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HEADLINE: What We Did in China

BYLINE: Carl M. Cannon

HIGHLIGHT:

It may have looked as if President Clinton was winging it in China, but his coziness with Jiang Zemin was no accident. Every move was scripted, down to his statements about Taiwan.

BODY:

It was the middle of the night on June 30, Washington time, and Stephen F. Chen, Taiwan's ambassador to the United States--though he's not allowed to use that title--was watching C-SPAN as President Clinton held court in Shanghai. Seated around Clinton in a modern-looking library were a businessman, a priest, a political scientist and five other individuals selected by the Chinese government to represent the face of contemporary Chinese society. Hillary Rodham Clinton was there, too, for what was billed as "a discussion for shaping China for the 21st century."

On a pre-arranged cue halfway through the session, Clinton turned to the young political scientist, a man named Wu Xinbo, and solicited from him a question that opened a brief discussion on Taiwan, the most dangerous issue between the United States and the People's Republic of China, and the most delicate subject to be raised in all of the President's nine-day visit to China.

Clinton told Wu Xinbo that he had discussed Taiwan with Chinese President Jiang Zemin. "I had a chance to reiterate our Taiwan policy, which is that we don't support independence for Taiwan, or two Chinas, or one-Taiwan, one-China. And we don't believe that Taiwan should be a member in any organization for which statehood is a requirement. So I think we have a consistent policy. Our only policy is that it has to be done peacefully. That is what our law says, and we have encouraged cross-strait dialogue. And I think eventually it will bear fruit, if everyone is patient and works hard."



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The President and senior foreign policy officials in his Administration have insisted that these remarks constituted absolutely no change in long-standing American policy. In one sense this is accurate--the language the President employed was derived from public statements of American Administrations going back to Richard Nixon's presidency and the Shanghai communique of 1972. But no previous American President had ever actually given voice to the policy, preserving an ambiguity that was regarded as crucial to the delicacy of the U.S. position, which rested on appearing to take neither the side of Taipei nor that of Beijing. White House officials knew, before Clinton spoke, that the fact of the President's articulating the policy on **Chinese** soil and in the context of a friendly visit to **China** could in itself change perceptions of the U.S. position, if not the position itself, and could suggest that the United States was shifting from a studiously neutral position to one more sympathetic to **China's** long-term goal of subsuming Taiwan.

Certainly, this was how Clinton's statement struck the Taiwanese themselves. "Oh my God!" Stephen Chen muttered as he stared at his television. "He said that!"

Clinton's statement on Taiwan was not the only gesture that raised concerns in Asia that a new, special relationship was emerging between the two superpowers that could affect the strategic dynamics of the region. After Clinton and Jiang issued a joint statement calling on India and Pakistan, which both conducted recent underground nuclear weapons tests, to "adhere immediately" to the Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, India's government stewed in anger. Pointing to **China's** role in assisting Pakistan's nuclear program, the Indian Foreign Ministry issued this statement: "India categorically rejects the notion of these two countries arrogating to themselves joint or individual responsibility for the maintenance of peace, stability and security in the region."

After Clinton, who pointedly refused to stop in Tokyo, joined Jiang in scolding Japan for its fiscal policies, the government was publicly quiet, but the Japanese press and public were incensed.

"The animating feature of Japanese politics and public policy is insecurity . . . 'fuan,'" said Richard Samuels, head of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology's Japan program. "From a Japanese perspective, (Clinton's **China** trip) is just one more good reason to feel anxiety--as if they needed more reason."

In Washington, the reaction was delayed, but by the time Clinton's triumphant tour ended, the questions being vigorously discussed by **China** scholars were of the most profound nature: Did President Clinton launch the United States on a historically different course regarding both Taiwan and **China**?



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If so, did he subtly alter the balance of power in Asia by strengthening the regime of Jiang Zemin?

"The answer to the first question is, he is certainly trying to," said Arthur Waldron, director of Asian studies at the American Enterprise Institute. "The answer to the second question depends on whether he's successful."

But Waldron's point implies that there is a more basic question: Is **Clinton's China policy** the right one?

This much is certain. There was nothing ad hoc about his "three no's" declaration in Shanghai--or anything else on the **China** trip. Clinton's remarks about Taiwan, about Tibet, about Japan, about nuclear proliferation, were the result of much thought and conscious design. Everything the President said and did in **China** reflected policies that are now five years in the making. Critical questions about Clinton's trip are really about the larger strategy. As presidential spokesman Michael D. McCurry said in an interview for this article, "The critics of the **China** visit are the same people who don't like our **China policy**."

The Clinton Stamp

The problem for the White House is that there are a growing number of such critics--including a majority in the U.S. Senate, an insurgent band of **China** experts at American universities, **Chinese** human rights activists and their American allies on both the Left and the Right, the ruling party in India, and much of the press and public in Japan.

Nowhere, of course, was the consternation greater than in Taiwan, where officials spanning the political spectrum had hoped that an American President who travels the globe lauding the world's emerging democracies would pay public notice of theirs. Instead, Clinton made a statement that seemed, to the Taiwanese at least, to legitimize **China's** longtime obsession with taking control over Taiwan.

"Mr. Clinton espoused the virtues of democracy while in **China**," said Parris Chang, a Taipei legislator who favors independence. "But he somehow forgot that here in Taiwan we already have a democratic society."

Taiwan's grievance was taken up last week by Senate Republicans. "Why am I concerned with the President's choice of words while he was in **China**?" said Frank Murkowski of Alaska as he offered a sense-of-the-Senate resolution designed to ease Taipei's fears. "Because I think it's misleading, dangerously misleading. It indicates to the **Chinese** and the Taiwanese that our policy on Taiwan has changed, when the President says it hasn't."

Murkowski's resolution carried 92-0. The White House deftly avoided an embarrassing rebuke by saying the measure



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merely restated American policy and urging Democrats to vote for it. But the Administration did little to address Indiana Republican Sen. Richard G. Lugar's succinct question about Clinton and the three no's: "Why did he say it at all?"

The short answer is that Jiang Zemin wanted him to. And in the process of obliging his host, Clinton altered the dynamic of U.S.-Sino relations, promoting a **China** policy that rests on four major points: rigorously advocating trade and cultural exchanges; bolstering Jiang's standing; offering tacit approval for Beijing's aspiration of someday subsuming Taiwan; and soft-pedaling the twin U.S. pet causes of human rights and nonproliferation, attempting to advance them not by sanctions or threats, but by respectful appeals to **China's** pride.

Suspensions linger that Clinton's conciliatory approach is a payback to the corporate interests that do business in **China** and that so generously supported the President's 1996 reelection campaign. These included such giant American firms as the Boeing Co., and Loral Space & Communications Ltd., as well as **Chinese** enterprises that allegedly laundered money through middlemen such as the former California entrepreneur and now-federal indictee Johnny Chung. Although Clinton makes no bones about his belief that trade has a legitimate place in post-Cold War diplomacy, the White House insists that Big Business has exerted no undue influence.

Certainly, there are other, more pressing, motivations for a softer approach toward **China**. Two of them are frustration and fear. The frustration is rooted, Administration officials say, in the fact that **China** simply doesn't respond rationally to sanctions, threats or peer pressure. The fear is that by pushing too hard--or, indeed, at all--on Taiwan, the United States could help start a war.

During the 1992 presidential campaign, then-Gov. Clinton accused President Bush on no fewer than eight occasions of being too cozy with Beijing's leaders, of not doing enough to foster democracy in **China** and of caring more about trade than human rights. He vowed to be tougher, but that approach lasted only a few months into Clinton's presidency.

In March of 1993, Clinton dispatched a letter to Beijing listing 14 areas in which he wanted to see improvement in return for his Administration's support for continued most-favored-nation trading status for **China**. Incensed, **Chinese** leaders fired back a letter listing seven areas in which they wanted to see changes in American policy.

In late May of 1993, Clinton announced that he would extend MFN for another year, but laid down strict requirements for progress on human rights on other issues. That stance lasted until March of 1994, when **Chinese** officials responded to a meeting between democracy activist Wei Jingsheng and John Shattuck, the State Department's top human rights official, by



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arresting Wei and by treating a visiting Secretary of State Warren Christopher with calculated public rudeness. This fiasco led Clinton to essentially abandon his human rights policy, on the grounds that it wasn't working.

A pattern had been established for the Clinton era. Washington gives Beijing a shove, Beijing shoves back, harder. Washington says: Let's shake hands and be friends.

At the heart of the question about Clinton's China policy is this dilemma: Clinton is right to say that his policies are basically the same as those of his predecessors, but Taiwan is not the same at all. The Taiwan that existed at the time of the Shanghai communique no longer exists.

The old Taiwan was an authoritarian state ruled absolutely by Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang Party (KMT) and dedicated to the somewhat quixotic proposition of eventually taking back mainland China. (That this goal was, by 1972, unrealistic, was beside the point. 'One China' was a model adhered to fervently on both sides of the Taiwan Strait; the United States was merely acquiescing in a formulation that was uniquely Chinese.)

The KMT is still around, but it no longer rules the island by force. In 1986, the KMT allowed the formation of opposition political parties. The following year, Chiang's son lifted the state of martial law. In 1988, Lee Teng-hui took over as president. In 1992, Lee dissolved parliament and ordered new elections. In 1996, Lee won the first-ever popular presidential election on Chinese soil. Today, Taiwan's population of 21 million represents a stunning economic and political success story.

'It's not an 'emerging' anything--it's a strong democracy (with) a vibrant economy,' says former White House national security adviser Anthony Lake. In a recent speech in Taipei, Lake advocated inclusion of Taiwan in the International Monetary Fund, a possibility that Clinton, Lake's former boss, seemed to preclude in Shanghai.

As for claiming the mainland, Taipei no longer unanimously embraces that 'one China' policy. The main opposition party favors independence; though it is split into factions over when it should occur. Some want it now, some favor it as an ideal. The KMT, which fears provoking Beijing too much, talks not of independence, but of serving as a role model for the mainland. Officially, the KMT still favors reunification, but only if the mainland becomes more democratic.

'If Beijing remains Communist, unification is out of the question--for the simple reason that no one in this world who is free would volunteer to live under Communism,' says Stephen Chen. 'Beijing's terms are 'one China, now; that we will dictate the terms; and that those terms are that you have to accept the



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same deal as Hong Kong.' To that, we say, 'No, no, no. . . . It's out of the question.''
Evolution of a Policy

In this context, U.S. support for 'one China' is no longer a statement of calculated ambiguity; it is a statement in support of Beijing's desire, but it fails to take into account that Taiwan has become a democracy. This disconnect was quietly recognized within the Bush Administration, which gave subtle signs that it was reevaluating the 'one China' policy. In the summer of 1991, after retiring as the Bush-appointed ambassador to Beijing, James Lilley said in a speech that China's territorial claims to Taiwan were 'anachronistic.' In 1992, Bush seemed to signal that he, too, was having second thoughts by agreeing to sell F-16 fighter jets to Taiwan.

This decision seemed to violate the spirit of the third China policy communique--signed in 1982 by President Reagan when Bush was Vice President--which committed the United States to eventually ceasing arms sales to Taiwan. Also in 1992, Bush dispatched U.S. Trade Representative Carla A. Hills on an official trip to Taipei, a move that Beijing saw as undermining the second communique, signed by President Carter in 1979, which downgraded Washington's relations with Taipei to 'unofficial.'

As the U.S. gave signs of shifting, Taiwan, as always, kept pushing--for arms; for support; and, above all, for tacit recognition as a state, through membership in multinational groups such as the International Maritime Organization and even the World Health Organization.

Meanwhile, a worried Beijing became increasingly insistent on U.S. expressions of support for an absolutely rigid 'one-China' policy, unchanged in all its Cold War particulars. In late 1993, after the first, brief summit between Jiang and Clinton, Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen made a point of telling reporters that 'President Clinton emphasized that he is committed to the one-China policy.' In those meetings, when the Clinton Administration pressed China about its destabilizing sale of M-11 missiles to Pakistan, Jiang coolly replied that he would talk about this only if Clinton would revisit Bush's decision to sell F-16s to Taiwan.

It was against this backdrop that a series of events occurred that brought about the next, and most profound evolution in Clinton's China policy.

In the spring of 1995, Clinton made what would turn out to be a hugely consequential decision, personally overruling the State Department, to permit Taiwan President Lee to visit the United States so that he might give the commencement address at Cornell University, his alma mater.

China had warned it would retaliate, and it made good on



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its threat. **China's** ambassador was briefly recalled, ongoing talks with Taipei--initiated by Lee--were canceled. Then, on July 21, 1995, **China** fired two missiles a day for three days into the sea 100 miles north of Taiwan. The Clinton Administration did not protest. Emboldened, late the next winter, the People's Liberation Army staged a series of provocative military maneuvers that included amassing 10,000 troops on the coast, firing M-9 ballistic missiles into the Taiwan Strait and rehearsing an amphibious invasion of Taiwan on Pingtan and Haitan Island.

Alarmed, Clinton ordered two carrier groups into the region, while Tony Lake and Secretary of Defense William J. Perry warned their **Chinese** counterparts that if anything should happen to Taiwan there would be 'grave consequences,' universally understood diplomatic code for war.

Out of this brinkmanship came the Clinton Administration's shift in emphasis, its decision to seek a 'strategic partnership' with **China**. 'They were spooked by the 1996 missile firings,' says the AEI's Waldron. 'President Clinton doesn't like trouble. He doesn't like confrontation. His instincts were, 'How do we calm that down?'

But one thing must be understood: The Clinton team didn't embrace Jiang and **China** because it thought **China** was bluffing about Taiwan, but, rather, because it believes precisely the opposite. This is a legitimate concern, one underscored by a veiled nuclear threat conveyed to the Administration by a **Chinese** official through **China** specialist Chas. W. Freeman Jr., a prominent former U.S. diplomat.

Freeman has said that a **Chinese** official he would not name--believed to be a lieutenant general--told him that **China** no longer feared U.S. nuclear threats because it had such weapons of its own, and sneered that the United States would not fight for Taiwan because 'in the end, you care a lot more about Los Angeles than Taipei.' It was an unmistakable warning that the **Chinese** were prepared to take any conflict over Taiwan nuclear. **Chinese** officials swiftly assured the Americans that this is not official Beijing policy, but other scholars have been alarmed to discover how prevalent the attitude conveyed to Freeman is within the **Chinese** military.

Michael Green, an Asia expert at the Council on Foreign Relations, recalled an ominous exchange that occurred during a recent lecture he gave at Harvard University to 30-some members of **China's** officer corps. 'It was a cordial, open session, but when Taiwan came up they just exploded at me,' Green recalled. 'They said things like, 'You can kill millions of **Chinese**, but we'll fight to the last man for Taiwan. How many Americans are you willing to sacrifice?'

But if the **Chinese** are quick to employ the apocalyptic language of World War III, critics of Clinton's policy invoke the



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lessons of the Second World War.

"What President Clinton gave to **China** on Taiwan . . . it's like Munich in 1938," complained Parris Chang from his Taipei home. "It's appeasement."
"Doing It Our Way"

Leaving to history the proof of whether **Clinton's** policy is wise, the question about the **China** visit shifts to this: How did **Clinton** execute his new **policy** while he was there? Specifically, did he go overboard in trying to accommodate Jiang Zemin?

So far, the reviews are mixed. Clearly, the White House was buoyed by two aspects of the trip. First and foremost was Jiang's unexpected decision to broadcast their joint press conference, in which the two men sparred over the importance of freedom.

"The things he discussed--Tiananmen, democracy as the birthright of all peoples, Tibet--none of these subjects have been discussed publicly in **China** during the last decade," said a senior White House foreign policy aide, who predicted that the broadcast would have "ripple effects" throughout **China**. "The average **Chinese** says, 'If President Clinton and President Jiang can talk about this on television, why can't I?'"

Numerous pro-democracy **Chinese** leaders and citizens concur with this analysis.

Wang Zhenyao, a mid-ranking **Chinese** official with a long-standing commitment to building the local electoral process in **China**, spoke of "the profound importance" for him of seeing the give-and-take between Jiang and Clinton on television. "It surprised me deeply, and left me excited," Wang said in an interview. "I'd just never seen a **Chinese** leader behave that way before."

The second benefit touted by the Administration was in the area of nonproliferation, where Jiang reiterated earlier pledges to refrain from selling anti-ship missiles to Iran, to stop providing technological assistance to "unsafeguarded" nuclear facilities (read "Pakistan") and to quit peddling M-9 missiles to the likes of Syria.

Some observers were dismissive of the campaign-like atmospherics of Clinton's trip. **Chinese** dissident Harry Wu characterized it as "a talk show that took place in **China**." Others, such as **China** scholars Kenneth G. Lieberthal of the University of Michigan and Suisheng Zhao, a **Chinese**-born professor at Colby College in Maine, insist that theatrics matter and say it is important for Americans to have an understanding of **China** that goes beyond the 1989 massacre in Tiananmen Square.

A third, if unstated, American aim was to enhance Jiang's



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standing within his own country. The logic of this objective eludes even some experienced **China** hands. Clearly, Jiang is no liberal reformer. Despite his taste for Western music, his command of English and his endearing habit of reciting the Gettysburg Address aloud, there are other signs that he doesn't quite grasp the lessons of democratic pluralism. One is the contempt he displayed for educated Westerners who believe in Tibetan Buddhism. "Why?" he said during Clinton's visit. "I don't understand."

"Clinton treats him as if he's some kind of Yeltsin or Gorbachev, but I don't really see that," said Steven J. Hood, a **China** scholar at Ursinus College in Pennsylvania. "I wish the traveling media had pressed (Clinton) more on this point: 'What is it, exactly, that you saw in Jiang Zemin that makes you believe he will lead **China** toward democratization?'"

But even if Clinton is right that Jiang is the best America can hope for in **China** right now, there is no question that the President went surprisingly far in aligning himself with his **Chinese** counterpart.

At the trip's final presidential press conference, Clinton praised Jiang as a man of "vision," who was committed to changing **China** for the better. Despite abundant evidence to the contrary, the President went on record supporting the official Beijing line that forced abortions and sterilizations are not part of its "planned-birth" policy. In Shanghai, Clinton also sat mute while a Communist Party-appointed Catholic bishop--Beijing doesn't allow the Vatican to appoint bishops in **China**--spewed government propaganda about the aims of the church and the government being identical.

Moments later, Hillary Clinton carried this preoccupation with good manners even further. "What I'm interested in is, are there any restrictions on access to the Internet?" she asked an entrepreneur named Edward Zeng. "Right now it's just purely in the application form," he replied. "You can get it right away."

Somehow, Mrs. Clinton took comfort in this bland and noncommittal statement. "Right away! So there's no restrictions, universally available to anyone who has the funds to have access to it," she gushed.

Going well beyond the language of diplomacy, the President gave Jiang Zemin everything he could have asked for: Clinton and his entourage chose respect over confrontation; argued that increased, not decreased, trade, will lead to liberalization; mouthed the exact words Jiang requested on Taiwan; and repeatedly used the word "stability," which several sinologists said was sweet music to Jiang's ears because to the **Chinese**, "stability" is a code word for acceptance of the status quo. In 1988, Reagan made meeting with dissidents a



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condition of his visit to Moscow. In 1998, Clinton acceded to **Chinese** requests that he be greeted in Tiananmen Square, hard by the spot where the People's Liberation Army slaughtered unarmed protesters for democracy.

Critics say that Clinton's remarkably approving behavior had the effect of vastly underplaying American concern for human rights, which could have profound consequences. The **China** trip, said Steve Rickard of Amnesty International, may have set in motion "a dramatic change in the way we present ourselves to the world."

Maybe so, White House officials rejoined, but what was the previous policy accomplishing? "The more relevant analogy was when Bush insisted that (dissident) Fang Lizhi be invited to a state dinner when he visited **China** in 1989," said McCurry. "He was arrested before he made it to the front door. It's a very tough bunch, but our argument is that we are making more headway doing it our way than through confrontation."

Adam Brookes in Beijing contributed to this report. Also contributing were Richard E. Cohen, Sydney J. Freedberg Jr. and Victoria Pope.

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LEVEL 1 - 45 OF 120 STORIES

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SECTION: SPECIAL REPORT **CHINA** AND THE U.S.; Pg. 28

LENGTH: 2300 words

HEADLINE: A WIN-WIN SUMMIT;

In spite of their differences, **China** and America seem set to develop closer ties for the next century

BYLINE: BY TODD CROWELL AND DAVID HSIEH, BEIJING With additional reporting by Sam Gilston/Washington

BODY:

"America wants to build a new relationship with you. We want **China** to be successful, secure and open, working for a more peaceful and prosperous world." That was the message U.S. President Bill Clinton had for his audience at elite Peking University, whom he called "the next generation of **China's** leaders." A skeptical student asked him if darker motives lurked behind the facade of charm. Clinton, relishing the cut and thrust, replied: "My words mean exactly what they say. I want a partnership, I'm not hiding behind a smile."

Indeed, America's president went to **China** last week to build a "strategic partnership" between the world's most powerful country and its most important emerging nation. But in many respects, the key elements for a new relationship were already falling into place in the weeks before Clinton's nine-day tour through four mainland cities, starting with the ancient capital of Xian, and ending in Hong Kong.

On May 30, the American leader picked up the new Washington-Beijing "hot line" set up after the U.S. visit of **Chinese** President Jiang Zemin last October. India had conducted a series of underground nuclear-weapons tests, and Pakistan, a longstanding friend of **China**, was threatening to match its arch-rival. For about 40 minutes, Clinton and Jiang discussed ways to dissuade Islamabad from escalating the arms race in South Asia. Though their effort proved in vain, it precipitated the first direct call between the White House and Zhongnanhai.

Then on June 17, Washington reversed a hands-off policy by intervening directly in global financial markets in a successful attempt to shore up the sagging Japanese yen. The about-face is widely believed to have been forced by **China**, which was becoming increasingly frustrated by the Americans' inability to budge Japan on needed economic reforms. The **Chinese** push was accompanied by strong hints that Beijing might devalue its own currency unless the yen's slide were halted. Seldom before has any nominally communist country exercised such sway over international financial affairs.

Indeed, shortly before accompanying Clinton to **China**, U.S. Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin revealed that American and **Chinese** finance officials were consulting almost on a daily basis. Whether it is the economic crisis in East



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Asiaweek July 10, 1998

Asia, the nuclear rivalry in South Asia or tensions on the Korean peninsula, the Sino-American partnership is rapidly becoming a geopolitical reality. Says former U.S. assistant secretary of defense Charles Freeman: "There is a growing list of issues of concern to the United States that cannot be discussed without **China's** cooperation."

It is hard to believe that two years ago, the same official was on the receiving end of an implied **Chinese** threat to "nuke" Los Angeles if Washington were to intervene in the Taiwan Strait missile crisis. Lt.-Gen. Xiong Guangkai, deputy chief of staff of the People's Liberation Army, reportedly told Freeman in Beijing: "In the end, you care a lot more about Los Angeles than Taipei." Memories of that episode add a certain edge to the show-piece of last week's summit -- an agreement by the U.S. and **China** not to target nuclear weapons at each other (see box page 30). In fact, the Clinton visit, the first by an American president since the traumatic Tiananmen crackdown of 1989, produced a win-win outcome. For all their differences, both sides seemed determined to build a closer, more mutually beneficial relationship for the next century.

Even so, a "strategic partnership" with **China** remains a tough sell in the U.S. That is true despite a concerted effort by American foreign-policy heavyweights -- including Henry Kissinger and former presidents Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter and George Bush -- to talk it up on the eve of Clinton's trip. Skepticism is specially strong in the U.S. Congress, many of whose members think of **China** less as a partner than a repressive, obnoxious force. Clinton's Democratic Party has been tarred by allegations that he may have jeopardized U.S. interests by accepting **Chinese** campaign contributions.

The opposition Republicans see in **China** an issue they can exploit to attack a president whose popularity seems impervious to criticism. Though Clinton found room for 1,200 people -- and 900 tons of baggage -- in his **China** entourage, only six were members of Congress. Evidently, he could not persuade even a single Republican representative to go with him. That may be a first among summit trips, on which U.S. presidents usually take care to demonstrate that their diplomacy has bipartisan support in the legislature.

Some Congressmen, complaining that Clinton's policy of "engaging" **China** had failed to show results, wanted him to cancel his trip. Other lawmakers, plus many opinion-shapers, had urged him not to be received officially at Tiananmen Square. To do so, they said, would sully the memory of those killed during the Tiananmen crackdown. But Clinton went along with **Chinese** wishes to review the honor guard at the square, intending to raise the June 4 issue and speak out on human rights in other forums.

The **Chinese** soon gave Clinton's critics more ammunition by revoking visas for three reporters from Radio Free Asia, a semi-official American station that Beijing considers a propaganda organ. The president countered by giving the trio an exclusive interview, though he did not insist they be allowed to accompany him to **China**. Temporary detentions of several dissidents at Clinton's first stop, Xian, brought a tart comment from National Security Adviser Sandy Berger: "People are not debris to be swept up for a visitor."

The president's first opportunity to shift the tone came on June 27, after his two-hour summit meeting with Jiang Zemin. The two leaders held a lively and seemingly unscripted press conference, which was broadcast live over national



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television in **China**. They traded comments about the Tiananmen affair (Clinton said the crackdown was wrong; Jiang insisted it was necessary for stability). They discussed the Asian financial crisis and human rights. They even touched on the sensitive subject of Tibet.

It was all very polite and for the most part pretty mild stuff. But American officials could hardly contain their excitement. "This has been quite an extraordinary day in the evolution of U.S.-**China** relations," said Berger. Clinton seemed pleased with his own performance: "I feel much better. I thought it was good." He and Jiang had met six times before, and seemed relaxed in each other's company. In closing their dialogue, Clinton said of the Dalai Lama that "if he had a conversation with President Jiang, I believe they would like each other very much." That elicited a hearty chuckle from Jiang, suggesting a certain personal rapport.

James Sasser, America's ambassador to **China**, reckoned that the uncensored telecast was seen by 600 million **Chinese**. That may be exaggerated, as the event had not been advertised. Still, the "debate" went on for 70 minutes, and people quickly spread the news by word of mouth, crowding around TV sets. Most **Chinese** who saw the program seemed to enjoy it, if only for its novelty value. "It gave me the feeling that our senior leaders are not avoiding the question of human rights," says Xue Mouhong, director of the International Affairs Institute at Beijing's Qinghua University. Zhang Hui, a store clerk in the capital, thought the press conference was "impressive," but felt Jiang tried to "show off" by using dashes of English. Another local resident said the encounter highlighted the differences between the two countries -- and cultures.

Many **Chinese** heard about the Jiang-Clinton dialogue only after it was over. They had to make do with edited excerpts on the late-afternoon and evening television news programs. The newspaper coverage was far from fulsome. The People's Daily relegated the conference to a few brief sentences at the end of its round-up of the day's events. Its main focus: the official welcoming ceremony.

Clinton had several more opportunities to communicate with **China's** people. One came on June 28, Sunday, when he addressed a 2,000-strong Protestant congregation at the Chongwenmen Church. His remarks, which stressed the importance of individual freedoms, were not broadcast by **Chinese** media. The next day, Clinton made a speech at Peking University which was covered live. Some 400 students crammed into the auditorium to hear the president and ask questions. Many had outstanding academic records, or were Communist Party members. They were not deferential.

Tiananmen aside, Clinton was quizzed on everything from Taiwan to human rights in America. One student asked whether the U.S. had no problems with democracy and civil liberties. Clinton acknowledged that his country had a history of slavery and remained plagued by violent crime as well as racial and sexual discrimination. Other students questioned the Americans' real motives concerning Taiwan and their security treaty with Japan. Clinton said the pact did not target **China**.

Noting that Jiang Zemin had been heckled when he addressed a comparable audience at Harvard University last year, one questioner wondered how Clinton would feel if he received the same treatment in **China**. Clinton responded by



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saying he had been the butt of many protests in the U.S. Then he quoted an old American Revolutionary hero, Benjamin Franklin: "Our critics are our friends, for they show us our faults." The well-prepped president also sprinkled his talks with allusions to **Chinese** heroes from Deng Xiaoping to Hu Shi, an influential Peking University thinker in Republican times.

In Shanghai, Clinton was a guest on local radio's most popular call-in program, Citizen and Society, which has a regular audience of 10 million. Though his visit was not widely publicized, the president, a master of the medium, fielded questions for an hour. Callers seemed most interested in more personal topics, asking him how he kept fit (golf) and who he thought might win the World Cup (Brazil).

Later, Clinton took part in a roundtable discussion with a cross section of community leaders at Shanghai's new public library, said to be the world's largest. It was during this session that Clinton chose to spring a surprise on the contentious subject of Taiwan. Going further than any of his predecessors in backing Beijing's position on the island, he said that the U.S. would not support Taiwan independence, "two **Chinas**" or Taipei's membership in international bodies comprising sovereign nations. His statement jolted Taiwan (see story page 39).

In recent months, key members of America's foreign-policy establishment have been urging the administration to end its calculated ambiguity on the island. The U.S., they argue, should declare formally that it would not recognize a Taiwan declaration of independence, and would discourage other countries from doing so. The quid pro quo from **China** would be an open promise not to use force to regain the island. Clinton did not go quite that far, and **China** made no public concession -- a fact that is likely to stir criticism from Taiwan's many friends in Congress.

The president's encounters provided the gloss to a trip that, despite its symbolic importance, produced relatively few concrete accords. The Americans had hoped for an unequivocal **Chinese** pledge to join the Missile Technology Control Regime, which governs international sales of offensive missiles. But they settled for a promise by Beijing to "actively consider" the prospect. Negotiators achieved their break-through on the de-targeting of nuclear weapons, despite the Americans' rejection of a **Chinese** demand that they join **China** in renouncing first use.

Neither side had real hopes for quick progress on **China's** bid for membership in the World Trade Organization. Indeed, the Americans treated all questions of trade and business deals gingerly. Clinton was anxious to put himself on the side of **China's** budding entrepreneurs and its economic reforms, but he declined to visit any Sino-American joint ventures in Beijing. It wasn't until the president had left for Shanghai that several big commercial deals were signed in the capital.

Business has been a tough subject for Clinton. His critics are clubbing him for putting money ahead of human rights. Moreover, allegations surfaced in May that the president had been overly generous in allowing sensitive satellite and missile technology to be exported to **China** as a favor to American companies using **Chinese** rockets to launch their satellites -- firms that happened to be big contributors to the Democratic Party. Beijing, the critics charge, has used



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some of the technology to upgrade its missiles.

Soon enough, the dinner in the Great Hall of the People, the tour of the Forbidden City and the strolls along the Great Wall and among the terra-cotta warriors will become but pleasant vacation memories for the Clinton family. The president returns to the harsh political reality of dealing with a legislature in which no fewer than 10 committees are delving into various aspects of America's relationship with **China**. Some 75 bills, many calling for sanctions against Beijing, await action, including possible presidential vetoes.

On top of all that is the impending debate on Clinton's decision to renew **China's** most-favored-nation trading status. While passage remains likely, the ongoing controversies about **China** are bound to make it a highly contentious affair. Clinton may have been an able spokesman for American values among the **Chinese** during his trip. But to smooth the path for his vision of a true U.S.-**Chinese** partnership, he will need to overcome the doubters at home.

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LEVEL 1 - 55 OF 120 STORIES

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June 29, 1998

SECTION: Pg. 25

LENGTH: 3311 words

HEADLINE: WISHFUL THINKING ON CHINA

BYLINE: By Arthur Waldron;

Arthur Waldron is Lauder professor of international relations at the University of Pennsylvania and director of Asian studies at the American Enterprise Institute.

BODY:

Critics of President Clinton's upcoming China trip point to its bad symbolism -- the welcome at Tiananmen Square above all. Its defenders counter with substance: Important strategic and political gains are at stake, and China is too important to let human-rights symbolism drive the agenda. Or, as Clinton put it in a recent address, "The choice is between making a symbolic point and making a real difference."

Would that it were so simple. The fact is, however, that the fundamental errors of the trip are -- if this is conceivable -- even worse than its symbolism. The whole enterprise reveals a profoundly unrealistic and Sinocentric approach to Asian policy that not only is unlikely to succeed, but also will work to undermine the very goals of peace and cooperation that Clinton touts to justify his visit.

The American relationship with China, so President Clinton believes, "will in large measure help to determine whether the new century is one of security, peace, and prosperity for the American people." That is an appealing claim, and initially not implausible, particularly given the facts of which he carefully reminds us: that China is "already the world's most populous nation," that its people have 13 million mobile phones, and so forth. But such facts -- of which the president's critics are of course well aware -- do not necessarily translate into Clinton's policy of largely uncritical "engagement" of China.

Suppose someone had made a similar argument 20 years ago about the Soviet Union -- and many did. The proper response, I suspect, would have been something like this: Yes, the U.S.S.R. is extremely important, and we should try very hard to lower tensions and increase cooperation. But our leverage is rather limited, and furthermore, real change is unlikely until the state democratizes. We cannot rest our security on the hope of good relations with Moscow. Therefore, the truly crucial relationships for peace in the years ahead will not be with Moscow but rather with our allies -- because if ties with our allies are sound, we can probably keep the peace even if the U.S.S.R. remains a threat. China today requires a similar approach, but Clinton is not taking it. His policy commits two fundamental errors.



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First, he overestimates the positive potential of the U.S.-China relationship. To hear him, one might imagine that Beijing and Washington were about to join hands and march into the future, solving the problems of nuclear proliferation, environmental pollution, and drug trafficking along the way. Such raising of expectations is irresponsible and opens the way for later disillusionment and anger. Even if it shared Washington's agenda, which it does not, the Beijing government would be too weak to carry out most of it and furthermore would be preoccupied with domestic problems.

Because cooperation on substance is so difficult, the administration may be tempted to settle for appearances instead. Not only that, it may actually sacrifice substance in order to maintain the appearance (as it has done repeatedly with waivers of sanctions for nuclear and missile proliferation). Or it may seek to purchase the appearance of harmony by making concessions (as it has over Taiwan in response to threats from Beijing). Making good relations with Beijing the primary goal of U.S. Asian policy can make Washington, unwittingly, a hostage of Chinese behavior.

Second, putting China first means putting our allies second, and they notice it. If and when things go wrong in China, we will need strong Asian alliances to prevent instability from spreading. But international structures in Asia are to begin with far weaker than in Europe. Even the crucial Japanese-American security relationship cannot compare to NATO in substance. By tilting to China and bypassing the long-term allies with whom we share both interests and values, the Clinton approach is steadily corroding the very Asian alliances on which our security rests.

Even more, the tilt is already creating new risks. China's diplomatic inflexibility and active military development were among the factors that led India to develop nuclear weapons. Domestic calculations played a part, to be sure, but the decision enjoyed wide support because almost all Indians recognize that China may pose a danger that India will have to face alone. If Washington's tilt toward China continues, we may see Japan or South Korea start thinking along similar lines.

Even before the visit, then, Clinton's policy is not working. But what is the alternative? Not, to be sure, either of the straw men the president set up in his recent talk: neither "to try to isolate and contain China" nor to count on "increased commercial dealings alone" for improvement. What is required is a realistic sense of China's potentialities, a definition of where we want China to go, and a balanced set of measures, both carrots and sticks, to move things along.

Our long-term policy goal with China must be, as it was with the U.S.S.R., to foster political change in a liberal direction, for without freedom in China, genuine peace will be no more likely in Asia than it was in Europe when the Soviet Union existed. But such domestic change may come slowly, or through turmoil, or not at all, so we must hedge against risks by strengthening and developing our cooperation with other free-market and democratic states in Asia.

One who understands this is Bao Tong, former chief of staff to the liberalizing premier Zhao Ziyang who was ousted in 1989, after appearing in Tiananmen Square to plead with the student demonstrators to leave. Bao is the most senior Communist party official to be jailed for political reasons in the



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last 20 years. Released from prison in 1996, he lives in Beijing, where recently he spoke with the Washington Post. **China**, Bao said, "has already gone mad twice over the last 40 years. . . . You have to ask yourself a question: What will it do on the international scene? Is it a source of stability or a potential source of instability? When it doesn't have enough power, its attitude will be restrained. But once it develops and becomes strong, what kind of role is it going to play without a complete structural change?" [Italics added.]

The White House pays a certain lip service to this fundamental insight but neglects it in practice, systematically misreading the **Chinese** scene. To hear the administration tell it, you might think that **China's** current leadership were gradually and deliberately taking the country toward political pluralism. There is evidence: continuing economic reforms, village elections, the selective exile (as opposed to imprisonment) of leading dissidents, a general warming of the political climate -- all of course welcome.

But what Bao Tong and many others appreciate -- but the administration does not -- is that such moves are merely tactical, in a game by the **Chinese** leadership whose long-term goal is to resist democratization and hold on to Communist party rule.

President Jiang Zemin, although rather cultured and humane by the previous standards of **Chinese** leadership, is no liberalizer. He was installed as party secretary in 1989, after the Tiananmen massacre, precisely because he opposed a political opening, and he has systematically excluded liberalizers from leadership positions, even though there are many in the Communist party. He is rumored to be preparing a speech promising democracy sometime around 2020, but there are no signs of the reforms urgently needed now -- and such signs would be obvious: task forces, consulting groups, and so forth.

Jiang's post-dated promises may pacify some critics in Washington, but his procrastination bodes ill for Asia: It suggests that **China** will not reform in time; that domestic problems will go unacknowledged and unresolved and that tensions will rise; that some event -- a strike, a run on the banks -- may trigger a political crisis, and unrest and disorder in **China** may ripple out over Asia.

The current **Chinese** leadership is probably unequal to dealing with these dangers. Jiang Zemin is most concerned with consolidating his own power: He plays factional politics, promotes a minor cult of personality (his biography, *Chronicle of General Secretary Jiang Zemin's Important Deeds in Party Building*, is reportedly about to be published), and proclaims loyalty to Marxism and "Deng Xiaoping thought." He likes to travel abroad and uses foreign recognition as a substitute for genuine legitimacy at home. He is locked in uneasy rivalry with premier Zhu Rongji and former prime minister Li Peng.

But this ruling group seems to share a common calculation -- which may explode in their faces. It is that economic growth, selective repression, and continued foreign support can make it possible for their Communist party to be the exception worldwide and keep its power.

What Beijing, therefore, wants above all from Clinton during his visit is that he act symbolically in ways that will enhance the prestige of this



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unelected **Chinese** leadership. Clinton may play the statesman who esteems substance over symbolism and leaves "the terms of the arrival ceremony" to his **Chinese** hosts. But when Jiang visited the United States last year his advance teams were at least as interested in the ceremonies (how-many-gun salute? how wide a red carpet?) as in the substance -- and we accommodated them. In any case, no one imagines for a moment that the White House has not been absorbed in setting up photo opportunities and themes of the day for this high-visibility trip (e.g., Guilin, a great beauty spot. Theme of the day: "the environment").

President Clinton wanted this **China** trip for his own political reasons, which have nothing to do with the substance of the relationship, and the **Chinese**, knowing this, are making him pay for it. For the visit the **Chinese** reportedly made two demands: first, that the American president visit Tiananmen Square; second, that he not stop in any other Asian country during the trip. They have evidently also pressured him not to meet one on one with Martin Lee, the triumphantly reelected leader of the Hong Kong democrats. Such gestures are demanded to signal to the **Chinese** people that the United States supports the **Chinese** leadership and approves even of its most controversial policies (such as the condemnation of the 1989 democracy movement).

Indeed, for the **Chinese** leadership, this symbolic approval of their rule is the substance of the visit.

Clinton has unwisely agreed. And every day brings fresh evidence of why he should not have done so. The direction of social change globally is manifestly away from outmoded authoritarian regimes like Suharto's and **China's** and towards democratically legitimated constitutional systems. Clinton of all people should understand this: He memorably lectured Jiang Zemin about being "on the wrong side of history" during last year's visit. The demand for constitutionalism and democracy has been perennial in **China** since the turn of the century, and it is picking up once again. The Hong Kong elections flashed unmistakably the message that **Chinese** people are not just economic animals; they want freedom and political participation too.

Yet the White House seems oblivious. Even as President Clinton verbally acknowledges the need for democratic change in **China**, his actions signal that he is betting on Jiang Zemin to stay in power and determine the **Chinese** future. This is as naive as expecting (and many did) that Gorbachev was going to reform, legitimate, and renew the Soviet Union. The fact is that the party's bold decisions to unleash economic and social reform in **China** over the past two decades have created a tide that is now washing away the foundations of Communist authority. Powerful transforming forces have rendered party rule obsolete and are pushing **China** toward profound political change. The current leadership, with which the United States seeks deep engagement, has decided to resist that change. But that will not head off change -- only render it more likely to be chaotic or otherwise dangerous.

This building political drama and the American and world response to it should be at the heart of policy, but you will find scarcely a hint of it in the calculations of the Clinton administration. A happy outcome -- a smooth transition to the "stable, open, prosperous **China**" that the administration seeks -- is unlikely. So what the White House should be doing, along with everything it can to aid a smooth transition, is preparing realistically for a failure of



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reform. This failure may lead to domestic unrest, or to chaotic liberalization, or to efforts at a new authoritarianism, perhaps coupled with a hardline foreign policy. "Engagement" with **China** will be no help then. The best bulwark will be our alliances, and today our Asian allies are deeply, if quietly, concerned about the possibility of a well-armed, assertive, and anti-democratic **China** in the future.

So Clinton's echoing silence, on the eve of his trip, about **China's** military programs and the security concerns of our allies is both astonishing and deeply worrying. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, **China** has faced no immediate or discernible threat. Yet it is pushing full-steam ahead with an ambitious and extensive military buildup. This includes the full panoply of nuclear arms -- all sorts of warheads, MIRVs, surface and submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and so forth. In addition there are advanced ex-Soviet anti-ship missiles clearly designed to threaten U.S. carrier battle groups, should these battle groups come to the aid of an Asian ally in the future; advanced fighter aircraft, stealthy diesel submarines, plans for a **Chinese** aircraft carrier, as well as space and information-warfare capabilities.

What is this all for? In part it is clearly a payoff to the People's Liberation Army, which was not happy about murdering the students in June 1989 and wants the proverbial "new toys." But the buildup also has something to do with **Chinese** territorial claims -- the lines on official **Chinese** maps that do not correspond to reality, but show as sovereign territory of the People's Republic of **China** everything from Taiwan and the Japanese-held Senkaku Islands to the South **China** Sea and disputed territories along the Korean and Indian borders. There are the makings here of many a bloody battle, and the weapons **China** is currently developing -- "force-projection" capabilities such as aircraft and blue-water naval forces -- suggest Beijing has not ruled out the use of force.

Our allies have reason to be worried, but we profess not to be. How seriously can allies take a U.S. president who doesn't even mention their most important concern? After all, when we dealt with the Soviet Union, even the most resolute doves insisted on talking with Moscow about, among other things, Soviet arms. But what kind of weapons is Clinton going to talk about limiting with a rapidly rearming **China**?

The almost comical answer is: Indian and Pakistani. Those countries, says Clinton, must "recognize that developing weapons of mass destruction is the wrong way to define their greatness." One may ask: Does that go for **China** too, which has an incomparably more advanced and active nuclear program? Or is **Chinese** greatness different? Or for that matter, how about the United States? Our Asian allies are understandably puzzled.

Nor will reference to the way we define our policy help them. The official phrase for our goal with **China** is "constructive strategic partnership." We have carefully indicated that "strategic" here has nothing to do with things military: We are interested, it seems, in the environment, rescues at sea, and so forth. But someone should have checked a few dictionaries before settling on this exact wording. For in both **Chinese** and Japanese the first component of the compound meaning "strategic" is the character for "war" [zhan in **Chinese**, sen in Japanese]. In those two languages then, it is hard to avoid reading the American policy as being, in effect, a military alliance.



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So far, our Asian allies are not openly criticizing the ever more apparent tilt toward **China** by the Clinton White House, but in private they express alarm. We, in turn, should be alarmed by the possibilities for ourselves and for the region if their fear and distrust lead them to move away from the United States and instead to seek to guarantee their own security.

Japan is the keystone of the current Asian security structure. Both the Japanese government and the Japanese people are deeply worried about renewed nuclear proliferation, and as a result they may be moving away from their long-held pacifism. They are moreover stung by the degree to which Clinton bypasses them and their interests, but -- owing to their cumbersome domestic politics and low international profile -- they are unwilling to make a scene. Thoughtful Japanese have valued stabilizing alliances since the days of their alignment with Britain early in this century, and today, in spite of its difficulties, they value their connection with the United States very highly. But it is now becoming thinkable that the alliance could end, undermined and displaced by the American connection to Beijing.

Much the same story can be told for nearly every Asian state. Worried by **China** and increasingly uncertain about U.S. policy, they are considering ways to guarantee their security unilaterally -- witness, for example, the proliferation of advanced fighter and submarine programs in Asia. But unilateral security is generally a mirage: A world of individual strong states without alliances or shared interests will be a dangerous and anarchic place. The U.S. tilt, which strengthens **China** alone, only adds to this dangerous regional trend.

The Indian nuclear tests prove just how destabilizing is the **Chinese** military buildup. India faces **China** on three borders: to the north directly and to the east and west through **China's** increasingly well-armed allies Pakistan and Burma. **China** has contributed decisively to Pakistan's missile and nuclear programs, with little U.S. response. Washington should at least have grasped that India might go nuclear and that therefore U.S. vigilance was in order. But it didn't.

So what is worrisome here is not only the Indian proliferation itself, but also the fact that the administration discounted the possibility of proliferation -- despite the clear logic of events, despite public statements by Indian leaders, despite intelligence information about earlier Indian preparations for tests. This is what is called wishful thinking. As with **China**, the Clinton White House is not making realistic assessments. Instead it is painting eloquent and politically expedient word-pictures, full of "peace" and "stability" and "dialogue" and so forth, which may be wonderful to contemplate, but which provide no map, or a dangerously misleading map, of the years ahead.

To fix things, only a new policy will do -- a policy squarely addressing the military buildup that worries **China's** neighbors and is driving Asian arms races. Like many foreigners ignorant of Asia, President Clinton and his colleagues may be bedazzled by **China's** size, power, and superficial unity, to say nothing of the prospect of money to be made there. Like others before them, they ignore the risks and pitfalls. But although good relations and proper diplomacy with Beijing are most desirable, **China** is far too unpredictable to serve as a cornerstone of U.S. Asian policy. The uncertainty surrounding **China's** future argues for keeping some distance -- and resting our interests and Asia's on



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June 13, 1998

SECTION: THE WEEK; Pg. 1344; Vol. 30, No. 24

LENGTH: 1576 words

HEADLINE: Clinton's China Policy: Defining Engagement Down

BYLINE: Michael Kelly

HIGHLIGHT:

Almost no responsible critics want to end trade with China or abandon diplomatic relations.

BODY:

The most interesting question of the week is not: Why did Monica Lewinsky allow the nasty boys at Vanity Fair to trick her up in sexpot costumes and show her off with a smirk and a sneer and an invitation for all to laugh? Everybody knows the answer to that already. She did it because she is a sap for any man cruel enough to exploit her delusions of being Marilyn, which is how she got into this mess in the first place, and because she had the great misfortune to be advised by Dr. Bernard Lewinsky, Father of the Year, and William Ginsberg, Esq., a couple of sharpies from La La Land who really enjoyed Monica's excellent adventure.

No, this week the interesting question is actually one that matters: Can the Clinton Administration's China policy be sustained? "Constructive engagement," which has been coming under increasing criticism in Congress and from an ideologically diverse coalition of human rights activists, appeared vulnerable this week as never before. With Clinton scheduled to become, on June 25, the first American President to honor Beijing with a state visit since the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre, congressional Republicans, emboldened by polls showing an erosion of support for his China policy, are increasingly challenging the Administration. The House has passed no fewer than eight bills seeking in one fashion or another to punish China. The Senate Republicans are less inclined to such measures, but they face the same pressure from the party's Christian Right core that has inspired action in the House.

The threat of policy implosion--and perhaps of a Bitberg-level publicity disaster in Beijing--led to the President's first



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serious attempt to articulate the rationale for his **China policy**. Clinton spoke on Thursday morning, to an audience of selected **China** hands at the offices of the National Geographic Society.

The **policy** disagreement over **China**, Clinton said, was "over how best to encourage the emergence of (a more democratic and stable) **China**, and how to handle our differences, especially over human rights, in the meantime." The President then framed the disagreement in two neat sentences. "Some Americans believe we should try to isolate and contain **China**, because of its undemocratic system and human rights violations, and in order to retard its capacity to become America's next great enemy," he said. "Some believe increased commercial dealings alone will inevitably lead to a more open, more democratic **China**."

This formulation undergirded the entire speech. Again and again, Clinton returned to the assertion that the dispute over **China** policy lay between those who would isolate **China**, cutting off all intercourse with the West; those who would engage it solely on the level of commerce; and those who would follow the Clinton way, engaging **China** in commerce while diplomatically pushing for progress toward democracy. Couched in these terms, the choice seems nearly inarguable. Who would not choose constructive engagement over isolationism or commerce alone? But here is precisely the problem, not only with the speech but with the policy that the speech purported to describe. The President's formulation of the disagreement over **China** policy is specious.

The critics on the left and the right who wish that Clinton would do more to deal with **China's** "undemocratic system and human rights violations" and to "retard (**China's**) capacity to become America's next great enemy" do not, in the main, argue that the United States "should try to isolate and contain **China**." They argue that the United States must of course engage **China**, but that it should do so much more aggressively than it is. Almost no responsible critics support stripping **China** of its status as a trading partner or curtailing diplomatic relations. What these critics argue is that the Administration does not go far enough in engaging **China**--that it does not effectively use the imposition of limited punishments and the withholding of specific boons to compel the People's Republic toward better behavior.

Clinton's assertion that free-traders argue that "increased commercial dealings alone will inevitably lead to a more open, more democratic **China**" is likewise misleading. Free-traders do believe that commerce will lead to the growth of a great middle class in **China** and that the demands of this middle class must encourage the advance of democracy. But who argues that diplomatic engagement is not simultaneously necessary?

In short, the debate over the Administration's **China** policy is not, as Clinton said it was, about either isolationism versus engagement or free trade versus engagement. It is about effective engagement versus ineffective engagement. And the



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President's failure to describe the debate honestly in his speech points to what critics say is the root cause of ineffective engagement: a persistent refusal to admit the realities of China.

Consider one of the human rights issues that the President touched upon briefly and delicately--the practices of China's "planned-birth" policy. This issue received dramatic attention this week, in an extraordinary hearing on Wednesday of the Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights of the House International Relations Committee.

The star witness was a woman named Gao Xiao Duan, who from 1984 until 1998 worked as the administrator of the government's Planned Birth Office in the township of Yonghe, a municipality comprising 22 villages in the Fujian province. Gao, who defected to the United States in April, was joined at the hearing by Harry Wu, a noted Chinese human rights dissident and expert on Chinese human rights practices.

The witnesses described a totalitarian regime in which the state regulates marriage, contraception and birth, toward the society-wide goals of "late marriage, late birth" and "one couple, one child." They described a system where births are permitted only to women who meet policy requirements and who are issued "birth-allowed certificates"; where women who are found to be pregnant without benefit of permit are forced to undergo immediate abortions, even well into the ninth month; where women are routinely forced to undergo sterilization after giving birth to one or two children; where citizens are rewarded for informing on couples who are attempting an illegal "extra-plan" pregnancy, and state-operated goon squads conduct midnight raids to seize illegally pregnant women and haul them off for their abortions; where "extra-plan" violators are impoverished through huge fines and effectively barred from respectable jobs.

Wu produced the official government statement, of May 12, 1991, that established planned-birth policies on a national basis. In this document, the "Chinese Communist Party Central Committee and the National Congress on the Decision to Intensify Planned-Birth Work and Strictly Control Population Growth," it is clearly ordered that "for the next 10 years, average annual population natural growth rate should be controlled to under 12.5 per cent," and that "each party committee and government office must place planned-birth work on the same level of importance as economic planning."

Gao testified that these orders were perpetuated and enforced down through the levels of government. She testified that the savage practices used to enforce birth-planning were encoded in provincial laws and municipal regulations, and she provided copies of these laws and regulations. She testified that the higher authorities kept close supervision over birth-plan practices by requiring each township to submit monthly "synopses of planned-birth reports," which are filed up through the party and the government bureaucracy.



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White House press secretary Michael McCurry was asked at his regular Wednesday briefing to comment on the hearing. McCurry said: "The government of China officially prohibits and tells us that they officially prohibit the use of force to compel people to submit to abortion and sterilization. But . . . anecdotal evidence that comes forward suggests that there is poor supervision of local officials, who are sometimes under very intense pressure to meet family-planning targets. And that results in clear instances of abuse, forced abortions, sterilizations."

There are two things that can be said about this statement. One, it is exactly the party line of the People's Republic of China. Two, as John Aird, a former Census Bureau expert on Chinese demographic issues, puts it, "It is a lie, a point-blank lie." Aird adds: "These are policy-convenient statements. They do not reflect the truth or any interest in pursuing the truth. They are utterly without integrity and in no way reflect what is occurring in China."

A policy that depends on this level of disingenuousness cannot last. Either the Administration will have to come to terms with the hard truths about its friends in Beijing, or its China policy will sooner or later collapse under the weight of its contradictions.

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Business Week

November 3, 1997

SECTION: BUSINESS WEEK INTERNATIONAL EDITIONS; Editorials; Number 3551; Pg. 88

LENGTH: 625 words

HEADLINE: WHAT CHINA MUST UNDERSTAND

BODY:

At the dawn of the 21st century, Chinese President Jiang Zemin's state visit with President Bill Clinton marks an opportunity to establish a long-term strategic relationship between the fastest-rising global power and the world's undisputed superpower. There is nothing more important to either Washington or Beijing than managing this relationship to a peaceful and prosperous end.

To date, the Clinton Administration's China policy has been inarticulate at best. It has failed to make any attempt at forging the kind of bipartisan foreign policy toward China that existed vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. It foolishly capitulated to congressional conservatives by undermining the bedrock "one-China" policy established under President Richard M. Nixon. It deliberately irritated Beijing by broadening a military alliance with Japan to include Taiwan. Finally, the Administration has allowed a revolving chorus of special-interest groups to substitute for strategic vision, confusing not only Beijing's policymakers but the American public.

The summit should be a time when American strategy toward China is firmly focused on developing political and economic security for the U.S. and the world into the next century. Surprisingly, the Administration has done a good job in the past year accomplishing the first goal. Under strong U.S. pressure, and thanks to an accommodating Jiang Zemin, China has signed treaties banning chemical weapons, nuclear weapons testing, and arms proliferation. Beijing is playing a big role in the four-party talks on North Korea and is the major supplier of food to Pyongyang. In Cambodia, it no longer supports the Khmer Rouge. Perhaps because it is becoming a major importer of Middle East oil and thus wants stability, not turmoil, in the Gulf, it appears ready to agree to American demands to cut missile sales to Iran. These are major accomplishments for the Clinton Administration. Under U.S. pressure, and following its own interests, China is clearly shifting from a position of outsider willing to challenge the international system to a responsible participant.

This is less true on the economic front. China wants "in" but only on its terms. Its political and military elites see economic growth as a means toward global power. Beijing has deliberately run up nearly \$ 200 billion in foreign reserves by exporting madly while controlling access to domestic markets. This cannot continue. China is simply too gigantic to duplicate the Japanese or Korean export model of growth. It will totally unsettle the international



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economic order. The world got a taste of **China's** power this summer when Chinese exports overwhelmed the economies of Southeast Asia. In 1994, Beijing devalued the yuan and generated \$ 65 billion in new exports over the next three years -- more than all of the Southeast nations' combined, and a lot cheaper. As for the U.S., it cannot continue to indefinitely absorb Chinese exports at the current double-digit rate of increase.

What to do? The U.S. is increasingly successful in getting **China** to play by the international political rules of the game. It must strive to do so on the economic front as well. Balanced growth, with domestic demand contributing as much as exports, is critical for **China** to avoid seriously disturbing the global economy in the future. Negotiating **China's** entry into the World Trade Organization is the process through which this balance can be forged. The Administration should not back away from the right kind of deal permitting **China's** entry. It is perhaps the most critical negotiation of this era. Nor should it shirk the hard work of explaining to Congress and the American people the need for long-term, serious relations with **China**.

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The National Journal

March 15, 1997

SECTION: FOREIGN AFFAIRS; Pg. 501; Vol. 29, No. 11

LENGTH: 5747 words

HEADLINE: The China Challenge

BYLINE: Bruce Stokes

HIGHLIGHT:

Can Beijing's masters be convinced that it's time for China to end its renegade ways? Washington is about to try.

BODY:

Suddenly, it seems, all roads--and airways--lead to China. Vice President Al Gore is scheduled to touch down there this month. So is Speaker Newt Gingrich, R-Ga., and a planeload of House colleagues. Other congressional delegations plan stops in Hong Kong before it reverts to Chinese control this summer. And early in 1998, President Bill Clinton has booked a summit with Chinese President Jiang Zemin, only months after Jiang is scheduled to visit Clinton in Washington.

China fever is back. Not since President Nixon's stunning 1972 visit to China--the beginning of the end of decades of icy hostility--has the world's most populous nation so preoccupied official Washington.

Because of its size and global ambitions, China will continue to be a dominant issue well into the 21st century. But for the Clinton Administration, the China challenge is more immediate and more personal. It involves not only making the country more accessible to American exporters and investors but also convincing the new masters in Beijing--still sorting out their positions and policies after the death of Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping--that they should abandon their renegade ways and become members in good standing of the world community.

Accordingly, after four years marked by acrimonious confrontations with Beijing, a new Clinton team--operating mostly out of the White House's National Security Council (NSC)--has recast America's China policy. Its approach even has its own buzzword--'engagement.'

'We must pursue a deeper dialogue with China for the sake of our interests and our ideals,' Clinton said in his Jan. 21 State of the Union address. 'Engaging China is the best way to work on our common



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challenges and to deal frankly with our fundamental differences."

To that end, the Administration has launched a number of initiatives, all pointing to the potentially decisive Clinton-Jiang summits. Topping the list are negotiations to smooth the way for **China's** admission into the World Trade Organization (WTO), the new international body set up to administer global trade rules. The WTO's 130 members have the responsibility for deciding whether **China** should become a member of the club. Because the United States has the most to gain by **China's** adhering to international trade rules, Washington is taking the lead in negotiating the terms under which **China** would be admitted.

"This is not just engagement for engagement's sake," an Administration **China** specialist said in a recent interview. "The tactic is engagement, but the strategy is integration."

The overarching goal is to enmesh **China** in a network of international commitments--from the WTO to agreements that would control the spread of missile technology--as a way to modify **China's** behavior and, in the process, advance America's economic and diplomatic interests. A critical date on the Administration's calendar is July 1, when Hong Kong reverts to **Chinese** control. (For more on Hong Kong, see box, pp. 504-05.) How **China** handles the transition may set the tone for Clinton's first meeting with Jiang. "The two summits constitute bookends for a book that is yet to be written," said Harald B. Malmgren, a former deputy U.S. trade representative who now runs an international consulting firm.

Although appealing in theory, engagement has plenty of critics in Washington, mainly on the right but also on the left. Many of them favor a policy of "containment," in which the U.S. uses more stick than carrot in dealing with **China**. Accommodating the **Chinese**, in this view, will only encourage them to take ever-greater liberties, even to thumb their noses at the international community when they don't get their way. Advocates of both engagement and containment agree that **China** is a proud and prickly nation, with an often lamentable record as a citizen of the world. The Administration's policy will be sorely tested by the range and seriousness of **China's** transgressions:

- * On human rights, the State Department pulled no punches when it offered its annual assessment on Jan. 30: "All public dissent against the party and the government was effectively silenced by intimidation, exile, the imposition of prison terms, administrative detention or house arrest. No dissidents were known to be active at year's end."

- * Myriad trade barriers hinder American exporters and sometimes keep them out altogether. Trade and investment rules are gauzy and erratically enforced, a source of constant frustration to American businesses operating in **China**. Because of its trade barriers and the cheap labor that fuels its exports, **China** has run up a trade surplus with the U.S. second only to America's imbalance with Japan.

- * **China** is the only major power that is increasing its military spending. The top priority has been modernizing equipment and improving technology so that it can extend its reach in East Asia. Its small nuclear arsenal already makes it a threat to the entire region, and experts believe it



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could become the preeminent Asian power not long after the turn of the century. While not yet a danger to the U.S., **China** clearly wants to succeed the former Soviet Union as the world's "other" superpower. (For a report on **China's** military, see p. 510.)

* **China** has agreed to sell equipment to Iran and Pakistan that would enable each to produce bomb-grade uranium. **China** has also supplied Iran with cruise missiles that could be used against U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf.

* **China's** rapid industrialization has been accompanied by a staggering array of environmental problems, including choking coal smoke that has made respiratory disease a leading cause of death, acid rain that affects 40 per cent of the country's forests and crop lands, and industrial and municipal waste that has polluted 90 per cent of urban water supplies.

(A survey of **China's** environmental problems appears on p. 512.)

It is against this backdrop of continuing problems that the political debate over the future of U.S. relations with **China** will play out. The first test will be the transfer of Hong Kong. If the transition is handled clumsily--with a crackdown on dissent, for example--human rights activists on the left and **China** critics on the right will most likely press for U.S. sanctions against Beijing. This summer, congressional critics--who have wanted to isolate Beijing since the slaughter of hundreds of protesters in Tiananmen Square in 1989--get another crack at denying **China** most-favored-nation (MFN) trading status. Some on Capitol Hill also want the unprecedented power to formally approve any WTO deal with Beijing.

Critics of engagement charge that the Administration is naively aiding **China's** "Stalinist capitalism." Given the allegations that the **Chinese** Embassy channeled money into the 1996 election campaign, the engagement policy is vulnerable to charges that it is a kind of appeasement bought by tainted campaign cash. (A report on **China's** lobbying appears on p. 514.)

The Administration must also sort through an internal contradiction in its new approach. For engagement to be politically palatable in the United States, officials acknowledge, America must receive at least back-channel assurances from **China** that it will maintain certain standards on human rights and access to markets. But that means the nature and extent of engagement is implicitly linked with **China's** behavior. Such linkage has been categorically unacceptable to Beijing in the past, and undermined the Administration's **China** policy during Clinton's first term. So to sustain engagement domestically, the White House must somehow signal that Beijing's bad deeds won't go unpunished. And to keep **China** at the negotiating table, it must soft-peddle any such linkage.

Even if Beijing plays along, developments in a number of ongoing investigations in Washington could undermine engagement. "Think about the June-July time frame," said Douglas H. Paal, the president of the Asia Pacific Policy Center in Washington and an Asia specialist on the Bush Administration's NSC. Fred Thompson of Tennessee, head of the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, which is gearing up to investigate campaign financing abuses, "will be removing skin on a daily basis, and (Whitewater special prosecutor) Ken Starr's report will be out. Will



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Clinton keep the courage of his convictions?''

Nixon, of course, advanced detente with the Soviet Union even as the Watergate scandal swirled around him. If things are going badly on the domestic front, Clinton might similarly focus on **China** in an attempt to demonstrate an ability to lead no matter what.

But will **China**, Capitol Hill and the Administration's critics cooperate? That may be Clinton's real **China** challenge.

HOUSEBREAKING THE DRAGON

During his 1992 campaign, Clinton vowed that he would 'get tough' with **China**. Once he was sworn in, he and his spokesmen confronted Beijing on human rights abuses and unfair trading practices.

China wouldn't budge, so the White House backed off. In 1994, the Administration stopped trying to use the threat of trade sanctions as a lever to get the **Chinese** to loosen up on human rights. The Administration's **China** policy then became inarticulate. 'It said, we will talk with you, but it was never clear what the message would be,' said Harry Harding, dean of the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University. 'Each Cabinet officer went to **China** with his own policy. (U.S. Trade Representative Mickey) Kantor acted tough. (Commerce Secretary Ron) Brown wanted to do business.'

In 1995, the mishandling of a visit to the United States by Taiwanese president Lee Teng-hui--the White House first assured Beijing that Lee would not be admitted, then reversed itself under pressure from Congress--further soured U.S.-**China** relations. The **Chinese** saw it as an affront to its sovereignty and a denial of its legitimate role in the world.

The March 1996 confrontation with Beijing over **China's** attempts to militarily intimidate Taiwan--and the dispatching of two U.S. Navy carrier battle groups to the Taiwan Straits--further delayed any significant recasting of U.S.-**China** relations. (For a report on Taiwan, see p. 509.)

By mid-1996, though, White House officials had begun privately describing a fresh approach that would guide America's relations with **China** if Clinton won a second term. The new point of departure would be the proposition that Beijing was more likely to adhere to international norms than to demands from Washington. 'The over-all strategy,' a senior White House official said, 'is to get **China** to accept that there are norms and principles that cover internal and external behavior. We hope this is a conditionality that **China** can swallow.' After all, he said, 'it doesn't ask them to do anything that others don't do.'

'What it does not mean,' another Administration Asia specialist said, 'is that the **Chinese** get to define the agenda and get high-level access whenever they want it. What it means is identifying the issues we can work on, while containing the issues we have difficulty with.'

A VAST SEA OF CONSUMERS

An early test of engagement may come in the negotiations between Washington and Beijing over **China's** membership in the WTO. The United



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States, Europe and Japan want **China** in the WTO so that it can be forced to play by agreed-upon rules. **China** regards membership in the club as a sign of global status; more narrowly, reformers in Beijing believe WTO affiliation would speed the pace of economic change in their country.

"There is a hierarchy of interest (in U.S.-**China** relations)," said Garrit W. Gong, director of the Asian studies program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), "and the most important element is economics."

The allure of **China**--especially to America's exporters and investors--is self-evident. The **Chinese** economy has grown at an average yearly rate of 10.1 per cent in the 1990s. It is expected to expand rapidly for some time to come, although at a slower pace. In the past decade, U.S. commerce with **China** grew sixfold; it's expected to increase by at least another 50 per cent by the year 2000.

Increasing **Chinese** imports of American goods and services won't be easy. **Chinese** import duties are five times higher on average than those imposed by the U.S. and quadruple those of Japan. Nearly half of **Chinese** imports are subject to other kinds of barriers. And certain key industries--electronics, petrochemicals, aircraft, telecommunications, construction materials, machinery and autos and auto parts--have been shielded entirely from foreign competition.

The best way to crack that market, Administration officials maintain, is to get **China** in the WTO, where members are required to reduce trade barriers and there is a built-in process for challenging members that don't.

So far in the WTO talks, America has been relatively unyielding about the need for **China** to adhere to certain international principles--such as treating foreign firms the same way it treats domestic companies--and less rigid on how quickly **China** must cut subsidies for domestic industries and lower trade barriers. At the same time, Washington has made it clear that Beijing's simple adherence to WTO rules won't be enough unless U.S. exports to **China** increase.

Even if the negotiators can resolve their differences--allowing the White House to brag that engagement has won a big one--WTO membership for **China** marks only the start of a prolonged process of fully integrating the country into the world trading system.

It could be a journey that tests both Beijing's political will and bureaucratic capacity. In the past, **China's** leaders have shown some willingness to play by the rules. They've cut tariffs without being prompted. Foreigners find investing in **China** is easier than investing in Japan has ever been. And as a member of both the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, **China** has a record on implementing reforms and repaying loans that is better than India's, Bank executives say.

But there could be bumps aplenty along the way. The core of the **Chinese** economy--the state-owned sector that accounts for a third of industrial production, with a workforce of more than 120 million, of



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whom perhaps 50 million do no useful work--is woefully inefficient. Much of it is technically bankrupt. Exposing these industries to competition could lead to widespread unemployment and economic dislocation. Accordingly, U.S. negotiators want to give **China** five years to phase out its industrial subsidies and other protective measures. But that might not do. "We probably will have to give them 10-15-year phaseouts," said Nicholas R. Lardy, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution.

Any WTO accord also faces bureaucratic resistance. The talks are being conducted by **Chinese** trade specialists who do not necessarily speak for the Communist Party officials who run much of **Chinese** industry and who stand to lose the most from no-holds-barred competition. Getting them to accept reforms will take time and political capital that Beijing may find in short supply, especially in the fluid period after Deng's death.

In addition, the WTO pact would be signed by **China's** central government. That would imply that Beijing can guarantee that the deal will be enforced. But America's experience with the recent U.S.-**China** intellectual-property agreement suggests that the provinces will ignore Beijing to protect local industries.

In a broader sense, **China's** membership could pose a severe test for the two-year-old WTO. "The issue of **China's** membership has always been framed as 'Do you want them outside the tent pissing in or inside the tent pissing out?'" a WTO official said. "But what if we have them inside the tent pissing in?"

Put more delicately, once **China** is a WTO member, what can the U.S. and **China's** other trading partners do if Beijing fails to abide by its commitments? "The question is, how many cases can you bring," said Greg Mastel, a vice president of the Economic Strategy Institute, a Washington think tank, and the author of the forthcoming book *The Rise of the **Chinese** Economy*. "And even if you win eight or 10 cases, how will the **Chinese** react? What if **China** threatens to withdraw? Will the United States back off? And, if so, won't the WTO then lose credibility on Capitol Hill and with the voters?"

As a result, U.S. trade negotiators are even warier than usual. "This accession agreement will be one of the most closely read documents in trade history," one official said. "We better damn well have our ducks in order."

RIGHTS; WRONGS AND TIME BOMBS

Though trade may provide an initial test of Washington's strategy, resolving a number of thorny human rights issues--some long-standing, others that may erupt after Beijing takes over Hong Kong--could be the touchiest challenge of all.

An immediate goal for the Administration is getting Beijing to sign two United Nations conventions on human rights and to allow the first-ever visits by Red Cross inspectors to **Chinese** prisons, where, human rights activists say, inmates are routinely abused.

Beijing has agreed for the first time to talk with the Red



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But in a departure from past practice, the Administration did not mount a high-profile campaign against **China** in the U.N. Human Rights Commission. The shift could be a tactic to gain **Chinese** consent on the human rights conventions. Or, some skeptics say, the change could reflect a failure of will in Washington. "It's an indication of how eager (the White House is) to back away from human rights as a source of tension in the relationship," said Mike Jendrzeczyk, Washington director of Human Rights Watch/Asia.

And then there's Hong Kong. "If Hong Kong goes badly," said the Brookings Institution's Lardy, "no one in the executive branch will want to go forward (on engagement), and if they do, they will be kneecapped in Congress."

Meanwhile, other elements of the Administration's **China** policy are slowly taking shape. During his forthcoming visit to **China**, Vice President Gore is expected to discuss ways that **China** can build up its economy without further damaging the environment. He will also sound out his hosts about the possibility of more contacts between Commerce Department officials and their counterparts in **China**.

"We have to try to find issues where we have similar interests and work together on common problem solving," said Susan Shirk, director of the University of California's Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation. "The Gore visit is intended to be a catalyst for discussion of these kinds of topics."

American manufacturers of nuclear power-plant components hope the dialogue eventually leads to full implementation of the 1985 U.S.-**China** nuclear cooperation agreement, opening the door for increased sales of U.S.-built plants to **China**. Similarly, U.S. agribusiness sees opportunities for a rich harvest of profits if it's allowed to help **China** increase crop yields, store and process grain, and more efficiently transport food to market.

On the foreign policy front, the Administration, in another shift, has clearly decided it is better to praise Beijing's achievements than to criticize its shortcomings. Officials in Washington go out of their way to point out that **China** now supports restrictions on chemical weapons and the spread of nuclear weapons, and that it agreed to take part in talks on the future of the Korean Peninsula.

Nevertheless, the Administration's new strategy could stumble because of any number of **Chinese** missteps.

Calman J. Cohen, president of the Emergency Committee for American Trade, a Washington business lobby, speculated that a chief White House worry is that "a rogue element in **China**" could accelerate arms exports to the Persian Gulf and other potential trouble spots. "That would cause a political explosion on Capitol Hill," he said.

Taiwan, which Beijing regards as a breakaway province, remains a



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ticking time bomb. "A peaceful settlement between **Chinese** on either side of the Taiwan Strait has become the most urgent task for U.S. policy toward **China**," Charles W. Freeman Jr., a former State Department official, wrote last fall in *Foreign Policy*.

China's growing need for imported oil to fuel its hyperactive economy has led Beijing to an ever-deeper involvement in the Middle East. While it is **China's** arms sales to Iran that have captured the headlines, Pentagon officials are increasingly worried about Beijing's connections with the intelligence and internal security services of the Persian Gulf states. These ties underscore Beijing's growing interest in stability in the region, but they also draw **China** into Arab politics in an unprecedented manner. The consequences are unpredictable--and, to Washington, worrisome.

Finally, the evolving nature of the U.S.-Japan security relationship--with Tokyo taking on more and more Asian defense responsibilities--has not escaped Beijing. "In the past," said Winston Lord, the former assistant secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific affairs, "when the **Chinese** felt the purpose (of the security relationship) was to work with Japan so that they would not have to build up militarily, they supported the security alliance because it kept Japan down. Now they think we are encouraging a Japanese buildup and they feel threatened."

The two scheduled summits, which will cap the first year of the new engagement strategy, may create an "expectations" dilemma. Administration officials assert that a heads-of-state meeting is simply one part of the effort to normalize relations with Beijing. At the same time, the White House knows that a summit that concludes without major announcements will be widely judged a failure, which could undermine the credibility of its engagement policy.

WHO'LL BE IN CHARGE?

The outcome of the high-stakes political realignment under way in Beijing will also help determine the future of Washington's new approach. "The question is, is **China** ready to buy into engagement?" a senior White House official said. "And even if they say they want to, can the **Chinese** manage to do so through their current political transition without lapsing back into authoritarianism and chaos?"

No one of course knows if Beijing's political realignment will evolve into a bitter power struggle or a polite game of musical chairs. In the long run, "succession in Communist countries often provides an opening for new policy ideas," Shirk of the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation said. But, in the short run, Administration officials will not be surprised if **Chinese** policy shifts do not surface before this fall's Party Congress, a national gathering of Communist leaders. Among the many unknowns is whether the new leadership will have any interest in putting **China** on even a slightly more accommodating course.

"Even the word 'engagement' is very difficult to translate into **Chinese**," George Washington University's Harding said. "The entire political culture is one of realpolitik, that nations act on the basis of self-interest not constrained by a set of international rules." His



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observation, which echoes the views of many American scholars of **Chinese** foreign policy, suggests the Administration's goal of enmeshing **China** in global institutions may be overly ambitious.

Moreover, it's not uncommon for Beijing to demand concessions for merely agreeing to act like a normal, law-abiding nation. Such demands have already complicated the WTO talks.

Many analysts also underscore the apparent delight the **Chinese** take in flaunting their independence. On the eve of former Secretary of State Warren M. Christopher's first visit, Beijing pointedly ordered a roundup of human rights activists, all part of an apparent attempt to embarrass him. "In **Chinese** culture," Harding said, "acting belligerently and wanting a good relationship are part of the same phenomenon. They see a bit of bluster as the way to get a good relationship."

So far, engagement has drawn support from some who were critical of the Administration's former **China** policy. "China is a country in transition," said Rep. Jim Kolbe, R-Ariz., who led a delegation of 22 congressional colleagues to Beijing in January. "Being engaged is the best way to make sure **China** will go in the right direction."

But a few key Democrats are on the attack. House Minority Leader Richard A. Gephardt, D-Mo., wants Congress to have veto power over any bid by **China** to join the WTO. Though he's not likely to get his way, his views might attract wider support if America's trade deficit with **China** continues to balloon.

Gephardt and Gore--whose scheduled trip to **China** this month will position him as a central player in the engagement game--end up competing for the 2000 Democratic presidential nomination, **China** could emerge as a defining policy difference between them.

The politics of engagement are further complicated by this year's vote on MFN for **China**, which is likely to come after the **Chinese** flag has begun flying over Hong Kong. After last year, when Congress approved another one-year extension of MFN, America's business community had hoped to obtain permanent MFN status for **China** this year. Now, said Kolbe, who has championed MFN extension in the past, "it is highly unlikely that we will grant permanent MFN. Members want to see what happens on Hong Kong."

Skeptics on Capitol Hill are also already questioning the influence of possible **Chinese** contributions in the 1996 campaign. "If there is reason to believe that the Administration's Asia policy has been influenced by people who gave money to the Administration," a GOP House aide said, "it could be impossible for this President to do anything on **China**."

Asked if he agreed that new approaches to **China** could be hostage to domestic political scandals, a White House official replied: "If you had asked me in October, I would have told you no. Now it's hard to tell."

Never-bright prospects for bipartisan support for engagement dimmed



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even further after the neoconservative Weekly Standard devoted an issue to censuring **China** and dismantling the Administration's engagement policy. A **China** issue of neoliberal New Republic was no kinder. Their criticisms: **China's** market potential has been hyped, its human rights record has gotten worse, the prospects for democracy in Hong Kong are dismal and **China** has an ambitious regional agenda backed up by a dangerous military.

In the end, the fate of the Administration's engagement policy rests on the political and diplomatic skills of the people trying to carry it out. "In the first term," CSIS's Gong said, "the Administration let the bureaucracy lead. . . . But this time, the President is out in front."

In Clinton's first term, the State Department--under the direction of Lord and John Shattuck, the assistant secretary for democracy, human rights and labor--had primary responsibility for Beijing. Now **China** relations are being coordinated by White House national security adviser Samuel R. (Sandy) Berger, his deputy James Steinberg and NSC aide Sandra J. Kristoff. Deputy assistant secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific affairs Jeff Bater will be added to the NSC to round out the group.

A report card on the new Clinton **China** team--and on engagement--probably can't be completed before spring 1998. By then, Beijing's treatment of Hong Kong will be apparent. Both summits will be history. The political leadership in Beijing may have been sorted out. And the WTO negotiations are likely to have been wrapped up. The grade will be Congress's vote on permanent MFN for **China**. If it passes sometime next spring, the Administration will know that the policy of engagement with **China** has survived its first test. But it will not be its last. Bruce Stokes is a contributing editor of National Journal and a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.

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November 26, 1999, Friday, Final Edition

SECTION: PART A; COMMENTARY; OP-ED; Pg. A47

LENGTH: 861 words

HEADLINE: The bite of the Chinese shark;
Trade inducements won't improve **China's** record

BYLINE: Arnold Beichman; THE WASHINGTON TIMES

BODY:

The new U.S.-**China** trade agreement, hailed as President **Clinton's** triumph, recalls troublesome historical precedents in American foreign **policy** going back to the Nixon **administration**, when there was an extant belief that trade agreements, abetted by semi-silence on human rights violations, would tame Soviet Communism.

Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was a leading exponent of that belief in "linkage." As the London Economist (Aug. 11, 1975) wrote at the time: "The nub of Kissinger's argument is that it's desirable to sign agreements from which Russia gets more immediate benefit than America does - because this gives future Soviet governments an investment in continued good relations with America; they won't want to lose the benefits they have won."

The realpolitik metaphor of this approach (it was also called "dtente") is that if you feed the shark, his teeth will eventually wear out and then he'll be unable to bite. Unfortunately, the shark's teeth regenerate a row at a time. So much for metaphors.

The creator of that "linkage" policy - smothering Bolshevism with secular oblations - was British Prime Minister Lloyd George. In 1922, Lloyd George said: "I believe we can save her Russia by trade. Commerce has a sobering influence . . . trade, in my **opinion**, will bring an end to the ferocity, the rapine and the crudity of Bolshevism more surely than any other method."

During the Carter administration, Marshall Shulman, then State Department adviser on Soviet affairs, wrote that "the measured development of economic relations can reasonably be made conditional upon Soviet restraint in crisis situations and in military competition." So the Soviet Union marched into Afghanistan in November 1979.

The just announced Sino-American WTO agreement raises troubling questions because the communist dictatorship is clearly aware of the risks inherent in opening **China** to Western trade and having its economy become dependent upon open Western markets. There is no Chinese Gorbachev on the horizon nor will there be. President Jiang has made it clear that as long as he is alive, **China** will never have democracy: "The communist system must not be shaken, weakened or discarded at any time. The Western mode of political systems must never be



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copied."

The trouble with a policy of "feeding the shark" is that we have also to cover up or ignore awful events in dictatorship lands. During the Nixon-Kissinger era, the Voice of America was forbidden to broadcast readings in Russian of Alexander Solzhenitsyn's "Gulag Archipelago" - nor was Mr. Solzhenitsyn himself, while visiting Washington, invited to the White House. Jimmy Carter's secretary of state, Cyrus Vance, uttered these idiotic words about Russia's then president: "Leonid Brezhnev is a man who shares our dreams and aspirations." And so today we have Dr. Susan Shirk, the **Clinton administration's** top **China policy** official, testifying to the House International Relations Committee that recent crackdowns on political, economic, religious, and free speech rights in **China** is merely "a repressive cycle reminiscent of earlier cycles in Chinese history."

One of the keenest and surely one of the most informed observers of **China** is Rep. Christopher Cox, California Republican. His analysis of Sino-U.S. relations, based on first-hand knowledge, was embodied in a speech last January which bears re-examination despite present White House euphoria.

Mr. Cox served as chairman of the House Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/ Commercial Concerns with the People's Republic of **China**. The Committee's three-volume report, approved unanimously by all the Republican and Democrat members, found that the PRC is "engaged in a concerted campaign to steal militarily sensitive high-technology equipment and know-how that will endanger America's national security."

Mr. Cox summarized the **Clinton-Gore PRC policy** claims as failing on the following four counts:

1. Promoting democratization and improvement in human rights.
2. Moving **China** more quickly towards free enterprise.
3. Increasing **China's** willingness to import goods and services from the United States and the outside world.
4. Making the PRC less threatening to the United States and to U.S. interests in the region.

"What these instances show -and there are many more - is that the **Clinton-Gore policy**," said Mr. Cox, "has made a more dangerous world, and produced exactly the opposite results from those that Bill Clinton, Al Gore, and the liberal dreamers in their **administration** have naively hoped for. The **Clinton-Gore policy** is called engagement. But surely that is understatement for a **policy** that gives **China's** ruling communists everything they want, and withholds all criticism and sanctions, no matter what."

This is the moment for Mr. Cox and his colleagues to update their findings on communist **China** as America's trusted trading partner.

Arnold Beichman, a research fellow at the Hoover Institution, is a Washington Times columnist. He is the editor of the forthcoming CNN Cold War Documentary: "Issues and Controversy" (Hoover Press).



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LEVEL 1 - 10 OF 278 STORIES

Copyright 1999 Times Mirror Company
Los Angeles Times

November 18, 1999, Thursday, Home Edition

SECTION: Metro; Part B; Page 11; Op Ed Desk

LENGTH: 781 words

HEADLINE: COMMENTARY;

DON'T PUSH **CHINA** ON PROLIFERATION;MISSILES: IMPOSING SANCTIONS ON BEIJING NOW FOR '92 SALES TO PAKISTAN WOULD NOT
SERVE U.S. SECURITY INTERESTS.

BYLINE: PHILLIP C. SAUNDERS and EVAN S. MEDEIROS, Phillip C. Saunders is the director of the East Asia, Nonproliferation Project Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the, Monterey Institute of International Studies. Evan S. Medeiros is a senior, research associate at the center

BODY:

The Senate's rejection of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty dealt a damaging blow to U.S. nonproliferation policy. Now the Clinton administration and Congress must reconsider how to address one of the biggest challenges to U.S. security: proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems.

A National Intelligence Council report in September publicly stated--for the first time--that **China** has transferred M-11 missiles to Pakistan. This unequivocal statement presents the administration with a dilemma. Under U.S. law, transfers of missiles or related technology exceeding Missile Technology Control Regime, or MTCR, parameters--the ability to deliver a 1,100-pound payload over 186 miles--trigger sanctions. The administration can either impose sanctions and provoke a crisis in relations with **China** or circumvent the law by ignoring convincing evidence of missile transfers that occurred in 1991-'92.

The challenge for the Clinton administration is to resolve this dilemma while advancing the goals of combating proliferation and improving relations with **China**.

The intent behind the 1990 Missile Control Act mandating sanctions is to punish current missile exporters and to deter future sales. With respect to **China**, able diplomacy by the Bush and Clinton administrations has largely accomplished this goal. Bilateral negotiations from 1990 to 1994 persuaded **China** to reduce and then to halt transfers of M-series ballistic missiles to Syria, Iran and Pakistan.

In the case of Syria, U.S. diplomats persuaded **China** to cancel a contract for



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Los Angeles Times November 18, 1999, Thursday,

M-9 missiles, even though the Syrians had already paid. The U.S. imposed limited economic sanctions on China in 1991 and 1993 over transfers of M-11 components to Pakistan. By 1994, this pressure resulted in China freezing the deal and strengthening its initially limited commitment to adhere to the MTCR. In October 1997, China even agreed to stop selling to Iran C-801 and C-802 cruise missiles, which are not covered by any accord.

China's recent record on missile proliferation is by no means perfect. It is not a full MTCR member and does not have export laws covering MTCR-controlled items. The U.S. continues to have concerns about transfers of dual-use technology not covered in China's nonproliferation commitments and about unauthorized exports by Chinese companies. Yet compared with a decade ago, when China openly sold intermediate range missiles to Saudi Arabia, the scope of China's missile proliferation activities have declined dramatically.

The recent intelligence report does not involve a new transfer of M-11 missiles to Pakistan. China already has been sanctioned twice for these activities. Additional sanctions now are unlikely to advance U.S. nonproliferation goals.

Internal Chinese debates on issues such as MTCR membership and the test ban treaty ratification are at a crucial stage. China likely would respond to sanctions by limiting future cooperation on these issues and might even backtrack on its existing commitments. Moreover, the Senate rejection of the CTBT is causing even U.S. friends and allies to question U.S. commitment to international arms control and nonproliferation agreements. China is likely to conclude that the U.S. only supports arms control when it is convenient.

Sanctions would deal another blow to strained relations only beginning to improve after the Chinese Embassy bombing in Belgrade. Our conversations with Chinese foreign ministry officials and army officers indicate that many Chinese view the months leading up to Taiwan's March presidential elections as a dangerous time. They worry that, as anti-China sentiments in the U.S. grow, Lee Teng-hui will be emboldened to make further moves toward independence, and China will be compelled to respond with force.

This adds up to an overwhelming case for waiving sanctions on the grounds of U.S. national security interests. The Clinton administration should admit that China transferred the missiles to Pakistan in the early 1990s, but it should decline to impose sanctions because they would not advance U.S. nonproliferation objectives.

We do not mean to suggest that the issue of nonproliferation is unimportant. Rather, the issue is so important that policymakers must concentrate on policies that work.

The administration and Congress should focus on the fundamental question of what measures will persuade China to behave in a manner consistent with international norms on nonproliferation, arms control and international trade. Sanctions are one tool, but in this case, mechanical imposition of sanctions will at best be ineffective and at worst counter-productive.

LANGUAGE: English



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LEVEL 1 - 12 OF 278 STORIES

Copyright 1999 Times Mirror Company
Los Angeles Times

November 14, 1999, Sunday, Home Edition

SECTION: Opinion; Part M; Page 1; Opinion Desk

LENGTH: 1441 words

HEADLINE: AN UN-AMERICAN POLICE;
THE U.S. EMBRACE OF A TOTALITARIAN POWER (CHINA) INSTEAD OF A DEMOCRACY (TAIWAN)
DEFIES AMERICAN VALUES. WILL CONGRESS KEEP SILENT?BYLINE: Greg Mastel, Greg Mastel is director of the Global Economic Policy
Project at, the New America Foundation and author of "The Rise of the Chinese,
Economy."

DATELINE: WASHINGTON

BODY:

Americans tend to judge U.S. foreign policy from the perspective of fostering American values. The United States militarily intervenes in Kosovo, Rwanda, Haiti and other spots around the globe to fight oppression and restore order. Whether from the right or left, they define foreign-policy objectives in terms of promoting democracy and human rights in regions from Latin America to East Timor to the former Soviet empire. When U.S. foreign policy undercuts American values by supporting dictatorships or seeking to overthrow elected leaders, it comes in for justified criticism.

But there is one aspect of U.S. foreign policy--now the subject of a heated debate in Congress--in which those American values seem to have been forgotten. In the South China Sea, a well-known totalitarian force threatens a fledgling democracy with talk of invasion and denies the right of the democracy to exist. The United States has an ambiguous security commitment to the fledgling democracy, carefully limiting arms sales to it to avoid offending the totalitarian power. It cautions the democracy not to assert its right to independence and self-determination too loudly and supports the totalitarian power's effort to deny the democracy international recognition. In fact, the United States itself refuses to formally recognize the democracy.

Although it may sound incomprehensible to most Americans, the paragraph above accurately describes U.S. policy toward the People's Republic of China and Taiwan, and it is a policy followed by both Republican and Democratic administrations, although Congress is now moving to change it. It runs against the most basic values of the United States to side with a totalitarian country against a vibrant democracy, but that is exactly what the United States is doing in the struggle between Beijing and Taipei.



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Los Angeles Times November 14, 1999, Sunday.

The complex histories of **China** and Taiwan are part of the explanation for this anomaly in U.S. policy. The current government of Taiwan traces its roots to the Nationalists who ruled **China** during World War II. Shortly after the war, Mao Tse-tung's communists ousted the Nationalists from the mainland and drove them to Taiwan, where the defeated forces set up their own government. Predictably, tensions were high between Taiwan and the mainland as each claimed to be the legitimate government of **China**.

For some four decades, Taiwan was ruled with an iron hand by the displaced Nationalist government. Conflict and threats dominated relations between the island and the mainland, and dialogue was limited and halting, each side viewing the other with great suspicion. Staunch anti-communists in the United States embraced Taiwan as a friend, but many liberals saw little practical difference between the oppressive and sometimes brutal totalitarian government in Beijing and the oppressive and sometimes brutal authoritarian government in Taipei.

Eventually, in need of allies to confront the Soviet Union, President Richard M. Nixon and Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger engineered a switch, later completed by President Jimmy Carter, in which the United States recognized the People's Republic of **China** as the legitimate government of **China** and dropped formal recognition of Taiwan. During the same period, **China** also displaced Taiwan in many international organizations, including the United Nations. Taiwan's friends in Congress forced through a legislatively mandated lifeline of informal support to Taipei, with limited weapons sales and a security commitment against Chinese invasion, but Taiwan's status clearly was downgraded. Many expected that **China** would somehow absorb Taiwan, perhaps after transforming itself into a modern democratic country.

But this expectation was not fulfilled. **China** did economically transform itself. Yet, as the Tiananmen Square massacre and subsequent revelations about the scope of oppression on the mainland make clear, it remains perhaps the most brutally oppressive government in the world. There are some early flickers of democratization at the local level, but the Chinese Communist Party still closely controls those limited efforts.

For its part, and with little notice in the United States, Taiwan completed its own dramatic transformation. It built a first-rate economy, but it did not stop there. In the 1990s, Taiwan became a true democracy, eventually electing its president in a free election. Local elections are now hotly contested; opposition parties gain parliamentary seats and power. A kind of Taiwanese Ross Perot leads in the presidential race. Individual freedoms are protected and widely exercised. Taiwanese democracy is still new and will undoubtedly face tests, but it appears as real as democracy in Mexico.

Unfortunately, U.S. policy fails to recognize this tremendous turn of events. As President Bill Clinton chose to make painfully clear on his recent trip to **China**, U.S. policy still treats Taiwan as a de facto possession of **China**. The administration holds to the Beijing-inspired vision that Taiwan can someday be absorbed by the mainland in the same fashion as Hong Kong was. The United States continues to refuse to recognize Taipei, it is reducing its sales of weapons to Taiwan, and it refuses to support, or supports halfheartedly, Taiwan's efforts to achieve international recognition.



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Even now, the pattern continues. The administration is working furiously to bring **China** into the World Trade Organization, while putting membership for the much more qualified Taiwan on hold.

When Taiwan's democratically elected leader, President Lee Teng-hui, demanded last summer that his country be treated as a separate state rather than as a possession of **China**, the United States effectively sided with Beijing, telling Taiwan's president to hold his tongue. Now the Clinton administration is encouraging business leaders to lobby Congress against new arms sales to Taiwan. The U.S. reaction to Lee's statement demonstrates that **China** has effectively been granted veto power over U.S. policy toward Taiwan.

Since **China** has such strong feelings about Taiwan's status, the United States should move cautiously in tracing new policy in this area. Certainly, no one wants war with **China**. Such a conflict would have grave consequences for Taiwan, **China**, the United States and the world. Having said that, the one-**China** policy is woefully out of date. Cold War realities that drove it are deep in the dust bin of history; **China** is no longer needed as a strategic counterweight to the Soviet Union. The main players that shaped policy after World War II, **China** and Taiwan, are greatly changed. The only seemingly unchanging facet of the situation is the stubborn insistence of U.S. leaders to keep their eyes tightly shut to changing reality for fear of offending Beijing.

Increasingly, U.S. policy lacks even internal coherence. For example, advocates of the status quo argue that they fear being drawn into a war with **China** sparked by a Chinese invasion or blockade of Taiwan to punish Taipei for its increasingly independent posture. Yet, many of these same voices support sticking to existing arms-sale policy toward Taiwan, thus effectively reducing Taiwan's ability to deter Chinese aggression and keep the risk of U.S. involvement in a war minimal. If the real objective is to maintain peace across the Taiwan Strait, what better way to achieve this objective than to allow Taiwan to defend itself. Making war between Taiwan and **China** unthinkable to Beijing's leaders is the surest way to ensure that U.S. lives are not lost in a war between the two **Chinas**.

The United States should not lightly ignore **China's** wishes, but it certainly should not ignore reality and its own values on Beijing's behalf. The situation in the South **China** Sea has changed, but U.S. policy remains frozen. As the congressional debate on this problem heats up, all Americans should take a hard look at U.S. policy on **China** and Taiwan and measure it against American values. If **China's** oppression of a few hundred students at Tiananmen Square is grounds for an outcry, how is it that **China's** continuing effort to suppress 23 million people on Taiwan warrants no notice? If fighting against oppression and being on the side of human rights and democracy is in U.S. interests in Kosovo, Kuwait and Rwanda, why is it not the case in Taiwan, a far truer democracy?

There is probably a limit to how far the United States should go to promote its values overseas, and maintaining a relationship with **China** is important, but that certainly should not mean that we turn our backs on what we believe in to appease Beijing. *

GRAPHIC: GRAPHIC-DRAWING: (no caption), MATT MAHURIN / for The Times ID NUMBER: 19991114hop0086



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Los Angeles Times November 14, 1999, Sunday,

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LEVEL 1 - 6 OF 20 STORIES

Copyright 1999 The Washington Post
The Washington Post

September 7, 1999, Tuesday, Final Edition

SECTION: OP-ED; Pg. A19

LENGTH: 2069 words

HEADLINE: Storm Clouds Gathering; The unnecessary rush toward confrontation must be reversed by both **China** and the United States.

BYLINE: Henry Kissinger

BODY:

When, within a few days, Bill **Clinton** meets with his Chinese counterpart, Jiang Zemin, at an international forum in New Zealand, it will be amid the greatest strain in Sino-American relations since diplomatic contact was reestablished in 1971.

Many in Washington perceive Beijing's reaction to the American attack on the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade as deliberate fostering of anti-American sentiments, and the Chinese military buildup and human rights practices as challenges to basic American interests and values. The view from Beijing is that the bombing of its Belgrade embassy was deliberate and that denial of World Trade Organization membership, human-rights accusations and charges of espionage are symptoms of America's unwillingness to allow **China** to play a role on the world stage.

In this atmosphere, Taiwan's sudden and unilateral challenge to the existing political understandings in the Taiwan Strait -- at a time when a senior Beijing representative was preparing to visit Taipei for the first time -- is interpreted in Beijing as the culmination of an American plot to divide **China**. Chinese warnings of a possible military response have taken on a severity reminiscent of the prelude to the Chinese intervention in the Korean War in 1950. In turn, many in Washington consider these Chinese expressions of concern as pretexts for executing long-held designs. Amid such mutual incomprehension, conflict, even military conflict, could suddenly erupt.

Three high-level visits -- of Jiang to Washington, of **Clinton** to China and of Prime Minister Zhu Rongji to Washington -- have accomplished little more than to assuage these trends. In each, atmospherics took precedence over substance, and in the Zhu visit American domestic politics blocked the conclusion of the WTO agreement that Zhu had been given reason to expect.

Some are fatalistic about this drift toward confrontation. Others compare the emergence of China to the rise of Germany before the First World War, the



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implication being that since a showdown is foreordained, better now, when China is still relatively weak. They forget that, in the eyes of history, the sin of the statesmen of that period was their failure to arrest the catastrophe that nearly destroyed European civilization.

A Sino-American conflict would be similarly avoidable and damaging to both sides. Both sides need a respite from the febrile mood of the moment. The atmosphere for this is not favorable in either country. Anti-American nationalism seems to be gaining momentum in Beijing. In America, a growing consensus in which China replaces the Soviet Union as our main enemy stultifies a necessary debate. Doubters of the dominant trend are accused of appeasement or of acting for their own economic benefit -- a charge to which I have been subjected because I am chairman of an international consulting company. Anybody believing this charge should stop reading here.

No single component of American foreign policy can be an end in itself. We have security, political and economic interests and commitments in Asia that we will not sacrifice to our interest in constructive relations with China, however important we judge these to be. But the prospects of world peace, stability and progress will be hazarded if the current unnecessary rush toward confrontation is not reversed by both sides.

The case against China boils down to three propositions:

That China, like the Soviet Union, is ideologically bent on regional, if not world, domination. Coexistence being impossible, we must maintain pressures on this last major totalitarian state until it transforms itself into a peaceful and cooperative democratic society.

That China's military buildup coupled with the growth of its economy inevitably challenges the U.S. position in Asia and should be stifled before it takes on unmanageable proportions.

That a military showdown over Taiwan is sufficiently probable that we must take all measures in defense of Taiwan, even if these measures make such a conflict inevitable.

But is China really comparable to the Soviet threat to the United States? Soviet ideology claimed universal applicability, and Soviet leaders as late as the '70s proclaimed the goal of the worldwide triumph of communism. Moscow avowed its determination to maintain communist parties in power, by force if necessary, intervening in Hungary and Czechoslovakia and threatening to do so in Poland and even in China. The Chinese communist leadership makes no such claims; it exploits no international network of communist parties or radical forces to undermine Western positions. While many repressive aspects of a one-party state continue, there has been a vast improvement since Mao and the Cultural Revolution.

The debate over whether human rights should play a role in the conduct of our foreign policy has been won by the activists. But when the stakes are so high, these concerns need to be brought into some relationship with other objectives of American foreign policy. And the experiences of Haiti, Somalia and today in Kosovo should inspire some caution about how easy it is to impose our values.



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The Washington Post, September 7, 1999

Even greater perspective is needed with respect to Chinese military power. The Soviet Union possessed some 2,500 strategic delivery vehicles, most with multiple warheads and many with high accuracy. An attack on the United States was technically feasible and strategically not inconceivable. The Chinese strategic force of some 25 liquid-fueled missiles with single warheads requiring hours to get ready is not an instrument for offensive operations. And when, in perhaps 10 years, the Chinese acquire multiple warheads for a larger number of missiles, an American missile defense -- which I have always favored -- should substantially preserve the strategic balance.

As for Chinese ground forces, they are at a level of the technology of the 1960s, capable of defending the home country but not suitable for offensive operations against a major opponent -- including Taiwan. And around its periphery, China must cope with a strategic situation far more problematic than was the Soviet Union's in Europe. The Soviet Union threatened weak neighbors, unable, either alone or in combination, to resist Soviet ground forces. But, from India to Japan to Russia, China faces militarily significant neighbors.

As for the Chinese economy, though China has grown at the average rate of 10 percent a year for much of the past 20 years, no country has ever maintained such a rate indefinitely. Nor is China doing so today. Its current growth of about 6 percent barely keeps pace with the growth of the Chinese labor force, leaving little room for a major increase in the percentage of the gross domestic product devoted to defense spending without risking a shipwreck like the Soviet Union's.

To be sure, as China develops what it calls its "comprehensive national strength," its military power will grow. But for the foreseeable future, the United States possesses diplomatic, economic and military advantages to enable us to shape the future confidently. Should China threaten the regional balance of power or our vital interests, we are bound to resist. But on proliferation, Asian economic progress and on stabilizing potential trouble spots such as South Asia and Korea, there are enough points of congruence to render a permanent geopolitical dialogue between China and the United States indispensable. For us to imagine that we can prevent China's natural growth and emergence as a major power is to commit us to an unprecedentedly domineering role. Over time, this would drain our physical and psychological resources, be opposed by the rest of the world and, in the end, by the American people.

Taiwan is the most explosive issue. Taiwan was part of China until 1895, when Japan annexed it, its first step toward conquest on the mainland. Starting with World War II, American presidents have affirmed Taiwan to be a part of China in one form or another: Franklin Roosevelt in 1943; Harry Truman in 1945; Richard Nixon in 1972; Jimmy Carter in 1979; and Ronald Reagan in 1982. The Reagan communique moreover stated that the United States had no intention of "pursuing a policy of two Chinas, or one China, on Taiwan" -- a formula repeated 16 years later by Clinton in Shanghai. Since 1971, each president has also firmly stated America's abiding concern for a peaceful resolution of the issue -- a euphemism for opposition to the use of force -- as did the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, which adopted the principle as American law.



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The Washington Post, September 7, 1999

Within this framework, Taiwan has prospered, become democratic and increasingly participated in international forums that did not require formal state-to-state relations. At the same time, the United States, like the vast majority of the world's governments, was recognizing Beijing as the legitimate government of all of China. But, unlike most other countries, we were supplying the vast majority of the weapons for what was being treated officially as part of another country. For 30 years, China, while insisting on ultimate unification, nevertheless on several occasions expressed its willingness to defer a final resolution in the interest of its relationship with other countries, especially the United States. It did so provided Taiwan did not stake a formal claim to sovereignty. The United States, while repeatedly reaffirming its opposition to the use of force, did so invariably within the framework of a "one-China" policy.

This complex framework should not be trifled with. Indeed, it is very much in Taiwan's own interest. For the key constraint on China's Taiwan policy has been China's stake in its relationship with the United States. Were Taiwan to achieve formal American recognition of a separate status, as its president now seems to seek, this would surely lead to some kind of military clash that, whatever its outcome, would permanently rupture Sino-American relations and isolate America in Asia and probably the world. Taiwan would be less, not more, secure in such an environment.

Thus, when President Clinton and Jiang meet, they must try to defuse the immediate crisis and begin to place Sino-American relations on a solid basis. Slogans such as "strategic partnership" without content cannot substitute for a careful examination of where interests are congruent and where they need to be reassessed or managed.

With respect to Taiwan, three steps are needed: (1) to leave no ambiguity about America's opposition to the use of force; (2) to make clear that there is no change in America's longstanding acceptance of the principle of one China; (3) to insist on Taiwanese restraint in challenging a framework that, in fact, ensures their autonomy and without which events may well run out of control.

A cold war would leave both sides in a classic no-win situation. China's economic progress would be stifled. Historically covetous neighbors might resurrect past ambitions. And, given the present disproportion of power, a military conflict would have grave consequences for China.

At the same time, Beijing would have many political cards to play. The Soviet Union, in the end, stood substantially isolated facing a coalition of all the industrial democracies plus China. But China has traversed its 5,000 years of recorded history by careful calculations of its necessities and great patience. No Asian nation will go along with a confrontational course unless provoked by Chinese pressures. Our European allies will distinguish their policies from ours and blame tensions on American highhandedness. Every crisis point, from Korea to the Middle East, would be exacerbated by a Sino-American cold -- or hot -- war.

Escape from this rush toward self-fulfilling prophecies requires a degree of bipartisanship not in great supply at this moment. Once the die is cast for confrontation, there will be no easy way back from the precipice. Which of the



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statesmen who so exuberantly went to war in 1914 would not have jumped at a chance to review their decision when they looked back at the damage done to the civilization of Europe and the long-term peace of the world?

The writer, a former secretary of state, is president of Kissinger Associates, an international consulting firm that has clients with business interests in many countries abroad.

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LEVEL 1 - 23 OF 278 STORIES

Copyright 1999 Globe Newspaper Company
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August 25, 1999, Wednesday, City Edition

SECTION: OP-ED; Pg. A27

LENGTH: 799 words

HEADLINE: Clinton can't play it safe with China;

MIKE JENDRZEJCZYK;

Mike Jendrzejczyk is Washington director of the Asia Division of Human Rights Watch.

BYLINE: By Mike Jendrzejczyk

BODY:

China's arbitrary detention of Daja Meston of Newton, a Tibet researcher visiting a World Bank project, underlines the urgent need to get human rights back on the administration's agenda with Beijing.

Next month the leaders of the United States and China will meet for the first time since the May bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade. President Clinton is due to meet President Jiang Zemin on the margins of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in New Zealand beginning on Sept. 12. Both leaders are scrambling to get US-Chinese relations back on track in time to sign a deal on Beijing's entry into the World Trade Organization this year.

Bringing China into the WTO would be good for trade and could help human rights and strengthen the rule of law over the long term. As a member of the global trading organization, China would face increasing demands for greater transparency, an independent judicial system, and protection of worker rights.

But Clinton shouldn't once again make the mistake of overstating the benefits of his trade policy. And he cannot remain silent about the harsh new crackdown now under way. Members of the fledgling China Democracy Party were recently given heavy prison sentences. The Falun Gong movement is under systematic attack. Daja Meston was severely injured while in the hands of security officials; his translator, a Chinese citizen, is being held in an unknown location, subject to intense interrogation and possible mistreatment.

Before the economic summit in New Zealand, Clinton should send Vice President Al Gore to Beijing on a confidence-building mission. Gore should take with him a delegation of senior members of Congress that includes both advocates of closer economic relations with China and outspoken critics of human rights abuses. The range of issues on the US-Chinese agenda should be discussed, but the message they deliver should be clear: The administration and Congress are willing to grant China permanent most-favored-nation trading status as part of a



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The Boston Globe, August 25, 1999

WTO package, doing away with the annual renewal process.

In return, Jiang must deliver on some of the key human rights concerns that Clinton raised so prominently during his tour of China last year. China's leaders need to understand that this is a crucial precondition to getting congressional approval of any WTO agreement.

For example, China should allow greater rights of free association by permitting independent groups such as Corruption Watch to operate freely. The organization was started in October 1998 to expose rampant corruption in rural areas and has members around the country. But it was declared illegal, and its founder is about to go on trial on charges of subversion.

Gore should also press for action by the People's Congress within one year of getting permanent favored trading status to ratify an important UN human rights treaty, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. When Beijing signed the treaty last fall, the Clinton administration hailed the decision as a positive step. But until it's ratified, it has no binding effect. Meanwhile, brave individuals in China continue to risk arrest and imprisonment by trying to exercise their rights under the treaty, organizing unemployed workers or calling for political reform.

The vice president should explore ways of beginning a legal process - perhaps with the formation of a special commission to which the United States and the UN could contribute technical assistance - of dismantling China's massive system of reeducation through labor. Each year, tens of thousands are arbitrarily sent to labor camps without ever being formally charged or taken before a judge.

In response to these appeals, Beijing might offer to resume the bilateral dialogue on human rights that was cut off after the Belgrade bombing.

This would give the administration a token gift to help show critics that its engagement policy is working. But the United States should resume a dialogue only if it is restructured so it has some chance of being productive and not the heavily politicized exercise it was before.

A high-level mission led by Gore would not be risk-free. However, sending lower-level envoys from the State Department or the National Security Council is unlikely to produce a breakthrough when decisions are needed at the very top.

Any major steps by Beijing are unlikely until after the Oct. 1 anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China. But the United States and China have too much at stake for the White House to play it safe. Clinton and Gore should take a bold step that demonstrates real leadership and unites Congress behind a common goal - promoting both free trade and greater respect for human rights in China.

LANGUAGE: ENGLISH

LOAD-DATE: August 25, 1999



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LEVEL 1 - 44 OF 278 STORIES

Copyright 1999 Globe Newspaper Company
The Boston Globe

June 3, 1999, Thursday ,City Edition

SECTION: OP-ED; Pg. A23

LENGTH: 873 words

HEADLINE: Ten years after Tiananmen, China is still tyrannical;
JEFF JACOBY

BYLINE: By Jeff Jacoby, Globe Staff

BODY:

For 11 days in the late fall of 1993, a group of senior Chinese policymakers gathered behind closed doors in the Jingxi Hotel in Beijing. They came together to lay out a long-term military and foreign-affairs strategy for China; among the participants were high-ranking officials from the Communist Party (including its powerful Central Committee) and the People's Liberation Army.

A detailed report on the group's consensus was subsequently leaked to the Hong Kong journal Cheng Ming. It began with these words:

"Whom does the Communist Party of China regard as its international archenemy? It is the United States."

The report went on to charge that a key goal of US foreign policy was "to control and sanction China" into bending toward the West; to subsidize "hostile forces both inside and outside Chinese territory" in order to "stir up turbulence"; to punish China with economic sanctions while whipping up regional fears of a Chinese threat; and "to manipulate Japan and South Korea" into following America's anti-China strategy.

This was, to repeat, in late 1993 - nearly a year into the Clinton administration, well after the president had conspicuously retreated from his campaign attack on George Bush for "coddling tyrants" and agreed to renew China's most-favored-nation trade status.

Before long, Clinton would be explicitly de-linking trade from human rights and embarking on a policy of "engagement" with China that would elevate business considerations above all others.

But Beijing's view of the United States would not soften. In mid-1996, "China Can Say No" would become a runaway Chinese best-seller. Its thesis: America is China's implacable enemy and must be fought diplomatically, economically, politically, and culturally. Books are not published in China unless the Communist rulers want them published; this one even included an



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introduction by Chai Zemin, **China's** first ambassador to the United States.

In short, no one should have been astonished at the riots that raged outside US government offices in **China** last month following the unintended bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade. Beijing's dictators have been feeding and nurturing anti-American hostility for years. The surprise was not that the government fanned the fires of public hysteria - it repeatedly asserted that the embassy tragedy was no mistake and that NATO's Kosovo operation is a vicious campaign of American aggression - but that it turned off the violence after only four days.

What was on display in **China** last month was no aberration. The government that bused demonstrators to the US embassy in Beijing so that they could hurl rocks and Molotov cocktails through its windows is unchanged in any important respect from the government that sent the tanks and machine guns into Tiananmen Square 10 years ago this week.

Yes, there are more computers in **China** today than there were in 1989. There are more cellular phones and tabloid newspapers, more Michael Jordan T-shirts and Nike sneakers. But there is not more freedom. There is less.

In the spring of 1989, millions, literally millions, of Chinese took to the streets - men and women, old and young, from every walk of life, in Beijing and 80 other cities - to plead for democracy and an end to repression. It was a moment of hope and courage unparalleled in **China's** long history; it ended in screams and blood and mass-murder.

In the decade since then, **China's** Communist tyrants have strangled every attempt to revive the movement for liberty and reform. Every known democracy activist of 1989 has been killed, imprisoned, or exiled. Political dissidents continue to be rounded up, convicted in sham trials, and thrown behind bars. Many have been tortured.

Bill Clinton, like George Bush before him, has embraced the fiction that trade leads to democracy, that the more we "engage" the Chinese with business deals and summit meetings, the freer and friendlier **China** will become. Clinton has taken this Sino-appeasement to depths even Bush didn't plumb - inviting the Chinese general who presided over the Tiananmen slaughter to the White House, for example, and approving the sale to **China** of missile-guidance technology.

It hasn't worked. Appeasing totalitarians never does. Ten years after Tiananmen, the junta in Beijing remains a deadly threat to Chinese citizens who denounce Communist rule, to devout Christians who refuse to worship in state-approved churches, to the free people of Taiwan who refuse to bow to Chinese hegemony. Ten years after Tiananmen, Tibetan monks and nuns are still beaten and jailed, the laogai slave labor camps still operate, and women are still subjected to forced abortions and sterilization. Ten years after Tiananmen, **China** has missiles targeted at the United States and has spies employed in stealing America's nuclear secrets.

Some engagements are better off broken. The Bush-Clinton **China** engagement is one of them. To whom, after all, do we owe our loyalty? The dictators of Beijing, who treat America as an "international archenemy?" Or the men and women of the Chinese nation, who once filled the streets in a plea for democracy - but



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who know they would be killed if they tried it today?

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LEVEL 1 - 45 OF 278 STORIES

Copyright 1999 Times Mirror Company
Los Angeles Times

June 2, 1999, Wednesday, Home Edition

SECTION: Metro; Part B; Page 7; Op Ed Desk

LENGTH: 792 words

HEADLINE: COMMENTARY;
 PERSPECTIVE ON DEMOCRACY;
 SPREADING VALUES BY EXAMPLE;
 INSTEAD OF ASSUMING CHINA SHOULD BE LIKE AMERICA, THE U.S. MUST REDEDICATE
 ITSELF TO ITS OWN IDEALS.

BYLINE: WILLIAM P. ALFORD, William P. Alford is a professor of law and the
 director of Harvard, Law School's East Asian legal studies program

BODY:

The 10th anniversary of the killings by Chinese of Chinese at Tiananmen Square ought to be a time for sober reflection by Americans as well. While China has yet to come to grips with the murders of Chinese citizens (and soldiers) that took place June 3-4, 1989, we in the U.S. have still to develop a thoughtful and effective way in which to deal with the challenges--political and intellectual, economic and moral--that the world's most populous nation presents.

It would be easy to attribute the confusion that surrounds our interaction with China to the ineptitude of the Clinton administration's "policy." Hoping to please everyone, the administration has succeeded in pleasing no one, leaving the business, national security and human rights communities exasperated with its unwillingness to stick to its promises and its overall lack of conviction and consistency. The administration also has managed the not-inconsiderable feat of leaving Beijing, Taipei, Tokyo and the expatriate dissident Chinese community, all dissatisfied if not feeling betrayed.

But, unfortunately, America's problems in coming to grips with China run far deeper and raise more basic questions about our approach toward the world. Whether out of hubris, ignorance or laziness, or some combination thereof, we have chosen to interpret China's course over the past two decades as an ineluctable movement toward an American model or at least that of a liberal democratic state.

This attitude was perhaps most starkly evident in the giddy reporting that misleadingly portrayed the 1989 occupation of Tiananmen Square as a call for American-style democracy. It also is apparent in our focus since then (at least until the recent trashing of U.S. diplomatic facilities and reports of Chinese



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Los Angeles Times June 2, 1999, Wednesday,

spying) on images of Chinese consumers merrily holding aloft American products, the flood of legislation many have taken as **China's** commitment to the rule of law and the much-touted village elections.

Changes in **China's** economy, legal system and state administration ought not to be slighted, but neither should they be overstated. President Jiang Zemin announced at the last major Communist Party Congress that even as it sheds smaller state-owned enterprises, **China** intends to pick hundreds of major state-owned enterprises to convert into international conglomerates. Chinese judges suffer from the triple whammy of being drawn almost exclusively from the ranks of the party, lacking independence from the local authorities who pay their salaries and yet finding it hard to secure enforcement of their judgments, whether against the state or other actors. And leading scholars of village elections suggest that they have been promoted in large measure because they provide higher-level authorities with a more palatable means through which to promote unpopular national policies concerning matters such as birth control, taxation and the like.

We need to keep in mind that the Chinese are undertaking these changes to strengthen **China** (or at least the position of those now in power) rather than to follow us. At least some Chinese view any reliance on foreign models with a profound ambivalence, given **China's** sense of cultural superiority, the legacy of the so-called "century of humiliation" (mid-1800s to mid-1900s) at the hands of foreigners and the distortions fostered by indigenous media that are still far from free.

Even those in **China** more willing to borrow from abroad may be discarding some of what we think most valuable in the American example, adopting some of what we deem least desirable and adapting practices that we would think unsustainable absent certain underlying institutions and values. And in so doing, they may be especially conscious of the gap between what we urge upon them and our own behavior (as in our demands that they adhere to international law while we do an end-run around the United Nations vis-a-vis Kosovo or in our outcries about campaign contributions at the same time our hands have been outstretched for them).

The really difficult question for Americans in both practical and philosophical terms will be how to reconcile the likelihood that a great many Chinese may not wish to be like us with our on-going commitment to promote those ideas and ideals we think worthy of emulation. Stated differently, once freed from the conceit that others have no choice but to follow our example, how do we, in fact, persuade them on the merits of what we may have to offer? Arguably, at least the beginning of an answer lies in our own rededication to the ideals that we would have others follow--for, in the end, if our actions belie our ideals, there is no reason to expect others to take them more seriously than we do.

GRAPHIC: PHOTO: WILLIAM P. ALFORD

LANGUAGE: English

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LEVEL 1 - 52 OF 278 STORIES

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May 28, 1999, Friday, Final Edition

SECTION: OP-ED; Pg. A35

LENGTH: 774 words

HEADLINE: The Real China Scandal

BYLINE: Charles Krauthammer

BODY:

The Clinton debacle in **China** -- technology transferred, secrets stolen, blind eye turned -- is, of course, part corruption and part incompetence. But that is too easy. It is, even more importantly, the failure of an idea.

First, corruption. It is not documented in the Cox report, which, in the interest of bipartisanship, generally steered away from the campaign finance scandal. But it is clear that an administration in which the president sips fund-raising coffee with a Chinese arms dealer and in which his own Johnny Chung takes \$ 300,000 from known agents of the Chinese military is an administration that will be reluctant to take serious steps when Chinese misconduct is suspected.

And then there is the more indirect corruption: Clinton's secretary of commerce auctioning seats on his trade mission to **China** -- near guarantees of preferential treatment -- to large Democratic donors. In order to keep that gravy train going, you need a market, which means **China** has to be kept open, happy and unoffended by anything so grubby as the gauche exposure of the espionage game.

The incompetence at the root of this scandal is equally obvious: a national security adviser who reacts with astonishing equanimity to reports of the greatest nuclear theft since the Rosenbergs; an attorney general who refuses FBI requests to tap the phones of the chief suspect in the Los Alamos leaks.

But at the very core of this scandal lies a **policy** and an idea. The **policy** is euphemized as "engagement." (Seven years ago, candidate Clinton called it "coddling.") It is a **policy** of openness, embrace, trade, exchanges by an **administration** that trumpets **China** not as a potential rising adversary, not as a source of instability in the Pacific, but as a "strategic partner" of the United States.

And underlying that policy is an idea: globalism, the notion that we are entering a new era -- a high-tech, Internet, info-highway, McDonald's-in-every-capital era -- in which borders and sovereignty are becoming obsolete. In such an era, the old power politics of the nation-state are equally



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obsolete. Under the new dispensation, to view other great powers as potential enemies is to be mired in Cold War old-think. Rising powers such as **China** are to be seduced into civility by a welcoming, nurturing, supporting American embrace.

One globalist mantra, for example, is that no two countries that have McDonald's have ever gone to war with each other, a theory made toast by our nasty little war with Yugoslavia, where the local population vented its rage by sacking three local McDonald's. (One can only imagine the booty: "Hot Sauce! I got the Hot Sauce!")

This globalist idea of universal McPeace took another hit when **China**, home to an archipelago of McDonald's, flagrantly exploited the accidental bombing of its embassy in Belgrade, busing in mobs to attack the U.S. Embassy in Beijing. Clinton's besieged U.S. ambassador boldly warned, as he dodged the rocks, that "this is going to make the road a little rockier to stabilizing the relationship between **China** and the United States."

The power of this fanciful new-era globalism has allowed the Clintonites to be insouciantly lax in every aspect of their dealings with **China**: espionage, technology transfer, open unregulated trade. They find it hard to understand that other nations, in particular those with histories infinitely longer and richer than ours, could have a worldview that might differ.

China has such a view. **China** does not see itself joining the happy U.S.-dominated McDonaldland of our dreams. **China** sees itself as it is: a growing, rising, have-not power, formerly colonized, long humiliated, now finally reaching for its rightful place in the sun. It is at the turn of the 21st century what Germany was at the turn of the 20th: the new, challenging Great Power, pushing inexorably against its neighbors in a world that does not yet know how to contain it. Clinton may view **China** as a lovey-dovey hands-across-the-sea trading partner. **China** sees the United States -- and says so repeatedly -- as an arrogant hegemonist that works its will on a pliant world.

China is not pliant. Pliant enthusiasts of globalism do not race to acquire a sophisticated, intercontinental nuclear capacity -- and do so with an alacrity and an urgency not seen since Stalin's Russia. They do not move relentlessly to field a mobile missile force that can target accurately not only its neighbors but San Francisco as well.

It is a pity that **China** does not share Clinton's woolly globalism. It is a scandal that he is oblivious to that reality. That is the real **China** scandal.

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