

Parts of this paper are based on a larger study, *Jobless Ghettos: The Disappearance of Work and Its Effect on Urban Life*, to be published by Knopf in 1995.

1. The figures on adult employment presented in this paragraph are based on calculations from data provided by the 1990 U.S. Bureau of the Census and the Local Community Fact Book for Chicago, 1990. The adult employment rates represent the number of employed individuals (14 and over in 1990 and 16 over in 1990) among the total number of adults in a given area. Those who are not employed include both the individuals who are members of the labor force but are not working and those who have dropped out or are not part of the labor force. Those who are not in the labor force "consists mainly of students, housewives, retired workers, seasonal workers enumerated in an 'off' season who were not looking for work, inmates of institutions, disabled persons, and persons doing only incidental unpaid family work" (The Chicago Fact Book Consortium, 1984, p. xxv).

2. A community area is a statistical unit derived by urban sociologists at the University of Chicago for the 1930 census in order to analyze varying conditions within the city of Chicago. These delineations were originally drawn up on the basis of settlement and history of the area, local identification and trade patterns, local institutions, and natural and artificial barriers.



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Needless to say, there have been major shifts in population and land use since then. But these units remain useful to trace changes over time, and they continue to capture much of the contemporary reality of Chicago neighborhoods.

3. The figures on male employment are based on calculations from data provided by the 1990 U.S. Bureau of the Census and the Local Community Fact Book for Chicago, 1950.

4. In Elliott's study 75 percent of the black males who were employed between the ages of 18-20 had terminated their involvement in violent behavior by age 21, compared to only 52 percent of those who were unemployed between the ages of 18-20. Racial differences remained for persons who were not in a marriage/partner relationship or who were unemployed.

5. The figures on male employment are based on calculations from data provided by the 1990 U.S. Bureau of the Census and the Local Community Fact Book for Chicago, 1950.

6. For a discussion of these findings, See Marilyn Krogh, "A Description of the Work Histories of Fathers Living in the Inner-City of Chicago." Working paper, Center for the Study of Urban Inequality, University of Chicago, 1993. The Urban Poverty and Family Life Study (UPFLS) includes a survey of 2,495 households in Chicago's inner-city neighborhoods conducted in 1987 and 1988; a second survey of a subsample of 175 respondents from the larger survey who were reinterviewed solely with open-ended questions on their perceptions of the opportunity structure and life chances; a survey of a stratified random sample of 185 employers, designed to reflect the distribution of employment across industry and firm size in the Chicago metropolitan area, conducted in 1988; and comprehensive ethnographic research, including participant observation research and life-history interviews conducted in 1987 and 1988 by ten research assistants in a representative sample of black, Hispanic and white inner-city neighborhoods.

The UPFLS was supported by grants from the Ford Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation, the Joyce Foundation, the Carnegie Corporation, the Lloyd A. Fry Foundation, the William T. Grant Foundation, the Spencer Foundation, the Woods Charitable Fund, the Chicago Community Trust, the Institute for Research on Poverty, and the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.

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William Julius Wilson, recipient of the 1994 Frank E. Seidman Distinguished Award in Political Economy, based at Rhodes College. The 1994 Selection Committee included Kenneth J. Arrow, James Buchanan, Vernon L. Smith, James Tobin and Harold F. Williamson, Jr. The Award Director is Mel G. Grinspan. William Julius Wilson is Lucy Flower University Professor of Sociology and Public Policy at the University of Chicago.

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first draft

Discussion Around the Root Causes of School Violence

- **Sylvia Ann Hewlett and Cornel West**, authors of The War Against Parents.

In their new book, the authors discuss the widespread societal pressures -- from government, business, and the wider culture -- that are combining to make parenting more difficult. They argue that parents have been hurt by economic forces which have lowered their wages, tax and housing policy, and a media that often degrades them. As a result, children have been left home alone to raise themselves with cultural influences like gangster rap and trash talk shows shaping their values in place of parents. The authors argue that the rise in juvenile violence over the last few decades is a necessary result of these forces' effect on the family.

- **William Finnegan**, author of Cold New World : Growing Up in a Harder Country.

The author follows four American teenagers and young adults, struggling to cope -- and often failing -- in their very different environments. The author depicts these four young people and their stories of lives that have become saturated with violence and drugs within the context of a larger economy that has left them and their families behind.

- **James Q. Wilson**, noted criminologist and chief proponent of the broken windows theory.

Mr. Wilson has recently discussed the connection between early learning and later delinquency.

- **Fox Butterfield**, *New York Times* reporter and author of All God's Children: The Bosket Family and the American Tradition of Violence.

In his book, the author examines how violence is learned and passed on from generation to generation, through studying one family's history of violence from their days in slavery in South Carolina to the present in New York.

- **David Kennedy**, author of "Can We Keep Guns Away From Kids?" from *The American Prospect*

David Kennedy has studied juvenile crime through the lens of youth access to guns. He has found that many children arm themselves with guns out of fear, thereby creating a cycle of increasing reliance on weapons, resulting in an arms race of sorts. In response, he helped create the Boston Gun Project, one of the primary goals of which is to reduce youth access to guns by reducing the number of guns on the street. The project systematically traces all crime guns in order to take illegal guns off the streets, thereby de-escalating the cycle of violence. The President has expanded this approach to 27 cities.

- **Sissela Bok**, author of Mayhem: Violence as Public Entertainment

Sissela Bok's Mayhem discusses the impact of violent entertainment, particularly on children, and provides strategies to reduce its impact. She notes the many ways the viewing of violence can affect children, often increasing their aggressiveness as well as their fearfulness.

- **Professor Tony Earles**, Harvard University

Professor Earles found in his study of Chicago neighborhoods that “collective efficacy,” defined as the willingness to monitor children’s play groups, help neighbors, and intervene in preventing acts such as juvenile truancy or street-corner loitering, is the key indicator for violence. They found that these values often determine whether a neighborhood will or will not experience crime problems. Professor Earles is also conducting a longitudinal study of at-risk youth in Chicago to determine what other influences affect delinquent behavior.

- **Reverend Eugene Rivers**, Boston

Reverend Rivers runs a faith-based anti-gang initiative out of the Ella J. Baker House in Dorchester, in which churches partner with community police and community-based organizations to reach out to youth, particularly those at risk of gang involvement. This effort attempts to create a sense of family for children who often have a troubled home life.

- **Dr. Howard Snyder**, National Center for Juvenile Justice, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania

An expert on the state of youth today, he would discuss statistics on juvenile crime rates, divorce rates, teen pregnancy rates, and changing demographics in general.

- **James Fox**, Dean of the College of Criminal Justice at Northwestern University.

He has published 12 books, including Mass Murder, Overkill, and Killer on Campus. He has also published dozens of journal and magazine articles and newspaper columns, primarily in the areas of juvenile crime, and multiple murders.

- **Robin Karr-Morse**, co-author of Ghosts from the Nursery : Tracing the Roots of Violence

The author’s work focuses on the connections between early childhood development and later violent behavior. They argue that a predisposition to violent behavior can be caused by such factors as abuse, neglect and exposure to drugs.

- **Bruce Perry**, MD PhD, Senior Fellow, Civitas Initiatives.

Mr. Perry is a leading early childhood researcher, specializing in brain development and the impact of early trauma on children. Dr. Perry's *High/Scope Perry Preschool Project* provides one of the longest assessments of the positive effects of early childhood intervention for low-income children on IQ and school performance, as well as on employment, welfare and crime outcomes.

- **Dr. David Satcher**, Surgeon General.

Dr. Satcher has examined the issue of violence and young people from a general public health standpoint.

- **Dr. Steve Hyman**, Director of the National Institute of Mental Health.

Dr. Hyman would discuss the connections between mental health problems and these disturbing outbreaks of violence in young people.

- **Shirley Burggraf**, author of The Feminine Economy and Economic Man
The author studies the family's role in the economy and how economic forces provide little incentive for care-giving. She provides an analysis of the increasing economic pressures on families and the concomitant decline in nurturing time parents spend with children, thus leaving more and more children growing up alone, without enough parental support.
- **Alex Kotlowitz**, *Wall Street Journal* reporter and author of There Are No Children Here.
Mr. Kotlowitz followed two boys growing up in a Chicago housing project and depicted their lives against the backdrop of rampant violence, street gangs, guns and drugs.
- **Ron Suskind**, *Wall Street Journal* reporter and author of A Hope in the Unseen.
Mr. Suskind describes the journey of Cedric Jennings, a talented black teenager struggling to succeed in one of the harshest, lowest-performing public high schools in Washington, D.C. Mr. Suskind follows Jennings beyond his high-school graduation to Brown University, and describes his story and the struggles of inner-city youth in modern America.
- The Attorney General.
- The Secretary of Education.

Weekly Report

Abortion -- A series of abortion-related votes occurred this week in the House, and we expect more next week. First, the Lowey provision in the House Treasury-Postal appropriations bill, requiring health plans participating in the FEHBP to provide coverage of contraceptives, was approved in the House by a vote of 224-198. Second, the House passed by a vote of 276-150 legislation which would make it illegal to transport a minor across state lines in order to avoid a state's parental consent law. Third, an Istook amendment to the House Labor HHS Appropriations bill requiring parental consent for Title X family planning services passed in Committee.

Next week, we can expect the House to vote on whether to override your veto of the Partial Birth Abortion bill and to consider international family planning restrictions in the Foreign Operations Appropriations bill. As you know, the Agriculture Appropriations bill, passed by the House, denies FDA funding for the testing or approval of RU-486. We have drafted for your signature a letter to Congress which expresses your concern over these politically motivated initiatives which will limit women's reproductive choices, harm women's health, and only lead to more abortions and unintended pregnancies by limiting women's access to family planning. The letter also calls on Congress, once again, to send you a bill banning so-called partial birth abortions, while including exceptions to protect women's lives and health.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 31, 1998

DINNER AND DISCUSSION ON YOUTH VIOLENCE

DATE: August 3, 1998
LOCATION: The White House Blue Room
TIME: 7:30 pm
FROM: Bruce Reed
Melanne Verveer

I. PURPOSE

To discuss issues of youth violence and the factors placing children at risk with a diverse group of leading writers and thinkers.

II. BACKGROUND

You will hear from a broad group of authors, writers and experts on topics such as: (1) the root causes of violence among young people; (2) the recent incidents of extreme violence; and (3) next steps we can take as a nation to address these problems. The discussion is likely to focus on the broader social forces that may contribute to youth violence, such as access to guns, the pervasiveness of violence in the media, early childhood trauma, the weakening of communities, and new social and economic stresses on families.

III. PARTICIPANTS

Briefing Participants

Rahm Emanuel
Bruce Reed
Melanne Verveer

Dinner Guests

Sissela Bok, author of Mayhem: Violence as Public Entertainment.

William Finnegan, author of Cold New World: Growing Up in a Harder Country, and writer for the New Yorker.

James Fox, Dean of the College of Criminal Justice, Northeastern University of Boston Massachusetts and author of Mass Murder; Overkill; and, Killer on Campus.

Sylvia Ann Hewlett, co-author of The War Against Parents (with Cornel West).

Dr. Steven Hyman, Director of the National Institute of Mental Health.

Robin Karr-Morse^d, author of Ghosts from the Nursery: Tracing the Roots of Violence.

David Kennedy, author of “Can We Keep Guns Away From Kids?” in *The American Prospect* and Director of the Boston Gun Project.

Rev. Eugene Rivers, Director of the Ella J. Baker House in Dorchester, Massachusetts.

Dr. Howard Snyder, Director of the National Center for Juvenile Justice in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.

Ron Suskind, author of A Hope in the Unseen and *Wall Street Journal* reporter. .

Robert Sampson, Professor of Sociology at the University of Chicago and Project Director for the Project on Human Development in Chicago Neighborhoods.

John Tierney, former Attorney General of Maine.

Cornel West, co-author of The War Against Parents (with Sylvia Ann Hewlett).

Administration

Attorney General Janet Reno

Shay Bilchik, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Department of Justice

Leslie Thornton, Chief of Staff, Department of Education

Melanne Verveer

Rahm Emanuel

Bruce Reed

VI. PRESS PLAN

Closed Press.

Note: Two guests are authors who are also print reporters (Finnegan and Suskind); they understand that the dinner is entirely off-the-record.

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

Informal dinner.

Bruce Reed will serve as discussion facilitator, as necessary.

VI. ATTACHMENTS

Background on dinner guests, including bios and excerpts of their writings.