

# FOIA MARKER

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**Folder Title:**

Briefing Materials 4/16/93

**Stack:**

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**Row:**

**90**

**Section:**

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Helicopter Evacuation

Encryption

Q: Your Administration today [Friday] announced a new initiative with regard to encryption products that it claims will improve the privacy of telephone communications while at the same time meeting the needs of law enforcement. Are the privacy rights of Americans going to be jeopardized by this initiative?

- A: -- Absolutely not. First of all, our approach is voluntary.
- We will give our citizens and business community the opportunity to buy an encryption product that is more secure, more convenient and less expensive than others readily available today.
- We are providing law enforcement with no new authorities to access the private conversations of Americans.
- The Administration is committed to policies that protect the rights of all Americans to privacy while also protecting them from those who break the law.

George Mamedov

"outrage + distress" Srebrenica

Christopher told Kozyrev all back  
off of Srebrenica file

Intolerable for us to stand aside.

Delay under circumstances of ceasefire

UNSC emergency mtg this afternoon

→ Pass forward of resolution

We will support resolution

Strongly sanctions absolute minimum

## Middle East Peace Talks

[Background: The Arab Foreign Ministers are meeting today [Friday] in Damascus to decide whether to accept our invitation to resume negotiations. A PLO official there has suggested further delay. After consultations here, a Hanan Ashrawi -- a Palestinian spokeswoman -- has said the Palestinians delegation cannot recommend resumption. Meanwhile, masked men in Jerusalem have threatened the families of several Palestinian delegates, including Feisal Husseini, if the Palestinians agree to resume negotiations.]

Q: Can you comment on the suggestion by a PLO official that Middle East peace negotiations should be delayed so that issues of concern to the Palestinians can be resolved beforehand?

A: -- I believe it is very important that the negotiations resume as the co-sponsors have proposed on April 20.

-- Negotiations are the only way to address effectively the issues that are of concern to the Palestinians.

-- Any delay in resuming negotiations will only put off solutions to those issues.

## Cambodia

Q: Does the Khmer Rouge's withdrawal from the SNC and Phnom Penh spell disaster for the UN-sponsored transition?

A: -- No, but we are concerned about recent developments in Cambodia.

-- We deplore the Khmer Rouge's cold-blooded killings of innocent UNTAC personnel and civilians.

-- We also regret the Khmer Rouge's apparent decision to pull out of Phnom Penh. But the Khmer Rouge long ago reneged on their commitment to the Paris Agreements.

-- These latest developments have not diminished our determination to press ahead with elections. Despite the many challenges that UNTAC faces, we believe that free and fair elections represent the best hope for the Cambodian people.

## Haiti

[Background: On the amnesty issue, it's important to understand the distinction between amnesty under Article 147 of the Haitian constitution and broad, blanket amnesty. Amnesty under 147 covers only political crimes, and Aristide has always been willing to grant that, and has said so publicly (most recently in his Easter speech). At issue is whether he is willing to grant amnesty for common crimes, which he believes the High Command is also guilty of (killings and other human rights abuses). Aristide has been much more ambiguous on this point. He has told Caputo in private that he's willing to extend the amnesty to common crimes, but he has told his advisors differently. He's probably, in fact, onboard, but we do not know for sure, and we certainly should not comment or speculate on this in public.]

Q: Any update on the Haiti talks?

A: -- Dante Caputo returned to Haiti Tuesday to continue his efforts toward a negotiated solution to the crisis there.

-- We are supporting those efforts; our Special Advisor in Washington, Ambassador Lawrence Pezzullo, and our Special Charge in Haiti, Ambassador Charles Redman, are following them closely.

-- We will leave it to Mr. Caputo to comment on the status of the talks.

Q: Any comment on Aristide's reported amnesty offer?

A: -- Amnesty has been a long-standing issue in the negotiations.

-- We believe assurances of security for all Haitians are necessary as part of a broader political settlement of Haiti's crisis.

-- Just what those assurances should be is a matter for the Haitians themselves to work out.

Q: Is it true that the U.S. military is planning to send military advisors to Haiti to professionalize the Haitian army?

A: -- We are considering civic action programs and programs to help professionalize the Haitian armed forces as part of a comprehensive settlement to restore democracy and the return of President Aristide to Haiti.

Q: What specifically is being considered, and when would the programs begin?

A: -- No final decisions have been made on specific programs. Timing will depend on the progress of the ongoing negotiations.

**FAX TRANSMITTAL**

**U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR**

**OFFICE OF INFORMATION AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS**

**TO:** George

**FROM:** Mary Meagher

**INSTRUCTIONS/COMMENTS:** \_\_\_\_\_

**NUMBER OF PAGES TO FOLLOW:** 2

## MEMORANDUM

April 15, 1993

TO: Interested Parties  
FR: Mary Meagher, DOL  
RE: Talking Points -- Response to NYT article on Jobs Data

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In response to the article which ran today in the NY Times Business section (see second page), following are some talking points you may find useful:

- 1) The fact remains that the numbers which were used by the Secretary and Larry Katz were accurate. The indicators which Secretary Reich and Larry Katz used, those from the monthly employment data, and those from the monthly household survey, are legitimate indicators. The laws of division still apply, and the results are still accurate.
- 2) The larger point, that this is a jobless recovery, is even more important. There are not enough full-time jobs being created during this period of recovery for a healthy and stable economy, and too many of the jobs we are recovering are involuntary part-time jobs. Virtually every economist agrees with these facts.
- 3) The comments made by Secretary Reich and Larry Katz in explaining the February's employment figures only highlighted the underlying reality that our nation's economy is in an undisputed jobless recovery.
- 4) With regard to Larry's reference to a "mistake:" Sylvia Nasar took his comments to her out of context. It is the best data available, and the calculation was legitimate. Larry was trying to convey to Nasar that he should have pointed to the volatility of using the figures from only one month's period, rather than looking to a longer-term trend.

# The Labor Secretary's Spin On Jobs Data Lifts Eyebrows

NY 02 4/15  
By SYLVIA NASAR

At a time when the economic outlook is confused and the President's economic stimulus package faces opposition, it should come as no surprise that the Clinton Administration is eager to put its own spin on politically charged economic statistics.

Most administrations do.

But a recent episode at the Labor Department has touched off much clucking within the economics community and within the department itself.

## An Inconvenient Fact

On March 5, just half an hour before the acting commissioner of the Bureau of Labor Statistics was due to testify on February employment statistics, Labor Secretary Robert Reich held his own special news conference. The February figures showed that the economy had created 385,000 new jobs in February, the biggest monthly

gain in years — a politically inconvenient fact for an Administration fighting for a big new jobs program.

The commissioner's testimony was fairly upbeat. In contrast, Mr. Reich maintained that while there were job gains in February, they did not make the stimulus program redundant because "90 percent of the new jobs that have been created are in involuntary part time, that is, the contingent work force."

This claim took many of the economists in his agency by surprise. As it turns out, there was no way for anyone to know what proportion of the payroll jobs were part-time, since the Labor Department simply does not ask businesses whether their payroll jobs are full- or part-time when it surveys them each month.

But Mr. Reich and his chief economist, Lawrence Katz, a labor economist from Harvard University, de-

*Continued on Page D2*

*Continued From First Business Page*

ceived the 90 percent statistic by going to a second Government survey, the so-called household survey by the Census Bureau, which asks individuals whether they worked in the previous month and, if so, whether they worked full time or part time.

But that survey produces totally separate data, and conclusions drawn from that data cannot be applied to the business payroll survey; for a variety of reasons, trends in one do not necessarily track trends in the other.

But that is what Mr. Reich and Mr. Katz did. They took the one-month jump in the number of Americans who said they were employed part time because they could not find full-time jobs, and applied it to that month's increase in the total number of Americans who said that they had jobs in February.

Their 90 percent figure was picked up by major news organizations and widely repeated as fact for weeks afterward.

## Volatile Data

The fact that the Labor Secretary had put out such a statistic created a furor among the department's career economists and statisticians. They drafted an internal memorandum — for use in answering telephone queries — to explain why one could not conclude what Mr. Reich had concluded from the data.

"The rise in total employment may have been largely persons working part time for economic reasons, or it

could have been all new full-time workers," the internal memo said. "We are unable to explicitly link the two movements."

What many of these economists and statisticians recognized is that the part-time data are extremely volatile from month to month, and that the rise in February was a blip that followed a sharp move in the opposite direction the previous month.

As the department's internal memorandum put it: "The trend over approximately the last year and a half has been flat, at a level of about 6.4 million even with periodic sharp monthly fluctuations (like this month for instance)."

Mr. Katz, for one, now admits that the calculation was indeed an error. "The notion that a lot of jobs created in this recovery are temporary and part time is an accurate perception," he said. But in using the 90 percent figure, he continued, "we made a mistake."

Economists outside the Labor Department were also quick to attack the Labor Secretary's calculations.

"How come they didn't say in the previous month that there was a big decline and this was a monthly blip?" asked Marvin Koters, an economist at the American Enterprise Institute, who had been chosen by President Bush to be the next Commissioner of the Bureau of Labor Statistics had he won re-election.

And Steven Roach, an economist at Morgan Stanley, called the Labor Secretary's approach "shenanigans."

"It smacks of cooking the numbers when it's convenient to do so, but

walking away from reality when it doesn't fit the script," Mr. Roach said. "It's unconscionable for a Cabinet level department at a critical juncture."

Some economists, however, said the episode reminded them of the time in 1971, during the Nixon Administration, when the Labor Secretary canceled the traditional briefing by the economist in charge of the the monthly employment report. Instead, the secretary issued his own rosy interpretation of some disappointing statistics. At that time, in 1971, much like today, unemployment was proving particularly stubborn.

In any case, Mr. Reich did not use the same approach this month, when the March jobs data were released.

"Using his methodology, the economy would have created 255,000 full-time jobs in March," said Mr. Roach of Morgan Stanley, pointing out that such an inference would have been ridiculous, though no more so than the contrary claim of the prior month.

Indeed, an April 2 public statement released by the Bureau of Labor Statistics sets the record straight from the Labor Department's perspective. Involuntary part-time employment, it said, had bobbed around a flat trend for a year and a half. And 25 percent — not 90 percent — of the payroll jobs created in the last year or so had sprouted in temporary help firms. And finally, it said, despite no further gains on either the unemployment or jobs-creation fronts in March, "the general trend in recent months has been one of slow improvement."

April 16, 1993

G-7 Support Package for Russia

- o The attached tables show two mutually reinforcing ways of presenting the G-7 announcement of support at Tokyo.
  - Table 1 breaks down the support by the type of assistance and how quickly we expect the funds to be provided.
  - Table 2 disaggregates support by when announcements were made, highlighting what is new versus what is a renewal of prior commitments.
- o The multilateral support effort announced by the G-7 foreign and finance ministers in Tokyo totals approximately \$28 billion.
  - This excludes the \$15 billion for the debt rescheduling, which provided real relief but not new disbursements from creditor countries.
- o The \$28 billion includes:
  - \$4 billion for initial stabilization support that will be provided quickly to allow the Russian government to take the first steps necessary to slow the expansive credit and monetary policy. Approximately half of this could be released as early as May with the remainder in early summer.
  - \$10 billion to support a full stabilization program that will be available in tranches over the coming year after agreement with the IMF on a stabilization program (\$4 billion for an IMF standby and \$6 billion for the currency stabilization program).
  - \$14 billion for structural reform and essential imports. These programs are more focussed on sectoral and microeconomic reform compared to the macroeconomic stabilization support. This includes World Bank and EBRD programs as well as approximately \$10 billion in bilateral export credits.

- 2 -

- o The second table breaks down the Tokyo announcement by what was new and was a renewal of prior commitments.
  - Approximately \$21 billion will be newly announced in Tokyo (including the \$10 billion in export credits).
  - \$7 billion is for renewed commitments to programs announced in FY 1992. This includes \$1 billion in already planned loans that the World Bank will move more rapidly to disburse and the \$6 billion currency stabilization fund which we believe is more likely to be activated as a result of the effort to streamline the IMF standby arrangement.



9-7 Support Package for Russia

<u>Initial stabilization support</u>	<u>\$4.1 billion</u>
--IMF Systemic Transformation Facility	\$3.0 billion
--World Bank Import Rehabilitation Loan	\$1.1 billion
<u>Support for full stabilization program</u>	<u>\$10.1 billion</u>
--IMF standby loan	\$4.1 billion
--IMF Currency Stabilization Fund	\$6.0 billion
<u>Support for structural reform and essential imports</u>	<u>\$14.3 billion</u>
--World Bank sectoral loan commitments	\$3.4 billion
--Cofinancing of World Bank loans	\$0.5 billion
--EBRD small and medium enterprise fund	\$0.3 billion
--Export credit agency credits and guarantees	\$10.0 billion
<u>Total</u>	<u>\$28.4 billion</u>
Memo item:	
Debt rescheduling	\$15.0 billion

WHITE HOUSE PRESS GUIDANCE -- 9:00 AM  
FRIDAY, APRIL 16, 1993

-- *Incription*  
ADDING: -- Bosnia: Srebrenica Threatened  
-- Bosnia: UNSC on Sanctions

Cambodia

Q: Does the Khmer Rouge's withdrawal from the SNC and Phnom Penh spell disaster for the UN-sponsored transition?

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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY/SPOKESMAN

For Immediate Release

April 15, 1993

STATEMENT BY RICHARD BOUCHER, SPOKESMAN

BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA HUMANITARIAN ASSESSMENT TEAM  
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

Attached is the executive summary of the report of the interagency humanitarian assessment team which traveled to Bosnia-Herzegovina last month. The executive summary is a six-page document presenting issues which the team identified as key as they prepare their draft comprehensive report.

We are following up on all the ideas presented in the report.

Many of the humanitarian actions identified by the assessment team, including some which fell even below the threshold for mention in the overall report, are within the means of appropriate agencies to pursue without reference to senior levels of the administration. These are already in various stages of follow-up or actual implementation.

As noted in the report, some of the recommendations had broader implications for policy and therefore required a wider and higher level review. That review continues. We are evaluating them in the context of our overall efforts to bring about a settlement as well as provide relief. On February 10, the Secretary promised "quite determined" steps to ensure the delivery of humanitarian supplies. We have flown airdrops now for 44 days and delivered over 1800 tons of food and medical supplies to those in need in eastern Bosnia. The UN has continued its efforts, despite the fighting and the security risks, in getting aid convoys into eastern and other parts of Bosnia.

The U.S. will continue to be at the forefront of efforts to stop the fighting, to bring Bosnian Serbs to a negotiated solution and to care for the many innocent people who are suffering because of the fighting.

## Humanitarian Assessment Team on Bosnia-Herzegovina

February 24 - March 10, 1993

### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

#### Introduction

International humanitarian relief efforts and an unusually mild Balkan winter are the two primary factors which combined to avert the predicted, much larger losses of life in war-ravaged Bosnia-Herzegovina. As the B-H economy continues its decline, dependence upon international relief for survival is mounting rapidly. The Bosnian Muslims are the overwhelming victims of the current war.

This report concentrates on identifying ways in which the USG can both augment and improve its own relief effort and contribute to enhancing the major, ongoing international programs. However, it also reconfirms the limits imposed on humanitarian relief which must be conducted in a war environment, especially one focused on civilian populations. In such an environment, there are no magic formulas to perfect the international relief effort in B-H.

NOTE: Although these recommendations are addressed to US policy makers and agencies, the humanitarian assessment team believes they must, if adopted, be carried out in conjunction with the UN, other donor nations and the private relief community.

#### Findings

##### 1. Political/military:

- a. The major cause of human suffering and loss of life in Bosnia-Herzegovina remains the war and attendant issues of:
  - oo security for both impacted populations and deliverers of relief when civilian populations are the specific targets of the war; and
  - oo lack of access to large elements of impacted populations.
- b. Despite Serbian and Bosnian Serb protestations that Bosnian Serb military commanders in isolated areas of B-H are acting independently when harassing relief workers or constricting the delivery of relief supplies, it is apparent that Belgrade and Pale are doing little to change the situation on the ground.

## E.S. - 2

- c. The team found evidence that Bosnian Croat forces (HVO) are increasing pressure on relief convoys and on Muslim civilians in areas under their control and areas designated as Croatian controlled under the Vance-Owen plan (e.g., Jablanica). HVO is vulnerable to Croatian government pressure and influence.
  - d. The deployment of UNPROFOR troops, despite continued attacks, has had a calming, facilitative effect on many parts of B-H. Although UNPROFOR units in Bosnia are not configured to aggressively enforce delivery of humanitarian aid, they have facilitated passage of convoys through checkpoints, established mail transfers, arranged prisoner and body exchanges, and assisted hospitals and other inter-communal facilities. The absence of either a permanent troop presence in or at least a liaison representation immediately adjacent to contested areas may constitute a lost opportunity to reduce tensions and assist the relief effort.
  - e. Acceptance and implementation of the Vance-Owen plan, particularly if marked by relative peace and the end of fighting, may lead to spontaneous large-scale population transfers, especially by Muslims to Muslim-controlled areas, creating major humanitarian assistance issues.
  - f. The forced termination of the UNPROFOR presence in Croatia and any resumption of Serb-Croat fighting there would have an immediate, major and disruptive impact on relief efforts throughout the region, including Serbia, Croatia, and especially B-H. Refugees and displaced persons, as well as other vulnerable groups, in all republics would be seriously and adversely affected.
2. Although they deliver only a portion of needed supplies, both the Sarajevo airlift and eastern Bosnia airdrop operations are very important -- supplementing food and medical deliveries and serving as sources of hope to innocent victims of the Bosnian catastrophe.
  3. The town and region around Tuzla in north central Bosnia risk being swamped with further major refugee flows if additional besieged enclaves of eastern Bosnia fall. Further, the central role of Tuzla in coal and electrical energy production for much of B-H makes it strategic in preventing the collapse of what remains of the B-H economy and further deterioration of the already disastrous electricity and water delivery systems in, for instance, Sarajevo. Marginal to impassable road conditions on the southern route from Croatia now through the spring thaw (while good roads exist, they are blocked by warring parties), and uncertainties of access over northern routes from Serbia, lead to pessimistic projections for resupplying Tuzla, even at current population levels. The Tuzla airport -- in terms of physical condition and cooperative attitude of responsible B-H authorities -- was studied by a qualified specialist seconded to the team and was found to be

## E.S. - 3

in condition to be made at least minimally operational now.

4. There are major weaknesses in medical and public health services available to the population at present, which vary from region to region and are susceptible to varying degrees of correction depending upon the issues of security and access noted above. Key areas of need are delivery of acute care, monitoring, and public health interventions, and there is the potential for severely worsening conditions. (The physicians from the CDC and other agencies who joined this assessment team have prepared a detailed description of medical care needs.)

5. There exist a range of problems in the areas of food and nutrition for large parts of the resident and refugee populations in and around B-H.

-- With the planting season at hand, there is an urgent need to provide a proper mix of seeds to those populations and areas in B-H which might be in a position to grow some of their own food requirements during the 1983 season. Agriculture in B-H, which satisfied only a fraction of domestic needs prior to the war, has ground to a virtual standstill.

-- Close attention is needed to ensure continued support of the food pipeline in the immediate and medium term future, as the number of beneficiaries grows in the wake of economic collapse and as currently important private contributions decline.

6. Logistics/relief delivery systems/public affairs and community relations:

a. Although both UNHCR and UNPROFOR staffs are dedicated to fulfilling their shared missions in leading the international assistance effort in B-H, short staffing, operational pressures, non-collocated headquarters, communications difficulties, and formidable logistical obstacles conspire to create relief delivery coordination problems in most of B-H. Coordination with NGOs is particularly difficult.

b. There is a current dearth of information available to the people of B-H regarding their own situation, as well as the evolution of international political developments and relief efforts on their behalf. A radio broadcasting facility capable of covering the country via short/medium wave and distribution of program materials to local stations could have a significant impact. A similar print media capacity could also be of great importance in supporting the morale of the population and in fostering positive relations between the people and key elements of the relief community.

c. UNPROFOR perceives significant opportunities for improving community relations at the local level, but has extremely

**E.S. - 4**

limited civil affairs expertise available to be drawn upon from current UNPROFOR contributing countries.

7. **Economic rehabilitation:** Beyond immediate relief needs, rehabilitation of critical economic sectors in B-H -- especially power generation/transmission and agriculture -- would greatly relieve suffering and improve prospects for moving beyond relief dependency in the mid-term.

8. Reliable data both on precise dimensions of specific needs and on the degree to which such needs are being met by existing relief efforts remain elusive, although there has been marginal improvement in information collection systems over recent months.

**Recommendations****1. Political/military:**

a. While actual recommendations on how to deal with the war itself go beyond the mandate of this team, the team notes some elements within the range of broader policy options which could have a beneficial impact in humanitarian terms:

oo The declaration and enforcement of safe havens for specifically identified beneficiary communities or populations;

oo A militarily robust system for delivery of relief supplies to such communities and populations, even in the absence of enforced safe havens; or

oo Application of robust military and/or renewed diplomatic means to silence heavy weapons systems which inflict a major portion of physical casualties and psychological trauma on civilian populations.

b. The USG should convey to Serb and Bosnian Serb leaders, in the strongest possible terms, that the US holds directly responsible for deaths and human suffering both the leaderships and those local commanders in B-H whose actions block humanitarian aid deliveries. Punitive measures must be developed (e.g., in the context of negotiations or confidence building measures) for obstruction of relief efforts.

c. To counter impact of HVO obstructions to Muslim relief:

-- The USG should insist that the GOC intervene with the HVO to cease its harassment of Muslim civilians and relief operations.

-- The USG should support the cost of additional employment of

## E.S. - 5

expatriate drivers and trucking necessary to transport relief material through central Bosnia checkpoints manned by opposing factions.

d. Beneficial effect of UN military presence:

- The USG should prompt discussion within the UN of creative mechanisms for establishing a small military presence, such as a UNPROFOR liaison team, in eastern B-H enclave regions, away from the front lines but in a position to facilitate relief and reconciliation initiatives or openings among the factions.
- UNPROFOR deployment to Banja Luka should be restudied.

2. Sarajevo airlift and eastern Bosnia airdrop operations:

- both operations should be continued at this time.:
- DOD officials should consult with AID, USDA and CDC experts on evolving composition of deliveries in both operations to maximize the benefits for target populations.

3. Tuzla Airport:

- The USG should review urgently options for participating in and actively supporting UN actions to open Tuzla airport in the very near future for delivery of food and critical coal/energy production-related materials.
- Short of a reopening, Tuzla airport should be given active consideration as a site for contingency airlift operations or air drops of key commodities.

4. Medical and public health:

- The USG (AID/DOD) should provide personnel and equipment in leading a major upgrading of medical care and preventive public health capabilities in B-H. Short of stopping military attacks on civilian populations, these steps will save the greatest number of innocent lives in B-H. (See Annex I.)

5. Food and nutrition:

- The USG (AID/USDA/DOD) should both identify the nutritionally appropriate mix of such seed and help cover costs of procurement and delivery of an appropriate portion of it, including by air drop -- beginning immediately. In view of the US' comparative disadvantage in providing bulk commodities from the US, and of obstacles to broader scale agricultural activities in B-H at present, the US effort should concentrate on relief of the individual through support of a "victory

## E.S. - 6

gardens" program.

- Planning for a surge of refugees into Tuzla and other Muslim-controlled areas, including either pre-positioning of food and medical supplies or the capacity to respond to such a surge, is necessary in consultation with other donors. (Finding 2.d.)
6. Logistics/relief delivery systems/public affairs and community relations:
- a. Multiple, linked coordination centers dealing with the UNHCR and NGO convoys, escorts, traffic control, etc., should be created. The USG (DOD/AID) should offer coordination and other support personnel to UNHCR and UNPROFOR, as well as communications and related equipment, identified in close consultations with UNHCR and UNPROFOR.
  - b. The USG should identify civilian and military media assets to be put at the disposal of UNPROFOR, for example, to conduct an intensive, ongoing public information program.
  - Alternatively, if a broader information system is created for keeping the people of B-H more aware of international efforts which affect them, ways should be found to use program content in support of UN agencies' roles and activities in B-H.
  - c. The USG should provide appropriately trained military personnel with concomitant resources to augment the fledgling UNPROFOR civil affairs effort aimed at improving its relations with the B-H populace, which poorly understands its limited, aid-related mission. This would not entail a formal US role in UNPROFOR, but the provision of a limited number of G-5 specialists to augment and train UNPROFOR G-5 staff. A possible model effort might be with UNPROFOR in Sarajevo.
7. A combined civilian-military task force on power supplies in B-H should be established to collaborate with B-H officials to enhance coal production, undertake power plant repairs and other programs possible in the current hostilities.

#### FUNDING IMPLICATIONS

There are few unexpended or non-earmarked funds available to the State, AID and Defense offices which normally bear the cost of humanitarian assistance programs. To the extent that options presented in this summary or in the full report require significant additional funding, the team will forward recommendations for reprogramming or for requesting a supplemental appropriation.

- 2 -

Qs & As

(IF ASKED)

Examples of actions we can implement without policy review:

- oo we are providing seeds for planting, following quick interagency consultations on most appropriate varieties;
- oo we are continuing both air drops into eastern Bosnia and the Sarajevo airlift;
- oo we are continuing and augmenting evacuation of special medical cases;
- oo we are studying intensely ways to be supportive of UN-centered relief activities.

Q. When did the team return from its mission, and why is the report only being issued now?

A. The team returned to Washington on March 10. Follow-up on elements of its findings not requiring high-level administration focus began immediately, and was not linked to formal or, particularly, public issuance of the report.

The executive summary in the form you see here was tabled by the team in late March. Administration deliberations on those of its findings which have broader implications -- for money, impact on other initiatives, effect on diplomatic efforts -- are not yet concluded.

(IF ASKED)

Q. Why did the team, in its briefings to Congressional staff, not brief the full contents of its findings?

A. It was the administration's preference to complete its internal deliberations on certain of the team's findings before briefing the Congress on them. The team noted at the outset of each briefing that there were certain of its findings upon which the administration was still deliberating, and that it was not at liberty to go deeply into them at the moment.

This summary was provided yesterday to key, interested members of the Congress.

- 3 -

(IF ASKED)

Q. What was the composition of this interagency team?

A. There were:


- oo representatives of various offices in the State and Defense Departments and the Agency for International Development;
- oo specialists from the Centers for Disease Control in Atlanta, from the US European Command in Stuttgart (EUCOM), and from US private voluntary agencies working in Bosnia-Herzegovina; as well as
- oo members of our embassies in Zagreb and Belgrade and of the Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) working out of Zagreb.
- oo The total number of participants in the travel in and around Bosnia-Herzegovina was 26.

(IF ASKED)

Q. Who led the team?

A. The team's leadership reflects the interagency nature of the endeavor:

- oo The team was led by Hugh G. Hamilton, Jr., Deputy Special Adviser for East European Assistance in the office of the Deputy Secretary of State.
- oo The deputy team leader was James Kunder, Director of the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) in AID, and the senior Defense Department representative was Captain (Navy) Larry Julihn of that department's office of European Policy.



April 15, 1992

Questions and Answers  
Press Briefing on Post-Vancouver Package

Q. Can you give us a breakdown of this new assistance package?

A. Of the \$1.8 billion in additional U.S. support announced today:

- \$500 million has been proposed for a U.S. contribution to a multilateral Special Privatization and Restructuring Fund that would be supplemented by contributions from other donors and would support the privatization of state enterprises in Russia:
- The remainder would be primarily used for grant support in the key areas of energy and environment, housing, private sector development, democracy support, exchanges, trade and investment programs, and humanitarian assistance:
- Some of the funds will also be used to support reform in other new independent states.
- We will be working with the Congress and leaders in Russia and the new independent states over the coming weeks to develop more detailed plans.

Q. How does the President intend to fund this package? Will he seek a supplemental budget from Congress this fiscal year?

A. The Administration is still consulting with Congress on funding for this package. No decisions have been made at this time.

- Q. Why has the Administration decided to announce a new package so shortly after Vancouver. Why are you doing this now before other G-7 countries have committed themselves to new assistance programs?
- A. At Vancouver, the President announced his intention to provide the \$1.6 billion in already appropriated funds on an expedited basis and targeted toward key Russian priorities. At that time, he indicated that more needed to be done to support the democratic and economic reforms in Russia. The additional U.S. support is intended to compliment and enhance the multilateral measures announced today.
- Other countries have joined the U.S. in this important effort. Japan announced an assistance package at the Tokyo ministerial. The Germans, Canadians and British have also announced new support for Russia in recent days.
- The multilateral package agreed to today along with the significant debt rescheduling announced two weeks ago also underlines the support of all the G-7 countries.
- As a result of discussion we have had at these meetings, we are hopeful that additional contributions to the efforts on privatization and denuclearization will be made in the weeks and months to come.
- Q. How does this assistance package relate to the \$700 million authorization that the President has already said he will seek in the FY 1994 budget.
- A. The \$1.8 billion announced today is separate from the \$700 million requested in the President's FY 1994 Budget.
- Q. Is an increased Nunn-Lugar authorization included in this package?
- A. No. The President had already requested an additional \$400 million authorization under Nunn-Lugar for de-nuclearization activities in the FY 1994 Budget. This is not included in the \$1.8 billion announced today.
- We are seeking to build on our Nunn-Lugar program by requesting that other G-7 countries contribute to a multilateral fund for the safe and secure dismantlement of nuclear weapons.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 16, 1993

Dear Mr. Chairman:

As the Senate prepares to return Monday to consideration of the pending appropriations bill to create jobs, to boost the economy, and to meet pressing human needs, it is important that we renew our commitment to breaking gridlock and to making government work.

To help accomplish those goals, I recommend you consider changes in the pending legislation to reduce its scope, while leaving unaffected certain key programs in the bill. I understand the procedural situation permits you and Senator Mitchell to offer a substitute amendment when the Senate reconvenes. Unfortunately, the rules of the Senate have enabled a minority to block the will of the majority. That makes it necessary for us to step forward and modify the bill in order to meet our objectives. Therefore I recommend you consider offering a substitute that includes these components:

- Leave in place the proposed funding levels for these essential programs to create jobs and to meet human needs: highway construction, summer jobs for young people, childhood immunization, the Ryan White program for AIDS victims, construction of wastewater treatment facilities, hiring meat inspectors, and assistance to small business. Of course, the \$4 billion for extended unemployment compensation benefits would be left in place.

- Reduce proportionately the other programs in the bill to bring budget authority down from \$16.2 billion to \$12 billion. This will require an across-the-board cut in other programs of about 44 percent.


- Target \$200 million for grants to local governments to hire police as a means of helping to fight crime and to offset layoffs resulting from the fiscal constraints on local government.

This approach would reduce the budget authority in this bill by approximately 25 percent, but it would create only 18 percent fewer jobs in this fiscal year.

I make this recommendation reluctantly, and regret the unwillingness of the minority to let the Senate act on the original legislation. But our mandate is to achieve change, to move the country forward, and to end business as usual in Washington. By taking the initiative in the face of an unrelenting filibuster I believe we can respond to that mandate and achieve a significant portion of our original goals.

Your advice and counsel, and persistent hard work for the working people of this country are greatly appreciated. You have my respect and the thanks of the millions of Americans in the cities, towns and rural communities across the nation who you are trying to help.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Robert C. Byrd", with a horizontal line underneath it.

The Honorable Robert C. Byrd  
United States Senate  
Washington, D.C. 20510