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LEVEL 1 - 54 OF 278 STORIES

Copyright 1999 News World Communications, Inc.
The Washington Times

May 27, 1999, Thursday, Final Edition

SECTION: PART A; COMMENTARY; Pg. A18

LENGTH: 718 words

HEADLINE: Clinton's China policy freefall

BYLINE: William Rusher

BODY:

President Clinton's foreign policies are not famous for either clarity or consistency, but in the case of China, his policy has been relatively straightforward. After castigating President Bush during the 1992 campaign for coddling the Chinese communist tyrants, Mr. Clinton promptly turned around and made appeasing them one of his primary foreign objectives.

First, after vowing to maintain the link, he decoupled Most Favored Nation trading status from Beijing's disgraceful performance on human rights. The administration's explanation was that "engaging" China in profitable trade would inevitably result in a loosening of the Communist Party's stranglehold on the nation's politics. It certainly has not worked out that way, but the businessmen who were eager to do business with China were profoundly grateful to Mr. Clinton anyhow.

Then the administration began issuing licenses to favored American companies to sell China all sorts of highly technical, highly classified information they needed to advance their nuclear missile program. This information dovetailed nicely with other technical data that Chinese spies at Los Alamos, N.M., and elsewhere had stolen between 1984 and 1999. (There is, by the way, no point in getting mad at the Chinese for stealing it. All countries spy. The heads that should roll belong to the U.S. officials who, when the espionage was discovered, failed either to nail the spies or even close the barn door.)

The visits of Chinese President Jiang Zemin and Prime Minister Zhu Rongji to this country, and Mr. Clinton's own trip to mainland China, took place in this atmosphere of puppy-dog friendliness on the part of the administration.

That is the context in which we must consider NATO's accidental bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, which destroyed the building and killed three persons. I would have paid a high price to be a fly on a nearby wall when Mr. Clinton was told about it.

The bombing was "accidental" in the sense NATO didn't think the building was the Chinese Embassy. (They thought it was part of Yugoslavia's military infrastructure and hence a legitimate target.) But its destruction was no accident: NATO intended to hit that particular building, and did - with missiles aimed from three different directions.



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A New York Times reporter in Beijing reported that "outlandish as it may seem," almost everybody there thinks the bombing was deliberate - i.e., that NATO knew what it was bombing. Here we are not helped by our own propaganda, which routinely depicts U.S. (and hence NATO) weapons as fearsomely "smart." But they do as they are told - and they were told, in this case, by intelligence officers using an out-of-date map.

But the communist bosses in Beijing know perfectly well Mr. Clinton had no intention whatever to bomb their embassy. Their deliberate encouragement of youthful rioters at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing, therefore, had uglier motives than outrage. One, probably, was to drain the accumulated venom in the riot-prone sections of the population before the 10th anniversary of the slaughter in Tienanmen Square on June 4. But the swiftness and vigor with which China has moved to condemn the United States in the United Nations and before the bar of world opinion in general can only have the purpose of diminishing U.S. power and prestige - an ambition China presumably would not have if it really thought of itself as the "strategic partner" Mr. Clinton is fond of calling it.

This incident, therefore, enables us to look directly at the unmasked faces of China's rulers, and it is not a pretty sight. Given the opportunity, they would destroy the United States without a moment's thought. Their pretense of a readiness for friendship is merely that - a pretense, to be cast aside when the opportunity arises to do real damage to this country.

It follows that Mr. Clinton's policy of "engagement" is fundamentally mistaken. The People's Republic of China is not America's friend, or potential friend, capable of being sweet-talked into good behavior. At bottom, it is our enemy. It is still, in most respects, a weak enemy. But it will go for the U.S. jugular whenever it sees an opportunity.

William A. Rusher is a nationally syndicated columnist.

GRAPHIC: Cartoon, STUDENTS, By Gary Markstein/Milwaukee Journal Sentinel (Copley News Service)

LANGUAGE: ENGLISH

LOAD-DATE: May 27, 1999



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LEVEL 1 - 65 OF 278 STORIES

Copyright 1999 Chicago Tribune Company
Chicago Tribune

May 14, 1999 Friday, CHICAGOLAND FINAL EDITION

SECTION: COMMENTARY; Pg. 23; ZONE: N

LENGTH: 840 words

HEADLINE: U.S. MUST FINALLY ADOPT A REALISTIC POLICY TOWARD CHINA

BYLINE: Georgie Anne Geyer, Universal Press Syndicate.

DATELINE: WASHINGTON

BODY:

If illusions had weight, there would have been earthquakes as they fell to Earth this last week from Brussels to Beijing to Belgrade. If utopian geopolitical dreams had gravity, they would by now be stuck helplessly all over the flowering bushes of this lovely spring city.

After the tragic accidental bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade--and then after the "spontaneous" demonstrations by "enraged" Chinese against the U.S. Embassy in Beijing--nothing is ever going to be the same. We have seen, once again, the ancient true face of the "new China."

Indeed, the Beijing regime has unmasked itself as so remarkably in lock step with the worst Chinese communists of the past that one has to conclude that all the incredible economic progress of the largest country in the world has led to few political or psychological changes. It is the old communist "Big Lie," all over again.

In Beijing's government-organized demonstrations, even the religious groups marched in serried ranks reminiscent of the great buried stone warriors of Xian: first, the Buddhist monks, then the Tibetan monks, Taoists, Roman Catholics, Protestants and Muslims.

And by carefully orchestrating all of this, the Chinese government has shown, beyond the shadow of a doubt, that even well before the bombing, it had entered into a new period of virulent anti-Americanism.

This has been coming for a long time, but it has been covered up by the Clinton administration's persistence in believing that China is a new "strategic partner," which will suddenly drop all of its historical imperatives to rule Asia if only we pump in enough supposedly transformational technology and investment. That illusion can now no longer be sustained. Perhaps Robert Kagan, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace here, put it best when he wrote on The New York Times op-ed page after the week's events: "While administration officials continue to yearn for a 'strategic partnership'



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Chicago Tribune, May 14, 1999

with Beijing, **China's** leaders make no effort to conceal the fact they consider the United States an enemy--or more precisely the enemy. How else can one interpret the Chinese government's response to the bombing?"

One must keep in mind that there now exists in this brave new world of "instant communications" an information-deprived axis that stretches from Belgrade to Beijing and even to Moscow.

Most people know that, since 1989, through a total control of communications and the Serbians' minds, Slobodan Milosevic has mesmerized his people with dreams of being a super-race. But few realize that the Chinese government also has allowed nothing to be printed or broadcast about the Serbs' mass killing; they blame every "aggression" on NATO. That same information blackout has been present every day in Russia as well, although the firing of hard-line Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov may change that.

So, after seven years of Clintonesque utopian foreign policy toward these countries, instead of coming together with us, they are actually forming a new "paranoid bloc" (my term). It is now Moscow, Belgrade and Beijing against NATO and the Islamic world. But remember, the "new NATO" bloc is no longer only central and northern Europe and the United States. NATO and NATO wannabes today are 19 nations at the core, plus 25 related countries, plus a rapidly expanding NATO consciousness that reaches even into faraway central Asia and the Black Sea nations. NATO constitutes the most progressive parts of the world.

What next? Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who has been a prime proponent of engagement, now finds himself more critical. He said this week: "First of all, we should stop apologizing. We made clear it was an accident. But **China** is opposed to our policy in Yugoslavia--they think it threatens (their control of) their own minorities. And so **China** is making a bet that the U.S. will not engage them at any cost. No. We should not be that reckless. We should continue with our policies."

Meanwhile, as the demonstrations in Beijing were turned off midweek, the government said that a penitent United States must 1) abandon the idea of including Taiwan in the proposed development of a U.S.-backed defense umbrella in **China**; 2) approve **China's** bid to join the World Trade Organization immediately and, 3) dismiss allegations of the Chinese theft of American nuclear secrets.

The next problem is American, not Chinese. It is whether President Clinton will finally adopt a realistic policy toward **China**.

If he does not--if he still insists upon treating **China** as an equivalent of, say, Britain or Germany--then NATO could still lose the war in Kosovo. For if Clinton permits any final Kosovo negotiation to be under the UN Security Council, where **China** and Russia both have a veto, then he will have put this terrible conflict in the hands of the enemies of NATO's intentions and the conflict's solutions.

He who lives by the sword dies by the sword? Maybe. He who lives by the illusion dies by the illusion? Certainly.

LANGUAGE: ENGLISH



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LEVEL 1 - 10 OF 20 STORIES

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The New York Post

April 25, 1999, Sunday

SECTION: All Editions; Pg. 055

LENGTH: 559 words

HEADLINE: OUR **CHINA** POLICY MUST MOVE BEYOND GESTURE

BYLINE: HENRY A. **KISSINGER**

BODY:

A **AMERICAN** policy faces no greater challenge than to define a steady course toward **China**.

China must be left in no doubt that America will resist attempts by any power to dominate Asia. But it must also be made to feel that, within these limits, the United States is prepared for a constructive relationship with a growing and developing **China**, and to integrate **China** increasingly in the international political and economic order.

A sustainable Sino-American relationship requires something beyond presidential invocations of "engagement" that imply that contact between the two societies will automatically remove all latent tensions, or of a "strategic partnership" whose content is never defined.

A symbol of that preoccupation with form over substance was President **Clinton's** visit to **China** in the summer of 1998 when, during a nine-day sojourn, only two hours of high-level conversations took place. And the gyrations during **Zhu Rongji's** visit with respect to WTO membership are unlikely to instill respect in **Beijing** for the steadiness of our course.

Issues like nonproliferation, the future of North Korea and restraint in conflicts in areas such as Southeast Asia and the Middle East require frequent high-level dialogue. Indeed, they are the test of whether the two sides' geopolitical interests can be harmonized.

The two toughest obstacles to improved Sino-American relations are human rights and Taiwan.

Human rights has become a central feature of **AMERICAN** policy sustained by administrations of both parties. And new Social Democratic governments in Europe are pursuing similar priorities. Prime Minister **Zhu Rongji** seems to have understood this, judging by his comments to various American media.

The challenge will be how to bring these new perspectives into some relationship to other goals. Human-rights activists must match their new



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influence with a broader vision. No single issue can possibly dominate a relationship as complex as that of the United States and China. Passion must not obscure the reality that China's political evolution is an internal and historical process not easily manipulated from the outside.

No issue in Sino-American relations is more neuralgic than Taiwan. For China, Taiwan represents an inalienable part of the national territory and has been formally so recognized by every American president since Franklin Roosevelt. This implies a moral obligation to stop short of acts implying Taiwan's sovereign political independence, either bilaterally or in the U.N. context.

By the same token, every American president - as well as Congress in the Taiwan Relations Act - has affirmed a deep commitment to a peaceful solution. We must understand that China cannot accept this as a legal obligation; but China would be wise to recognize it as a fact of life within which relations in the Taiwan Straits must evolve. All this requires unusual delicacy by both sides - in fact, on all three sides.

The Clinton administration has an obligation to go beyond the words "engagement" and "strategic partnership" as the key solvent of all Sino-American difficulties. But its critics have an obligation to develop a vision commensurate with the vastness and historical sweep of the challenge.

GRAPHIC: President Clinton and Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji at their April 8 joint press conference. AP

LANGUAGE: ENGLISH

LOAD-DATE: April 25, 1999



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LEVEL 1 - 74 OF 278 STORIES

Copyright 1999 Globe Newspaper Company
The Boston Globe

April 25, 1999, Sunday ,City Edition

SECTION: OP-ED; Pg. C7

LENGTH: 822 words

HEADLINE: Big business calls the shots on **China**;

ROBERT KUTTNER;

Robert Kuttner's is co-editor of The American Prospect. His column appears regularly in the Globe.

BYLINE: By Robert Kuttner

BODY:

The trade negotiations with **China**, which stalled and then suddenly restarted, reveal much about who really dictates the priorities of our **China** policy. In a word: business...

China desperately wants entry into the World Trade Organization, not only to improve access to global markets but to gain a seal of approval. This poses a vexing policy question.

On the one hand, here is a huge, slowly liberalizing country, a dominant Asian power, with more than a billion souls. On the other hand, as a recovering totalitarian regime, **China** still denies basic political liberties, still treats factory workers like serfs, and lately got caught conducting some nasty espionage operations against the United States.

The **Clinton** policy of constructive engagement is broadly sensible, but it still leaves open all the difficult particulars - what carrots, what sticks, what pace of rewards to exchange for what liberalizations inside **China**?

Earlier this month, with a trade deal virtually done and **China's** Prime Minister Zhu Rongji in Washington for the historic handshake, President Clinton abruptly killed the deal, apparently fearing broad opposition on Capitol Hill.

The doubters in Congress include four distinct factions. Many Republicans and Democrats think **China** has not yet demonstrated enough progress toward eventual democracy to be rewarded with full WTO membership. The 1974 Jackson-Vanik amendment explicitly prohibits full trade privileges for undemocratic nations.

Then there are "protectionists" in both parties, this time with more credibility than usual, since **China** enjoys a \$60 billion trade surplus with the United States, which it obtains by getting far more access to US consumer



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The Boston Globe, April 25, 1999

markets than it gives. The proposed trade deal only remedies part of this asymmetry, given **China's** huge state-owned, subsidized, and protected sector.

Another group, mostly Republicans, holds that **China**, having lately mounted both bribery and nuclear espionage operations, should not now be rewarded with WTO membership. At the other end of the spectrum, most liberal Democrats insist that **China** in particular and the WTO in general should be more mindful of labor and environmental standards as criteria of fair commerce. Just as countries that ignore intellectual property rights are denied full WTO status, labor rights should be a condition of entry, too.

So while there is not a positive majority in Congress with a coherent **China** policy, there may well be a negative majority with the power to block.

But within a week, remarkably, Clinton was begging Zhu to restart talks and to expect an early deal. Part of the reason was diplomatic. Clinton's **China** experts feared a massive loss of credibility at home for the prime minister, who is a relative moderate and modernizer.

What really turned Clinton around, however, was a massive campaign of corporate lobbying. The **China** deal, though flawed, promised American companies new access to Chinese markets - in banking, aircraft, insurance, public construction, and so on.

Business pursues profits above all else. If they can be obtained in a still totalitarian state that steals nuclear secrets, no problem. As for mistreatment of workers, many of the Asian factories with the worst labor records are already subsidiaries, partners, or producers for US corporations - kindred spirits.

A parade of corporate CEOs, working closely with Zhu, commenced a massive public relations campaign. This past Thursday Clinton announced that he would seek a congressional vote this summer on both **China** WTO membership and normal trade status in time for the November meeting of WTO ministers in Seattle. Congress, evidently, is also amenable to business lobbying.

To get the flavor of who really calls the shots, consider a letter that recently went to corporate CEOs from a quasi-official body called the WTO Seattle Ministerial Host Organization, chaired by Phil Condit, CEO of Boeing, and Bill Gates of Microsoft. For a donation of \$250,000, the letter offered, an "Emerald Level" corporate sponsor could send five guests to the ministerial dinners and receptions. A "Diamond Level" donation (\$150,000-\$249,999) gets you four seats and other lesser perks.

Sponsors who sign on by May 1 get to "meet with senior US trade officials to discuss priorities for the upcoming [trade] Round"; and preferential seating at the formal dinner with ministers and heads of state will be assigned based partly on contributions. Shades of the International Olympic Committee!

At \$250,000 a pop, few labor or environmental representatives will be present. Maybe the CIA should dip into petty cash to buy a ticket so that espionage concerns can be raised.

This explicit auctioning of access is, of course, outrageous and possibly illegal. But it only reflects the reality that business interests are drowning



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out all others in our **China** policy.

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Copyright 1999 The Washington Post
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April 12, 1999, Monday, Final Edition

SECTION: OP-ED; Pg. A23

LENGTH: 898 words

HEADLINE: Clinton's Capitulation on China

BYLINE: David Ignatius

BODY:

President Clinton did something so shortsighted and potentially costly last week in scuttling a trade deal with China that you begin to wonder if the Kosovo policy jinx is spreading to Asia.

Some Clinton insiders just shake their heads in chagrin when asked to explain why the president backed away from a deal that would have opened Chinese markets as a condition for Chinese entry into the World Trade Organization. They concede that the reason for Clinton's last-minute reversal was entirely political: He wanted to appease protectionist congressional Democrats and avoid what might look to critics like an embarrassing concession to visiting Chinese leader Zhu Rongji.

Clinton's flip-flop on the WTO sullies one of the few areas -- free trade -- where he reasonably can claim to have acted consistently on principle, rather than short-term politics. In that sense, it's a measure of just how weak Clinton has become -- that he would sabotage his legacy to gain a few weeks' respite from criticism.

The administration is betting that it can tiptoe back to Beijing and salvage a WTO deal before Labor Day. But that's a risky bet about an issue that Clinton himself has rightly said is crucial to America's economic future. No other country has more to gain from a free and open Chinese economy than we do.

The larger danger of Clinton's WTO decision is that it could exacerbate China's economic troubles just as a fragile recovery is beginning elsewhere in Asia.

Something quite amazing has been happening the past few months in South Korea and Thailand -- two of the countries that were hardest hit by the Asian financial crisis: Their economies are beginning to recover, like resilient buds of spring after a brutally nasty winter.

The financial markets already are signaling a turnaround. Stock market indexes in Seoul and Bangkok roughly have doubled from their lows of last year. Meanwhile, interest rates for Korean and Thai debt have fallen -- with spreads



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between their debt and that of Western countries moving toward pre-crisis levels.

"For the countries closest to the crisis, the worst seems to be over," says Tom Byrne, the senior Asia analyst at Moody's Investor Service. Moody's recently upgraded South Korea's bond rating, back to its pre-crisis "investment grade" level; Moody's rates Thai debt one notch below that of Korea.

More important than the simple fact of recovery in Korea and Thailand are the reasons for it. Strong governments have taken first steps to break the stranglehold of "crony capitalism" on those economies. Insolvent banks have been allowed to fail; inefficient companies have been forced to restructure operations; asset prices have been free to fall to levels where the market can clear -- and rebuilding can begin.

These structural changes -- as potent in their way as China's transition from communism to capitalism -- are encouraging Western investors to lend money again. Analysts caution that there's still much to be done in Korea and Thailand -- the process of clearing away corrupt and inefficient business is only beginning. And some worry that the Koreans and Thais will now ease up, dissipating the gains they've made so far.

But Lawrence Summers, deputy Treasury secretary and the administration's chief fireman during the Asian mess, thinks some crisis countries are beginning to turn the corner.

"Where countries have been able to carry through on their reform commitments -- as in Korea, Thailand and the Philippines -- results are starting to come in the form of lower interest rates, new investment and increased growth," says Summers.

Japan remains mired in a deep recession -- clouding prospects for regional recovery. But even in Tokyo, financial markets are signaling hope that a recovery is ahead. The Nikkei index of leading Japanese stocks is up more than 25 percent this year in yen terms, on hopes that the government's huge stimulus package finally will get the economy moving.

The Asian recovery, when it gets rolling, should be as rapid and surprising as the financial typhoon that swamped the region's economies in 1997. The recent news from Korea and Thailand is encouraging -- a sign that the harsh medicine prescribed by the Clinton administration and the IMF may be working as intended.

But that recovery is still fragile, and the most delicate factor may be China. A year and a half ago, during the darkest days of the Asian crisis, China was our most reliable economic ally in the region. An important reason the crisis didn't become even worse was that Zhu Rongji kept his promises to maintain economic growth and avoid devaluation.

Now the Chinese economy is looking shakier. China's exports and economic growth are slowing, and foreign investment is shrinking. Some U.S. officials fear the pressures are building for a Chinese devaluation, which could trigger a disastrous wave of competitive devaluations by other Asian economies. The failure of Zhu's visit won't make things any easier. That's a problem for Zhu, but it's also a problem for the United States.



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The Washington Post, April 12, 1999

Clinton's political capitulation on the WTO was a sorry example for a supposed superpower. You might almost call it "crony capitalism." Clinton could learn something from the more principled, disciplined leaders whose tough decisions are nurturing a revival in South Korea and Thailand.

GRAPHIC: ILL, ,OHLSSON

LANGUAGE: ENGLISH

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Copyright 1999 News World Communications, Inc.
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April 6, 1999, Tuesday, Final Edition

SECTION: PART A; COMMENTARY; OP-ED; Pg. A19

LENGTH: 1137 words

HEADLINE: Who lost China again?

BYLINE: Frank Keating

BODY:

Fifty years ago, when American intelligence officials told President Harry Truman that the Soviet Union had exploded its first atomic bomb, he was described as flabbergasted.

"Are you sure?" Truman demanded. "Are you sure?" They were, and they soon told the President why: An elaborate Soviet espionage ring had stolen key A-bomb secrets from the Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico, allowing our new Cold War foe to achieve nuclear capability years ahead of schedule. There were also Soviet spies in Truman's administration, including Alger Hiss and others who had occupied sensitive sub-Cabinet posts, often with direct influence on policy. Soon, Truman was bristling defensively at Republican speakers who asked, "Who lost China?"

Though an honorable man with many virtues, "Give-em-hell" Harry was slow to believe that American security had been so thoroughly penetrated, and slower still to act. As the pursuit of Hiss built to an eventual perjury conviction, Truman mockingly called the case "a red herring." He failed to contradict a statement by his own secretary of state that seemed to place South Korea outside America's security sphere; one result was the Korean War. Truman never seemed to comprehend why he became an unelectable lame duck by 1951. In fact, many Americans simply didn't trust him to defend the nation's vital interests against communism, a suspicion that was to plague Democratic presidential candidates for more than four decades. Democratic presidents, many Americans felt, were forever shutting the barn door after some Russian spy had made off with the livestock. They were . . . soft on communism.

Fast forward a half-century: Recently, Americans learned that a Chinese espionage operation may have once again penetrated Los Alamos and stolen technology that allows the miniaturization of nuclear warheads. Is this important? Look at a globe; it's a long way from China to San Francisco. The smaller the warheads, the smaller the rocket required to loft them across the Pacific, or from a submerged submarine well off shore. When you are separated from a potential enemy by half a world, smaller is definitely better. Warhead size is a potent strategic advantage.

While the Chinese thefts of sensitive information apparently occurred in the 1980s, there is reason to believe that the leaks, and the precise nature of what had been compromised, were not fully isolated until 1996. That's when the FBI



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launched an espionage investigation, according to published reports this week. President Clinton apparently did not order increased security until sometime in 1997.

Unfortunately, he took his time telling Congress and the American people. Sen. John McCain called the administration's failure to share information about the leaks "incredibly disturbing." Sen. Richard Shelby said his Intelligence Committee has "been pushing, we've been prodding the administration to do more, to tighten up security." Rep. Chris Cox has produced a report that details intensive Chinese efforts to buy or steal American defense technology. Perhaps most troubling of all is speculation that the administration may have stonewalled news of Chinese espionage during congressional investigations of 1996 fundraising scandals that involved the Chinese government and the Democratic party. In 1949, Republicans asked, "Who lost China?" In 1999, they are right to demand, "Is the Clinton administration's China policy in the best interests of the United States?"

The recent revelations about Chinese espionage must be viewed against a most disturbing background:

- * The Clinton administration has consistently supported efforts by American companies to sell sensitive technology to the People's Republic of China, in the name of a policy of economic "engagement." Missile guidance and control systems provided by Loral, ostensibly to help launch commercial satellites, could also help aim stolen miniature warheads at Spokane.

- * The still-disturbing campaign finance scandals of 1996 may actually have involved the direct delivery of funds from the PRC military to the Clinton campaign. Imagine the uproar if, say, the 1952 Adlai Stevenson campaign had been found to have accepted bundles of cash from the Red Army!

- * No one has fully explained the shadowy connections of John Huang, a Clinton-appointed Department of Commerce official, to the Lippo Group, China Resources and other entities with apparent ties to Chinese intelligence. The Democratic National Committee, even during the 1996 campaign finance feeding frenzy, was sufficiently wary of Mr. Huang's \$3 million to refund at least half of those dollars, a step or two ahead of Senate investigators.

- * Johnny Chung's famed description of the Clinton White House as like a subway - "you have to put in cash to get through the gates" - was rivaled only by the president's mystifying and disturbing claim that "I don't believe you can find any evidence of the fact that I changed government policy (on technology sales to China) solely because of a contribution." "I don't believe you can find"? "Solely"? This from a man who quibbles over the definition of the verb "is" to avoid perjury charges.

The administration's China policy, like most of its other foreign engagements for the past six years, is difficult to define, but it echoes the naive doctrine of "peaceful coexistence" that dominated left-liberal thought for much of the Cold War: Be nice to them, trade with them and perhaps they won't gobble up too much territory or shoot too many people. In fact, there are reasons to be optimistic about China's ultimate destiny, given the free-market cravings so evident in her people. The bamboo curtain is more porous than the iron one ever was.



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Reasonable trade can carry the twin beneficial viruses of capitalism and political freedom, as we learned in eastern Europe in 1989. We should remember that capitalism helped Soviet communism rot, but it was Ronald Reagan's firm military and foreign policy that gave it a final shove. The Chinese people are not the Chinese regime, which is as out of touch with those it proposes to govern as Leonid Brezhnev's Soviet Union was in the 1970s. Giving modern missile technology to thugs like that is like lending your pistol to a mugger. Don't be surprised when you become a victim.

If Mr. Clinton is remembered primarily for the Lewinsky sleaziness, and for the other tawdry scandals that have plagued him since his first campaign, he will enter the textbooks as merely a bad joke. If his legacy is a resurgent, powerful and aggressive communist **China**, fattened on dangerously sloppy American trade and security policies, history will be far less kind, and Americans should be far less forgiving.

Frank Keating is governor of Oklahoma.

GRAPHIC: Illustration, NO CAPTION

LANGUAGE: ENGLISH

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The New York Times

April 5, 1999, Monday, Late Edition - Final

SECTION: Section A; Page 21; Column 1; Editorial Desk

LENGTH: 740 words

HEADLINE: Get Tough With China

BYLINE: By Paul Wellstone; Paul Wellstone is a Democratic Senator from Minnesota.

DATELINE: WASHINGTON

BODY:

In 1994, when President Clinton formally separated China's "most favored nation" trading status from its human rights record, he insisted that this did not diminish our commitment to pursuing a vigorous human rights policy. The Administration even went so far as to claim that economic growth and liberalization in China, fueled by increased trade with the United States, would actually promote political liberalization.

Five years down the road these assurances have proved to be empty rhetoric. Last fall the Chinese authorities undertook the toughest crackdown on dissidents since the Tiananmen Square massacre a decade ago. The State Department's own human rights report, released in February, acknowledged that "China's human rights record has deteriorated sharply over the past year." As that record has worsened, though, the 1994 "de-linkage" has turned into complete disassociation. Human rights and trade are no longer parts of the same overall policy package but are proceeding on completely separate tracks.

Two recent pronouncements dramatically demonstrate the contradictions -- if not downright schizophrenia -- of the current American approach. On the same day that Charlene Barshefsky, the United States trade representative, said she would travel to China to try to close the deal on China's entrance into the World Trade Organization, the State Department announced that the United States would sponsor a United Nations resolution condemning China's terrible human rights record.

While I welcome the decision on the resolution, having been co-author of a Senate resolution calling for just this approach, I am dismayed that momentum toward W.T.O. membership for China builds as if the human rights situation there is irrelevant.

A return to a formal link between trade and human rights policy is not in the cards under this President. But we should insure that the Chinese understand that commercial concerns alone will not determine our policy.



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The New York Times, April 5, 1999

As the Administration and Congress consider China's request for W.T.O. admission, we should insist that China, at a minimum, take concrete steps to establish an independent judiciary, a free press and respect for the rule of law. A government that routinely violates its own laws to crack down on dissent is equally likely to cheat on market access agreements, fail to honor contracts or restrict the free flow of business information from abroad. Congress should insist on voting on whether the President should support China's entry into the World Trade Organization before the Administration signs off on a W.T.O. deal.

This week Prime Minister Zhu Rongji will pay an official visit to Washington, the first by a Chinese Premier in 15 years. This is an opportunity for the President to tell the Chinese leader just why we are calling for United Nations condemnation of China's human rights abuses and signal to him that these abuses could jeopardize any W.T.O. decision.

Since President Clinton's visit to China last June, the Chinese Government has continued to commit abuses and has taken actions that flagrantly violate the commitments it has made to respect internationally recognized human rights. Restrictions on free expression have been tightened, including the adoption of strict regulations on the formation of nongovernmental political and social organizations and the imposition of tough regulations aimed at film directors, computer software developers, artists and journalists who "endanger social order."

Based on this deplorable record, the resolution we are sponsoring at the United Nations Commission on Human Rights is clearly justified. But simply introducing it is not enough. The Administration must commit to pushing for adoption, an effort that must include having the President, Vice President and members of the Cabinet lobby other countries, particularly those in the European Union. This will be an uphill battle because China has a big head start in its own lobbying, but it is preferable to sponsoring a resolution and then sitting on our hands to watch it fail.

Even if the resolution is not adopted, simply having a debate on human rights in China (and the related issue of human rights in Tibet) will make a difference. It is essential for the Administration to make clear that at this moment in history the United States stands with the courageous Chinese who are struggling to achieve the rights they deserve.

<http://www.nytimes.com>

LANGUAGE: ENGLISH

LOAD-DATE: April 5, 1999



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Copyright 1999 The New York Times Company
The New York Times

January 15, 1999, Friday, Late Edition - Final

SECTION: Section A; Page 23; Column 2; Editorial Desk

LENGTH: 611 words

HEADLINE: The Price of 'Engaging' China

BYLINE: By Robert Kagan; Robert Kagan is a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

BODY:

In the past six months the Chinese Government has carried out the most systematic crackdown on political rights since the Tiananmen Square massacre of 1989. Dozens of democratic activists have been arrested, hundreds more have been detained, and three leaders, Xu Wenli, Wang Youcai and Qin Yongmin, have been sentenced to long prison terms. Their crime? Taking President Clinton at his word.

It was Mr. Clinton who last year emboldened Chinese democrats to press their Government for modest reforms. At the June summit in Beijing, the President declared that free speech; free association and freedom of religion were "the right of people everywhere and should be protected by their governments."

Upon his return to the United States, Mr. Clinton said his visit had made it "more likely that political dissent would be more respected," and his national security adviser, Samuel Berger, said the meeting had proved that "through engagement" it is possible to "promote American values" and "advance the process of change in China." Administration officials declared that China's decision to sign the international covenant on human rights was further evidence that American policy was a success.

Chinese democrats took the President seriously. They seized the occasion of his visit last June to begin seeking approval from their Government to register a new opposition party through appropriate legal means. Wang Youcai, Xu Wenli and others did not take to the streets or challenge Communist control. They merely asked their Government to abide by the rule of law and by the principles of the human rights covenant.

They hoped that the Government would be reluctant to clamp down on dissent for fear of angering Mr. Clinton and cooling his desire to establish his "strategic partnership" with China.

They were wrong, and they have paid dearly. China's leaders seem confident that they will pay no significant price for the crackdown and that President Clinton will tolerate almost any misbehavior rather than change his policy of



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The New York Times, January 15, 1999

"engagement." So far, they are right. President Clinton has been silent. In fact, Administration officials, talking to reporters, have even begun criticizing the democrats for pressing too far and too fast.

The Administration is now twisting itself into a pretzel trying to defend its policy. In June, Mr. Berger said he hoped we would see that "through engagement you can get a lot of serious things done." Now that all the supposed fruits of engagement have proved illusory, Mr. Berger has pivoted, arguing that engagement is "even more important when the pendulum on human rights appears to be swinging back." In other words, engagement is the right policy when it is working, and it is even more right when it is not working.

Last year the Administration dropped efforts to seek a United Nations resolution to review China's human rights performance in exchange for China's agreement to sign the human rights covenant. Now that China's promise has proved meaningless, the Administration should lobby hard for the resolution. It might even find allies in Europe, where the new German Government has taken a tougher line on China. Commerce Secretary William Daley is planning a trip to China in the spring with some American business leaders. Would the Administration cancel it as a protest against the crackdown?

These are small steps, but they would demonstrate that President Clinton was not just playing for the crowds back home when he spoke those bold words about freedom in China last year. Those Chinese who took his words seriously, and who are now in jail, deserve more than a policy of blind engagement.

<http://www.nytimes.com>

GRAPHIC: Photo. (Art Hughes)

LANGUAGE: ENGLISH

LOAD-DATE: January 15, 1999



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LEVEL 1 - 12 OF 20 STORIES

Copyright 1998 The Houston Chronicle Publishing Company
The Houston Chronicle

June 28, 1998, Sunday 2 STAR EDITION

SECTION: OUTLOOK; Pg. 1

LENGTH: 2572 words

HEADLINE: Clinton in China;
No place for nostalgia in our China dealings

BYLINE: HENRY A. KISSINGER; This is another in the continuing series of articles that Kissinger, the former secretary of state, is writing for the Chronicle and other major newspapers

BODY:

I cannot recall when a president has left on a major foreign trip amidst so much controversy. The right wing of the Republican Party and the left wing of the Democratic Party either oppose President Clinton's trip to China or state conditions for it that are more compatible with confrontation than with stabilizing, much less improving, the relationship with the world's most populous country and second largest economy.

Republicans see China as a threat; Democrats view it as a laboratory for the spread of American values. Both view China through the prism of their parties' experiences over the last 30 years.

Republicans rightly see themselves as the party that has most consistently attended to U.S. security in recent decades. Democrats are justly proud of their long advocacy of civil and human rights. But with respect to China, too many in both parties substitute nostalgia for analysis of what our national interest requires.

I have often been critical of the foreign policy of the Clinton administration, disturbed about its discomfort with the role power plays in international affairs - most recently in the calamitous handling of the Persian Gulf crisis - and dismayed with its tendency to conduct foreign policy as an aspect of domestic politics. But on the trip to China, the president deserves bipartisan support. In the present global turmoil, nothing is to be gained by turning China into an enemy; much by exploring potential areas of common interest.

Unfortunately, too many Republicans have substituted China for the collapsed Soviet Union and seek to deal with it by the methods that accelerated the collapse of the Soviet empire: diplomatic confrontation, economic ostracism and ideological warfare. Too many Democrats act as if the principal goal of American policy should be to replicate our institutions and principles in China, even at the cost of our many other interests at stake in Asia and without regard for the



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complexities of Chinese history.

Still, each group has raised a number of serious issues.

Chinese proliferation of missile and some nuclear technology has been worrisome (though less so than that of countries with which we continue to cultivate friendly relations, such as Russia). Chinese human-rights practices have often fallen far short of desirable standards. Clearly, if China continues to grow at anything like the rate of the past two decades, it will be in a stronger position to oppose American interests politically.

No serious student of history can doubt that the emergence of China as a world power presents a serious challenge to American foreign policy. Such a process is never smooth (witness the emergence of Germany in the last century). Yet it will not go away by railing against it. It must be in our interest that China emerge as a responsible member of the international community with interest in regional and global stability and progress.

To be sure, this will not depend on American actions alone. And if, despite our most serious efforts to bring about a cooperative relationship, China should come to pose a direct threat to U.S. security or seek hegemony in Asia, we would surely resist that at any cost.

But our ability to sustain such an effort, were it to become necessary, would depend on having explored alternatives that are reasonable and, I believe - on the basis of recent conversations with Chinese leaders - available. It is an abdication to base America's policy toward China on the assumption that U.S. actions and policies cannot affect the evolution of Chinese policies, or that China is destined to be congenitally hostile to American interests. Such a course could lead to a disastrous self-fulfilling prophecy.

In its 5,000-year history of independence, China has resisted foreign pressures with extraordinary tenacity and intelligence. Do we really want to turn the world's most populous nation and second largest economy into an enemy at a time when Japan is in economic crisis, South Asia is entering the nuclear age, Indonesia is in turmoil, the Russian evolution is uncertain, the Persian Gulf unsettled and the Balkans on the brink of war? Should we treat China as an enemy when it has, on the whole, behaved responsibly on most of these issues?

China is seeking to improve relations with the United States in pursuit of its own interests, notably to sustain its economic reform. In pursuit of that goal, it has been prepared to adjust its policies in many areas. On human rights, considerable progress has been made in the years since the death of Mao Tse-tung. Abuses continue. Are they more likely to be improved by all-out confrontation or by the further integration of China into the international community?

Between great powers, a complete confluence of interests is rarely achieved. For example, more remains to be done on such issues as nuclear proliferation. But do these gaps justify the provocative needling implicit in so many congressional measures and of some of our public discourse? Why shouldn't the differences be the subject of a serious diplomatic dialogue? Are we so unsure of ourselves that we assume that such an approach is bound to fail to achieve our objectives?



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The Houston Chronicle June 28, 1998, Sunday

It cannot be an accident that every former president, secretary of state and national-security adviser - the people with the longest experience in dealing with the nation's foreign policy - reject the confrontational strategy urged by both the left and right wings of American politics. Nor would any other major power - or, for that matter, any country - join us in such a course.

Before going further, let me state that I head a consulting firm that advises a few clients with business interests in China. Anyone who, despite my record of fostering Sino-U.S. relations for nearly three decades (for most of which nobody did any business in China), believes that my views are for sale should stop reading here.

It is important to understand the distinction between the old Soviet Union and today's China. The Soviet Union avowed an ideology fundamentally hostile to our values, actively propagated it around the world and backed it up by supporting communist revolutionary parties bent on undermining the domestic cohesion of governments friendly to the United States. Moscow had deployed thousands of missiles and tens of thousands of warheads capable of reaching the United States. And it espoused a foreign policy that directly challenged American interests, occasionally including the threat of force.

None of this has been true of America's relations with China. Though Beijing describes its ideology as communist, in practice it bears no similarity to Moscow's Stalinist state-run economy. The economy in China is increasingly market-oriented; Beijing is making strenuous efforts to get rid of its state-run enterprises; its reform depends crucially on linking China to the world economy. China supports no political movement hostile to American interests and, except for Taiwan, does not challenge the existing world order. And Taiwan, as will be discussed below, is not considered a foreign-policy issue in Beijing.

There are overwrought scenarios that sketch an increasing Chinese military threat to the United States. Thirteen missiles are reported to be aimed at American cities and Chinese anti-ship missiles are supposed to pose a threat to our Navy. But can one seriously believe that China will take on the United States with 13 obsolescent liquid-fueled missiles in the face of 2,000 American strategic weapons and perhaps 15,000 warheads, not to speak of the thousands of ship-based warheads on cruise missiles and U.S. planes on aircraft carriers? (At any time, the United States has 96 Trident missiles on submarines, each with at least 10 warheads.) No doubt, Chinese military capacity will grow in tandem with its economic development. But it will not be a global military power for at least a quarter of a century. Is the United States so unsure of its capacity to maintain its supremacy that we must take pre-emptive action based on hypothetical perspectives?

Little in China's current or even historical performance justifies such an assumption. China's responsible conduct in the Asian crisis has demonstrated its interest in the region's economic and political stability. It has resisted strong pressures to devalue its currency, has kept its promise not to suppress political expression, including demonstrations commemorating Tiananmen in Hong Kong, and has supported the American objective of maintaining stability on the Korean peninsula.

China has adhered to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, as well as



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The Houston Chronicle June 28, 1998, Sunday

test-ban, biological and chemical-weapons conventions. It follows most of the guidelines of the Missile Technology Control Regime (though it is not a signatory and the United States has some legitimate complaints in this area). China has extended some nuclear help to Pakistan in ways that we cannot condone. But its purpose was not mischief-making, as is often alleged, but to establish some balance of power on the Indian subcontinent after the Indians tested nuclear explosives in 1974. This perhaps unwise policy is comparable to America's direct assistance to Britain, indirect help to France and acquiescence in the nuclear program of Israel. China has also proposed resumption of talks with Taiwan.

Should all this progress be jettisoned for the sake of preventing what China might do 25 years from now? Undoubtedly, if China continues to grow at the rate of the past 20 years, it will become perhaps the most powerful country in Asia. Its impact on its neighbors would magnify. But do we really want a showdown now to block what is inherent in the existence of China rather than its policies? It would be an unprecedented objective of American foreign policy to prevent the emergence of any potential major power. Such a neo-imperialist course would, sooner or later, unite China with the rest of the world against us.

No country has ever grown indefinitely at China's recent rate. And China is not doing so at this moment. But were Beijing, at whatever juncture, to pursue hegemonic policies, it would have to contend around its borders with many states of considerable strength. A wise America could forge a determined resistance among them. Which is the better course: to make Chinese hostility a self-fulfilling prophecy by the confrontational and provocative measures now being advocated; or to seek to establish a cooperative pattern at a moment when Chinese leaders seem uniquely receptive to it?

A cooperative relationship should be given a chance, and the president's trip should be the occasion for working on the substance of such a relationship. Neither side should act as if the visit itself is a concession or an opportunity to gain a unilateral advantage.

These principles should guide the presidential trip:

The United States and China are two great powers seeking to adjust potential differences and to fortify common purposes. The test of the meeting is the ability to harmonize interests and to take the sting out of disagreements. The key principle is reciprocity. A full and candid explanation by each side of its views of the international situation is an essential component of this process.

High priority must be given to encouraging restraint in troubled regions of Asia, especially in the Korean peninsula and the Indian subcontinent.

The United States and China are already pursuing largely parallel policies on the Korean peninsula. These should be strengthened by discussions designed to synchronize attitudes toward accidents, irrational acts (such as military offensives) and political upheavals.

With respect to the Indian subcontinent, the United States and China should avoid giving the impression that they have established a condominium to deprive the two emerging nuclear powers of their newfound capability. Rather, they should try to enlist Delhi and Karachi in a nonproliferation regime Washington



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The Houston Chronicle June 28, 1998, Sunday

and Beijing are themselves practicing. And they should use their influence to defuse political tensions between India and Pakistan.

The two sides should strengthen their efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and missile technology.

China has already joined a number of the international nuclear agreements described above. It has agreed to stop nuclear and missile cooperation with Iran. I have reason to believe that it is possible to persuade Beijing to take further steps, particularly toward developing bilateral arrangements for more stringent controls over the exports of nuclear, chemical and biological materials.

Efforts by both countries to calm the economic crisis in Asia should be coordinated to the greatest extent possible. This implies a full discussion of trade relations. The presence in Clinton's entourage of Secretary of the Treasury Robert Rubin and Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky should allow a full discussion of global economic issues of key concern to both countries. Chinese prosperity and Chinese cooperation are essential to Asian recovery. If the economy of Asia stays flat, and surely if it declines, the global economy would risk a worldwide recession.

Secretary Rubin could help allay Chinese concerns that America opposes Chinese devaluation while acquiescing to, or even encouraging, Japan's, which threatens to undermine the exports of both China and Korea. This is a particular problem at a moment when China is beginning to confront many of the institutional problems common to other Asian countries: capital allocation on the basis of political, not commercial, criteria; asset inflation, especially in real estate; a shaky banking system; and huge loss-making state enterprises.

For its part, China needs to do much more to create an open and free market and to take effective measures to reduce its growing trade surplus with America.

China must recognize that human-rights pressures are not generally intended as instruments of harassment but reflect America's deepest values and necessities. No administration that fails to take account of this reality can maintain public support. The president speaks for all Americans when, with due regard to the national pride of an ancient civilization, he affirms these concerns.

For China, Taiwan is the most sensitive issue. It cannot be put aside, and a realistic discussion is essential. To China, Taiwan is not a foreign country but a secessionist province. It must therefore be handled with great sensitivity.

Six U.S. presidents from both parties have affirmed the unity of China and rejected a two-China or China-Taiwan solution. The same presidents have endorsed peaceful resolution of the issue.

The United States has therefore an implied obligation to oppose Taiwanese independence or membership in the United Nations or its institutions made up of sovereign states. Within that framework, constructive, close U.S.-Taiwan relations should be maintained.

The above agenda defines the president's trip as an opportunity to point

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Sino-American relations in a positive direction. Keeping the journey from turning into nothing more than a photo opportunity is a matter of choice, not necessity. And for the critics at home, the time has come to give the relationship a chance before we throw ourselves into a new set of confrontations that guarantee decades of tensions with an uncertain outcome.

GRAPHIC: Drawings: 1. Three men getting ready to greet one another; 2. Chinese dragon (p. 4)

LANGUAGE: ENGLISH

TYPE: Editorial Opinion

LOAD-DATE: June 29, 1998



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LEVEL 1 - 217 OF 278 STORIES

Copyright 1998 The New York Times Company
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June 22, 1998, Monday, Late Edition - Final

SECTION: Section A; Page 19; Column 1; Editorial Desk

LENGTH: 718 words

HEADLINE: Stop Playing by China's Rules

BYLINE: By Robert Kagan and William Kristol; Robert Kagan is a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. William Kristol is editor and publisher of the Weekly Standard.

BODY:

In defending his China policy, President Clinton says America faces a stark choice: engage China as his Administration has done or isolate it. But that is a false choice.

No one, contrary to the President's recent assertion, is "seeking to isolate China." For example, the Administration's critics do not oppose any summit that advances America's overall strategic and moral interests. The problem with Mr. Clinton's policy is that it undermines those interests, because his brand of engagement is failing.

The Administration has argued, for instance, that giving satellites, supercomputers and other technology to China would encourage it to stop selling weapons of mass destruction and the missiles to deliver them. But in the last six months, China has been caught peddling nuclear-weapons-related material to Iran. And in recent years, China made missile and nuclear weapons technology available to Pakistan, inviting India's nuclear test.

The Clinton Administration has argued that once the United States stopped challenging China's human rights record and withdrew the threat of economic sanctions, China would ease repression at home. In fact, the Chinese Government has responded by exiling a couple of prominent dissidents and arresting many others -- in sum, by maintaining one of the world's most repressive regimes.

The Administration says its brand of engagement has fostered stability in Asia. Why, then, has China fired missiles off the coast of Taiwan, seized islands in the South China Sea and continued to increase its defense spending at an alarming rate?

Finally, to avoid offending Chinese sensibilities, the White House invents excuses for indefensible practices like forced abortion and religious repression. The Administration has always argued that its policy of engagement will make China more like us. In fact, it is making us more like them.

Last year, when it was reported that the Chinese Government tried to subvert American elections, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright declared there would be grave consequences if the story was substantiated. It was, but there have



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The New York Times, June 22, 1998

been no consequences. If any country other than **China** were involved, the summit would be postponed. But the President is keeping his appointment in Beijing. Indeed he pretends he has no choice but to be greeted at Tiananmen Square.

Mr. Clinton now describes our relationship with **China** as a "strategic partnership" and insists **China** responds best to incentives. But placating its Government at every turn is not the answer. The Chinese leadership must know that when it breaks its promises -- by aiding Pakistan's and Iran's nuclear weapons programs -- it will be punished with sanctions, including, for instance, cutting off trade with corporations known to be controlled by **China's** military. A year ago, in a memorandum to the State Department, Mr. Clinton's own Arms Control and Disarmament Agency pointed out: "The only time we have gotten movement from the Chinese on missile proliferation has been in the face of a penalty being imposed. Carrots have gotten us nothing."

The United States must make it clear in both word and deed that we will contain **China's** strategic ambitions. We should begin by reversing the decline in our military strength. Chinese leaders interpret America's shrinking defense budgets and our uncertain response to crises in the Persian Gulf and elsewhere as a sign of weakening resolve. Nor could it have escaped the notice of Beijing that when the President sent aircraft carriers to the gulf earlier this year, none were left in the East Asian theater.

Beijing evidently hopes to drive a wedge between the United States and its Asian allies. That is why the Chinese Government insisted that President Clinton not visit Japan, South Korea and Taiwan before or after the summit. But they are our true strategic partners in Asia and deserve the reassurance of a visit by an American President.

Mr. Clinton seems determined to cast his critics as backward-looking isolationists spoiling for a new cold war. In fact, the **Clinton Administration's** current policy invites Chinese adventurism abroad and repression at home. At the end of this bloody century, we all should have learned that appeasement, even when disguised as engagement, doesn't work.

GRAPHIC: Drawing (Natasha Tibbott)

LANGUAGE: ENGLISH

LOAD-DATE: June 22, 1998

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Copyright 1998 Times Mirror Company
Los Angeles Times

June 21, 1998, Sunday, Home Edition

SECTION: Part A; Page 1; Foreign Desk

LENGTH: 1824 words

HEADLINE: CLINTON'S CHINA STRATEGY SEEN FALLING SHORT

BYLINE: TYLER MARSHALL, TIMES STAFF WRITER

DATELINE: WASHINGTON

BODY:

Few American presidents have worked the sound bite or the photo op to better advantage on overseas trips than Ronald Reagan and Bill Clinton.

Reagan stumbled badly only once: when he laid a wreath at a West German war cemetery in Bitburg where members of Hitler's notorious SS units are buried.

Clinton's equivalent could come Saturday. Bowing to Chinese demands, he has agreed to be officially welcomed in Beijing's Tiananmen Square--where Chinese troops massacred hundreds, perhaps thousands, of student demonstrators nine years ago.

"It's wrong," said Sen. Paul Wellstone, a liberal Minnesota Democrat.

Added Rep. Christopher Cox (R-Newport Beach), "Tiananmen Square is an infamous killing field, and the president shouldn't be part of a ceremony there."

But unlike Reagan's ill-fated wreath-laying, Clinton's willingness to go through with the Tiananmen welcoming ceremony has an added dimension: It is seen by many as symbolic of a larger failure.

Refusal to Impose Sanctions Cited

To a wide cross-section of U.S. foreign affairs specialists, the decision stands as a striking example of Clinton's inability to reap benefits from his policy of "engagement"--his strategy of cooperating with China on issues of common interest without letting serious differences, particularly on human rights, get in the way.

"I can't think of a single situation with regard to China where the administration hasn't backed off," said Warren Cohen, director of the Asia Program at the Woodrow Wilson Center, a Washington-based think tank.

Cohen cited Clinton's refusal to impose sanctions against China despite



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Los Angeles Times June 21, 1998, Sunday,

compelling evidence that it sold sensitive weapons technology to Pakistan and Iran. And he said Clinton has failed to win human rights improvements in China in return for trade preferences for Chinese products entering the U.S.

"This isn't a poker game, but if you say an issue is important to you, then you need to get at least something on that issue," Cohen said. "This administration has gotten nothing out of the Chinese except promises the Chinese haven't kept."

Other specialists credit the administration's engagement policies with yielding progress in several important areas, including trade and weapons nonproliferation. But they echo Cohen's opinion that a harder-edged engagement could bring even greater rewards.

"They've constantly pulled their punches on China," said Joseph Cirincione, an arms control specialist at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington. "The entire history of tracking Chinese assistance to countries like Pakistan and Iran is one of refusing to see the evidence or implement sanctions."

Noted Mike Jendzejczyk, the Washington director of Human Rights Watch/Asia: "It's right that the administration's long-term objective should be making China a full partner in international regimes governing trade, human rights and proliferation, but I don't think they've come up with a credible way of achieving that objective."

Jendzejczyk and others cite preparation for the Beijing summit, with its planned stop in Tiananmen Square, as merely one in a long list of Clinton's failures to exert American leverage with China.

They argue that the White House first squandered valuable bargaining leverage by quickly agreeing late last year on a date for the summit, then made matters worse by moving up the date from November to June, sharply reducing time for U.S. officials to negotiate a favorable outcome.

"This is when the Clinton administration could have played hardball, saying the president is willing to come in principle, but not unconditionally," said a U.S. China specialist who declined to be identified by name or organization. "Instead, they did it backward. They agreed to the dates and are now scrambling to make the trip more than a series of photo ops."

U.S. Officials Admit Problems Remain

For the Chinese, photo ops alone are the payoff--a de facto endorsement that relations between the two great Pacific powers have moved beyond the Tiananmen era.

Although Clinton's decision to engage China across a broad range of issues has yielded results, administration officials, reacting to reports that China was assisting both Iran and Libya on missile technology, admitted last week that problems remain.

"They have improved; they still need to improve," Secretary of State Madeleine Albright told a Senate committee. "We will continue to press that."



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Los Angeles Times June 21, 1998, Sunday,

But the real emphasis of Clinton's engagement with China has been in the commercial field, underscoring the president's personal view that strong trade ties are the key both to international peace and to the United States' long-term prosperity.

That conviction led Clinton to shift the main responsibility for monitoring the export of sensitive U.S. technology from the State and Defense departments to the trade-friendly Commerce Department.

Conflicting Messages Received From U.S.

After receiving some early confused signals from the Clinton administration, including a halfhearted attempt to link trade preferences with progress in human rights, the Chinese understand that Clinton's desire to build strong commercial ties rests at the heart of the U.S.-China relationship, Asia specialists maintain.

Chinese officials have reportedly described to visiting American scholars how the late Commerce Secretary Ronald H. Brown once advised them to ignore tough human rights messages delivered by then-Secretary of State Warren M. Christopher and that trade was Clinton's main priority.

"You get this from Chinese officials," Cohen said.

In her office near the White House, U.S. Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky charted the harvest of this emphasis: a 70% rise in U.S. exports and a 140% jump in imports during the Clinton era; the conclusion of 15 trade agreements covering agriculture, textiles and intellectual property rights; and a successful crackdown on Chinese-produced pirated compact discs.

"In 1995, China was the chief pirater of these products," she said. "Now they are a minor offender."

For California especially, the strong emphasis on developing trade with China has contributed to an enormous economic windfall stemming from Asian markets.

In 1996, the latest full-year figures available from the Bank of America show, California exported about \$ 2 billion worth of goods to mainland China, a volume of trade that would normally support between 30,000 and 40,000 jobs.

"It's had a big impact on the California economy," said Kelvin Lee, president of the Los Angeles-based Asian Business League.

For many critics, however, the administration's preoccupation with boosting trade has seriously jeopardized U.S. leverage in other key areas, including human rights and even national security.

Earlier this month, Clinton found himself on the defensive, deflecting charges that, in doing business with China, two U.S. satellite producers may have provided Beijing with information that could help it build more accurate nuclear missiles.

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Los Angeles Times June 21, 1998, Sunday,

By making it easier for U.S. companies to sell sensitive technology to countries such as **China**, "we are now giving trade a dangerously high priority at the expense of national security," said Gary Milhollin, director of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control.

Frank J. Gaffney Jr., director of the conservative Center for Security Policy, goes further. He says the U.S. has frequently helped **China** and other "proliferators" by providing them with technology they need to bolster their weapons arsenals.

Clinton is certainly not the first president to ease the restrictions on what U.S. firms may export to former Cold War adversaries. That relaxation was begun by Republican presidents Reagan and Bush in the 1980s and early 1990s. But Clinton is the first to give the Commerce Department the lead on technology transfer decisions, a move some critics argue reflects a misplaced presidential enthusiasm for trade.

Rights activists, like the arms control community, also lament the absence of a stronger administration stand. They complain that progress on such issues as worker rights, political prisoners and Tibet has been painfully slow, even if **China** recently released its two most prominent political dissidents, Wang Dan and Wei Jingsheng.

Cohen said the reason for the administration's reluctance to exert greater leverage on **China** is simple: "They fear the Chinese will buy from Airbus a European company and not Boeing."

To Cohen, this also explains Clinton's presence at Tiananmen Square. And he argued that even if Clinton condemns the events of 1989, it wouldn't offset the visual impact of his appearance.

"What the Chinese people will see is the president of the United States standing in the square next to those responsible for the massacre," Cohen said. "They'll never hear the words."

Times staff writer Art Pine contributed to this report.

(BEGIN TEXT OF INFOBOX / INFOGRAPHIC)

Clinton's Itinerary

President Clinton leaves Washington on Wednesday for a 10-day tour of **China**, the first presidential mission to the world's most populous nation since 1989.

XIAN: Thursday-Friday

Clinton's first stop is the ancient capital of **China**. The president, First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton and daughter Chelsea will visit the village of Xia He and the tomb of the Qin Emperor (221-206 BC), famous for its thousands of terra cotta models of the emperor's warriors.

BEIJING: Friday-Monday, June 29



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Los Angeles Times June 21, 1998, Sunday,

The theatrical high point of Clinton's **China** trip is Saturday's welcoming ceremony at Tiananmen Square, site of the 1989 massacre. Later, President Jiang Zemin hosts a state dinner for the Clintons in the Great Hall of the People. Other public appearances: the Forbidden City and Great Wall on Sunday, and a speech at Beijing University on Monday. In private consultations, **Clinton** is expected to discuss the U.S.-**China** "strategic partnership" and other priority **policy** issues.

SHANGHAI: Monday, June 29-Thursday, July 2

Clinton will focus on economic growth and trade relations during his visit to **China's** biggest city and its center of commerce and industry. The president will participate in a series of public sessions with Shanghai community leaders, U.S. business executives, young Chinese entrepreneurs, and new homeowners and their lenders.

GUILIN: Thursday, July 2

On his way to Hong Kong, Clinton will make a quick stop in this picturesque city, situated on the Li River amid the towering Guilin Peaks. He will deliver a speech stressing environmental themes.

HONG KONG: Thursday, July 2-Friday, July 3

On the final stop of his tour, Clinton will meet with business and community leaders in this former British protectorate now under Chinese rule. The president will hold a concluding news conference before departing **China** for the United States.

Source: The White House

Compiled by Times staff researcher Tricia Ford in Washington

GRAPHIC: PHOTO: Former President Reagan, second from right, was criticized for laying a wreath at Bitburg, where members of Hitler's notorious SS units lie.

PHOTOGRAPHER: Associated Press GRAPHIC: Clinton's Itinerary / Los Angeles Times

LANGUAGE: English

LOAD-DATE: June 21, 1998



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LEVEL 1 - 235 OF 278 STORIES

Copyright 1998 The Washington Post
The Washington Post

June 05, 1998, Friday, Final Edition

SECTION: OP-ED; Pg. A31

LENGTH: 795 words

HEADLINE: Clinton's China Grovel ; By shamelessly courting the world's worst proliferator, the president has fueled the South Asian nuclear arms race.

BYLINE: Charles Krauthammer

BODY:

On Friday, May 15, with much fanfare and import, the State Department sent a "high-level delegation" to persuade Pakistan not to explode a nuclear bomb. So much for American persuasiveness.

Perhaps there was nothing we could have done. But after India exploded its bomb, President Clinton tried to muster international pressure on India in order to assuage Pakistan and keep it from responding in kind.

What happened? At the G-8 summit in London, Clinton struck out. He asked the other leading powers to join him in sanctions against India. His G-8 friends smiled politely and issued a statement distinguished in its feebleness. It was no surprise, given that this president is all entreaty and no enforcement.

After all, at the very same summit he caved on the issue of sanctions against Iran. And Iran is a really bad actor; India, after all, does not celebrate "Death to America Day." Yet in London, Clinton agreed to forgo sanctions against three oil companies (Russian, French and Malaysian) for concluding a huge natural gas development deal with Iran. He also weakened the Cuban boycott in deference to the Europeans, who find Castro more entertaining and/or admirable than we do.

After Clinton's humiliation on Indian sanctions, Pakistan's response was foreordained. The Pakistani leadership had to decide which offered better protection against India's nuclear arsenal: words of assurance from Strobe Talbott or its own nuclear deterrent.

Clinton's subsequent criticism of Pakistan showed why the choice was obvious: "By failing to exercise restraint and responding to the Indian test, Pakistan lost a truly priceless opportunity to . . . improve its political standing in the eyes of the world." What is Pakistan to make of such patent nonsense? That nuclear vulnerability represented a "priceless opportunity" to look good? In the eyes of whom? Bill Clinton? India?

Clinton really does live in a fantasy world very much a reflection of his own



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The Washington Post, June 05, 1998

political experience. In that world, courting favor with others trumps everything. But in the real world inhabited by Pakistan, a nation bordered by a hostile, populous, heavily armed neighbor, popularity simply doesn't rate compared with national security.

Clinton is guilty of more than mere fatuousness, however, in dealing with the India-Pakistan nuclear arms race. He is guilty of fueling it. While for years his administration has claimed deep concern about proliferation, Clinton has shamelessly courted the world's worst proliferator of weapons of mass destruction: **China**.

China purveyed nuclear power to Algeria, poison gas to Iran and, most ominously, nuclear technology to Pakistan. We winked. Why? Because not since Calvin Coolidge has an American **administration** lived more by the credo that the business of America is business.

Clinton's **China** policy is born of a combination of diplomatic myopia and political cynicism. The single most important consideration has been the promotion of trade and exports. Rather than seeing **China** as a potential rival, a rising superpower, a notorious proliferator and a potential destabilizer, Clinton sees nothing more than a market. For Clinton, it's the economy, stupid -- always.

This view, as with all of Clinton's views, dovetails perfectly with his political needs. The Chinese market became a giant prize to be auctioned off to the highest bidder, with proceeds going to the Democratic National Committee. Clinton contracted out **China** policy to Ron Brown, who in turn sold it in pieces to various political and financial supporters. Coveted seats on his trade missions to **China** and everywhere else went to big Democratic contributors like Bernard Schwartz of Loral Corp.

And when the Justice Department objected to a Loral satellite launch in **China**, Clinton himself overrode it. The fact that Schwartz was the DNC's number-one contributor in the 1996 election cycle (more than \$ 600,000) is, of course, but a fortunate coincidence. Clinton's **China** grovel will be most spectacularly dramatized by his visit to Tiananmen Square later this month. But it was heralded much earlier, when on April 29 Secretary of State Albright spoke with satisfaction of the "strategic partnership" the United States was building with **China**.

There is nothing quite like a U.S.-**China** strategic partnership to put the fear of God in India. This is not to say that there were no domestic reasons for India and then Pakistan to go nuclear. But to the extent that Clinton has a foreign policy -- apart from a trade and political-contribution policy -- it was blind to the implications of its open embrace of **China**. We now are reaping the consequences, even as Clinton scratches his head trying to figure out why bad things happen to good people.

GRAPHIC: Illustration, T. Gibson

LANGUAGE: ENGLISH

LOAD-DATE: June 05, 1998



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LEVEL 1 - 251 OF 278 STORIES

Copyright 1998 Times Mirror Company
Los Angeles Times

May 19, 1998, Tuesday, Home Edition

SECTION: Metro; Part B; Page 7; Op Ed Desk

LENGTH: 767 words

HEADLINE: COLUMN RIGHT / GARY L. BAUER, RICHARD LAND;

COMMENTARY;

With Clinton, Watchdog Is China Lapdog;

Chinese campaign money is traded for technology and ignoring human rights abuses.

BYLINE: GARY L. BAUER and RICHARD LAND, Gary L. Bauer is president of the Family Research Council. Richard, Land is president of the Ethics & Religious Liberty Commission of the, Southern Baptist Convention

BODY:

President Clinton's defenders have said that we should ignore private morality and focus on public performance. The facts suggest otherwise. Not only has the president's personal life completely captured the public's attention, lowered respect for political leadership and threatened his hold on office, but his penchant for deception and double talk has bled over into our relationship with foreign powers, with fatal results. "Compartmentalism" is this year's Big Lie and its deadliest deception.

Clinton's China policy is the major case in point. Before he became president, Clinton criticized President Bush for "coddling" China's dictators. The sight of Bush administration officials toasting the butchers of Tiananmen Square was too much for candidate Clinton. If elected, he would be a watchdog, not a lapdog. But Clinton has exceeded Bush's shameful accommodation. He is not only toasting the butchers, but also pushing plans to sell them nuclear technology, despite their record of weapons sales to Iran and Iraq.

In addition, he is essentially running a pro-China public relations campaign. Reports of Clinton fund-raiser Johnny Chung's testimony that he channeled tens of thousands of dollars from Gen. Liu Huaqing, China's top military commander, to the national Democratic Party during Clinton's 1996 reelection campaign raise even more troubling concerns.

According to the reports, Liu was in charge of China's drive to modernize the People's Liberation Army by using proceeds from weapons sales to acquire Western technology. At the time the Chinese money was flowing, Clinton was making it easier for American civilian communications satellites to be launched by Chinese rockets, a major goal of the PLA.



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Los Angeles Times May 19, 1998, Tuesday,

In 1994, when he was vigorously lobbying to extend most-favored-nation status, the president countered criticism from human rights groups by promising to keep China's feet to the fire regarding its abysmal human rights record. He pledged, explicitly and passionately, that he would "step up efforts" to secure approval of a U.N. resolution condemning abuses. According to released dissident Wei Jingsheng, the resolution is "a matter of life and death" for Chinese reform. MFN was extended. So were the rights abuses.

While the State Department's most recent report on China was rightly criticized by Amnesty International for pulling punches, even it reported "widespread and well-documented" horrors, including state-sanctioned murder, torture, arbitrary arrest and detention, forced abortion and sterilization and continued brutalization of Protestants, Catholics and ethnic minorities, including Tibetans. Clinton's own assistant secretary of state for Asia admits that "the situation has deteriorated."

How has the administration reacted? With silence. Silence despite the fact, according to the Washington Post, that China's regime is as oppressive today as it was in 1994. Silence despite the fact that last month the FBI arrested two Chinese agents for allegedly attempting to sell human organs plundered from the bodies of executed Chinese prisoners.

When the Clinton administration threatened \$ 3 billion in sanctions unless China stopped pirating CDs, it showed its sense of priorities: Pop stars are worthy of protection, but political and religious dissidents are not. By the way, this move did not work. The Chinese merely made a show of compliance.

Not only has the president failed to push the U.N. resolution, but his administration has tried to silence other critics. It attempted to pull the plug on a Voice of America Mandarin Chinese broadcast featuring Wei Jingsheng. It has strongly opposed the Freedom from Religious Persecution Act, which would create an office in the State Department to monitor international religious persecution and recommend penalties.

The result of his China pandering cannot be understated. As Wei Jingsheng said, "If the United States, Britain and other European Union members don't take the lead on a U.N. resolution criticizing China's human rights practices, the resolution will die, and the international community will lose a critical opportunity to promote improved respect for human rights for the Chinese and Tibetan people." The torture and murder will continue, with the Clinton administration's tacit blessing.

Some of us have argued that a man who will lie to his family will lie to the rest of the world. The ever-widening squalor of the Clinton administration, with its deadly worldwide consequences, proves that every public horror has its roots in private moral belief--or lack thereof.

LANGUAGE: English

LOAD-DATE: May 19, 1998



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FOCUS - 1 OF 30 STORIES

Copyright 1997 Times Mirror Company
Los Angeles Times

November 23, 1997, Sunday, Home Edition

SECTION: Opinion; Part M; Page 2; Opinion Desk

LENGTH: 1520 words

HEADLINE: THE WORLD;
CHINA;

HOW MANY FREED DISSIDENTS ADD UP TO A SOUND HUMAN-RIGHTS POLICY?

BYLINE: Robert A. Manning, Robert A. Manning, a former State Department advisor for policy, (1989-93), is a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations

DATELINE: WASHINGTON

BODY:

When Wei Jingsheng, China's leading dissident, stepped on to the Northwest Airlines jet ready to wing him into U.S. exile last week, it was no surprise that the U.S. ambassador to China, James R. Sasser, broke out the champagne. After all, Wei's release was the result of long months of firm, quiet diplomacy. No less, it was a gift from Beijing for the legitimacy that President Bill Clinton had bestowed on Chinese President Jiang Zemin by according him red-carpet treatment at last month's summit. It also seemed to demonstrate that Clinton's "engagement" with China could yield results, leaving anti-China critics who cited Wei's fate as proof that the president had abandoned principles for economic gain with egg on their faces. But does Wei's release add up to a human-rights policy or does it simply play along with China's cynical game?

Since the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989, China's human-rights abuses have been central to the erosion of congressional and public support for, first, George Bush's, then Clinton's China policies. In U.S. policy, human rights seem to take a back seat to security and economic issues. Then, a prominent dissident is released, usually into exile, to symbolize concern about human rights. Wei's release fits this pattern. During the Bush administration, Fang Lizhi, an astrophysicist and outspoken critic of China's political leaders, took refuge in the U.S. Embassy in Beijing and, after long negotiations, was allowed to emigrate to the United States.

Of course, freedom for the long-suffering Wei, particularly in light of his grave health problems after 18 years in jail, is a humanitarian achievement. But Wei's release raises far more questions than it answers. What of some 2,000 remaining political prisoners and the repression that has stifled political freedom throughout China? Do symbolic victories such as the release of



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well-known dissidents advance the broader goal of political liberalization?

If the administration views the release of Wei, or the likely pending release of student leader Wang Dan, as "checking the box" on human rights, it is mistaken. Equally mistaken are critics like conservative Gary L. Bauer, who compared Wei to Soviet dissident Andrei D. Sakharov in admonishing Clinton to cancel last month's summit if Wei was not released.

Then there is the puzzle of China's hypersensitivity about releasing dissidents. Beijing's resistance is curious because the record shows that when dissidents are exiled, their release makes instant headlines but the dissidents themselves soon fade away. Who in China or in the United States has heard from Fang or Tiananmen student leaders like Chai Ling lately? So why is it like pulling teeth to persuade Beijing that the right thing to do is to release dissidents from prison even when they agree to exile?

The short answer is that Beijing's Confucian-Leninist leaders--who operate a system based on the rule of men, not law--are deeply insecure. They fear that personalities advocating democracy could undermine their personalized authoritarian rule. Given the preoccupation of most Chinese with making money, Beijing's harshness seems a tad paranoid. But the lesson of Tiananmen is stability over civility.

The American emphasis on celebrity dissidents and breast-beating at public forums represents a concrete approach to human-rights issues: The administration can show its concern while personalizing the issue and giving human-rights groups a hero. But its focus on well-known dissidents also serves to increase their value in Beijing's eyes, another reason why China acts paranoid.

The assumptions undergirding this human-rights approach reflect a flawed view of China. The administration has framed the issue as one of "engagement or containment." Clinton contends that by engaging China, we will integrate the Chinese into the world community; confrontation would only isolate them. The president's critics, meanwhile, act as if China is a brittle, authoritarian, adversarial monolith. Exerting pressure on China to release its leading dissidents is part of their broader effort to impose change from the outside, since internally generated change is seen as unlikely.

The reality of the situation is quite another matter. When Deng Xiaoping launched market reforms in 1979, he decided that China had no choice but to integrate itself into the world economy. Beijing is betting it can ride the tiger of modernization and maintain its political monopoly. For U.S. policy, the question should be not integration or isolation but, rather, on what terms China integrates itself into the international system.

What does this mean for human rights? Assuming that China is a dynamic society in the midst of unprecedented social change yields a quite different human-rights policy, one that can more easily co-exist with U.S. economic, political and strategic goals.

China's economic modernization requires living with satellite TV, faxes, the Internet and talk radio. Its reforms and rapid economic growth, averaging 9% annually since 1980, have begun to unleash new social forces and the beginnings of a middle class. The role of the state in people's daily lives is shrinking as



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the economy privatizes: Individuals now choose where to work, go to school, travel and be entertained. The decollectivization of agriculture has resulted in village elections with non-communists even occasionally winning. The need for a legal system has created laws allowing citizens to sue the government. All

this doesn't mean China is marching, wittingly or unwittingly, toward democracy, for Beijing's model is authoritarian, market-oriented Singapore; tolerance stops at political expression.

But this more dynamic view of China suggests a human-rights strategy aimed at aiding and abetting social forces pushing for change within China. In recent years, there has been a proliferation of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), the birth of a fledgling legal system and local elections, which may be expanded to the county level. China must next develop commercial codes, civil law and an independent judiciary in order to fulfill successfully its goal of modernization.

These are all essential ingredients for the development of a civil society and thus should be the focus of U.S. human-rights policy. One element of such a policy would aim to bolster the efforts of the USIA and groups like the National Endowment for Democracy to promote civil society; to aid rule-of-law programs; to help develop legal curricula in universities, and to broaden the exposure of China's National People's Congress (NPC) to the workings of our legislative system. A second element would involve the president exerting hortatory pressure, as Clinton did during Jiang's visit, and greater use of the Voice of America, which has a large audience and is perceived as having a measure of independence. Finally, quiet diplomacy is also essential to achieving practical results like more Red Cross visits to jails, the release of more dissidents and to apply pressure privately.

This is not a sexy or dramatic human-rights policy, nor would it yield sensational political trophies. Rather, it feeds off a strong belief in American values and patience. The experience of much of East Asia--Philippines, Korea, Taiwan, Thailand--is that economic growth eventually creates a middle class, which then presses for more accountable governance. U.S. human-rights policy should give these kinds of forces a steady nudge.*

GRAPHIC: GRAPHIC-DRAWING: (...), TIM TEEBKEN / for The Times

LANGUAGE: English

LOAD-DATE: December 21, 1998



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LEVEL 1 - 16 OF 20 STORIES

Copyright 1997 Times Mirror Company
Los Angeles Times

July 6, 1997, Sunday, Home Edition

SECTION: Opinion; Part M; Page 2; Opinion Desk

LENGTH: 1387 words

HEADLINE: THE WORLD;
CHINA;
THE FOLLY OF BULLYING BEIJING

BYLINE: Henry Kissinger, Former Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger writes frequently for, The Times

DATELINE: NEW YORK

BODY:

On a recent visit to Beijing, I found improving Sino-American relations to be a key objective--perhaps the key foreign policy objective--of the post-Deng leadership. Meanwhile in the United States, the debate over China's most-favored-nation trade status grows more venomous with each passing year. Some seek to punish China over human rights; others want to clip China's wings; many are seeking to use the China issue to restructure America's political parties. If they succeed, they will thrust the United States into political and economic war with China. Such a confrontation is not called for by any realistic assessment of the national interest.

The administration has shown statesmanship in resisting these pressures. But it has been extraordinarily timid in dealing with the demonization of China. It has basically accepted the objectives of its critics while asserting that it has a better way of achieving them. As a result, no positive agenda emerges.

The challenge is to impart to our China policy a strategic dimension capable of generating broad bipartisan support.

(I must inject a personal note. Many of us urging cooperation with China are being accused of doing so for commercial reasons. As chairman of an international consulting firm, I inevitably encounter clients who also do business in China, though they represent a very small part of our total income. Still, anyone who believes that my views are for sale and who is prepared to ignore nearly 40 years of my published views, long before any business was done in China by anybody, should stop reading now.)

The post-Cold War world obliges us to conduct two different types of foreign policy simultaneously. In the North Atlantic and the Western Hemisphere, we are



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Los Angeles Times July 6, 1997, Sunday,

dealing with pluralistic democracies practicing market economics. In these regions, U.S. policy can be based on a sense of community and shared moral values.

It is different in Asia. There, nations consider each other, at least in part, as strategic rivals. No integrating institutions exist. In Asia, at least for the next generation, peace will require the conscious and deliberate managing of a balance of power, a uncomfortable task for the United States.

That alone should cause the United States to be wary of unnecessarily antagonizing China. If we cannot cooperate with China, our options will shrink; the bargaining position of all other players in the region will improve. Any opponent of the United States will automatically find support in Beijing.

Before embarking on so risky and irrevocable a course, it's necessary to define the challenge posed by China. China's economic growth, while spectacular, starts from the base of a far lower gross national product than ours. In absolute numbers, even if China continues to grow at a rate of 10% indefinitely, it will, for the foreseeable future, barely match America's absolute growth of 2.5% to 3%. China is no military colossus bestriding Asia, either. While the precise amount China spends on its military is unclear, most experts believe it represents, at most, a tenth of our spending.

Moreover, China faces strong neighbors. For at least the next decade, Japan will have a more formidable military establishment. Nor can planners in Beijing ignore the military capacities of India, Korea, Russia, Vietnam or Taiwan.

Accordingly, the United States should not sacrifice one of its chief diplomatic assets--that we are, or could be, closer to each of the contenders in Asia than they are to one another. Indeed, we are in a position to advance our interests and protect the balance of power from a position of flexibility. In the months ahead, an exceptional opportunity exists for exploring the prospects of coexistence in the preparations for the Clinton-Jiang summit and at the summit itself.

For us, the key issues are trade, nonproliferation and human rights. Success in the first two cases depends on establishing equitable rules for trade and enforceable rules for preventing the spread of nuclear and missile technology. This would enable China to enter the World Trade Organization and to address U.S. concerns about the spread of advanced technology.

Human rights have a legitimate, indeed inevitable, place on the Sino-American agenda. Yet, the issue should be brought into a proper relationship with other objectives in our relations with China and with respect for China's many great historical achievements. In trying to encourage the pace of evolution, it is only fair to recognize that the system is much less rigid than when I first encountered it, though it retains its uncompromising insistence on a monopoly of power.

For China, the potential flash points are Hong Kong and Taiwan. I take seriously the Chinese leaders' expressed commitment to Hong Kong's autonomy, above all, because it is so overwhelmingly in their self-interest. Even with the best of intentions, there are, however, some intangibles that can only be tested by the passage of time: a) How will Chinese officials daily react to a more open



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Los Angeles Times July 6, 1997, Sunday,

system? b) Will the authorities and the opponents of the new institutions muster the self-restraint needed to operate Hong Kong's autonomous system without resorting to violence? c) Will Taiwan see the practice of autonomy in Hong Kong as a challenge or as an opportunity?

On these issues, the United States can play a helpful role so long as it proceeds with some sensitivity. China has been told insistently by both administration officials and members of Congress that major breaches of the agreement will have a disastrous impact on U.S. public opinion. The point has been made.

All sides have an interest in maintaining and reaffirming the principles of the Shanghai communique. The United States must stick to the spirit of the one-China policy; China must understand that America is serious about our interest in a peaceful solution; and Taiwan must recognize that America's interest in a peaceful solution does not give Taiwan license to rekindle the Chinese civil war.

The forthcoming exchange of visits between Presidents Bill Clinton and Jiang Zemin must not be treated as public-relations exercises. Sino-American relations will either improve dramatically or decline dramatically.

Unless carefully and thoughtfully prepared, these meetings could, in the present atmosphere, backfire. Expectations must be realistic on both sides. And domestic pressure groups must temper their often valid concerns with an equal concern for the possibly unintended consequences of their actions. For what is at stake may be the prospects of peace in the next century.

LANGUAGE: English

LOAD-DATE: December 21, 1998

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FOCUS - 11 OF 30 STORIES

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May 27, 1997, Tuesday, Late Edition - Final

SECTION: Section A; Page 17; Column 5; Editorial Desk

LENGTH: 706 words

HEADLINE: On My Mind;
China's Poisonous Lie

BYLINE: By A. M. ROSENTHAL

BODY:

The United States is helping China get away with a plain, obvious lie that is a plain, obvious threat to peace and to American armed forces.

The Clinton Administration expects the American public to pay little attention and Congress to take no action -- and it is probably right. Then, public and Congress would share responsibility with this Administration if American troops in the Middle East ever come under poison gas attack from Iran.

The elections in Iran show how strongly Iranians resent their Government's suffocating control of their lives. But there is no expectation that Iran's new President will change its foreign policy, which relies on terrorism and hatred of America, or would be allowed to keep office if he tried. Power remains with the ayatollahs who have constructed the policy and live by it.

Iran is making more progress at building up its chemical and biological warfare power -- and its missile strength and nuclear potential -- than any other nation in the developing world. It has more than 2,000 tons of mustard gas, blister gas and probably nerve gas. It has chemical bombs and artillery shells. It has loaded warheads, on missiles with the range to reach American forces now in the Mideast.

Western powers did their trade-uber-alles best to build Iran's stockpile and production capability -- now more than 200 tons a year. Stricter Western controls reduced that help, for the time being.

For years China has rushed in to fill Iran's orders. China became Iran's chief supplier of the chemicals and technology Iran needs to become self-sufficient in chemical warfare.

And for years the U.S. has known about China's role in Iran. Finally, at painful last, Washington announced on May 22 that it had nailed down two of the Chinese companies that sell the chemicals to Iran. It turns out that the U.S. knew about these companies for two years and notified the Chinese Government at the "highest levels." Usually that means a President or Vice President.



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The U.S. is bound by its law to impose export and import sanctions against China if it exports chemical warfare materials.

So Beijing carefully spits in the eye of the "highest" by contemptuously informing them it knows nothing about such exports. The U.S. then tells Congress there is no "evidence" that Beijing knew of those treaty-violating chemical sales.

My sources believe the companies are owned by the Chinese Government. But no known fool is such a big fool as not to understand that whether government-owned or operated by the armed forces or working behind some "private" facade set up for denial purposes, no plant in China capable of producing a revolver, let alone chemical warfare components, exports without government approval.

For the U.S. to say it has no "evidence" that Beijing did know passes the insult along to the intelligence of the American public and Congress.

Gathering itself up fiercely, the U.S. says that the two companies will be barred from their pittance of trade with the U.S., for a year. Washington then accepts Beijing's lie by saying it hopes this "action" against the companies will "encourage" China to "improve further its export controls." That is exactly what Washington said when it caught China exporting nuclear technology to Pakistan last year; cringing is addictive.

Why does the U.S. behave in this self-destructing way about China? Why, because President Clinton's China policy -- trade over everything -- has so trapped Washington that it can neither deal honestly with the American public and Congress nor act effectively about China in support of other American interests.

Knowing Washington would not endanger trade with China, even though it is mountainously in China's favor, Beijing increased political oppression and religious persecution in China and Tibet -- and its sales of missiles, nuclear material and chemical weaponry.

Washington knows what China's rulers are doing. The Administration's refusal to acknowledge it, even when the U.S. catches Chinese companies selling the stuff of poison gas to Iran, is merely one more example showing how right the Chinese Communists are to understand that the President of the United States has become their prisoner.

LANGUAGE: ENGLISH

LOAD-DATE: May 27, 1997



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FOCUS - 12 OF 30 STORIES

Copyright 1997 The Washington Post
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May 11, 1997, Sunday, Final Edition

SECTION: OP-ED; Pg. C07

LENGTH: 883 words

HEADLINE: On the Defensive on China

BYLINE: Jim Hoagland

BODY:

President Clinton's appeasement of China has turned U.S. trade with Beijing into a political quagmire. The president and his critics battle toward a Pyrrhic victory that will not abet the cause of freedom and democracy in China, whoever wins here in Washington.

Trade has become a club to swing in a larger struggle over Clinton's authority in foreign affairs and the viability of his China strategy, which is now in tatters.

Clinton will probably prevail in the short-term battle over extending most favored nation (MFN) trading status to China for another year. But the fact that the battle is being waged at all underscores the hollowness of the administration's China policy.

I suspect many in the odd coalition of Republican free traders, human rights activists and religious conservatives who are attacking MFN extension would agree with my view that normalized trade with China promotes positive change there, however marginally. Revoking MFN is a way of punishing China with economic sanctions that will make reform of all kinds less likely in the short run.

But Clinton's removal of political sanctions as a tool for dealing with China's communist leadership three years ago has forced his critics together on the battleground of trade privileges.

The president's overly lavish embrace of Chinese leaders -- whom he styled as bloodstained dictators in his 1992 campaign -- has encouraged Beijing to push its search for advantage in the U.S.-Chinese relationship to the brink. The backlash this produced in America is now amplified by indications that Beijing seems to have undertaken criminal interference in U.S. domestic politics as well.

This is presumably not what Clinton had in mind when he reversed course in 1994: He stopped praising the dissidents who had led demonstrations in Tiananmen Square, began eyeing ceremonial summits with China's leaders and delinked trade



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with China from human rights.

Clinton's "comprehensive engagement" policy held out the promise that greater U.S. economic cooperation with China would lead Beijing to moderate its tyrannical behavior at home and its proliferation of dangerous arms and nuclear technology to other nations. But economic growth has not produced any serious change for the better in behavior by China.

China was to be a centerpiece for foreign policy in the second Clinton term. Before the inauguration, Clinton and Samuel (Sandy) Berger, his national security adviser, charted an ambitious economic program for the year to underpin the exchange of presidential visits Clinton has promised to Beijing. They would seek permanent extension of MFN from Congress and support accelerated membership in the World Trade Organization for China "on commercial terms."

Those are not bad ideas. Getting China to accept and abide by normal world rules on trade is a step forward. Requiring the president to expend political capital to grant annual authorizations for normal trade with China is a relic of the Cold War that should be abandoned. In the right political climate, Clinton's agenda would be reasonable.

But Clinton is suddenly on the defensive on China. The MFN extension, which the president must sign and submit to Congress for approval by June 3, is under attack by conservatives upset with Beijing's birth control policies, labor unions that oppose China's use of prison labor to bolster its soaring trade surpluses with the United States, and others.

House Speaker Newt Gingrich and other Republicans have indicated they may limit this extension to three to six months if they approve it at all. Appeals from Hong Kong Chinese leaders and American business have caused the Republican leadership to soften its tone on MFN extension, but the GOP majority still expects to hold Clinton's feet to the fire on this issue.

Gone is any talk of a permanent extension of Chinese trading rights.

Assume as I do that Clinton will veto any effort by Congress to curb China's MFN status and that he can defeat an override. His "victory" will come days before China takes over Hong Kong. A Chinese crackdown on human rights in the former British colony would seriously embarrass Clinton and Vice President Gore by underlining the impotence of their policy and "trip diplomacy."

But Hong Kong is not the only powder keg Beijing's rulers sit on. Japanese and U.S. specialists have noticed a significant beefing up of Chinese internal security forces in recent months. Some analysts speculate this is aimed not only at possible trouble around the Hong Kong handover on July 1 but also at the likelihood of serious labor unrest throughout China later this year.

China has delayed shutting down inefficient and costly state-run enterprises as long as it can. The market share of Chinese-owned factories is actually shrinking in the midst of the foreign investment boom. Massive layoffs of state employees lie just ahead, in the view of many foreign analysts and, apparently, of China's party and police bosses.

The Clinton administration has lost control of the political and economic



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forces that drive U.S.-Chinese relations. Washington has let its diplomacy in Asia be taken hostage by events that will be little affected by the ceremonial visits the American and Chinese presidents covet so ardently.

LANGUAGE: ENGLISH

LOAD-DATE: May 11, 1997



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FOCUS - 22 OF 30 STORIES

Copyright 1996, The Washington Post
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July 09, 1996, Tuesday, Final Edition

SECTION: A SECTION; Pg. A01

LENGTH: 2373 words

HEADLINE: U.S. Focuses On Better Ties to China; Policy Flip-Flops Roil Mercurial Relationship

BYLINE: Michael Dobbs, Washington Post Staff Writer

BODY:

Ask Clinton administration officials to state their number one geopolitical concern over the next few years, and the answer is usually the same. Not Russia, not Bosnia, not the Middle East. The consensus is growing in Washington that all these foreign policy headaches pale by comparison with the challenge of encouraging China to become a responsible member of the world community.

Last weekend, President Clinton dispatched his national security adviser to Beijing with the goal of repairing relations with the most populous nation on Earth. The four-day trip by Anthony Lake follows a high-level review of U.S. policy toward China earlier this year, triggered by a series of clashes with Beijing. The review concluded that the United States needed to place its relationship on what White House officials describe as "a firmer, more strategic footing."

"By the end of last year, the White House had recognized that it was going to have to manage China policy very carefully in order to prevent it from falling off the cliff," said Stanley Roth, a former director of Asian affairs at the National Security Council. "We were faced with a very unpleasant reality. This is a country that is at least a regional superpower and could be a global one. We cannot make progress unless we have a cooperative relationship with it."

There is widespread agreement, both inside and outside the administration, that the United States needs the cooperation of Beijing to achieve key security objectives in Asia, including dealing with the nuclear threat from North Korea and preserving peace in the western Pacific. As one of five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, China has the ability to facilitate or thwart U.S. foreign policy initiatives. It is also the focal point of the world's most dynamic economic region, with annual growth rates of 9 percent over the last 15 years.

There is sharp disagreement, however, over the responsibility for the deterioration in relations between Washington and Beijing over the past few years. The two have had a series of battles over human rights, trade policy, arms proliferation and the status of Taiwan.



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Clinton administration officials put most of most of the blame on the succession struggle in Beijing, as a new generation of leaders takes over from the aged and ailing patriarch Deng Xiaoping. They depict the present Chinese leadership as prickly and xenophobic, and point to the legacy of mistrust left from the June 1989 massacre of hundreds of pro-democracy activists near Tiananmen Square.

The critics, who include many of America's leading China experts, concede that China is going through a difficult period. But they also fault the Clinton administration for a series of policy flip-flops, on issues such as China's trading status and visas for senior Taiwanese officials. According to this view, the administration's penchant for making threats against Beijing only to back down at the last moment has severely undermined U.S. credibility in Beijing.

"I do not think there is any respect for the American government in Beijing," said Warren I. Cohen, head of China Studies at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington. "Each one of these incidents reinforces two negative views that the Chinese have of America: first, that we are constantly picking on them; and second, that we do not hold them to account on anything."

The Clinton administration's handling of relations with China could become an issue in the presidential campaign this fall. Republican candidate Robert J. Dole has accused Clinton of "weakness and indecision, double-talk and incoherence" in his approach to Beijing. But he has also made clear that he shares the strategic goal of bringing China into the international community and is opposed to attempts by the anti-Beijing lobby in Congress to deny China most-favored-nation (MFN) trading status.

Senior administration officials insist they are laying the basis for a more stable relationship with a country of 1.3 billion people that is just beginning to flex its muscles on the world stage. As evidence, they point to several positive developments over the past few months, including settlement of a long-running dispute on intellectual property rights and the defusing of a war of nerves between China and Taiwan.

During his stay in Beijing, Lake is to meet with a wide spectrum of Chinese officials, including President Jiang Zemin and Prime Minister Li Peng.

"China is a very important country to us," said Winston Lord, the State Department's senior policymaker on Asia. "Inevitably, there are going to be problems in certain areas, such as human rights. In order to cope with these problems, we need to construct as broad an agenda as we can," as the administration is seeking to do, Lord said.

At the same time, Lord acknowledges that the administration "needs to do a better job of articulating its overall approach to China."

Trade and Human Rights

Under Clinton, two major shifts in U.S. policy have roiled U.S.-Chinese relations. The first was the administration's decision in 1994 to back down on using trade as a weapon to punish Beijing for human rights abuses. The second was last year's granting of a U.S. visa to the president of Taiwan, which



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Beijing regards as a renegade province.

The ups and downs in U.S. relations with China are hardly new. What is new, in the opinion of many China experts, is that the differences between Beijing and Washington have threatened to dominate ties, pushing the need for a steady, long-term strategic relationship into the background.

The Clinton administration came into office just as the rationale for a two-decades-old, U.S.-Chinese strategic alliance was crumbling. The geopolitical logic for cooperation between the United States and China was expressed most succinctly by Communist Party Chairman Mao Zedong a few months after President Richard M. Nixon's landmark visit to Beijing in 1972. In his typically earthy fashion, Mao told then-Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger that America and China could overcome their vast ideological differences by working together "against a common bastard" -- the Soviet Union.

Fear of Moscow was the strategic glue that held the U.S.-China relationship together during six Republican and Democratic administrations. But Clinton remarked during the 1992 presidential campaign that it "no longer made any sense to play the China card" and show "forbearance" toward Beijing, because America's Soviet opponents had "thrown in their hand."

Clinton then went on to accuse his rival, President George Bush, of "coddling aging rulers with undisguised contempt for democracy, for human rights." If he came to power, Clinton said, he would withdraw all trading privileges from China as "long as they're locking people up."

Four months after taking office, Clinton signed an executive order giving China one year in which to "significantly improve" its human rights record. Otherwise, it would lose its valuable MFN trading status, which allows Chinese goods the same access to U.S. markets as that enjoyed by the vast majority of America's trading partners.

China experts inside and outside the administration are now virtually unanimous in saying that Clinton's attempt to link MFN to improvements in China's human rights record was doomed. Chinese leaders have a long tradition of digging in their heels when subjected to outside pressure.

Moreover, the threat of American retaliation was immediately undercut by the administration's inability to speak with one voice on China. While the State Department fulminated about human rights, the Commerce Department insisted that one of the world's fastest-growing markets be made safe for U.S. exports. Moreover, the Pentagon was in favor of renewing Sino-American military exchanges, as a way of promoting more openness in Chinese national security institutions.

"The Chinese began to get the idea that the Americans did not mean business," said Cohen, echoing the private complaint of many China specialists in the administration.

The low point in the administration's efforts to develop a coherent China policy came in March 1994, with a visit to Beijing by Secretary of State Warren Christopher. A few days earlier, without informing Christopher, Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights John Shattuck held a meeting in a Beijing



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hotel with China's most prominent dissident, Wei Jingsheng. The Chinese were furious, and they took it out on Christopher, rounding up human rights activists while the secretary was still in Beijing.

Despite some token concessions, it was clear that China had failed to make "significant improvements" in its human rights record. But studies showed that as many as 140,000 U.S. jobs could be lost if the administration revoked MFN and the Chinese took counter-measures. The loss of jobs would be particularly serious in the Pacific seaboard -- a major center of trade with Asia -- including California, whose 54 electoral votes make it the richest prize in presidential politics.

The agonizing within the Clinton administration came against the background of exploding trade between the United States and China, which shot up from around \$ 6 billion in 1980 to nearly \$ 40 billion in 1993. Faced with an intensive lobbying campaign by American businessmen, Clinton decided to back down. On May 26, 1994, he announced that the policy of linking MFN to China's observance of human rights had reached the end of its useful life.

Trouble Over Taiwan

The next big challenge to the administration's China policy came from Taiwan, whose leaders had been conducting a skillful campaign for greater international recognition. Successive U.S. administrations had refused to grant visas to senior Taiwanese officials on the grounds that doing so could undermine the "one-China policy" worked out by Nixon and Mao. In late 1994, however, the Taiwanese began pressing the administration to permit President Lee Teng-hui to pay a visit to Cornell University, his American alma mater.

When the administration stood firm, Taiwanese lobbyists took their campaign to the Republican-controlled Capitol, where they found a sympathetic audience. Unlike mainland China, Taiwan had made rapid strides toward multi-party democracy by early 1995 and boasted a flourishing free market economy.

Most China experts in the administration were adamantly opposed to granting a visa to Lee. They understood that such a step would produce a neuralgic reaction in Beijing, which was hypersensitive to any issue affecting Chinese sovereignty. Several of these experts, including Roth and Robert Suettinger of the National Security Council, Don Keyser of the State Department, and the CIA's Ezra F. Vogel, wrote memos accurately predicting the counter-measures that China was likely to take, from cutting off military contacts with the United States to ratcheting up tensions in the Taiwan Straits.

After Congress voted virtually unanimously to grant a visa to Lee, State Department officials began taking informal bets among themselves over the timing of the administration cave-in. But senior U.S. officials continued to assure the Chinese that permitting a Lee visit would be inconsistent with the one-China policy. The administration's position was reiterated in early April by Christopher at a meeting in New York with Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen.

According to State Department officials, Christopher also told Qian that the administration had so far been unsuccessful in arguing its case to Congress. His remark was intended as a veiled hint that a policy reversal was in the offing. Christopher aides now acknowledge, however, that the hint was probably lost on



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the Chinese foreign minister.

Later that month, Christopher attended a regular breakfast meeting at the White House with Lake and Defense Secretary William J. Perry, at which Taiwan was the main subject under discussion. Despite some soul-searching about the likely damage to Sino-U.S. relations, the three officials decided to recommend a change in policy to the president. Clinton, who had visited Taiwan four times as governor of Arkansas, was predisposed to granting Lee a visa, according to aides.

Subsequent events unfolded almost exactly as the China experts predicted, from the almost immediate cancellation of bilateral military visits to the war games in the Taiwan Straits last February.

TRACKING SHIFTS ON CHINA

On two significant policy issues with China, President Clinton has said one thing and gone on to do another. Both times the administration had come under strong congressional pressure to switch course.

MOST-FAVORED-NATION TRADE STATUS

Human rights groups and a strong lobby in Congress have pressed to make China's trade status dependent on progress in human rights. Exports to China are a significant source of U.S. revenue and jobs.

What Clinton said

Clinton, June 1992: "I wouldn't have done what Mr. Bush did and give all those trade preferences to China when they're locking their people up."

What Clinton did

Renewed China's most-favored-nation trade status in May 1994 despite lack of progress in human rights. "Let me ask you the same question I have asked myself," Clinton said at the time. "Will we do more to advance the cause of human rights if China is isolated?"

A VISA FOR TAIWAN'S PRESIDENT

Lee Teng-hui, president of Taiwan, sought a visa to speak at Cornell University, his alma mater. China asserts that Taiwan is a renegade province and strongly opposes efforts by Taiwan to draw international recognition.

What the administration said

State Department statement, May 9, 1995: "This administration has the greatest respect for President Lee.... Nevertheless, a visit by Lee would have serious consequences for U.S. foreign policy."

What the administration did

Announced May 22, 1995, it would grant Lee a visa. A day earlier, Winston Lord, assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, said



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members of Congress "just feel someone should be able to go back to his alma mater and be recognized without implying officiality."

SOURCE: Congressional Research Service

GRAPHIC: Lee with wife, Wen-hui, at Cornell in June 1995.

LANGUAGE: ENGLISH

LOAD-DATE: July 09, 1996



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FOCUS - 26 OF 30 STORIES

Copyright 1996 The Washington Post
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May 19, 1996, Sunday, Final Edition

SECTION: OP-ED; Pg. C09

LENGTH: 916 words

HEADLINE: On China: The Surest Way to Fail

BYLINE: Jim Hoagland

DATELINE: NEW YORK

BODY:

The best thing that can be said about the U.S. threat to impose punitive trade sanctions on \$ 3 billion worth of Chinese goods is also the worst thing that can be said about it: In the end, President Clinton had no choice but to make it.

That is the most curious aspect of the **Clinton China policy**, which the future ex-senator Bob Dole recently flailed with uncharacteristic gusto. Time after time on China, the White House has left itself with final options that are no better than gruesome. Time after time, the administration has publicly defined failure and then pursued a course that left no other outcome available.

Secretary of State Warren Christopher came to New York on Friday to argue that the **Clinton policies on China** "have opened important new opportunities for U.S.-China cooperation on a broad range of shared interests." Someone should check to see what the secretary has not been inhaling.

China is not interested in cooperating or engaging with America for the sake of engagement or mutual benefit. The Leninist leadership of Beijing sees itself engaged in a long-term confrontation with the United States that it is determined to win. We want to get along; they want to prevail. They say this openly; we pretend not to hear.

U.S. actions toward China have been contradictory and lacking in strategic purpose. As Washington delivered the threat of trade sanctions to protect compact discs, Christopher was defensively accepting the patently false assertion of the Chinese government that it had not known about the export from China of sensitive nuclear material to Pakistan. That way he did not have to recommend still more serious sanctions.

Even where the United States has done the right thing -- as in finally moving to bolster Taiwan against Beijing's military threats -- it has done so in tardy, grudging fashion that undercuts its purpose.



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That is likely to be the case with the president's looming decision to renew most-favored-nation trading status for China by the beginning of June.

Normal trade -- MFN status merely gives China the same access to the American market that almost all other nations enjoy -- will help erode the Communist dictatorship that still runs the world's most populous nation. Not by much, admittedly; but it helps.

But when the president announces his decision to renew MFN, the Chinese will see it not as cooperation but as surrender. MFN renewal -- I repeat, a good thing in itself -- will have the taint of being a concession both to the Communists of China and to American corporations that have exerted heavy pressure on the White House.

In 1993 Clinton coupled his first MFN renewal to a stirring defense of human rights and dissent in China. He would be forced to suspend trading rights if China did not improve its record on human rights, he warned. Beijing belligerently stonewalled him. A year later Clinton acknowledged the failure of his original policy: He renewed MFN in the absence of any change by China.

Christopher played a key role in another example of defining failure and then ensuring it. He promised Beijing last year that he would not give Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui a U.S. visa. In a few weeks Christopher had to do just that in the face of congressional pressure.

Let's be clear: The culprit in this situation is China, not the Clinton administration. Beijing, not surprisingly, senses a strategic vacuum in U.S., Western and Japanese policy-making on Asia. Beijing, not surprisingly, believes this White House can be bullied and lied to without significant reprisal.

This gives China room to assert flagrantly its regional military ambitions over Taiwan and in the South China Sea, and to push to reshape international trading rules in ways that would allow it to become a dominant global economic power on its own terms.

But in each of the conflicts Beijing wages -- stonewalling on MFN, missile tests to intimidate Taiwan, the struggle over Chinese membership in the World Trade Organization, violation of its promises on nuclear nonproliferation, cheating on intellectual property rights agreements -- the administration's responses are self-contained and taken with scant regard to the others.

Moreover, each step is unduly influenced by short-term political and economic concerns.

For Beijing, each battle is one more step in a long-term struggle to erode American influence in Asia and the Pacific. The administration prefers to focus on Chinese words about the value of America's presence in the region, rather than face up to Chinese actions that consistently undercut that presence.

The White House can still hope, as Christopher hinted in his speech on Friday, for a surprise settlement in the trade sanctions row over illegally copied movies, compact discs and software. But the fact that president finds himself going to the trade brink with Beijing on this issue underscores the hollowness of the engagement policy.

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The Chinese betrayal in this instance was too obvious, especially to important Clinton campaign contributors, for the president to blink it away.

The first step to changing this policy of defining and then ensuring failure is for the administration to recognize the long-term nature of the struggle and the true nature of the Leninist leadership in Beijing. Without such a change, China will continue to be Bob Dole's biggest and best target for indicting the administration's handling of foreign policy in the coming campaign.

LANGUAGE: ENGLISH

LOAD-DATE: May 20, 1996May 20, 1996



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LEVEL 1 - 20 OF 20 STORIES

Copyright 1996 The Washington Post
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March 31, 1996, Sunday, Final Edition

SECTION: OP-ED; Pg. C07

LENGTH: 2044 words

HEADLINE: The Stakes With China

BYLINE: Henry Kissinger

BODY:

While the immediate crisis in the Taiwan Strait is likely to subside, its periodic recurrence is nearly guaranteed if each side's perception of the other remains unchanged.

China considers Taiwan a purely domestic matter. Washington sees China's attitude as a deliberate provocation. Beijing interprets our human rights policy and actions on Taiwan as a strategy to weaken and dismember China. If the trend continues, America's relationship with China, which has been fostered by six U.S. presidents -- of both parties -- as an expression of the national interest, will be shattered.

In warning about this danger, I will, in the present fevered atmosphere, undoubtedly again be accused of serving my own business interests. My views on China policy have been on record since my secret visit in 1971 and long antedate my consulting business, which advises international companies, a minority of which do business in China. Anyone who still doubts that my writing seeks any goal other than to promote the national interest should stop reading here.

Of course, neither paternity nor longevity of a policy is an ultimate test. If China should come to threaten our security, a policy of confrontation would find wide support. At the same time, those in both parties so eager to launch America on a collision course with the most populous and potentially most powerful country in Asia should reflect on the consequences. If hostility to China were to become a permanent aspect of our foreign policy, we would find no allies. Nationalism would accelerate throughout the region. Just as American prestige grew with the opening to China, most Asian nations would blame America for generating an unwanted cold war with Beijing.

Before we embark on a self-fulfilling prophecy, let us all take a deep breath and see what is at stake. China increasingly will be the key to stability in Asia and to peace in the world. Whenever a country of China's potential emerges into great power status, a period of adjustment and tension follows.

China's ascendance coincides with major transitions in the rest of Asia. Japan is returning to a more nationalistic foreign policy; Korea may become



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unified and even without that will achieve an economic capacity comparable to that of the major European nation states; Russia's evolution, though uncertain, appears to be moving in a nationalist and neo-imperialist direction; India will become a great power, spreading its influence into South Asia; Southeast Asia -- and its largest nation, Indonesia -- nearly equals China's rate of economic growth.

Despite current tensions, China and the United States continue, in my view, to have a common interest in shaping the peaceful evolution of Asia. China at this stage is more concerned with security and territorial integrity than with predominance; it fears several of its neighbors far more than it fears America.

A wise American policy will not seek premature confrontation; it will try to benefit from our biggest asset -- that we have fewer real quarrels with Asian nations than they have with each other, enabling us to act as balancer of the Asian equilibrium.

Those who are nostalgic for the anti-Soviet Cold War need to remember that Beijing is not Moscow. The Soviet Politburo maneuvered itself into isolation vis-a-vis all the industrial nations of the world plus China. The Beijing leadership is far more subtle. In a confrontation with America, it would appeal to Asian nationalism and make the American military presence in Asia a bone of contention. And it would be able to enlist the economic cooperation of Japan as well as of the other industrial nations of Europe and the Western Hemisphere, all eager to seize the opportunities that we might abandon.

To be sure, China, too, has much at stake. While it would fairly easily find substitutes for American investors, discovering alternative markets would impose a serious strain. Nor can it be blind to the import of a conflict with America relative to its nightmares of Russia and Japan. Yet China broke with the Soviets in 1959 when it had no political alternatives, and the chill has continued for more than 30 years: Pushed against the wall, it would pay the necessary price for its self-respect today and sustain it for a long period.

America is not solely responsible for what could turn into a misfortune for both countries. China's stiff-necked negotiating tactics and its recent militaristic conduct in the Taiwan Strait have touched a raw nerve. If that attitude continues and a military confrontation develops -- possibly even a confrontation with strategic overtones -- those of us who have most deplored the way relations have evolved will side with their country.

Taiwan, too, has contributed to the tense situation. Six presidents, including the incumbent, have repeatedly stated concern for a peaceful solution of the Taiwan question. They have successfully supported Taiwan's entry into international institutions. But Taiwan has increasingly challenged the one-China policy of those same presidents as well as of the three joint communiques approved by Presidents Nixon, Carter and Reagan. Using its economic leverage to lobby extensively, it has tried to move America from support for a peaceful solution to near participation in a Chinese civil war that has lasted more than a half-century. Over such an issue, Beijing will resort to force regardless of consequences.

In the end, a heavy responsibility rests on America. Regrettably, both political parties have contributed to the crisis atmosphere. Yet it is the



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The Washington Post, March 31, 1996

failure of the administration to put forward a coherent strategy that has deprived its vacillating tactics of credibility in China and prevented the formation of a national consensus at home. When Washington abandoned -- in my view correctly -- its confrontational human rights **policy** under the pressure of its own deadline, Beijing learned that it had the ability to call our bluff. The succeeding **policy** of constructive engagement was put forward not as a means of defining common interests but as a way of accelerating Chinese internal reform -- which, whatever we may think, creates no incentives for reciprocity.

In the process, the basis for a rational dialogue seeking to define common interests is being eroded. Nixon and Mao -- neither distinguished by sentimentality -- expressed in the Shanghai Communique an overriding interest in Asian stability. That interest has not changed.

Without a commitment to a common interest, all other issues -- from nonproliferation to Taiwan -- turn into tests of strength. We seem tone-deaf to the condescension implicit in a **policy** whose principal weapon seems to be sanctions -- from most-favored-nation status to export-import credits -- and which presents friendly relations as a unilateral favor Washington may or may not grant to Beijing.

The most immediate issue is Taiwan. Our media and many in Congress describe the issue as facing down China. The real challenge is to vindicate our interest in a peaceful solution without adopting a two-China **policy**. China does not consider Taiwan a foreign country; it is where the erosion of Chinese territory began when Japan annexed the island in 1895. China sees the issue in terms of national unity against secession.

Starting with the first meetings, Chinese leaders have rejected a two-China solution or a one-China, one-Taiwan outcome. Every American president since, including Clinton, has affirmed America's commitment to a one-China **policy**. At the same time, every American president has expressed concern for a peaceful solution. Gradually, a tacit bargain emerged that worked well for nearly a quarter of a century: America affirmed a one-China **policy**; Beijing denied any urgency in settling the issue; America avoided internationalizing the problem; Beijing refrained from threats and pressure; Taiwan did not push beyond these limits.

Taiwan prospered under this tacit bargain. It established a vibrant economy and democratic institutions. It joined the Asian Development Bank, APEC (Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation) and the Olympic Games with Beijing's acquiescence. For its part, Beijing just last year put forward proposals for unification in which Taiwan was given total internal autonomy, including the right to its own armed forces.

That hopeful evolution has been systematically undermined by the growing loss of public support for Sino-American relations in the wake of Tiananmen Square as well as by Taiwan's maneuvers to achieve formal independence. However understandable, such measures as its offer of \$ 1 billion to the United Nations for membership represent an explicit challenge to the one-China **policy**. The straw that broke the camel's back was the granting of a visa to Lee Teng-Hui a month after Secretary of State Warren Christopher had assured his Chinese counterpart that no visa would be granted because to do so would violate the long-standing American **policy** of recognizing only one China.



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It was then that the Chinese leadership decided that unless it drew a line, the erosion of the one-China **policy** would lead to the formal partition of its country. Every observer of the Chinese scene shares the conviction that, whatever the cost, China will fight rather than give up what it considers Chinese territory.

If that was the point China was trying to make to Taiwan and to the rest of the world by its recent military exercises, it overshot the mark and misjudged the foreseeable American reaction. Washington, in turn, exacerbated matters by combining necessary precautionary moves with a rhetoric veering from public truculence to ambiguity, finally to secret conciliation -- a prescription for disaster. At the edge of the precipice, all sides must make a serious effort to reverse the headlong rush toward confrontation.

Beijing should sheath its sword, return to diplomacy and show greater understanding for the values that animate American conduct. Taiwan must be given to understand that American concern for a peaceful outcome does not extend to reentering the Chinese civil war, either overtly or by subterfuge. And it should realize that its present support may prove evanescent if a prolonged Sino-American conflict can be blamed on Taiwanese machination. Beijing and Taipei should resume their dialogue.

As for American **policy**, the administration should return to the tacit bargain of a genuine one-China **policy** on the part of America and avoidance of military pressures and threats by Beijing. This requires: (1) an end to foreign **policy** as an exercise in pleasing incompatible domestic constituencies, (2) discerning and then avowing a thread of common interest with Beijing and (3) a serious dialogue to bring it to life.

So far, what has passed for dialogue has been an attempt to persuade China to adopt an American-designed agenda in the formulation of which the Chinese have not even been consulted. America's definition of reciprocity has been to withdraw the threat of some embargo or other in exchange for Chinese concessions.

At the same time, our human rights **policy** toward China must be brought into some relationship with other U.S. objectives. America has achieved such a balance with Russia, which has inflicted incomparably greater casualties on Chechnya and over a longer period of time than China did at Tiananmen Square.

In the context of common purpose, mutual restraint regarding Taiwan and a resumed Beijing-Taipei dialogue would render most day-to-day crises negotiable. I cannot believe that, in the end, China does not have an even greater interest in keeping nuclear weapons out of South Asia than the United States, provided it is given a voice in shaping the agenda. At this point, tactical issues are less important than to remind those so eager to rush pell-mell into confrontation of such historical disasters as the outbreak of World War I, which seemed so inevitable to contemporaries and so incomprehensible to posterity.

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The writer, a former secretary of state, is president of Kissinger Associates, an international consulting firm that has clients with business



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interests in many countries abroad.

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FOCUS - 29 OF 30 STORIES

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Los Angeles Times

February 11, 1996, Sunday, Home Edition

SECTION: Opinion; Part M; Page 5; Op-Ed Desk

LENGTH: 740 words

HEADLINE: THINKING THE UNTHINKABLE TO AVOID A WAR;
CHINA: THE U.S. MUST BE UNEQUIVOCAL IN ITS SUPPORT OF TAIWAN OR RISK BEIJING'S
NEW BELLIGERENCE ESCALATING.

BYLINE: By JIM HOAGLAND, Jim Hoagland writes a syndicated column in Washington.

BODY:

War between China and Taiwan is unthinkable today. It makes no sense. It is as unthinkable as an Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was in July 1990, as unthinkable as China entering the Korean War against the United States was in November 1950, as unthinkable as Britain having to expel the Argentines from the Falklands seemed in 1982.

That, of course, is the point: The Clinton administration must now think the unthinkable. It must move with an energy and determination it has not previously shown to prevent a war that could surprise the world by happening.

Every rational, calculated scenario shows that Beijing is simply bluffing with its increasingly belligerent behavior and statements. The experts assure us that this bellicosity is designed to scare Taiwan away from moves toward independence and influence the island's March presidential election.

Miscalculation and hubris can sweep away those rational scenarios in the blink of an eye. In this decade, few governments have shown as great a propensity to miscalculate and misunderstand each other as Beijing and Washington.

The Clinton administration now confronts the consequences of clinging to a failed China policy it feels it cannot afford to abandon. The political, bureaucratic and economic investments in the policy rule out any acknowledgment of failure and a change of direction. The same bureaucratic reflex that kept secret arms shipments flowing to Iran's "moderates" under Ronald Reagan and guaranteed agricultural credits to Saddam Hussein to make him more reasonable now drives Bill Clinton's policy toward China.

Clinton's "comprehensive engagement" policy has not given the rational reformers that Washington presumes to be lurking in the Chinese government enough ammunition to prevail and moderate Chinese behavior.

The U.S. concessions that have been justified in the name of



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engagement--Clinton's reversal on granting low-tariff trading status to China, the waffling on visas for Taiwan officials, looking the other way on China's export of nuclear technology to Pakistan, the high visibility meetings Clinton has held with Chinese leaders--have not purchased moderation. At best they have bought time. But time has run out as Beijing escalates its aggressive behavior and its buying of sophisticated Russian warplanes.

The administration's approach has convinced Beijing that everything else in the relationship--human rights, Hong Kong's future, even regional security--comes second to economic relations and trade. That may not be true. The point is that Beijing now believes it and acts upon it for its own advantage.

Clinton needs now to remove the leverage he has given the Chinese. He should instruct his aides to de-emphasize the importance of China to America's economic future in their public statements. He should order them to drop the engagement policy's phony argument that a strong trade relationship is America's best chance to moderate Chinese political behavior and bring democracy to China.

What the administration needs to pursue now is selective disengagement.

Left to their own devices and without the politically damaging boosterism that Secretary of Commerce Ron Brown and his aides have exhibited, American businessmen will make pragmatic decisions about trade. They should be left to do that on their own.

Some in Congress want to revoke the most-favored-nation trading status Clinton at first opposed and then granted. But another abrupt reversal on trade will not help bring clarity to a relationship that urgently needs it. Revoking MFN again would only deepen the Chinese view that American values are exclusively bound up in and can only be expressed by economic action.

Clinton can show that is not the case by pledging unambiguous U.S. military support for Taiwan. And he must forcefully make the point that relations between Taiwan and the United States cannot be held hostage by Beijing.

The president must also renounce the friendly meetings and communications he has held with a Chinese leadership that has repaid him by threatening war against Taiwan, an American friend that borders on being an American protectorate.

It may be beyond America's power to stop China from miscalculating where the brink lies. But it is within America's power to dispel the current ambiguity about the U.S. commitment to Taiwan and U.S. political values. That is the best way to prevent the unthinkable from becoming reality.

GRAPHIC: Drawing, (...), PANCHO, Le Monde, Paris

LANGUAGE: ENGLISH

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