

FOIA MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Folder Title:

[European Union] [2]

Staff Office-Individual:

Speechwriting-Orzulak, Paul

Original OA/ID Number:

4023

Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:	Stack:
48	6	9	3	v

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. briefing paper	Background Paper: Financial Crime (4 pages)	05/17/2000	P1/b(1)
001b. briefing paper	Background Paper: U.S. Russia Issues (2 pages)	05/17/2000	P1/b(1)
001c. briefing paper	Background Paper: Arms Control (4 pages)	05/17/2000	P1/b(1)
001d. briefing paper	Background Paper: Nuclear Cooperation (2 pages)	05/17/2000	P1/b(1)
001e. briefing paper	Background Paper: Counternarcotics (4 pages)	05/17/2000	P1/b(1)
001f. briefing paper	Background Paper: Expanded Threat Reduction Initiative (ETRI) (3 pages)	05/17/2000	P1/b(1)
001g. briefing paper	Background Paper: European Security (2 pages)	05/17/2000	P1/b(1)
001h. briefing paper	Background Paper: Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty (2 pages)	05/17/2000	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Speechwriting (Paul Orzulak)
OA/Box Number: 4023

FOLDER TITLE:

[European Union] [2]

2008-0702-F

jm212

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

December 17, 1999

PRESS BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR DIRECTOR FOR EUROPEAN AFFAIRS TONY BLINKEN

The Briefing Room

1:55 P.M. EST

MR. FALLON: We have Tony Blinken available. He is the Senior Director for European Affairs and will give a readout. This is on the record, and it's on the foreign policy aspects of today's U.S.-E.U. Summit.

MR. BLINKEN: Good afternoon. I notice a distinct drop-off from the Barry Toiv briefing -- (laughter) -- but I will nonetheless do my best to give you a quick readout of what was discussed at the U.S.-E.U. Summit and try and answer any questions you may have.

I want to just focus on the foreign policy aspects of this. Charlene Barshefsky, the U.S. Trade Representative is going to be doing a briefing, I believe later today, as Joe indicated, covering the economic aspects. So I'll just touch on them, but save any details for her.

First, just on exactly what happened in terms of the format, the President first met in the Oval Office with his counterparts, that is, the other leaders -- Finnish President Ahtisaari and Prime Minister Lipponen. The Finns, as you know, are in the presidency, the rotating presidency of the European Union right now; and also the European Union President Prodi.

They met for about an hour and focused their discussions on diplomatic and security questions. Then they moved into the Cabinet Room and the ministers from both sides came in and they focused that discussion on economic issues that Charlene will talk about later.

Q Do you know if that's going to be here?

MR. BLINKEN: I don't know. You'll have to ask my colleagues, but I believe it's later this afternoon.

On the session on foreign and security policy, the President began the meeting by praising the EU leadership for their success at the Helsinki Summit that ended last weekend. In particular, he singled out the EU's decisions to proceed with enlarging the European Union, adding six countries to the list of those who are actually beginning accession negotiations with the European Union: Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria and Malta.

They join six countries who have already begun accession discussions: Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Slovenia and Cyprus. And of course, he emphasized how pleased we were that the EU had offered, and Turkey had accepted, candidate status for membership in the Union.

The President emphasized, beyond the question of Turkey, that the decision to put Romania and Bulgaria in line to start these accession talks was something we thought was very, very positive for both of those countries.

The other issue that the President raised in terms of the Helsinki Summit was the question of European security and defense policy. Again, he praised the leaders of the European Union for the decisions they had taken to strengthen the European Union's capabilities for conducting defense policy, and also the emphasis it placed on the central role of NATO in our common defense and security.

He suggested that as we go forward, and as the EU goes forward, it would be important to focus on the links between NATO and the EU as the EU develops this capacity to strengthen our common defense and security.

After they talked about the Helsinki Summit, the discussion focused heavily on Southeast Europe. And the President and the leaders touched on a number of different subjects in relation to Southeast Europe. They talked about Kosovo. I think as many of you know, the EU pledged \$2.5 billion for Kosovo between now and the year 2004; but there was an agreement on both sides on the need to be able to get these resources and the resources that we're dedicating to Kosovo into the field as quickly and as effectively as possible.

In particular, to support the work of the U.N. mission in Kosovo, to be able to pay civil servants, teachers, police and also money for the Kosovo Protection Corps. Both sides agreed that this was vitally important, it wasn't enough to simply commit the funds that we've committed, we actually had to get them into the field quickly and effectively.

They talked at some length about the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe more broadly. There again, I think it's worth pointing out that the EU pledged some time ago to spend \$12 billion between now and 2006 on the broader region. And that sum may go higher as the member states also contribute to this process. And already, under the Stability Pact, there are a number of very solid initiatives that were announced in Istanbul, initiatives on investment, fight corruption, on small arms, on weapons of mass destruction.

The leaders agreed that the key next step is a regional funding conference that will take place in March; and, in particular, pledge to work closely together to develop this conference; and, in particular, to develop projects that have a real and quick impact on people's lives in the region.

They then turned to a discussion of Russia and, in particular, Chechnya. And there again there was strong agreement -- and here I would refer you to a joint statement that I believe is going to be issued this afternoon in the name of the European Union and the United States on this. Both the European Union and the United States agreed that they strongly support Russia's right to defend its territorial integrity to combat terrorism; but that we both shared a very deep concern about the impact on civilians, the loss of civilian life, the indiscriminate use of force.

And we also deeply share a conviction that the only possible outcome to this situation is a political outcome -- a political dialogue, a political solution. And that the goals that Russia seeks to advance in Chechnya, we believe the means it is using are counterproductive to those goals. And both sides agreed on that and I think that's reflected in the joint statement.

They discussed briefly Ukraine. And the President described to his counterparts at the meeting he had recently with Mr. Kuchma, who was here, and, in particular, the strong expression that Mr. Kuchma made of the need to move forward on reform. The President pointed out that the new Prime Minister designate in Ukraine is someone who is very highly regarded here in the United States. The Europeans agreed that he was highly regarded in Europe. They also noted that the reform plan that the Ukrainians had put forward to cut the size of their government was quite impressive. And both agreed strongly on the need to continue to strongly support Ukraine.

Finally, in this Oval Office session, the President gave his counterparts a quick readout on the Middle East peace talks, on the talks between Israel and Syria here at the White House. And let me leave it at that. I know we've made statements on that in the last day.

The final issue that came up -- this in the larger session with the ministers, but it is a foreign security issue of sorts -- is on the question of judicial and law enforcement cooperation. The European Union is taking important strides to harmonize its own laws on things like visa policy, immigration policy, law enforcement, judicial procedures. And the President made the point that as they do this it would be very useful for us to be able to work with them to harmonize between the United States and the European Union. We have a lot of bilateral agreements with individual countries, and those agreements are impacted as the EU harmonizes its own regulations, and there was an agreement on the need to cooperate on that.

As I said, Charlene Barshefsky will cover the trade and economic issues that were discussed, let me just list them for you so that you know what was discussed, and then I'll let Charlene handle any of the specifics. They of course talked about that recent Seattle summit and WTO. They talked about China and the WTO. They talked about biotechnology. And they talked about a number of trade disputes that continue to linger between the United States and the European Union on some of our favorites -- bananas, beef hormones, hush kits and also the Foreign Sales Corporation. But Charlene will get into all of that in more detail later.

Finally, let me say, and let me refer you to a number of joint statements that are being issued, or may have already been issued as a result of this summit -- one on Chechnya that I mentioned, another on Southeast Europe; a third on small arms and working to combat the proliferation of small arms; a fourth one on Northern Europe and our common efforts with the European Union to deepen our engagement with the Nordic countries, with the Baltic countries and also with Russia. And, finally, a statement on trade and on the WTO that is coming out.

And with that, any questions?

Q Tony, on Chechnya, was there anything beyond a condemnation of what Russia is doing? Was there any discussion of any kind of sanctions or any kind of action that can be taken, other than writing down words on a piece of paper?

MR. BLINKEN: Well, I think there was a very lengthy discussion of Chechnya and Kosovo. I don't want to get into any of the details of that discussion; but, clearly, they looked at what we've been doing and what we've been saying, what we can be doing and saying going forward. And let me leave it at that.

Q What is the "doing" part?

MR. BLINKEN: I don't want to get into that now. Let me simply say that there is a clear agreement between the United States and the European Union on the need for Russia to engage in a political process to try and bring this crisis to a close. We have, as you know, at the summit in Istanbul, urged -- and the OSCE agreed -- that it could play a role, not only on the humanitarian side, but also perhaps in facilitating a political dialogue. The European Union leaders reported on some conversations they've had recently with the Russian leadership. People on our side did the same. And I think there was a strong agreement that we need to continue to encourage Russia very strongly to pursue a political solution to this crisis.

I think the very strong, unified approach that we've seen from the European Union and the United States -- the European Union in Helsinki, our own statements on this -- has certainly gotten Russia's attention. We don't want Russia to be isolated from the international community; Russia certainly doesn't want that. And there's a concern that as this crisis goes on and civilian casualties mount, that that could be one result.

The bottom line and the main point is that we have -- the European Union and the United States -- Russia's interests at heart and we are simply convinced that the means they are choosing to advance those interests are counterproductive, and that was the conviction of the leaders on both sides.

Q Did the Ex-Im vote come up specifically?

MR. BLINKEN: No.

Q In terms of -- French officials in recent interviews indicated that the creation of the 60,000-man force is really to counteract U.S. power in Europe. And that that's the whole M.O., they'll be tied to NATO. What's our feeling about it?

MR. BLINKEN: The President expressed our feeling very clearly to his counterparts. He said -- this is not a direct quote, but this is the import of what he said, that Europe's efforts to develop greater defense and security capabilities are something that the United States strongly supports.

You know, a lot of our predecessors for years have been complaining that the Europeans didn't do enough to share the burden of common defense and security. And now that they are, in fact, working to do that, in our view it would be hypocritical for us to say, no, they shouldn't.

So the President has been on record repeatedly as strongly supporting this. And he repeated that strong support today. This is something that, as Europe develops more capabilities, is something that's very good for our common defense and security, and is good for NATO. It will allow more assets to be dedicated to NATO operations. And where NATO chooses not to be engaged in a particular mission or operation, it will give the European Union capabilities to handle these things.

The one thing the President focused on was that he's convinced that as this goes forward, as the European Union develops its policy, there need to be very clear and strong links between NATO and the European Union so that we can coordinate as well as possible. But the main point is, this is something that he and the administration strongly support.

Q You said that our warnings or our concerns about Chechnya has been heard in Moscow, and President Ahtisaari said the same thing. And

today Moscow has launched a three-prong attack on Grozny, with tank fire coming in from like three different directions. What evidence do you have that Moscow has heard anything on the ground? What evidence on the ground do you have of that?

MR. BLINKEN: Well, first of all I'm not at all aware of the reports you're referring to, so I just can't comment on them. But certainly the indications we've had and the statements that Russian officials have made in recent days lead us to believe that certainly they're very well aware of the strong, unified position of the international community, and particularly the United States and Europe, on the way they're conducting the operations in Chechnya; our conviction that it's counterproductive; our conviction that the loss of civilian life, casualties, damage, is something of deep concern to all of us. And we believe they're hearing that message.

Q They're hearing you, they're just not listening to you.

MR. BLINKEN: Well, again, I can't comment on the reports that this gentleman raised. I just am not aware of them.

Q But you can comment, certainly, on the fact that the Russians have been attacking Grozny all week. Maybe you don't know this particular day, but an armored column went into Grozny -- I think it was on Wednesday -- and got decimated.

MR. BLINKEN: Again, I think those reports which I've heard, I haven't seen confirmed. I'm not the Russia expert, but I haven't seen confirmation of a lot of the reports that we've been hearing.

Q Basically what is the political solution that they have to discuss? And, number two, you said that the statement respects Russian fighting terrorism and all that. But do you think terrorists are using civilians as a shield? How do you solve this problem when the fighting is going on?

MR. BLINKEN: I don't want to get into the details of the Russian Chechnya policy. My mission today is to describe for you what they discussed. Those kind of details weren't discussed. I'd rather leave that to my colleagues who are more expert in these issues.

Q Can you give me the full names of those who were saw President?

MR. BLINKEN: Sure.

Q Thank you.

END

2:10 P.M. EST

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

December 17, 1999

U.S.-E.U. SUMMIT STATEMENT ON SOUTHEAST EUROPE

We reaffirm our commitment to the emergence of a secure, democratic and prosperous Southeastern Europe. We agree on the central importance of promoting democratic change in Yugoslavia and will remain engaged in enhancing the security of the region until that happens. We will therefore work together with Yugoslav democratic forces, including the Government of Montenegro, to promote such change. We support the efforts of the freely elected government of Montenegro to advance political and economic reform within the FRY. We will also continue our support for the full implementation of Security Council Resolution 1244 and for UNMIK and KFOR's efforts to establish in Kosovo a safe environment for all individuals, regardless of their ethnic, religious or other affiliation. We will lay the foundations for an effective administrative and judicial system, just as we will continue our strong support for the work of SFOR and the High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina. We call upon Croatia to take steps to ensure that its parliamentary and presidential election processes are free and fair, in accordance with democratic principles and OSCE standards.

We are further strengthening our cooperation with all the countries of Southeastern Europe in fulfillment of the goals and commitments of the Stability Pact. Led by the European Union and strongly supported by the United States, the Pact has achieved much since the Sarajevo Summit last July, including specific steps to improve the investment climate, fight corruption, control small arms and light weapons, implement commitments on weapons of mass destruction, and advance democracy and human rights throughout the region. The countries of the region will play an essential role in implementing the Pact and have recognized the importance of accelerating overall economic and political reforms. There is now much work to do in the months ahead to transform the commitments of each country into concrete progress and to prepare for a Regional Funding Conference to be held in the first quarter of 2000. The European Union and the United States have made clear their readiness to provide assistance for regional reform efforts and to fight corruption and organized crime, build sound public institutions, mobilize private investment, and expand trade. We intend to work closely with Southeastern Europe to take full advantage of the opportunity before us at the verge of a new century to forge greater stability and advance the region's integration into the Euro-Atlantic mainstream.

#

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary
(Ankara, Turkey)

For Immediate Release

November 15, 1999

REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT
AND PRESIDENT DEMIREL OF TURKEY
IN JOINT PRESS AVAILABILITY

Presidential Palace
Ankara, Turkey

2:10 P.M. (L)

PRESIDENT DEMIREL: Distinguished members of the press, I would like to welcome once again in your presence, the President of the United States, my dear friend, Bill Clinton. Mr. Clinton is in our country for a five-day visit.

Taking this opportunity, I would like to, in Mr. Clinton's person, express our thanks to the American people for the support and solidarity they have shown during the disasters that affected our country, one after another, in recent months.

The Republic of Turkey and the United States of America work together for peace, stability and prosperity on a vast geography which extends from the Balkans to the Caucasus, Central Asia to the Middle East, Europe to the Black Sea, Caspian and the Mediterranean Basin.

Earlier today, we had an extensive exchange of views and opinions as two strategic partners. We discussed our contribution to regional peace, stability and prosperity. We also reviewed areas where we can improve cooperation. We were pleased to note that both of us had the determination to evaluate new and broader avenues of cooperation between our countries.

We explained to the President our activities in the areas of economy, trade and energy, and the importance we place on cooperation with the EU in this context. We also discussed defense cooperation and regional security issues. We evaluated our joint projects together. And we explored new possibilities for deepening our relations even further.

And we listened to the views of the President of the United States regarding the opinion and attitude of the United States on these subjects. President Clinton shares our view that it's very important for Turkey -- as a country where democracy, Islam and secularism are proven to coexist -- to become an EU member in order to realize the project of a plurarlist, democratic Europe with rich diversity.

In light of these views, we reviewed Turkey's relations with the European Union on the eve of the Helsinki Summit. We explained once again to the President the assessment of the Turkish Republic regarding the European Union. We also expressed Turkey's contractual rights for EU membership. And we stressed our expectation from the European Union to focus on the proper perspective on this matter this time.

President Clinton has confirmed continued support of the U.S. for Turkey's membership to the EU. I can say that the meetings between two

friends and allies that have strong bonds were beneficial and productive and that we were able to review common areas of interest, attention and action that are included in the broad spectrum of the Turkish-American strategic partnership.

Our friendship with the United States is an important guarantee for the success of our common goals and ideals. This friendship will be fruitful in the future and joint efforts by the United States and Turkey will bring further peace, stability and prosperity to a vast geography.

I would like to welcome Mr. Clinton once again and wish him a good time in Turkey. Thank you all.

PRESIDENT CLINTON: Thank you very much, Mr. President. I would like to thank you, the Prime Minister and the members of the Turkish government for your warm welcome here today, and reiterate the profound sympathies of the American people with the people of Turkey as a result of these two earthquakes.

The President has summarized our meeting quite well, and so I will just briefly add a couple of points. We spoke about the coming OSCE meeting, which Turkey will host. It is fitting that Turkey would be the host in this final year of the 20th century, when the agenda for Europe is to build a Europe that for the first time in history is undivided, democratic and at peace. For Turkey is the key to meeting all the challenges that remained of that vision of Europe: the challenge of integrating Russia, of stabilizing the Balkans, of bringing a real peace to the Aegean and Cyprus, of bridging the gulf between the West and the Islamic world. In these areas and more, Turkey and the United States should be partners.

In that regard, I thank the President and the Prime Minister for the principled stand Turkey took in Kosovo and for Turkey's leadership today in bringing peace and prosperity to the Balkans.

We also had a very good conversation about the hopeful progress in cooperation between Turkey and Greece, an issue of profound importance to the United States because of our friendship with both nations and because of our strong support for Turkey's full partnership in the European Union. I expressed my hope that the coming talks on Cyprus will bring us closer to lasting peace with real security for all Cypriots, and an end to the island's division.

We discussed the importance of continuing to integrate Russia with Europe as a strong, stable democratic nation, and our shared concern that the mounting civilian casualties in Chechnya will hinder that goal.

We talked about energy security in the Caspian, and I reaffirmed America's commitment to making the Baku-Ceyhan and the trans-Caspian pipelines commercial realities, and my appreciation for the leadership of President Demirel and others toward that goal.

Finally, we discussed Turkey's progress in deepening its democracy and strengthening human rights. There has been impressive momentum in the last few years, and I hope there will be continued progress, especially in the area of freedom of expression.

In closing, Mr. President, I want to thank you for your friendship, for your commitment to our alliance. And I want to once again reaffirm my personal strong support for Turkey's European Union candidacy as it moves forward in all the areas that we have discussed today.

Thank you very much.

Q Mr. President, on the WTO deal that you announced today, did China go beyond the concessions that it offered in April? And if so, could you say where and how far? And does this mean that China will be able to have an active role in the WTO talks in Seattle?

PRESIDENT CLINTON: The answer to the first question is that we -- I think the fair answer is that we finished a lot of the matters which were left unresolved when we were meeting in the springtime in Washington. I don't think it's fair to the Chinese or to the United States to give the inference that either one made massive new concessions.

I think that there were matters that were still outstanding that we were able to resolve and work through and I'm very grateful, frankly, for the leadership of Ambassador Barshefsky and Mr. Sperling on our side and for all those on the Chinese side. I think this is a good agreement for China and for America and for the world. I think that all of us benefit when the most populous nation in the world is now going to be part of a rule-based system that will bring shared prosperity.

The answer to your second question -- the short answer to your second question is, I don't know. That is, I honestly don't know how this changes the specific formal role that China might play at Seattle. But as I'm sure you know, all the developing nations have been taking various positions on these issues. And I would certainly hope that the conclusion of this agreement between ourselves and China will lead to the rapid accession of China to the WTO and would lead the Chinese to urge other developing countries to take the same sort of comprehensive approach to their participation in the world economic system, because I think that will bring the quickest benefits to them and to the rest of the world.

Q A question for both of you, please. Mr. President, what do you say to allegations of repression and torture in your country? And President Clinton, do you believe these allegations; are they a serious impediment to Turkish-American relations? And I speak now partly of the Kurds, but also other dissident groups.

PRESIDENT DEMIREL: It is impossible to say that there is no torture in Turkey; there is torture. But torture is not state policy. Torture is a crime. And whoever commits this crime, no matter who that person may be, that person is investigated and is penalized accordingly. And I can say that we are doing everything we can to make sure that there is not torture.

PRESIDENT CLINTON: Let me, in response to your question, say that we believe that there has been a renewed and clear determination of the Turkish government to take a stand against torture and to generally increase protection of human rights. There are some non-torture areas that we hope there will continue to be progress in, like freedom of expression. But President Demirel has faithfully stated, I think, the policy of the Turkish government. And we are encouraged that the human rights issue is moving in the right direction in this nation.

Q Mr. Prime Minister [sic], I would like to ask, have you observed a rapid development in the Turkish-American relationship, especially in the last years? Can you briefly describe the current status of the Turkish-American relations from the point of view of America?

PRESIDENT CLINTON: Well, I would say from the point of view of America, they are very good. And I could give you some specific examples. One, our partnership in the Balkans, first in Bosnia and then in Kosovo, to stand up for human rights. Two, our commitment to energy security in the region, and the support of the pipelines projects I

mentioned earlier.

Three, the improvement in relationships between Turkey and Greece, something which has always been a little bit of a limitation on our partnership, because of our ties to both countries. And, four, the economic and political reforms undertaken by Turkey in the last year and several months have been very impressive to us.

So, for all these reasons, I would say that the state of our partnership is strong, and I just want the United States to be in a position to give more economic assistance and more political support as we move toward our shared objectives.

Q Mr. President, could you please tell us how determined you will continue to be in supporting Turkey's efforts with EU?

PRESIDENT CLINTON: Excuse me. Did you ask me how determined am I to do that, or in what ways will I do that, or both?

Well, let me say first of all, I am very determined to support Turkish membership in the EU for a very good reason. I think if you -- any of you, including my American colleagues here -- if you were to go home tonight and make a list of the big problems you think the world could face in the next 10 or 20 years, every one of them would be strengthened if Turkey were a full partner in a Europe that respected religious and cultural diversity and shared devotion to democracy and human rights.

I might say that's one of the reasons I am so pleased by the recent improvement in relationships between Turkey and Greece and why I think it's so important to continue to make progress there, because the difficulties between the two nations are small when compared to the benefits of cooperation and European integration, both to Turkey and to Greece.

As to how I intend to express my support, I will continue to talk to the leaders of Europe. I take every opportunity that I have to have this discussion. I feel very strongly that one of the four or five key questions to the future of this whole part of the world is whether Turkey is a full partner with the European Union. So I will continue to advocate it.

PRESIDENT DEMIREL: Thank you.

PRESIDENT CLINTON: Thank you very much.

END 2:42 P.M. (L)

~~SECRET~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 0003387
RECEIVED: 17 MAY 00 15

TO: BRADTKE

FROM: KENNEY, K

DOC DATE: 17 MAY 00
SOURCE REF: 200009104

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA

PRESIDENTIAL TRAVEL

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: BRIEFING PAPERS FOR POTUS TRIP TO RUSSIA ON 3 - 5 JUN

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR BERGER

DUE DATE: 23 MAY 00 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: MEDISH

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION
MEDISH

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
ANDREASEN
BINNENDIJK
EPSTEIN
HILLIARD
MALINOWSKI
MCCARTHY
SCHWARTZ

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSTSM

CLOSED BY:

DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: JAM Date: 3/30/11

2008-0702-F



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

www.state.gov


May 17, 2000

~~SECRET~~

(UNCLASSIFIED when separated from attachments)

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT A. BRADTKE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCILSUBJECT: Briefing Materials for the President's Trip to
Russia

Please find attached 2 diskettes, background papers and scenarios for the President's trip to Russia, June 3-5, 2000. Department of State Executive Secretariat staff point of contact is Matthew Cordova. Mr. Cordova can be reached at (202) 647-6627 or via the Department of State Operations Center at (202) 647-1512.


Kristie A. Kenney
Executive SecretaryAttachments:Tab 1: Background Papers
Tab 2: ScenariosDECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
Department of State Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By JM NARA, Date 3/30/11
2008-0702-F~~SECRET~~Classified by Executive Secretary Kristie A. Kenney
Per reasons 1.5 (b) (d)

Background Papers

1. Russia's Integration Into Global Economic System, including WTO
2. Financial Crime
3. Corruption Issues (S/NIS Draft & Coordinate w/Treasury)
4. Religious Freedom and Ethnic Tolerance
5. Jackson-Vanik/Anti-Dumping/Non-Market Economy Status
6. U.S.-Russia Investment Issues
7. Nongovernmental U.S.-Russian Relations
8. Exchanges and People-to-People Programs
9. Arms Control: ABM Treaty, National Missile Defense, START Issues
10. Iran Nonproliferation Issues
11. Export Controls
12. Counternarcotics/Counterterrorism
13. Commercial Space Launch
14. Plutonium Disposition
15. Expanded Threat Reduction
16. BWC, CW Destruction
17. European Security/NATO-Russia/ESDI
18. CFE
19. Chechnya
20. NIS Regional Issues
21. Caspian Energy Issues (outstanding)
22. Overview of U.S. Assistance to Russia

Scenesetters

1. Kremlin/Red Square
2. Spaso House
3. Church of Christ the Savior
4. Victory Memorial.

UNCLASSIFIED

**BACKGROUND PAPER
INTEGRATION INTO THE WORLD ECONOMY**

Russia's successful integration into the global economy will depend largely on whether it can reform its economic institutions and establish "rule of law" in both domestic and international economic relations. Russia's ongoing negotiations for accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) support both objectives. To join the WTO, applicants must adopt WTO provisions in their trade regimes and undertake trade-liberalizing commitments for tariffs, agriculture, and trade in services. Meeting these requirements - e.g., in the areas of intellectual property protection, transparency, due process and right of appeal on trade issues, goods and services market access, standards, and customs valuation and procedures - can support Russia's plans for economic reform and restructuring while accomplishing the goal of WTO membership at the same time. The principal benefit of the WTO accession process is the establishment of a stable, internationally recognized framework for conducting international trade and pursuing trade liberalization that promotes economic growth and provides a more attractive climate for foreign investment.

After excellent progress through 1997, Russia's efforts in the negotiations slowed due to political and economic upheavals, an uncooperative Duma, and a lack of clear direction and support from the Government. Based in large part on close bilateral contacts and U.S. technical assistance throughout this period, the technical basis to move forward in the negotiations is mostly in place. In moving forward, political leadership from the GOR, making WTO accession a priority, is essential. To move to the next stage, Russia must be prepared to make the necessary legal changes to implement WTO rules; to eliminate existing WTO-inconsistent practices; and to reach agreement with WTO trading partners on market access commitments. This will require a strategy to secure Duma approval of necessary legislative changes and eventual ratification of the WTO package, as well as to provide strong political support for the negotiating team. These points should be confirmed to WTO Members at the May 25-26 Working Party Meeting now scheduled. Putin's selection of a new WTO negotiator to fill the gap left by the untimely death of Deputy Trade Minister Georgiy Gabuniya will also be an important indication of his support. Designation of a senior official responsible for coordinating the negotiating process and possessing a clear mandate from the top would be an important step in moving Russia's WTO accession forward. The U.S. government could send a delegation of trade officials to Russia to discuss next steps forward in the negotiations following designation of such an official.

President Putin's new government and expressed personal commitment to broad economic reform offers an opportunity to reinvigorate Russia's accession. Current legislative priorities already identified by Putin and ongoing technical work on standards issues

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

offer near-term vehicles to incorporate elements of WTO obligations in its economic and trade regime.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Drafted: EB/TPP/BTA/DCT:Jspeck 5/10/00
X7-1995 Word doc: bckgrd - Russ WTO - Summit
Cleared: EB/TPP/BTA/DCT:RBoehme
EUR/RUS:RKiene
E:JKessler
D:Tcynkin
P:SWhite
S/P:AStent
Treasury:SRzemien
Commerce:ILitvinsky
USTR:KKuhlmann/CKlein

nc tr

UNCLASSIFIED

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. briefing paper	Background Paper: Financial Crime (4 pages)	05/17/2000	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Speechwriting (Paul Orzulak)
OA/Box Number: 4023

FOLDER TITLE:

[European Union] [2]

2008-0702-F

jm212

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

UNCLASSIFIED

**BACKGROUND PAPER
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND ETHNIC TOLERANCE**

RELIGIOUS FREEDOM. Russia's Constitution provides for freedom of religion; this right is generally respected in practice. Russia's 1997 law on religion remains a cause for concern. It grants special status to mainstream Russian Orthodoxy and seeks to restrict the rights of newer religions with fewer members. Although federal officials and Russians courts have taken action to mitigate its most negative effects, local officials have cited the law in restricting the rights of religious minorities, especially those which engage in missionary activity, such as Jehovah's Witnesses, Mormons and Pentecostals. Three recent reports, the first 1999 Annual Report on International Religious Freedom, the Annual State Department Country Report on Human Rights, and the recently released first Report of the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, document the inadequate response of the federal authorities to curtailment of religious freedom by local and regional officials.

ETHNIC TOLERANCE: Anti-Semitism remains a serious problem, although the number of violent incidents has dropped in the past year. Although the Russian Government is in the process of launching a new program to promote tolerance, it needs to be more responsive to anti-Semitic incidents. Intolerance of darker-skinned people who appear to be from the Caucasus region has increased markedly since fighting renewed near Chechnya. Officials cited the deadly apartment bombings as justification to harass, arrest and deport people who appear to be from the Caucasus.

OUTLOOK UNDER PUTIN. Although the Putin Administration has not had time to establish a clear record on religious freedom, Putin's public statements, his government's development of an interagency program to promote tolerance, and his extension of the deadline for re-registration of religious organizations suggest his Government will follow a progressive approach to implementing the restrictive 1997 law similar to that of President Yeltsin. Nevertheless, religious and ethnic intolerance remains a serious concern that the USG will follow closely and continue to raise with the Putin administration.

UNCLASSIFIED


UNCLASSIFIED

Drafted: DRL/IRF:Nhewett/DRL/BA:SILVERMAN
May 9, 2000

x6-7133

F/IRFPublic/POTUS trip Russia IRF & Ethnic

Cleared: DRL/BA:WSILVERMAN ok
D:Tcynkin ok
P:Swhite ok
G:GSHELTON ok
S/NIS/EUR/RUS:AGODFREY ok
S/P:BHERMAN ok



UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

**BACKGROUND PAPER
JACKSON-VANIK, DUMPING AND NON-MARKET ECONOMY STATUS**

Title IV of the 1974 Trade Act (which includes the Jackson-Vanik Amendment), denies Normal Trade Relations (NTR, formerly MFN) status to countries that were considered to be Communist-dominated in 1974, unless the president certifies that a country complies with the Act's freedom of emigration requirements or determines that a waiver will promote the Act's objectives. Congress has passed legislation terminating application of the provisions of Title IV to some of these countries, but Jackson-Vanik still applies to Russia and 16 other countries.

Russia has been found to be in full compliance with the Act and thus receives NTR treatment without being required to obtain an annual waiver. But Russian officials consider Jackson-Vanik discriminatory, trade-disruptive, a relic of the cold war, and a violation of our bilateral trade agreement commitment to provide unconditional MFN/NTR. Continuing concerns about human rights, including anti-Semitism, would make terminating the application of Jackson-Vanik to Russia difficult at this time. Without doing so, however, the U.S. cannot grant Russia unconditional NTR treatment, as required by the WTO Agreement, and would have to invoke non-application of the WTO Agreement if and when Russia becomes a member of the WTO. Non-application means that neither the U.S. nor Russia would be bound by WTO disciplines with respect to each other or have recourse to WTO dispute settlement.

Russia has been the subject of a number of antidumping cases. Several steel cases have been resolved through suspension agreements, and, in 1999, we also negotiated a comprehensive export restraint agreement on steel, covering all Russia's steel exports. That agreement now appears to be acceptable to the Russian steel industry, which appreciates the stability it provides. The Russians soon seek an increase in the quotas under the agreement. The GOR and the U.S. Commerce Department also initialed a suspension agreement dropping anti-dumping proceedings against the Russian ammonium nitrate (fertilizer) industry. Canada objects on NAFTA grounds to proposed changes in the current suspension agreement involving Russian uranium.

Russia is considered a "non-market economy" for purposes of U.S. anti-dumping laws. This legal designation has no broader policy implications, but the Russians have asked to be designated a "market economy." We have stressed repeatedly that Russia can raise the issue of its non-market economy status in the context of any antidumping case, but also pointed out that changing to market economy status for purposes of the anti-dumping law could expose them to liability under U.S. countervailing duty law.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Drafted by: EB/TPP/BTA/DCT:Jspeck 7-1995
Word doc # J-V,AD,mkt econ - Russia 5/11/00
Cleared: EUR/RUS:RKiene
EB/BTA:VSambaiew ok
E:JKessler ok
D:KDoherty ok
USTR:KKuhlmann ok
Commerce:ILitvinsky ok/LRaisner ok
P:SWhite ok
L:KLoken ok
S/P:AStent ok

mc

UNCLASSIFIED

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001b. briefing paper	Background Paper: U.S. Russia Issues (2 pages)	05/17/2000	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Speechwriting (Paul Orzulak)
OA/Box Number: 4023

FOLDER TITLE:

[European Union] [2]

2008-0702-F

jm212

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

UNCLASSIFIED

**BACKGROUND PAPER
NON-GOVERNMENTAL U.S.-RUSSIAN RELATIONS**

Russia has come a long way in developing a vibrant civil society: 65,000 active registered non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are now seeking to shape Russia's future and provide essential social services. Roughly 15% of these NGOs have received support from USAID. Though the majority are small, they are actively advocating for the rights and concerns of their constituents at all levels of government, while becoming increasingly sophisticated in management, fundraising and networking. As the leaders of the majority of Russian NGOs, women are playing a particularly vital role in this process. While these are significant achievements, more work needs to be done to build Russian government and societal support for the important work of NGOs, which continue to face a variety of obstacles related to registration and taxation.

Independent media have also proliferated in Russia, with an estimated 10,000 independent newspapers as of mid-1998. Although the August 1998 financial crisis caused many to lose national advertising revenue, some have since found new sources of local revenue with USG help. The USAID-supported NGO Internews has nurtured over 300 independent regional television stations, helping raise their audiences from zero in 1991 to over 30% in many local markets and to an estimated 25% or more of Russia's viewing public. A national network of 80 independent stations now reaches a potential audience of about 50 million. However, there is concern among independent television and newspapers about increased government scrutiny, harassment and censorship.

The Russian economy remains dominated by large enterprises. An underdeveloped but vibrant small business sector is emerging, however, and forming the basis for a Russian middle class. There are nearly 900,000 officially registered small businesses in Russia today; estimates of the actual quantity range up to five times that number. They face tremendous challenges, including corrupt bureaucrats, a confiscatory and arbitrary tax system, and few if any sources of finance. The USG has tried to bolster Russian entrepreneurs by making available a variety of training and small/micro credit programs. We also bring Russian business people to the U.S. for hands-on learning, and bring volunteer U.S. executives to Russia to provide practical advice.

Recognizing the heavy toll it takes on their society, Russians are increasingly undertaking individual and collective efforts to fight corruption. USG programs support the courageous NGOs, media, entrepreneurs, legal professionals and local governments involved in these efforts, working closely with them to put in place laws on transparent budgeting and procurement. As a result, some regional governments have instituted regular town meetings and begun to post their budgets on the Internet.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Drafted: S/NIS/C:LpredhamKeir;5/11/00;Summit-Russia-NGO

Cleared: S/NIS/C:Drosenblum-ok

S/NIS/C:Ckupchan-ok

EUR/RUS:MYovanovitch

USAID:Mkarbeling-ok (subst) *nc8*

ECA:REMcCarthy-ok

DRL:Pdayis-ok

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

**BACKGROUND PAPER
EXCHANGES AND PEOPLE TO PEOPLE PROGRAMS**

USG-supported exchange programs have grown exponentially from less than 100 Russian participants per year under the old Soviet agreement on educational and cultural exchanges to nearly 40,000 over the last 7 years. People to people initiatives expose Russians to new ideas, forge lasting linkages between Russians and Americans, and prepare the next generation of leaders. Exchanges establish contacts between Americans and Russians who speak the same language - entrepreneur to entrepreneur, legislator to legislator, student to student - and lead them to discover new ways to approach our shared concerns. Returned exchangees find support among a growing network of alumni who are contributing to Russia's future.

USG-sponsored exchanges range from year-long programs in U.S. high schools for Russian students, to graduate degree programs for promising young professionals, to internships for entrepreneurs to professional exchanges for legislators. Exchangees have been hosted by American families, communities and businesses in all 50 states. They are selected for their leadership potential and typically share what they have learned with their families, colleagues, communities and regions. The USG will spend nearly \$50 million this year to support exchanges with Russia.


Substantive, mutually-beneficial partnerships between American and Russian businesses and institutions are flourishing. For example, there are currently 117 Russian-American Sister Cities, 15 hospital partnerships supported by the USG and 53 USG-funded university partnerships. Demand is growing steadily on both sides. Partnerships have complemented individual exchanges by providing an intellectual framework for practical, joint work in areas such as environmental protection, health care, curriculum development and economic development. This year the U.S. will utilize a partnership between U.S. and Russian educational institutions to help Russia develop a first-class School of Public Policy to train Russia's future public officials, and business and non-profit sector leaders.

The availability and use of Internet on both sides has increased dramatically, facilitating communication between Americans and Russians. The Internet is a vital source of information for Russians reaching out to fill the information void they experienced under Communism. To this end, the USG has supported 33 public access Internet sites in Russia and will add an additional 22 this year.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Drafted: S/NIS/C:LPredham;5/11/00;Summit-Russia-NGO
Cleared: S/NIS/C:Drosenblum-ok
S/NIS/C:Ckupchan-ok
EUR/RUS:MYovanovitch
USAID:Mkarbeling-ok (subst) *mcx*
ECA:REMcCarthy-ok
DRL:PDavis -ok



UNCLASSIFIED

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001c. briefing paper	Background Paper: Arms Control (4 pages)	05/17/2000	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Speechwriting (Paul Orzulak)
OA/Box Number: 4023

FOLDER TITLE:

[European Union] [2]

2008-0702-F

jm212

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001d. briefing paper	Background Paper: Nuclear Cooperation (2 pages)	05/17/2000	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Speechwriting (Paul Orzulak)
OA/Box Number: 4023

FOLDER TITLE:

[European Union] [2]

2008-0702-F

jm212

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

**BACKGROUND PAPER
RUSSIAN EXPORT CONTROLS**

Russia has made considerable progress improving its export controls over the last year. The July 1999 Federal Law on Export Controls provides a comprehensive basis for controlling WMD, missile and sensitive dual-use materials and technology and streamlines the Russian export control bureaucracy. The GOR is still in the process of drafting implementing regulations for the new law, but we have already seen evidence that the GOR is utilizing authority provided by the new regulations to crack down on export control violators. The GOR has launched, with U.S. assistance, a major industry outreach effort to establish internal control programs (ICPs) at Russian nuclear, aerospace and dual-use entities to help ensure compliance with the new law and regulations. However, we continue to see illicit transfers to countries of proliferation concern and it is unclear whether Russia is ready to devote the necessary resources for consistent, effective export control enforcement in the long-

Export Control Dialogue: We have an extensive export control dialogue with the GOR structured around the seven export control subgroups -- nuclear, missile, catch-all and internal compliance, conventional weapons, law enforcement, dual-use and licensing, and customs -- that you and President Yeltsin created at the September 1998 Summit. These groups, which report to an over-arching Bilateral Working Group (BWG), share information, experience and expertise on export control issues and practices, and help identify areas for U.S. assistance programs. We anticipate a meeting of the BWG shortly after the summit to evaluate progress made in the seven subgroups and to discuss future export control cooperation.

U.S. Assistance: Under the Expanded Threat Reduction Initiative, we have allocated approximately \$6.5 million in FY2000 funds to enhance Russian export controls through seminars, training and equipment. This constitutes a significant increase in funding for U.S. export control assistance for Russia. These funds will be used to expand the Commerce Department-led program to help the GOR install ICPs at hundreds of Russian entities. They also will fund the Department of Energy's Second Line of Defense Program with Russian Customs to enhance Russia's ability to detect and prevent illicit transfers of nuclear materials at key Russian transit points. We will continue to target our assistance on Russian export control enforcement to support effective implementation of the new law.

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

Drafted: NP/ECNP:Mfooks x74724

Np/ecnp/fooksmd/000508potusexcon.doc

Cleared: NP:Jbarker - ok
NP/ECNP:Jsmaldone - ok
EUR/PRA:Teggert - ok
T:Jtimbie - ok
P:Swhite/Dshields/JStevens - ok
D:Tcynkin - ok
S/P:Lfeinstein/Astent - ok
PM/RSAT:Ptinsley - ok
S/NIS/C:JBaldwin - ok
Commerce:Dhurley - ok

MC 8

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001e. briefing paper	Background Paper: Counternarcotics (4 pages)	05/17/2000	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Speechwriting (Paul Orzulak)
OA/Box Number: 4023

FOLDER TITLE:

[European Union] [2]

2008-0702-F
jm212

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

UNCLASSIFIED

**BACKGROUND PAPER
PLUTONIUM DISPOSITION**

Plutonium disposition advances key U.S. and Russian arms control and nonproliferation interests by safely, securely and transparently disposing of weapon-grade plutonium declared excess to defense needs by each country. While reducing proliferation risks associated with Russian plutonium from dismantled weapons, the agreement will establish a framework for providing a significant investment in Russia and advance shared political interests.

Following the 1998 U.S./Russia Summit statement, negotiating teams have nearly completed an agreement with the goals, schedules, monitoring principles, and conditions, including irreversibility, for each side's program. One major obstacle remains -- liability protection for U.S. entities and personnel that would work on the project in Russia. Sandy Berger and Leon Fuerth have been working with their counterparts to find a way forward on this issue before your June Summit and to have the agreement signed prior to the Okinawa G-8 Summit in late July.

Implementation of the bilateral agreement is conditioned on developing financing for Russia's program. The U.S. program is expected to cost \$4.1 billion which Congress is expected to fully fund. In addition, Congress appropriated \$200 million to assist Russia's program, and you have pledged another \$200 million through your Expanded Threat Reduction Initiative. All this is keyed to completion of the agreement and gaining commitments on the order of a billion in additional international support for the Russian program.

The G-8 endorsed efforts to gain support at previous summits and recognized the need to assist Russia's program. At the Okinawa Summit, we are pressing for a G-8 commitment to secure international funding and develop the multilateral framework for cooperation by the 2001 Summit, along with additional resource commitments where possible. Completing the U.S./Russia agreement is key to getting the G-8 commitments we seek.

UNCLASSIFIED

Drafted: NP/PTR:MCurry 6-7692 9 May '00
e:\\NPptr\\CurryMR\\pu general\\potus briefer.doc

Cleared:

NP/FO:JDeThomas (ok)
NP/PTR:SAoki (ok)
NP/FM:MGuhin (ok)
EUR/PRA:JReichert (ok)
S/NIS/C:KSavit (ok)
AC/ST:KHodgdon (ok)
D:TCynkin (ok)
P:DSields (ok)
S/P:AStent (ok)
T:JTimbie (ok)
DOE NN-60:LHolgate (ok)
OSD:SKoch (ok)
OMB:ERobinson (ok)

WEL JX

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001f. briefing paper	Background Paper: Expanded Threat Reduction Initiative (ETRI) (3 pages)	05/17/2000	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Speechwriting (Paul Orzulak)
OA/Box Number: 4023

FOLDER TITLE:

[European Union] [2]

2008-0702-F

jm212

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

BACKGROUND PAPER
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION PROTOCOL

Since inception of negotiations (1995) in Geneva on a legally binding compliance Protocol to the BWC, Russia has remained isolated in its position on nearly all key areas of the "rolling text." It opposes any on-site activities short of challenge investigations and insists on defining key terms of Article I of the Convention (such as "biological weapons") in order to limit the scope of its prohibitions. Although Russia continues to demand the UN Security Council mediate disputes over non-compliance, it has now agreed to a small BWC oversight organization (without UNSC veto).

Russia made clear last fall in Geneva and Moscow that it did not welcome BWC as an agenda item for G-8 expert or Political Director discussion. It did join the other BWC Depositaries, the U.S. and UK, in issuing a March 27 joint statement commemorating the 25th Anniversary of the Convention. The original draft was significantly watered down, allowing for Moscow's minimalist position in the Geneva Ad Hoc Group.

Recognizing the state of the negotiations, the United States recently made a proposal to demonstrate our flexibility and move the negotiations forward. We signaled willingness to engage in the debate over export controls and proposed dropping certain data declarations proposals. We will not accept any regime that undermines rather than strengthens national and international efforts to curb the proliferation of BW.

The U.S. is committed to trying to complete work on the BWC Protocol before the Fall 2001 Review Conference, as agreed by States Parties at the 1996 Review Conference.

/
Drafted:AC/CBW - JGromoll
Doc #93249 7x8778 5/8/00

Cleared:AC/CBW:DMahley - ok
AC/MCA - MLekson - ok
AC/CB - RMikulak - ok
VC/CCB - KWard - ok
NP/CBM - RVTersch - ok
EUR/PRA - TEggert - ok
T - JTimbie - ok
L - DBush - ok
D - TCynkin - ok
P - DShields - ok
NSC/S - EHarris - ok
OSD/NPP - SKoch - ok

ncs

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001g. briefing paper	Background Paper: European Security (2 pages)	05/17/2000	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Speechwriting (Paul Orzulak)
OA/Box Number: 4023

FOLDER TITLE:

[European Union] [2]

2008-0702-F

jm212

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001h. briefing paper	Background Paper: Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty (2 pages)	05/17/2000	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Speechwriting (Paul Orzulak)
OA/Box Number: 4023

FOLDER TITLE:

[European Union] [2]

2008-0702-F

jm212

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

UNCLASSIFIED

**BACKGROUND PAPER
OVERVIEW OF U.S. ASSISTANCE TO RUSSIA**

From FY92-99, the USG assistance budget for Russia totaled \$7.26 billion. Assistance in FY00 will be \$1.06 billion. More than two-thirds of this budget is for threat reduction and non-proliferation activities (see separate paper). The remaining funds are used to assist Russia's economic and democratic transition, and to provide humanitarian food assistance. This year, the combination of flat Congressional appropriations and a significant increase in security-related programs means that funding for market and democratic reform programs declined. AID funding was reduced by nearly 30%.

We have moved away from providing technical advice on economic and democratic transition to the central government and are now promoting change from the bottom-up: helping regions and cities introduce market reforms; bolstering small business; bringing Russians to the U.S. on exchanges to learn about market democracy; and promoting partnerships among cities, universities, hospitals, businesses and civic groups.

Our grassroots approach to assistance has meant an emphasis on exchange programs aimed at students, entrepreneurs and others. 5,000 Russians will visit the U.S. this year alone, including 1,800 young political leaders through the Library of Congress' Russian Leadership Program. Other programs provide direct support and skills transfers to NGOs and independent media to ensure their survival and growth. Economic programs focus outside Moscow, and emphasize training and credit for small business, and the creation of a market policy infrastructure. We recently chose Tomsk in Siberia as the fourth site for our Regional Initiative, which focuses USG assistance on progressive Russian regions (potential models of success).

The small amount of our remaining assistance to the GOR is targeted in those areas where we can advance reform and U.S. interests. Advisors from our Treasury Department continue to work with the GOR on modernizing tax administration because of progress in this area. We also provide advisors to facilitate Russia's entry in the WTO. And we work with Russian government bodies in other high priority areas, such as law enforcement and combatting the spread of TB and HIV/AIDS.

Last fall, the GOR requested five million tons of donated grain for 2000. In light of Russia's improving economic performance, we decided to provide only 500,000 tons of food aid to be targeted at vulnerable groups in Russian society.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Drafted: S/NIS/C:DRosenblum
5/12/00, Summit-Russia Assistance

Cleared: S/NIS/C:CKupchan--ok
EUR/RUS:RKiene--ok
USAID:MKarbeling--ok
D:KDoherty--ok
P:Swhite--INFO
E:Jkessler--ok
S/P:RHerman--ok
NP:ROliver--ok
S/NIS:JBeyrle--INFO

mcc

UNCLASSIFIED

The Kremlin

The Moscow Kremlin (fortress) is the ancient residence of the rulers of Moscow. It is surrounded by brick walls and towers and, with neighboring Red Square, forms the heart of Moscow. In the 14th century, the first cathedrals and residences were built. Cathedral Square is the focal point, surrounded by gold-domed churches. The Kremlin also contains several palaces, official administration buildings, a theater where Party Congresses were previously held, and a small garden that overlooks the river.

The Great Kremlin Palace was built in the 15th century, attaining its present-day shape in the mid-19th century, and was the residence of the Imperial family. It is a good example of the Russian palace décor of the period, with lavish interiors and furnishings, and was renovated in recent years. This is the primary location for large state events and ceremonies, such as Putin's inauguration.

The former Senate building, visible from Red Square, has been the official residence of the Russian president since 1991. It was built in the classical style under orders of Catherine II in the late 18th century; it was renovated after 1991 to restore its classical decor. Smaller state events and meetings are often held in the residence.

The Kremlin Wall bordering Alexandrov Gardens houses the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier and the memorials to the Hero Cities of World War Two. The President has visited the Tomb to lay a wreath twice before. Alexandrov Gardens borders Manezh Square, which includes an underground mall and outdoor sculptures and fountains.

Spaso House

Since 1933, Spaso House has been the residence of American Ambassadors to Moscow. The house was completed in 1914 for a wealthy merchant and manufacturer. It is in the New Empire Style, with a bright yellow façade and a green dome, and is of an impressive scale. After the Revolution, all such private homes were appropriated for State use and Spaso House was offered to the first American ambassador to the Soviet Union, who arrived in 1933. Spaso House has hosted several memorable events, been described in many novels, and hosted many famous guests. It was redecorated in 1995, restoring the home to its original style. It boasts an 82 foot-long hall, crowned by a domed ceiling, with the largest house chandelier in Moscow. It also has a large dining room, a ballroom, and several side rooms appropriate for small meetings.

Cathedral of Christ the Savior

Completed in the 1830's, the original Christ the Savior Cathedral was built to commemorate the Russian defeat of Napoleon. The Cathedral was destroyed in 1931 under Stalin, who originally intended to build a monumental skyscraper on the site. (This was to be the centerpiece of central Moscow -- the "Seven Sister" skyscrapers that ring the city were modeled on its design.) When the ground proved too marshy for such a large building, a swimming pool was installed instead. After the breakup of the Soviet Union, the city of Moscow and a large group of corporate contributors succeeded in building a replica of the original Christ the Savior, which opened to the public in 1999. A museum about the history of the site fills the lower floor of the cathedral, and the rooftop boasts a spectacular view of Moscow.

Victory Park

Mosque

Completed in 1997, this mosque, located in Victory Park, is dedicated to Muslim victims of World War II (known as the Great Patriotic War in Russia). It is a small, graceful three-story structure elaborately decorated in hand-carved stone, and graced by a crescent-shaped chandelier. Construction was financed by the city of Moscow. Prayers are conducted five times daily for a small number of regular worshippers.

Jewish Heritage and Holocaust Museum (Poklonnaya Gora Synagogue)

Located on the grounds of Victory Park and inaugurated in 1998, this synagogue and museum is dedicated to victims of the Holocaust. Media magnate and President of the Russian Jewish Congress Vladimir Gusinskiy was the primary donor and organizer. The ground floor contains a small synagogue; the lower level features a multi-media presentation about the Holocaust, as well as an exhibit designed in cooperation with Russian state museums, archives and the Holocaust Foundation.