Case Number: 2010-1024-F

FOIA MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Folder Title: China WTO (June 1998) [2]				
Staff Office-Individual: National Economic Council-Lee, Malcolm				
Original OA/ID Number: CF 1176				
Row: 23	Section: 5	Shelf: 5	Position: 3	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. letter	President Jiang Zemin to President William Clinton. [English Translation] (2 pages)	04/29/1998	P1/b(1)
001b. letter	President Jiang Zemin to President William Clinton. [Chinese] (2 pages)	04/29/1998	P1/b(1)
002. routing sheet	Memorandum for Secretary of State. Record ID: 9803180 (2 pages)	05/04/1998	P1/b(1)
003. report	Economic Executives' (12 pages)	05/05/1998	P1/b(1)
004. draft	Letter to President Jiang Zemin. (2 pages)	04/15/1998	P1/b(1)
005. talking points	China (1 page)	04/15/1998	P1/b(1)
006. email	White House Situation Room to Malcolm Lee. Subject: Preparing for Summit (7 pages)	04/03/1998	P1/b(1)
007. paper	China. (1 page)	02/1998	P1/b(1)
008. paper	Status of China WTO Accession Negotiations. (3 pages)	12/1997	P1/b(1)
009. cable	re: China / WTO (5 pages)	04/15/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Economic Council
Malcolm Lee
OA/Box Number: CF 1176

FOLDER TITLE:

China WTO (June 1998) [2]

2010-1024-F
vz1868

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9803180
RECEIVED: 04 MAY 98 14

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: JIANG ZEMIN

DOC DATE: 29 APR 98
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CHINA P R   WTO
CBW   HS

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: ACCESSION TO WTO & OTHER TOPICS IN PREPARATION FOR PRES VISIT TO CHINA

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR BERGER   DUE DATE: 15 MAY 98   STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: BADER   LOGREF:

FILES: PA   NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T   D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
BADER	KRISTOFF	BELL
	LEE	BERGER
		BRAINARD, L
		DAVIES
		HARRIS
		KERRICK
		KYLE
		MALLEY
		POOLE
		STATE
		STEINBERG

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VC NARA, Date 2/6/2013
2010-1024-F

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY   DATE   BY HAND   W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSSWD   CLOSED BY: DOC 1 OF 1

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001b. letter	President Jiang Zemin to President William Clinton. [Chinese] (2 pages)	04/29/1998	P1/b(1)

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National Economic Council
Malcolm Lee
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National Economic Council
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CHINA AND WTO

It is in the interest of the United States to see China join the WTO on commercially meaningful terms. China's emergence as a trade power is of major significance to the US and to the world. The manner in which we engage China will help determine whether it becomes integrated into international norms and institutions like the WTO, or whether it becomes more isolated and unpredictable.

Joining the WTO means bringing China into a rules-based trading system. WTO accession represents an important opportunity for China to create and implement a rules-based trade regime. To meet WTO requirements, China must make laws public, require judicial review of all trade actions, apply all trade laws uniformly, and submit to WTO dispute settlement to ensure compliance with WTO rules. All of these measures will enhance the rule of law and the application of international norms in China's trade regime, to the benefit of China and the United States. The rule of law in trade has spillover benefits to the rule of law elsewhere.

China's commitments must be commercially meaningful. All WTO members agree that China's accession to the WTO must provide commercially meaningful market access for goods and services. Lowered tariffs, the elimination of quotas and other market access barriers, the right to export directly, and access to consumers in a full range of sectors must be part of any viable accession package for China.

WTO accession will mean greater access for a wide range of U.S. goods and services into one of the world's fastest growing economies.

- The semiconductor industry estimates that if market access barriers were eliminated, exports of U.S. semiconductor products would increase well in excess of $500 million per year.

- Eliminating licensing and other barriers to China's insurance sector would open a market estimated by industry to top $24 billion in premium income by the year 2000.

- Currently, China has no bound tariff rates. This means they can raise their rates as high as they want. In the WTO talks, we have the opportunity to have China reduce its base tariff rates from over 20 percent on wood, paper, construction equipment, medical equipment recreational equipment, telecommunications equipment, aluminum plates and power generation equipment. Some tariffs are even higher and should also be reduced.

MFN revocation would derail WTO negotiations to open China's market. Negotiations are moving forward on fundamental WTO principles such as the right of entities to engage directly in trade and appeal the decisions of government agencies to independent tribunals, and the right to fair and nondiscriminatory treatment of foreign businesses. We are also making progress in eliminating major trade barriers that face U.S. firms, including high tariffs, quotas and bans on providing services. Revoking MFN would likely stop any progress in WTO negotiations.

MFN revocation would jeopardize gains achieved in bilateral negotiations. Recent bilateral negotiations have produced important advances in intellectual property rights enforcement and market access for textiles and apparel, as well as the elimination of market access barriers in other sectors, such as agriculture. The Administration has used, and will continue to use targeted trade law provisions to protect US trade interests. MFN revocation is too blunt a tool.

LEVEL 1 - 17 OF 79 STORIES

The Economist

October 11, 1997, U.S. Edition

SECTION: World Politics and Current Affairs; ASIA; Pg. 45

LENGTH: **1124** words.

HEADLINE: **Chinese** traders at the door

BODY:

GENEVA

EARLY this summer, only the churlish thought that **China's** long-stalled entry into the World Trade Organisation would not be settled by the end of the year. It was not just the **Chinese,** promising a more open economy, who were eager for admission. American policymakers expected **Chinese**-American relations to be put on an even keel with Bill Clinton's stamp of approval for **China's** entry to the **WTO** at a summit with the **Chinese** president, Jiang Zemin, in Washington later this month.

At that meeting a few rabbits will be pulled out of **Chinese** and American hats to make the event a success: trade deals for American companies, and promises from **China** on human rights and the non-proliferation of nasty weapons--together with an invitation for Mr Clinton to visit Beijing. But the giant bunny of a **WTO** deal, 11 years on from the start of **China's** world-trade negotiations, will remain as elusive as ever.

This week a senior **Chinese** mission arrived at the **WTO's** headquarters in Geneva. Originally, this group was supposed to put the finishing touches to **China's** entry. Instead, even the working-party overseeing **China's** application will not meet, so little is there to discuss. The mood in Geneva has gone from cheerful optimism to gloomy frustration. What has gone wrong?

Some in the western camp complain that **China's** offers of free trade fall short of what is expected. **Chinese** officials counter by pointing to a range of bold concessions. Mr Jiang has promised that import tariffs will be cut by more than one-third, to below the developing countries' average. The near monopoly on trade with the outside world enjoyed by some of **China's** state firms will be broken. In agriculture, **China** has offered to ban export subsidies, although it reserves the right to support farm prices. In financial services, such as banking and insurance, licences will be given to foreign companies. But this will happen only slowly, Zhu Rongji, **China's** economics supremo, recently told bankers--and for the good of the licensees. After all, he said, who else but Mr Zhu would be blamed if everyone was let in and all lost money?

Some countries acknowledge progress by **China.** Japan and New Zealand recently said they were satisfied with the terms **China** is offering them on bilateral trade in goods. South Korea is thought also to have come to an understanding with **China.** This greatly pleases **Chinese** negotiators.

The agreements, however, have annoyed the rest of the western camp, which thinks that a united front is needed. True, **China** is lowering tariffs (and with smuggling and tariff-evasion so widespread, its customs may end up collecting more, not less, revenue). But more worryingly, a soup of non-tariff measures frustrates foreigners trying to do business in **China.** Quotas, some of them not even published, are slapped on many imports. Quality inspection is tougher for foreign manufactures than for domestic ones. And foreign-made goods, even if allowed into the country, are at the mercy of state-run distributors.

Still, some imperfections with goods might be tolerated if western negotiators could report progress on opening up **China's** potentially vast service economy. Yet it is because of **Chinese** inaction here that both America and the European Union say **China's WTO** entry cannot, for now, be contemplated. Last spring **China's** foreign-trade ministry, which represents **China** in the **WTO** talks, promised that an offer providing the basis for an agreement on services would be produced in the summer. It never arrived. It was promised instead for the autumn. Now **China** says the offer has been delayed again. **China** appears to be trying to use sweeteners to individual countries--a banking branch here, an insurance licence there--instead of a general undertaking to open up services.

This strategy may buy off smaller **WTO** members, as well as Japan, but it cuts little ice with the European Union and America, whose trade officials are emphatic that **China's** banking, insurance and telecoms markets need to be much more open. Similarly, the state grip on distribution, which America says is part of the "service" sector, will need to be overhauled.

Will such proposals come? **Chinese** officials say that early hopes of an offer on services were stymied by what they refer to, politely, as problems of "domestic co-ordination". What they mean is that powerful interests, including the armed forces, insist on protecting **Chinese** telecoms. Enfeebled state banks and their guardian ministries argue keenly against foreign competition. And state insurance companies want to keep that rapidly growing market largely to themselves. **Chinese** officials say their colleagues who oversee protected chunks of the economy consider it the height of impudence that foreigners should make strident demands. The foreign-trade ministry, never a dominant force, has lost all negotiating authority on services--which is why the offer on services has not yet materialised.

Three years ago, **China** set great store by being in on the **WTO's** founding. When it became clear that America would not countenance such a hurried entry, **China's** leaders felt bitter and humiliated by what they regarded as American sabotage. They can be expected to be less emotional about failing to join this year. They are more confident about their own domestic reforms, and no longer see **WTO** membership as crucial for anything else. **Chinese** officials also point to the benefits that will flow from September's Communist Party congress, which cut free the bulk of **China's** state-owned enterprises. They believe more benefits will follow the leadership conclave in Beijing next month that will try to sort out **China's** rotten banking system. Success there could open banking more quickly to foreigners. All of this can only help **China's WTO** bid.

Above all, the leadership is now convinced that it is American policy to see **China,** sooner or later, within the **WTO.** This is underlined by recent visits to

China by America's treasury and commerce secretaries. The **Chinese** have also learnt more about Washington politics. They now appreciate that Congress would not only have to bless **China's** entry to the **WTO,** but (as part of a **WTO** requirement to treat all members equally) grant **China** permanent "most-favoured-nation" status. At present, Congress grants such status year by year. The **Chinese** are beginning to understand that Congress will not be happy unless they produce a **WTO** package that contains some genuine goodies. And that understanding, for the first time, no longer seems to contain much resentment.

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LEVEL 1 - 24 OF 79 STORIES

Financial Times (London)

August 29, 1997, Friday LONDON EDITION 1

SECTION: COMMENT & ANALYSIS; Pg. 12

LENGTH: **1174** words

HEADLINE: The **Chinese** challenge:
Personal View . Bruce Stokes:
The US and Europe must have common tactics for dealing with
Beijing's entry into the **WTO**

BODY:

The most important trade chal-lenge facing Europe and the US is how to integrate the growing **Chinese** economy into the global marketplace.

However, the US-led negotiations with Beijing over the terms and conditions of **China's** admission to the World Trade Organisation are not going well. The Clinton administration has rejected **China's** latest proposals, and demanded greater openness in services and agriculture and faster timetables for reducing trade barriers and subsidies.

The immediate outlook is for more argument. US and **Chinese** negotiators meet again in Geneva next month to stitch together a **WTO** deal to be unveiled at the late-October summit between Jiang Zemin, **China's** president, and Bill Clinton, the US president. The betting in Washington is that the negotiation will again come up short and that no deal will be possible before the next Sino-American summit, scheduled for early next year.

Whatever the hurdles, however, **China's** admission to the **WTO** is inevitable. So while the lower-level negotiators hammer out the details, senior US and European trade officials should devise a common strategy for the complications that will occur once Beijing becomes a **WTO** member.

Too much is at stake to delay. A mishandling of **China's** role in the **WTO** could undermine many of the advantages Europe and the US hope to gain from the present accession talks. Most important, the long-term credibility of the **WTO** could be hurt if **China** becomes a "problem" member.

The stakes for Beijing are high: the **WTO** is asking it to change the very structure of its economy. To meet the obligations of membership, **China** must wind down subsidies and protection for its industry. But the **Chinese** government is wary of triggering unemployment by too rapid reform.

Facing this dilemma, whatever its intentions when it signs the accession agreement, Beijing may find itself unable to meet all of its **WTO** commitments in a timely fashion.

In such circumstances, like any **WTO** member, the **Chinese** government can be hauled before a disputes resolution panel. But given the problems with the

Chinese economy, the number of these cases could soon get out of hand. No government of a major country - be it **China,** Japan or the US - is likely to continue to play a game it consistently loses.

What if Beijing refuses to comply with **WTO** decisions or threatens to withdraw? Will Brussels and Washington back off? And if so, will the **WTO** then lose international credibility and future leverage over **China?**

To avoid such problems Brussels and Washington need to tell Beijing now which of its **WTO** commitments are of greatest importance to them, where failure to comply would trigger immediate **WTO** cases. At the same time, they need to develop a strategy for filing such cases, one that has clear, joint priorities

The European Commission and the Clinton administration also need to find new means for dealing with **Chinese** trade problems, short of a wave of **WTO** cases that would alienate the **Chinese** or break the **WTO.** This might entail joint dumping actions or other bilateral initiatives, reserving the dispute resolution process for the biggest problems.

If the Americans and the Europeans fail to devise such common tactics, they will end up doing combat with the **Chinese** one-on-one, a prescription for more transatlantic backbiting, finger pointing and short-sighted, behind-the-scenes deals with the **Chinese.**

On a functional level, **China's** admission to the **WTO** risks politicising a relatively new and fragile institution. If Beijing acts as the spokesperson for third-world interests in Geneva, the **WTO** could be transformed from a functional body dealing with the practical commercial concerns of the world's largest trading economies into a talking shop focused on the political interests of small, developing countries.

In other international bodies **China** has proved to be a follower not a leader. But followers can be foot-draggers. And if Beijing becomes a foot-dragger in the **WTO,** it could impede US and European Union efforts further to liberalise service trade and develop international trade norms on worker rights, the environment and competition policy.

More practically, **China's** admission could bloat the organisation's bureaucracy, reducing its effectiveness. If Beijing presses for **Chinese** to join English, French and Spanish as a working language of the **WTO,** costs and the time needed to reach any decision will escalate.

To head off these problems, Brussels and Washington should agree now to the creation of a formal **WTO** directorate of major trading nations that would take the lead in guiding the organisation. **China** would automatically qualify for membership in such a group once it becomes a **WTO** member. But Europe and the US should formalise this process before **China** joins to maximise their influence.

Similarly, Brussels and Washington should do whatever they can to sever the **WTO** from the UN personnel system before Beijing becomes a member. Among other things, such a move would help insulate the organisation from the cronyism that has long hamstrung the UN.

Finally, **Chinese** officials continue to confound foreigners with their lack of

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understanding of the implications of **WTO** membership. For example, **Chinese** experts on the **WTO** naively argue that entry will protect them from the many dumping cases now levelled against **Chinese** exports by Europe and the US. They fail to realise that while membership may change the venue of many trade battles, it will not necessarily alter the nature of the war.

To avoid such fundamental misunderstandings and to prepare the **Chinese** for all the practical changes they face in joining the multilateral trading system, the US should mount an education and training effort for the **Chinese** leadership.

In the early 1990s, Washington built into the intellectual property accords it signed with Beijing a commitment to help train **Chinese** lawyers, judges and customs officials in the concepts and practicalities of copyrights, trademarks and patents, so the **Chinese** could effectively implement the deal.

The **WTO** has instituted some training for **Chinese** officials to help them to implement Beijing's eventual **WTO** commitments. But additional European and US funds and expertise are needed to involve a range of **Chinese** in the training effort - not only officials from the trade ministry but administrators from all parts of the bureaucracy and entrepreneurs from the emerging private sector.

In the end, it is not only the terms of **China's** accession to the **WTO** but the nature of its participation that matters to Europe and the US. Even as they rush to complete the accession negotiations, Brussels and Washington need to lay the groundwork for dealing with this long-term **China** challenge.

Unless the EU and the US can work together, they will have no choice but to cope independently. And that will not be in the interest of the **WTO,** Europe, the US or transatlantic relations.

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LEVEL 1 - 9 OF 79 STORIES

The Washington Times

December 1, 1997, Monday, Final Edition

SECTION: Part SYMPOSIUM; Pg. 24

LENGTH: **1758** words

HEADLINE: Q: Should **China** Be allowed to join the World Trade Organization?; Yes: The built-in sanctions of the **WTO** will speed **China's** market reforms.

BYLINE: Jagdish Bhagwati; SPECIAL TO INSIGHT

BODY:

China has replaced Japan as the Lex Luthor in America's imagination and in its public-policy domain. It is facile, however, to conclude that we need an enemy to feel comfortable and that the end of the Cold War has left us with a withdrawal symptom that makes us yearn for a devil to fear and a monster to slay.

Yes, **China** is truly off the curve regarding its economic organization and its civil and political regime. Its economy, despite the massive inroads made by capitalist roaders, is marked by residual features of the extensively planned system by which it had been managed since the triumph of the communists almost a half-century ago. At the same time, having put perestroika (economic restructuring) ahead of glasnost (political liberalization), the **Chinese** communists have continued to preside over an authoritarian regime that violates all conventions of a civil and civilized society, offending not merely the human-rights groups, but anyone with a moral sense and a social conscience.

The question of **China's** entry into the World Trade Organization, or **WTO,** thus has been caught up in the acute reactions that **China** provokes among some trade-policy elites and virtually all of the human-rights activists. In one of those rare alliances that make politics ever fascinating, these groups, normally in unison only in their distrust of each other, have come together in opposing **China's** entry into the **WTO.** But I believe they are fundamentally mistaken. In fact, the goal of getting **China** to conform more to rules-based and market-determined trade and to respect human rights will be reached more quickly by admitting her to the **WTO.**

Among the many fallacious arguments advanced by the opponents of **China's** entry, three stand out. Foremost among these is the claim that **China** does not have a market economy. It has been claimed that the **WTO** requires that member states be "market economies," since they must accept meaningful obligations in regard to matters such as access which cannot be implemented if the economic system does not permit markets.

But put this claim in perspective. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, or GATT, already permitted communist states - Czechoslovakia and Poland -

to join. We therefore face a genuine question: Is **China,** which surely has moved away from communism to markets in a dramatic (though incomplete) fashion, to be considered less favorably than previous members which had not made the move at all? The best, and not necessarily partisan, Sinologists are divided on the question of how far markets have gone in today's **China.** But there is no debate about the fact that markets are indeed here and that they are steadily increasing in scope.

Take import markets: Already in bilateral negotiations with the United States (often backed by threat of sanctions and counterthreats by the **Chinese**), the People's Republic has proceeded to make pledges to publish the rules and procedures American exporters must follow, while reducing or eliminating import licenses, quotas and other controls that impeded access to **China's** markets.

The same is true of state trading. Here again, we should recall that GATT traditionally accommodated occasional state trading, adding safeguards to ensure, however imperfectly, the preservation of market-access obligations and nondiscrimination between different exporters. True, **China** presents a more difficult problem because of the preponderance of state-owned companies. But even here, profound change is on the way. With the economic realities of inefficient state enterprises all too evident to the **Chinese** authorities themselves, the latest **Chinese** Communist Party Congress finally has resolved to reduce them to a negligible share of the economy.

Indeed, the Brookings Institution's **China** expert, Nicholas Lardy, has shown fairly conclusively that **China's** goods markets have been liberalized in farming and distribution sectors as well, whereas the labor markets also are functioning to allocate labor in the rural and small-scale manufacturing sectors.

Thus, the traditional practice of GATT in admitting truly nonmarket economies and the complex reality of the **Chinese** economy, which has manifold and growing aspects of the market in it, indicate that it is folly to exclude **China from the WTO** on what only can be regarded as de facto ideological grounds.

A second faulty argument against **China's WTO** membership is that **China** runs huge external surpluses, exporting far more than it imports. Critics claim that this is incontrovertible proof that **China's** markets are unfairly closed. The charge, however, is wrong - both factually and conceptually.

China has, since 1978 when its reforms began, run overall deficits - and not just surpluses. Currently, its surplus in balance of trade is small (though the bilateral surplus with the United States is large). But it also must be said that, in economic logic, these balances have nothing to do with whether a country is open or closed. Surpluses and deficits are macroeconomic phenomena: They reflect not trade policies, but domestic differences between aggregate spending and income (which are influenced by fiscal and monetary policies).

The same fallacy, inferring trade openness from deficits and closedness from surpluses, was rampant in Washington during the period of Japan-bashing. It managed to survive obvious contradictions: For instance, Japan had run deficits when it was less open for decades after World War II and only surpluses since the eighties, when it clearly had opened much wider.

A third argument of the critics is that **China** cannot be expected to abide by

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the rules of **WTO** when it has no rule of law. But that is a non sequitur. True, **China** has no rule of law as we understand it. But this has not prevented us and others transacting with **China** in gargantuan terms: Her total trade already is close to $200 billion.

And in 1993, she was attracting direct foreign-investment flows of more than $25 billion, putting her ahead of all other developing countries, even as we were threatening **China** with retribution due to her lack of protection for intellectual-property, or IP, rights and seeking to persuade her implausibly that she would lose foreign investment if she did not do so! The absurdity of the notion that **China** would cease to attract investment in the absence of IP protection was brought home to me when I was at a meeting at the Commerce Department, where many of America's top chief executive officers were being briefed by scholars, just before boarding the plane for **China** on then-commerce secretary Ron Brown's jaunt to Beijing in search of trade and investment opportunities: Nothing like the absence of the rule of law, including nonexistent IP rights, was going to deter these gentlemen from that gigantic market!

Some critics charge that **China** cannot enforce internally the disciplines it accepts bilaterally or multilaterally. Thus, in regard to lax enforcement of IP agreements, some **China** specialists pleaded that Beijing could not effectively enforce what is enforced elsewhere. This is a ludicrous claim: Try telling that to the Tibetans, or just see how much better the enforcement is now that **China** sees that it is necessary if she is to get our support in getting into the **WTO**.

Besides, if any member of the **WTO** fails to deliver on a commitment, that immediately exposes it to the binding Dispute Settlement Procedure and hence to retaliation in the shape of withdrawal of trade concessions to the offending country. So, **China** would be subject to the **WTO's** rules-based discipline which itself inevitably would create the incentive for **China** to exercise discipline internally.

In fact, precisely because the **WTO** imposes discipline on its members, with built-in punishments for deviant behavior, we confidently can predict that **China's** entry into it will help the United States to advance our trade and our human-rights objectives.

WTO entry will multilateralize the demands that we have made bilaterally on **China** for new and further reforms. So far, we have asked, with only moderate success, that the **Chinese** change their nontransparent import procedures, state trading and production, inadequate IP protection and a host of other unacceptable practices. But, as a precondition of **WTO** membership, **China** will have to accept these and other demands simply as part of its membership obligations as long as we insist, as we have done so far, that **China** get no special exemptions.

Besides, the lesson from our clumsy attempts during the eighties to use our clout to get Japan and the European Union bilaterally to accept new trade obligations is that typically these big players tell us to get lost when we demand new concessions bilaterally but accept them when the same demands are made multilaterally. The U.S.-Japan auto dispute, begun by us with dire threats of tariff retaliation against Japanese auto firms, ended in ignominious failure on our part as the Japanese drew a line in the sand. Japan plays far more pliably within the multilateral **WTO.** So will **China.**

In fact, I would urge that **China** also be required to sign the optional **WTO** Government Procurement Agreement as a condition for **WTO** accession, even though developing countries (except for Singapore and Hong Kong) have not accepted it. Given the current preponderance of state enterprises in **China,** despite the announced intention to reduce it drastically, it is important that politics be taken out of their functioning so as to ensure fairer market access. Human-rights groups also should welcome this since **China,** unconstrained by **WTO** discipline, typically has tried to switch orders away from those who criticize its human-rights record. Everything that makes **Chinese** enterprises stick to **WTO** principles of nondiscrimination in purchasing would make such **Chinese** threats less credible since they could be immediately challenged, if translated into action, at the **WTO.**

In the end, contrary to the fears often expressed that **China** will wreck the **WTO,** it is the **WTO** that will help change **China.** It will be the bull in the **China** shop. As **China** moves herself out of the old economic and political order, benefiting her own multitudes while also suiting our own objectives, the **WTO** will provide a nudge in the same direction.

Bhagwati, an economics and political-science professor at Columbia University in New York City, was the economic policy adviser to the director general of GATT from 1991-1993.

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