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Deep Background Briefing Material on WTO and Non-WTO China Issues

November 1999

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Young, Alwyn. "The Razor's Edge: Distortions and Incremental Reform in the PRC." Working paper.	45	8/99
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Goldman Sachs. "WTO Membership: What This Means for Greater China."	12	4/26/99
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
TAB E: Commentary

Lo, Chi. "China's Fiscal Time Bomb." The China Business Review.	4	9/99
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TAB F: Miscellaneous Background


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
THE CHINESE POLITICAL SYSTEM

THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY ORGANIZATION (simplified)



Source: Fodor's 89: People's Republic of China - With a Section on Business Travel, Fodor's Travel Publications, Inc. p. 91.

GOVERNMENT OF THE PRC



DEPARTMENTS UNDER THE STATE COUNCIL

MINISTRIES

Agriculture
Liu Jiang
Chemical Industry
Gu Xiulian (f)
Civil Affairs
Doje Cering
Coal Industry
Wang Senhao
Communications
Huang Zhendong
Construction
Hou Jie
Culture
Liu Zhongde
Electronics Industry
Hu Qili
Finance
Liu Zhongli
Foreign Affairs
Qian Qichen
Foreign Trade & Economic
Cooperation
Wu Yi (f)
Forestry
Xu Youfang
Geology & Mineral Resources
Song Ruixiang
Internal Trade
Chen Bangzhu
Justice
Xiao Yang
Labor
Li Boyong
Machine-Building Industry
He Guangyuan
Metallurgical Industry
Liu Qi
National Defense
Chi Haotian
Personnel
Song Defu
Posts & Telecommunications
Wu Jichuan

MINISTRIES (cont'd)

Power Industry
Shi Dazhen
Public Health
Chen Minzhang
Public Security
Tao Siju
Radio, Film & Television
Sun Jiazheng
Railways
Han Zhubin
State Security
Jia Chunwang
Supervision
Cao Qingze
Water Resources
Niu Maosheng

STATE COMMISSIONS

Economic & Trade
Wang Zhongyu
Education
Zhu Kaixuan
Family Planning
Peng Peiyun (f)
Nationalities Affairs
Ismail Amat
Physical Culture & Sports
Wu Shaozu
Planning
Chen Jinhua
Restructuring Economy
Li Tieying
Science & Technology
Song Jian
Science, Technology & Industry for
National Defense
Ding Henggao

STATE BUREAUS AND ADMINISTRATIONS

Foreign Experts Bureau
Wang Nai

STATE BUREAUS (cont'd)

Admin. for Import & Export
Inspection
Tian Runzhi
Nuclear Safety Admin.
Zhou Ping
Admin. of Exchange Control
Yin Jieyan
Gold Control Admin.
Xu Daquan
Admin. of State Property
Tang Bingwu
Admin. of Taxation
Jin Xin
Traditional Chinese Medicine
Admin.
Zhang Wenkang
Copyright Bureau
Song Muwen
Cultural Relics Bureau
Zhang Deqin
Language Work Bureau
Liu Bin
Patent Bureau
Gao Lulin
Secrecy Bureau
Shen Hongying
Tobacco Bureau
Jiang Ming

WORKING BODIES

Special Economic Zones
Hu Ping
State Council Research
Wang Menhkui
HK & Macao Affairs
Lu Ping
Overseas Chinese Affairs
Liao Hui
Foreign Affairs
Qi Huaiyuan
Information
Zeng Jianhui

WORKING BODIES (cont'd)

Taiwan Affairs
Wang Zhaoguo

SPECIAL AGENCIES OF THE STATE COUNCIL

Auditing Admin. Auditor General
Lu Peijian
China Council for the Promotion of
Int'l Trade
Guo Dongpo
Counselors Office
Chang Jie
Civil Aviation Admin. of China
Zhang Zhuping
General Admin. of Customs
Qian Guanlin
Government Offices Admin.
Guo Ji
National Tourism Admin.
Liu Yi
Press & Publication Admin.
Yu Youxian
Religious Affairs Bureau
Ye Xiaowen
State Admin. for Industry &
Commerce
Wang Zhongfu
State Archives Bureau
Feng Zizhi
State Building Materials Bureau
Wang Yanmou
State Commodities Prices General
Admin.
Luo Zhiling
State Environmental Protection
Bureau
Xie Zhenhua
State Land Admin. Bureau
Zou Yuchuan
State Meteorological Admin.
Zou Jingmeng

SPECIAL AGENCIES (cont'd)

State Oceanography Bureau
Yan Hongmo
State Pharmaceutical Admin.
Zheng Xiaoyu
State Seismological Bureau
Fang Zhangshun
State Statistical Bureau
Zhang Sai
State Technology Supervision
Admin.
Li Chuanqi

State Banking

Agricultural Bank
Shi Jiliang
Bank of China
Wang Xuebing
China Investment Bank
Zhou Daojiong
Communication Bank of China
Li Xianrui
Industrial & Commercial Bank of
China
Gu Shifan
People's Bank of China
Dai Xianglong
People's Construction Bank
Wang Qishan
People's Insurance Company of
China
Ma Yongwei

RESEARCH BRANCHES

Academy of Sciences
Zhou Guangzhao
Academy of Social Sciences
Hu Sheng
Xinhua News Agency
Guo Chaoren

The Composition of the Politburo of the 15th CCP CC



Standing Committee Members (left to right):
Jiang Zemin, Li Peng, Zhu Rongji, Li Ruihuan, Hu Jintao, Wei Jianxing, Li Lanqing

SHORT BIOGRAPHIES OF PRC OFFICIALS

This alphabetical listing of short biographies of leading Chinese figures includes most of the major national personalities as well as some individuals involved in international affairs who meet foreign visitors. For background purposes, it also includes formerly prominent persons who are no longer active (some in fact have passed away) but who have played major roles in the past. When a person holds several concurrent positions, titles appear in the order of Party, government, military. See the first page of this section for a list of the abbreviations used. With constant personnel changes, some of the biographies may be incomplete. We welcome updated information.

CHAI ZEMIN President, China International Public Relations Association; Vice Chairman, Chinese People's Association for Peace and Disarmament; Member of National Committee and Deputy Director of Foreign Affairs Committee, CPPCC

Chai Zemin was born in 1916 in Shanxi Province. During the Sino-Japanese War, he served as a political commissar in the PLA. In 1948, he became secretary of a Communist Party district committee in Shanxi. In the early 1950's he was appointed deputy secretary general (and later secretary general) of the Beijing Municipal People's Government and a council member of both the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs and the Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries.

In the 1960s and 1970s, Chai served as ambassador to Hungary, Guinea, the United Arab Republic, and Thailand. He was appointed chief of the Chinese Liaison Office in Washington, DC in 1978. With the normalization of U.S.-China relations in 1979, he became the first ambassador from the People's Republic of China to the United States, a post he held until May 1983.

Upon his return to China, he became vice president at the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs, a position which put him in contact with prominent government officials visiting China. Chai retired from the CPIFA in 1991 and now heads the CPPCC's Foreign Affairs Committee.

Despite his foreign experience, he speaks no English. His somewhat gruff exterior conceals a classical Chinese poet.

CHEN MUHUA Member, CCP-CC; Vice Chairman, 7th NPC; Honorary Chairman, Bank of China

A native of Zhejiang Province, she was born in 1921. A former member of the State Council (May 1982-April 1988), Chen has served in extremely influential positions within the government structure. Much of her career has been with the Ministry of Economic Relations with Foreign Countries, where she first served as vice minister in 1970 and took over as minister in 1977. During the major reshuffling of the State Council in 1982, Chen was appointed head of the newly created Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade (MOFERT). This centralized ministry had major responsibility for implementing and managing policy concerning trade and economic cooperation with foreign countries. Chen also served as minister of the State Family Planning Commissions, established in March 1981. In 1985 she left MOFERT to become president of the People's Bank of China and chairman of the Council of the People's Bank. In recent years, Chen has stepped down from positions of real authority and assumed the

largely honorary positions of vice chairman of the 7th NPC and honorary chairman of the Bank of China.

Chen was an alternate member of the Politburo from August 1977 to November 1987. She visited the United States in 1984 and 1987 for consultations on bilateral trade.

CHEN YUN Former Chairman, CCP-Central Advisory Commission (d. 1995)

Chen Yun was born in a town outside Shanghai in 1900. As a young labor organizer in Shanghai, he joined the Party in 1924 and in 1934 was elected to the Central Committee. This Long March veteran headed the Party's Organization Department in Yan'an during the late 1930s, emerging during the 1950s as one of China's top economists. Chen's courageous criticism of the disastrous Great Leap Forward in 1958 damaged his standing in the Party hierarchy; but the economic about-face in 1960--the adoption of moderate economic policies he had advocated--resulted in his partial rehabilitation.

He fell from grace once again during the Cultural Revolution, reappeared publicly in 1977, was named Party vice chairman in December 1978, and was appointed head of the State Financial and Economic Commission in 1979. Also in 1979, he was made a vice premier, a position he resigned in August 1980 as part of the campaign to bring younger leaders into prominent positions in the government.

Chen is regarded as a "conservative" because of his criticism of aspects of the current economic reforms. At the 13th Party Congress in October 1988, Chen left the Central Committee in an effort to rejuvenate the Party leadership and replace Deng as chairman of the CCP Central Advisory Commission. Nonetheless, his influence on issues of national economic policy continues to be substantial, and he is reported to have played a behind-the-scenes role in the crackdown on pro-democracy demonstrators in June 1989.

CHI HAOTIAN Member, CCP CC; Minister, National Defense; State Councillor; Member, PRC Central Military Commission; Member, CCP CC Military Commission

General Chi was born in 1929 in Shandong Province. At age 16 he joined Communist forces during the war with Japan and the civil war. From 1950 to 1952 he served as a battalion instructor with Chinese troops in Korea. After his graduation from the PLA Military Academy in 1960 he served as political commissar of an army division. In 1975 he was appointed deputy chief of staff of the Beijing Military Region. Chi was identified as deputy editor-in-chief of the People's Daily and as deputy chief of the PLA General Staff in 1977. He was appointed political commissar of the Jinan Military Region in June 1985 and later served as secretary of its party committee. From November 1987 to through 1992 Chi was chief of the PLA General Staff. He was the commanding officer over of troops at Tiananmen in June 1989. He has been a member of the PRC Central Military Commission since April 1988, and a member of the CCP CC Military Commission since November 1989. He was appointed state councillor and minister of national defense, succeeding Qin Jiwei, in March 1993. Chi is a member of the 14th CCP CC. He made an official visit to the United States in December 1996 and was received at the White House.

In September 1997, at the 15th Congress of the CCP, Chi is elevated to the Politburo.

DAI XIANGLONG Alternate Member 14th CCP-CC; Governor, People's Bank of China (PBOC)

Born in 1944 in Jiangsu Province, he joined the CCP in 1973. He graduated from the Accounting Department of the Central Institute of Finance and Banking in 1967. After 1978, he served as deputy section chief of the PBOC in Jiangsu, and as deputy section chief, deputy department head, and vice-governor at the Agricultural Bank of China in Jiangsu. From 1985 to 1989, he was vice-president of the Agricultural Bank of China. In December 1989, he began serving as secretary of the CCP Group at the Communications Bank of China (CBC) and the CBC general manager and vice-chairman of its board. From 1990 to 1993, he concurrently served as board chairman of China Pacific Insurance Co., Ltd. He was the PBOC's vice-governor from July 1993 until appointment to his current post in June 1995.

DENG XIAOPING Member, CCP (d. 1997)

Born in Sichuan in 1904, Deng has been one of the most important political figures in China since the mid-1950s. He was among the early communists trained in France and the Soviet Union during the 1920s. Rising quickly in the Party hierarchy after his transfer to Beijing from the southwest in 1952, he became a vice chairman of the National Defense Council in 1954. Elected to the Politburo in 1955, Deng became a member of its Standing Committee in 1956 and soon assumed the post of CCP general secretary. In the decade after the mid-1950s he was deeply involved in CCP relations with foreign communist parties; and in the 1960s he was one of the major figures in the Sino-Soviet dispute. Some analysts assert he was the author of Mao's polemics of the early 1960s with Moscow.

Purged during the Cultural Revolution as a leading "revisionist" and "the number two person who follows the capitalist road," Deng reappeared during 1973 and in the fall of that year was rehabilitated. By early 1976, he had risen to vice premier and was viewed as third in the Chinese hierarchy after Mao and Zhou Enlai. But Deng fell from office once again following Zhou's death in early 1976, when radical elements led by Jiang Qing moved against him in the wake of the "Tiananmen Incident".

Deng endured almost ten months of public vilification before making an extraordinary second comeback following the October 1976 downfall of the "Gang of Four." After much internal debate, Deng was reinstated to his former Party and government posts in July 1977. He has been the active force behind most of the post-Mao reforms and policy changes, as well as a major supporter of the move to normalize relations with the United States. Deng capped that event by leading a Chinese Government delegation to the U.S. in January 1979.

Deng resigned from his government posts in August 1980 as part of a broad action to bring younger leaders into the government. He subsequently stepped away from day-to-day decision making to concentrate on broader issues. In 1987, in a step to secure the continuation of his policies after his death, Deng retired from the Party Central Committee at the 13th Party Congress. Although he resigned his remaining official posts of chairman of the Party's Military Affairs Commission and the State's Central Military Commission in 1989, he still maintains his informal status as China's paramount leader.

Deng is largely regarded as the principal figure behind the armed crackdown on the pro-democracy movement that erupted in China in the spring of 1989. In ordering the crackdown and in ousting then General Secretary Zhao Ziyang and other party moderates, Deng undid much of his work of the past decade to build international confidence in China and insure a smooth transfer of power after his death. At the CCP's 14th Congress in October 1992, Deng was able to oust many hard-liners from key party positions and install more reform oriented officials. The 14th Congress called for continued market oriented reforms while not increasing political freedom. It remains to be seen whether Deng's policies and the party officials he placed in power will survive since his passing in February 1997.

FANG LIZHI

Fang Lizhi was born in 1936 in Beijing. In 1952, he entered Beijing University and quickly distinguished himself as both a capable scientist and a free-thinker. Fang's long history of political dissent began with his expulsion from the Party during the Anti-rightist Movement in 1957 while with the Academy of Sciences in Beijing. Fang again ran afoul of politics with the onset of the Cultural Revolution in 1966. Imprisoned and later sent down to the countryside, he eventually was sent to the University of Science and Technology (UST) in Hefei, Anhui.

His full rehabilitation came in 1978 at which time he regained his party membership and became China's youngest full professor. Despite Fang's outspoken criticism of China's one-party system and advocacy of democratic reform, he was promoted to vice president of UST in 1984. Accused of inciting pro-democracy student demonstrations in late 1986 and early 1987, however, Fang fell victim to the anti-bourgeois liberalism campaign and was again expelled from the Party, removed from his university post, and transferred to the Beijing Observatory. Fearing arrest, Fang sought refuge in the American Embassy in Beijing following the crackdown on pro-democracy demonstrators in Beijing in June 1989. His presence in the Embassy added a further irritant to a Chinese-American relationship already strained by the killing of several hundred civilians in the capital. As a result of pressure from the U.S. government, Fang was allowed to leave China in June, 1990. He and his wife moved to Britain and Fang accepted a post at Cambridge University.

Fang is a remarkably frank man of keen intelligence and fearless conviction. A popular figure in the western press, he is often labelled "China's Sakharov." In November 1989, Fang received the Robert F. Kennedy Human Rights Award. He has travelled abroad extensively, even before the events in Tiananmen, and now resides in the United States.

HU JINTAO Member, CCP-CC Politburo Standing Committee; Secretary of Tibet Autonomous Region CCP; Deputy for Guizhou Province to the 7th NPC

Born in Anhui in 1942, Hu graduated from Qinghua University in 1965. In 1987, Hu became the Secretary of the CCP Guizhou Provincial Committee, and in 1988, was appointed Secretary of the CCP's Tibet Autonomous Regional Committee. Hu was the first Tibet Party Secretary not to have come from the military. A member of the 12th and 13th CCP Central Committees, Hu was appointed to the Standing Committee of the CCP-CC Politburo at the Party's 14th Congress in October 1992, becoming its youngest member. He is also currently the youngest provincial governor in China.

HU QILI Former Member, CCP-CC Politburo Standing Committee and Secretariat

Born in 1929 in Yulin County, Shaanxi Province, Hu Qili joined the CCP in 1948 and rose to power through the youth movement, serving as president of the All-China Students' Federation and as an alternate member of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Youth League. After the Cultural Revolution he became vice president of Qinghua University and secretary of the Communist Youth League. In 1979 he was elected president of the All-China Youth Federation and was made a member of the Standing Committee of the 5th Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. He also served as mayor of Tianjin before being assigned duties as permanent secretary of the CCP-CC Secretariat.

Hu is a protege of both Deng Xiaoping and Hu Yaobang. At the 13th Party Congress in 1987 he was named to the five member Politburo Standing Committee in charge of ideological education, theoretical research and propaganda. Hu fell into disfavor after he aligned himself with Zhao Ziyang during the pro-democracy movement and the ensuing power struggle during the spring of 1989. Hu was dismissed from the Standing Committee of the Politburo and the Central Committee Secretariat at a Central Committee meeting in late June, though he still retains his seat on the Central Committee.

He speaks some English and is an impressive, engaging person with broad interests. He headed a Youth Federation delegation to the United States in 1979. His wife, Hao Keming, is deputy chairman of the State Education Commission; she led a National Committee sponsored delegation to the United States in 1986 and came again to the States in 1988 on a major fund-raising mission.

HU YAOBANG Former Member, CCP-CC Politburo (d. 1989)

Born in 1915, Hu was one of China's rising political stars prior to the Cultural Revolution. He had been secretary of the Communist Youth League since 1952 and became a member of the Central Committee at 43. During the 1950s, he led delegations to World Communist Youth conferences in Moscow and Bucharest. His close association with Deng Xiaoping and the late Tao Zhu, both victims of the Cultural Revolution, assured his own downfall at that time--and his restoration in 1978. In July 1981 he replaced Hua Guofeng as chairman of the CCP; when that office was abolished in September 1982, he became the general secretary. In January 1987, Hu was severely criticized at an enlarged meeting of the Politburo for encouraging "bourgeois liberals" to speak out for democratic reforms and then was dismissed from the post of general secretary of the CCP-CC. Yet after the 13th Party Congress in October 1987 he managed to retain a position on the CCP-CC Politburo.

Hu died of a heart attack on April 15, 1989. Long regarded as the most liberal of China's leaders and a protector of intellectuals, university students throughout the country reacted to his death by taking to the streets in mourning. The focus of the demonstrations quickly changed as students rallied around Hu's legacy calling for democratic reforms in the largest manifestation of public unrest in Communist China's history. The most immediate results of the liberal leaders' death and the June crackdown on the demonstrations it produced were the suppression of political dissent in China and a realignment of Party leaders along a more conservative line.

HUA GUOFENG Member, CCP-CC

On October 7, 1976 almost one month after the death of Mao Zedong, Hua Guofeng, by resolution of the Central Committee, became chairman of the Chinese Communist Party. Reportedly hand-picked by Mao to be his successor, Hua was reappointed premier by the Fifth NPC in March 1978. Under pressure from elements in the leadership who supported Deng Xiaoping, his authority began to erode, and he was pushed out of the premiership in August 1980. He subsequently disappeared from public view but, interestingly, retained his membership in the CCP-CC during the September 1985 Party shake-up and the 13th Party Congress in late 1987.

JIANG CHUNYUN Member, CCP-CC Politburo; Vice-Premier; Member, CCP-CC Secretariat; Former Governor, Shandong Province; Secretary of Shandong CCP Provincial Committee; First Secretary of Shandong Military District Committee.....

Born in Shandong in 1930, Jiang joined the CCP in 1947. He left school and began working at the age of 16. From 1954 to 1956 he served as director of the General Office of the CCP Laixi County Committee, from 1957 to 1960 as deputy section chief of the China Export Corporation for Local Products and in the Foreign Trade Bureau of Qingdao City, and from 1960 to 1966 as instructor and inspector of the Propaganda Department of the CCP Shandong Provincial Committee and as deputy director of the department's General Office. He held various posts in the CCP Shandong Provincial Committee throughout the 1970s and 1980s, before his appointments as acting governor of Shandong Province in July 1987, and governor in February 1988. His major credit is to have made Shandong an economically successful province and to have been praised by Deng Xiaoping in February 1991 when the latter passed through Jinan.

Jiang was a member of the 13th CCP CC and is a member of the 14th CCP CC. He is also a delegate from Shandong Province to the 8th NPC. In March 1995 he was elected a vice-premier. In the State Council is entrusted with the agricultural development portfolio.

JIANG QING Former Member, CCP-CC Politburo (d. 1991)

Mao's third wife, Jiang Qing achieved notoriety in 1966 as the fiery leader of militant elements in the Cultural Revolution. Born in 1914, she was a film actress in Shanghai before moving to Yan'an to join the communists in the late 1930s. She married Mao in the early 1940s (having been previously married) and became head of the film office of the Propaganda Department of the CCP-CC in 1948. At the time of her marriage to Mao, she had to promise other revolutionary leaders in Yan'an who did not trust her that she would stay out of politics. It was not a promise that she was to keep.

In the early 1960's she launched a revolutionary reform movement in Peking Opera and ballet and continued to play a leading--and feared--role in the arts until her arrest in 1976. She was one of the most implacable foes of Deng Xiaoping and the "moderates" associated with him. Jiang and her cohorts were tried in November 1980. She was given the death sentence, though this was commuted. She was released for medical treatment in 1984, and committed suicide in May 1991, reportedly by hanging herself.

JIANG ZEMIN Member, CCP-CC Politburo Standing Committee; General Secretary, CCP-CC; President, PRC; Chairman, CCP Military Commission; Chairman, State Central Military Commission

Jiang was born in Jiangsu in 1926. In addition to numerous affiliations with scientific, technical, and engineering organizations, Jiang has more than thirty years experience in science. He served as commercial counselor at the Chinese embassy in Moscow from 1950 to 1954. From 1956 until about 1970 he held the positions of deputy director and director at several industrial research institutes. From 1971 to 1979 he was a deputy director in the Foreign Affairs Bureau. He became secretary general of the State administration Commissions on Import and Export affairs and on Foreign Investment Control in April 1980, and became minister of the Electronics Industry in April 1982. A year later, Jiang publicly acknowledged China's need to rely on foreign investment, imports, and joint ventures while encouraging the electronics industry to become self-sufficient. He was replaced by Li Tieying as minister of the Electronics Industry in 1985. After 1985, he served as deputy secretary of the Party Committee and Mayor of Shanghai. In January 1988 he relinquished his mayoral position and became first Party Secretary of Shanghai.

Jiang was elevated to the Politburo at the 13th Party Congress in October 1988. He was known to be inflexible towards the student demonstrations that erupted in Beijing and Shanghai in April 1989. Instrumental in the dismissal of Qin Benli from his post as editor of the outspoken journal, Shanghai's World Economic Herald, Jiang apparently won praise for his firm actions during the turmoil. He became general secretary of the CCP at a meeting of the Central Committee in late June that year. Jiang then assumed Deng Xiaoping's military posts after the latter's retirement in November 1989. In October, 1992, he was re-elected as general secretary of the CCP-CC at the CCP's 14th Congress. Jiang is also currently a member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo and chairman of the Military Commission of the CCP-CC. At the National People's Congress in March 1993 Jiang was elected president of China.

A sophisticated, urbane man, Jiang speaks English, Russian, and Romanian, and is reported to read Japanese and French. He met with President Clinton in November 1993 at the APEC summit in Seattle, in New York in October 1995 during the Fiftieth Anniversary celebration of the United Nations, and during a state visit to Washington in October 1997.

LIDAOYU Ambassador to the United States

Li Daoyu was appointed to his current position as Ambassador to the United States in 1993. Previously he served as the PRC's permanent representative to the UN and other posts in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Mr. Li was born in 1932 and graduated from Shanghai University in 1952.

LI LANQING Member, Politburo Standing Committee of CCP-CC; Vice-Premier, State Council

Mr. Li was born in Zhenjiang, Jiangsu Province in 1932. He graduated with a degree in enterprise management from Fudan University in Shanghai in 1952. For the next two decades Li was involved in China's automobile industry. In 1981, he became chief of the Government Loan Office under the State Commission on Imports and Exports. The following year Li was appointed the director of the Foreign Investment Administrative Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade (MOFERT). In 1983, Li became mayor of Tianjin. Li

was appointed vice-minister of MOFERT in 1986, later becoming minister until MOFERT was changed to the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation in 1993. At the National People's Congress in March, 1993 Li was elected vice-premier of the State Council. In September 1997, at the 15th Congress of the CCP, Li is promoted to the Politburo Standing Committee.

LILUYE Former permanent representative of the PRC to the United Nations; Director-General of the China Centre for International Studies; Chairman, China National Committee for Pacific Economic Cooperation

Born in Beijing in 1925, Ambassador Li Luye, a university graduate, is director-general of the China Centre for International Studies and chairman of the China National Committee for Pacific Economic Cooperation.

Ambassador Li has also served as director of the Department of International Organizations and Conferences under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 1983 he became permanent representative and ambassador to the United Nations office in Geneva. He was named permanent representative to the United Nations in New York in 1985, a position held until 1990. He served as vice chairman of the delegation of the People's Republic of China to five successive sessions of the General Assembly as well as president of the Security Council in January 1986, May 1987, August 1988, and November 1989. Ambassador Li is very well-spoken and his English is excellent.

LIPENG Member, CCP-CC Politburo Standing Committee; Premier

Born in 1928 in Sichuan Province and the "adopted" son of Zhou Enlai, Li is an electrical engineer who spent the years 1948-54 studying at the Moscow Power Institute. After 1955, he served successively as deputy chief engineer of the Northeast China Electrical Power Administration, director of the Fuxin Power Plant in Liaoning Province, and director of the Beijing Electrical Power Administration. Li became a vice minister of Electric Power in 1980; the next year he was appointed minister. In March 1982, when his ministry was merged with the Ministry of Water Conservancy, Li became a vice minister in the new ministry. He was made a vice premier in 1983.

After the reorganization of the Ministry of Education in June 1985, Li was appointed head of the new body, now known as the State Education Commission. Li travelled to the United States and Canada in July 1985, during the state visit of then President Li Xiannian. He was appointed to the Politburo in September 1985. In 1987 at the 13th Party Congress he was elected to the Politburo Standing Committee and named acting premier, a position which was later confirmed at the 7th NPC in April 1988. Also at the 7th NPC, Li was named minister-in-charge of the State Commission for Restructuring the Economic System.

Generally regarded as one of the most conservative of China's top leaders, Li was one of the principle targets of pro-democracy demonstrations during the spring of 1989. Confronted with mounting unrest, Li, backed by senior leaders within the Party, imposed martial law and ordered PLA troops into Beijing. One of the key figures behind the suppression of the movement, Li is regarded as the front man for the Party's hard-line faction but the amount of power he actually has is unclear. In September 1997, Li was re-elected to the Standing Committee of the Politburo.

LI RUIHUAN Member, CCP-CC Politburo Standing Committee and Secretariat; Chairman, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference

Li was born in Tianjin in 1934. He joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1959 after working as a construction worker in the Beijing No. 3 Construction Company. In the late 1960's he served as the Company's deputy secretary of the party committee and secretary-general of its timber plant. In the early 1970's he was in the city's trade union federation. From 1979 until 1981 Li worked as a member of the secretariat of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Youth League and vice chairman of the All-China Youth Federation.

In 1982, Li was elected deputy secretary of the Party Committee and Mayor of Tianjin. He was elected a member of the 12th Party Central Committee and at the 13th Party Congress was both promoted to secretary of the Tianjin Municipal Party Committee and named to the Politburo. Li is very energetic with an outgoing personality and is seen by China-watchers as a real "comer." In the wake of the crackdown on nation-wide unrest in June 1989 and the political shake-up that followed, Li was promoted both to the new six-man Standing Committee of the Politburo and to the Central Committee Secretariat at a meeting of the CCP-CC in late June. Li was re-elected to the Standing Committee of the Politburo in October 1992, at the 14th Party Congress. In March, 1993 he was elected chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference at the National People's Congress.

LI TIEYING Member, CCP-CC Politburo; Minister, State Commission for Restructuring the Economy; State Councilor

Li, one of the younger generation of Chinese leaders, was born in 1936 in Changsha, Hunan Province. Li graduated from the physics department of Charles University in Czechoslovakia in 1961 and served in a number of technical and administrative posts in his field (electronic engineering) through the 1960's and 1970's. In 1979, he was made an alternate member of the CCP-CC; he achieved full membership in September 1985. In 1987, he was elected to the CCP-CC Politburo and at the 7th NPC in April 1988 he was selected to the post of minister-in-charge of the State Education Commission. At the 14th Congress of the CCP in October 1992, Li was re-elected to the Politburo, and in March of 1993, he was appointed to his current position of Minister of the State Commission for Restructuring the Economy.

LIU HUAQING Vice-chairman, Military Commission of the CCP-CC; Former Member, CCP-Central Advisory Commission; Member, Central Military Commission

Liu was born in 1916 in Hubei Province. He joined the CYL in 1929, joined the Red Army a year later, and in 1935 joined the CCP. During the Sino-Japanese War and the Chinese Civil War, Liu worked in various political departments in the Southern Hubei, Plains, and Southwest China Military Commands. In 1958, he graduated from the Voroshilov Navy Academy in Leningrad and returned to become the commander of the Lushun Naval Base. In 1982, he was appointed the commander of the navy after having served as vice minister on several commissions involved with industry, technology, and national defense. After being the deputy secretary-general of the CCP-CC Military Commission and a member of the 12th CCP-CC he was appointed the Vice Chairman of the Military Commission of the CCP-CC in 1989. In October 1992, at the 14th Congress of the CCP, Liu was appointed to the Standing Committee of the Politburo of the CCP-CC, becoming its only military member. In September 1997, at the 15th Congress of CCP, Liu loses his seat on the Central Committee.

LIU HUAQIU Vice-minister, Foreign Affairs

In April of 1987 Liu Huaqiu was identified as the director of the America and Oceanic Affairs Department under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Later, in 1988, he was named assistant minister and finally in October of 1989 Mr. Liu was appointed vice-minister of foreign affairs for United States relations. He accompanied Yang Shangkun, in May 1990, to Mexico, Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina and Chile. In June of the same year, Mr. Liu was the delegate to the 46th Annual Session of the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and Pacific in Bangkok, Thailand. He was appointed director of the Office of Foreign Affairs under the State Council in November 1994. He visited Washington in February 1996 for talks with senior Clinton administration officials.

LIU SHAOQI Former Chairman of the People's Republic of China; Former Vice Chairman, CCP-CC (d. 1969)

Although he died of pneumonia during the Cultural Revolution, Liu deserves mention as the period's most eminent victim because of his contribution to building the CCP in the 1940s. Liu was born in 1898 in Hunan and was a close comrade of Mao's in the CCP for four decades. Prior to his fall, he was head of state, vice chairman of the CCP-CC, Mao's heir apparent, and the Party's principal organizational theoretician. Liu's writings were required reading for a generation of CCP cadres, and are again receiving wide circulation.

Liu was attacked for ten years as China's leading "renegade revisionist." In 1979, his widow, Wang Guangmei, was rehabilitated and made a member of the NPC and the All-China Women's Federation. Their youngest daughter was also singled out for press attention in 1979 when she received one of the highest scores on the nationwide university entrance examinations. Liu was posthumously rehabilitated in 1980, and memorial services for him were held throughout China.

LIU SHUQING President, Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs

Liu Shuqing has had a long career as a diplomat. He served as ambassador to Poland from 1972 to 1977, to Norway from 1977 to 1980, and to Bangladesh from 1980 to 1982. He was then appointed vice-minister of Foreign Affairs. In the mid-1980's he travelled abroad extensively, accompanying many delegations as a senior advisor and leading several as well. Prior to assuming his current post in early 1992, Ambassador Liu was director of the Foreign Affairs Office under the State Council.

Born in 1925 in Jiangsu Province, he does not speak English.

MAO ZEDONG Former Chairman, CCP-CC; Former Member, Politburo Standing Committee; Former Chairman, Military Affairs Commission (d. 1976)

Mao Zedong, born in Hunan in 1893, was one of the twentieth century's most influential figures. A founder of the CCP, he played a major role in the establishment of the Red Army and the development of a base area in Jiangxi Province during the late 1920s and early 1930s. He consolidated his rule over the Party in the years after the Long March. His reliance on the peasantry (a radical departure from prevailing Soviet doctrine) and guerrilla warfare were vital to the communist triumphs in China during both the Sino-Japanese and Chinese Civil wars.

Mao's ideology, as combination of Marxism and Chinese nationalism that distinguished his style of leadership over fifty years, provided the vision and force behind China's continuing revolution. Following the establishment of the PRC in 1949, Mao developed and directed many of the revolutionary policies, including the successful land reform program and the unsuccessful Great Leap Forward. In the late 1950s, Mao yielded his post as head of state to Liu Shaoqi but remained chairman of the Party. In 1966 he initiated the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, which would eventually wreak havoc on the entire country.

This charismatic leader was also well known as a poet and calligrapher. His death on September 9, 1976 marked a turning point in modern Chinese history. His status in the pantheon in recent years has been downgraded; many of his economic and social policies have been discarded and many of his political opponents rehabilitated. Current historiography has it that "pre-1956 Mao" was good, having led the revolution, the anti-Japanese war, and the founding of the PRC. After 1956, Mao is said to have abused power and initiated catastrophic domestic policies.

PENG ZHEN Member, Standing Committee of Presidium of the 13th Party Congress

Peng, born in 1902 in Shanxi Province, has been a major figure in the CCP since the early 1940s and was mayor of Beijing from 1951 to 1966. He also played a key role in developing relations with foreign communist parties in the late 1950s. Peng was among the few people singled out as one of Mao's "close comrades-in-arms"--until the Cultural Revolution. An early victim of the Cultural Revolution, Peng reemerged in 1979 and was elected vice chairman of the NPC Standing Committee at the second session of the 5th NPC. Concurrently, he became a member of the Politburo and was elected director of the State Legal Commission of the NPC, which was responsible for drafting China's first legal code. The code, which went into effect on January 1, 1980, is considered a vital part of China's modernization program. Peng relinquished this latter position to Xi Zhongxun in 1981. In 1983 he became chairman of the Sixth NPC Standing Committee. Peng lost all of his party posts at the 13th Party Congress in October 1987 and gave up his position as Chairman of the NPC Standing Committee to Wan Li in the spring of 1988. Despite his retirement from formal positions of power, Peng continues to exert influence over the direction of policy in China, playing a behind-the-scenes role in the crackdown on pro-democracy demonstrators on June 4, 1989.

QIAN QICHEN Member, CCP-CC Politburo; Vice Premier; Minister, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Born in Shanghai in 1928, Qian joined the Communist Party in 1942. He was involved in Shanghai's underground student movement and with the newspaper Da Gong Bao until Liberation in 1949, Qian then became a key figure in Shanghai's Communist Youth League. In 1953, he was promoted to the Central Committee of the Youth League after which he steadily grew in power and prominence. From 1954-1955, he studied in the Soviet Union and began his diplomatic career as second secretary and counsellor in the Chinese Embassy in Moscow. Thereafter until 1977, he served successively as deputy director of the Ministry of Higher Education and ambassador to Guinea and Guinea-Bissau. Appointed director of the Information Department of the Foreign Ministry in 1977 (China's first foreign ministry spokesman), Qian advanced to vice minister in 1982 and, ultimately, minister in 1988. From 1982-1988, he was the vice minister responsible for discussions with the Soviet Union. He headed the delegation in

1987 when the border talks with Moscow resumed. He was elected a member of the 12th and 13th Central Committees of the CCP. In April 1991, he was appointed state councilor. At the 14th Congress in October 1992, he was appointed to the Politburo of the CCP-CC. In March 1993 he was elected vice premier of China at the National People's Congress.

Qian has visited the United States several times; his English is excellent.

QIAO SHI Secretary, Central Discipline Inspection Commission; Secretary, Political and Legal Commission; Chairman, National People's Congress

Qiao joined the Chinese Communist Party in Shanghai in 1940 when he was 16. Four years later he was one of the organizers of the students' movement in Shanghai. From 1954 through 1962 Qiao worked on the industrial front as a technical division chief of the largest iron and steel enterprise in China, Anshan Iron and Steel Works, and later as director of the Design Institute of the Jiuquan Iron and Steel Company in Gansu Province.

In 1963 Qiao was transferred to the International Liaison Department of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee and worked there until 1982 when he became a member of the CCP-CC and an alternate member of its Secretariat. Qiao was elected both a member of the Politburo and secretary of the Political and Legal Committee under the CCP-CC in 1985. Appointed vice premier of the State Council in 1986, he retained that post until the 7th NPC in April 1988. At the 13th Party Congress in October 1988, he was named to the Standing Committee of the Politburo and Secretary of the Central Discipline Inspection Commission, and advisory body that plays a watchdog role against corruption. He plays a leading role in security issues.

With a power base in charge of China's security and law enforcement agencies, he was a favorite for the position of party chief in 1989, but Jiang Zemin vaulted past him, in part because Qiao wavered during the leadership's deliberations about how to handle the student demonstrators in Beijing. Qiao's political inclinations remain unclear. Some political analysts align him with moderate elements within the Party, while others view him as a protege of old-guard conservatives like Chen Yun and Peng Zhen. In October, 1992, Qiao was re-elected to the Standing Committee of the Politburo at the 14th Congress of the CCP-CC. At the National People's Congress in late March 1993 he was elected chairman of the National People's Congress. After several years at Jiang Zemin's elbow, as a rival and colleague, Qiao was maneuvered off the Standing Committee of the Politburo and excluded from the Central Committee at the 15th CCP Congress in September 1997.

Qiao is familiar with the history of Communist Parties in various countries. He sometimes reads books in English.

REN JIANXIN Member CCP-CC; President, Supreme People's Court

Much of Ren's early life and career remain in obscurity. He first appeared on the national scene in 1964 as deputy-secretary of an economic exhibition to Japan. After disappearing during the most turbulent years of the Cultural Revolution, he reemerged in the early 1970s as a member of several international delegations. In 1980, he was appointed to his first substantive post as vice president of the International Law Society, though he no longer retains this position. In 1981, he was identified as vice chairman of the China Council for Promotion of International Trade, a post he held until 1986. Appointed to the Supreme People's Court in 1983 as vice president, Ren succeeded to the presidency at the 7th NPC in April 1988.

He has been a member of the CCP-CC since 1987. His specialty is maritime law. He is chairman of the CCP-CC Commission for the Protection of Party Secrets, and also serves as chairman of the CCP-CC Commission for Comprehensive Management of Social Security.

RONG YIREN Vice President; Former President and Managing Director, China International Trust and Investment Corporation (CITIC)

A former Shanghai industrialist and still a "capitalist," Rong was made vice mayor of Shanghai in 1954 and served as vice minister of the Ministry of Textile Industries from 1959 to 1966. He dropped from sight during the Cultural Revolution and surfaced again in 1972 during Nixon's visit to China.

Rong was appointed to his position at CITIC in July 1979 and has made many trips to the U.S. since then, taking part in banking and investment conferences. In March, 1993 he resigned from his post at CITIC. That same month Rong was elected vice-president of China at the National People's Congress.

He speaks and understands some English but prefers to use an interpreter. He is unusually tall for a Chinese, and his steel-grey hair, glasses, and distinguished demeanor make him an ideal representative for the pragmatic leaders of China in negotiations with foreign industrialists and bankers. Under his leadership, CITIC has diversified, buying interests in Cathay Pacific Airlines, foreign lumber, and other ventures, perhaps including weapon sales.

SONG JIAN Member, CCP-CC; Minister, State Scientific and Technological Commission; State Councilor

Song Jian, born in 1931, was relieved from the post of vice minister of the Aeronautics Industry in September 1984 to replace Fang Yi as minister of the State Scientific and Technological Commission. Having served as state councilor since April 1986, he was elected a full member of the CCP-CC at the 13th Party Congress in 1987. He is an expert on cybernetics. He has visited the United States several times. Song was a member of the 14th Party Congress in October 1992.

TIAN JIYUN Member, CCP-CC Politburo

Born in 1929, a native of Feichang County in Shandong Province, Tian has written extensively on economic affairs. He joined the CCP in 1945. During 1949-52, he was a confidential secretary in the financial department of the Guiyang Military Control Commission and an instructor at the Guiyang People's Revolutionary university and at the Guiyang People's Provincial Training Center for Financial Cadres. Since 1953 he has served as deputy director of the Bureau of Finance in Sichuan Province, deputy director of the Financial and Budgetary Division under the Southwest China Bureau of the CCP-CC, and deputy secretary general of the State Council. He was elected to the CCP-CC in 1982. In June 1983, Tian was made secretary general of the State Council, a post he held until November 1985. He was appointed vice premier at the 6th NPC in June 1983 (holding that post until March 1993) and became a member of the Politburo in September 1985. Tian is said to concentrate on economic affairs and as a protege of Zhao is strongly committed to reforms. He was instrumental in reform of the tax system. Despite his ties to Zhao, Tian retained his post on the Politburo following the party shake-up that followed the crackdown on pro-democracy demonstrators in June 1989. In October 1992, Tian was re-elected to the Politburo at the 14th Congress of the CCP-CC.

Tian has travelled to Asia, Africa, and Europe. He made his first trip to the United States in May 1988 where his forthright manner impressed all who met him.

WAN LI Former member, CCP-CC Politburo; Chairman, 7th NPC (d. 1996)

Wan, born in 1916 in Shandong Province, joined the CCP at age 20. He served as general secretary of the Hebei-Shandong-Henan Border Region Communist Party during the Sino-Japanese War and was active in organizing guerrilla activities behind Japanese lines. In December 1966 he was publicly branded a "bourgeois reactionary" and follower of Liu Shaoqi. He reappeared after the Cultural Revolution when, in March 1971, he was elected a member of the Standing Committee of the Beijing Municipal Party Committee; he held this post until November 1974.

Dismissed after the Tiananmen Incident of 1976, Wan appeared again in May 1977 when he was appointed governor and first Party secretary of Anhui Province. Along with Sichuan under Zhao Ziyang, Anhui was a province that led the way in reforms, particularly in rural areas and in population policy. He visited the United States in October 1979 as head of an Anhui provincial delegation to Maryland. Appointed vice premier in 1981, he was elected to the Politburo in 1982. At the 7th NPC in April 1988, Wan stepped down as vice premier to assume his responsibilities as chairman of that legislative body, replacing Peng Zhen.

Wan was on an official state visit to the United States when martial law was declared in Beijing during the pro-democracy movement in May 1989. Wan cut short his visit amid rumors that he was returning to China to convene a special session of the NPC to repeal the martial law decree. Just two weeks later on June 9, however, he appeared at Deng Xiaoping's side along with several other senior leaders to congratulate martial law troops on their actions in quelling the democracy movement. In October 1992, at the 14th Congress of the CCP-CC Wan retired from the Politburo.

WANG DAOHAN Former member, CCP-Central Advisory Commission; Former Mayor of Shanghai; Chairman, Association for Relations across the Straits (ARATS)

Born in Hunan in 1917, Wang was educated as a mechanical engineer at Shanghai's Tongji University and elected president of the Mechanical Engineering Society in 1962. He rose to prominence in the First Ministry of Machine Building during the 1950's and, after his disappearance during the Cultural Revolution, reemerged as vice minister for economic relations with foreign countries in 1978. In 1979, he was identified as vice minister of the State Foreign Investment Control Commission, which he left in 1980 to become mayor of Shanghai. His tenure as mayor ended in 1985, although he remains an important figure in the area.

As chairman of ARATS, Wang led the PRC delegation to Singapore in April, 1993 for talks with members of the Straights Exchange Foundation, a non-governmental organization representing the interests of Taiwan. These historic talks marked the first semi-official contact between the PRC and Taiwan since 1949. Agreements were reached concerning the verification of official documents and the delivery of registered mail between China and Taiwan. Most notably, the two sides agreed to maintain contacts, and by March of 1994, representatives from the two organizations had met another three times.

Wang first visited the U.S. in May 1983 as the guest of San Francisco, Shanghai's sister city, and has returned several times since.

WANG XUEBING President, Bank of China

Born in 1952, Wang was appointed president of the Bank of China in December 1993. He had been vice-general manager of the Everbright Group for only eight months before his appointment to his current post. From 1976 to April of 1993, he had served in the Bank of China, mainly in its overseas branches. Known for his expertise on China's foreign currency and gold trading, Wang was the director of the Bank of China New York branch for five years.

WEI JIANXING Member, Politburo Standing Committee, CCP-CC Secretariat, Commission for Inspecting Discipline

Born in Zhejiang Province in 1931, Wei Jianxing graduated from Dalian Institute of Engineering in 1952. After serving as mayor of Harbin in the early 1980s, he was appointed head of the Organization Department of the CCP Central Committee in 1985. At the 14th CCP Congress in 1992 he was appointed to the Central Committee and became secretary of the CCP Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, the party's internal watchdog agency. In September 1997, at the 15th CCP Congress, he was elevated to the Politburo Standing Committee.

WEI JINGSHENG

A former electrician at the Beijing Zoo, Wei Jingsheng became famous as a leader of China's short-lived Democracy Wall Movement in 1978. Wei was known for his vitriolic attacks on the Communist Party and bold calls for democracy. Following the government crackdown on Democracy Wall activists, he was sentenced to 15 years in prison for counterrevolutionary activities and passing military secrets to a foreigner. Sporadic reports indicated that his physical and mental condition was deteriorating. He became the focal point of a campaign by Chinese intellectuals for political amnesty for political prisoners in early spring 1989.

Wei was released from prison under probationary terms in September 1993, six months before the completion of his sentence. His release was viewed as a political concession to help the Chinese in their bid to host the 2000 Olympic Games. He was picked up by police for questioning in 1994, held in custody for 20 months, charged with sedition in November 1995 and sentenced to 14 years in prison the following month. In 1997, a collection of his writings and letters from prison was published by Viking Press.

In November 1997, Wei was released from a labor camp in Hebei Province and allowed to go to the United States for medical treatment of several health problems that developed during his years in prison. U.S. State Department officials express hope that China would allow Wei to someday return to China. During a meeting with President Clinton a few weeks later, he tells the Clinton that only continued pressure from the West could help free more Chinese political prisoners.

WU BANGGUO Member, CCP-CC Politburo; Vice-Premier; Member, CCP-CC Secretariat; former secretary of CCP Shanghai Municipal Committee

Wu was born in 1941 in Anhui Province, grew up in Beijing, and joined the CCP in 1964. From 1960 to 1967 he studied engineering in the Radio and Electronics Department of Qinghua University. Following graduation he worked as a technician, section head, and deputy managing director at various electronics factories in Shanghai. From 1981 to 1983 he served as deputy Party secretary of the Shanghai Telecommunications Industrial Bureau. In 1983 Wu

became a Standing Committee member of the CCP Shanghai Municipal Committee and Party secretary of the Scientific and Technical Commission, in 1985 deputy secretary of the CCP Shanghai Municipal Committee, and in 1988 head of the Leading Group for Restructuring the Political System. In 1991 he succeeded Zhu Rongji as secretary of the CCP Shanghai Municipal Committee. Wu was an alternate member of the 12th and 13th CCP CC and is a member of the 14th CCP CC. He was elected vice-premier in March 1995 and is now the youngest among the six vice-premiers.

When he was Shanghai Party Secretary, Wu stressed the need for the city to integrate its development with that of the rest of China. Although Wu spent his whole career in Shanghai, he is believed to have strong support at the Center. As vice-premier, he is in charge of industrial production and state-owned enterprise reform.

WU SHUQING President, Beijing University

Born in 1933, Wu Shuqing became an economics teacher at China People's University after graduating from the same school in 1955, and became an assistant professor in 1980. He was appointed deputy chief of the Political Economics Teaching and Research Section under the Political Economics Department in 1982, and became a professor in 1984. Wu was appointed vice president of China People's University in September 1987. In 1989, Wu was appointed president of Beijing University.

Wu is known for his conservative style and is generally considered close to Li Peng. Wu is highly learned in Marxist political economics and believes that basic Marxist doctrines should be adhered to, and that any economic reforms should be based on China's national conditions. This viewpoint along with two articles, the first criticizing the development of a "stock system" in 1987, and the second, written in September 1989, slamming the liberal reformist line of Zhao Ziyang and his proposal to completely privatize the Chinese economy have made him unpopular with students and a closer ally of Li Peng's. According to some students, he was handpicked also because of his "good performance" and "unswerving support to the government" during the pro-democracy demonstrations in spring 1989.

WU YI Minister, Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation

Ms. Wu was born in Wuhan, Hubei Province in 1938. She graduated from Beijing Petroleum College in 1962 and went to work in the Lanzhou Oil Refinery in Gansu Province. Wu has spent most of the past three decades working in various petrochemical enterprises. She was elected vice-mayor of Beijing in 1988. In May 1991 she became the vice-minister of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade (MOFERT). Wu played a major role in the recent negotiations on intellectual property rights with Ambassador Carla Hills of the United States. At the National People's Congress in late March 1993 Wu was appointed minister of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (formerly MOFERT). She and Deputy U.S. Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky were the principal negotiators in a tense three-month round of talks that resulted in a February 1995 settlement committing the Chinese to improve protection of intellectual property rights in exchange for U.S. removal of a threat to impose prohibitive duties against Chinese products.

XIONG GUANGKAI Deputy Chief of the General Staff, People's Liberation Army; Alternate Member 14th CCP CC.

Xiong has served in his current position since 1992. He concurrently serves as a member of the CCP Taiwan Affairs Leading Group.

Born in March 1939 in Jiangxi Province, Xiong joined the PLA in 1956 and the CCP in 1959. After graduating from the PLA Foreign Language Training School in 1959, he served as translator in the Military Attaché's Office of the Chinese Embassy in the former East Germany from 1960 to 1967. He later served as deputy military attaché in the Chinese Embassy in the former West Germany between 1974 and 1981. After studying at the PLA Military Academy in 1981, he served as deputy division chief, deputy director, and director of the Second Department of the PLA General Staff Headquarters from 1982 to 1992. He was granted rank of major general in 1988.

He led a delegation of Chinese military officials in talks with Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Walter Slocumbe at the Pentagon in December 1997. At their first Defense Consultative Talks, the Chinese and American sides agreed to exchange information on the military role in relief missions and initialed an agreement to minimize the risk of naval accidents in the Pacific.

XU KUANGDI Mayor of Shanghai; Alternate Member of the 14th CCP CC; Deputy Secretary CCP Shanghai Municipal Committee

Xu Kuangdi was born in 1937 in Zhejiang Province and graduated from the Beijing Institute of Iron and Steel Engineering in 1959. An expert on steel production and electric metallurgy, Xu held a number of teaching posts in Shanghai from 1963 until he was appointed vice-president of the Shanghai Polytechnic University in 1986. He spent two years as a technical manager with Saab in Sweden. From 1991 on he served as deputy head of the Shanghai Education and Public Health Office, director of the Shanghai Municipal Higher Education Bureau, and chairman of the Shanghai Municipal Planning Commission. In August 1992 he was appointed vice-mayor of Shanghai, serving concurrently as chairman of the municipal government's Stock Administration Commission. He was elected mayor of Shanghai in February 1995, and also serves as deputy secretary of the CCP Shanghai Municipal Committee.

An advocate of a less heavy-handed approach to central planning, Xu's views attracted the attention of reformer Zhu Rongji, then mayor of Shanghai, now a vice-premier. A fluent English speaker, his appointment as mayor was hailed as a step toward advancing Shanghai's plan to become China's financial center and a leading base for high-tech investments from abroad.

He visited the United States in November 1996.

XU XIN former Vice Chief of the PLA General Staff; Chairman and President of the China Institute for International Strategic Studies (CISS); member of the NPC Foreign Affairs Committee; Chairman China-Romania Friendship Group

Xu Xin was born in 1921 in Lingshou County, Hebei Province. He joined the Eighth Route Army and the CCP in 1937. He then served as company instructor, head of district detachment and regiment commander of North China Military Region, and as deputy division commander and concurrently chief of division staff of the 19th Army Corps. From 1950 to 1954 he served as division commander with the "Chinese People's Volunteers" in Korea. After

graduating from a military academy in the USSR in 1957 and his return in 1958, Xu served a deputy director of the Combined Operation Strategy Education Association and deputy head of the Training Department of the PLA Higher Military Academy, as army commander and chief of staff of Beijing Military Region, and as assistant to the Chief of the PLA General Staff from 1980-82. He was an alternate member of the CCP Central Committee until November 1987 when he was elected member of the Central Advisory Commission. Xu was granted rank of major-general in 1964 and of general in 1988. In May 1994, a delegation assembled by the National Committee to examine U.S.-China military relations was hosted by General Xu for a two-day seminar at CISS in Beijing.

YANG SHANGKUN Former member, CCP-CC Politburo; Former Permanent Vice Chairman, Military Commission; Former President, PRC; Former Executive Vice Chairman, Central Military Commission

Yang Shangkun, a Long March veteran, was born in 1907 in Sichuan to wealthy landlord parents. He joined the Communist Youth League in 1925 while a student in Chongqing and officially joined the CCP the following year. In 1928 he married Li Bozhao, a well-known writer. Branded a counterrevolutionary during the Cultural Revolution, he made his first reappearance after the "ten years of chaos" in December, 1978. Through the late 1970s and early 1980s he steadily rose in power and prominence. In 1982 he was elected member of the Politburo and permanent vice-chairman of the Military Commission under the Central Committee of the CCP and in 1983 was appointed vice chairman of the Central Military Commission. In April 1988, he was elected to replace Li Xiannian as president of the PRC. He held that post until March 1993.

Yang, who has strong familial ties to units of the PLA, played an instrumental role in ordering the suppression of the pro-democracy demonstrations that swept Beijing and the rest of the country in the spring of 1989. His influence in the military further increased when his brother, Yang Baibing, was appointed the secretary-general of the CCP-CC Military Commission in fall 1989. But in October 1992, at the 14th Congress of the CCP-CC Yang retired from the Politburo and lost his military posts. Yang was once one of the most powerful persons in the military, along with his half-brother Yang Baibing, and was thought to be the second most powerful leader in China, second only to Deng Xiaoping. But his removal from the Politburo and from the military most likely will greatly weaken his power base.

YAO YILIN Former member, CCP-CC Politburo Standing Committee (d. 1994)

Yao Yilin was born in Anhui in 1917 and joined the CCP in 1935. He was elected to the CCP-CC at the 11th Party Congress in December 1978. Prior to the GPCR he was vice minister of Commerce (1949-62) and then minister of Commerce from 1962 until his purge in 1966. Yao returned in 1973 to become first vice minister of Foreign Trade. In August 1978 he was again appointed minister of Commerce, and in February 1979 he became secretary general of the State Financial and Economic Commission. Yao became a vice premier in August 1979 and was one of two vice premiers retained following the 1982 restructuring of the State Council (a post he continued to hold until March 1993). In August 1980 he was made minister of the State Planning Commission, a position he held until 1983. He regained this position again in 1987. He was designated an alternate member of the Politburo in 1982. In 1985 he made the first high-level Chinese visit to the USSR in years (where he signed a trade and exchange

agreement), and in September 1985 he became a member of the Politburo. At the 13th Party Congress he was elected to the Politburo Standing Committee. Yao is reported to have been a strong supporter of the conservative position on dealing with the pro-democracy unrest during the spring of 1989. In October 1992, at the 14th Congress of the CCP-CC, Yao retired from the Politburo and its Standing Committee. In May 1986 he made an official visit to the U.S. He died in December 1994 at the age of 77.

ZHANG CHUNQIAO Former Member, CCP-CC and Politburo Standing Committee; Former Vice Premier; Former Director, General Political Department, PLA; Former First Secretary, Shanghai Municipal Party Committee; Former Chairman, Shanghai Revolutionary Committee

A propaganda specialist and theoretician, Zhang was at one time the second-ranked vice premier behind Deng Xiaoping. After the 1976 ouster of Deng, he was in line for the premiership but was bypassed in the apparent compromise between "moderates" and "radicals" that promoted sixth-ranked vice premier Hua Guofeng to succeed Zhou Enlai. Zhang had long been associated with the radical Shanghai faction of the CCP as well as with Jiang Qing. He moved steadily upward in the Party until the Cultural Revolution catapulted him into national leadership. Arrested in October 1976 and tried in November 1980 as a member of the "Gang of Four," he was convicted and sentenced to death. Indications are that he will be imprisoned for life and there are periodic reports that he is dying of cancer.

ZHANG WENPU Former Ambassador to Canada; Vice President, Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs

Born in 1927, Zhang Wenpu graduated from Tsinghua (Qinghua) University in Beijing in 1951. From 1954 to 1966 he held positions as assistant to the vice minister and deputy division chief of the general office of the Ministry of Higher Education. In 1973 he was appointed deputy division chief of the Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries. He joined the Foreign Ministry in 1979. At this ministry he served successively as division chief, deputy director, and director of the Department of American and Oceanian Affairs (equivalent to an Assistant Secretary of State in our system). From 1986 to 1990 he served as ambassador to Canada. Upon his return to China and retirement from the Foreign Ministry, he took the position of vice president of the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs. Ambassador Zhang is very urbane and cosmopolitan and speaks excellent English.

ZHAO ZIYANG Former Member, Politburo Standing Committee; Former General Secretary, CCP-CC; Former First Vice-Chairman, Military Affairs Commission; Former First Vice-Chairman, Central Military Commission

Appointed premier in August 1980 and then General Secretary of the CCP-CC in January 1987, Zhao was one of the most powerful men in Beijing until his dismissal from power in June 1989. Long considered a protege of Deng Xiaoping, with whom he shared a preference for economic pragmatism and flexibility, Zhao was known to take a more open view of political restructuring than his one-time patron.

Born in Henan in 1919, Zhao joined the Communist Youth League in 1932 and the CCP in 1938. During the war of resistance against Japan, he served as a county Party secretary and a prefectural Party secretary in the Hebei-Shandong-Henan anti-Japanese base area. In 1951, he went to Guangdong Province to lead the land reform there. Later, he served as deputy secretary

of the South China sub-bureau of the CCP-CC and as secretary and first secretary of the Guangdong Provincial Party Committee. Zhao became secretary of the Inner Mongolian Regional Party Committee in 1971 and later returned to Guangdong Province to become secretary and then first secretary of the Provincial Party Committee. After 1975, he served as first secretary of the Sichuan Provincial Party Committee, first political commissar to the Chengdu units of the PLA, vice chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, and vice premier of the State Council.

Zhao was elected a member of the 10th and 11th CCP-CC and an alternate member of the Politburo. He was elected a full member of the Politburo at the Fourth Plenary Session of the 11th CCP-CC in 1980 and became a member of its standing committee at the 5th Plenary Session of the Central Committee. In January 1987, after the ouster of Hu Yaobang, Zhao became the acting general secretary of the CCP-CC, a post later confirmed at the 13th Party Congress. At the 13th Party Congress he was also appointed first vice chairman of the Military Affairs Commission, and in April 1988 further assumed the post of first vice chairman of the Central Military Commission. Zhao's moderate political views and his ability to make innovative and productive economic changes in Sichuan's previously chaotic industry and agriculture helped fuel his swift rise. However, inflation and corruption associated with some of his more liberal economic policies began to undermine his position within the Party in mid- to late 1988.

When pro-democracy demonstrations erupted in Beijing in April 1989, Zhao took the lead in advocating a more conciliatory response to the demands of the demonstrators and became embroiled in a fierce power struggle with Premier Li Peng and other Party conservatives. Zhao was reportedly removed from power following the imposition of martial law in Beijing on May 20, though his ouster from all leading posts was not made official until June 24. Zhao retains his nominal party membership, though an investigation into his "mistakes" is reported to be going on.

He made a very successful visit to the U.S. in January 1984.

ZHOU ENLAI Former member, CCP-CC Politburo; Former Premier (d. 1976)

Zhou Enlai was born in 1898 in Zhejiang Province where he spent his childhood studying the Confucian classics in preparation for the state exams. However, after the graduation from middle school in 1917, he became increasingly active in the student movement and was a leader of the May Fourth Movement in 1919. He joined the CCP in 1924, and, in 1927, Zhou's political activism earned him a seat on the CCP Politburo, a post he held until his death 49 years later.

Zhou continued to play a leading role in the Party through the 1930s and 1940s. The consummate politician, he served as the CCP's chief representative during all important negotiations with Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist government and its American patrons. Following the Communist victory in 1949, Zhou was appointed premier and minister of Foreign Affairs.

During the next three decades until his death, Zhou remained one of the principle decision makers in China. His political skill and close association with Mao Zedong were instrumental in keeping him from falling victim to the numerous political campaigns of the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s.

A popular figure with the Chinese people, Zhou's death in 1976 touched off a series of mourning rallies which grew into anti-government demonstrations attacking the excesses of

Cultural Revolution policies. Demonstrators were shot at by police in what has become known as the Tiananmen Incident. In its wake, a leftist backlash spearheaded by Mao's wife, Jiang Qing, again toppled many "liberal elements" within the Party, including Deng Xiaoping.

ZHU QIZHEN Former Ambassador to the United States

Appointed Ambassador to the United States in September 1989, Zhu was born in Shanghai, studied at St. John's University, and speaks English fluently. He served as section chief in the West Asia and African Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1971 and later served as counselor in the Chinese Embassy in Australia from 1973 to 1976, in which capacity he conducted negotiations in Papua New Guinea for the establishment of diplomatic relations. He was vice minister for American and Oceanic Affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 1984 until his appointment as ambassador, a post he held until 1993.

ZHU RONGJI Member, CCP-CC Politburo Standing Committee; Vice Premier; Secretary, Shanghai Communist Party; former Governor, Bank of China

Zhu was born in 1928 in Changsha, Hunan Province and completed his secondary education there. In 1947, he entered Qinghua University in Beijing. After graduating in 1951, he spent over thirty years working for the State Planning and Economic commissions. Initially denounced during the "Anti-rightist" Campaign in 1957, little is known about Zhu's activities until he was identified as the director of the Technical Transformation Bureau under the State Economic Commission (SEC). In 1983, he was promoted to vice minister of the SEC.

Zhu became Mayor of Shanghai in April 1988, after serving for three months as secretary of the city's Municipal Party Committee of the CCP. In August 1989, he was appointed secretary of the Shanghai Communist Party.

In April 1991, Zhu was appointed vice premier and moved to Beijing. At the 14th Congress of the CCP-CC in October 1992, he was appointed to the Standing Committee of the Politburo. In March 1993 Zhu was elected vice premier of China at the National People's Congress. He lacks a deep party base and has spent his career largely in the economic and planning bureaucracy. But he is seen as the most pragmatic of all the Politburo members and has the backing of Deng Xiaoping.

Zhu assumed the position of governor of the People's Bank of China (PBOC) in July 1993. He initiated a 16-point austerity plan in order to cool down the overheating economy and regain some centralized control over economic activity, particularly expenditures and investment. In June 1995 he was replaced as governor of the PBOC by his deputy, Dai Xianglong.

A tall man with a commanding presence, Zhu is very forthright, aggressive, and relates to foreigners very well. He visited the United States in July of 1990 as head of a National Committee-sponsored delegation of mayors. He understands English and speaks it quite well, though prefers to use interpreters.

ZOU JIAHUA Member CCP-CC Politburo; Vice Premier; Minister, State Planning Commission

Zou was born in 1927 in Shanghai. He began to work for the CCP in 1944 and joined the Party in 1945. In 1948 he began to study the Russian language at the Harbin Polytechnical University and was later sent to Moscow to study machine building. After graduating he returned to China in 1955. By 1964, he had become the director of the Machine Tool Research

Institute under the No. 1 Ministry of Machine-Building Industry. In 1973, he served as deputy director of a State Council office in charge of the National Defense Industry. After 1985, he served as minister of Ordinance Industry and minister-in-charge of the State Machine-Building Industry Commission. He became a state councilor and minister of Machine-Building and Electronics Industry in 1988. In December 1989, Zou replaced Yao Yilin as minister of the State Planning Commission. Zou became a member of the CCP-CC Politburo at the 14th Party Congress in October 1992.

Zou is the son-in-law of the late marshal and Politburo member Ye Jianying. He made a successful visit to the United States in May of 1994 and visited the White House.

GLOSSARY OF COMMONLY USED TERMS

Whether your visit to China is a general tour or one designed with a particular area of interest in mind, you are bound to hear a number of political themes and phrases repeatedly, as the Chinese place their work and duties within the context of Chinese politics. The following are some of the most commonly used terms. See the first page of this section for a list of abbreviations.

Note: From the late 1970's to the early 1990's, as economic development and modernization overtook political study in the minds and lives of the average Chinese, the frequency with which one heard many of these terms decreased. However, as a consequence of the Tiananmen Square Incident, several are once again being used. Even some that are out-of-date have been listed here for historical background.

Autonomous Region: Autonomous prefectures and counties have been created where significant concentrations of particular minorities exist to encourage cultural continuity and the flexible implementation of central policy. There are currently five minority regions scattered in sparsely settled border areas: Inner Mongolia, Ningxia, Xinjiang, Xizang (Tibet), and Guangxi.

Basic Law: The legal charter jointly drafted by the Chinese government and representatives from Hong Kong which will govern Hong Kong after it is returned to the Chinese in 1997.

Cadre: Any person who plays a leading political or administrative role in factories, business enterprises, rural townships (formerly communes), the army, the government, etc. Cadres are usually, but not necessarily, CCP members. (Often given the British pronunciation, "codder" rhyming with "fodder;" the American pronunciation is "cod-ray.")

Capitalist Roader: A derogatory term used to characterize people who depart from Communism's ideological boundaries in economic matters and use capitalistic methods to attain wealth and prosperity. The term is broadly used against reformers in the party hierarchy and entrepreneurial citizens during times of political rectification.

Class Struggle: Conflict between socioeconomic classes, which is said to be the primary motivating force in social history. In socialist societies such as China, the principle class struggle is between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. This "social contradiction" in China was to have ceased after the elimination of the "exploiting class." Proponents of the Cultural Revolution and militant leftists argued for continuing the class struggle as a major campaign. Moderates argued that it was no longer relevant. Current Party policy seems to fall between the two positions, holding that the class struggle will continue "within certain limits for a long time to come," and adding that China must adopt modern economic construction policies.

Conservatives: In China's ideological split over modernization policy, the conservatives are those who would emphasize Maoist class struggle—"politics in command" and "red over expert"—as opposed to Deng Xiaoping's liberal reforms based on economic reforms, a larger role for market forces, and "seeking truth from facts."

Contradictions: A central concept in Maoist political philosophy, as expressed in Mao's early essay entitled "On Contradiction." Competitive or conflicting relationships between classes; between historical processes, such as revolution and production; or between sectors of the economy, such as industry and agriculture. Antagonistic contradictions, such as those between the "people" and the "enemies of the people," can only be resolved through struggle. Non-antagonistic contradictions—those among the "people"—can be resolved through discussion and debate. The Chinese Communists believe that any natural or social phenomenon can be analyzed by identifying the contradictions within it.

Cultural/Spiritual Pollution: Catch-all term to describe undesirable products of modern Western society--literature, films, tapes, lifestyles, etc. not in keeping with traditional Chinese values. A campaign against "Cultural Pollution" begun in the fall of 1983, but was curtailed in early 1984, partially because of the strong reaction to the campaign in the West.

Cultural Revolution (GPCR): Also known as the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and the Ten Bad Years (1966-1976). Launched by Mao in 1966 to combat elitism, revisionism, and the vicissitudes of a burgeoning bureaucracy in the CCP hierarchy, the GPCR destroyed much of the Party's old-guard leadership, beginning with Mao's second-in-command, Liu Shaoqi. Much of the machinery of power was usurped by Mao's wife, Jiang Qing, who, with the aid of a veritable army of ultra-left, xenophobic supporters and militant youth unleashed in the "Red Guard" movement, managed to bring China to a state of near anarchy. The GPCR rejected much of China's traditional art and culture and dismantled the education system in the name of egalitarianism. Millions of youths were moved from urban to rural areas as "sent down youths;" heavy emphasis was placed on self-reliance and practical experience in national development (rather than on cooperation with foreign nations and higher education); and science and technology were denigrated in the pursuit of a society of people who were "red (ideologically sound) not expert."

Democratic Centralism: Method of governing in which decision making is exercised at the top in response to the masses. Power at the "center" is held by government and party organs and leadership whose members are, theoretically, chosen by the masses acting through lower-level bodies.

Democracy Wall: A wall in Beijing where posters, often critical of government officials and Party policies, were pasted up from early December 1978 until their prohibition in December 1979. Small groups of students would also distribute newsletters containing literature and political essays that called for reform, and rehabilitation of those whose lives had been ruined during the GPCR. Located at the intersection of Chang An Avenue and Xidan Street, it became a popular spot as the Chinese gathered to read and discuss the posters. This brief era of seeming toleration of open criticism of the party is called Democracy Spring, taking its name from the Wall.

The Dragon: Term often used to refer to China in tandem with the Polar Bear being used to describe the Soviet Union; also, along with the color yellow, a traditional symbol of the emperor or "yang," male principle, paired with the phoenix which symbolizes the empress and the "yin," female principle.

Five Guarantees: The five basic necessities of life to which every individual in Chinese society is entitled: they are food, clothing, heating fuel, an honorable funeral, and a decent education for one's children.

Four Cardinal Principles: The four basic principles expostulated by Deng Xiaoping in 1979 which are to be upheld by all: socialism; the dictatorship of the proletariat; Marxism, Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought; and the leadership of the Communist Party.

Four Modernizations: The development targets for modernizing industry, agriculture, science and technology, and national defense, first proposed by Premier Zhou Enlai in January 1975. In 1978 the attainment of the Four Modernizations by the year 2000 became a national campaign slogan.

Four Tigers (or Dragons) of Asia: Term used in reference to South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore--four areas that have experienced rapid economic growth and great prosperity.

Gang of Four: The collective name given to Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Wang Hongwen, and Yao Wenyan. They were the militant leaders of the GPCR who came under attack a month after the death of Mao (see individual entries in the Short Biographies section). The "Gang of Four" has been convicted of a multitude of crimes, one of the most serious being the alleged attempt to create

turmoil in order to seize power. This term also refers to their followers, some of whom are also under arrest or who have been tried, others of whom have repented and been pardoned.

Great Leap Forward: A program of forced draft economic development initiated by Mao in the late 1950's. Asserting that economic modernization had to be greatly accelerated, Mao claimed, for example, that within ten years China would overtake Great Britain in steel production. Unrealistic production targets were set for steel, hydroelectric power, and rural factories. During this campaign, backyard furnaces for producing pig iron were introduced, and deep plowing was undertaken on an extensive scale. In agriculture, communes were established and extremely high output quotas were set for each commune. This campaign led to considerable disorder and was largely abandoned in 1960, though widespread hunger lasted for three years thereafter. Its failure was exacerbated by natural disasters and the withdrawal of Soviet technicians from China.

Hegemonism: Chinese "code" word for Soviet and American efforts to dominate other countries.

Hundred Flowers Campaign: A political campaign initiated by Mao in 1957 and introduced under the slogan, "Let a hundred flowers bloom, let a hundred schools of thought contend." Intellectuals were urged to criticize the Party and the government freely. The movement was abruptly halted in June 1957, when criticism of the Party and State became too harsh and pointed for the Party's liking. As the Hundred Flowers began to wither, a new campaign, this one directed against intellectuals, was launched, reaching its peak during the GPCR.

Initial Stage of Socialism: The Chinese Marxist analysis of the evolution of society identifies four stages of economic development that all societies pass through, and which shape all policies, ideologies, and class relations. They are: feudalism, capitalism, socialism and finally, communism. The phrase "initial stages of socialism" therefore has a specific meaning and concrete implication for policy. The idea is that only some elements of socialist construction have been completed, especially the institutionalization of the people's ownership of the means of production, under the administration of the Party's leadership. Therefore it is appropriate to use market forces and private enterprise mechanisms as well as central planning. The theory is an ideological justification for a "mixed economy." For Deng, the path to eventual communism is wrought through economic modernization that will create the condition for communism by increasing the economic level.

Iron Rice Bowl System: Policy which guarantees workers' income and lifetime employment regardless of productivity. As a result, inefficient rationalization of the labor force has emerged. Consequently, the policy is being phased out and replaced by a "responsibility system."

Joint Declaration: The agreement between China and Great Britain on the status of the colony of Hong Kong, signed in late 1984. According to the agreement, Hong Kong will return to China on July 1, 1997, and become a Special Administrative Region of China under a unique political arrangement of "one country, two systems."

Jumping into the Sea: A rough translation of the term "xia hai", it is slang for those who leave a secure civil service job to go off on their own to try their way in the market-economy; going into business.

Lei Feng (1940-1962): A Chinese soldier noted for his desire to "serve the people." He has now attained legendary status in China, aided by anecdotes about his life which are probably apocryphal. His motto was, "the value of my life lies in making others live better." Campaigns to "learn from Lei Feng" have been sporadically waged in the last 25 years. As a gesture of respect, two memorial halls are named after him in China, one in Fu-hsien and the other in Wangcheng County.

Liberation: Establishment of the People's Republic of China on October 1, 1949, following defeat of the Nationalist (KMT) forces on China's mainland. Events are often described as occurring before

or after Liberation.

Long March: The epic 1933-1935 exodus of peasants and Red Army personnel from a beleaguered base in southeastern China. Of the 100,000 who began the March, only 20,000 survivors reached Yanan, which became CCP headquarters for the next decade. The aging survivors still comprise a substantial portion of the senior Chinese leadership.

Management Responsibility System: A major aspect of recent economic reforms based in large part on economic incentives for personal initiative. Includes decollectivization of land and systems of bonuses and penalties in factories, as well as personal profit for agricultural production through open market systems. The reforms have been aimed largely at ending the wasteful results of the "iron rice bowl" system, which guaranteed workers' income and lifetime employment regardless of productivity. Responsibility system reforms have varied in scope and impact, but they include systems of promotion based on merit, accountability of enterprises depending on their profitability, and other policies that are anathema to more ideologically-minded leaders.

May 4th Movement: A political and cultural reform movement by Beijing intellectuals in 1919 after Chinese territorial concessions were given to Japan by the European colonial powers in the Treaty of Versailles. The movement represented a dissatisfaction with China's continued international backwardness and weakness in spite of governmental attempts to modernize.

May 7 Cadre Schools: Special schools in which cadres engaged in political study, manual labor, criticism and self-criticism during the Cultural Revolution. Named for a directive issued by Mao on May 7, 1966, many cadres spent considerable time in such institutions. Essentially, the schools provide a medium for "rectification of thought and conduct."

National People's Congress: China's parliamentary body that meets annually to discuss and vote on new initiatives suggested to them by the Party Central Committee. In reality, very little discussion occurs and approval is almost always unanimous. In 1987, there were tentative moves to express diverse opinions, but no organized opposition has surfaced.

One Child Per Family Policy: To control its burgeoning population of over 1.1 billion, China adopted an official family planning policy of one child per family in the late 1970's. This policy is implemented through wage incentives and social pressures. Minorities and remote rural communities are exempted. Compliance has been relatively high in the cities, but not in the countryside, where the new economic reform policies inadvertently also provide incentives for families to have more children in order to put more hands to work. This is a good example of two national policies coming into direct conflict with one another.

One Country, Two Systems: The unique, political arrangement between Hong Kong and China which would allow Hong Kong to retain its status as a free port and continue a free trade policy, including the free movement of goods and capital. Meanwhile China will retain territorial control over the whole of Hong Kong. The PRC is also trying to interest Taiwan in this concept.

Open-Door Policy: A policy to welcome foreign economic involvement in China, begun after the fall of the Gang of Four and pushed by Deng Xiaoping and other supporters in the move towards a market-economy. It contrasted with the People's Republic of China's insularity prior to that time.

Peaceful Evolution: Peaceful Evolution is defined by the Chinese government as the promotion by capitalist countries of an internal change in the character of political power in socialist countries. The belief is that as relations with socialist countries began to thaw in the late 1970's and 1980's capitalist countries began to seek peaceful means to undermine socialist governments. There are three basic practices that western countries have implemented in trying to achieve this evolution: To support intellectual "elites" who share Western bourgeois democratic theory and ideology, and also accept western economic systems as the sole models for change; To provide economic and tech-

nological aid as bait in order to encourage reform to be carried out in accordance with Western standards; To take premeditated, joint action along with the western media, human rights foundations, trade unions and other organizations against socialist countries in support of infiltration and evolution. In light of all these practices, the Chinese government feels it necessary to carry out a struggle between evolution and counter-evolution in order to guarantee the smooth implementation and healthy development of reform and opening to the outside world.

Polar Bear: Term often used to refer to the USSR, especially during the 1970's and early 1980's.

Proletariat: The class of industrial wage earners who possess neither capital nor production means and must earn their living by their labor power. According to Chinese communist thought, the proletariat is destined to seize power in the wake of the collapse of the capitalist system.

Red Guards: A general term for the millions of young people who answered the call of Chairman Mao during the summer of 1966 wearing red armbands and carrying Mao's little red book of quotations. They formed numerous competing revolutionary organizations. At the height of the violence, the competing Red Guard factions raided armories and clashed violently within cities and regions for power; such violence was eventually quelled by the PLA on orders from Zhou Enlai.

Rectification: First developed by the CCP in the 1940's, rectification refers to political reeducation of cadres in the Party bureaucracy. Rectification campaigns vary in intensity. While generally conducted inside the Party, at times the leadership asked non-Party people to offer criticism of officials as an instrument of rectification. In this sense, both the Hundred Flowers Campaign and the GPCR were rectification campaigns.

Reform Era: In 1978, after Deng Xiaoping was established as China's "paramount leader," he changed the CCP policy from class struggle to economic reform. Areas of reform included foreign relations (a new "open door" policy), agriculture, industry, and academia.

Revisionism: Considered a threat to China's path to communism, revisionism describes an attitude that deemphasizes ideology in order to achieve certain goals. Charges of revisionism were especially prevalent during the Cultural Revolution. Revisionism was an ideological concept that contributed to the Sino-Soviet split.

Sent Down to the Country: A policy in effect from 1966 to 1979, primarily for middle-school youth, of sending people out of urban areas to live and work on rural communes. Many of the "sent-down youth" remained in the country unless they were able to pass examinations and be selected to go to a university. The policy was an attempt to distribute population more evenly throughout China and to avoid problems of urban concentration and flight from the countryside to the more exciting cities. It also had the ideological objective of acquainting urbanites with rural problems.

Serve the People: Phrase used from the beginning of the CCP to encourage a selflessness among the society. It was heavily promoted during the GPCR and could be seen, written in Mao's calligraphy, all over—on walls, on signs, on childrens' backpacks.

Special Economic Zones (SEZs): Special Economic Zones were established in 1979 by Deng Xiaoping to encourage more foreign investment by allowing liberal economic reforms (including tax benefits, exemptions from customs duties, negotiable land-use fees, some access to domestic markets, and simplified bureaucratic procedures) in certain coastal areas. Success has varied in different zones.

Spiritual Civilization Campaign: Promoted by Jiang Zemin, and formally endorsed at the Sixth Plenum of the 14th CPC Central Committee in October 1996, the platform calls for promoting orthodox values by strengthening ideological education, "socialist ethics," cultural activities, and patriotism, and warns against corruption and excessive materialism. The campaign is seen as

movement to haul China's fast-evolving society back onto a narrower, more controllable track; assert party relevance in the face a growing range of social and economic problems spawned by explosive economic growth; and emphasize traditional virtues such as Confucianism and respect for authority.

Ten Thousand Yuan Family: General term used in reference to families whose finances have risen dramatically since the institution of economic reforms.

Three Nos: The official Taiwanese policy toward mainland China consisting of: 1) no compromise; 2) no negotiation; and 3) no contact. The third of these is no longer intact since the promulgation of a 1987 policy which allowing certain categories of Taiwan residents to return to the mainland for visits.

Tiananmen Square: The large square in the center of Beijing which was formerly an outer courtyard of the Imperial Palace. Tiananmen, which means the Gate of Heavenly Peace, is a large arch looming over the square. It has been the site of many demonstrations and parades throughout the modern era; it was the location of Chairman Mao's pronouncement of the founding of the People's Republic in 1949, and the focal point for the mass demonstrations for greater freedom in the spring of 1989.

"To get rich is glorious": A phrase attributed to Deng Xiaoping which has spurred Chinese mania for entrepreneurship and making money.

Ultra-leftism: The radical extremist line associated with the supporters of Lin Biao and the Gang of Four.

Walking on Two Legs: This phrase was very popular from 1972 to 1977. It refers to the policy of combining traditional Chinese practices with new technology. An example of this is the use of traditional Chinese herbs and medical techniques such as acupuncture in combination with new medical knowledge, such as antibiotics.

THE ART OF ASKING QUESTIONS IN CHINA

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One of the most rewarding aspects of any visit to China is the opportunity to ask questions of your Chinese hosts. Asking questions is a way of penetrating beyond first impressions, discovering the implications of what you have been told, and learning things that are not visible through direct observation.

To a degree, asking questions can be done on an individual basis. One of the most promising opportunities is to talk with the guides that accompany you throughout China, usually on longer trips by bus, train, or airplane. It is with your guides, more than with any other Chinese, that you will be able to form a relationship that is deep, personal, and frank. In addition, it is also possible to ask questions of Chinese companions at luncheons and dinners, even though you should also understand that Chinese are not as accustomed as Americans to conducting serious conversations at mealtimes, nor as used to being completely candid with foreigners whom they have only just met. But the most common occasions for asking questions are the more formal briefing sessions held at the Chinese institutions you will visit.

Americans are naturally inquisitive, and enjoy these opportunities to learn more about the country that they have travelled so far to visit. But they are often slower to realize that there is a strategy to asking questions in a Chinese manner. Adopting that strategy will probably produce rewarding results. Ignoring the strategy, in contrast, usually creates frustration and dissatisfaction on both sides.

This strategy for asking questions in China can be summarized in the following six rules of thumb:

Rule One: Wait until the Chinese speaker has completed his or her presentation to ask questions. It is considered rude to interrupt during the presentation itself.

Rule Two: Before arriving at your meeting or interview, pick your topics of conversation carefully, in consultation with your scholar-escort. He or she can help you identify the major issues confronting the official or the institution you are about to visit, the major policies they are responsible for carrying out, and the unresolved questions and problems with which they are grappling. The scholar-escort can also tell you about the main gaps in American understanding about the institutions and issues you are about to encounter.

Without such advance preparation, you may waste your time asking questions that fall outside the sphere of competence of your Chinese hosts. It makes little sense, for example, to ask a provincial governor for his views on U.S.-China relations, or an official of the Foreign Ministry for an explanation of China's new agricultural policy.

Less obviously, without advance preparation, you may find yourself satisfied with superficial answers that could just as well have been gleaned from a reading of Beijing Review or China Daily back in the United States. In most cases, the scholar-escort can tell you what those general answers will be, so that you can proceed directly to probe issues at a deeper level.

In short, the more preparation you have put into your meetings, the better answers you will be able to receive. Spontaneity may have its virtues, but failure to prepare in advance is costly on a visit to China. Don't try to wing it.

Rule Three: In your conversations with Chinese officials, pursue a single line of questioning for a respectable period of time, responding to each answer with a carefully selected follow-up question. This will enable you to move beyond the necessarily general reply to your first question, and allow you to gain a deeper and fuller understanding of the topic in which you are interested. To be sure, it may seem preferable at first to ask about as many different subjects as time permits. But such a "scatter shot" approach will give you a superficial understanding of many topics, and a deep understanding of none.

Some groups find it useful to assign a particular topic to each member of the delegation, allowing him or her a reasonable amount of time (say, five or ten minutes) to pursue that subject in depth. Other groups prefer to let everyone contribute follow-up questions to the discussion of a single subject, before the leader determines that it is time to move on to another topic. No matter which tactic you use, the key point to remember is to focus on a limited number of topics in any given meeting or interview.

Rule Four: Don't forget that, in most situations in China, you will be speaking through an interpreter. This may be true even when your Chinese interlocutor speaks some English. The use of even a highly qualified interpreter introduces some artificiality and awkwardness into your conversations with your Chinese hosts, and thus can prevent you from taking the greatest advantage of your opportunities to ask questions in China.

The following guidelines may be useful in overcoming those difficulties. First, and in some ways most important, the process of consecutive translation (it is very unlikely that you will encounter simultaneous translation on your trip to China) reduces the amount of time available for substantive discussion by about half. Each question must be translated into Chinese; each answer must be translated back into English. Thus, what appears at first glance to be an hour-long meeting will actually become a thirty-minute session once the time allotted to translation is discounted. This makes it all the more important for each group to carefully consider which subjects they want to explore, and what questions they want to ask. Time is precious, and should not be wasted on frivolous or secondary issues.

Second, don't overestimate the interpreter. Speak slowly and enunciate as clearly as you can. Speak in complete sentences, rather than in phrases and clauses, and use simple syntax, rather than more complicated constructions. Avoid asking contrafactual questions (like, "What would you have done if this year's harvest had not been so abundant?") because they are extremely difficult even for the most seasoned interpreters to translate into Chinese.

Third, make sure that the interpreter has finished translating the answer to your question before asking another one. It is just as impolite to interrupt the interpreter as it would be to interrupt the person who actually answered the question. It is also rude, by the way, to talk when the interpreter is translating your question into Chinese, or when your Chinese host is answering your question in Chinese.

Fourth, when asking a question, don't look at the interpreter, but at the person to whom you are directing the question. The conversation is not, after all, between you and the interpreter, but between you and your Chinese host.

Above all, understand that the process of interpretation may be responsible for some of the misunderstandings and frustrations that often develop during a visit to China. What may appear to be incomplete answers to your questions are often the result of poor translation, or a difficulty in understanding the intent of your queries, rather than a deliberate attempt to conceal the truth.

Rule Five: Chinese are more comfortable in discussing generalities than specifics, the normal and customary rather than the unusual or the deviant, and instances of unity and harmony rather than cases of conflict or disagreement. But it is precisely these latter subjects that Americans like to ask questions about. As a result, questions that seem very natural for Americans--"What, specifically, is the tax rate on this commodity?" or "What do you do if someone refuses to pay his utility bill?"--often strike Chinese as being somewhat embarrassing or presumptuous. This is not to say that Americans should avoid asking these kinds of questions. But you should understand that these cultural predispositions may pose a significant obstacle to obtaining completely satisfying answers to your questions.

In addition, don't forget that the main purpose of your Chinese hosts and interlocutors is to give you a good impression of their country, and to instruct you in the official policy of their government. They will therefore be reluctant, especially when they meet a foreign guest for the first time, to express their personal opinions, or to discuss problems and shortcomings in a totally candid manner.

Because of these considerations, Americans are often skeptical about what they hear in China. In many ways, this is a healthy phenomenon. But the skepticism that often develops during a visit to China should be tempered by an awareness that differences in cultural norms and political systems may be responsible for answers that strike Americans as being less than completely forthcoming. Thus, it is usually better not to express your skepticism openly, except in the extremely rare situations that you suspect a patent attempt to be misleading or untruthful.

Rule Six: A scholar-escort or someone knowledgeable about China may be accompanying your delegation in order to help you better understand China. But requests for explanations and clarifications are best done privately, rather than in front of your Chinese hosts. To ask a substantive question of your scholar-escort when Chinese are present implies either that you consider an American to be more knowledgeable about China than the Chinese themselves, or that you do not trust the Chinese to give an honest or accurate answer. Neither impression is necessarily the one you intend to leave. Accordingly, it is best to wait until the delegation is alone--at breakfast or after dinner--for substantive discussions with your scholar-escort.

CHRONOLOGY OF TWENTIETH-CENTURY CHINA

- 1900 Growing resentment against foreign domination in China erupts in the "Boxer Rebellion."
- 1905 Sun Yat-sen and others form the Tung Meng Hui (Alliance Society), forerunner of the Kuomintang (KMT) (Nationalist Party) and dedicated to the overthrow of the Qing (Manchu) dynasty and the end of imperial rule.
- 1911 Qing dynasty overthrown in revolution inspired by Sun Yat-sen.
- 1919 Chinese students protest Treaty of Versailles granting former German territorial concessions in China to the Japanese. These protests, climaxing on May 4th, marked the beginning of student involvement in politics known as the "May 4th Movement."
- 1921 Chinese Communist Party formed; Mao Zedong one of the founders.
- 1923 Collaboration between Communist Party and KMT begins in an effort to unify the country, now largely controlled by warlords.
- 1925 Sun Yat-sen dies; factionalization of KMT.
- 1926 General Chiang Kai-shek launches "Northern Expedition" from Guangzhou with aid of Communist Party political advisors.
- 1927 Kuomintang-Communist collaboration disintegrates as Chiang Kai-shek moves against the Communists in Nanjing.
- 1928 Chiang Kai-shek assumes leadership of KMT and the Chinese Government and establishes capital in Nanjing. China is nominally united (although Japan and Russia still hold territory in Manchuria) and the government gets international recognition.
- 1928-34 Mao Zedong establishes guerrilla base in southeast China (Jiangxi Province) and begins to formulate a strategy for revolution based on peasant support.
- 1931 Japanese invade and occupy Manchuria, setting up the puppet government of Manchukuo under the last Manchu "boy emperor."
- 1934 Red Army begins the Long March from Jiangxi base to northwest China (Yan'an) to escape encirclement by KMT forces.
- 1936 Xi'an Incident: Chiang is captured by a young warlord eager to fight Japan. He agrees upon his release to form a second united front with the Communists to resist the Japanese.
- 1937 Sino-Japanese War begins with Japanese attack on Marco Polo Bridge outside Beijing.

- 1945 Sino-Japanese War ends. Open civil war resumes.
- 1949 Nationalist forces are defeated and the People's Republic of China is established. Chiang Kai-shek flees to Taiwan and sets up a provisional capital.
- 1950 Signing of Sino-Soviet friendship treaty. China enters Korean War.
- 1952 Basic land reform concluded, ending landlord system.
- 1953 Inauguration of First Five-Year Plan, which relied on the Soviet model. Korean armistice concluded.
- 1955 Rapid increase in agricultural collectivization.
- 1956-57 Hundred Flowers Campaign (see Glossary).
- 1958 Great Leap Forward (see Glossary).
- 1960 Soviet technicians abruptly withdraw from China; Sino-Soviet difficulties now become an open break.
- 1962 Sino-Indian border war.
- 1964 First Chinese nuclear detonation.
- 1966-76 Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (see Glossary).
- 1971 People's Republic of China voted in as a member of the United Nations.
- 1972 President Nixon visits China; signs Shanghai Communique pledging "normalization" of U.S.-China relations.

Campaign launched to criticize Confucius and Lin Biao.
- 1973 CCP Tenth Party Congress; emergence of new Party leaders closely allied with Mao's wife, Jiang Qing.
- 1974 Deng Xiaoping is rehabilitated and becomes acting leader of the government. Zhou Enlai hospitalized for cancer treatment
- 1975 Fourth National People's Congress ratifies new constitution.
- 1976 Premier Zhou Enlai dies, provoking massive pro-Zhou demonstrations that are suppressed by force.

Deng Xiaoping blamed for demonstrations and dismissed from all posts; Hua Guofeng appointed Vice Chairman of the CCP and Premier.

Major earthquake in Tangshan, northeast China.

Chairman Mao dies.

Hua Guofeng succeeds Mao as Chairman of the CCP. Jiang Qing (Mao's widow) and three close associates (collectively known as the "Gang of Four"), all members of the extremist faction of the Politburo, are arrested and purged.

1977 Deng Xiaoping restored to offices from which he had twice been purged. Other previously disgraced political figures begin to reemerge; some reassume positions of power.

Deng initiates reforms which eventually lead to the dismantling of the commune system and increased privatization in rural areas during the late-1970s and early 1980s.
1978 Fifth National People's Congress ratifies new constitution.

Wall posters begin to appear in major cities demanding human rights and calling for some aspects of Western-style democracy.

PRC and U.S. announce establishment of full diplomatic relations effective January 1, 1979.

1979 Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping visits U.S. to mark normalization of relations.

Second session of the Fifth National People's Congress begins to codify China's legal system, promulgates laws concerning joint ventures with foreign businesses, and moves to abolish revolutionary committees as governing agencies.

Sino-Vietnamese border war.

Posters banned on Beijing's famous "Democracy Wall" and restricted to Yuetan Park, located in a remote section of the city.

1980 Liu Shaoqi, former head of state and chief victim of the Cultural Revolution, is posthumously rehabilitated.

Deng Xiaoping announces his retirement from government positions by 1985.

Governor Zhao Ziyang of Sichuan Province promoted to premier, replacing Hua Guofeng.

Bohai oil rig disaster; Minister of Petroleum resigns.

Gang of Four put on trial on charges of organizing and leading a counter-revolutionary clique, plotting to subvert the government, engineering an armed insurrection, murder and homicide with counterrevolutionary motives, fabricating false charges, framing counterrevolutionary propaganda, and provocation.

1981 Gang of Four and chief followers convicted and jailed.

Hu Yaobang replaces Hua Guofeng as chairman of the CCP.

1982 Major restructuring of State Council begins in March, with existing government ministries, commissions, and agencies merged and reduced, and their administrative staffs greatly cut back.

The Twelfth Communist Party Congress approves a new constitution, replacing the one adopted in 1978. The Central Advisory Commission, composed of elder statesmen to assume "second-line" responsibilities, is created.

1983 Economic responsibility system promoted throughout China, placing greater emphasis on private initiative and the accountability of individual leaders and organizations.

Deng Xiaoping initiates rectification of the CCP, designed to weed out many middle-level officials associated with the ultra-leftist policies of the Cultural Revolution.

Sixth National People's Congress convenes and appoints new leaders, among them Li Xiannian, titular head of state, and Ulanhu, vice president of the PRC, as well as several vice premiers.

"Spiritual [or Cultural] Pollution" becomes focus of a campaign to eliminate "harmful" social influences from the West.

CCP General Secretary Hu Yaobang and Premier Zhao Ziyang make several trips abroad.

1984 The Third Plenary Session of the Twelfth Central Committee of the Communist Party adopts the "Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Reform of the Economic Structure." Urban enterprises, with the exception of major industries such as steel, power, etc., are to be given greater freedom to plan production and assume responsibility for profit and loss; limitations are put on mandatory central planning; prices of some commodities are allowed to "float" on the basis of market demand; aspects of the responsibility system extended to the urban economy.

Leadership moves to end "Spiritual Pollution" campaign.

CCP General Secretary Hu Yaobang visits several foreign countries, including Japan and Australia.

Under Deng Xiaoping's prodding, several senior Party, government, and military leaders retire.

1985 Chinese and Soviets make several small but significant moves to ease strained relations, despite major persisting differences.

Increasing numbers of PRC leaders travel abroad throughout the year, including President Li Xiannian, General Secretary Hu Yaobang, Premier Zhao Ziyang, Vice Premier Li Peng, and a number of ministers.

Beginning early in the year and peaking in September, major shifts in senior Party, government, and military posts are pressed by Deng Xiaoping. Large numbers of older officials resign from Central Committee, Politburo, and central, provincial, and municipal government positions and are replaced by younger cadres, many of them college graduates and known supporters of Deng's economic and social reforms.

1986

Sino-Soviet relations show marked improvement with economic and political steps by both sides. Gorbachev makes major speech in Vladivostok offering concessions in effort to restore normal relationship. At the same time, China makes significant gesture to U.S. by permitting naval visit to Qingdao.

Defection of CAAC airplane to South Korea results in semi-official contacts, with CAAC director flying to Seoul.

Chinese policy towards unrecognized governments of South Korea and Israel softens, as visas are given to citizens of both countries for travel to China. Chinese take full part in Asian Games in Seoul, and receive South Korean teams in China.

Chinese media report extensive debate over issues of political reform and democracy. Following several months of newspaper discussions of "socialist democracy," students demonstrate in several cities calling for swifter political reforms.

1987

In January, at an "enlarged" meeting of the Politburo, "bourgeois liberalism" is denounced. Blamed for the student demonstrations, Hu Yaobang resigns from the CCP general secretary post, but remains a member of the Politburo.

The government takes measures to curb dissident activities by expelling leading intellectual reformists from the CCP and from their jobs.

Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang and Portuguese Prime Minister Cavaco Silva sign a Joint Declaration stating that China will reassume sovereignty over Macao on December 20, 1999.

The 13th Party Congress signals the apparent continuation of Deng Xiaoping's policies for economic change despite his retirement. The retirement of other senior hard-line members of the party, as well as Zhao Ziyang's confirmation as Party General Secretary, allows the new Central Committee to streamline Party organization with younger, better-educated leadership.

Pro-independence demonstrations in Tibet break out, provoking a sharp crackdown by Beijing. Travel to Tibet is restricted and all foreign reporters are ordered out.

1988

Renewed pro-independence demonstrations in Tibet provoke international criticism of China's policies there.

Hainan Island, in southwestern China, is designated China's 37th province and 5th Special Economic Zone in a move to speed the island's development and encourage foreign investment.

The 7th NPC reiterates support for the reform policies. Li Peng is confirmed as Premier of the State Council amid a major restructuring of the government bureaucracy. The Congress is characterized by an unusually high degree of openness and debate.

China expands its direct ties with Taiwan, announcing regulations allowing Taiwanese investment in the PRC for the first time.

Double digit inflation ravages China's cities causing Beijing to abandon its bold price reforms in favor of more stable economic policies.

Rajiv Gandhi visits China marking the first visit by an Indian Prime Minister in 34 years.

1989

Pro-independence riots in Tibet cause the Chinese to impose martial law in Lhasa and to expel all foreigners from the region.

Second session of the 7th NPC meets reiterating the call for more cautious economic policies. Premier Li Peng tells the Chinese people to be "mentally prepared for few years of austerity" amid rumors that he had displaced Zhao Ziyang as China's number two leader behind Deng Xiaoping.

Former Secretary General of the CCP, Hu Yaobang, dies on April 15 touching off student demonstrations mourning the death of the liberal former party chief. The student movement quickly expands to other cities and incorporates many sectors of society as the focus of the demonstrations shifts to demands for greater democracy. On May 17 and 18 over 1 million students, teachers, reporters, civil servants, and workers pour into Beijing's streets in the largest show of unrest in Communist China's history. A split in the party over how to respond to the demonstrations leads to the most serious political infighting in a decade. Amid reports that the hard-liners, headed by Deng Xiaoping, Yang Shangkun, and Li Peng have gained the upper hand over more moderate elements within the party, including General Secretary Zhao Ziyang, Li Peng imposes martial law in areas of the capital on May 20 and orders troops into the city to quell the protests. The People's Liberation Army, which for two weeks is blocked by Beijing citizens from entering the city and shows reluctance to carry out the martial law order, moves against the demonstrators shortly after midnight on June 4. In the ensuing melee, several hundred civilians and several soldiers are killed. Labeling the confrontation a "counterrevolutionary rebellion," the government arrests over 1,500 pro-democracy demonstrators. The government launches an intense media campaign to propagate the Party line that the troops acted valiantly to preserve order in Beijing and to protect the people's democratic dictatorship, and that a minimum of civilians were killed in the confrontation.

Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev arrives in China on May 15, signaling the normalization of Sino-Soviet relations after three decades of mutual suspicion. Despite the historic nature of the meeting between Deng Xiaoping and Gorbachev, the Soviet President's visit is overshadowed by the student demonstrations and little progress on substantive issues is reported.

At a meeting of the Central Committee in late June, several leading moderates within the party hierarchy are dismissed for "mistakes" in their handling of student unrest in the capital. Zhao Ziyang is ousted from all leading posts, and is replaced by Chairman of the Shanghai Municipal Party Committee, Jiang Zemin.

The government begins a massive campaign to "reeducate and unite with the overwhelming majority, isolate and attack the handful of hostile elements, and make a thorough investigation into all counterrevolutionary scheming." Thousands are arrested, including several leaders of the student movement (although many of the prominent ones escaped). Highly publicized executions of guilty counterrevolutionaries and "hooligans" take place, some degree of mandatory labor is made compulsory for students with no such experience, political meetings are once again stressed in the work place, and those suspected of participation in the spring events are forced to write self-criticisms and detailed accounts of their actions. While everyone superficially complies with these requirements, there appears to be little enthusiasm and a great deal of sullen resignation.

Deng Xiaoping continues to try to bridge the gap in the CCP between its conservative and reformist factions. Since Jiang Zemin lacks a strong enough power base to bring about a smooth political succession, attempts are made to raise his public stature and he is designated as the "core" of the next generation of leaders.

1990

On January 10th, the Chinese government announces that martial law in Beijing will be lifted. PLA soldiers are replaced by policemen and Tiananmen Square is opened to the public for the first time since June 4, 1989. Other laws still remain that ban unauthorized demonstrations, speeches, and wall posters.

The Chinese government reveals in January that 573 detainees from the pro-democracy protests have been gradually released in small numbers over the past few months. No specific names, dates, or numbers of detainees are given.

In July, China establishes diplomatic relations with Indonesia and states its intentions to formalize ties with Singapore. In early August, official relations are established with Saudi Arabia, which in turn breaks official ties with Taiwan. China also establishes trade relations with South Korea, and engages in its first direct discussions with Vietnam since the 1970's.

In late August, China reaps international praise for its crucial vote in favor of U.N. sanctions against Iraq for invading Kuwait, as well as for its efforts to end the Cambodian conflict.

In late September, China hosts the 11th Asian games. Asian teams from throughout the continent (except Iraq) compete, with China taking well over half the gold medals. Though a political, public relations, and athletic success, the Asian Games raised public questions in China over the event's cost.

1991

China sentences 18 democracy activists in January and February. Most sentences range from two to eight years, with journalist Wang Juntao and economist Chen

Ziming sentenced to the longest terms so far, thirteen years. Many others arrested for dissident activities remain under arrest, but not yet publicly sentenced.

In April, Zhu Rongji, mayor of Shanghai, and Zou Jiahua, Minister of the State Planning Commission, are appointed Vice-Premiers of the State Council. Ye Xuanping, governor of Guangdong Province, is appointed Vice-Chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. Both Zhu and Ye are considered to be in favor of quicker reform in China.

In mid-June, unusually heavy rains cause massive flooding along the Huaihe, Chu, and Yangtze rivers. By late July, 18 provinces in the Southern region had been affected with 1,800 people reported dead, 32,000 injured, a loss of 13.2 billion kilos of grain and a direct economic loss of 40 billion yuan (US\$7.5 billion) reported. For the first time in its 42 year history the government of China requests disaster aid from foreign countries.

1992

Deng Xiaoping, in his first public appearance in a year, and President Yang Shangkun make well-publicized trips to the economically booming southern towns of Guangdong province, signalling their endorsement of liberal economic reform. Conservative Premier Li Peng and Chen Yun, the most influential of the octogenarian hard-liners, voice more limited support for market reform. This sparks nation-wide frenzy to make money.

In August, China (despite close ties with North Korea) and South Korea (despite close ties to Taiwan) establish official diplomatic relations.

A brief riot erupts in Shenzhen after applications for buying company shares in the local stock market quickly run out. Thousands of protesters express their anger over the perceived corruption in the issuing of the applications.

The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party holds its 14th Party Congress in October, at which several hard-liners resign and are replaced with reformers. The Congress also endorses Deng Xiaoping's policies calling for China to move toward a "socialist market economy".

1993

Top government and cabinet positions are ratified at the National People's Congress (NPC) in late March. The new leadership line-up is a compromise between Deng Xiaoping and his more conservative colleagues. As a result five important government figures are in a position to vie for power once the last of the older generation of leaders leave the scene.

With the title of president added to his former positions, Jiang Zemin is now the official head of the government, the Chinese Communist Party, and the army. But he lacks a natural constituency and his collection of posts is seen as a sign of weakness. Li Peng retains the premiership and represents the conservatives in the party and government.

Qiao Shi, as chairman of the National People's Congress, and Li Ruihuan, as chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), do not hold the highest government posts but each

have wide networks of support.

The fifth contender is rising star Zhu Rongji. Zhu, now the ranking vice-premier, has been given the major responsibilities for overseeing China's continuing economic reforms. Later in the year, Zhu is appointed governor of the Bank of China and charged with the responsibility of reigning in the country's furious economic growth. Zhu's austerity program of fiscal discipline and anti-inflationary measures is deemed only partially successful in cooling down the economy.

Beginning in April, Premier Li Peng disappears from the public scene. It is rumored that he is suffering from a severe cold or a mild heart attack. There is also speculation that his absence is the result of political causes. But by early June, Li is again seen in public, welcoming foreign dignitaries and holding a position of considerable power in the political system.

In May, the World Bank releases a report stating that China's economy is the third largest in the world. Continued growth of the economy in 1993 creates inflation anxieties and overheated capital investment particularly in the real estate sector. This prompts the government, spearheaded by economic chief Zhu Rongji, to launch a targeted austerity program that, not long after commencing, seems to lose steam.

In 1993 the Chinese go all-out in their quest to host the 2000 Summer Games of the Olympics. Intense lobbying of International Olympic Committee officials and propaganda campaigns in China are all part of the leadership's effort to bring the Games to China. Just days before the decision on where the Olympics will be held, China releases prominent Democracy-Wall activist Wei Jingsheng - some six months before completion of his 15-year sentence. The move is viewed as an attempt to blunt Western criticism of China's human rights practices and to help China's chances of being awarded the Games.

However, the I.O.C. chooses Sydney as the host city for the games. Suffering deep embarrassment, the Chinese quietly let the affair drop, but not before expressing displeasure with those countries, particularly the United States, that came out against China's bid.

1994

In early 1994 Chinese security authorities begin picking up and detaining Wei Jingsheng and other dissidents for speaking out against the government, claiming he had broken the conditions of his parole.

The annual meeting of the National People's Congress in March produces no bold initiatives or concrete proposals for dealing with problems created by China's enormous economic growth. Targets are set to slow down growth, but implementation methods are noticeably missing.

With the health of paramount leader Deng Xiaoping rumored to be in decline, the prospect of a protracted succession struggle looms in the background.

In September, the Fourth Plenum of the 14th CCP Central Committee addressed the role of "democratic centralism" which it described as the "fundamental organizational system of our party." Further, the successful establishment of a socialist market economy depended upon Party leadership. There was, however, a recognition that the development of a socialist market economic system could adversely affect Party discipline. Concern was given to "decentralism and anarchism" or to "apathy" within the Party ranks, especially at the local level.

1995

At the third session of the Eighth NPC in March, major reform legislation related to education and the banking/financial sectors is adopted. Draft laws relating to the reform of judicial bodies and the police forces are also enacted. A majority of delegates approve the appointment of two new Vice-Premiers: Wu Bangguo and Jiang Chunyun. The session emphasizes outstanding problems related to inflation, corruption, the poor state of public order, and the lagging economic performances of agriculture and state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Widespread concern is voiced about ensuring a stable standard of living in the countryside against the background of a declining arable land base, increasing population, and the incidence of frequent natural disasters. A key task during 1995 was to integrate further reform of SOEs with improvements in the social security system to cope with growing numbers of under-employed and laid off workers. By year end, Party leaders announce their intention of rescue only 1,000 of the most important state industries -- such as aviation, steel, and petrochemicals -- and let more than 13,000 large and medium-sized SOEs close, merge, or "go to sea," the euphemism for privatization.

A tight-credit policy, food subsidies, and price controls are the keys used to bring inflation down in 1995. Inflation slows to 14.8 percent, down from more than 20 percent a year earlier.

Former Politburo member Chen Yun dies in April; Chen was the chief architect of China's centrally planned economy.

Amidst the continuing speculation about the ill-health and imminent demise of Deng Xiaoping, Premier Li Peng indicates the succession problem has been resolved with the transfer of power to the "third generation leading collective" under Jiang Zemin. Such assurances notwithstanding, problems of weak and lax discipline within the Party, particularly in the countryside, remains a major preoccupation.

An anti-corruption campaign, begun in 1993, reaches into the upper ranks of Beijing municipal government. On April 4, Wang Baosan, the deputy mayor of Beijing, is reported to have committed suicide; Wang was under investigation for "economic crimes," according to Xinhua. Wang was later accused of embezzling \$37 million, but investigators found more evidence of graft after looking into a series of construction of construction projects under Wang's control that apparently involved huge payoffs to staff at the Beijing Municipal Communist Party Committee, headed by Politburo member and former Beijing mayor, Chen Xitong. After implication in the scandal, Chen resigns as Beijing Communist Party chief and is stripped of his party membership on charges of abuse of office and corruption. Chen's arrest arouses speculation that Jiang Zemin will open a far-reaching crackdown on corruption, both to clear out rivals/political enemies and to earn respect from ordinary Chinese who express disgust with growing corruption among

officials. While no more upper-rank officials in Beijing are charged, the anti-corruption campaign continues elsewhere in the country.

An underground nuclear test is conducted on May 15 in western Xinjiang province; the test breaks a worldwide moratorium on nuclear testing and comes only days after the vote in New York by delegates from 175 nations, including China, supporting indefinite extension of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). China defends its action by stating it has conducted very few tests compared to the other nuclear powers. It will cease all nuclear testing once a comprehensive test ban treaty is agreed upon. A second nuclear test is conducted in August. Japan also reports that China launched a solid-fueled intercontinental ballistic missile -- the first test of a long-range, solid-fueled missile by the Chinese.

In June, it is reported that U.S. intelligence sources believe China delivered missile components to Pakistan in violation of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). China denies the reports, contending it is strictly honoring its commitments to the accord. Despite the pleas of some Western governments, China also announces it will continue with plans to sell a nuclear reactor and related technology to Iran.

Officials arrest literary critic Liu Xiaobo in May for preparing, along with 44 other leading intellectuals, a petition to commemorate the anniversary of the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests; the petition, which is presented to the National People's Congress, also calls for broad and substantive political change. Twenty-two dissidents are later arrested in Beijing. After 20 months in custody, Wei Jingsheng, China's leading political dissident, is charged with sedition in November and sentenced to 14 years in prison at his trial the following month.

In early 1995, Jiang Zemin delivers a speech outlining an eight point proposal for the reunification of Taiwan and the mainland. Jiang reiterates that the basis of peaceful reunification should be the idea of "one country, two systems." Taiwan would be permitted to retain its social and economic identity, enjoy a "high degree" of autonomy in legislative and judicial matters, and keep its armed forces and administer its party, government and military systems. Jiang condemns the "growing separatist tendency and the increasingly rampant activities of the forces working for the independence of Taiwan." Taiwan's Premier, Lien Chan, acknowledges that relations between the mainland and Taiwan had entered "an era of negotiation" with trade and economic issues as the main concerns. However, by summer cross-Strait talks come to a halt.

In June, Taiwan's President, Lee Teng-hui, is granted a visa by the Clinton Administration to make a private visit to the United States. On Taiwan, this is widely hailed as a major diplomatic breakthrough, though the visit is designated by the United States as unofficial and private. Beijing's reaction, which was anticipated, is stronger than expected. In late July and August the PLA stages a series of guided missile tests in the East China Sea, off Taiwan's coast. In November, large-scale military exercises are conducted in Fujian province, with Beijing redesignating the exercise area from a military zone to a war zone. These actions, combined with an organized attack against Lee Teng-hui by mainland media circles, are viewed as an attempt to influence the outcome of parliamentary

elections away from pro-independence candidates and provide a clear warning that Beijing will not tolerate any effort by Taiwan at *de jure* secession. Later visits by Li Teng-hui to the Middle East and Lien Chan to central Europe are characterized by Beijing as an attempt to build support for "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan." Jiang Zemin is believed to be under increasing pressure from military and nationalist elements to adopt a tougher approach in foreign policy matters, particularly as related to Taiwan.

September elections in Hong Kong lead to the effective control of the Legislative Council (LegCo) by pro-democracy groups. Voters resoundingly reject pro-China parties, favoring pro-democracy candidates in 17 of the 20 seats open to direct election. Beijing terms the election "unfair and unreasonable" and reiterates its pledge to abolish the legislature. Beijing also insists that the Court of Final Appeal not be established until after 1997 and limit the number of overseas judges. At year end, China names the Preparatory Committee, made up of 150 men and women, more than half from Hong Kong, who will be responsible for steering Hong Kong through its transfer from British colony to Chinese rule in 1997. Beijing, as expected, cold-shoulders Hong Kong's most popular political party, the Democrats, and draws heavily from the colony's business elite.

Despite concerns about the maintenance of the rule of law during the transition and afterwards, surveys and press accounts throughout the year suggest that many business executives appear convinced that Beijing ultimately understands the colony's needs and intends to give Hong Kong the autonomy it requires for success.

1996

Early in the year, a new set of foreign exchange control regulations is announced and gradually implemented that by year's end will permit convertibility of the yuan for trade transactions throughout China. The move is China's first major currency change since it allowed domestic companies to buy foreign currency at banks in January 1994, and a major step toward making the yuan fully convertible on "current account" for the first time since 1949. The change gives foreign-invested companies the same access to exchange markets that local companies enjoy, and removes obstacles to repatriation of profits. While symbolically important, the move will not speed China's entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) or affect outstanding issues like market access and legal transparency, contend Western economic analysts. Accession to the WTO becomes an ever pressing goal of the Chinese leadership. While Japan favors China's rapid entry into the WTO, the U.S. and other OECD countries caution the sheer size of China's economy requires its accession on a commercially sound basis.

Gross Domestic Product(GDP) grows at an annual rate of 9.7 percent. Though the 1996 GDP growth rate is considered sustainable over the long term, at least 70 percent of GDP is now produced by the nonstate sector, consisting of private and semi-private enterprises, including foreign joint ventures. However, China's state-owned enterprises (SOEs) continue to drag on the Chinese economy. SOEs now account for less than 35 percent of total output. As overall losses increase in the state sector, scattered protests erupt around the country by workers and retirees from SOEs who have not been paid wages or pensions for months. Government estimates that 10 million state employees are not being paid at all or are furloughed with tiny stipends are considered conservative by some analysts. In

the broader context of rising urban unemployment, *China Daily* reports urban unemployment could hit 54 million by 2000. The World Bank estimates that 17 percent of China's GDP consists of "unsaleable" SOE-made goods. The People's Bank of China continues to increase lending to SOEs. The government will not undertake large-scale SOE reforms until their social welfare functions from pensions to housing – are shifted to the local level. Until then, a steady flow of working capital loans is required for SOEs to provide these services to their employees. Other problems include increased rural-urban migration, along with generally slower economic growth rates in the interior and rural areas. Significant progress on SOE and banking reform is not expected until after the 15th Party Congress in late 1997.

At the annual plenum of CCP senior leaders in October, there were few surprises and no major personnel changes. The platform endorses President Jiang Zemin's so-called Spiritual Civilization Campaign, the most significant overhaul of party ideology since 1989, following the events in Tiananmen. The lengthy, meandering message, called by Xinhua News Agency, "one of the most important documents ever compiled" by the party, spells out how the country's leaders should combat rampant individualism, lack of patriotism, and moral decline – all problems attributed to rapid economic progress. The campaign is seen as Jiang's attempt to control the party's message, to reassert its relevance, and to diminish the influx of Western ideas and values. At the practical level it means stricter media censorship, patriotic exhortations, and an emphasis on traditional Chinese virtues, such as Confucianism, and respect for authority.

U.S.-based Human Rights Watch reports in January that thousands of children have died in state-run orphanages as a result of deliberate starvation and physical abuse, the government denies the allegations. A BBC documentary on the subject and resulting world press coverage have a negative impact abroad on China's image and human rights situation. In response, UNICEF announces that it will train workers and help establish management practices for Chinese orphanages.

In February, the *Far Eastern Economic Review* reports that China plans to increase defense spending by 19 percent. Western analysts believe that actual defense expenditures will be 2 to 5 times higher than the official figure of US\$9 billion.

In March, China announces that it will hold missile tests at sea, in an area just off the coast of Taiwan. Naval and air force exercises are undertaken with live ammunition in the Taiwan Strait. The exercises are an attempt to intimidate Taiwanese voters in the run-up to Taiwan first-ever presidential elections. Pictures of Chinese gunships firing orange streams of artillery into the Taiwan Strait juxtaposed with scenes of Taiwanese voters lining up to participate in the elections are shown on television around the world. In response Secretary of State Christopher announces that the United States is ordering two aircraft carriers to the waters off Taiwan. After the election, President Jiang Zemin offers to meet with Taiwanese President Li Teng-hui in a conciliatory gesture, but a lack of concrete concessions on key issues from both sides prevent progress toward the two sides meeting.

1997 After suffering from Parkinson's disease, and complications from a lung infection, Deng Xiaoping dies in Beijing on February 19, at the age of 92. Although he had retired from his last official post in 1989, his presence behind the scenes conferred a reassuring sense of order and direction on a fractious leadership struggling to sustain economic progress.

His death and the possibility of political uncertainty in its aftermath fuels speculation about China's future direction and the strength of the younger political collective centered around Jiang Zemin. Deng departs at a sensitive time – as the party prepares to celebrate the return of Hong Kong to Chinese sovereignty, and as it prepares for a major party congress to ratify the leadership lineup that will lead China into the next century.

China resumed sovereignty of Hong Kong a few moments after midnight on July 1, ending 156 years of British colonial rule. A threatened confrontation on the streets fails to materialize when democracy activists are allowed to stage their rallies and marches with no police interference. Members of the popular Democratic Party appear on the Legislative Council's outdoor balcony for a pro-democracy protest as the hand-over ceremonies proceed at the Exhibition and Convention Center. Hong Kong's elected legislature is abolished, and a new Beijing-appointed body of lawmakers is sworn in. Hong Kong is to be the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region with its own currency, legal system, and social framework for at least 50 years. The official slogan remains, "one country, two systems." Returning to Beijing after the ceremonies, Jiang Zemin appears before a huge crowd and calls on Taiwan to be next by taking "concrete steps" toward "the complete reunification of the country." Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui tells a gathering of foreign journalists two days after Hong Kong's handover that "The Republic of China...is a full-fledged democracy and the vast majority of the people do not support this model of unification proposed by Peking." He described "one country, two systems" as "wishful thinking" and vowed "never to abandon our democratic institutions."

In late April, at least three people are executed in Yili, Xinjiang for taking part in pro-independence riots that shook the Muslim-dominated northwest province in February. By official count, at least 10 people were killed, 140 were wounded, and scores were arrested. In May, eight Muslim separatists are executed in Urumqi after being convicted of bomb attacks on Urumqi buses that killed nine people and injured dozens. Some analysts view the violence as partly the result of China's nationwide "Strike Hard" campaign against crime, begun in April 1996 and concentrated on subversive and religious elements in the northwest region and Tibet.

In his speech at the 15th Communist Party Congress in September, President Jiang Zemin announces a plan to sell most state-owned industries to a share-holding system, deemed appropriate by calling it "public ownership," instead of the "state ownership" that is mandated in the Constitution. Jiang apparently forges consensus with those decision-makers who believe the burden and losses of state industries can no longer be afforded. The plan would convert most of the PRC's 305,000 state companies into shareholder-owned corporations, while under the guidance of ministries and top planners, state companies in key sectors will be formed into 1,000 huge corporations, modeled on Japanese and Korean conglomerates, that remain under state subsidization. At the close of the Party Congress, Qiao Shi, chairman of the National Party Congress, and General Liu Huaqing and Yang Baibing lose their seats on the Politburo and the Central Committee. New spots on the Politburo go to Wei Jianxing, the head of the Central Discipline Inspection Commission, and Li Lanqing, deputy prime minister.

CHRONOLOGY OF SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS

- 1784 First American clipper ship calls at Canton; trade begins, mainly in U.S. farm products and Chinese arts, crafts, and textiles.
- 1811 First American missionaries arrive in China. Their ranks grow to about 8,000 by 1925.
- 1844 U.S. and China sign Treaty of Wangxia granting the U.S. the same rights extracted from China by Britain after the Opium War (1830-1842)—extraterritoriality, most-favored-nation status, and establishment of commercial centers, churches, and hospitals.
- 1850 The beginning of two decades of substantial Chinese emigration to the United States.
- 1861 Secretary of State Seward sends Anson Burlingame, first Minister to China, with instructions to cooperate with other foreign powers in assuring equal economic opportunity for all.
- 1864 U.S. recruits up to 10,000 Chinese to work on the first transcontinental railroad.
- 1872 China sends first large contingent of students to U.S.
- 1879 Responding to increasingly violent agitation against Chinese immigration, Congress passes a bill that limits the number of Chinese arriving in the U.S. to 15 per ship. Although President Hayes vetoes the bill, both parties put immigration restrictions in their election platforms.
- 1881 President Arthur signs bill suspending Chinese immigration for 10 years.
- 1892 Congress promulgates the Geary Act requiring Chinese to register and carry identification photos.
- 1899 Secretary of State John Hay announces the "Open Door Policy" calling for equal economic opportunity for all foreign powers in China.
- 1900 U.S. provides 2,100 men for the Allied force suppressing the Boxer Rebellion
- 1902 U.S. exports to China reach \$25 million; investment totals \$19.7 million.
- 1905 Chinese students initiate boycotts of American goods, protesting U.S. immigration restrictions.
- 1912 U.S. is the first Western power to recognize the Republic of China, founded following the 1911 uprising.

- 1915 Approximately 1,200 Chinese students, many through scholarships from the Boxer indemnity funds, attend U.S. universities.
- 1917-18 High tide of Chinese student interest in America prompted by Woodrow Wilson's idealism and Chinese hopes for an end to foreign imperialism through "self-determination." John Dewey lectures at Beijing University.
- 1921 Treaty powers hold Washington Conference to work out post-war settlement of Far East territorial claims.
- 1928 U.S. recognizes the Nanjing government of Chiang Kai-shek.
- 1930's High point of American private aid to China through missionaries, youth organizations, and foundations. Conflicting American images of China formed by sympathetic writers like Pearl Buck on the one hand and by negative stereotypes in films, comic strips, and popular literature on the other.
- 1941 General Chennault organizes U.S. "Flying Tigers" to aid in China's resistance to the Japanese.
- Japan bombs Pearl Harbor, bringing U.S. into war as China's ally. General "Vinegar Joe" Stilwell is made Chiang Kai-shek's Chief of Staff.
- 1943 U.S. formally relinquishes extraterritoriality in China.
- U.S. insists, at Moscow Conference of the Allied Powers, that China be included as one of the Big Four.
- Madame Chiang Kai-shek tours U.S. and addresses Congress. U.S. grants China a \$300 million "morale booster" loan.
- 1944 Chiang forces ouster of General Stilwell, who is replaced by General Albert Wedemeyer.
- Ambassador Patrick Hurley arrives in Beijing to help China in its lagging war effort and to try to bring about improved relations between the Nationalist government and the Communists.
- 1945 War with Japan ends. Urged by the U.S., Chiang and Mao sign agreement to end civil war, but fighting continues. U.S. troops involved in occasional minor skirmishes with Communists.
- Hurley resigns, citing lack of U.S. support to Nationalists; charges some Foreign Service officers with supporting the Communists.
- President Truman sends General George Marshall to China to try to effect a coalition between Nationalists and Communists.

- 1947 Marshall Mission fails; civil war intensifies.
Congress approves \$400 million in aid for the Nationalists (total postwar aid would amount to about \$2.5 billion).
- Wedemeyer report (made public in 1949) bluntly indicts Nationalist government for its failures; U.S. continues to support Chiang.
- 1949 Establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC); Chinese communist leaders declare they will follow pro-Soviet policy.
- Nationalists abandon mainland, set up "provisional capital" in Taipei.
- State Department "White Paper" on China ascribes Nationalist defeat to corruption and incompetence. U.S. tries to "wait for the dust to settle," withholding recognition from new government while ending military aid to the Nationalists.
- 1950 Due to increasing harassment of Americans and the seizure of American property in China, U.S. withdraws all official personnel and closes embassy and consulates.
- North Korea invades South Korea. Truman reverses policy and orders U.S. Seventh Fleet into Taiwan Straits to discourage any Communist offensive.
- China enters Korean War as UN forces approach Yalu River.
- Truman freezes Chinese assets in the U.S. and begins trade embargo.
- 1953 Korean Armistice; U.S. troops remain in South Korea.
- 1954 U.S. and Nationalist government sign Mutual Defense Treaty; U.S. organizes SEATO to prevent Chinese expansion in Southeast Asia.
- 1955 U.S.-PRC ambassadorial level talks begin in Geneva and continue intermittently for the next 15 years in Warsaw.
- The State Department rejects a Chinese proposal that Dulles and Zhou Enlai meet to discuss "Taiwan and other problems," citing continued imprisonment of 13 Americans in China.
- 1956 In a speech to the National People's Congress, Zhou states, "China proceeds from the desire to co-exist peacefully with all countries, including the United States....Furthermore, we are deeply convinced that the day will come when the Chinese and American peoples, because of their traditional friendship, will resume their ties through their respective governments."
- 1958 Chinese precipitate a crisis by shelling Nationalist-held offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu.

- 1962 China issues the first in a long series of warnings against U.S. intrusion into or over Chinese territory in connection with the war in Vietnam.
- 1965 American bombing of North Vietnam provokes strong PRC reaction, expressed in anti-U.S. statements and increased aid to Hanoi.
- 1966 The Senate Foreign Relations Committee holds hearings on China policy; President Johnson declares that "the U.S. will persist in efforts to reduce tensions between the two countries."
- Ambassador Goldberg announces support of an Italian proposal to take a fresh look at the China question in the UN.
- 1968 Republican Party platform opposes both recognition of PRC and its admission to UN, although candidate Richard Nixon writes: "[A]ny American policy toward Asia must come urgently to grips with the reality of China." Democratic platform promises to "actively encourage economic, social, and cultural exchange with mainland China as a means of freeing that nation and her people from their narrow isolation."
- 1969 Secretary of State Rogers implies U.S. is prepared to agree to accept principle of "peaceful coexistence" with PRC.
- U.S. eases restrictions on American travel to China for scholars, journalists, students, scientists, and members of Congress.
- U.S. suspends Seventh Fleet patrols in Taiwan Strait.
- U.S. eases trade restrictions, permitting foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies to trade in nonstrategic goods.
- 1970 Mao Zedong tells American journalist Edgar Snow he would welcome a visit by President Nixon to Beijing.
- U.S.-PRC talks resume in Warsaw but are canceled after two meetings by the Chinese in protest over U.S.-Cambodian incursion.
- U.S. announces it will support seating of PRC in UN as long as it is not "at the expense of the expulsion" of the Nationalists.
- Selective licensing of direct exports to China is authorized.
- 1971 State Department abolishes all travel restrictions to China.
- U.S. Table Tennis Team invited to China.

National Security Council Chairman Kissinger travels secretly to Beijing; Nixon announces he will visit China in 1972 to "seek the normalization of relations between the two countries."

UN votes to seat China and expel Taiwan.

1972 President Nixon's visit to China in February concludes with issuance of Shanghai Communiqué, in which the U.S. "acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain that there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China," and both sides affirm the desirability of normalization of relations.

Chinese Table Tennis Team makes first "people-to-people" visit to U.S. under auspices of U.S. Table Tennis Association and National Committee on U.S.-China Relations.

1973 U.S. and PRC establish liaison offices in Beijing and Washington; cultural exchanges begin to develop.

1974 Sino-American trade hits pre-normalization peak of almost \$1 billion, the balance heavily in favor of the U.S. with agricultural products comprising 80 percent of U.S. exports.

1975 President Ford visits China.

1976 President Ford sends message of congratulations to new premier Hua Guofeng pledging to "complete the process of normalization."

1977 President Carter recommits the U.S. to further development of relations with the PRC in accord with the Shanghai Communiqué.

1978 President Carter announces U.S. recognition of the Government of the PRC as "the sole legal Government of China," effective January 1, 1979, and states that the U.S. "will maintain cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan." He also states "we will continue to have an interest in the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue."

1979 Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping visits the United States.

Liaison offices in Beijing and Washington raised to full embassy status.

U.S. and China sign agreements on cultural exchange, scientific cooperation, and trade during visits to China of Secretaries Blumenthal, Califano, and Kreps.

American Consulate General opens in Guangzhou.

Vice President Mondale visits China; states that a strong and stable China is in U.S. interest. Speech at Beijing University is broadcast live on national TV in China.

China opens Consulates General in Houston and San Francisco.

1980

Secretary of Defense Harold Brown visits China; U.S. agrees to sell China dual-purpose and defense-related technology. His counterpart, Geng Biao, visits the U.S.

U.S. and China sign six documents for cooperation in science and technology as well as agreements covering civil aviation, maritime links, and regulation of bilateral textile trade.

Congress ratifies U.S.-China Trade Pact; PRC receives most favored nation trade status.

U.S. opens Consulate General in Shanghai. China announces plans to open consulates in New York, Chicago, and Honolulu. U.S. announces intention to open three additional consulates in China.

1981

Former President Ford delivers message from President Reagan affirming new administration's desire to strengthen U.S.-PRC relations.

U.S. announces willingness to sell combat arms to China during June visit of Secretary of State Alexander Haig.

A five-year cultural agreement calling for exchanges in the fields of art, education, journalism, broadcasting, television, libraries, archives, translation, publications, sports, and social sciences is signed.

1982

Reagan Administration decides not to sell advanced aircraft to Taiwan but to allow the continued co-production of the F-5E. Chinese Government issues a strong protest against this decision.

On August 17, the two countries sign a communique in which the U.S. agrees that future arms sales to Taiwan will not exceed the level of recent years and that they will be gradually reduced; the Chinese agree to "strive for a peaceful solution to the Taiwan question."

Former President Nixon returns to China in September and is received by the principal Chinese leaders.

1983

Responding to an impasse on negotiations to expand China textile sales to the United States, the Chinese impose restrictions on the purchase of U.S. commodities, including cotton, wheat, and soybeans.

Secretary of State Shultz meets with Chinese leaders in Beijing to discuss major issues affecting U.S.-China relations. Agreement reached in principle for a visit by Premier Zhao Ziyang to the United States and a return visit to China by President Reagan.

The U.S. Department of Justice grants political asylum to Chinese tennis player Hu Na. Four days later, the Chinese government suspends all pending 1983 official cultural and sports exchanges under the framework of the U.S.-China Accord for Cultural Exchange; exchanges under private auspices, such as the National Committee's, continue.

Commerce Secretary Malcolm Baldrige visits China and announces that the United States will expedite technology transfer to China, which was designated a friendly, nonaligned country.

Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger visits China offering military assistance and asking for Chinese cooperation; obtains agreement in principle for exchange of military missions in 1984.

Chinese Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian meets with top U.S. officials, including President Reagan, in Washington, DC, in a cordial effort to repair relations strained over the issue of Taiwan.

U.S. and PRC announce that Zhao Ziyang and Ronald Reagan will exchange visits in 1984.

1984

Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang arrives in the United States on an official visit, meets with President Reagan in Washington, and signs two accords, one on science and technology and the other on trade promotion.

Chairman of the State Planning Commission (SPC) Song Ping leads SPC delegation to U.S. to study economic planning in public and private sectors, role of foreign investment in developing economies, and development of energy resources, particularly nuclear. Delegation meets with executives of major American corporations and senior U.S. government officials.

President Reagan makes a six-day state visit to China for talks with Chinese leaders, signs tax treaty calling for an end to double taxation on American companies participating in joint ventures in China, initials agreement on nuclear cooperation enabling U.S. firms to sell reactors to China, and extends existing cultural agreement.

Defense Minister Zhang Aiping arrives in Washington, DC for three days of talks with U.S. officials including President Reagan and Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger. U.S. prepared to sell China anti-aircraft artillery and anti-armor munitions.

1985

President Li Xiannian makes first visit to the U.S. by a Chinese head of state, accompanied by several senior government and Party leaders.

U.S. opens Consulates General in Shenyang and Chengdu.

U.S. announces it is prepared to sell technology for the production of certain armaments to China.

Vice President Bush makes official visit to the PRC.

1986

While steps are taken to improve Sino-Soviet relations, China also invites unprecedented U.S. naval visit to Qingdao amid special gestures of high-level hospitality.

Vice Premier Yao Yilin visits U.S.

1987

Secretary of State Shultz visits China on official six-day trip marking the 15th anniversary of the Shanghai Communique.

General Yang Shangkun, vice-chairman of the CCP Central Military Commission, heads a delegation to the United States, making him the highest ranking Chinese military figure ever to visit the U.S.

Despite Chinese denials, U.S. officials report China has provided Iran with Silkworm missiles, prompting the U.S. to delay transfers of high-technology items to the Chinese unless such shipments are stopped.

U.S. Congress condemns alleged Chinese human-rights violations in Tibet. China views the Congressional resolution as interference in its internal affairs.

1988

U.S. lifts Iran-related trade sanctions on China during March visit of Foreign Minister, Wu Xueqian.

U.S. and Chinese officials reach agreement in principle allowing Peace Corps volunteers into China for the first time.

Shultz makes final visit to China as Secretary of State, but fails to secure assurances from Beijing to stop selling arms to the Middle East.

Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci visits China and receives "satisfactory assurances" on question of Middle East arms sales.

Celebrations on both sides of the Pacific in December mark the tenth anniversary of the normalization of U.S.-China Relations.

1989

President George Bush visits China in February, only one month after his inauguration. While intended to underline Chinese-American friendship, the visit is marred by Chinese refusal to allow Fang Lizhi, China's most outspoken dissident, to attend a dinner to which he was invited by President Bush.

Following the violent suppression of demonstrations in Beijing on June 4, President Bush condemns the bloodshed and cuts off military sales and exchanges between the United States and China, extends the visas of all Chinese nationals in the United

States until June 1990, and offers humanitarian aid to those injured in the confrontation. U.S.-China relations are further strained when the U.S. Embassy in Beijing grants temporary refuge to Fang Lizhi, his wife, Li Shuxian, and their son. China's state-run media launches an intense propaganda campaign against the United States for meddling in China's internal affairs.

On June 20, in reaction to unfolding events in China, President Bush announces the suspension of high-level exchanges between United States and Chinese government officials and takes steps to postpone consideration of loan applications by China to international financial institutions.

On the weekend of July 4, just weeks after the White House declared sanctions against China, National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft and Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence S. Eagleburger undertake a secret mission to China for President Bush, "to personally underscore the U.S. shock and concern about the violence in Tiananmen Square, and to impress upon the Chinese Government the seriousness with which this incident was viewed in the U.S." The occurrence of this trip is revealed on December 18th, following a second trip by Scowcroft and Eagleburger to Beijing.

In November, former President Nixon makes an unofficial visit to China. Frank discussions are held in which Nixon reiterates American shock at the excessive violence used to quell the pro-democracy protests. In response, the Chinese continue to accuse the U.S. of not understanding what occurred and of being too involved in the "counterrevolutionary movement" and Chinese domestic affairs in general. The Chinese press only reports Nixon's positive comments, but the international media cover the former president's concerns and criticisms as well.

A week after Nixon's trip, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger travels to Beijing as a guest of the Chinese Foreign Ministry. While there he attempts to gauge the Chinese political climate through talks with senior Chinese officials.

Just before the Congressional recess, both the House and Senate overwhelmingly pass a bill put forth by Congresswoman Nancy Pelosi to waive the restriction placed on some Chinese students to return home for two years before seeking permanent residence in the U.S. President Bush vetoes the bill during the recess, putting into effect a set of administrative measures providing similar protection for students.

The second Scowcroft-Eagleburger visit is announced after they arrive in China. Its stated purpose is to bring "new impetus and vigor" to the Sino-U.S. relationship and to keep China from slipping into international isolation. In a much publicized and, in the United States much criticized, toast Scowcroft says, "In both our societies there are voices of those who seek to redirect or frustrate our cooperation. We must take bold measures to overcome these negative forces."

The Chinese Government accredits a new VOA correspondent after five months of being banned following the June crackdown.

China and the U.S. open discussions about resuming the Fulbright scholar exchange program.

1990

The Chinese government publishes a 22-point code for foreign journalists which prohibits distorting facts, creating rumors, obtaining interviews or reports through illegal means, or conducting activities that do not accord with their status or harm China's "security, unity and social benefits." Journalists fear these vague stipulations create foundations for expulsion should anti-government demonstrations erupt.

A day after the House of Representatives overrides President Bush's veto of the Pelosi Bill, 390 votes to 25, the Senate sustains the veto by a margin of four votes. The President again declares his administrative measures will assure the safety of the students in the U.S., and that none will go home against their will.

The Senate unanimously approves legislative sanctions (as part of the State Department Authorization Bill) urging the Export-Import Bank to continue to postpone financing for U.S. exports to China, and suspends financial support from the Overseas Private Investment Corporation and the Trade and Development Program. The legislation halts the issuance of licenses for the export of military items and, if the repression in China deepens, calls for a review of China's Most-Favored-Nation trade status (MFN) and bilateral trade agreements related to satellite technology and nuclear energy. It also calls for a suspension on the process of technology liberalization.

In late May, President Bush decides to renew Most-Favored-Nation trade status for China, citing the potential harmful economic repercussions on American businesses, Hong Kong, and small businessmen in China. He also cites the Jackson-Vanik rules on MFN status in which only emigration restrictions are grounds for withdrawal of MFN.

In June, Chinese dissident astrophysicist Fang Lizhi and his wife are given guarantees of safe passage to Britain after their release from the American Embassy in Beijing.

At the G-7 Nations "Economic Summit" in Houston, there is an expression of willingness, led by the Japanese, to gradually ease sanctions on China, particularly to renew disbursement of yen loans to China. Later in the summer, the World Bank grants loans to China for "basic human needs."

In October, the House of Representatives votes to withdraw MFN, but the Senate does not take up the issue before the adjournment of the 101st Congress; though MFN status for China thus remains in place, it still looms as a recurrent issue inasmuch as renewal each year is required.

In November, China votes with the other Permanent Members of the U.N. Security Council on sanctions against Iraq, abstaining only on the use of force. In succeeding months, China continues to call for moderation and restraint by the allied forces in the Persian Gulf.

1991

In April, President George Bush meets with the exiled Dalai Lama "in recognition of his contributions toward world peace" and due to his role as a strong world religious figure. China issues a strong protest.

Beginning in February, with the completion of the dissident trials in China, MFN once again becomes the topic of much debate in Congress, particularly in the House of Representatives. In the following months China becomes the focus of a number of different accusations, including the use of prison/slave labor in the manufacturing of textiles and clothing, the repeated violation of intellectual property rights and international copyright laws, and more importantly the continued "dumping" of manufactured goods in the U.S. market that has led to a trade surplus of over US\$10.4 billion (a figure which China states is exaggerated due to different methods of statistical computation, mainly regarding goods shipped through Hong Kong).

Questions regarding China's missile sales to unstable Third World countries, such as Pakistan, and its possible exporting of nuclear weapon technology and assistance to Algeria (in violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, of which China is not yet a signatory), lead to both Congresswoman Nancy Pelosi and Senator George Mitchell introducing bills that would extend China's MFN status for a year, but attaching conditions regarding the treatment of dissidents in China and Tibet, the speeding of reform in China's economy, more equitable trade relations with the United States, and the movement towards the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and missiles to unstable Third World countries. In early August, both bills pass Congress, (by a 2/3 majority in the House). However, Bush continues to back unconditional MFN status for China and his presidential veto stands.

1992

The U.S. and China sign an Intellectual Property Rights agreement to provide greater protection for American pharmaceuticals, computer software, books and music recordings. China agrees to adopt most international standards for foreign investments, and to enact laws that extend the duration and scope of patent, copyright, and trade-secret protections. China also resolves a longstanding dispute over market access by allowing two American companies to compete directly with Chinese shippers.

Other bilateral trade issues remain unresolved. The U.S. still presses China to dismantle various import barriers to goods and services, including high tariffs, import quotas, and regulations that U.S. exporters contend are unnecessary. Charges by U.S. Federal prosecutors of efforts by Chinese exporters to evade duties and bypass import quotas by shipping textiles made in China through other countries adds to trade tensions between the two countries.

In September, President Bush decides to sell 150 F-16 fighter planes to Taiwan. China considers this a violation of the August 1982 Communiqué in which the U.S. agreed to reduce and eventually eliminate American arms sales to Taiwan. President Bush also vetoes a bill passed by Congress which would have ended or conditioned MFN status for China. His veto again stands. Yet Sino-American rela-

tions continue to plummet, with China concerned that a Clinton victory in the elections might make the situation even worse.

In October, averting a possible trade war, China and the U.S. reach a market access memorandum of understanding under the auspices of Section 301 of the 1988 trade act. The agreement calls for the gradual elimination of quotas, bans, and various import licenses on American goods entering China by 1997, as well as elimination of import substitution policies and publication of all Chinese regulations. In exchange, the U.S. pledges to "staunchly" support China's bid to re-enter the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).

1993

With President Clinton's election, Beijing's concern over his impending decision on its MFN status grows, given his campaign statements. On May 28, Clinton issues an Executive Order renewing China's MFN status for another year but making further extensions conditional upon China meeting certain comparatively flexible conditions. China's Foreign Ministry issues a one-page statement criticizing the President's Order, but there are few other visible reactions.

During the summer a number of incidents add stress to U.S.-China ties. In August the United States accuses the Chinese of seeking to ship chemical precursors for weapons to Iran, and puts pressure on the Chinese to allow inspections of a Chinese vessel, the Yinhe, as it approaches an undisclosed port in the Middle East. It turns out that the ship is not carrying the suspected cargo. In September, after an intense lobbying campaign by Beijing, the International Olympic Committee chooses Sydney Australia as the site of the 2000 Summer Games. Many in China are angered over resolutions passed by the Senate and House calling on the I.O.C. not to award Beijing the Games and blame the U.S. for their failure. Finally, an amendment offered by Senator Murkowski proposes that the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 "supersede" the 1982 Sino-American joint communique concerning weapons sales to Taiwan.

In a gambit to improve ties with the Chinese leadership the Clinton Administration initiates the resumption of contacts between senior American and Chinese officials. In the fall of 1993, Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights John Shattuck, Assistant Secretary of Defense Chas Freeman, and Agriculture Secretary Mike Espy all go to Beijing. In the November APEC meeting held in Seattle Washington, Clinton meets with Chinese President Jiang Zemin, the first such meeting between the top leaders of the two countries since George Bush's trip to Beijing in February, 1989.

1994

In early 1994, official American delegations continue to travel to China, often to deliver stern warnings about China's human-rights behavior while at the same time fortifying bilateral trade ties. During a February visit to Beijing, Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights John Shattuck meets with celebrated Democracy-Wall dissident Wei Jingsheng and receives a letter from Wei for President Clinton. Partially as a response to this meeting, the Chinese leadership gives Secretary of State Warren Christopher a chilly reception on his visit in March.

Christopher warns the Chinese that the Clinton Administration is determined to follow through on the May 28, 1993, Executive Order to revoke MFN trading status if China fails to meet the order's minimum human-rights requirements. Unimpressed, the Chinese leadership makes no pledges to change its current human-rights practices, hinting that China could live without MFN.

In the wake of Christopher's visit to Beijing, the Clinton Executive Order comes under fire in the United States for being a fundamentally flawed approach to dealing with the Chinese, and the Clinton Administration finds itself squeezed between critics of the policy of human rights-MFN linkage and its own Executive Order. Meanwhile, the Chinese leadership continues to disregard American human-rights expectations by arresting and detaining dissidents.

As the June 3 deadline draws nigh, the Clinton Administration gradually shifts towards a more conciliatory position. Chinese Vice Premier Zou Jiahua, with quite a "shopping list" of U.S. goods to be purchased if bilateral relations are sound, meets President Clinton in the White House as well as the secretaries of commerce and energy on an early May visit sponsored by the American business community. Various administration plans are contemplated which call for punitive action short of revoking MFN, but many doubt the efficacy of such moves.

At a May 26 news conference at the White House, the President announces renewal of MFN, "delinking" economic issues and human rights. The administration's analysis is that revoking MFN status would not achieve desired human rights objectives, nor would it be in long-term U.S. interests to isolate China. Instead, Clinton outlines a new human rights strategy of increased broadcasting to China, multilateral pressure, strengthening NGOs, and developing voluntary standards for conducting business in China.

However, mood swings in U.S.-China relations remain, with friction over American plans to target China with Radio Free Asia; Chinese jamming of American broadcasting; the State Department human rights report and ongoing human rights concerns; Chinese refusal to back full sanctions against North Korea; China's new policy of forbidding foreign competitors to invest in auto assembly plants until 1996; the pursuit of a Section-301 investigation into Chinese intellectual property violations; and the growing U.S. trade deficit with China. There continue to be strong sentiments in Congress reflecting American concerns about Taiwan, Tibet and Hong Kong.

1995

The beginning of 1995 sees the United States and China embroiled in a tense trade dispute. U.S. Trade Representative Mickey Kantor charges that China has shown itself unwilling to take proper measures to protect American intellectual property rights (IPRs) and was blocking market access for American videos, films, and sound recordings. China's failure to meet a February 4 deadline for American demands on IPR protection will result in retaliatory trade sanctions -- the introduction of 100 percent tariffs -- on specific Chinese exports to the United States. China reacts by issuing its own counter-retaliatory list and declaring American demands an intervention in China's internal affairs and a violation of its sovereign rights. The

deadline passes and U.S. sanctions are implemented. However on February 26, Deputy U.S. Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky, Trade and Economic Cooperation Minister Wu Yi, and Vice Minister Sun Zhenyu reach an agreement. China makes long-term commitments to improve IPR protection in exchange for U.S. removal of a threat to impose prohibitive import duties against Chinese products. In March, Kantor and Wu sign an "Agreement on Intellectual Property Rights" in Beijing.

Though by year end, the dispute is reopened with Kantor charging lax enforcement of the agreement by Chinese officials and continued foot-dragging in closing 29 factories that produce illegal copies of American films and software. Kantor and his aides warn China to fulfill its commitments, making it clear that the country's admission to the World Trade Organization, which the United States has blocked, depends on it.

On June 7, Taiwanese President Lee Tung-hui sets foot on United States soil and precipitates the most serious crisis in Sino-American relations since the 1989 Tiananmen tragedy. Lee is granted a visa by the U.S. State Department for a private visit to accept an honorary doctorate at Cornell University -- where he had received a Ph.D. 25 years earlier.

In 1994 the State Department prevented Lee from disembarking from his plane during a refueling stop in Honolulu, and had allowed Taiwan's Prime Minister, Lien Chan, only a brief stopover in the U.S. en route to Latin America. This action angered many members of Congress, who took the position that the administration's marginal improvements in Taiwan's status were inadequate and that Taiwan deserved better treatment as a result of its transition to democracy. That sentiment grew stronger with the arrival in January 1995 of a Republican majority in both houses. Many in Congress now believe State Department China specialists and successive administrations have been too deferential to Beijing for too long; they wrongly accepted Beijing's definition of Taiwan as a renegade province. In March the Senate Foreign Relations Committee unanimously approves a resolution declaring that Taiwan should be given a seat in the United Nations. The House Committee on International Relations amends the Taiwan Relations Act to strengthen the U.S. commitment to supply Taiwan with defensive weapons; the Committee also endorses legislation declaring Tibet a sovereign and occupied country.

Against this backdrop, both houses of Congress overwhelmingly endorse a resolution in May calling on the Clinton administration to permit Lee Teng-hui to visit the U.S. The votes put President Clinton in a difficult position: Secretary of State Warren Christopher and Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Winston Lord had assured China that "under no circumstances" would Lee be permitted to visit the United States. But the vote in Congress is too overwhelming for Clinton to ignore.

The Chinese Foreign Ministry declares the Lee visit a violation of the three Sino-American communiques. It notes that the U.S. State Department had earlier

admitted that a private visit by Lee Teng-hui would be seen as altering the unofficial character of relations between Taiwan and the United States. The visit is described as a "gross interference in China's internal affairs," and an attempt to create "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan." Xinhua suggests that Lee's visit to the United States has a political motivation: to internationalize the Taiwan issue, make permanent the separation of the two sides of the Taiwan Straits, and to encourage Taiwan's independence.

By way of retaliation, China postpones the U.S. visit of Defense Minister Chi Haotian, as well as of bilateral experts on nuclear energy and missile export controls. Clinton reaffirms the U.S. government's commitment to a "one China" policy and insists Lee Teng-hui's visit to Cornell is "totally unofficial and private" and does not represent the U.S. government's recognition of Taiwan. China remains unconvinced and recalls its Ambassador to Washington, Li Daoyu. The tenure of the U.S. Ambassador to Beijing, J. Stapleton Roy, concludes at this time, leaving the ambassadorial posts vacant in both countries. Chinese Vice President Rong Yiren warns that bilateral relations are at a "critical moment."

In early July it is reported the CIA believes that China has recently delivered missile components to Pakistan in violation of the Missile Control Technology Regime. China denies the reports, but the charges add fuel to the heated rhetoric in both countries.

Relations deteriorate further with the arrest of naturalized American citizen Harry Wu after he was detained attempting to enter China at a remote northwestern border crossing. Wu, who was imprisoned for 19 years in China, has devoted himself to exposing China's gulag. He intended to continue his investigations of alleged transgressions in the penal system. Chinese officials charge Wu with attempting to enter the country with a false passport and engage in espionage. He is convicted, sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment, and immediately expelled.

Harry Wu's arrest, together with Beijing's family planning policies, nuclear assistance programs to Iran and Pakistan, arms sales, assertive claims in the South China Seas, prison labor practices, restrictions on human rights activists, and other individual issues has a cumulative impact on Congressional views of American interests and the PRC. These concerns are subsumed in the 1995 China Policy Act, which passes both houses on July 20. The Act requires the President to report on intensified U.S. diplomatic initiatives and other prescribed actions taken to alter those PRC policies Congress views as inimical to American interests and concerns. Chinese government statements express strong resentment of the Act. China watchers express concern about an emerging consensus among Beijing's hard-liners that U.S. policy is to keep China weak -- to "contain" it.

On the day of Harry Wu's expulsion in August, Undersecretary of State Peter Tarnoff arrives in China for a fence mending mission. With Wu's release, Tarnoff is able to inform his hosts that First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton will visit Beijing

in September as honorary head of the American delegation to the United Nations-sponsored Fourth World Women's Conference.

President Jiang Zemin and President Clinton meet in October when both men are in New York to address the opening of the United Nations General Assembly. Jiang's request for a meeting in Washington foundered on disagreements over protocol. The meeting is viewed as a sign that both countries have resumed their high-level dialogue and are stabilizing the relationship. Jiang and Clinton agree that they share certain important strategic interests, such as the maintenance of peace and stability in East Asia. Jiang emphasizes the sensitive nature of the Taiwan issue, and seeks to ensure that the U.S. will not lift Taiwan's status any further, by commission or omission. Despite the positive tone of the meeting between the two leaders, it is believed the number and the nature of disagreements between the two powers portend a relationship with a mixture of some cooperation — where their interests coincide — and considerable friction.

1996

In a speech at Harvard University in January outlining the Clinton administration's foreign policy agenda, Secretary of State Warren Christopher said the United States "is ready to restore a positive momentum to our relationship" with China after what he acknowledged was "a rocky period" caused by differences over Taiwan, human rights, and trade.

An American military attache' and a Japanese military attache' are detained while traveling in Southern China in January and expelled on charges of espionage.

On January 26, U.S. officials confirm that the American aircraft carrier *Nimitz* passed through the strait dividing Taiwan and China on December 19, 1995; this is the first time a U.S. navy ship has entered the strait since 1979.

James R. Sasser, former U.S. senator from Tennessee, arrives in Beijing in February to assume the post of American ambassador to China. At the time of his arrival, Washington is considering limited trade sanctions against the PRC for alleged failure to end piracy of American intellectual property. Concerns continue over China's human rights record and complaints mount in the media and on Capitol Hill over China's US\$35 billion trade surplus with the United States. The Clinton administration is also considering sanctions against China for what it claims was export of nuclear materials to Pakistan. Both China and Pakistan deny the allegations. In the military sphere, there are China's armed maneuvers and missile tests off the coast of Taiwan, seen as a campaign of intimidation to discourage support for Taiwan's increased diplomatic profile and advocates of independence in the run-up to the island's first direct presidential election on March 23.

The missile tests fuel pro-Taiwan sentiment in the U.S. Congress. On March 8, a non-binding resolution is signed by several dozen House and Senate members calling on the administration to assist in defending Taiwan in the event of an invasion or blockade by China. As it happens, the following day the administration dispatches two carrier battle groups to the East China Sea. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia Winston Lord explains that the move is intended to ensure there

will be no further escalation by China and to reassure Asian countries that the U.S. is willing to play a stabilizing role in the region. China's Foreign Minister Qian Qichen warns the U.S. against interference in the region, stating that "Taiwan is a part of China and not a protectorate of the United States." American officials in Washington and Beijing warn their Chinese counterparts that military action against Taiwan could have grave consequences. At the same time, during his meetings in Washington with senior officials, Liu Huaqiu, vice minister of Foreign Affairs, states that Taiwanese leaders must once again endorse the "one-China" idea before Beijing will renew direct dialogue with Taiwan about reunification.

As part of series of a meetings with top Chinese officials to bring the Sino-American relationship back into equilibrium, Christopher and Qian Qichen meet in April at The Hague to discuss outstanding issues between the China and the United States, including China's military exercises off Taiwan, alleged Chinese violations of nuclear non-proliferation agreements, arms sales, and human rights.

For the first time since the end of the Cold War, the Chinese Government publicly expresses serious concern that the U.S.-Japan security agreement that served to contain the former Soviet Union might now shift its focus toward China. President Clinton and Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto reaffirmed the 45-year-old security arrangement in Tokyo in April. Relations are further strained by U.S. criticisms of the PRC's human rights record in the latest State Department report. Beijing's human rights record also is being debated at a U.N. meeting in Geneva, with a resolution sponsored by the European Community, and supported by the United States, to condemn China. China heavily lobbys support from African countries to pre-empt the introduction of the resolution, while Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Russia, and the Sudan, all facing similar criticism, choose to debate or dispute the resolutions about them on their merits.

In May, Secretary Christopher calls for upgrading of the strategic dialogue between Washington and Beijing to include regular summit-level meetings in each other's capitals. He also proposes regular conferences of American and Chinese cabinet-level officials to tackle a wide range of bilateral issues, including human rights and trade.

During May, results of a survey among Chinese youths published by *China Youth News* show 90 percent of the respondents feel the U.S. behaves "hegemonistically," with expansionist aims, toward China, and 94 percent feel the U.S. is blocking China's entry to the World Trade Organization.

The following month the administration reaches agreement with China over enforcement of intellectual property agreements, thereby averting a trade war. On another front, faced with ambiguous evidence that China had shipped nuclear components to Pakistan, the administration accepts Chinese promises to tighten export procedures and the U.S. does not impose sanctions. The administration successfully presses Congress for renewal of MFN status for China. Clinton concludes that "using MFN was a blunt instrument that would have serious long-term adverse consequences and would not work in the near-term or have any impact on human rights."

U.S. and Chinese officials express confidence that relations between the two countries are mending, although there are no indications of major breakthroughs as National Security Advisor Anthony Lake met with Chinese leaders during a four-day visit in July.

In August, U.S. government officials report that they believe China is helping Pakistan build a factory that can produce medium-range nuclear missiles; this would put China in violation of the Missile Technology Control Regime; both China and Pakistan deny the charge. At the same time, the status of Taiwan emerged at the center of dispute between the U.S. and China again, with Beijing sharply criticizing a Pentagon decision to sell advanced Stinger antiaircraft missiles to the island. The Defense Department, in a statement to Congress, asserts that the sale of the equipment "will not affect the military balance in the region."

Secretary Christopher visits China in mid-November. The U.S. agrees to consider expanding cooperation in nuclear technology in exchange for the PRC's agreement to have regular meetings on arms proliferation and its renewed commitment not to provide nuclear assistance to states with unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. The most difficult issue, from the PRC's perspective, was U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. The following week, at an APEC meeting in Manila, President Clinton and President Jiang Zemin agree to the first exchange of state visits since 1989.

1997

Secretary of State Madeleine Albright arrives in Beijing in February for meetings with China's top leaders on the eve of a memorial service for Deng Xiaoping who died on February 19. China is the last stop on Albright's nine-country, 11-day trip around the world. Albright registers American concerns with the human rights situation in China and Chinese shipments of missile and chemical weapons technology during her brief meetings.

In March, Vice President Al Gore and House Speaker Newt Gingrich make visits to China.

The Senate Governmental Affairs Committee opens an investigation in July into possible violations of campaign financing laws by the Democratic Party and the White House. Earlier in the year, the Justice Department, FBI and Congressional Committees begin examining whether foreign business interests influenced administration policy through political donations. The investigations focus on whether the Chinese government, Chinese companies, or other Asian interests funneled money into the presidential and congressional campaigns in 1996. The Chinese government denies any wrongdoing.

On October 26, President Jiang Zemin arrives for the first official visit to the United States by a Chinese Head of State in 12 years, the last being that of Li Xiannian in 1985. From Hawaii, Jiang went to Washington, D.C.; Philadelphia; New York; Boston; and Los Angeles.

In the "Joint U.S.-China Statement" released on October 29, areas of cooperation but also major differences were highlighted—most notably in the area of human rights. A decision was reached to organize regular visits of the American and Chinese presidents to each other's capitals and to set up a "presidential communication link" to facilitate direct contact. Areas of cooperation listed in the joint statement are broad, including energy and environment, economic relations and trade, nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear energy, law (joint efforts against international organized crime and narcotics trafficking), military, science and technology, education and culture.

- 1998 Secretary of Defense William Cohen makes a three-and-a-half day visit to China during a tour of Asia in January. Cohen's visit is part of an effort by the Clinton administration to follow up on the summit meeting between Bill Clinton and Jiang Zemin in Washington the previous fall. To that end, Cohen and Defense Minister Chi Haotian sign an agreement that is aimed at avoiding clashes or accidents at sea between the two countries' naval ships. However, strengthening bilateral military ties proves a challenging issue, because it is politically controversial in both China and the United States and because neither side truly understands the others' intentions.