

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	Elaine Mistler to Jeffery Bader and Kenneth Lieberthal. Subject: FW: Tab II of Final Paper. (8 pages)	12/10/1998	P1/b(1)
002. email	Jeffery Bader to Malcolm Lee. Subject: FW: China WTO Principals Conclusion. (4 pages)	02/05/1999	P1/b(1)
003. email	Malcolm Lee to Glyn Davies, Donna Dejbán, Nina Hachigian et al. Subject: FW: Radout of Zhu Rongji-Summers. (9 pages)	02/23/1999	P1/b(1)
004. email	Glyn Davies to Edward Rice. Subject: WTO and China. (3 pages)	03/27/1999	P1/b(1)
005. email	Kenneth Lieberthal to Glyn Davies, Donna Dejbán, Nina Hachigian et al. Subject: FW: WTO and China. (4 pages)	03/29/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Email
 Exchange-Record (Sept 97-Jan 01) ([China, WTO, Barshefsky, Kantor])
 OA/Box Number: 620000

FOLDER TITLE:

[12/10/1998-03/29/1999]

2010-1024-F

vz1902

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 2/5/99 11:32:49 AM
FROM Gobush, Matthew N.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT China WTO USAToday [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Crowley, Philip J.
Gobush, Matthew N.
Hammer, Michael A.
Hurwitz, Marc I.
Leavy, David C.
Wozniak, Natalie S.

CARBON_COPY**TEXT_BODY**

FYI

U.S. mulls tough turn on China trade policy

By Rich Miller,
USA TODAY

WASHINGTON - The United States is considering shifting its trade policy toward China from the carrot to the stick.

Administration officials think the strategy they've followed in recent years, offering China the carrot of entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in return for opening up its markets, may be nearing the end of its usefulness.

If the United States doesn't achieve a trade break-through during Chinese Prime Minister Zhu Rongji's visit here in April, some U.S. officials are ready to move toward a more confrontational approach using threats of sanctions as sticks.

U.S. Trade Representative
Charlene Barshefsky hinted at a change in tactics last month.

"As (Zhu's) visit approaches, China has an opportunity, perhaps the last opportunity, to resolve the issues which remain outstanding (on WTO entry)," she said in a speech. "We hope China will take it. But delay in trade reform is not an option."

Some U.S. officials have been blunter in private conversations with the Chinese.

U.S. Deputy Trade Representative Richard Fischer was in Beijing last week for talks on China's membership in the WTO. Officials described the meetings as productive, but there was no breakthrough.

WTO membership would give China trade privileges it doesn't enjoy now. The United States would be required to permanently grant China so-called most favored nation trading status, rather than reviewing it each year.

But China's WTO membership would also be good for the USA because it would lock the world's most populous country into the Geneva-based organization's global trade rules.

"A good WTO package is still the best answer to opening up China's market," Barshefsky's spokesman, Jay Ziegler, says.

But many experts doubt that China is willing to take the tough steps needed to open up its markets in return for entry into the WTO. That's because those steps would hurt domestic firms at a time when they are already suffering from the fallout from the global crisis.

The administration has yet to reach a consensus on what the U.S. should do if major progress is not made in the WTO talks in the coming weeks.

While there's agreement that some change in strategy would then be needed, there are differences over the specifics. Some officials oppose too tough a stance, arguing that the USA needs China's help in stabilizing Asia's shaky economy and in dealing with the military threat posed by North Korea.

The U.S. trade deficit with China rose 15 1/2% in the first 11 months of last year to \$52.9 billion. Only Japan has a bigger trade deficit with the USA.

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Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 2/17/99 2:19:09 PM
FROM Gobush, Matthew N.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT China WTO Public Affairs Strategy [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Leavy, David C.

CARBON_COPY Bobbitt, Philip C.
Crowley, Philip J.
Gobush, Matthew N.
Hammer, Michael A.
Hurwitz, Marc I.
Leavy, David C.
Wozniak, Natalie S.

TEXT_BODY Dave - A cut at an e-mail update for SRB on our WTO meeting yesterday.
Jay faxed over TPs - should be getting them electronically soon.
Thanks.

FOR SRB/JS
China WTO Public Affairs Strategy

Dave
and I met yesterday with USTR (Ziegler), NEC (Siewert), NSC Asia (Bader) and NSC Intecon (Lee) to discuss public affairs strategy for WTO. At issue were recent press reports (USA Today 2/5) that the U.S. is taking a more confrontational approach with the Chinese in negotiations, supported by Barshefsky's statement that "As (Zhu's) visit approaches, China has an opportunity - perhaps the last opportunity - to resolve the issues which remain outstanding (on WTO entry)."

USTR
and NEC argue that we need to convey a sense of urgency in negotiations without raising the expectation bar for a breakthrough. On the one hand, industry leaders and Congressional supporters are pressuring U.S. negotiators to show progress, while urging them not to lower our standards. At the same time, the press is attempting to make WTO a litmus test issue for the Zhu visit - something we want to avoid.

To strike this balance, they suggest that Administration use the "window of opportunity" metaphor: China's integration into the global economy through WTO accession is crucial to the success

of its free market reforms - and negotiations will only become more difficult as the December ministerial approaches. The implication of this approach is that this is not/not the last chance for China to join, but it may be the best chance.

We recommend adopting this line and pushing it publicly in the ramp-up to the Zhu visit. The attached talking points and Q&As attempt to capture this approach. Opportunities to push them include Albright's trip (March 1-2) and Barshefsky's trip (March 3-4) to China. Barshefsky, Eisenstadt and Sperling anticipate press calls from Paul Blustein (Washington Post international trade reporter) and can echo this point as well.

Seek your approval for this approach and your permission to circulate the attached guidance throughout the interagency.

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 2/17/99 5:30:13 PM
FROM Gobush, Matthew N.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT RE: China WTO PA Strategy [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Bader, Jeffrey A.
Lee, Malcolm R.

CARBON_COPY Arvizu, Alexander A.
Bader, Jeffrey A.
Heitkotter, Karen R.
Lieberthal, Kenneth C.
Pritchard, Charles (Jack) L.
Duncan, John D.
Hammonds, D. Holly
Hendricks, Lori A.
Holtzapple, Richard A.
Lee, Malcolm R.
McNamer, Bruce
Mitsler, Elaine M.
Schaefer, Matthew P.
Thompson, Kathleen C.
Bobbitt, Philip C.
Crowley, Philip J.
Gobush, Matthew N.
Hammer, Michael A.
Hurwitz, Marc I.
Leavy, David C.
Wozniak, Natalie S.

TEXT_BODY Dave/Jeff/Malcolm - Here are the USTR talking points on China WTO
(thanks, Natalie!). Would appreciate any edits ASAP. Will attach to the e-mail to SRB. Thanks.

-----Original Message-----

From: Gobush,
Matthew N.
Sent: Wednesday, February 17, 1999 5:11 PM
To: Bader,
Jeffrey A.; Lee, Malcolm R.
Cc: @ASIA - Asian Affairs; @INTECON
- Economic Affairs; @PRESS - Public Affairs

Subject: RE: China WTO
PA Strategy [UNCLASSIFIED]

Should be on your fax machine (69250).
Hope to have an electronic version soon that we can circulate for editing. Thanks.

-----Original Message-----

From: Bader, Jeffrey
A.
Sent: Wednesday, February 17, 1999 4:46 PM
To: Gobush, Matthew
N.; Lee, Malcolm R.
Cc: @ASIA - Asian Affairs; @INTECON - Economic
Affairs; @PRESS - Public Affairs
Subject: RE: China WTO PA Strategy
[UNCLASSIFIED]

Matt,

Looks fine to me, captures nicely the
gist of our conversation and conclusions. Message refers to attached
talking points, which I don't see. Is there something else we should
look at?

Jeff

-----Original Message-----

From: Gobush, Matthew
N.
Sent: Wednesday, February 17, 1999 4:26 PM
To: Bader, Jeffrey
A.; Lee, Malcolm R.
Cc: @ASIA - Asian Affairs; @INTECON - Economic
Affairs; @PRESS - Public Affairs
Subject: China WTO PA Strategy
[UNCLASSIFIED]

Jeff/Malcolm - Can I get your quick chop on the
attached e-mail before I send it forward this evening? Tried to
summarize our discussion from yesterday. Also faxing hard copy of
USTR's talking points to your offices now (these will serve as the
attachment). Thanks!

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without raising the expectation bar for a breakthrough. On the one hand, industry leaders and Congressional supporters are pressuring U.S. negotiators to show progress, while urging them not to lower our standards. At the same time, the press is attempting to make WTO a litmus test issue for the Zhu visit - something we want to avoid.

To strike this balance, they suggest that Administration use the "window of opportunity" metaphor: China's integration into the global economy through WTO accession is crucial to the success of its free market reforms - and negotiations will only become more difficult as the December ministerial approaches. The implication of this approach is that this is not/not the last chance for China to join, but it may be the best chance.

In addition, we want

to avoid criticism from the business community or the Hill for seeking

to lower our standards and trying to get a "political" deal. We should therefore address WTO in terms of the above "window of opportunity"

BUT consistent with commercially-viable terms and that we are not seeking a political agreement that undermines our economic and commercial interests.

We recommend adopting this line and pushing it publicly in the ramp-up to the Zhu visit. The attached talking points and Q&As attempt to capture this approach. Opportunities to push them include Albright's trip (March 1-2) and Barshefsky's trip (March 3-4) to China. Barshefsky, Eisenstadt and Sperling anticipate press calls from Paul Blustein (Washington Post international trade reporter) and can echo this point as well.

Seek your approval for this approach and your permission to circulate the attached guidance throughout the interagency.

CHINA WTO TALKING POINTS

February 16, 1999

* 1999 represents an important opportunity for China to demonstrate its seriousness about joining the World Trade Organization. The visit of Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji to the United States and the launch of a new global Round of trade negotiations at Seattle in December provide clear opportunities for progress in WTO negotiations.

* The Clinton Administration has consistently indicated that China's accession to the WTO must be on a commercially-meaningful basis, and that China must open its market to U.S./foreign goods, services, and agricultural products. A viable commercial package must also address the spectrum of our bilateral trade concerns.

* It is in China's own economic interest to undertake the economic reforms we are advocating in a WTO package to improve productivity, increase efficiency, and raise living standards among the people of China. A solid WTO package would advance the rule of law in China. The recent decline in foreign direct investment in China - FDI may fall to \$15 billion in 1999, down from \$43.6 billion last year - is a very clear indicator that around the world, China's trading partners are looking for more open and fair trade terms with China.

Is the United States lowering the bar in negotiations with China to get a deal during Zhu Rongji's visit?

* No. We have consistently indicated that China's accession must address the spectrum of U.S. trade concerns on commercially-meaningful terms. We have long taken the position -- shared by U.S. industries -- that WTO accession

is the most effective way to address the full range of issues necessary to effectively open China's market. We hope the Chinese government recognizes the importance of engaging in comprehensive market-opening reforms.

U.S. industries indicate that the Administration is looking for new "bottom lines" in its WTO negotiations with China.

* We are working with the full range of U.S. industries, Congress, and other constituencies that are interested in our trade relationship with China. There is no search for a "bottom line." Economic conditions in Asia have changed substantially over the last 18 months, and we want to ensure that our negotiating objectives are contemporary and represent the full range of trade concerns.

Why is the issue of China's accession to the WTO now, so suddenly on the agenda for the Zhu meeting?

* We have had an active dialogue with China on bilateral trade issues and WTO accession for some time, as our negotiators have met with their Chinese counterparts virtually every month over the last two years. We have made some important progress in that time, but progress has been uneven, and at a rate which is not commensurate with China's emergence as a leading global exporter.

We have annual MFN renewal as clear leverage to cut off China's trade benefits in the United States. Why does the United States want China to join the WTO?

* China's accession to the WTO would put China's trade practices under multilateral surveillance. As a member of the WTO, China's trade practices would be subject to clear rules and enforcement terms. Accordingly, China's

membership
in the WTO would advance the rule of law.

Is this the last chance for China to join the WTO?

* 1999 is an important opportunity for China to more effectively undertake economic reforms that better integrate China into the global economy. That's what WTO accession would do. With the upcoming WTO Ministerial and the launch of a new round of trade negotiations, it only becomes more difficult for China to meet an ever-higher standard of market-opening commitments down the road.

Wouldn't WTO accession require a change in law to provide permanent MFN for China?

* The first objective must be to secure a comprehensive WTO package. Of course, Congress will be involved in this process. We would consider supporting permanent MFN, after we have secured a comprehensive market-opening package that addresses goods, services, and agricultural trade concerns.

Won't the "Zhu Summit" be a failure if it fails to deliver a WTO package?

* No. A WTO package would most certainly provide the best market access certainty for U.S. farmers, manufacturers, and service industries in China. At the same time, these negotiations are as complex as they are important. We will measure progress by substantive commitments, not by time or a particular meeting. Make no mistake, we will continue to press our full range of bilateral trade concerns with China before, during and after the Zhu meeting.

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 2/17/99 7:36:09 PM
FROM Gobush, Matthew N.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT RE: China WTO PA Strategy [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Lee, Malcolm R.

CARBON_COPY**TEXT_BODY**

Thanks, Malcolm. Just spoke with Jake - he and Lael are fine with USTR talking points with our changes. Forwarding to SRB now - will coordinate with NEC to circulate interagency once we've gotten his feedback. Thanks.

-----Original Message-----

From: Lee, Malcolm
R.

Sent: Wednesday, February 17, 1999 7:21 PM

To: Gobush, Matthew
N.

Cc: @INTECON - Economic Affairs; @ASIA - Asian Affairs

Subject: FW:

China WTO PA Strategy [UNCLASSIFIED]

Matt: some minor edits
to cover email. Suggest you coordinate with Jake to send around interagency, so we are not confusing folks with two sets. Sending around from NSC/NEC makes sense. ML

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From: Gobush,
Matthew N.

Sent: Wednesday, February 17, 1999 5:48 PM

To: Bader,
Jeffrey A.; Lee, Malcolm R.

Cc: @ASIA - Asian Affairs; @INTECON
- Economic Affairs; @PRESS - Public Affairs

Subject: FW: China WTO

PA Strategy [UNCLASSIFIED]

Thanks, Jeff - good changes. Dave/Malcolm
- More to add?

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From: Bader, Jeffrey

A.

Sent: Wednesday, February 17, 1999 5:42 PM

To: Gobush, Matthew

N.; Lee, Malcolm R.

Cc: @ASIA - Asian Affairs; @INTECON - Economic
Affairs; @PRESS - Public Affairs

Subject: FW: China WTO PA Strategy
[UNCLASSIFIED]

Matt,

Some suggestions.

Jeff

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Message-----

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Sent: Wednesday, February
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Cc: @ASIA

- Asian Affairs; @INTECON - Economic Affairs; @PRESS - Public Affairs

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- to resolve the issues which remain outstanding (on WTO entry)."
Also at issue were press reports (Inside U.S. Trade) that we are
lowering the bar for China to enter the WTO for the Zhu visit, which

concerns some in industry and Congress.

USTR and NEC argue that we need to convey a sense of urgency in negotiations without raising [delete bar, insert expectations] for a breakthrough. On the one hand, industry leaders and Congressional supporters [want progress, but are concerned we are not lower our standards.] At the same time, the press is attempting to make WTO a litmus test issue for the Zhu visit - something we want to avoid.

To strike this balance, they suggest that Administration use the "window of opportunity" metaphor: China's integration into the global economy through WTO accession is crucial to the success of its free market reforms - and negotiations will only become more difficult as the December ministerial approaches. The implication of this approach is that this is not/not the last chance for China to join, but it may be the best chance.

In addition, we want to avoid criticism from the business community or the Hill for seeking to lower our standards and trying to get a "political" deal. We should therefore address WTO in terms of the above "window of opportunity" BUT consistent with commercially-viable terms and that we are not seeking a political agreement that undermines our economic and commercial interests.

We recommend adopting this line and pushing it publicly in the ramp-up to the Zhu visit. The attached talking points and Q&As attempt to capture this approach. Opportunities to push them include Albright's trip (March 1-2) and Barshefsky's trip (March 3-4) to China. Barshefsky, Eisenstadt and Sperling anticipate press calls from Paul Blustein (Washington Post international trade reporter) and can echo this point as well.

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FROM Gobush, Matthew N.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT China WTO Public Affairs Strategy [UNCLASSIFIED]

TO Davies, Glyn T.
Dejban, Donna D.
Hachigian, Nina L.
Kerrick, Donald L.
Millison, Cathy L.
Moretz, Sheila K.
O'Brien, Penelope R.
Rice, Edward A.
Scott-Perez, Marilyn L.
Storey, Sharon V.
Sutphen, Mona K.

CARBON_COPY Duncan, John D.
Hammonds, D. Holly
Hendricks, Lori A.
Holtzapple, Richard A.
Lee, Malcolm R.
McNamer, Bruce
Mitsler, Elaine M.
Schaefer, Matthew P.
Thompson, Kathleen C.
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Intecon

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through WTO accession is crucial to the success of its free market reforms - and negotiations will only become more difficult as the December WTO ministerial approaches. The implication of this approach

is that this is not the last chance for China to join, but it may be the best chance.

In addition, we want to avoid criticism from the business community or the Hill for seeking to lower our standards and trying to get a "political" deal. To do so, we should address WTO in terms of the above "window of opportunity" while underscoring

our commitment to achieve commercially-viable terms and not strike a political agreement that undermines our economic and commercial interests.

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Seek your approval for this approach and your permission to circulate the attached guidance throughout the interagency.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

China WTO TPs 2-17-99.doc
CHINA WTO TALKING POINTS
February 16, 1999

* 1999 represents an important opportunity for China to demonstrate its seriousness about joining the World Trade Organization. The visit of Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji to the United States and the launch of a new global Round of trade negotiations at Seattle in December provide clear opportunities for progress in WTO negotiations.

* The Clinton Administration has consistently indicated that China's accession to the WTO must be on a commercially-meaningful basis, and that China must open its market to U.S./foreign goods, services, and agricultural products. A viable commercial package must also address the spectrum of our bilateral trade concerns.

* It is in China's own economic interest to undertake the economic reforms we are advocating in a WTO package to improve productivity, increase efficiency, and raise living standards among the people of China. A solid WTO package would advance the rule of law in China. The recent decline in foreign direct investment in China - FDI may fall to \$15 billion in 1999, down from \$43.6 billion last year - is a very clear indicator that around the world, China's trading partners are looking for more open and fair trade terms with China. It is in the interests of the United States that China embrace international norms.

Is the United States lowering the bar in negotiations with China to get a deal during Zhu Rongji's visit?

* No. We have consistently indicated that China's accession must

address the spectrum of U.S. trade concerns on commercially-meaningful terms. We have long taken the position -- shared by U.S. industries -- that WTO accession is the most effective way to address the full range of issues necessary to effectively open China's market. We hope the Chinese government recognizes the importance of engaging in comprehensive market-opening reforms.

U.S. industries indicate that the Administration is looking for new "bottom lines" in its WTO negotiations with China.

* We are working with the full range of U.S. industries, Congress, and other constituencies that are interested in our trade relationship with China. There is no search for a "bottom line." Economic conditions in Asia have changed substantially over the last 18 months, and we want to ensure that our negotiating objectives are contemporary and represent the full range of trade concerns.

Why is the issue of China's accession to the WTO now, so suddenly on the agenda for the Zhu meeting?

* We have had an active dialogue with China on bilateral trade issues and WTO accession for some time, as our negotiators have met with their Chinese counterparts virtually every month over the last two years. We have made some important progress in that time, but progress has been uneven, and at a rate which is not commensurate with China's emergence as a leading global exporter.

We have annual MFN renewal as clear leverage to cut off China's trade benefits in the United States. Why does the United States want China to join the

WTO?

* China's accession to the WTO would put China's trade practices under multilateral surveillance. As a member of the WTO, China's trade practices would be subject to clear rules and enforcement terms. Accordingly, China's membership in the WTO would advance the rule of law.

Is this the last chance for China to join the WTO?

* 1999 is an important opportunity for China to more effectively undertake economic reforms that better integrate China into the global economy. That's what WTO accession would do. With the upcoming WTO Ministerial and the launch of a new round of trade negotiations, it only becomes more difficult for China to meet an ever-higher standard of market-opening commitments down the road.

Wouldn't WTO accession require a change in law to provide permanent MFN for China?

* The first objective must be to secure a comprehensive WTO package. We will be consulting with Congress in this process. We would consider supporting permanent MFN, after we have secured a comprehensive market-opening package that addresses goods, services, and agricultural trade concerns.

Won't the "Zhu Summit" be a failure if it fails to deliver a WTO package?

* No. A WTO package would most certainly provide the best market access certainty for U.S. farmers, manufacturers, and service industries in China. At the same time, these negotiations are as complex as they are important. We will measure progress by substantive commitments, not by time or a particular meeting. Make no mistake, we will continue to press our full range of bilateral

trade
concerns with China before, during and after the Zhu meeting.

* Zhu Rongji's visit is not just about progress on WTO. Certainly economic and commercial issues, including regional economic and financial issues, will be an important part of the agenda because of Zhu's stewardship of China's economy. In addition, the Vice President and Zhu will cohost a meeting of the U.S.-China Forum on Environment and Development. We also will be discussing other important U.S. interests in China, including security, nonproliferation, and human rights.

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 2/19/99 9:03:56 AM
FROM Gobush, Matthew N.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT FW: China WTO Public Affairs Strategy [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Hachigian, Nina L.

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY Nina - Here's the note on China WTO I mentioned in my voicemail. NEC is desperate to circulate interagency today to ensure everyone's reading from the same sheet of music. Mona doubts Sandy will have a chance to take a look at it before the weekend. Can you please show to Jim? Thanks.

-----Original Message-----

From: Gobush,
Matthew N.
Sent: Wednesday, February 17, 1999 7:54 PM
To: @NSA
- Natl Security Advisor
Cc: @INTECON - Economic Affairs; @ASIA -
Asian Affairs; @PRESS - Public Affairs
Subject: China WTO Public
Affairs Strategy [UNCLASSIFIED]

FOR SRB/JS
China WTO Public Affairs
Strategy

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USTR and
NEC argue that we need to convey a sense of urgency in negotiations without raising expectations for a breakthrough. On the one hand, industry leaders and Congressional supporters want progress, but

are concerned that we not lower our standards. At the same time, the press is attempting to make WTO a litmus test issue for the Zhu visit - something we want to avoid.

To strike this balance, they suggest that Administration use the "window of opportunity" metaphor:
China's integration into the global economy through WTO accession is crucial to the success of its free market reforms - and negotiations will only become more difficult as the December WTO ministerial approaches.
The implication of this approach is that this is not the last chance for China to join, but it may be the best chance.

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Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 2/22/99 12:49:38 PM

FROM Lee, Malcolm R. .

CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT RE: China WTO Public Affairs Strategy [UNCLASSIFIED]

TO Gobush, Matthew N.
Arvizu, Alexander A.
Bader, Jeffrey A.
Heitkotter, Karen R.
Lieberthal, Kenneth C.
Pritchard, Charles (Jack) L.
Duncan, John D.
Hammonds, D. Holly
Hendricks, Lori A.
Holtzapple, Richard A.
Lee, Malcolm R.
McNamer, Bruce
Mitsler, Elaine M.
Schaefer, Matthew P.

CARBON_COPY Bobbitt, Philip C.
Crowley, Philip J.
Gobush, Matthew N.
Hammer, Michael A.
Hurwitz, Marc I.
Leavy, David C.
Wozniak, Natalie S.
Hachigian, Nina L.

TEXT_BODY

1. Suggest "We would welcome China's accession, but only on commercially viable terms." Given continued reports we are caving to Chinese, I think this is best formulation now. Alternatively, "We fully support China's accession on commercially meaningful/viable terms."

2. I thinks can lean in a bit more permanent MFN, but should not state our full support for it until we get a bilateral deal on accession. Doing so beforehand will only mobilize the opposition. POTUS on record from last summers stating he does not think annual MFN debate constructive, or words to that effect. We should build in some of that language. I think Jeff is hunting that down. ML

-----Original Message-----

From: Gobush, Matthew

N.

Sent: Monday, February 22, 1999 9:42 AM

To: @ASIA - Asian Affairs;

@INTECON - Economic Affairs

Cc: @PRESS - Public Affairs; Hachigian,
Nina L.

Subject: FW: China WTO Public Affairs Strategy [UNCLASSIFIED]

Jeff/Malcolm:

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1. Haven't we always said that we would welcome China's accession? [believe he's looking for more forward-leaning language in the talking points]
2. "We would consider supporting permanent MFN after we have secured a comprehensive market-opening package..." - is that our language?

Thoughts? Need to get something to USTR and NEC today, if possible. Thanks.

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From: Gobush,

Matthew N.

Sent: Wednesday, February 17, 1999 7:54 PM

To: @NSA

- Natl Security Advisor

Cc: @INTECON - Economic Affairs; @ASIA -
Asian Affairs; @PRESS - Public Affairs

Subject: China WTO Public
Affairs Strategy [UNCLASSIFIED]

FOR SRB/JS

China WTO Public Affairs
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Seek your approval

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<< File: China WTO TPs 2-17-99.doc

>>

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 2/22/99 3:12:14 PM

FROM Hachigian, Nina L.

CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT RE: China WTO Public Affairs Strategy [UNCLASSIFIED]

TO Lee, Malcolm R.
Gobush, Matthew N.
Arvizu, Alexander A.
Bader, Jeffrey A.
Heitkotter, Karen R.
Lieberthal, Kenneth C.
Pritchard, Charles (Jack) L.
Duncan, John D.
Hammonds, D. Holly
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CARBON_COPY Bobbitt, Philip C.
Crowley, Philip J.
Gobush, Matthew N.
Hammer, Michael A.
Hurwitz, Marc I.
Leavy, David C.
Wozniak, Natalie S.

TEXT_BODY Jim responds: OK to both

-----Original Message-----
From: Lee,
Malcolm R.
Sent: Monday, February 22, 1999 12:50 PM
To: Gobush,
Matthew N.; @ASIA - Asian Affairs; @INTECON - Economic Affairs
Cc: @PRESS
- Public Affairs; Hachigian, Nina L.
Subject: RE: China WTO Public
Affairs Strategy [UNCLASSIFIED]

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Sent: Monday, February 22, 1999 9:42 AM
To: @ASIA - Asian Affairs; @INTECON - Economic Affairs
Cc: @PRESS - Public Affairs; Hachigian, Nina L.
Subject: FW: China WTO Public Affairs Strategy [UNCLASSIFIED]

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From: Gobush, Matthew N.
Sent: Wednesday, February 17, 1999 7:54 PM
To: @NSA - Natl Security Advisor
Cc: @INTECON - Economic Affairs; @ASIA - Asian Affairs; @PRESS - Public Affairs
Subject: China

WTO Public Affairs Strategy [UNCLASSIFIED]

FOR SRB/JS
China WTO
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>>

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 2/22/99 3:12:51 PM

FROM Sutphen, Mona K.

CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT RE: China WTO Public Affairs Strategy [UNCLASSIFIED]

TO Gobush, Matthew N.
Davies, Glyn T.
Dejban, Donna D.
Hachigian, Nina L.
Kerrick, Donald L.
Millison, Cathy L.
Moretz, Sheila K.
O'Brien, Penelope R.
Rice, Edward A.
Scott-Perez, Marilyn L.
Storey, Sharon V.
Sutphen, Mona K.

CARBON_COPY Duncan, John D.
Hammonds, D. Holly
Hendricks, Lori A.
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Gobush, Matthew N.
Hammer, Michael A.
Hurwitz, Marc I.
Leavy, David C.
Wozniak, Natalie S.

TEXT_BODY Matt -

Sandy writes: Good. Work w/Jim to coordinate overall China public posture.

cc:JS

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To: @NSA

- Natl Security Advisor

Cc: @INTECON - Economic Affairs; @ASIA -

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FOR SRB/JS

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003. email	Malcolm Lee to Glyn Davies, Donna Dejbán, Nina Hachigian et al. Subject: FW: Radout of Zhu Rongji-Summers. (9 pages)	02/23/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Email
Exchange-Record (Sept 97-Jan 01) ([China, WTO, Barshefsky, Kantor])
OA/Box Number: 620000

FOLDER TITLE:

[12/10/1998-03/29/1999]

2010-1024-F
vz1902

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
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b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004. email	Glyn Davies to Edward Rice. Subject: WTO and China. (3 pages)	03/27/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Email
Exchange-Record (Sept 97-Jan 01) ([China, WTO, Barshefsky, Kantor])
OA/Box Number: 620000

FOLDER TITLE:

[12/10/1998-03/29/1999]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005. email	Kenneth Lieberthal to Glyn Davies, Donna Dejban, Nina Hachigian et al. Subject: FW: WTO and China. (4 pages)	03/29/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Email
Exchange-Record (Sept 97-Jan 01) ([China, WTO, Barshefsky, Kantor])
OA/Box Number: 620000

FOLDER TITLE:

[12/10/1998-03/29/1999]

2010-1024-F
vz1902

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]