

FOIA MARKER

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Folder Title: Iraq Op-ed [2]				
Staff Office-Individual: Speechwriting-Rosshirt, Thomas				
Original OA/ID Number: 4020				
Row: 48	Section: 6	Shelf: 8	Position: 3	Stack: V

Sept. 1980 →

he had been power behind.

Clintonian themes in State of the Union and Inaugural Addresses

41

1993 inaugural:

there is no longer division between what is foreign and what is domestic – the world economy, the world environment, the world AIDS crisis, the world arms race – they affect us all.

Scuds

our greatest strength is the power of our ideas, which are still new in many lands.

1994 SOTU

Ultimately, the best strategy to ensure our security and to build a durable peace is to support the advance of democracy elsewhere.

We must remember as these nations chart their own futures ... how much more secure and more prosperous our own people will be if democratic and market reform succeed all across the former communist bloc. ...

That is why I went to Europe earlier this month – to work with our European partners, to help integrate all the former communist countries into a Europe that has a possibility of becoming unified for the first time in its entire history – its entire history – based on the simple commitments of all nations in Europe to democracy, to free markets and to respect for existing borders. ...

1995 SOTU

The financial crisis in Mexico is a case in point. I know it's not popular to say it tonight, but we have to act. Not for the Mexican people, but for the sake of the millions of Americans whose livelihoods are tied to Mexico's well-being. If we want to secure American jobs, preserve American exports, safeguard America's borders, then we must pass the stabilization program and help to put Mexico back on track.

1996 SOTU

We can't be everywhere. We can't do everything. But where our interests and our values are at stake – and where we can make a difference – America must lead.

1997 Inaugural

America stands alone as the world's indispensable nation.

...where it can stand up for our values and interests in the world ... government should do more, not less.

The divide of race has been America's constant curse. And each new wave of immigrants gives new tartest to old prejudices. Prejudice and contempt, cloaked in the pretense of religious or political conviction are no different. These forces have nearly destroyed our nation in the past. They plague us still. They fuel the fanaticism of terror. And the torment the lives of millions in fractured nations all around the world.

The world is no longer divided into two hostile camps. Instead, now we are building bonds with nations that once were our adversaries. Growing connections of commerce and culture give us a chance to lift the fortunes and spirits of people the world over. And for the very first time in all of history, more people on this planet live under democracy than dictatorship.

SOTU 1997

Now, we stand at another moment of change and choice -- and another time to be farsighted, to bring America 50 more years of security and prosperity. In this endeavor, our first task is to help to build, for the first time, an undivided, democratic Europe. When Europe is stable, prosperous and at peace, America is more secure.

a Europe in which all democracies define their future not in terms of what they can do to each other, but in terms of what they can do together for the good of all -- that kind of Europe is good for America.

I will go to China, and I have invited China's President to come here, not because we agree on everything, but because engaging China is the best way to work on our common challenges like ending nuclear testing, and to deal frankly with our fundamental differences like human rights.

But this is about more than economics. By expanding trade, we can advance the cause of freedom and democracy around the world.

We should all be proud that America led the effort to rescue our neighbor, Mexico, from its economic crises. And we should all be proud that last month Mexico repaid the United States -- three full years ahead of schedule -- with half a billion dollar profit to us.

America must continue to be an unrelenting force for peace --- from the Middle East to Haiti, from Northern Ireland to Africa. Taking reasonable risks for peace keeps us from being drawn into far more costly conflicts later.

Every dollar we devote to preventing conflicts, to promoting democracy, to stopping the spread of disease and starvation, brings a sure return in security and savings.

All over the world, people are being torn asunder by racial, ethnic, and religious conflicts that fuel fanaticism and terror. We are the world's most diverse democracy, and the world looks to us to show that it is possible to live and advance together across those kinds of differences.

1998 SOTU

I think we should seek to advance worker and environmental standards around the world. I have made it abundantly clear that it should be a part of our trade agenda. But we cannot influence other countries' decisions if we send them a message that we're backing away from trade with them.

Now, why should Americans be concerned about this (financial crisis)? First, these countries are our customers. If they sink into recession, they won't be able to buy the goods we'd like to sell them. Second, they're also our competitors. So if their currencies lose their value and go down, then the price of their goods will drop, flooding our market and others with much cheaper goods, which makes it a lot tougher for our people to compete. And, finally, they are our strategic partners. Their stability bolsters our security.

Our policy is clear: No nation can recover if it does not reform itself. But when nations are willing to undertake serious economic reform, we should help them do it.

To meet these challenges, we are helping to write international rules of the road for the 21st century, protecting those who join the family of nations and isolating those who do not. Within days, I will ask the Senate for its advice and consent to make Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic the newest members of NATO.

In the months ahead, I will pursue our security strategy with old allies in Asia and Europe, and new partners from Africa to India and Pakistan, from South America to China. And from Belfast, to Korea to the Middle East, America will continue to stand with those who stand for peace.

SOTU 1999

Today, much of the world is in recession, with Asia hit especially hard. This is the most serious financial crisis in half a century. To meet it, the United States and other nations have reduced interest rates and strengthened the International Monetary Fund. And while the turmoil is not over, we have worked very hard with other nations to contain it. At the same time, we have to continue to work on the long-term project, building a global financial system for the 21st century that promotes prosperity and tames the cycle of boom and bust that has engulfed so much of Asia.

But at the same time, we must ensure that ordinary citizens in all countries actually benefit from trade -- a trade that promotes the dignity of work, and the rights of workers, and protects the environment. We must insist that international trade organizations be more open to public

scrutiny, instead of mysterious, secret things subject to wild criticism. When you come right down to it, now that the world economy is becoming more and more integrated, we have to do in the world what we spent the better part of this century doing here at home. We have got to put a human face on the global economy.

In China, last year, I said to the leaders and the people what I'd like to say again tonight: Stability can no longer be bought at the expense of liberty. But I'd also like to say again to the American people: It's important not to isolate China. The more we bring China into the world, the more the world will bring change and freedom to China.

SOTU 2000

To realize the full possibilities of this economy, we must reach beyond our own borders, to shape the revolution that is tearing down barriers and building new networks among nations and individuals, and economies and cultures: globalization. It's the central reality of our time. Of course, change this profound is both liberating and threatening to people. But there's no turning back. And our open, creative society stands to benefit more than any other -- if we understand, and act on, the realities of interdependence. We have to be at the center of every vital global network, as a good neighbor and a good partner. We have to recognize that we cannot build our future without helping others to build theirs.

But others must recognize that open markets and rule-based trade are the best engines we know of for raising living standards, reducing global poverty and environmental destruction, and assuring the free flow of ideas.

we must continue to encourage our former adversaries, Russia and China, to emerge as stable, prosperous, democratic nations ... Of course, no one, not a single person in this chamber tonight, can know for sure what direction these great nations will take. But we do know for sure that we can choose what we do. And we should do everything in our power to increase the chance that they will choose wisely, to be constructive members of our global community.

[We must] protect our own security from conflicts that pose the risk of wider war and threaten our common humanity.

We have ... to keep this inexorable march of technology from giving terrorists and potentially hostile nations the means to undermine our defenses.

I predict to you, when most of us are long gone, but some time in the next 10 to 20 years, the major security threat this country will face will come from the enemies of the nation state: the narco-traffickers and the terrorists and the organized criminals, who will be organized together, working together, with increasing access to ever-more sophisticated chemical and biological weapons.

I hope we can also have a constructive effort to meet the challenge that is presented to our planet by the huge gulf between rich and poor.

In a world where over a billion people live on less than a dollar a day, we also have got to do our part in the global endeavor to reduce the debts of the poorest countries, so they can invest in education, health care and economic growth.

I also want to say that America must help more nations to break the bonds of disease.

I want to tell you that I am very grateful for many things as President. But one of the things I'm grateful for is the opportunity that the Vice President and I have had to finally put to rest the bogus idea that you cannot grow the economy and protect the environment at the same time.

Dear Representative Duncan:

Thank you for your letter concerning sanctions on Iraq.

Like you, my Administration has always believed that our Iraq policy should focus on Saddam Hussein and not the Iraqi people. We continue to work with others on the UN Security Council to ensure that the pressure of sanctions is felt by the government of Iraq.

For this reason, food, medicine, and other humanitarian goods have always been exempt from the sanctions on Iraq. Moreover, the United States has consistently advocated allowing Iraq to sell oil to finance humanitarian imports, as reaffirmed in our sponsorship of Security Council Resolution 986 -- the oil-for-food deal -- in 1995. Saddam refused to accept oil-for-food until 1996, but since then the program has made a major difference in the lives of ordinary Iraqis. The oil-for-food program enabled Iraq to sell over \$20 billion worth of oil used to import over \$4 billion worth of food, nearly \$750 million worth of medicine, and over \$700 million worth of other humanitarian supplies. Another \$2 billion worth of food, medicine and other humanitarian goods have been approved by the UN Sanctions Committee and will be delivered in coming months. Late last year, the Security Council passed Resolution 1284, to further improve the oil-for-food program in a variety of ways, including allowing Iraq to export an unlimited volume of petroleum to enable it to import required humanitarian goods.

The greatest problem the people of Iraq face today is that Baghdad systematically limits the distribution of humanitarian goods to preserve the suffering of its own people as a diplomatic asset. UN statistics since 1996 make clear that problems of malnourishment and disease are abating much faster in northern Iraq -- where the UN controls distribution of food

forgaining chip

and medicine -- than in central and southern Iraq where the regime remains in control.

~~There is no reason to believe Saddam would use new oil revenues to feed his people should sanctions be lifted. Since 1991, he~~
has squandered Iraq's resources on weapons of mass destruction, grandiose palaces, a new city bearing his name, and other monuments to his own ambition. It is for this reason that we remain committed to the oil-for-food program as the best way to relieve the suffering of the Iraqi people. Only by ensuring that the UN controls how Iraq can spend its money and oversees the distribution of food and medicine inside Iraq can we have any expectation that Iraqi revenues will go to feed the Iraqi people rather than Saddam's war machine and his ego.

Although we are working to limit the impact of sanctions on the Iraqi people, sanctions continue to be essential to contain the Iraqi regime, constrain Saddam from rebuilding his military, deny him the cash that gave him broad influence in the Middle East before the Gulf War, and limit his ability to disrupt regional stability. Nevertheless, Resolution 1284 creates a mechanism for suspending the economic sanctions on Iraq if Iraq fulfills key, longstanding disarmament requirements. The military sanctions would remain in place, and the UN would maintain strict financial controls to ensure that Iraqi revenue goes to the Iraqi people, rather than to finance Saddam's palaces and WMD programs.

Again, thank you for writing and for sharing your views on this difficult issue.

Sincerely,

The Honorable John J. Duncan, Jr.
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-4202



October 20, 1999, Wednesday

SECTION: Opinion; Pg. 8

LENGTH: 936 words

HEADLINE: The Iraqis Are Victims of Saddam, Not of the Outside World

BYLINE: By **Samuel R. Berger**; International Herald Tribune

DATELINE: WASHINGTON

BODY:

Various diplomats attending the recent UN opening session chided proponents of continued **sanctions** against **Iraq** for being insensitive to the plight of the Iraqi people. The people of **Iraq** are indeed suffering today, but the cause is not **sanctions**. It is the policies of Saddam Hussein.

When the United Nations first imposed **sanctions** against **Iraq**, immediately after the invasion of Kuwait, it exempted food, medicine and other humanitarian supplies. Soon after the Gulf War, the United States took the lead in proposing that **Iraq** be allowed to sell controlled quantities of its oil to pay for these critical humanitarian needs.

For five long years, Saddam refused to do so, hoping to manipulate international opinion by perpetuating the misery of his people.

Now that the oil-for-food program is finally being implemented, it is making a real difference in the lives of the people. This year oil-for-food is expected to generate nearly \$7 billion for use by **Iraq** to purchase food, medicine and humanitarian goods. The food supply in **Iraq** has grown, providing the average citizen with approximately 2,030 calories a day, an amount exceeding the UN-recommended daily minimum.

In fact, the amount of food and medicine that **Iraq** has been able to purchase under this program is greater than all of the humanitarian aid that the United Nations has provided to all the other countries in the world in the last three years.

Even so, Saddam continues to hinder the program and deprive all his people of its benefits. Today, according to the United Nations, one-third of all the medicine that has arrived in **Iraq** since the start of the oil-for-food program sits undistributed in Iraqi warehouses.

Despite a 50 percent increase in oil revenues, **Iraq** has increased the amount earmarked for food purchases by just 16 percent. Despite infant malnutrition, **Iraq** has spent less than 40 percent of the \$25 million that has been set aside for nutritional supplies, and until just a few weeks ago had gone more than 18 months without ordering a single nutritional supplement.

Not only is Saddam depriving his people of food, he is selling it illicitly for his own profit. Baby milk sold to **Iraq** through the oil-for-food program has been found in markets throughout the Gulf region.

Recently, Kuwaiti authorities stopped a shipment coming out of **Iraq** that included baby powder, baby bottles and other nursing materials for resale overseas. And the Kuwaiti Coast Guard has seized three cargo vessels that were trying to smuggle more than 600 tons of food and foodstuffs out of **Iraq**.

We know where that money is going. Since the end of the Gulf War, Saddam has built 48 grand palaces, complete with gold-plated faucets and man-made lakes and waterfalls.

Five months ago, Iraqi officials inaugurated Saddamiyat al Tharthar, a lakeside resort for high government officials that contains stadiums, an amusement park, hospitals, parks, and new homes, at a cost of hundreds of millions of dollars.

Top military officials are provided with extra monthly food rations, a Mercedes and stipends in the thousands of dollars, while most Iraqis are forced to live on less than \$3.50 a month

All of this is obscene.

It's telling that, according to Unicef, in northern Iraq, which is under the same sanctions as the rest of Iraq but where the United Nations directly administers humanitarian assistance, child mortality rates have fallen below pre-Gulf War levels, and children are living better lives. In southern and central Iraq, where the government controls the program, child mortality rates have more than doubled.

Opponents of current policy need to consider the alternative. Under sanctions, Saddam must sell the commodity he values most to meet the needs of those he values least, the people of his country. If sanctions were lifted, he could spend his oil wealth on anything he wanted. Oil for food would likely become oil for tanks. Iraq's people could well have less to eat. Iraq's neighbors would certainly have more to fear.

Saddam's priorities are clear: palaces for himself, perks for his cronies, prisons for his people, and weapons to destroy Iraq's citizens and neighbors.

Meanwhile, the UN Security Council is unanimous in its judgment that Iraq has not fulfilled its obligations to the international community. It has not disarmed. It has not forsworn the development of weapons of mass destruction. It has not renounced the use of chemical and biological weapons. It does not respect the international border with Kuwait, and has not accounted for Kuwaiti prisoners of war.

It has not stopped the repression, torture and abuse of its own people, from Kurds in the north to Shiites in the south.

There is no conflict here between the demands of sensitivity and security, no trade-off between feeding the people of Iraq and freeing the Gulf region from fear. In fact, the only realistic way to achieve both goals is to encourage a new regime in Iraq that will meet the needs of its people and its obligations to the world.

When that new regime emerges, the United States is prepared to do its part to help foster economic development, restore Iraqi civil society, replenish the middle class, rebuild Iraq's health and education sectors, and welcome Iraq back into the community of nations.

We should work together, with patience and determination, until that day when we can not only lift sanctions but truly lift the lives of the Iraqi people.

The writer is the U.S. national security adviser. He contributed this comment to the International Herald Tribune.

LANGUAGE: ENGLISH

LOAD-DATE: October 20, 1999

March 2, 1998, Monday

SECTION: Opinion; Pg. 8

LENGTH: 1210 words

HEADLINE: U.S. Will Hit Hard If Saddam Reneges on Agreement

BYLINE: By **Samuel R. Berger**; The Washington Post

DATELINE: WASHINGTON

BODY:

Although it may fail to satisfy those who want to use force against **Iraq** regardless of the context, Saddam Hussein's agreement to open all Iraqi sites to international weapons inspectors advances America's strategic objectives, either in the event that he complies with it - or that he doesn't.

If **Iraq** follows through on its commitment, the inspectors will for the first time have unrestricted, unconditional access to all suspect sites - including sites that the Iraqi government previously had declared off-limits. If **Iraq** reneges, we will respond powerfully, from a position of maximum strength internationally.

From the beginning of this crisis, the president has made clear that the best outcome for the international community was for Unscm inspectors to be given access to all locations in the country, including presidential sites and other security related installations from which they had been blocked.

The reason was simple: Despite continual harassment and deception by the Iraqi regime over the years, Unscm has been remarkably effective in locating and destroying Saddam Hussein's nuclear, biological, chemical and missile capabilities and establishing a long-term monitoring system that makes it far more difficult for the Iraqi regime to rebuild that capacity.

The president also made crystal clear that if Saddam Hussein failed to let Unscm do its work, he would use overwhelming force to seriously diminish **Iraq's** weapons of mass destruction threat and its ability to strike its neighbors.

He sent Secretaries Madeleine Albright and William Cohen and Ambassador Bill Richardson around the world, not to seek approval but to explain to others our position in unmistakable terms. As a result, Saddam knew that he would be hit, and hit hard, if he did not comply.

Backed by two American and two British aircraft carriers in the Gulf, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan went to Baghdad. We had made clear to him our two bottom lines: total, unfettered access for Unscm and the ability of Unscm to do its work in a professional and expert manner.

Saddam unequivocally committed to the first. If he complies - and I offer no odds - it will be a significant step in the long process of disarming **Iraq's** weapons of mass destruction capability.

As for the second, clarifications provided in discussions between Mr. Annan and the determined chairman of Unscm, Richard Butler, have led Mr. Butler to conclude that Unscm will have operational control over all inspections and that the arrangements are "entirely satisfactory" to his organization.

The Special Group for the eight presidential sites will answer to Mr. Butler; Unscm procedures will apply; the

inspection team leader will come from Unscm; the diplomats who accompany the inspection will be observers only, and for all other sites, including those previously blocked, existing Unscm practices will apply.

Ultimately, however, as the president also made clear, "the proof is in the testing."

In the days and weeks ahead, Unscm will test **Iraq's** commitment. We will keep our forces in the region at a high state of readiness. Failure to allow the inspectors to go where they want, when they want, will result in the use of serious force. After two crises provoked by **Iraq** in four months, the time for diplomacy will be over.

The consternation of some that the guns are silent for now in part reflects an important debate about our strategic objectives in **Iraq**. Since 1991, the Bush and Clinton administrations have pursued a policy of containing Saddam - stopping him from threatening a region of strategic importance to the United States.

This policy has been successful. For example, when Saddam moved toward Kuwait again in 1994, we immediately deployed forces to the region and warned him to move back. He did. So long as we have the national will to sustain that policy, it serves our national interests. It is strategically sound, even if aesthetically displeasing. Saddam's threat is blocked, even if he still blights the landscape.

Two alternative approaches have been suggested. Some countries want to pursue essentially a narrow disarmament strategy - "inspect and lift": Let Unscm finish its work (and hurry up while you're at it), then lift **sanctions** (which deprive Saddam and his military machine of \$15 billion a year) and reintegrate him into the international community.

But given Saddam's record, there is good reason to believe that this approach - which fails to require him to demonstrate his "peaceful intentions" by complying with all UN resolutions - would simply allow him to refinance his territorial ambitions.

Some here in the United States argue that our strategic objective should be to remove Saddam Hussein from power. There is no doubt that the Iraqi people would be better for it. We would gladly work with a successor regime that respects its neighbors and returns **Iraq** to its rightful place in the family of nations.

But this also is a course with substantial risks and costs. A military campaign to remove Saddam would require a major commitment of ground troops, risk large numbers of casualties and cost tens of billions of dollars. We would pursue it alone. Once we fought our way to Baghdad, it is unlikely Saddam would be waiting at the airport. I am convinced the costs - in blood, treasure and political isolation - are not justified.

Alternatively, we could seek to achieve that result by proxy - through support of Iraqi opposition groups. We have worked with the Iraqi opposition in the past and we can do so more effectively in the future. But before we embrace lofty goals, we must be sure this time that we are prepared for the ride. From Budapest in 1956 to the Bay of Pigs in 1961 to postwar **Iraq** in 1991, we have learned the dangers of starting something we were not prepared to finish.

This discussion about strategic objectives is healthy. It forces us to challenge our thinking and assumptions. But unless we are prepared either to invade under current circumstances or to dismiss the threat Saddam poses - two options I reject - Saddam will be with us for some time. In the meanwhile, we must maintain the resolve, alone if necessary, to prevent him from threatening the region - in other words, to contain him.

There are four pillars to this policy. Maintain **sanctions**. Continue to enforce a no-fly zone over the north and south of his country to reduce the threat Saddam poses to his neighbors and his people. Insist that Unscm be permitted to do its work without conditions. Be prepared to reinforce each of these undertakings with military force.

It also means permitting the Iraqi government to sell some of its oil to buy food and medicine for the Iraqi people under strict UN supervision. Starvation is not a card we wish to play, nor to permit Saddam to play against us.

That is the policy we are pursuing. For seven years it has held in check the Gulf's most disruptive and dangerous threat and helped maintain stability in a region vital to our national interest. But, as President Bill Clinton said last

week, whether that continues to be our strategy will be affected in no small measure by whether this agreement is honored.

LANGUAGE: ENGLISH

LOAD-DATE: March 2, 1998

1. * Saddam's sins against ~~his neighbors.~~ Pollack email
2. * The purpose of sanctions; conditions for lifting them.
3. * conditions in Iraq - economy and public health
4. * calls for lifting sanctions "sanctions aren't working."
5. * assumptions of anti-sanctions position (assume new revenues will go to people)
let's look at what he's done w/ the revenues he has
6. * likely consequences of lifting sanctions
7. * Saddam purposefully withholding food and medicine from his people, corrupting the program; screwing his own people
8. * U.S. humanitarian response
9. * Conclusion/summary:

Ken - @ UNSCR 4

69279

Dec 17 passed

with money to

average Iraqi ——— cal/day

2000

This is the Section of UNSCR 1284:

15. Authorizes States, notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs 3 (a), 3 (b) and 4 of resolution 661 (1990) and subsequent relevant resolutions, to permit the import of any volume of petroleum and petroleum products originating in Iraq, including financial and other essential transactions directly relating thereto, as required for the purposes and on the conditions set out in paragraph 1 (a) and (b) and subsequent provisions of resolution 986 (1995) and related resolutions;

16. Underlines, in this context, its intention to take further action, including permitting the use of additional export routes for petroleum and petroleum products, under appropriate conditions otherwise consistent with the purpose and provisions of resolution 986 (1995) and related resolutions;

17. Directs the Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) to approve, on the basis of proposals from the Secretary-General, lists of humanitarian items, including foodstuffs, pharmaceutical and medical supplies, as well as basic or standard medical and agricultural equipment and basic or standard educational items, decides, notwithstanding paragraph 3 of resolution 661 (1990) and paragraph 20 of resolution 687 (1991), that supplies of these items will not be submitted for approval of that Committee, except for items subject to the provisions of resolution 1051 (1996), and will be notified to the Secretary-General and financed in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 8 (a) and 8 (b) of resolution 986 (1995), and requests the Secretary-General to inform the Committee in a timely manner of all such notifications received and actions taken;

18. Requests the Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) to appoint, in accordance with resolutions 1175 (1998) and 1210 (1998), a group of experts, including independent inspection agents appointed by the Secretary-General in accordance with paragraph 6 of resolution 986 (1995), decides that this group will be mandated to approve speedily contracts for the parts and the equipments necessary to enable Iraq to increase its exports of petroleum and petroleum products, according to lists of parts and equipments approved by that Committee for each individual project, and requests the Secretary-General to continue to provide for the monitoring of these parts and equipments inside Iraq;

19. Encourages Member States and international organizations to provide supplementary humanitarian assistance to Iraq and published material of an educational character to Iraq;

20. Decides to suspend, for an initial period of six months from the date of the adoption of this resolution and subject to review, the implementation of paragraph 8 (g) of resolution 986 (1995);

21. Requests the Secretary-General to take steps to maximize, drawing as necessary on the advice of specialists, including representatives of international humanitarian

organizations, the effectiveness of the arrangements set out in resolution 986 (1995) and related resolutions including the humanitarian benefit to the Iraqi population in all areas of the country, and further requests the Secretary-General to continue to enhance as necessary the United Nations observation process in Iraq, ensuring that all supplies under the humanitarian programme are utilized as authorized, to bring to the attention of the Council any circumstances preventing or impeding effective and equitable distribution and to keep the Council informed of the steps taken towards the implementation of this paragraph;

22. Requests also the Secretary-General to minimize the cost of the United Nations activities associated with the implementation of resolution 986 (1995) as well as the cost of the independent inspection agents and the certified public accountants appointed by him, in accordance with paragraphs 6 and 7 of resolution 986 (1995);

23. Requests further the Secretary-General to provide Iraq and the Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) with a daily statement of the status of the escrow account established by paragraph 7 of resolution 986 (1995);

24. Requests the Secretary-General to make the necessary arrangements, subject to Security Council approval, to allow funds deposited in the escrow account established by resolution 986 (1995) to be used for the purchase of locally produced goods and to meet the local cost for essential civilian needs which have been funded in accordance with the provisions of resolution 986 (1995) and related resolutions, including, where appropriate, the cost of installation and training services;

25. Directs the Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) to take a decision on all applications in respect of humanitarian and essential civilian needs within a target of two working days of receipt of these applications from the Secretary-General, and to ensure that all approval and notification letters issued by the Committee stipulate delivery within a specified time, according to the nature of the items to be supplied, and requests the Secretary-General to notify the Committee of all applications for humanitarian items which are included in the list to which the export/import mechanism approved by resolution 1051 (1996) applies;

26. Decides that Hajj pilgrimage flights which do not transport cargo into or out of Iraq are exempt from the provisions of paragraph 3 of resolution 661 (1990) and resolution 670 (1990), provided timely notification of each flight is made to the Committee established by resolution 661 (1990), and requests the Secretary-General to make the necessary arrangements, for approval by the Security Council, to provide for reasonable expenses related to the Hajj pilgrimage to be met by funds in the escrow account established by resolution 986 (1995);

27. Calls upon the Government of Iraq:

They have refused

3

(i) to take all steps to ensure the timely and equitable distribution of all humanitarian goods, in particular medical supplies, and to remove and avoid delays at its warehouses;

(ii) to address effectively the needs of vulnerable groups, including children, pregnant women, the disabled, the elderly and the mentally ill among others, and to allow freer access, without any discrimination, including on the basis of religion or nationality, by United Nations agencies and humanitarian organizations to all areas and sections of the population for evaluation of their nutritional and humanitarian condition;

(!)

(iii) to prioritize applications for humanitarian goods under the arrangements set out in resolution 986 (1995) and related resolutions;

(iv) to ensure that those involuntarily displaced receive humanitarian assistance without the need to demonstrate that they have resided for six months in their places of temporary residence;

(!)

(v) to extend full cooperation to the United Nations Office for Project Services mine-clearance programme in the three northern Governorates of Iraq and to consider the initiation of the demining efforts in other Governorates;

(?)

WAR CRIMES

Saddam Hussein's
Iraq
صدام حسين
عراق

SUMMARY

Saddam Hussein and his closest aides have committed a long list of criminal violations of international humanitarian law and the laws and customs of war. Saddam Hussein and his closest aides should be investigated, indicted, and prosecuted for these crimes.

The goal of the United States is to see Saddam indicted by an international tribunal. We are gathering our own evidence against Saddam and providing support to groups working on Iraqi war crimes issues.

War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity

Saddam Hussein seized power in 1979. The list of war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by Saddam Hussein and his regime is a long one. It includes:

- *The use of poison gas and other war crimes against Iran and the Iranian people during the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war. Iraq summarily executed thousands of Iranian prisoners of war as a matter of policy.*
- *The "Anfal" campaign in the late 1980's against the Iraqi Kurds including the use of poison gas on cities. In one of the worst single mass killings in recent history, Iraq dropped chemical weapons on Halabja in 1988, in which as many as 5,000 people -- mostly civilians -- were killed.*
- *Crimes against humanity and war crimes arising out of Iraq's 1990-91 invasion and occupation of Kuwait.*
- *Crimes against humanity and possibly genocide against Iraqi Kurds in northern Iraq. This includes the destruction of over 3,000 villages. The Iraqi government's campaign of forced deportations of Kurdish and Turkomen families to southern Iraq has created approximately 900,000 internally displaced citizens throughout the country.*
- *Crimes against humanity and possibly genocide against Marsh Arabs and Shi'a Arabs in southern Iraq. Entire populations of villages have been forcibly expelled. Government forces have burned their houses and fields, demolished houses with bulldozers, and undertaken a deliberate campaign to drain and poison the marshes. Thousands of civilians have been summarily executed.*
- *Possible crimes against humanity for killings, ostensibly against political opponents, within Iraq.*

Holding Saddam Accountable

The United States wants to see Saddam and his close aides investigated, indicted, and if possible, prosecuted by an international tribunal. The Yugoslav war crimes tribunal's May 1999 indictment of Slobodan Milosevic for crimes against the Muslim Kosovar Albanian people

VILLAGE RAZED NEAR AL MASHA SHIA VILLAGE DESTROYED IN SOUTHERN IRAQ

AUGUST 1999



SEPTEMBER 1999



As this photo shows, the destruction of villages in southern Iraq has continued into 1999. Iraqi forces have intensified their leveling of the village of al Masha.

shows that when crimes are committed on the scale that Saddam Hussein has committed them, justice should be done not just in the name of the victims, but in the name of all humanity.

The United States is helping international efforts to gather evidence.

- The U.S. Government helped human rights and opposition groups collect 5.5 million pages of captured Iraqi documents from the "Anfal" campaign against the Iraqi Kurds in the 1980's. These documents show the routine nature of the atrocities and abuses committed by Saddam Hussein's regime against the Iraqi people. These documents are being catalogued, indexed, and electronically transcribed for use by investigators and prosecutors.
- Tens of thousands of pages of Iraqi documents captured during Operation Desert Storm in 1991 are

also now being indexed and computerized. The originals themselves will be returned to Kuwait and computerized copies will be made available to human rights groups, scholars, investigators and prosecutors.

- The U.S. has large amounts of information on Iraq's campaign to destroy the Southern Marshes and repression of the people of southern Iraq.
- We are preserving videotapes of Iraqi war crimes that can be used for eventual prosecution of Iraqi war crimes. The United States also has classified documents, some of which can be declassified and shared with an international tribunal or commission.

Saddam Hussein's Iraq is a brutal police state and so the collection of evidence of the crimes of the regime is difficult to obtain. Opposition groups work with great

courage to bring this news to the world. We are working with Iraqi opposition and human rights groups in support of their efforts to collect additional evidence of Saddam's war crimes. Opposition and human rights groups' efforts include:

- Locating witnesses to Iraqi war crimes and help build evidence that could be used to justify the arrest of senior Iraqi officials traveling outside the country.
- Helping analyze captured Iraqi documents and translate them so that the world can be educated about Iraqi war crimes.

The U.S. Government is providing grants to a number of NGO's working on Iraqi war crimes issues. Grants have been provided for gathering evidence, translating captured Iraqi documents written in Arabic into other languages, making evidence of Iraqi war crimes avail-

able on the Internet, and taking steps to preserve written, visual and testimonial evidence of the crimes committed by Saddam Hussein's regime.

International efforts to draw attention to the war crimes record of the Iraqi regime has already begun:

- Efforts were made to arrest Izzat Ibrahim, Vice Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council, while he was visiting Austria in August of 1999.
- A few weeks later, Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz decided not to travel to Italy to attend a conference entitled, "Peace, Prosperity, and an End to War." As one human rights group said, "The only suitable venue for Tariq Aziz to express his opinions is that of a courtroom where we will all have a chance to hear about his government's record on peace, prosperity and war."

This document is also available:
<http://www.usia.gov/regional/nea/nea.htm>

March 2, 1998, Monday

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HEADLINE: U.S. Will Hit Hard If Saddam Reneges on Agreement

BYLINE: By **Samuel R. Berger**; The Washington Post

DATELINE: WASHINGTON

BODY:

Although it may fail to satisfy those who want to use force against **Iraq** regardless of the context, Saddam Hussein's agreement to open all Iraqi sites to international weapons inspectors advances America's strategic objectives, either in the event that he complies with it - or that he doesn't.

If **Iraq** follows through on its commitment, the inspectors will for the first time have unrestricted, unconditional access to all suspect sites - including sites that the Iraqi government previously had declared off-limits. If **Iraq** reneges, we will respond powerfully, from a position of maximum strength internationally.

From the beginning of this crisis, the president has made clear that the best outcome for the international community was for Unscm inspectors to be given access to all locations in the country, including presidential sites and other security related installations from which they had been blocked.

The reason was simple: Despite continual harassment and deception by the Iraqi regime over the years, Unscm has been remarkably effective in locating and destroying Saddam Hussein's nuclear, biological, chemical and missile capabilities and establishing a long-term monitoring system that makes it far more difficult for the Iraqi regime to rebuild that capacity.

The president also made crystal clear that if Saddam Hussein failed to let Unscm do its work, he would use overwhelming force to seriously diminish **Iraq's** weapons of mass destruction threat and its ability to strike its neighbors.

He sent Secretaries Madeleine Albright and William Cohen and Ambassador Bill Richardson around the world, not to seek approval but to explain to others our position in unmistakable terms. As a result, Saddam knew that he would be hit, and hit hard, if he did not comply.

Backed by two American and two British aircraft carriers in the Gulf, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan went to Baghdad. We had made clear to him our two bottom lines: total, unfettered access for Unscm and the ability of Unscm to do its work in a professional and expert manner.

Saddam unequivocally committed to the first. If he complies - and I offer no odds - it will be a significant step in the long process of disarming **Iraq's** weapons of mass destruction capability.

As for the second, clarifications provided in discussions between Mr. Annan and the determined chairman of Unscm, Richard Butler, have led Mr. Butler to conclude that Unscm will have operational control over all inspections and that the arrangements are "entirely satisfactory" to his organization.

The Special Group for the eight presidential sites will answer to Mr. Butler; Unscm procedures will apply; the

inspection team leader will come from Unscm; the diplomats who accompany the inspection will be observers only, and for all other sites, including those previously blocked, existing Unscm practices will apply.

Ultimately, however, as the president also made clear, "the proof is in the testing."

In the days and weeks ahead, Unscm will test **Iraq's** commitment. We will keep our forces in the region at a high state of readiness. Failure to allow the inspectors to go where they want, when they want, will result in the use of serious force. After two crises provoked by **Iraq** in four months, the time for diplomacy will be over.

The consternation of some that the guns are silent for now in part reflects an important debate about our strategic objectives in **Iraq**. Since 1991, the Bush and Clinton administrations have pursued a policy of containing Saddam - stopping him from threatening a region of strategic importance to the United States.

This policy has been successful. For example, when Saddam moved toward Kuwait again in 1994, we immediately deployed forces to the region and warned him to move back. He did. So long as we have the national will to sustain that policy, it serves our national interests. It is strategically sound, even if aesthetically displeasing. Saddam's threat is blocked, even if he still blights the landscape.

Two alternative approaches have been suggested. Some countries want to pursue essentially a narrow disarmament strategy - "inspect and lift": Let Unscm finish its work (and hurry up while you're at it), then lift sanctions (which deprive Saddam and his military machine of \$15 billion a year) and reintegrate him into the international community.

But given Saddam's record, there is good reason to believe that this approach - which fails to require him to demonstrate his "peaceful intentions" by complying with all UN resolutions - would simply allow him to refinance his territorial ambitions.

Some here in the United States argue that our strategic objective should be to remove Saddam Hussein from power. There is no doubt that the Iraqi people would be better for it. We would gladly work with a successor regime that respects its neighbors and returns **Iraq** to its rightful place in the family of nations.

But this also is a course with substantial risks and costs. A military campaign to remove Saddam would require a major commitment of ground troops, risk large numbers of casualties and cost tens of billions of dollars. We would pursue it alone. Once we fought our way to Baghdad, it is unlikely Saddam would be waiting at the airport. I am convinced the costs - in blood, treasure and political isolation - are not justified.

Alternatively, we could seek to achieve that result by proxy - through support of Iraqi opposition groups. We have worked with the Iraqi opposition in the past and we can do so more effectively in the future. But before we embrace lofty goals, we must be sure this time that we are prepared for the ride. From Budapest in 1956 to the Bay of Pigs in 1961 to postwar **Iraq** in 1991, we have learned the dangers of starting something we were not prepared to finish.

This discussion about strategic objectives is healthy. It forces us to challenge our thinking and assumptions. But unless we are prepared either to invade under current circumstances or to dismiss the threat Saddam poses - two options I reject - Saddam will be with us for some time. In the meanwhile, we must maintain the resolve, alone if necessary, to prevent him from threatening the region - in other words, to contain him.

There are four pillars to this policy. Maintain sanctions. Continue to enforce a no-fly zone over the north and south of his country to reduce the threat Saddam poses to his neighbors and his people. Insist that Unscm be permitted to do its work without conditions. Be prepared to reinforce each of these undertakings with military force.

It also means permitting the Iraqi government to sell some of its oil to buy food and medicine for the Iraqi people under strict UN supervision. Starvation is not a card we wish to play, nor to permit Saddam to play against us.

That is the policy we are pursuing. For seven years it has held in check the Gulf's most disruptive and dangerous threat and helped maintain stability in a region vital to our national interest. But, as President Bill Clinton said last

week, whether that continues to be our strategy will be affected in no small measure by whether this agreement is honored.

LANGUAGE: ENGLISH

LOAD-DATE: March 2, 1998

Questions to Ask

How much of the GOI's own resources (from taxes, reserves, smuggling, oil-for-food contract kickbacks) are spent on education and health care? How much on the military? How much on palace construction?

Why does Baghdad consistently under-order foodstuffs? Why has it never allocated sufficient foodstuffs to meet the minimum calorie and protein targets recommended by the UN?

Child mortality rates in the North are below pre-War levels. There has long been a supplementary feeding program in the North. Due to the program's success, the SYG's report notes that those in need have dropped from a quarter million to under 80,000. Why has Baghdad refused to implement the SYG's recommendation for a similar program in the south/center?

Why won't the GOI allow NGO's to operate in the south/center as they do in the north?

The Special Rapporteur for Human Rights told the UN in 1999 that landmines placed by the regime between 1992 and 1997 have caused more than 15,000 casualties, of which 15% were children. Why doesn't Baghdad permit demining work in the south/center as is done in the North? Why does Baghdad oppose demining in the North (where significant progress has been made in agriculture and reforestation thanks to successful demining).

Would Iraq permit additional UN monitors in Iraq to ensure oil-for-food inputs are being used appropriately? If not, why not?

Why did the GOI refuse a visa to the new UN Special Rapporteur for Human Rights? Will the GOI allow him entry in the future? Why did it consistently refuse entry to former Special Rapporteur Max Van der Stoep (save for one visit in 1992)?

During the drought Iraq is currently experiencing, how was Saddam able to build the private lakes and water works around his palaces and Thar-Thar village?

Why did the GOI refuse entry to the UN's new High-Level Coordinator for Kuwait-Issues Yuliy Vorontsov?

The Human Rights Rapporteur points out that in Iraq "there is no freedom of speech or action since the mere suggestion that someone is not a supporter of the president carries the prospect

• Ask the Iraq Office —

have the Iraqis ordered any key water, sanitation food categories.

of the death penalty." In such a situation, is your source's assessment credible?

Why wouldn't the GOI allow Saybolt (oil industry analysts on contract to the UN) conduct a study on foreign investment in the oil sector (one of the recommendations of the Amorim humanitarian panel adopted in UNSCR 1284)?

Why has Iraq banned any inquiry by Saybolt into refinery needs? (The vast majority of smuggling involves gasoil, a refined petroleum product.)

Where do the new cars on the streets of Baghdad come from?

March 24. - Cummy

The UN just issued a report on the humanitarian situation in Iraq. It compares what the Secretary-General recommended in his February 1998 Supplementary Report and what the GOI has done since.

"The Supplementary Report recommended to increase the nutritional value of the food basket to 2,463 calories ... per day." Despite surge in revenues, Iraq is still not there; has resisted efforts to improve the ration basket. Still, OFF provides substantially increased calories per day than the pre-OFF era.

"The health sector, which includes the targeted nutrition program, despite having been given the largest additional sectoral allocation in the Supplementary Report, was in fact funded in Phase IV at a level less than Phase III, and only marginally higher than phase III level in phases V and VI." In contrast, in the North, "food, health repairs (?) and nutrition" were funded at a level comparable to what the SYG recommended.

Targeted nutrition: Supplementary Report proposed \$58.4 million per phase, targeting over a million Iraqi children and mothers. "Although funds were allocated starting with Phase IV, the majority of contracts ... were submitted starting with phase VI." At the end of last year, only \$22 million worth of contracts had been presented. In contrast, in the North, the programs have been fully implemented. Over a quarter million children started out in the program; now only 80,000 need this assistance. Child mortality lower than pre-war and dropping.

Report frequently cites lack of reliable country-wide data to draw conclusions about the impact of OFF in various sectors.

SYG plan called for education funding to be spent on general education and included rehabilitation of schools. GOI spent about 40% of available funds on higher education (and none on rehabilitation of school infrastructure).

Other points:

Distribution plan includes luxury busses for VIPs, musical door chimes. Committee just approved a contract for decorated ceramic tiles. Nothing wrong with tiles, but it does show an interesting sense of priorities.

OPTIONAL FORM 88 (7-90)

FAX TRANSMITTAL

of pages > 2

To	K Pollack	From	Betsy
Dept./Agency	hope some of this is useful	Phone #	
Fax #	456 9120	Fax #	

While UN is working hard at getting Iraq to distribute goods, and improvements have been made, more needs to be done.

Slow ordering: this is hard to do in simple terms. When a Phase ends, ordering against revenue earned in that phase continues until the money is spent. We are now in phase VII (Dec. 99-June 00), phase VI was May-Nov 99, Phase V was Nov. 98-May 99, Phase IV was May-Nov. 98. We are still seeing a trickle of Phase IV contracts. Iraq has not spent all the \$ it earned in 1998.

The first contract to spend Phase VII \$ was not presented until two months after the Phase started. Contracts for Phase VII are only just beginning to trickle in.

Despite all the talk about holds, roughly 90% of what is requested is approved. If Iraq would accept weapons inspectors to watch 1051 goods, more could be approved. Many holds are placed because poorly prepared contracts do not provide sufficient information on possible dual-use items. When additional information is received, dual-use concerns can often be resolved. In March 2000, the U.S. released holds on over \$200 million worth of goods via this process.

U.S. track record: created idea of OFF program in 1991. Iraq refused to accept until Dec. 1996; first OFF deliveries in March 1997. Not all problems in an economy devastated by caused by years of war and then sanctions have been addressed, but there have been great improvements in the two years of OFF.

Early phases Iraq exported about \$2 billion worth of oil per phase. Last phase exported \$7.4 billion. Slow ordering and distribution = no immediate impact of this revenue, but over time situation will improve at a faster and faster rate.

U.S. has supported Council steps to broaden and deepen OFF, allowing greater levels of exports and using the expanded funding to move OFF to sectors beyond just food and medicine.

Understanding that the oil sector is key, U.S. has supported first a special allocation in OFF funds for that sector; U.S. recently led successful effort to double that allocation.

1284: U.S. was active supporter. Streamlines ordering and approval processes, allows for local purchases, lifts ceiling on exports tied to humanitarian purchases. These improvements plus enhanced revenues will make a big difference in the humanitarian situation. GOI is also called upon to take a number of steps - will they?

IRAQ AND THE WEST

Ken
Need to discuss
B.A.

When sanctions don't work

BAGHDAD

Almost ten years of them have left Iraqis desperate and Saddam Hussein as defiant as ever

IT SEEMS a suicidal act: to climb into one of Baghdad's ancient taxis and announce that you are an American. The odds are that the driver has lost a comfortable desk-job and is now hunting fares, in a vehicle held together with duct tape and cardboard, to make ends meet. It is likely that a close relative has died during either the Gulf war or the nine subsequent years of sanctions, or that American jets have just bombed some corner of Iraq. Your driver has no reason to love the United States.

Yet most of Baghdad's taxi drivers seem more puzzled than angry. After asking for help to emigrate to Detroit, they invariably want to know how America, to their minds the embodiment of prosperity and opportunity, can wilfully reduce the people of Iraq to such misery.

In the corridors of the Pentagon and the State Department, American officials show equal bewilderment. After all, the villain of the piece is not America, but Saddam Hussein, Iraq's dictatorial president. He could, they point out, bring the saga to an end tomorrow by surrendering his stash of illicit arms or accounting for their disappearance. Yet they acknowledge that the United Nations' trade embargo, which was intended to pressure him to do so, has not had that effect. It has merely devastated the lives of ordinary Iraqis. Nor, they concede, has the humanitarian scheme that was designed to soften sanctions done as much good as had been hoped.

The embargo was imposed by the Security Council when the Iraqi army occupied Kuwait in 1990. It was meant to reduce Iraq to such ruin that Mr Hussein would have no choice but to withdraw his forces. Before matters got to that stage, the American-led coalition expelled Iraqi troops from Kuwait. Since Mr Hussein still possessed weapons of mass destruction, the sanctions were to be kept in place until he agreed to get rid of those weapons and show UN inspectors that he had done so.

Inspections were, at first, hugely successful: Mr Hussein was forced to scrap his nuclear programme. When the UN inspectors

began closing in on the remains of his industrial-sized biological-weapons programme, however, Mr Hussein dug his heels in. After America and Britain bombed Iraq in 1998, he refused to readmit the inspectors or make any concession over his nastiest weapons.

Unicef estimates that 500,000 under-fives died between 1991 and 1998



With the Security Council split over what to do next, the sanctions remained in place.

The original terms of the embargo banned all trade with Iraq and froze all Iraqi assets overseas. In theory, food and medicine were exempt; but without export earnings, Iraq could not pay for imports, so the gesture was meaningless. Trade (the sum of exports and imports) was equivalent to 44% of GDP in 1989. In 1991, according to the IMF, Iraq's economy shrank by nearly two-thirds.

Even that figure understates the scale of

the collapse. Every sector of the Iraqi economy depended to some extent on imports. The simplest of textile mills could not function without foreign-made parts; farmers needed imported pumps to run their irrigation systems; and the government could not mend the war-damaged telephone, electricity, road, water and sewerage networks without material from abroad. The impact of sanctions was intensified because Iraq's infrastructure had already suffered damage and neglect during the country's eight-year war with Iran; and because Mr Hussein, when he got money, preferred to spend it on defence and magnificence.

Factories and businesses began shutting down, pushing people out of work. Government employees remained on the job, but inflation reduced their salaries to a pittance. To this day, civil servants earn about 5,000 Iraqi dinars a month—\$2.50 at the present exchange rate. Engineers, scientists and academics have abandoned their professions to hawk cigarettes, drive taxis or fish for a living. Prostitution and crime have increased so dramatically that the government has instituted the death penalty for pimping, solicitation and many categories of theft.

Every Iraqi town now boasts fleamarkets where down-at-heel members of the middle class can sell off the trappings of their former lives: dog-eared copies of *Life* magazine, broken transistor radios, jewellery, watches—even door knobs, plumbing fixtures and wiring stripped from their homes. Nine cars in ten have a cracked windscreen, because no one can afford to replace the glass.

Sanctions impinge on the lives of all Iraqis every moment of the day. In Basra, Iraq's second city, power flickers on and off unpredictably in the hours it is available. It can take ten minutes to get a line for a local telephone call. Smoke from jerry-rigged generators and vehicles hangs over the town in a thick cloud. The tap-water causes diarrhoea, but few can afford the bottled sort. Because the sewers have broken down, pools of stinking muck have leached through to the surface all over town. That effluent, combined with pollution upstream, has killed most of the fish in the Shatt al-Arab river and has left the re-

IRAQ AND THE WEST

mainder unsafe to eat. The government can no longer spray for sand-flies or mosquitoes, so insects have proliferated, along with the diseases they carry.

Most of the once-elaborate array of government services have vanished. The archaeological service has taken to burying painstakingly excavated ruins for want of the proper preservative chemicals. The government-maintained irrigation and drainage network has crumbled, leaving much of Iraq's prime agricultural land either too dry or too salty to cultivate. Sheep and cattle, no longer shielded by government vaccination programmes, have succumbed to pests and diseases by the hundreds of thousands. Many teachers in the state-run schools do not bother to show up for work any more. Those who do must teach listless, malnourished children, often without benefit of books, desks or even blackboards.

No sutures, no disinfectant

Hospitals display the effects of the embargo at their most tragic. Iraq's health services, like its schools, were once the best in the region. Now most hospital lifts have ceased to function, so trauma patients have to be carried up and down the stairs. Cleaning staff often lack disinfectant to wash the floors. The director of Basra's largest hospital says he must do without sutures and blood for transfusions for weeks at a time. Medicine, too, is rationed. Whole wards of children with leukaemia go unattended, since the different drugs needed to treat them are rarely available at the same time. The senior gynaecologist explains that 90% of the pregnant women he cares for are anaemic because of malnutrition. Diseases such as cholera and typhoid, which had been eradicated before 1990, have reappeared.

The Iraqi authorities, doubtless with an eye to the headlines, recently claimed that more than a million people had died as a re-

sult of the embargo. But the more cautious studies of foreign researchers show horrific rises in infant mortality, malnutrition and disease. An analysis of NGO health surveys conducted by Richard Garfield, a public-health expert at Columbia University, found that at least 100,000 (and probably as many as 227,000) children under five had died between 1991 and 1998 as a result of the Gulf war and sanctions. That works out at between 26 and 60 deaths every day among infants alone. A recent Unicef report estimated that, over the same period, some 500,000 under-fives had died.

At times, American officials have declared that such deaths are a regrettable but necessary feature of the effort to get Mr Hussein to behave. It is because he will not budge that his people have to suffer. But more often America, along with the other members of the Security Council, has acknowledged the need to relieve the burden innocent Iraqis bear for their leader's intransigence. As early as 1991, the Security Council approved a plan to allow Iraq to export some oil in order to buy food and medicine under UN supervision. But Mr Hussein, presumably holding out for a complete lifting of sanctions, refused to co-operate for five years. So the oil-for-food scheme, as the plan is known, did not even get under way until December 1996.

Originally, the Security Council authorised Iraq to sell \$1.32 billion-worth of oil ev-

ery six months to cover humanitarian imports. Large as the sum sounds, it provided little more than a dollar a month to cover food and medicine for each Iraqi, not to mention repairs to infrastructure. The cumbersome bureaucracy imposed by the council and the inefficiency and recalcitrance of Iraqi officials made the system even less effective. Once oil started flowing, it took over three months for the first shipment of food to arrive in Iraq.

In 1998, faced with such obvious shortcomings, the council raised the limit on humanitarian purchases to \$3.4 billion. The situation scarcely improved. Iraq's oil pumps and pipelines had fallen into such disrepair that it could not export enough oil to meet its new allowance, despite having the world's second-largest reserves. Although the council eventually allowed the import of spare parts to improve capacity, bringing these in proved even slower and more bureaucratic than importing food.

Iraq reached its export target in late 1999, thanks largely to rising oil prices. But the oil-for-food programme is not out of the woods yet. Since last December the flow of oil has fallen, at least in part because the oil-industry's hardware has deteriorated further. At the urging of Kofi Annan, the UN secretary-general, the Security Council has just agreed to double Iraq's budget for spare parts.

Even when a decent amount of money is coming in, oil-for-food does not work as well as it should. Goods take ages to get to Iraq; so far, only about half of what has been ordered has arrived (see chart). Then there are delays in distribution. The past two heads of the UN's humanitarian mission in Iraq have resigned, along with several of their junior colleagues, complaining that the programme is hopelessly ineffective.


Whose fault?

America blames all these failures on Iraq, and with some reason. Mr Hussein has manipulated the programme, welcoming the fact that if money for food and medicine comes in from outside, he no longer needs to spend his own government's money on such things—diverting it instead to rocket engines, or to comforts for himself and his henchmen. Under the programme, Iraqi officials place the orders: in one instance they did not bother to order nutritional supplements for children and pregnant mothers, although money had been set aside for them. Some of the items ordered (such as an MRI machine; a high-tech scanner used in medicine) are scandalous in a country that is short of aspirin and swabs.

However, UN officials insist that the glitches result not from malice as much as bureaucratic incompetence—and that they are sometimes deliberately misinterpreted. The State Department claims, for example, that the Iraqi regime left some \$200m-worth of oil-for-food medicine simply sitting in


A chapter of delays

Use of Iraq's authorised oil revenue, \$bn



In Basra, pools of stinking muck have leached through to the surface all over town

The State Department points out that Saddam Hussein could end this state of affairs tomorrow



warehouses. But the UN's public reports clearly state that this had either just arrived, or had failed quality-control tests, or could not be used because of lack of complementary items. The Iraqi authorities held back only 15% of their usable stock as a buffer, rather than the 25% recommended by the World Health Organisation—a risky tactic, since oil-for-food is plagued by such frequent delays.

The State Department also cites the poor performance of the oil-for-food programme in the part of Iraq under Mr Hussein's control, compared with its success in the Kurdish-run areas in the north of the country. American officials quote UN figures that show infant mortality declining in the north since the implementation of oil-for-food, but continuing to rise in the government's territory. For this discrepancy, though, UN staff provide a host of reasonable explanations: the north has a healthier economy thanks to widespread smuggling, receives more aid from NGOs, gets more oil for food per person and does not depend, as the south does, on a crumbling irrigation system.

Even if Iraqi officials are deliberately gumming up the oil-for-food programme, so are their American and British counterparts, by abusing their power to block suspicious imports. Oil-for-food contracts worth \$1.7 billion—more than 10% of all orders placed—are currently in limbo, mainly because the goods in question might be used for military rather than humanitarian purposes. There is, of course, no reason to trust Mr Hussein an inch; he would not hesitate to smuggle dual-use items through the oil-for-food scheme. But among such supposedly threatening purchases was a shipment of ambulances, held up by America for fear the armed forces might appropriate them. Many contracts for pumps, tyres and even soap remain frozen to this day. Other restrictions seem hopelessly arbitrary: spare parts allowed at one oilfield are banned at another.

Despite countless pleas from the secre-

tary-general to hurry contracts along, the value of goods placed on hold has risen since the beginning of the year. Some items, such as bulldozers and crop-dusters, certainly could be put to nefarious use. But instead of banning them outright, UN officials argue, America could settle for a monitoring scheme to guard against misuse. UN inspectors already oversee the distribution of food and medicine and check to make sure that Iraq is using the spare parts for its oil industry as intended. The same system could easily be extended to other suspect items. Since Iraq foots the bill for such supervision out of its oil sales, money is no object. But America's representatives on the Security Council are dragging their feet.

Gaping loopholes

Although, in theory, no goods should leave or enter Iraq without the Security Council's approval, the UN has not set up machinery to monitor what crosses its borders. So the Iraqi authorities are able to ship out tankers of oil through Turkey and Iran and import what they like with the proceeds, unhindered by committees or inspectors of any kind. For every legitimate load entering Iraq from Turkey, as many as 200 pass without permission. This clandestine trade may not be enough to raise the living standards of ordinary Iraqis, but it certainly puts soap and tyres within Mr Hussein's reach, not to mention more luxurious or sinister items.

Indeed, while his country is in desperate straits, Mr Hussein shows no eagerness to spend on his own people the money he gets from illicit oil exports. Instead, he has built several new palaces for himself. He has also acquired, for his police force, a fleet of spanking new Hyundai patrol cars that certainly did not come in under oil-for-food. Friends of the regime have plenty of money to spend on computers with the latest Pentium III chips, which are sold at prohibitive prices in several shops in Baghdad. Yet, under sanctions, no computers with a Pentium chip of

any sort may be imported for Iraqi schools lest they fall into the army's hands.

American ships try to intercept the tankers that spirit out Iraqi oil through the Gulf. But the United States has made no attempt to stop the illegal trade with Turkey, in the hope of assuaging Turkish misgivings about America's policy on Iraq. Indeed, to Turkey's great satisfaction, the Security Council recently scrapped an Anglo-Dutch scheme to close this loophole. How can such nonchalance about what actually enters Iraq be squared with such zeal to dissect each contract that passes through the UN's sanctions committee?

America has also resisted changes to the regulations that would allow the UN to spend cash in Iraq. At the moment, all oil-for-food goods come from outside the country, to avoid putting money in Mr Hussein's hands. But that also means that UN food imports, for example, undercut Iraqi farmers, driving many of them to abandon their fields and so exacerbating the shortage of food. The UN also cannot spend money training Iraqi doctors or teachers—an obstacle no amount of imported medicines or textbooks can make up for.

To the extent that it works, the oil-for-food scheme has turned Iraq into a massive welfare scheme. The UN supervises the pumping of Iraq's oil and the distribution of the proceeds, while suspending all other economic activity. Even with limitless resources and no interference from outside, a bunch of UN bureaucrats is no substitute for a working economy.

The programme has worked, up to a point. It has stopped Iraqis starving to death or succumbing to epidemics. To improve the humanitarian situation beyond that basic level, oil-for-food's administrators have had to begin the much more controversial work of repairing Iraq's infrastructure. That has brought them into conflict not only with the more hawkish members of the Security Council, but also with the very aim of the embargo. The UN's own sanctions regime runs counter to the UN's humanitarian programme to rebuild Iraq.

As Hans von Sponeck, the just-departed head of the UN's humanitarian programme in Iraq, points out, the basic problem lies with tying ordinary Iraqis' well-being to questions of disarmament. The Security Council has implicitly acknowledged the injustice of that link by creating the oil-for-food programme to mitigate its worst effects.

Sanctions remain the world's only leverage over a ruthless and bellicose tyrant. Yet almost ten years into the embargo, they have not budged him. Instead of clinging to the forlorn hope that Mr Hussein will live up to his legal and moral responsibilities, perhaps America and Britain need to rethink a policy that has so embittered and impoverished his people.



How Economic Freedom Drives Prosperity

By Gerald P. Driscoll, Jr., PhD

Why do some economies flourish, while others lag? Although many theories exist, the findings of the recently released *2000 Index of Economic Freedom* suggest that high rates of economic growth and prosperity can be traced to high levels of economic freedom.

Since 1995, the *Index of Economic Freedom* has offered the international community an annual in-depth examination of the factors that contribute most directly to economic freedom and prosperity. Economic freedom is defined as the absence of government coercion or constraint on the production, distribution, or consumption of goods and services beyond the extent necessary for citizens to protect and maintain liberty itself.

By examining ten key measures of economic freedom, my colleagues and I have been able to document and substantiate the relationship between economic freedom and economic prosperity. Our research demonstrates that governments which pursue policies that expand economic freedom systematically produce higher rates of economic growth and more overall prosperity than governments which curb economic liberty.

Taken together, these ten key measures represent a roadmap for political leaders striving to foster a more prosperous economy for their citizens. The ten factors are:

Trade Policy. Government deterrents to the free flow of trade, such as tariffs or import quotas, have a direct – and adverse – impact on economic freedom. High barriers to trade, which inhibit the exchange of goods between nations, limit economic freedom, while low barriers to trade enhance economic freedom.

Fiscal Burden of Government. The greater the government's overall burden on the economy – measured by the level of taxes and government expenditures – the lower the nation's economic freedom.

Government Intervention in the Economy. Governments with high rates of consumption

as a percentage of GDP, extensive ownership of business and property, and high levels of intervention in the economy curtail the overall

economic freedom of their people.

Monetary Policy. When a government's monetary policy facilitates market pricing, individuals in that country enjoy greater economic freedom. Inflation, a sign of misguided monetary policy, not only confiscates wealth, it also distorts prices, misallocates resources, undermines a free society and thwarts economic freedom.

A well-functioning legal system adhering to the rule of law and respect for private property, including intellectual property, create the indispensable foundations for economic growth.

Capital Flows and Foreign Investment Policy. Government restrictions on foreign investment limit the inflow of capital and thus hamper economic freedom. By contrast, little or no restriction on foreign investment enhances economic freedom.

Banking. In most countries, banks provide essential financial services that facilitate economic growth. When governments exert a high level of control over banks, financial institutions are restricted from allocating credit and providing other services that enhance growth. Therefore, the more a government restricts banking activity, the lower the level of economic freedom.

Wage and Price Controls. In a market economy, the price system allocates resources to their highest and most productive uses. Government mandates on wages and prices restrict economic activity and curtail economic freedom.

Property Rights. A well-functioning legal system adhering to the rule of law and respect

for private property, including intellectual property, create the indispensable foundations for economic growth. As Professor Robert Barro

of Harvard University explained: "If property rights are insecure – for example, because of high crime rates or high rates of taxation or high chances of government expropriation – people tend to work less and invest little."

Regulation. Government regulations that impose an undue burden on business through stringent licensing requirements, excessive labour regulations, and oppressive environmental regulations limit economic freedom and hamper economic growth.

Black Markets. The presence of a black market indicates an activity which is heavily taxed, overly regulated, or simply outlawed by government. The more vigorous a country's black market, the lower the level of economic freedom.

According to our research, over the past year, nearly twice as many countries expanded economic freedom as contracted it. Of the 161 countries rated, 57 granted their citizens more economic liberty, while 34 imposed new restrictions.

It is no accident that nations with high levels of economic freedom experience higher rates of growth, while those countries that restrict economic freedom are mired in poverty. Interestingly, our research found little or no correlation between the level of foreign aid and the level of economic growth, despite the good intentions of donor states. The evidence suggests that no amount of foreign aid can compensate for a lack of economic freedom.

At the dawn of the new century, it is critical that our leaders remember one of the most important lessons of the old century: Economic freedom is the cornerstone of economic prosperity.

Dr. O'Driscoll is Director of the Center for International Trade and Economics at the Heritage Foundation in Washington, D.C. This essay is adapted from *The 2000 Index of Economic Freedom*, which he co-authored with Kim R. Holmes and Melanie Kirkpatrick. To obtain a copy, please see the Heritage website at www.heritage.org or call + 202/546-4400.

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head:

People continue to buy Saddam's oil

2. unique sanctions regime (greatest humanitarian effort ever by UN?) ☒

Do history of program

Saddam's perfidy, efforts to obstruct

states on how much oil he's allowed to sell.

3. What would happen if we lifted sanctions? 1284 etc.
oil for food $\rightarrow$ oil for tanks

Saddam the villain section

4.

~~Start~~

~~We are concerned~~

~~It's~~ Saddam clearly ~~has~~ disdains his own people - any path he suggest for ending suffering is likely to multiply it. Because it is not an end in itself, it is a means

Start a counter-campaign

North/South differences

some have argued there are other reasons -
we'll let em in and we'll see.

tough questions/challenges.

① lead

② unique sanctions regime —

have to spend do history
perversions
outrages

Completely unique sanctions regime
Iraq allowed to sell ~~for~~ oil for food

require Iraq to spend on one

They Iraq cares about least
they may end up w/ less to eat.

distinctive
features
of
sanctions

① So why are they still suffering:

obstinate
smuggling
NGO
w/ ~~some~~ 2
palaces.

②

What would happen if we lifted them.
he would spend oil revenues on anything he wanted
- oil for food become oil for tanks.

* all starts on how much oil he's allowed to
sell.

compare to before sanction.

Human rights —

we

④

Sharp questions at end
country campaign — ~~get~~ same access
to north?

Op-Ed Response to French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine
on Oil-for-Food in Iraq

Recently, various diplomats attending the UN opening session chided proponents of continued sanctions against Iraq for being insensitive to the plight of the Iraqi people. The people of Iraq are indeed suffering today. But the cause is not sanctions. It is the policies of Saddam Hussein, who seems to have a standing order to let his people suffer. Be clear about the purpose of the sanctions – and the conditions for lifting the sanctions.

Assumptions of those who want to end sanctions; consequences of ending sanctions. When the UN first imposed sanctions against Iraq, immediately after its invasion of Kuwait, it exempted food, medicine, and other humanitarian supplies. Soon after the Gulf War, the United States took the lead in proposing that Iraq be allowed to sell controlled quantities of its oil to pay for these critical humanitarian needs. For five long years, Saddam refused to do so, hoping to manipulate international opinion by perpetuating the misery of his people.

Now that the oil-for-food program is finally being implemented, it is making a real difference in the lives of the Iraqi people. This year, oil-for-food is expected to generate nearly \$7 billion for use by Iraq to purchase food, medicine, and humanitarian goods. The food supply in Iraq has grown, providing the average Iraqi citizen with approximately 2,030 calories a day, an amount exceeding the UN recommended daily minimum. In fact, the amount of food and medicine Iraq has been able to purchase under this program is greater than all of the humanitarian aid the UN has provided to all the other countries in the world over the last three years – combined.

Even so, Saddam continues to hinder the program and deprive all his people of its benefits. find more facts of this sort. Today, according to the UN, one third of all the medicine that has arrived in Iraq since the start of the oil-for-food program – more than \$200 million worth – sits undistributed in Iraqi warehouses. -Despite a 50 percent increase in oil revenues, Iraq has increased the amount earmarked for food purchases by just 16 percent. Despite infant

malnutrition, Iraq has spent less than 40 percent of the \$25 million that has been set aside for nutritional supplies – and until just a few weeks ago, had gone more than 18 months without ordering a single nutritional supplement.

very powerful: “buys less than he can; then smuggles it out of his country, and out of the mouths of babes, to acquire more money to buy the loyalty of his corrupt coterie of aids. Not only is Saddam depriving his own people of food, he is selling it illicitly for his own profit. Baby milk sold to Iraq through the oil-for-food program has been found in markets throughout the Gulf region. Recently, Kuwaiti authorities **stopped** a shipment coming out of Iraq that included baby powder, baby bottles, and other nursing materials for resale overseas. **And just last week, the Kuwaiti Coast Guard seized three cargo vessels that were trying to smuggle more than 600 tons of food and foodstuffs out of Iraq.**

And we know where that money is going. Since the end of the Gulf War, Saddam has built 48 grand palaces – complete with gold-plated faucets and man-made lakes and waterfalls – for himself. Five months ago, Iraqi officials inaugurated “Saddamiat al Tharthar” – a sprawling lakeside resort for high government officials that contains stadiums, an amusement park, hospitals, parks, and new homes, at a cost of hundreds of millions of dollars. Top military officials are provided with extra monthly food rations, a Mercedes, and stipends in the thousands of dollars – while most Iraqis are forced to live on less than \$3.50 a month. Iraq has even spent \$10 million on two pieces of equipment -- an MRI machine and a gamma knife, which is used for complicated neurosurgery – solely for use by Saddam’s elite. All of this is obscene.

very powerful: It’s telling that, according to UNICEF, in Northern Iraq – which is under the same sanctions as the rest of Iraq, but where the UN directly administers humanitarian assistance – child mortality rates have fallen below pre-Gulf War levels, and children are living better lives.

But in southern and central Iraq – where the Iraqi government controls the program – child mortality rates have more than doubled.

Opponents of our current policy need to consider the alternative. Under sanctions, Saddam must sell the commodity he values most – Iraq's oil – to meet the needs of those he values least – the people of his country. If sanctions were lifted, Saddam could spend his oil wealth on anything he wanted. Oil for food would likely become oil for tanks. Iraq's people could well have less to eat. Iraq's neighbors would certainly have more to fear.

Saddam's priorities are clear: palaces for himself, perks for his cronies, prisons for his people, and weapons to destroy Iraq's citizens and neighbors. Meanwhile, the United Nations Security Council is unanimous in its judgment that Iraq has not fulfilled its obligations to the international community. It has not disarmed. It has not forsworn the development of weapons of mass destruction. It has not renounced the use of chemical and biological weapons. It does not respect the international border with Kuwait, and has not accounted for Kuwaiti prisoners of war. It has not stopped the repression, torture, and abuse of its own people, from Kurds in the North to Shi'as in the South. And it has not demonstrated it can live at peace with its neighbors.

There is no conflict here between the demands of sensitivity and security, no trade off between feeding the people of Iraq and freeing the Gulf region from fear. In fact, the only realistic way to achieve both goals is to encourage a new regime in Iraq that will meet the needs of its people and its obligations to the world. When that new regime emerges, the United States is prepared to do our part to help foster economic development, restore Iraqi civil society, replenish the middle class, rebuild Iraq's health and education sectors, and welcome Iraq back into the community of nations. We should work together, with patience and determination, until that day when we can not only lift sanctions, but truly lift the lives of the Iraqi people.

hit them hard with questions.

^U.N. body accuses Iraq of rights violations

GENEVA, April 18 (Reuters) - The top U.N. human rights body on Tuesday strongly condemned Iraq for alleged grave violations including killings which it said had led to an "all-pervasive repression and widespread terror."

The 53-member U.N. Commission on Human Rights, holding its annual session in Geneva, adopted a resolution on Iraq tabled by the European Union and co-sponsored by countries including the United States.

The vote was 32 countries in favour of the text, with no countries voting against it and 21 abstaining from the vote, including big powers China and Russia.

Portugal's ambassador Alvaro Mendonca e Moura presented the resolution on behalf of the 15-member EU. Seven EU members have voting rights at this year's six-week U.N. session.

The EU text slammed Iraq for widespread use of the death penalty and suppressing freedom of thought and association "through fear of arrest, imprisonment, executions, expulsions, house demolitions and other sanctions."

It denounced executions "including political killings and the so-called clean-out of prisons," as well as arbitrary arrests and widespread, systematic torture.

A U.S. statement read out to the session said: "Mass human rights violations are being perpetrated by the regime of Saddam Hussein.

"The cause of suffering is due to the reprehensible behaviour of the Iraqi regime which systemtically denies badly needed food and medical supplies to its people.

"Instead Saddam Hussein spends wealth on palaces and military hardware which stand as monuments to his failure."

Russia said the resolution was "one-sided and biased."

"We believe it is unfair to reproach the government of Iraq for refusing to cooperate with humanitarian agencies and being discriminatory in distribution of humanitarian assistance," a Russian statement said.

"On the other hand, we believe Iraq still must do a lot in order to guarantee enjoyment of univeral standards of human rights," it said.

RB-- 04/18/00 07:07:15

-----Original Message-----

From: Rosshirt, Thomas M. (SPCHW)
Sent: Monday, April 17, 2000 4:52 PM
To: Pollack, Kenneth M. (NESA)
Subject: RE: rapporteur [UNCLASSIFIED]

so what is the name of the rapporteur we're talking about, what's the document we're quoting from and when was it released?

thanks,

tom

-----Original Message-----

From: Pollack, Kenneth M. (NESA)
Sent: Monday, April 17, 2000 4:47 PM
To: Rosshirt, Thomas M. (SPCHW)
Subject: RE: rapporteur [UNCLASSIFIED]

The Human Rights rapporteur has been barred entrance since he was appointed. Used to be Van Der Stoel. Now a Cypriot named Mavormatis. They collect their evidence as best they can from defectors, intelligence, neighboring countries, visitors to Iraq, etc. No one disputes their judgments -- including the French and Russians.

-----Original Message-----

From: Rosshirt, Thomas M. (SPCHW)
Sent: Monday, April 17, 2000 4:22 PM
To: Pollack, Kenneth M. (NESA)
Subject: rapporteur [UNCLASSIFIED]

I'm reading things that say the UN rapporteur has been denied entry into Iraq since 1992. So where are the recent reports coming from? Could you name and date the document they come from? (The one that says there is no freedom of speech, etc.)

thanks,

tom

SINS

!

Rosshirt, Thomas M. (SPCHW)

From: Pollack, Kenneth M. (NESA)
Sent: Friday, April 14, 2000 6:16 PM
To: Rosshirt, Thomas M. (SPCHW)
Subject: RE: categories for Iraq sanctions op-ed [UNCLASSIFIED]

I wish.

Here is stuff on War Crimes. It is all unclassified and although it merely names the Iraqi government, Saddam was responsible for all of them. I pulled it from a State cable demarching governments.

- Ken

-- AS PART OF OUR JOINT EFFORTS TO ADVANCE HUMAN RIGHTS AT THE 56TH U.N. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN GENEVA, THE UNITED STATES BELIEVES THE ACCUMULATION OF EVIDENCE POINTING TO WIDESPREAD CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY BY THE IRAQI LEADERSHIP WARRANTS INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE. WE BELIEVE SUCH RESPONSE IS OVERDUE AND THAT THE APPROPRIATE RESPONSE IS FORMATION OF AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL TO ADDRESS CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, WAR CRIMES

AND POSSIBLE GENOCIDE COMMITTED BY SADDAM HUSSEIN AND HIS TOP ASSOCIATES.

-- THE GRAVITY OF THE WAR CRIMES AND HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS ALLEGED AGAINST IRAQ'S LEADERSHIP IS WELL KNOWN. THE QUESTION IS WHETHER THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY THAT IS CONCERNED AND DEDICATED TO ADDRESSING HUMAN RIGHTS AND WAR CRIMES MATTERS WILL ADDRESS SUCH CRIMES ON A DISPASSIONATE, LEGAL BASIS. THE UNITED STATES BELIEVES IT SHOULD. WE SOLICIT YOUR GOVERNMENT'S REACTION TO THIS SUGGESTION AND POTENTIAL SUPPORT FOR SUCH ACTION AT THE UNCHR.

RECORD OF THE IRAQI LEADERSHIP

-- ALTHOUGH WELL KNOWN, A SUMMARY OF THE IRAQI LEADERSHIP'S RECORD IS APPROPRIATE:

-- THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT KILLED BETWEEN 50,000 AND 100,000 IRAQI CIVILIANS DURING THE "ANFAL" CAMPAIGN IN THE LATE 1980'S. THIS INCLUDED THE 1988 USE OF CHEMICAL AGENTS ON THE CIVILIAN POPULATION IN THE EASTERN CITY OF HALABJA IN WHICH THE IRAQI AIR FORCE DROPPED CHEMICAL WEAPONS THAT KILLED APPROXIMATELY 5,000 PEOPLE.

-- THE IRAQI REGIME KILLED MORE THAN A THOUSAND CIVILIANS IN KUWAIT ALONE DURING ITS INVASION AND OCCUPATION IN 1990-91.

-- DURING THE IRAN/IRAQ WAR, THE IRAQI REGIME KILLED AT LEAST 5,000 IRANIS BY CHEMICAL WEAPONS ALONE, ACCORDING TO WELL-DOCUMENTED OFFICIAL IRANIAN SOURCES. THE IRAQI REGIME ALSO REPORTEDLY KILLED SEVERAL THOUSAND IRANIAN PRISONERS OF WAR.

-- CRIMES OF THE IRAQI LEADERSHIP ARE CONTINUING. FOR ALMOST A DECADE, THE IRAQI REGIME HAS BEEN KILLING CIVILIANS AND CARRYING OUT A CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE MARSH ARABS IN SOUTHERN IRAQ, WHICH HAS INCLUDED DRYING AND DESTROYING THE MARSHES ON WHICH THEIR LIVES AND CULTURE DEPEND.

-- THE IRAQI REGIME ALSO CONTINUES TO CONDUCT "ETHNIC CLEANSING" CAMPAIGNS IN THE NORTH, INCLUDING IN SUCH KEY CITIES AS KIRKUK, KHANAQIN, AND SINJAR, FROM WHICH LOCAL NON-ARAB ETHNIC GROUPS ARE FORCIBLY REMOVED AND REPLACED BY ETHNIC ARAB POPULATIONS.

THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE

-- PREVIOUS UNCHR RESOLUTIONS ON IRAQ HAVE STRONGLY CONDEMNED THE IRAQI REGIME'S "SYSTEMATIC, WIDESPREAD AND EXTREMELY GRAVE VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW." SIMILAR LANGUAGE APPEARED IN THE 1999, 1998 AND 1997 RESOLUTIONS.

-- SADDAM HUSSEIN'S GOVERNMENT HAS FAILED TO RESPOND TO ANY OF THE UNCHR'S CALLS THAT IT STOP VIOLATING INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, AND THAT IT END THE ABILITY OF THOSE RESPONSIBLE TO ACT WITH IMPUNITY.

-- UN SPECIAL RAPPOORTEUR MAX VAN DER STOEL IN HIS FEBRUARY 1999 REPORT FOUND "GRAVE VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS" AGAINST IRAQIS LIVING IN THE SOUTHERN MARSHES, INCLUDING WIDESPREAD ATTACKS AGAINST CIVILIANS. HE SAID THESE ATTACKS WERE REPORTEDLY CARRIED OUT BY SADDAM'S SON QUSAY SADDAM HUSSEIN AND SADDAM'S COUSIN ALI HASSAN AL-MAJID, THE INFAMOUS "CHEMICAL ALI" RESPONSIBLE FOR CHEMICAL ATTACKS AGAINST THE IRAQI KURDS IN THE 1980'S AND WAR CRIMES AGAINST THE KUWAITI PEOPLE IN 1990.

-- THE SPECIAL RAPPOORTEUR FOUND THERE WAS A CAMPAIGN OF "INTERNAL DEPORTATION AIMED AT THE FORCED RELOCATION OF THE NON-ARAB POPULATION, ESPECIALLY THE KURDS, TURKMEN AND ASSYRIANS LIVING IN KIRKUK" AND OTHER DISTRICTS.

-- THE SPECIAL RAPPOORTEUR CONCLUDED THAT "THE GRAVITY OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN IRAQ HAD FEW COMPARISONS IN THE WORLD SINCE THE END OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR. WITHOUT FIRM DETERMINATION ON THE PART OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO RESPOND SUBSTANTIALLY AND MEANINGFULLY TO THE

EXTREMELY SERIOUS VIOLATIONS REFERRED TO IN THIS REPORT, THE TRADITION OF IMPUNITY WHICH PREVAILS IN IRAQ WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY CONTINUE."

-- REPEATED CALLS BY THE UNCHR AND THE SPECIAL RAPPOORTEUR FOR THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT TO ADMIT HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORS HAVE FAILED YEAR AFTER YEAR. THERE IS NO PROSPECT MONITORS WILL EVER BE ALLOWED INTO IRAQ.

-----Original Message-----

From: Rosshirt, Thomas M. (SPCHW)
Sent: Friday, April 14, 2000 6:01 PM

To: Pollack, Kenneth M. (NESA) -
Subject: RE: categories for Iraq sanctions op-ed [UNCLASSIFIED]

No problem. This will hold for next week, unless Saddam dies over the weekend.

Tom

-----Original Message-----

From: Pollack, Kenneth M. (NESA)
Sent: Friday, April 14, 2000 5:45 PM
To: Rosshirt, Thomas M. (SPCHW)
Subject: RE: categories for Iraq sanctions op-ed [UNCLASSIFIED]

Tom:

Unfortunately, I have two Iran crises and one Iraq crisis I am handling right now. I probably won't be able to get to this till Monday. That said, State is faxing me over more stuff which I will walk down to you as soon as I get it.

- Ken

-----Original Message-----

From: Rosshirt, Thomas M. (SPCHW)
Sent: Friday, April 14, 2000 5:05 PM
To: Pollack, Kenneth M. (NESA)
Subject: categories for Iraq sanctions op-ed [UNCLASSIFIED]

Ken:

Here are eight categories that we will need to articulate and illustrate in this op-ed. I need help from you on each one.

Thanks,

Tom

- * Saddam's sins against his neighbors.
- * The purpose of sanctions; conditions for lifting them.
- * conditions in Iraq - economy and public health
- * characterize the calls for lifting sanctions "sanctions aren't working."
- * assumptions of anti-sanctions position
- * likely consequences of lifting sanctions
- * Saddam purposefully withholding food and medicine from his people, corrupting the program.
- * U.S. humanitarian response

notes on iraq op-ed

Nothing is more dangerous to international peace and stability than the failure to recognize and oppose evil. evil: the quest for power at any price in principles or national priorities.

This man is evil - ferociously evil. If he had the power of Hitler, he would do the damage of Hitler. (cite the UN rapporteur).

Don't forget who you're dealing with. List of sins of Saddam. Now the outrage is diminished because memories of his horrors have faded, because we have kept him in his box, because we have slapped sanctions on him.

He is purposely withholding food, water, health care

"Why no expenditures for food

We have to resist this back door effort to acquire WMD as strongly as we resisted his earlier, more obvious efforts, as strongly as we resisted his invasion and occupation of Kuwait.

"When sanctions don't work" Let's be clear: **the point of the sanctions** is to keep Saddam from using oil revenues to fund the rebuilding of his weapons of mass destruction.

Berger Op-ed
Rosshirt
Tuesday

This spring in Baghdad, in the midst of the worst drought in fifty years, word has gone out to Iraqi farmers to cut back on rice planting, and not to plant summer crops without permission from the Ministry of Irrigation. Meanwhile, as the farmers forego their planting, and Iraq blames hunger on UN sanctions, water has been found to fill Saddam's man-made lakes, his VIP water parks, and the reservoirs in his hometown of Tikrit.

By obstructing UN relief efforts, refusing to order nutritional supplements, even smuggling baby formula out of the country for hard currency to build his palaces – Saddam has carefully stage-managed the humanitarian suffering of his people, and used the spectacle of their hardship as diplomatic leverage to seek the removal of sanctions.

Yet ending sanctions on Iraq will not ease the suffering of the Iraqi people. The UN sanctions regime does not outlaw exports from Iraq; it encourages them. It does not block deliveries of food and medicine to the Iraqi people; it facilitates them. It is not designed to inflict suffering on the Iraqi people; it is designed to limit Saddam's ability to inflict suffering on his people and their neighbors – by denying him the revenues he needs to rebuild his military, ^{and} reconstitute his weapons of mass destruction, ~~repress his people and threaten his neighbors.~~

The United States is as eager as anyone to ease human suffering in Iraq. But we have to act with a full account of the facts: why sanctions were imposed in the first place, how they target Saddam, ^{but spare} ~~and not his people~~, and what is likely to happen if we lift them. Let me address each in turn.

As all sides understand ~~very well~~, sanctions were imposed on Iraq by the UN Security Council at the close of the Gulf War to urge Saddam disarm and to keep him from rebuilding his military.

Of course, ^{the UN} ~~neither the United States nor our allies~~ ^{never} ~~ever~~ intended to punish the Iraqi people for the actions of Saddam. That is why the United States took the lead in sponsoring the oil-for-food program – the largest humanitarian program in UN history – that allows Iraq to export oil, channel the revenues in to a UN escrow account, and draw from the account for purchases of food, medicine and other humanitarian supplies. That has been the distinguishing feature of this sanctions regime: it prohibited Saddam from spending the revenues on what he cared ~~most~~ ^{least} about – rebuilding his military – and limited him to spending it on what he cared ~~least~~ ^{most} about -- food and medicine and humanitarian supplies for the Iraqi people.

Saddam rejected the oil for food program for five long years – preferring to deny his people the food and medicine it made available. But now – three years after the Iraqi regime acquiesced to oil for food, Iraqi oil exports and food imports are now reaching pre-war levels. With oil prices rising, revenues are surging, and oil for food has dramatically increased the availability of medicines and raised the available food supply well above the UN recommended minimum.

So why

~~Why, then,~~ are the Iraqi people still suffering? Because Baghdad has worked to obstruct oil for food, undermine relief efforts, and preserve as a diplomatic bargaining chip the humanitarian suffering of its people.

Despite Iraqi claims of infant malnutrition, the government of Iraq has ordered only a fraction of the nutritional supplies for pregnant and nursing mothers recommended by the UN and for which money has been set aside under oil-for-food.

At the same time, Iraq is actually exporting food, and baby milk sold to Iraq through the oil-for-food program has been found in markets throughout the Gulf. Out of the mouths of babes, Saddam has been stealing the very food that helps finance his 48 palaces and new VIP playgrounds. ~~And the average Iraqi lives on less than four dollars a month.~~

Medicines go undistributed; while some are seized by the govt officials and sold at exorbitant prices.

The suffering of Iraqi citizens is the fault of the Iraqi government. UNICEF's report on Child Health, issued last year, notes that in Northern Iraq, where the UN administers humanitarian assistance, child mortality rates have fallen below pre-Gulf War levels. In the South and Center of the country – where the Iraqi government administers humanitarian assistance – child mortality has more than doubled.

From child mortality; to supplementary feeding programs, to medical treatment and vaccination campaigns, citizens in the North of Iraq are by many measures better off than before sanctions, while their fellow citizens in central and South of Iraq continue to suffer.

So why lift sanctions? There would be no improvement in Iraq's ability to export oil; it can export now all it wants. There would be no improvement in Iraq's ability to import food and medicine; it can import now all it needs. ~~Ending sanctions would strengthen Saddam.~~ Oil revenues would no longer go to a UN escrow account; they would go to Saddam. They would no longer be restricted to humanitarian supplies, they could be spent on anything from rebuilding the military to reconstituting weapons of mass destruction. Oil for food could quickly become oil for tanks. Iraqi people might well have less to eat and more to fear.

We have to remember who we're dealing with. The year after Saddam seized power, he started an 8-year war with Iran, in which he used chemical weapons. He launched an ethnic campaign against the Iraqi Kurds, destroying more than 3,000 villages, and – in one of the worst single mass killings in a half century – dropped chemical weapons on his own people in Halabja, killing 5,000 people.

During Saddam's campaign to hold onto Kuwait during Operation Desert Storm, Iraq fired 41 Scud missiles into Israel – trying desperately to draw Israel into the conflict, create chaos in the coalition, and ignite a wider war in the ~~Middle East.~~

Saddam has never retreated one step from his aggressive, belligerent approach to ~~his people or his neighbors.~~ He has called for the overthrow of moderate Arab leaders. He organized an ~~attempt in 1993~~ *effort* to assassinate President Bush and the Emir of Kuwait. And on the last anniversary of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the government mouthpiece called the invasion "the right response."

Meanwhile, ~~backed into his own land, and hemmed in by no-fly zones,~~ Saddam continues the vicious repression of his people. He is deporting Kurds from the North to the South – where local officials have ordered the arrest of anyone who provides them food, shelter, or employment. He is increasing his attacks on Shi'ite Moslems – last year assassinating the most senior Shi'ite religious leader in Iraq. And his forces have begun a campaign to drain and poison the marshes in the South that sustain the life and culture of the Marsh Arabs.

For two decades, Saddam Hussein has been a source of suffering to millions of people within his borders and beyond. It is hard to imagine a sensible approach to reducing human suffering that gives Saddam more money, and fewer restrictions on the use of that money.

The right way to ease the suffering on the Iraqi people is not to call for the end of sanctions, but to call on Saddam to meet the needs of his people. As brutal as Saddam is, he is not impervious to international pressure: it convinced him, finally, to accept the oil-for-food program. It convinced him, finally, to order nutritional supplements for children, mothers, and babies. It can convince him, I believe, to curb his complicity in the humanitarian suffering of his people. ~~We~~ *But we* need to make Saddam answer for his actions by posing questions bluntly and repeatedly:

Why don't you reveal how much of your budget you allocate for education, nutrition, health care? How much for the military? How much for palaces?

Why won't you allow free access by United Nations and humanitarian organizations throughout Iraq for evaluation of the humanitarian condition of your people?

Why won't you allow UN personnel and NGOs to operate in the rest of the country as they do in the North?

Why have you never allocated sufficient foodstuffs to meet the minimum calorie and protein targets recommended by the UN?

Why have you refused to ensure the timely and equitable distribution of all humanitarian goods, in particular medical supplies?

Why won't you give up your pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, for the good of your people?

Friends of Saddam should be forced to face these questions. And friends of the Iraqi people -- instead of insisting the UN should end sanctions on Saddam -- should insist that Saddam end his restrictions on UN monitors, and NGOs, and feeding programs, and all other international efforts to benefit the people who have been so punished by his policies.

We are determined to provide humanitarian relief to the people of Iraq, in spite of the obstructions of the government of Iraq. But we are realistic. We know there is a limit to the relief the Iraqi people will experience until they are relieved of the Iraqi leader. We look forward to that day, and when it arrives, the United States is prepared to do our part – with the Iraqi

people, its new government, and the international community – to welcome Iraq back into the community of nations and move quickly to advance the peace, stability, and prosperity of the country and the region.

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Tom Rosshirt
National Security Speech Writing
Old Executive Office Building (OEOB)
Room 331
Washington DC

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Description of Item(s)	Two (2) photographs titled "Saddamiyat Al-Tharthar, Iraq, resort city built for regime VIP's, April 1999"			

Donor Information

Last Name:		First Name:		Middle Name:		Title:	
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
Transferred to:	Audio/Visual Department
Other (Specify):	

Transferred by:	Jamie Metrailler
Transfer Point	During Processing

Date of Tranfer	6/2/2011
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**SADDAMIYAT AL-THARTHAR, IRAQ
RESORT CITY BUILT FOR REGIME VIP's**

APRIL 1999




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**SADDAMIYAT AL-THARTHAR, IRAQ
RESORT CITY BUILT FOR REGIME VIP'S**

APRIL 1999



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