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UNHCR and World Food Program sources are cited as saying there is virtually no food left in warehouses in and around Bosnia. Were flights into Sarajevo suspended because there was nothing to carry? What's being done to get more pledges and more food?

A: -- WE ARE CONCERNED THAT THERE IS NOT ENOUGH FOOD IN THE PIPELINE FOR THE COMING MONTHS. WE ARE RAISING THIS ISSUE AT HIGH LEVELS WITH DONOR GOVERNMENTS.

-- [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] SHIPMENTS ARE ON THE WAY FROM THE U.S. AND CANADA, AND SECONDARY WAREHOUSES IN BOSNIA STILL HAVE FOOD IN THEM. IN ADDITION, THE U.S. IS SUPPLYING THREE MILLION DOLLARS TO UNHCR FOR THE IMMEDIATE PURCHASE OF FOOD.

-- UNHCR HAS INFORMED US THE AIRLIFT WAS SUSPENDED BECAUSE OF REPORTS OF THE INSERTION OF ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUNS AROUND SARAJEVO AIRPORT.

WHITE HOUSE PRESS GUIDANCE -- 9:00 AM
MONDAY, APRIL 12, 1993

ADDING: South Africa: Fallout from Assassination
Vietnam: POW/MIAs

Bosnia

Q: What can you tell us about the humanitarian assessment team to Bosnia and its findings?

A: -- As promised in Secretary Christopher's February 10 speech setting forth our basic policy toward the ex-Yugoslav conflict, the team went to Bosnia to assess what could be done to improve the humanitarian situation there while the war continued.

~~The team's only finished product thus far has been a briefing for Capital Hill and interested non-governmental organizations.~~

-- ~~We did not think it appropriate to preview policy recommendations in such a briefing before those recommendations had been considered within the Administration.~~

-- A wide variety of options already have been and will continue to be under consideration within the Administration. I will not comment on what those options might be.

-- While the mission of the humanitarian assessment team was not to make recommendations on how to end the fighting, we welcome suggestions from any quarter as a contribution to our ongoing deliberations within the executive branch.

PRESS GUIDANCE

NEW YORK TIMES ARTICLE ON HUMANITARIAN ASSESSMENT TEAM FINDINGS
RE BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

(FOLLOWING ON AN IF-ASKED BASIS ONLY)

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- Q. According to an April 11 New York Times article, the administration is trying to suppress some of the findings and recommendations of the humanitarian assessment team sent to Bosnia-Herzegovina from late February to early March -- including specifically a recommendation to establish safe havens for the protection of the populations of the eastern Bosnian enclaves.
- Has the team made that specific recommendation or others with which the administration is unhappy?
- Is it true that the administration is trying to suppress that or other recommendations?
- A.- Secretary Christopher announced on February 10 that we would put together a United States Government team to assess further humanitarian needs. An interagency humanitarian assessment team, focussed on the urgent crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina, traveled to many parts of the former Yugoslavia between February 24 and March 10. Parts of that team visited a large number of locations in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The team identified a wide range of options for augmenting US contributions to the large, ongoing international relief effort.
- The large majority of the team's findings fall within the competency of various departments (State, AID, DOD) to follow through on, and appropriate actions are already under study or in some cases actually underway.
- In a few cases, possible courses of action have broader implications -- for money, impact on other initiatives, effect on diplomatic efforts -- which must be considered at the policy level of the administration. The review process of those particular issues has not yet concluded. Until that process is concluded, we are not prepared to comment on the specifics of those issues.
- None of the views of the team members were suppressed. However, not every viewpoint of each individual member obtained the consensus to make it into the final report.

- 2 -

(FOLLOWING ON AN IF-ASKED BASIS ONLY)

- Q. We have seen an early draft of an executive summary of findings, which specifically recommends safe havens. Yet members of the team, in briefing Hill staffers earlier this week, did not include that recommendation in their report. Does this not reflect an administration effort to suppress that finding/recommendation?
- A.- The team clearly found that the major cause of human suffering and loss of life in Bosnia-Herzegovina remains the war and attendant issues of:
- oo security for both impacted populations and deliverers of relief when civilian populations are the specific targets for the war; and
 - oo lack of access to large elements of impacted populations.
- At the same time, without addressing the substance of specific courses of action recommended by the team, it is inaccurate to suggest that there is anything unusual about the administration wanting to follow through on its own deliberations before briefing parties outside the administration (whether Hill or others) on the status of those issues.
- Possible differences between a putative draft recommendation for internal discussion within the administration and the content of a briefing on that issue outside the administration -- during the period of internal administration deliberation -- in no way implies an administration effort to suppress the issue or the recommendation.

THE WHITE HOUSE**Office of the Press Secretary**

For Immediate Release**April 11, 1993****Statement by the Press Secretary
Announcing Mission to Vietnam by the President's
Special Emissary for POW/MIA Affairs**

The President has asked General John W. Vessey, Jr. to travel to Vietnam April 18-19 to assess Vietnamese cooperation on accounting of American POW/MIA's and to seek further progress. The government of Vietnam has agreed to receive General Vessey.

President Clinton has pledged that the fullest possible accounting for our service personnel must lie at the core of our policy toward Vietnam. General Vessey's trip is a step in the Administration's effort to make progress on this critical issue. While important advances have been made in recent years, the President seeks to determine whether the Vietnamese are cooperating fully.

The President is grateful that General Vessey has agreed to undertake this important mission. No one is better qualified to provide the best possible assessment of the progress to date on this issue or commands greater respect among the American people for his decades of dedicated service to the nation. As the President's Special Emissary to Hanoi for POW/MIA Affairs since 1987, he has been responsible for much of what has been achieved in recent years.

The President is looking forward to working with him, with the families of POW/MIA's, with veterans organizations, and with the United States Congress to assure the fullest possible accounting of our service personnel in Vietnam.

Attached is a biography of General Vessey.

###

BIOGRAPHY OF GENERAL JOHN W. VESSEY, JR.

General John W. Vessey, Jr. was appointed the tenth Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense, by President Ronald Reagan June 18, 1982. He was reappointed to a second two-year term in 1984. In this capacity, he served as the senior military advisor to the President, the Secretary of Defense and the National Security Council. General Vessey served as Vice Chief of Staff, United States Army, prior to his appointment as Chairman.

General Vessey was born and raised in Minnesota. He enlisted in the Minnesota National Guard in May, 1939, and was called to active duty in February 1941. He rose to the rank of first sergeant before receiving a battlefield commission as a second lieutenant of Field Artillery at the Anzio beachhead May 6, 1944.

Much of the first 30 years of General Vessey's military service was with combat divisions. His assignments included duty with the 34th Infantry Division in North Africa and Italy during World War II, the 4th Infantry Division in Germany, two tours with the 3rd Armored Division in Germany, the 25th Infantry Division in Vietnam, and command of the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) at Fort Carson, Colorado.

In 1970, General Vessey returned to Southeast Asia for his first assignment as a brigadier general. He served in Thailand, then in Laos, where he was responsible for coordinating US military operations until the cease-fire was signed in Laos in February 1973.

Upon promotion to Lieutenant General in 1975, General Vessey became the US Army's Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans. He was promoted to general in 1976 and assigned to Korea as Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command; Commander, US Forces, Korea; and Commanding General, Eighth US Army. In 1978, he also became the first Commander-in-Chief of the Republic of Korea-United States Combined Forces Command. General Vessey returned to Washington in July 1979 to become the Vice Chief of Staff, United States Army.

General Vessey's military schooling includes the Special Basic, Associate Advanced, and Advanced courses of the Field Artillery School; the Command and General Staff College; the Armed Forces Staff College; the Industrial College of the Armed Forces; and the Army Aviation School.

He is the recipient of numerous US military decorations and awards including the Distinguished Service Cross, the Defense Distinguished Service Medal, the Army Distinguished Service Medal, and the Purple Heart. He has also been decorated by the Governments of Belgium, Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, France, Greece, Honduras, Korea, Luxembourg, Norway, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Thailand, and Uruguay.

General Vessey's civilian education includes a Bachelor of Science degree from the University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland, and a Master of Science degree from The George Washington University, Washington, DC. He also attended the University of Pittsburgh's Management Program for Executives. He is a member of Phi Kappa Phi Honor Society. General Vessey was awarded an honorary Doctorate of Letters from Concordia College, St. Paul, Minnesota; an honorary Doctor of Laws from the University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland; and honorary Doctor of Laws from Concordia Seminary, St. Louis, Missouri; and an honorary Doctor of Military Science from Norwich University, Northfield, Vermont.

In addition to his military duties, General Vessey serves on the Board of Governors of the American Red Cross; Youth Service, USA, Inc.; National Flag Day Committee; and is Co-Chairman, Awards Committee, American Academy of Achievement. He is also a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and the Washington Policy Council of the International Management and Development Institute (INDI). Among his civilian awards honoring his public service are the State of Minnesota Distinguished Service Medal; the Alumni Achievement Award and the Distinguished Public Service Award, The George Washington University; the Distinguished Alumnus Award, American Academy of Achievement; the Reserve Officers Association Minuteman Hall of Fame Award; the Admiral John M. Will Award, New York Council of the Navy League; the Maxwell A. Kriendler Award, Air Force Association, Inongate Chapter; the David Sarnoff Award, Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association; and the National League of Families honorary award recognizing efforts on behalf of prisoners and missing in Southeast Asia.

General Vessey is married to the former Avis Funk of Minneapolis, Minnesota. They have two sons, John III, a Foreign Service Officer, and David, a Warrant Officer with the US Army; and a daughter, Sarah Vessey Krawczyk.

Retirement: effective October 1, 1985.

Vietnam:
VESSEY MISSION Q & A

- Q: What is the purpose of the General's mission?
- A: -- THE PRESIDENT HAS PLEDGED THAT THE FULLEST POSSIBLE ACCOUNTING FOR OUR SERVICE PERSONNEL MUST LIE AT THE CORE OF OUR POLICY WITH VIETNAM.
- WHILE THERE UNQUESTIONABLY HAS BEEN PROGRESS ON POW/MIA ACCOUNTING IN VIETNAM, THE ISSUE FOR THE PRESIDENT IS WHETHER THE VIETNAMESE ARE COOPERATING FULLY.
- THEREFORE THE PRESIDENT HAS ASKED GENERAL VESSEY TO GO TO VIETNAM TO EVALUATE THE PROGRESS TO DATE, AND TO SEEK FURTHER PROGRESS ON POW/MIA ACCOUNTING.
- UPON HIS RETURN, THE GENERAL WILL PROVIDE THE PRESIDENT WITH AN ASSESSMENT OF VIETNAM'S POW/MIA COOPERATION.
- Q: What will be the Administration's policy on Vietnam at the IMF/World Bank meeting later this month?
- A: -- THE PRESIDENT HAS MADE NO DECISIONS REGARDING FURTHER STEPS IN U.S. POLICY TOWARD VIETNAM.
- Q: When will the President take further steps to lift the U.S. embargo on Vietnam?
- A: -- THERE IS NO TIMETABLE FOR FUTURE STEPS IN U.S. POLICY TOWARD VIETNAM.
- Q: Why is the President sending General Vessey to Hanoi?
- A: -- THE GENERAL HAS BEEN THE PRESIDENT'S SPECIAL EMISSARY TO HANOI FOR POW/MIA AFFAIRS SINCE 1987. OUR POW/MIA EFFORTS IN VIETNAM HAVE ACCOMPLISHED A GREAT DEAL DURING THAT TIME, DUE IN LARGE PART TO GENERAL VESSEY'S WORK. NO ONE IS BETTER QUALIFIED TO PROVIDE THE PRESIDENT THE BEST POSSIBLE ASSESSMENT OF THE PROGRESS TO DATE ON THIS ISSUE.
- Q: How many times has General Vessey gone to Vietnam in his role as the President's Special Emissary?
- A: -- SINCE PRESIDENT REAGAN FIRST ASKED THE GENERAL TO BE THE SPECIAL EMISSARY FOR POW/MIA AFFAIRS, HE HAS UNDERTAKEN SIX MISSIONS TO VIETNAM.
- GENERAL VESSEY'S MISSIONS TOOK PLACE IN AUGUST 1987; OCTOBER 1989; APRIL 1991; OCTOBER 1991; JANUARY 1992; AND IN OCTOBER 1992.

Q: The White House statement reports that when Chinese officials visited CINCPAC they turned over new information on two POW/MIA cases. Can you give us details?

- A: -- IN A VERY IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENT, A DELEGATION FROM THE PRC PROVIDED US WITH NEW INFORMATION THAT CONFIRMS THE DEATHS OF TWO U.S. NAVY PILOTS MISSING IN CHINA FROM THE VIETNAM WAR. THE U.S. GOVERNMENT DEEPLY APPRECIATES THE ASSISTANCE OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT IN THIS IMPORTANT HUMANITARIAN ISSUE. THIS ASSISTANCE REFLECTS A NEW LEVEL OF COOPERATION BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES ON ACCOUNTING FOR OUR MISSING SERVICEMEN.
- THE TWO PILOTS HAD BEEN MISSING SINCE 1967, WHEN THEIR PLANE HAD INADVERTANTLY ENTERED CHINESE AIRSPACE WHILE ON A MISSION TO VIETNAM.
- THE CHINESE HANDED OVER PHOTOS OF THE BODIES OF THE TWO PILOTS AND PHOTOS OF THEIR I.D. CARDS. THE PHOTOS CLEARLY SHOW BOTH PILOTS TO BE DEAD, AND APPEAR CONTEMPORANEOUS TO THE INCIDENT OF LOSS.
- THE PHOTOGRAPHS WERE PRESENTED TO THE U.S. BY A PRC DELEGATION THAT VISITED CINCPAC MARCH 28 TO APRIL 1 FOR POW/MIA-RELATED BRIEFINGS AND MEETINGS WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DEFENSE DEPARTMENT, U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND, AND THE U.S. ARMY CENTRAL IDENTIFICATION LABORATORY - HAWAII. WE WITHHELD ANNOUNCING THIS DEVELOPMENT PENDING NOTIFICATION OF THE FAMILIES OF THE TWO PILOTS.
- IN A MARCH 31 MEETING, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE KENNETH M. QUINN LED A COMBINED DEPARTMENT OF STATE - DOD DELEGATION IN A MEETING WITH THE PRC DELEGATION, AND HE PROPOSED FURTHER COOPERATION WITH CHINA ON POW/MIA MATTERS.

SEVLC 8316
4/9/93

U.S. Contacts with Egyptian Fundamentalists

Q: Why were U.S. Embassy officers meeting with Islamic extremists?

A: -- U.S. Embassies are routinely involved in assessing the political dynamics of the countries in which they are located. In fulfillment of this task, Embassy officers are often in touch with opposition elements.

-- In Egypt and elsewhere in the Middle East, we have made clear that we have no interest in a dialogue with extremist elements who advocate the use of violence for political reasons. As the President has repeatedly declared, there will be zero tolerance in this Administration for these extremists.

Iraq

Q: What comment do you have on The New York Times report that the Clinton Administration has cut the budget for the CIA's covert action program against Iraq in half?

A: -- We will not comment on intelligence matters.

-- US policy on Iraq remains firm. We want full compliance with all the UN resolutions. As Secretary Christopher told Congress last month, we believe that by "pressing those resolutions, we will ensure Saddam Hussein's departure from power." We are not softening our position on Iraq or Saddam.

Occupied Territories

Q: Do you have any reaction on the Israeli move to seal off the Occupied Territories?

A: -- The United States deplores the increasing violence that claims innocent lives both in the Occupied Territories and Israel.

-- We have made it clear that we believe the Israeli Government has the responsibility of providing security for its people and for the security of the territories under its control. ~~We have also urged all parties to act with restraint.~~

-- Only a political settlement will help solve the problems underlying the violence in the Middle East.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Office of the Assistant Secretary/Spokesman

For Immediate Release

April 10, 1993

ASSASSINATION OF CHRIS HANI

THE ASSASSINATION OF CHRIS HANI IS A DEPLORABLE AND TROUBLING EVENT. THIS BRUTAL MURDER WILL SADDEN ALL WHO ARE WORKING FOR PEACE, DEMOCRACY AND JUSTICE IN SOUTH AFRICA. IT UNDERSCORES THE URGENT NEED TO END VIOLENCE IN THE COUNTRY AND TO PUSH AHEAD WITH THE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH WILL CREATE A DEMOCRATIC SOUTH AFRICA.

CHRIS HANI ACTIVELY SUPPORTED THESE NEGOTIATIONS AND ONLY THIS WEEK CALLED FOR AN END TO VIOLENCE SO THE NEGOTIATIONS COULD PROCEED IN A CLIMATE OF PEACE AND STABILITY.

WE SHARE THE GRIEF OF THE HANI FAMILY AND EXTEND OUR CONDOLENCES TO THEM AND TO MR. HANI'S CLOSE FRIENDS.

**Statement of the Decision
to seek Fast Track Renewal**

The President has asked me to announce today his decision to pursue with Congress the approval of legislation renewing fast track procedures to conclude the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations.

Since taking office in January, this Administration's highest priority has been to strengthen the U.S. economy. We have put forth an ambitious program designed to reduce the budget deficit and increase investment in areas critical to our future economic strength. But while the Administration's economic strategy starts with the enactment of the President's economic program, global economic growth from expanded world trade is a crucial part of our strategy.

The Uruguay Round, involving more than 100 nations, began in 1986. The failure to complete the Round has been a source of disappointment and frustration to the United States and many of our trading partners. A successful Round would lower tariff and non-tariff barriers around the world, and establish new multilateral rules for world trade. It would be the single most important step we can take to open foreign markets around the world to U.S. manufactured goods, agricultural products and services.

President Clinton and Ambassador Kantor have spoken with leaders from the EC, Japan and other nations and emphasized our strong desire to complete an ambitious Uruguay Round this year. They believe that our trading partners share their commitment to the overriding importance of completing the Round.

Consequently, the President has decided, after consulting with members of Congress, to seek the legislation needed to complete these important negotiations this year. The draft bill we will send to Congress would extend Congressional "fast track" procedures to a Uruguay Round implementing bill, provided that he notifies the Congress no later than December 15, 1993, of his intent to enter into such agreement before April 15, 1994.

I want to emphasize that the President is seeking this authority only for the Uruguay Round. The President has previously said that he intends to negotiate a trade agreement with Chile, and we will seek authority for that agreement at the appropriate time. Similarly, while many members of Congress have trade legislative proposals to which they are committed, some of which the Administration supports, we hope that they will be willing to defer from offering those proposals on this legislation, enabling Congress to move quickly to give the

~~President the authority needed to help bring the Round to a successful conclusion.~~

Conventional wisdom says it will be difficult to complete this Round, to expand and liberalize trade at a time when much of the world economy is in the doldrums. But the President believes that is precisely the time when we must do it. We ask other nations to join us in taking the sometimes hard steps needed to bring the Round to a successful conclusion, for the benefit of all nations.

Q's and A's on Fast Track Announcement

Q. Did the Administration consult with the Hill in reaching the conclusion that you should seek fast track only for the Uruguay Round?

A. We did consult with key members in the Congressional leadership and on the committees with jurisdiction over trade. Their overall reaction was that if the President asked for the negotiating authority to try to complete the Round, Congress would likely give him the chance. A broader request, however, would open the door to a major trade bill, which we are not seeking at the present time.

Q. The request envisions 120 days between the time when the President gives notice of his intention to enter into an agreement and when he actually signs it. Why have you increased from the usual 90 days?

A. Congress would be out of session for much of December and January, and we wanted to make sure that Congress had adequate time to fully review the envisioned agreement and consult with the Administration.

Q. Isn't the decision to seek fast track only for the Uruguay Round a disappointment to Latin American nations, particularly Chile, which hoped to be next in line to negotiate a trade agreement with the U.S.?

A. The decision in no way diminishes our admiration for what Chile (and other nations in Latin America) have accomplished in liberalizing their economies and democratizing their political systems. As I indicated, we plan, at some future point, to seek from Congress the authority to negotiate a bilateral trade agreement with Chile. But traditionally, general negotiating authority will be granted only after major consultation with Congress and extensive discussion of, and debate over, trade policy and priorities.

Our decision today reflects the reality that in the coming months, our trade negotiating priorities are completing of the Uruguay Round, and the implementation of the NAFTA, assuming we can reach sufficiently strong supplemental agreements on labor, the environment and import surges. We will also, of course, be working hard on bilateral issues with Japan and China, as well as Special 301 on intellectual property, enforcing existing trade agreements and using statutory tools that Congress has provided.

Q. How quickly do you think you can get a fast track renewal through Congress?

A. We have no fixed timetable in mind, but the chairmen and ranking members of the trade committees have been supportive and encouraging, and we hope the Congress will share their view that it is important for us to do our part to complete the Round.

Q. President Clinton and Ambassador Kantor have expressed support for "Super 301". Would the Administration oppose a Congressional effort to add Super 301 to a fast track bill?

A. The President does believe Super 301 has been a useful tool in opening foreign markets. But we would like to put this fast track extension through as quickly and cleanly as possible; therefore we would prefer that even amendments that we support should wait for another legislative vehicle.

Q. Can you elaborate on why the President thinks that the Round can be successfully completed this year?

A. The President has had conversations with numerous leaders of our trading partners about the Uruguay Round, including Prime Minister Major, President Mitterand, Chancellor Kohl, and EC President Delors. He has received a letter from Argentine President Menem conveying the strong views of 37 nations about the importance of completing the Round. He looks forward to discussing the subject with Prime Minister Miyazawa. There is a widely shared belief that the Round must be successfully completed, and as has been said "if not now, when? If not us, who?"

Q. Can you give us any insight into the Administration's strategy for finishing the Round?

A. Ambassador Kantor has conferred with Sir Leon Brittan, the EC Trade Minister, and they have agreed that the U.S. and the EC should take the lead in an intense work plan, starting immediately, to make concrete progress in the weeks leading up to the G-7 Summit in Tokyo in July. The U.S. and the EC have begun meeting bilaterally on market access issues and have received enthusiastic responses from other nations about joining in the talks in the coming weeks.

Q. There has been concern that the Administration is seeking major changes in the Draft Final Act, also known as the Dunkel Text. If the U.S. seeks such changes, won't other nations, causing the text to unravel?

A. We admire the prodigious work that went into the Dunkel text, but we do see some areas in which it has to be strengthened. No one should doubt that there is still a lot of work, and some hard bargaining ahead. We are committed to doing our part to see this through to a successful conclusion.

Q. Do you see the current unpopularity of NAFTA on the Hill hampering progress on the Uruguay Round?

A. They are distinct trade agreements, each posing very different issues. I think that Congress will take each on its respective merits. Let me say on NAFTA: if we are successful in our efforts to negotiate strong supplemental agreements, I think the value of NAFTA, in terms of economic benefits, and enhanced environmental quality and worker standards, will be more widely appreciated as the year goes on.

Q. Can you give us some idea of your positions on particular issues in the Round, and how they have changed from the Bush Administration?

A. Ambassador Kantor has said he won't do his negotiating in public, and I certainly won't.

Q. Will this legislation increase the deficit, requiring the Administration to raise revenues to pay for it?

A. We have fully reflected the costs of the Uruguay Round in the President's budget.

Q. Does the President really think that you can successfully implement NAFTA and negotiate the Uruguay Round at the same time?

A. We thought it would be a very busy, challenging year, and it is shaping up as we anticipated. And you failed to mention the economic package and health care.

Vietnam Prisoners

Q: When did the Administration learn about the document of possible POW's in Vietnam. What did you do about it? Did it come up at the summit?

A: [NOTE: The document is a Russian translation of a report apparently given by General Liutenant Van Quang to the Vietnamese politburo of the Central Committee September 15, 1972. It claims the total number of American POW's held by North Vietnam at that time was 1205,, even though the number of American POW's returned at homecoming in 1973 was 591.]

The Administration (NSC, DOD) was notified of the document in mid-February by a Congressional source. NSC officials contacted Harvard researcher Steve Morris and asked to meet with him.

Mr. Morris met with the NSC in mid-February and there have been several subsequent conversations.

Morris did not provide the NSC with a copy of the document but, on the basis of the information provided by Morris, the White House asked DOD to evaluate the information.

DIA did so and raised some questions.

Last month, US officials, working through the US-Russia Joint Commission on MIA/POW affairs, asked the Russians about the document.

It was turned over to Ambassador Malcolm Toon on April 8 and is being evaluated by U.S. government experts on an expedited basis.

Questions raised in this document will be raised with the Vietnamese by General Vessey on his trip to Vietnam later this week.

Q: Did you raise the issue with Yeltsin in Vancouver?

The issue of Russian cooperation on Vietnamese MIA/POW's did come up at the summit.

*George - not final. Call me before you
go out.*

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[REDACTED] SHIPMENTS ARE ON THE WAY FROM THE U.S. AND CANADA, AND SECONDARY WAREHOUSES IN BOSNIA STILL HAVE FOOD IN THEM. IN ADDITION, THE U.S. IS SUPPLYING THREE MILLION DOLLARS TO UNHCR FOR THE IMMEDIATE PURCHASE OF FOOD.

- *we have recently requested additional contributions from allies.*
- **UNHCR HAS INFORMED US THE AIRLIFT WAS SUSPENDED BECAUSE OF REPORTS OF THE INSERTION OF ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUNS AROUND SARAJEVO AIRPORT.**

WHITE HOUSE PRESS GUIDANCE -- 12:00 PM
MONDAY, APRIL 12, 1993

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Upon promotion to Lieutenant General in 1975, General Vessey became the US Army's Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans. He was promoted to general in 1976 and assigned to Korea as Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command; Commander, US Forces, Korea; and Commanding General, Eighth US Army. In 1978, he also became the first Commander-in-Chief of the Republic of Korea-United States Combined Forces Command. General Vessey returned to Washington in July 1979 to become the Vice Chief of Staff, United States Army.

General Vessey's military schooling includes the Special Basic, Associate Advanced, and Advanced courses of the Field Artillery School; the Command and General Staff College; the Armed Forces Staff College; the Industrial College of the Armed Forces; and the Army Aviation School.

He is the recipient of numerous US military decorations and awards including the Distinguished Service Cross, the Defense Distinguished Service Medal, the Army Distinguished Service Medal, and the Purple Heart. He has also been decorated by the Governments of Belgium, Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, France, Greece, Honduras, Korea, Luxembourg, Norway, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Thailand, and Uruguay.

General Vessey's civilian education includes a Bachelor of Science degree from the University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland, and a Master of Science degree from The George Washington University, Washington, DC. He also attended the University of Pittsburgh's Management Program for Executives. He is a member of Phi Kappa Phi Honor Society. General Vessey was awarded an honorary Doctorate of Letters from Concordia College, St. Paul, Minnesota; an honorary Doctor of Laws from the University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland; and honorary Doctor of Laws from Concordia Seminary, St. Louis, Missouri; and an honorary Doctor of Military Science from Norwich University, Northfield, Vermont.

In addition to his military duties, General Vessey serves on the Board of Governors of the American Red Cross; Youth Service, USA, Inc.; National Flag Day Committee; and is Co-Chairman, Awards Committee, American Academy of Achievement. He is also a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and the Washington Policy Council of the International Management and Development Institute (INDI). Among his civilian awards honoring his public service are the State of Minnesota Distinguished Service Medal; the Alumni Achievement Award and the Distinguished Public Service Award, The George Washington University; the Distinguished Alumnus Award, American Academy of Achievement; the Reserve Officers Association Minuteman Hall of Fame Award; the Admiral John M. Will Award, New York Council of the Navy League; the Maxwell A. Kriendler Award, Air Force Association, Longate Chapter; the David Samoff Award, Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association; and the National League of Families honorary award recognizing efforts on behalf of prisoners and missing in Southeast Asia.

General Vessey is married to the former Avis Funk of Minneapolis, Minnesota. They have two sons, John III, a Foreign Service Officer, and David, a Warrant Officer with the US Army, and a daughter, Sarah Vessey Krawczyk.

Retirement: effective October 1, 1985.

Vietnam:
VESSEY MISSION O & A

Q: What is the purpose of the General's mission?

A: -- THE PRESIDENT HAS PLEDGED THAT THE FULLEST POSSIBLE ACCOUNTING FOR OUR SERVICE PERSONNEL MUST LIE AT THE CORE OF OUR POLICY WITH VIETNAM.

-- WHILE THERE UNQUESTIONABLY HAS BEEN PROGRESS ON POW/MIA ACCOUNTING IN VIETNAM, THE ISSUE FOR THE PRESIDENT IS WHETHER THE VIETNAMESE ARE COOPERATING FULLY.

-- THEREFORE THE PRESIDENT HAS ASKED GENERAL VESSEY TO GO TO VIETNAM TO EVALUATE THE PROGRESS TO DATE, AND TO SEEK FURTHER PROGRESS ON POW/MIA ACCOUNTING.

-- UPON HIS RETURN, THE GENERAL WILL PROVIDE THE PRESIDENT WITH AN ASSESSMENT OF VIETNAM'S POW/MIA COOPERATION.

Q: What will be the Administration's policy on Vietnam at the IMF/World Bank meeting later this month?

A: -- THE PRESIDENT HAS MADE NO DECISIONS REGARDING FURTHER STEPS IN U.S. POLICY TOWARD VIETNAM.

Q: When will the President take further steps to lift the U.S. embargo on Vietnam?

A: -- THERE IS NO TIMETABLE FOR FUTURE STEPS IN U.S. POLICY TOWARD VIETNAM.

Q: Why is the President sending General Vessey to Hanoi?

A: -- THE GENERAL HAS BEEN THE PRESIDENT'S SPECIAL EMISSARY TO HANOI FOR POW/MIA AFFAIRS SINCE 1987. OUR POW/MIA EFFORTS IN VIETNAM HAVE ACCOMPLISHED A GREAT DEAL DURING THAT TIME, DUE IN LARGE PART TO GENERAL VESSEY'S WORK. NO ONE IS BETTER QUALIFIED TO PROVIDE THE PRESIDENT THE BEST POSSIBLE ASSESSMENT OF THE PROGRESS TO DATE ON THIS ISSUE.

Q: How many times has General Vessey gone to Vietnam in his role as the President's Special Emissary?

A: -- SINCE PRESIDENT REAGAN FIRST ASKED THE GENERAL TO BE THE SPECIAL EMISSARY FOR POW/MIA AFFAIRS, HE HAS UNDERTAKEN SIX MISSIONS TO VIETNAM.

-- GENERAL VESSEY'S MISSIONS TOOK PLACE IN AUGUST 1987; OCTOBER 1989; APRIL 1991; OCTOBER 1991; JANUARY 1992; AND IN OCTOBER 1992.

Q: The White House statement reports that when Chinese officials visited CINCPAC they turned over new information on two POW/MIA cases. Can you give us details?

A: -- IN A VERY IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENT, A DELEGATION FROM THE PRC PROVIDED US WITH NEW INFORMATION THAT CONFIRMS THE DEATHS OF TWO U.S. NAVY PILOTS MISSING IN CHINA FROM THE VIETNAM WAR. THE U.S. GOVERNMENT DEEPLY APPRECIATES THE ASSISTANCE OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT IN THIS IMPORTANT HUMANITARIAN ISSUE. THIS ASSISTANCE REFLECTS A NEW LEVEL OF COOPERATION BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES ON ACCOUNTING FOR OUR MISSING SERVICEMEN.

-- THE TWO PILOTS HAD BEEN MISSING SINCE 1967, WHEN THEIR PLANE HAD INADVERTANTLY ENTERED CHINESE AIRSPACE WHILE ON A MISSION TO VIETNAM.

-- THE CHINESE HANDED OVER PHOTOS OF THE BODIES OF THE TWO PILOTS AND PHOTOS OF THEIR I.D. CARDS. THE PHOTOS CLEARLY SHOW BOTH PILOTS TO BE DEAD, AND APPEAR CONTEMPORANEOUS TO THE INCIDENT OF LOSS.

-- THE PHOTOGRAPHS WERE PRESENTED TO THE U.S. BY A PRC DELEGATION THAT VISITED CINCPAC MARCH 28 TO APRIL 1 FOR POW/MIA-RELATED BRIEFINGS AND MEETINGS WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DEFENSE DEPARTMENT, U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND, AND THE U.S. ARMY CENTRAL IDENTIFICATION LABORATORY - HAWAII. WE WITHHELD ANNOUNCING THIS DEVELOPMENT PENDING NOTIFICATION OF THE FAMILIES OF THE TWO PILOTS.

-- IN A MARCH 31 MEETING, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE KENNETH M. QUINN LED A COMBINED DEPARTMENT OF STATE - DOD DELEGATION IN A MEETING WITH THE PRC DELEGATION, AND HE PROPOSED FURTHER COOPERATION WITH CHINA ON POW/MIA MATTERS.

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Alleged Chinese Missile Transfers

Q: What can you tell us about reports today that China has transferred M-11 missiles to Pakistan and missile components to Iran?

- A: -- China has committed to observe the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) guidelines and we expect it to fulfill that commitment.
- We have been concerned about reports that China may be engaged in missile-related transfers inconsistent with those guidelines.
- We have made our views on this known to the Chinese on repeated occasions.
- We will continue to monitor the situation very carefully.
- If we determine that China has indeed transferred MTCR-controlled items to other countries, we will take the appropriate steps.

Bosnia

Q: What can you tell us about the humanitarian assessment team to Bosnia and its findings?

- A: -- As promised in Secretary Christopher's February 10 speech setting forth our basic policy toward the ex-Yugoslav conflict, the team went to Bosnia to assess the humanitarian situation there.
- The team was comprised of representatives of the State Department, AID, DOD, specialists from the Center for Disease Control, and the US European Command (EUCOM). It was in the former Yugoslavia from February 27 until March 9. It also made stops in Stuttgart to consult with the EUCOM and in Geneva to consult with UN agencies and other international organizations.
- The team's only finished product thus far has been a briefing for Capitol Hill and interested non-governmental organizations.
- We did not think it appropriate to preview policy recommendations in such a briefing before those recommendations had been considered within the Administration.
- I understand that the team's report to the Administration will be completed this week. Any recommendations it makes will be studied carefully.
- A wide variety of options already have been and will continue to be under consideration within the Administration. I will not comment on what those options might be.

EUR Contingency PRESS GUIDANCE

April 12, 1993

Q: Has the U.S. agreed to delay the vote on the sanctions resolution which the UNSC was scheduled to take on April 12?

A: IN A TELEPHONE CALL FROM FOREIGN MINISTER KOZYREV, SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER WAS ADVISED THAT THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT IS ACTIVELY WORKING TO BRING ABOUT A MORE RESPONSIBLE APPROACH BY THE BOSNIAN SERBS.

-- BOSNIAN SERB LEADER KARADZIC HAS WRITTEN TO LORD OWEN THAT HE IS WILLING TO PARTICIPATE IN A RESUMPTION OF TALKS IN GENEVA. WE ALSO UNDERSTAND THAT KARADZIC, AND POSSIBLY THE OTHER PARTIES, WILL LIKELY BE MEETING WITH CYRUS VANCE AND LORD OWEN WITHIN THE NEXT TWO WEEKS.

-- MEANWHILE, WORK IS PROGRESSING ON THE DRAFTING OF A NEW SANCTIONS RESOLUTION AT THE UNITED NATIONS. ALSO, AMBASSADOR BARTHOLOMEW WILL BE IN THE REGION NEXT WEEK CONSULTING WITH THE VARIOUS PARTIES.

-- IN ORDER TO PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THESE DEVELOPMENTS TO YIELD RESULTS, THE RUSSIANS HAVE ASKED THAT WE DELAY A VOTE ON THE SANCTIONS RESOLUTION.

-- IN VIEW OF THESE FACTORS, AND AFTER DIPLOMATIC CONSULTATIONS, WE HAVE AGREED TO URGE A POSTPONEMENT OF THE VOTE UNTIL APRIL 26, ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT THE RUSSIANS WILL COOPERATE IN THE ADOPTION ON APRIL 26 OF A SUBSTANTIALLY SIMILAR RESOLUTION TO TIGHTEN SANCTIONS IF THE BOSNIA SERBS HAVE NOT COME INTO AN AGREEMENT ON THE VANCE-OWEN PROCESS BY THEN.

Q: Why have you agreed to postpone for two weeks? Is this not related to the April 25 referendum in Russia?

A: -- IN LIGHT OF THE BELIEF EXPRESSED BY RUSSIA THAT PROGRESS MAY NOW BE POSSIBLE, AND THE OTHER FACTORS I'VE MENTIONED, WE BELIEVE THIS DELAY IS REASONABLE.

-- YOU WILL RECALL THAT THE RESOLUTION CURRENTLY BEFORE THE UNSC CONTAINS A PROVISION WHEREBY IMPLEMENTATION WOULD TAKE EFFECT TWO WEEKS AFTER PASSAGE OF THE RESOLUTION.

-- THIS CONCEPT WOULD NO LONGER BE NECESSARY IN VIEW OF THE DELAY IN THE VOTE. THE RESULT WILL BE THAT THERE IS NO DELAY IN THE ACTUAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RESOLUTION.

Q: Do you have a commitment from the Russians that they will not seek to delay or block passage of the resolution after the two week period?

A: THE RUSSIANS ARE PREPARED TO CONTINUE TO WORK CONSTRUCTIVELY TO ACHIEVE A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT TO THE CONFLICT IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA. WE ARE PROCEEDING ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT THEY WILL COOPERATE IN THE ADOPTION OF A SUBSTANTIALLY SIMILAR RESOLUTION TO TIGHTEN SANCTIONS IF THE BOSNIAN SERBS HAVE NOT COME INTO AN AGREEMENT ON THE VANCE-OWEN BY THEN.

NAFTA

Q: Is there anything to **The Wall Street Journal** report that you are backpeddling on side agreements to NAFTA on the Environment and Labor issues?

A: -- We are committed to creating strong side agreements to ~~NAFTA on those issues~~.

-- We expect to reach agreement with our partners, Canada and Mexico, very soon.

U.S. Contacts with Egyptian Fundamentalists

Q: Why were U.S. Embassy officers meeting with Islamic extremists?

A: -- U.S. Embassies are routinely involved in assessing the political dynamics of the countries in which they are located. In fulfillment of this task, Embassy officers are often in touch with opposition elements.

-- In Egypt and elsewhere in the Middle East, we have made clear that we have no interest in a dialogue with extremist elements who advocate the use of violence for political reasons. As the President has repeatedly declared, there will be zero tolerance in this Administration for these extremists.

Iraq

Q: What comment do you have on The New York Times report that the Clinton Administration has cut the budget for the CIA's covert action program against Iraq in half?

A: -- We will not comment on intelligence matters.

-- US policy on Iraq remains firm. We want full compliance with all the UN resolutions. As Secretary Christopher told Congress last month, we believe that by "pressing those resolutions, we will ensure Saddam Hussein's departure from power." We are not softening our position on Iraq or Saddam.

Q: Didn't US CENTCOM Commander General Hoar say that the US will restore ties with Iraq to the level prior to the Gulf War if UN resolutions are complied with?

A: -- ~~We've seen news accounts~~ reporting such statements, but we have no confirmation.

-- Our position remains clear -- we seek full compliance with all pertinent UN resolutions.



Occupied Territories

Q: Do you have any reaction on the Israeli move to seal off the Occupied Territories?

A: -- The United States deplores the increasing violence that claims innocent lives both in the Occupied Territories and Israel.

-- We have made it clear that we believe the Israeli Government has the responsibility of providing security for its people and for the security of the territories under its control. We have also urged all parties to act with restraint.

-- Only a political settlement will help solve the problems underlying the violence in the Middle East.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Office of the Assistant Secretary/Spokesman

For Immediate Release

April 10, 1993

ASSASSINATION OF CHRIS HANI

THE ASSASSINATION OF CHRIS HANI IS A DEPLORABLE AND TROUBLING EVENT. THIS BRUTAL MURDER WILL SADDEN ALL WHO ARE WORKING FOR PEACE, DEMOCRACY AND JUSTICE IN SOUTH AFRICA. IT UNDERSCORES THE URGENT NEED TO END VIOLENCE IN THE COUNTRY AND TO PUSH AHEAD WITH THE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH WILL CREATE A DEMOCRATIC SOUTH AFRICA.

CHRIS HANI ACTIVELY SUPPORTED THESE NEGOTIATIONS AND ONLY THIS WEEK CALLED FOR AN END TO VIOLENCE SO THE NEGOTIATIONS COULD PROCEED IN A CLIMATE OF PEACE AND STABILITY.

WE SHARE THE GRIEF OF THE HANI FAMILY AND EXTEND OUR CONDOLENCES TO THEM AND TO MR. HANI'S CLOSE FRIENDS.

**Statement of the Decision
to seek Fast Track Renewal**

The President has asked me to announce today his decision to pursue with Congress the approval of legislation renewing fast track procedures to conclude the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations.

Since taking office in January, this Administration's highest priority has been to strengthen the U.S. economy. We have put forth an ambitious program designed to reduce the budget deficit and increase investment in areas critical to our future economic strength. But while the Administration's economic strategy starts with the enactment of the President's economic program, global economic growth from expanded world trade is a crucial part of our strategy.

The Uruguay Round, involving more than 100 nations, began in 1986. The failure to complete the Round has been a source of disappointment and frustration to the United States and many of our trading partners. A successful Round would lower tariff and non-tariff barriers around the world, and establish new multilateral rules for world trade. It would be the single most important step we can take to open foreign markets around the world to U.S. manufactured goods, agricultural products and services.

President Clinton and Ambassador Kantor have spoken with leaders from the EC, Japan and other nations and emphasized our strong desire to complete an ambitious Uruguay Round this year. They believe that our trading partners share their commitment to the overriding importance of completing the Round.

Consequently, the President has decided, after consulting with members of Congress, to seek the legislation needed to complete these important negotiations this year. The draft bill we will send to Congress would extend Congressional "fast track" procedures to a Uruguay Round implementing bill, provided that he notifies the Congress no later than December 15, 1993, of his intent to enter into such agreement before April 15, 1994.

I want to emphasize that the President is seeking this authority only for the Uruguay Round. The President has previously said that he intends to negotiate a trade agreement with Chile, and we will seek authority for that agreement at the appropriate time. Similarly, while many members of Congress have trade legislative proposals to which they are committed, some of which the Administration supports, we hope that they will be willing to defer from offering those proposals on this legislation, enabling Congress to move quickly to give the

~~President the authority needed to help bring the Round to a successful conclusion.~~

Conventional wisdom says it will be difficult to complete this Round, to expand and liberalize trade at a time when much of the world economy is in the doldrums. But the President believes that is precisely the time when we must do it. We ask other nations to join us in taking the sometimes hard steps needed to bring the Round to a successful conclusion, for the benefit of all nations.

Q's and A's on Fast Track Announcement

Q. Did the Administration consult with the Hill in reaching the conclusion that you should seek fast track only for the Uruguay Round?

A. We did consult with key members in the Congressional leadership and on the committees with jurisdiction over trade. Their overall reaction was that if the President asked for the negotiating authority to try to complete the Round, Congress would likely give him the chance. A broader request, however, would open the door to a major trade bill, which we are not seeking at the present time.

Q. The request envisions 120 days between the time when the President gives notice of his intention to enter into an agreement and when he actually signs it. Why have you increased from the usual 90 days?

A. Congress would be out of session for much of December and January, and we wanted to make sure that Congress had adequate time to fully review the envisioned agreement and consult with the Administration.

Q. Isn't the decision to seek fast track only for the Uruguay Round a disappointment to Latin American nations, particularly Chile, which hoped to be next in line to negotiate a trade agreement with the U.S.?

A. The decision in no way diminishes our admiration for what Chile (and other nations in Latin America) have accomplished in liberalizing their economies and democratizing their political systems. As I indicated, we plan, at some future point, to seek from Congress the authority to negotiate a bilateral trade agreement with Chile. But traditionally, general negotiating authority will be granted only after major consultation with Congress and extensive discussion of, and debate over, trade policy and priorities.

Our decision today reflects the reality that in the coming months, our trade negotiating priorities are completing of the Uruguay Round, and the implementation of the NAFTA, assuming we can reach sufficiently strong supplemental agreements on labor, the environment and import surges. We will also, of course, be working hard on bilateral issues with Japan and China, as well as Special 301 on intellectual property, enforcing existing trade agreements and using statutory tools that Congress has provided.

Q. How quickly do you think you can get a fast track renewal through Congress?

A. We have no fixed timetable in mind, but the chairmen and ranking members of the trade committees have been supportive and encouraging, and we hope the Congress will share their view that it is important for us to do our part to complete the Round.

Q. President Clinton and Ambassador Kantor have expressed support for "Super 301". Would the Administration oppose a Congressional effort to add Super 301 to a fast track bill?

A. The President does believe Super 301 has been a useful tool in opening foreign markets. But we would like to put this fast track extension through as quickly and cleanly as possible; therefore we would prefer that even amendments that we support should wait for another legislative vehicle.

Q. Can you elaborate on why the President thinks that the Round can be successfully completed this year?

A. The President has had conversations with numerous leaders of our trading partners about the Uruguay Round, including Prime Minister Major, President Mitterand, Chancellor Kohl, and EC President Delors. He has received a letter from Argentine President Menem conveying the strong views of 37 nations about the importance of completing the Round. He looks forward to discussing the subject with Prime Minister Miyazawa. There is a widely shared belief that the Round must be successfully completed, and as has been said "if not now, when? If not us, who?"

Q. Can you give us any insight into the Administration's strategy for finishing the Round?

A. Ambassador Kantor has conferred with Sir Leon Brittan, the EC Trade Minister, and they have agreed that the U.S. and the EC should take the lead in an intense work plan, starting immediately, to make concrete progress in the weeks leading up to the G-7 Summit in Tokyo in July. The U.S. and the EC have begun meeting bilaterally on market access issues and have received enthusiastic responses from other nations about joining in the talks in the coming weeks.

Q. There has been concern that the Administration is seeking major changes in the Draft Final Act, also known as the Dunkel Text. If the U.S. seeks such changes, won't other nations, causing the text to unravel?

A. We admire the prodigious work that went into the Dunkel text, but we do see some areas in which it has to be strengthened. No one should doubt that there is still a lot of work, and some hard bargaining ahead. We are committed to doing our part to see this through to a successful conclusion.

Q. Do you see the current unpopularity of NAFTA on the Hill hampering progress on the Uruguay Round?

A. They are distinct trade agreements, each posing very different issues. I think that Congress will take each on its respective merits. Let me say on NAFTA: if we are successful in our efforts to negotiate strong supplemental agreements, I think the value of NAFTA, in terms of economic benefits, and enhanced environmental quality and worker standards, will be more widely appreciated as the year goes on.

Q. Can you give us some idea of your positions on particular issues in the Round, and how they have changed from the Bush Administration?

A. Ambassador Kantor has said he won't do his negotiating in public, and I certainly won't.

Q. Will this legislation increase the deficit, requiring the Administration to raise revenues to pay for it?

A. We have fully reflected the costs of the Uruguay Round in the President's budget.

Q. Does the President really think that you can successfully implement NAFTA and negotiate the Uruguay Round at the same time?

A. We thought it would be a very busy, challenging year, and it is shaping up as we anticipated. And you failed to mention the economic package and health care.

HHS NEWS

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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Contact: Avis LaVelle
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HHS Secretary Donna E. Shalala announced the department's approval of a welfare reform demonstration project in Vermont. Secretary Shalala's action means Vermont can begin operation of its "Family Independence Project" (FIP) next year, pending approval of the state legislature. The demonstration seeks to promote work and self-sufficiency for recipients of Aid to Families with Dependent Children.

"The Clinton administration acknowledges the leadership role of the states in demonstrating and rigorously evaluating innovative welfare reform strategies. I am pleased to approve Vermont's Family Independence Project, an initiative designed to promote work and family stability," Shalala said.

President Clinton in February pledged to give states more flexibility in testing welfare reform strategies.

The Vermont demonstration makes substantial changes to Vermont's AFDC program. For instance, a new formula will encourage AFDC families to work by enabling them to keep more income and accumulate more assets than is normally allowed.

Second, most recipients who have received AFDC for a certain period of time will be required to participate in public or community service jobs (30 months for most AFDC families, 15 months for families participating in the unemployed parent component of AFDC).

- More -

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DRAFT

Third, child support payments will bypass the state and go directly to families entitled to receive them.

FIP is scheduled to begin operation on July 1, 1994, and will run through June 30, 2001. A rigorous evaluation, utilizing experimental and control groups, will operate in tandem with the demonstration.

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SANCTIONS TALKING POINTS

- We are continuing our initiative to tighten the grip of the existing sanctions pending the passage of a new UNSCR resolution.
- ~~We called in a number of Ambassadors last week to review with them the measures we must take together to cut off sanctions loopholes and evasion routes.~~
- ~~Secretary Christopher has also written to the Foreign Ministers of several EC and CSCE states to underscore this effort.~~
- One of the key elements in the tightening of sanctions is the needed expansion of the sanctions assistance missions (SAMS) to more closely cover the borders with Serbia and Montenegro. There are now about 60 such monitors in the five countries around Serbia. The U.S. will deploy an additional 17 customs officers this month, bringing the total US commitment to 27. Most of these will be sent initially to plug significant embargo leakage through Macedonia.
- The WEU has also announced its intention to provide units of customs officers and border police to monitor the Danube on both sides of Serbia.
- The NATO and WEU fleets in the Adriatic have also stepped up their vigilance to ensure against diversions through Bar.
- We expect EC and CSCE countries to also expand their sanctions enforcement efforts.
- We are also tightening up on the procedures to control the movement of goods through Serbia.
 - The CSCE Sanctions Liaison Group has called on the neighboring states to reduce the number of border crossings for cargo into Serbia. .
 - the SAMS have been directed to closely monitor all Danube transshipments.
 - EC and other states have agreed to introduce more stringent measures to control Serbian access to funds overseas.

-2-

- We are pressing a number of states including Italy, Egypt, Pakistan, and Greece to detain Serbian owned controlled ships and to detain all conveyances and cargoes suspected of violating sanctions.
- We are also working with our European friends to expand technical assistance to the front line states to aid them in their sanctions enforcement efforts. Last week we delivered three patrol boats each to the Romanians and Bulgarians for this purpose.