Case Number: 2008-0702-F

FOIA MARKER

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4022				
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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. statement	re: Draft National Security Council Advisor Samuel R. Berger remarks to the Woodrow Wilson Center on China (15 pages)	02/01/2000	P5
002. statement	re: Draft National Security Council Advisor Samuel R. Berger remarks to the Woodrow Wilson Center on China (13 pages)	02/01/2000	P5
003. report	Timesheet (1 page)	01/29/2000	P6/b(6)
004. report	Timesheet (1 page)	02/02/2000	P6/b(6)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Speechwriting (Paul Orzulak)
OA/Box Number: 4022

FOLDER TITLE:
China [Folder 1] [3]

2008-0702-F
jm194

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
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1/29/00 6:00 p.m.
Orzulak

NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR SAMUEL R. BERGER
REMARKS TO
THE WOODROW WILSON CENTER
ON CHINA
WASHINGTON, D.C.
FEBRUARY 4, 2000

Speaking to the Wilson Center is always a daunting prospect. It brings to mind the story of the man who lived through the famous Johnstown flood. All his life, this man would stop and tell everybody he met the story of how he survived. When he died and went to heaven, he immediately asked St. Peter to convene a crowd so he could tell them about the great flood. St. Peter said, "I'd be happy to. But you have to remember one thing - Noah will be in the audience."

That's a little bit how it feels to address the Wilson Center. For more than 50 years, you have helped America think through the most difficult challenges we face in the world. In particular, I want to thank you President, Lee Hamilton, for the sure and steady hand he brought to American foreign policy for more than 20 years in Congress. Together, you have helped us build a safer, more prosperous world.

Last week in his State of the Union address, we heard the President give a powerful summary of the challenges America will face in the 21st century world. It's not hard to feel optimistic about the future. America today is enjoying the longest economic expansion in its history. Our military strength is unchallenged. Our alliances are strong. Our values are ascendant. Eighty years after Woodrow Wilson hoped that American leadership would help make the world safe for democracy - today, for the first time in history, more than half the world's population live under governments of their own choosing.

But as the President said last Thursday, this is not a world without dangers to us. There is a chance that our security could be threatened by regional conflicts that pose the risk of a wider war, especially those rooted in ethnic and religious tensions. There is a danger that the inexorable march of technology will give terrorists and hostile nations the means to undermine our defenses, and force us to live again in fear. There is a chance that the stability of the 21st Century will be threatened by an ever-widening gap between rich and poor. And of course, there is the possibility that our former adversaries Russia and China will fail to emerge as stable, prosperous, democratic partners of the United States.

Today, I want to talk about China. For many years now, American policy toward this emerging power has been guided by constant goals: A China with an economy that is open to American products, farmers, and businesses. A China whose people have access to ideas and information. A China that upholds the rule of law at home and plays by global rules on everything from nuclear non-proliferation to human rights to trade. This year, we have an unprecedented opportunity to start turning those goals into a reality. The opportunity, of course, is China's entry into the World Trade Organization.

Before America can realize the benefits of Chinese membership in this institution, Congress must answer a simple question: will it grant China permanent Normal Trade Relations status, which is our part of the deal we reached, and the same arrangement we have given to every one of our partners in the WTO? Or will Congress turn its back on the most sweeping changes China has agreed to make in decades and risk losing even more ground on the issues we care about?

We know that this is going to be a difficult debate, because there are a lot of people on both sides of the aisle who have legitimate concerns about China. But let me take a few minutes today to talk about why supporting this agreement - and voting yes on permanent NTR for China -- is the right thing to do.

Every trade debate begins with the simple question: will our nation be better off with this agreement, or without it? Will our economy and our workforce benefit from the terms we've negotiated, or will they suffer? From an economic perspective, there is no denying that this agreement is an absolute home run for America.

For more than a decade, China has had significant access to our markets, while its markets have been in many ways closed to American products and services. The incredible thing about this agreement is that China makes huge new concessions to open its market to America, but we promise only to maintain the market access policies we already apply to Chinese goods. So rejecting this agreement would in no way limit China's access to our markets. It would only continue to limit our access to China, and ensure that our trade deficit remains high.

On the numbers alone, this agreement will dramatically expand our access to a market of more than 1.3 billion people. Over the past 20 years, U.S. exports to China have grown from negligible levels to more than $14 billion in goods and services each year and now supports 400,000 American jobs. These figures will grow substantially with the new access that the WTO agreement creates.

On key agricultural products, China's tariffs will drop by 60 percent by January 2004 - and dramatically expand export opportunities for our farmers who grow bulk commodities like wheat, rice, and corn. Tariffs on industrial products will drop by nearly two-thirds, from 25 percent in 1997 to an average of 9.4 percent by 2005. Both our manufacturers and our farmers will gain the right to distribute freely inside China, without going through state trading companies or middle men. And on products such as computers, semiconductors, and Internetrelated equipment, tariffs will shrink to zero by the year 2005. Our information technology firms lead the world and stand to do very well in China's huge, information-hungry market.

The agreement also opens China's market for services, including distribution, insurance, telecommunications, banking, professional and environmental services. Here, too, American firms are world leaders and will find tremendous opportunities in China.

And it directly responds to concerns raised by Republicans and Democrats alike about unfair trade practices in China. It includes a "product-specific" safeguard that protects against import surges in any sector. It provides strong protections against "dumping" the sale of goods in our market below the producer's costs. And under the agreement, China must give up its practices - such as forced technology transfers and local content requirements - that drain jobs, investment and technology from the United States. It means that our businesses will be able to export to China from home, rather than being forced to set up factories in China to sell products there.

That is what this agreement means in principle. But just think about what it means in practice.

Look at the auto industry. Right now, a car made in Dearborn faces an 80 to 100 percent tariff before it can be sold in Shanghai --which prices us right out of the market. So if you want to sell cars in China, you actually have to go to China. And what you do is, you find a Chinese middle-man, either a state-run or private-run firm - because American firms aren't allowed to directly own anything in China - and you contract to have an equity stake in the company. But then, to sell your cars, the law says you have to teach the Chinese how to make them. So you have to transfer a huge amount of your technology to China, teach them how to use it, and then you leave it to them to make your cars -- which essentially means you are transferring both your product and your training to your eventual competitors. It's also against the law in China to import American car parts, so you have to work with Chinese vendors to set up components processors, and train them how to make those, too.

In addition, Americans are not allowed to run distribution centers in China, so once your parts are made, it is in the hands of the Chinese to sell those, too. Americans are not allowed to set up service centers, either. Since there is no real service industry, most Chinese buy cars with the understanding that they have to learn how to fix them too - if they can get the parts. Of course, all that assumes that the Chinese can buy the cars in the first place, because the only financing that is allowed in China is through state-run banks - and they don't make loans for cars. Little wonder that there are many times more bicycles in China than automobiles.

That's how it works now. Under the new agreement, it's completely different. Tariffs on American cars fall by 75 percent, so we can compete in Chinese markets. The requirement that we have to produce the cars in China is eliminated. So is the requirement that we have to transfer our own technology. What's more, American manufacturers will now be free to ship parts made in America into China, to set up their own distribution centers, and to run their own service shops - which means, for the first time, Chinese who buy cars will actually be able to get them fixed by the manufacturer. On top of all that, China also agreed to let American car companies like GM and Ford set up financing operations in China itself, to help Chinese citizens buy our cars.

From our perspective, it means that we're going to sell a lot more American-made and American-assembled cars in China, which means a lot more jobs in America. In return, the Chinese people end up with much better products at lower prices.

Take that example and multiply it out across all of our other industries - from manufacturing to high-tech to insurance to agriculture - and you begin to get an idea of how much this deal could mean to both the American and Chinese economies. You also realize it won't take long to see the balance on that trade deficit start shifting.

That is what America gets under the trade agreement we negotiated last fall. All we are required to do in return is to grant China permanent normal trade relations status, to bring China into the WTO. It's important to understand what that means: permanent NTR is not a favor to China, it is the best way to level the playing field. It is the same arrangement we have with the other 135 nations who are our partners in the WTO. It is the entry fee that nations pay to join the world trading system. And it is a reciprocal agreement (yes, China must also grant us PNTR) that means that each will give the other the same tariff schedule that applies to every other nation in the world. It simply means that we will give you the same tariff schedule we apply to every other nation in the world, and you will give us yours. If we do not do this, WTO rules do not apply to our access to the Chinese market.

Of course, passing permanent NTR with China does not mean that Congress is permanently barred from ever revisiting the issue of Chinese trade. Congress always has the authority to visit our trading relationships with any nation, as well as any other part of our relationship with China, and that's the way it should be. What it will do is get us out of the cycle we are now in, where the future of Chinese trade comes up for a vote every single year in Congress.

The economic benefits of this deal to America are clear: If Congress votes yes on PNTR, we will get open markets and more American jobs. If Congress votes no, it would deny American firms the ability to enter the Chinese market under WTO rules, and cancel the special import protections and vastly expanded trading rights that we negotiated. As a result, American farmers and firms would almost certainly be put at a tremendous competitive disadvantage against European and Japanese competitors as they stake out privileged positions in one of the 21st

Century's biggest markets. Without permanent NTR, America would become the only major country that gets left behind.

But that is not the end of the argument. This agreement is as vital to our national security as it is to our economic security.

As a nation, we have a tremendous stake in how China evolves. A large part of our future is tied to Asia. The stability of Asia - both economically and militarily - is tied directly to the stability of China, the largest nation in the world. As China develops, the light it shines or the shadow it casts will be felt very far from its own borders in the 21st Century.

Today, we face some fundamental questions: will China become an open, democratic society that respects the human rights and freedoms of all its people - or will it continue to operate behind a great wall of secrecy, repression, and fear? Will it come to grips with the need for economic reform to ensure its own viability in this increasingly globalized world - or will it be a nation unable to deal with its own problems, facing stagnation, even collapse from within? Will it become a constructive participant in the international community, contributing its wealth and strength to common global endeavors, or will it stay outside the system and threaten the freedom and security of its neighbors? Only China can answer those questions. But we have a stake in encouraging it to choose wisely. And bringing China into the WTO will help.

To understand why, we need to see China clearly - its progress and its problems, its system and its strains, its policies and its perceptions of us, of itself, and the world.

In the last 20 years, China has made remarkable progress in building a new economy, lifting more than 200 million people out of absolute poverty. But China faces many problems as well. Its working age population is increasing by more than 12 million people - equal to the population of New England - every year. Tens of millions of peasants are migrating from the countryside, where they see no future, to the city, where only some find work. China's political system has become riddled with corruption. Its environment is severely stressed, with crippling water shortages in the North. And China's economic growth has slowed just when it needs to be rising to create jobs for the unemployed and maintain support for economic reform.

For all the progress of China's reforms, private enterprise still accounts for less than 20 percent of its non-farm economy. State-held stock still accounts for 62 percent of all the equity issued by companies listed on China's stock exchange. Much of China's landscape is still dominated by unprofitable, polluting state industries. China state banks are still making massive loans to struggling state firms, the sector of the economy least likely to succeed.

Chinese top leaders understand that far reaching economic changes are needed, and in many ways they are trying to make them. They also know that in the short run, economic reform is likely to cause more unemployment, and risk social unrest. But so far they have been unwilling to open China's political system, because they see that as contributing to instability when, in fact, giving people a say in their decisions actually provides a peaceful outlet for expressing frustration.

What does this mean for us? As the President has said, "if we've learned anything in the last few years from Japan's long recession and Russia's current economic troubles, it is that the weaknesses of great nations can pose as big a challenge to America as their strengths. So as we focus on the potential challenge that a strong China could present to the United States in the future, let us not forget the risk of a weak China, beset by internal conflicts, social dislocation and criminal activity, large-scale illegal emigration, and loose nukes, becoming a vast zone of instability in Asia." Indeed, we've already begun to see in China some of the problems a society can face when it is moving away from the rule of fear, but not yet firmly rooted in the rule of law -- from the first stirrings of ethnic tensions to the rise of organized crime to the use of Chinese territory for drug trafficking.

Our interest lies in encouraging China to maintain stability and growth at home by meeting, not stifling, the growing demands of its people for openness and accountability. Bringing China into the WTO will help in three ways.

First, this is not simply an agreement to expand trade between our two countries. It will obligate China to deepen its market reforms, and empower leaders who want their country to move further and faster toward economic freedom.

One thing we have learned in the global economy is that nations can move from an agrarian society to a low-tech society fairly easily. But it's a much harder step to move from making textiles in a closed system to making cars and high-tech consumer products that people want to purchase. One example is South Korea, who tried to grow behind the walls of protection. When it opened its market, it collapsed, because it was making a lot of things that nobody wanted to buy.

Premier Zhu Rongji and other reform-minded leaders in China know the South Korea example well. They understand that opening their markets by lowering tariffs exposes China's state-run industries to competition, many of which will not be able to compete if they don't privatize. But they also understand that privatization is something China must do. With this agreement, they will also have the leverage to say: we must make this change to earn the full benefits of the WTO.

Let's go back to that auto industry example I gave a few minutes ago. The state run auto industry in China vehemently opposes this agreement. Why? Because it knows that when Ford and GM and Chrysler start to sell cars at competitive prices in the Chinese market, many state-run firms will go belly-up. They just can't compete with the technology that we have in our cars. But reformers in China are also betting that those firms which do adapt and survive -- like Honda did in Japan -- will become global players. At the same time, they also know that if they are going to develop into a 21st Century economy and compete in a globalized world, the Chinese need more than bicycles. As a society, they need the mobility that automobiles afford.

In some places, China has already seen the positive effects of competition. Six years ago, the American insurance giant AIG won the right to sell insurance in Shanghai. Almost immediately, it captured 30 percent of the market, because it offered services like life and risk insurance that Shanghai had never seen before. But it didn't take long for the Chinese to learn what kinds of insurance products you need in a market economy, and they diversified. Today, AIG has just 11 percent of the market, but it's a much bigger market. Meanwhile, tens of thousands of people in Shanghai enjoy the benefits of things like life insurance that they never had before. [NOTE: Check specifics of this example.]

The introduction of competition results in natural pressure for progress. A decade ago, China's best and brightest college graduates would seek jobs in the government, in large state-owned firms or state-run research institutions or universities. More and more, the best and brightest are either starting their own companies or choosing to work for foreign-invested companies -- where they generally get higher pay and a better work environment. They find that foreign-owned firms are more likely to reward employees for their achievement, and not their political connections.

Industry surveys show that U.S. companies are the leaders in the Chinese market in developing human resources -- by emphasizing teamwork and respect for invidividual rights. If we have learned anything in this country the past twenty years, it is that talent will flow to the places and companies where employees feel most valued. More and more, Chinese firms are learning that unless they change their working style and treat employees with respect, they will lose out in the critical war for talent. That process will only accelerate as China joins the WTO, and we should do all we can to encourage it.

Second, by accelerating economic change, the agreement we reached also has the potential to move China toward a more open and free society.

In the past, the Chinese state was employer, landlord, shopkeeper and news-provider all rolled into one. This agreement will accelerate a process that is already beginning to remove government from vast areas of people's lives.

Take Shanghai, for example, the city that has been most open to international influence. Ten years ago, it was illegal for people in China to own their own homes. Today, 25 percent of Shanghai residents are homeowners. Ten years ago, there were no supermarkets, and citizens had to buy food from state-run outlets using coupons. Today, there are more than 1,000 supermarkets and no more rationing of food. A decade ago, Chinese citizens could rarely travel in or out of their own country. Last year, on New Year's Day, airlines added more than 250 flights to international destinations from Shanghai alone.

None of this means that we should look at China through rose-colored glasses. We don't assume for a moment these kinds of developments mean that the people of Shanghai enjoy political freedom. Last week's announcement by Beijing that the government is cracking down on Internet use is the latest troubling reminder of its insecurity and fear of greater openness.

The fact that the Chinese government is pushing back against these changes only proves that the changes are real - and deeply threatening to the status quo. This kind of repression is not an argument for slowing down the effort to bring China into the world and promote the development of market forces in the domestic system; it's an argument for accelerating it.

This agreement will in fact bring the information revolution to cities and towns across China. A year ago, China had two million Internet users. Today, according to the Chinese government's own statistics, it has nine million.This agreement will open China's telecommunications market to American technology and American firms. Soon, people in some of the most remote villages in central China will have access to CNN. Indeed, some already do. And as they become more mobile, more prosperous, and more aware of alternative ways of life, they will seek a stronger voice in shaping their country's destiny.

This is the central irony of the change that China is undertaking today. In the information economy that China is moving toward, you cannot expect people to be creative economically and repressed politically. Nations that are finding success in the global economy are nations that encourage creative thinking and risk taking and social mobility, that are ruled by law, and that invest in education. They are also finding that people are far more willing to tolerate wrenching economic change when they have a say in the decisions that affect their lives -- just ask the former rulers of Indonesia. As China moves down the path of reform, eventually its leaders will face a moment of truth on the question of democracy. Bringing China into the WTO doesn't guarantee it will make the right choice. But by accelerating the process of economic change, it will force China to confront that choice sooner.

This agreement will advance our interests in a third way as well: it increases the chance that in the new century China will be on the inside of the international system, playing by the rules, instead of on the outside, denying them.

Under the terms of this agreement, the Chinese government is obliged to publish laws and regulations and subjects some of its most important decisions, for the first time, to the review of an international body. Why does that matter?

Quite simply, it allows us to bring international pressure to bear more effectively to influence China's policies. And it applies to China the basic principle at the heart of our concept of the rule of law: that governments cannot behave arbitrarily at home or abroad, that their actions are subject to limits and to rules consistently applied. As China begins to accept that principle, it will be more likely to respect international norms on everything from non-proliferation to trade to human rights. Remember, China is choosing to embrace these obligations, not having them forced on themselves. That in turn will lead to greater acceptance of international judgements of whether it is playing by the rules.

Of course, it's fair to ask: how do we know China will do what it promised to do in the agreement we signed? Of course, we cannot know for sure. But we do have reasons to believe that it will.

First, China is pledging to open its economy and its markets not just as a means of getting in the WTO, but because most of its leaders believe reform is in China's interest. I find it encouraging that in recent months the Chinese have asked for our advice and technical assistance to better understand and live up to the terms of the WTO agreement.

Second, as a member of the WTO, China must submit disputes to that body for adjudication. Unlike today, if China violates its trade responsibilities under the WTO it will confront judgments backed by a 135-member body, rather than being able to chalk up friction to supposed U.S. bullying. Right now, if China treats our products unfairly, we have no recourse, short of pulling the plug on trade. This agreement increases our leverage with China in the event of a future trade dispute on everything from intellectual property to dumping. And it gives the forces of reform within China greater leverage to press their government to move in the right direction.

I know some people are convinced that China simply cannot be trusted to live up to its agreements, and I probably won't be able to change their minds today. But I would ask them to reflect on a little history. In 1975, we signed the Helsinki Accords with the Soviet Union, even though we knew that country had no intention of meeting the human rights commitments it made in that treaty. Yet the agreement still gave ammunition to courageous critics of the Soviet regime, both inside and outside the country, and people like Andrei Sakharov and Vaclav Havel have said it contributed to its transformation.

Perhaps that is why Martin Lee, leader of Hong Kong's Democratic party supports the agreement we reached with China; he says that without entry to the WTO, "any hope for the political and reform process would also recede. And Chinese dissident Ren Wanding said upon the deal's completion: "Before, the sky was black. now it is light. This can be a new beginning."

Obviously, China's interests and ours will not always converge. But if we are going to move the World Trade Organization to a broader recognition of its mandate - particularly with regard to labor and environmental rights - China will need to be part of that effort. It would improve our leverage if China was on the inside looking out, rather than on the outside looking in.

Let me make very clear: this agreement alone is not a human rights policy. It cannot alone cannot bring all the change in China we seek. We must and will continue to speak out on behalf of the people in China who are persecuted for their political and religious beliefs. That is why we have worked for the release of key dissidents like Dickinson College librarian Song Yongyi, who was released just last week in Beijing. That's why we sponsored a resolution last year in the UN Human Rights Commission condemning China's human rights record last year and why we're doing it again this year. We will continue to press China to respect global norms on non-proliferation; to encourage a peaceful resolution of issues with Taiwan; to urge China to be part of the solution to the problem of global climate change.

How will China change? I believe it will be a combination of internal pressures for greater freedom and external validation of the human rights struggle by the international community. The WTO agreement will contribute to the former while we will maintain our leadership role in the latter. Our policy should no more be measured week to week or year to year than you could have measured our policy toward the Soviet Union - with which we continued to engage, even though it posed a much greater threat to us than China does today.

In other words, we must and will continue to protect our interests with firmness and candor. But we must do so without isolating China from the global forces empowering its people to build a better future. That would leave the Chinese people with less access to information, less contact with the democratic world, and more resistance from their government to outside influence and ideas. No one could possibly benefit from that except for the most rigid, anti-democratic elements in China itself. Let's not give them a victory by locking China out of the WTO.

The question is not whether or not this trade agreement will cure serious and disturbing issues of economic and political freedom in China; the issue is whether it will push things in the right direction. President Clinton believes it will. Some of the most courageous proponents of change in China agree. It is our shared conviction that supporting this agreement - and voting yes on permanent NTR for China -- is the right thing for America, and the right thing for China.

Let us have the wisdom to choose wisely. Thank you.

2/1/00 9:00 p.m.
Orzulak

NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR SAMUEL R. BERGER
REMARKS TO
THE WOODROW WILSON CENTER
ON CHINA
WASHINGTON, D.C.
FEBRUARY 2, 2000

Speaking to the Wilson Center is always a challenging prospect. It brings to mind the story of the man who lived through the famous Johnstown flood. All his life, this man would stop and tell everybody he met the story of how he survived. When he died and went to heaven, he asked St. Peter to convene a crowd so he could tell them about the great flood. St. Peter said, "I'd be happy to. But you have to remember one thing -- Noah will be in the audience."

There's more than one foreign policy Noah in this esteemed audience. Indeed, Lee Hamilton himself comes with an entire Ark. For 20 years, he brought a steady hand to foreign policy in Congress, with the emphasis always on patriotism, not partisanship. I thank him for that.

Last week in his State of the Union Address, the President gave a compelling summary of the challenges America will face in the 21st Century. Looking ahead, there's good reason for optimism. America is enjoying the longest economic expansion in its history. Our military strength is unchallenged. Our alliances are strong. Our values are ascendant. Eighty years after Woodrow Wilson hoped American leadership would help make the world safe for democracy -- more than half the world's people now live under governments of their own choosing.

But as the President said, this is not a world without dangers to us. Our security can be threatened by regional conflicts that pose the risk of a wider war. The march of technology can give terrorists and hostile nations the means to undermine our defenses, and force us to once again live in fear. The stability of the 21st Century can be threatened by an ever-widening gap between rich and poor. And of course, there is the possibility that our former adversaries Russia and China will fail to emerge in this century stable, prosperous, and democratic.

Today, I want to talk about China. Since President Nixon went to China in 1972, the United States has sought to develop a constructive relationship with Beijing, initially as a counterweight to the Soviet Union and later in recognition of China's growing importance in its own right. We have worked for the emergence of a China with an economy that is open to American products, farmers, and businesses. A China whose people have access to ideas and information. A China that upholds the rule of law at home and adheres to global rules on everything from nuclear non-proliferation to human rights to trade.

This year, we have an unprecedented opportunity to advance those goals. The opportunity, of course, is China's entry into the World Trade Organization.

But before America can realize the full market-opening benefits of Chinese entry into the WTO, Congress must answer a simple question: will it grant China permanent Normal Trade Relations status, which, in effect, is necessary to guarantee the full benefits of the agreement we negotiated with China, and the same arrangement we have given to 132 of the other 134 countries in the WTO? Or will Congress turn its back on the most sweeping changes China has agreed to make in decades and risk losing ground on the issues we all care about?

This will be an intense and important debate. There are legitimate concerns about China. So let me take a few minutes today to talk about why supporting this agreement - and permanent NTR for China -- is not only in our economic interest, but in our national security interest as well.

Every debate on trade must first answer the threshold question: will our economy and our workforce benefit from the terms we've negotiated, or will they suffer? From an economic perspective, there is no denying that this agreement strongly benefits the United States.

For years, China has had extraordinary access to our markets, while its markets have been in many ways closed to American products and services. Indeed, we ran a $63 billion trade deficit with China last year – our largest with any country. This agreement requires China to make sweeping new concessions to open its market to America, while we have simply agreed to maintain the market access policies we already apply to China by granting it permanent NTR. Denying China PNTR would simply risk depriving American companies and workers of the same favorable market access – and effective enforcement through WTO dispute settlement -- that our European, Japanese, and other competitors would have.

This agreement will dramatically reduce China's tariffs on everything from agricultural and industrial products to computers and semiconductors. It directly responds to concerns about unfair trade practices in China – from product dumping to technology transfers – and gives us protections against import surges from China that we have with regard to no other country. And it allows our businesses to export to China from home, and have their own distribution in China, rather than being forced to set up factories in China to sell products through Chinese control.

That is what this agreement means in principle. Here is what it means in practice.

Consider the auto industry. Right now, a car made in Dearborn faces an 80 to 100 percent tariff before it can be sold in China --which prices us out of the market. If you want to sell cars in China, you need to base your operations in China. To do that, you must form a joint venture with a Chinese middle-man, a state run enterprise and give them at least 51%. You also must to transfer a huge amount of your technology to China, and teach the Chinese how to use it -- which means you are transferring both your product and expertise to your eventual competitors. And because of local content requirements, most parts have to be made in China, too.

In addition, Americans cannot now directly run parts distribution centers in China, so once your parts are made, Chinese partners have to sell them for you. Americans are not allowed to directly own service centers, either. And all this assumes that Chinese consumers can buy the cars in the first place, because the only financing that is allowed in China is through state-run banks - and they don't make loans for cars. Little wonder that there are many times more bicycles in China than automobiles.

Under the new agreement, it's completely different. Tariffs on American cars fall by nearly 75 percent, so we can compete in Chinese markets. The requirement that we have to link up with Chinese enterprises is eliminated. So is the requirement that we have to transfer our technology. And, American manufacturers will now be free to use parts made in America for assembly in China, to set up their own distribution centers, to run their own service shops, and to provide their own financing to consumers.

From our perspective, it means that we're going to sell a lot more American cars in China, which means more jobs in America. In return, the Chinese people end up with much better products at lower prices. Take that example and multiply it out across all of our other industries - from manufacturing to high-tech to insurance to agriculture - and you begin to get an idea of what this agreement could mean to both our economies.

For our part, we must grant China permanent normal trade relations status. It's important to understand what that means: it simply means that we will give China the same tariff schedule we apply to most every other nation in the world, and China will do likewise. It would eliminate the annual vote on China MFN, which we do not apply to any other WTO member. Some have said we need the annual vote to address other concerns we have with China, on human rights, proliferation, or religious freedom. Congress always has the authority to address any part of our relationship with any nation, as well as any other part of our relationship with China or any other country. The annual MFN vote has not been an effective instrument. It has simply affirmed our trading relationship with China for ten years in a row. In many ways, denying China normal tariffs, because it has such a dramatic effect on us as well as them, makes it an ineffective remedy. What it will do is get us out of the cycle we are now in, where the future of Chinese trade comes up for a vote every single year in Congress.

The economic benefits of this deal to America are clear. If Congress votes no, we risk losing the full, enforceable market access benefits of the agreement, as well as the special protections we negotiated. On a global economy, where global markets are essential, American businesses and workers would be put at an enormous disadvantage, essentially hobbled with one fifth of the world. It would be a self-inflicted wound that would hurt the economic health of America.

For me, the economic benefits are only the beginning of the argument, not the end. For I am convinced that it is as vital to our national security as it is to our economic security.

Our nation has a tremendous stake in how China evolves. Our future is substantially tied to Asia. The stability of Asia – economically, politically and militarily - is inextricably entwined with the stability and direction of China. As China develops, the path it illuminates or the shadow it casts will be felt very far from its own borders.

China will write that future as it answers some fundamental questions: It has extended some freedoms -- but will it gain the stability that can only come from respecting human rights and permitting opposing political voices to be heard -- and felt? It is reforming its economy -- but will it unleash the necessary ingredient of sustained growth in the information age – namely access to knowledge and unfettered thought? It has become deeply engaged in the international community -- but will it make a broad commitment to play by global rules and do its part to address global challenges like the spread of weapons of mass destruction and climate change? It is growing stronger -- but will it use that strength to build a more secure Asia, or to threaten the freedom and security of its neighbors? Ultimately, the answers will come from China. But we have a enormous stake in encouraging it to choose the path of integration and reform, not confrontation and decline. And bringing China into the WTO will make a difference.

To understand why, we need to have a clear-eyed view of China clearly, neither looking through rose-colored glasses or through the glass darkly. We need to look -- its progress and its problems, its system and its strains, its policies and its perceptions of us, of itself, and the world.

In the last 20 years, China has made remarkable progress in building a new economy, lifting more than 200 million people out of absolute poverty. One incredible result is that China now has the largest wireless communications network in the world, and is linking so many consumers to one another it is adding the equivalent of a new Baby Bell every year.

But China faces daunting problems as well. Its working age population is increasing by more than 12 million people - equal to the population of New England - every year. Tens of millions of peasants are migrating from the countryside, where they see no future, to the city, where only some find work. China's political system has become plagued by corruption. Its air is so dirty that 25 percent of all deaths in China over the age of five come from chronic respiratory disease, four times the rate of the United States. And China's economic growth has slowed just when it needs to be rising to create jobs for the unemployed and maintain support for economic reform.

For all the progress of China's reforms, private enterprise still accounts for less than one-third of its GDP. China's state banks still are making massive loans to struggling state firms, the sector of the economy least likely to succeed.

China's top leaders understand that economic change is both essential and risky. They are risky because opening China's antiquated economy to global competition is likely to cause more short-term unemployment and the specter of social unrest. But, interestingly, they also understand that this change is essential because China cannot make the next leap in development without world-class industries and products that can compete in the global economy. And the only way to produce competitive industries is to open the country to outside competition. In other words, China simply cannot ensure stability by maintaining the status quo.

What does this mean for us? As the President said when Premier Zhu Rongji visited Washington last year, "if we've learned anything in the last few years from Japan's long recession and Russia's current economic troubles, it is that the weaknesses of great nations can pose as big a challenge to America as their strengths." So as we focus on the potential challenges that a strong China could present to the United States in the future, let us not forget the risks that could be posed by a weak China, beset by internal conflicts, social dislocation, criminal activity, and large-scale illegal emigration -- a vast zone of instability in Asia.

Our interest lies in encouraging both stability and change in China by encouraging it to meet, not stifle, the growing demands of its people for openness, accountability, freedom and reform. Bringing China into the WTO will help in each way.

First, this is not just an agreement to expand trade between our two countries. It will obligate China to deepen its market reforms and open its society to the world. It will increase the pace of change.

Those Chinese leaders who are reform-minded understand that lowering tariffs and other barriers exposes China's state-run industries to competition; many will not be able to compete without fundamental changes in ownership and management. But they also understand that forcing firms to compete is something China must do to sustain its growth. With this WTO agreement, they have chosen to continue opening their economy, despite the risks that path entails. Do we really want to reject that choice?

The introduction of competition results in natural pressure for progress. A decade ago, China's best and brightest college graduates sought jobs in the government, in large state-owned firms or state-run research institutions or universities. More and more, the best and brightest either are starting their own companies or choosing to work for foreign-invested companies -- where they generally get higher pay, a better work environment, and a chance to get ahead based on merit, not political connections.

Industry surveys show that U.S. companies are the leaders in the Chinese market in developing human resources -- by emphasizing teamwork and respect for individual rights. In turn, more and more, Chinese firms are learning that unless they change their working style and treat employees with respect, they will lose out in the competition for top talent. This process will only accelerate as China joins the WTO, and we should do all we can to encourage it, because it will lift the standards of Chinese workers – and their expectations.

Second, by accelerating economic change, the agreement we reached also has the potential to encourage China to evolve into a more open and free society.

In ways that are halting, incomplete, but nonetheless real for millions of ordinary Chinese citizens, China's economic opening already has given its people greater scope to live their lives. Take Shanghai, for example, the city that has been most open to international influence. Ten years ago, it was illegal for people in China to own their own homes. Today, 25 percent of Shanghai residents are homeowners. Ten years ago, there were no supermarkets, and citizens had to buy food from state-run outlets using coupons. Today, there are more than 1,000 supermarkets and no more rationing of food. A decade ago, Chinese citizens could rarely travel in or out of their own country. Last year, on New Year's Day, airlines added more than 250 flights to international destinations from Shanghai alone. Nationwide, China has seen the emergence of more than 200,000 professional associations, consumer groups, tenant organizations, environmental groups; a 2,500 percent explosion of print and broadcast media over the past 25 years; and local elections in the vast majority of the country's 900,000 villages.

Let us understand very clearly: these changes do not mean that the people of China enjoy political freedom. Chinese authorities still tolerate no organized political dissent or opposition, and no challenge to the Communist Party. Over the past year, we have see an increase in its crackdown on political activities and dissent; stepped-up controls on unregistered churches; the suppression of ethnic minority groups, especially Tibetans; and the imprisonment of even more dissidents whose only crime is free expression and free speech. Because the Communist Party's ideology has largely been discredited in China, and because it lacks the legitimacy that can only come from democratic choice, it seeks to maintain its grip by suppressing other voices.

So let me make very clear: This agreement is not, by itself, a human rights policy for the United States. We must and we will continue to speak out on behalf of the people in China who are persecuted for their political and religious beliefs. That is why we worked hard for the release of Dickinson College librarian Song Yongyi, who was released just last week. That's why we sponsored a resolution last year in the UN Human Rights Commission condemning China's human rights record and why we're doing it again this year. We will continue to press China to respect global norms on non-proliferation; to encourage a peaceful resolution of issues with Taiwan; to urge China to be part of the solution to the problem of global climate change.

We must continue to work in all these areas. Constant pressure is required in all these areas. The fact is that bringing the China into the WTO is not a human rights policy -- it is one part of a larger strategy to engage China in every forum on every front -- but it will reinforce and complement those efforts, and move China in the right direction.

liberaln

how get back into it.

In the past, the Chinese state was every citizens' employer, landlord, shopkeeper, and news provider all rolled into one. By advancing privatization, this agreement will accelerate a process that is removing government from vast areas of people's lives.

By giving investors and property owners predictability and protection against arbitrary government action, it reinforces the idea that individuals have rights. This will give added impetus to those trying to strengthen the Chinese legal system in a way that allows citizens to hold their government truly accountable.

Finally, by opening China's telecommunications market to cutting-edge American technology and international firms, the WTO agreement will help bring the information revolution to cities and towns across China. A year ago, China had two million Internet users. Today, it has nine million. Soon, people in some of the most remote villages in interior China will have access to CNN. And as they become more mobile, more prosperous, and more aware of alternative ways of life, I believe they will seek a stronger voice in shaping their destiny..

Of course, just last week, Beijing announced that it was cracking down on the Internet. When you think about it, it's outrageous -- but it's also futile. In this information age, cracking down on the Internet is like trying to nail Jello to a wall [or like King Canute trying to still the waters]. Indeed, the fact that the Chinese government is pushing back against the increasing flow of information to the Chinese people only proves that the changes China is undergoing are real and deeply threatening to the status quo. This kind of repression is not an argument for slowing down the effort to bring China into the world; it's an argument for accelerating it.

In the end, Chinese leaders must come to understand: as China opens to the information economy, it can succeed only as it liberates the minds of their people and empowers the individual. In this age, you cannot expect people to be creative economically and frozen politically. Nations that are finding success in the global economy encourage creative thinking and risk taking. And the more people are educated, the more they tend to think for themselves.

It is also true that nations that adjust best to the global economy discover that people are far more willing to tolerate wrenching economic change when they have a say in the decisions that affect their lives. Compare the fates of the governments of an autocratic Indonesia and a democratic South Korea as they faced the Asian financial crisis. Bringing China into the WTO doesn't guarantee it will make the right choice for political reform. But by accelerating the process of economic change, it will force China to confront that choice sooner, and make the imperative for that choice far more powerful.

How will China change? I believe it will be a combination of internal pressures for a greater voice and external validation of the human rights struggle by the international community. The WTO agreement will contribute to the internal forces while we must maintain our leadership role in the latter. Our policy should no more be measured week to week or year to year than you could have measured our policy toward the Soviet Union - with which we continued to engage, even though it posed a much greater threat to us than China does today.

<u>This agreement will advance our national security interests in a third way as well: it increases the chance that in the new century China will be on the inside of the international system, playing by the rules, instead of on the outside, denying them.</u>

Under the terms of this agreement, the Chinese government is obliged to publish laws and regulations. It subjects some of its most important decisions, for the first time, to the review of an international body. Why does that matter?

Quite simply, it applies to China the basic principle at the heart of the concept of the rule of law: that governments cannot behave arbitrarily at home or abroad, that their actions are subject to limits and to rules consistently applied. Remember, China is choosing to embrace these obligations. As China becomes a stakeholder in the WTO and other international regimes, it will be more likely to accept the legitimacy of international norms, and define its future within the international community, not outside of it.

I know some say that if China is allowed to join the WTO, it actually will undermine our effort to strengthen global norms in two very important areas: labor rights and the environment. But the fact is, most of the members of the WTO already are developing countries, with the same concerns that these norms not become an instrument to restrict their growth. China's membership won't change that equation. And considering the fact that China is home to one-fifth of the world's workers and the source of a rising share of greenhouse gas emissions, it is hard to imagine an effective global effort to meet these challenges without China. Trying to make necessary progress on labor and the environment in a global system that does not include China would be like building a house with a roof that covers just four-fifths of the rooms.

It's fair to ask: how do we know China will do what it promised to do in the agreement we signed? Of course, we cannot know for sure. But we do have reasons to believe that it will, and mechanisms to reinforce that.

First, China is pledging to open its economy and its markets not just as a means of getting in the WTO, but because most of its leaders believe reform is in China's interest.

Second, as a member of the WTO, non-compliance by China is subject to dispute resolution. under the WTO; like any other country, China will confront judgments backed by a 135-member body, rather than being able to chalk up friction to supposed U.S. bullying. Right now, if China treats our products unfairly, we have no recourse, short of pulling the plug on trade. This agreement increases our leverage with China in the event of a future trade dispute. If China does not comply with adverse rulings by the WTO, we are entitled to take equivalent action against China. And this process gives the forces of reform within China greater leverage to insist that China move in the right direction.

In the end, we must and will continue to protect our interests with firmness and candor. But we must do so without isolating China from the global forces that can empower its people to build a better future. That would leave the Chinese people with less access to information, less contact with the democratic world, and more resistance from their government to outside influence and ideas. No one could possibly benefit from that except for the most rigid, anti-democratic elements in China itself. Let's not give them a victory by locking China out of the WTO.

The question is not whether or not this trade agreement by itself will cure serious and disturbing issues of economic and political freedom in China; the issue is whether it will push things in the right direction. President Clinton believes it will. Some of the most courageous proponents of change in China agree. Martin Lee, leader of Hong Kong's Democratic party, says that without entry to the WTO, "any hope for the political and reform process would also recede. And Chinese dissident Ren Wanding [NOTE: CHECK PRONUNCIATION] said upon the deal's completion: "Before, the sky was black. now it is light. This can be a new beginning."

It is our shared conviction that supporting this agreement is a new beginning. It is the right thing for America, for China, for Asia, and for the world. It will move China toward defining its future within the international community, and toward a more open, prosperous, and eventually democratic society. That is what is at stake in this debate. Let us have the wisdom to choose wisely. Thank you.

FAX

Date: 2/2/00 4:27 PM

Number of pages including cover sheet: 3

To: Paul Orzulak

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CC:

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Fax phone: 202-401 2325

REMARKS: ☐ Urgent ☒ For your review ☐ Reply ASAP ☐ Please comment

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Jean Buie

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

To: David Castignetti

Fr: Paul Orzulak

Pgs: 9

Re: Berger's China Speech from yesterday. Call me at 456-9378 with any questions. See you next Friday.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

To: David Castignetti

Fr: Paul Orzulak

Pgs: 9

Re: Berger's China Speech from yesterday. Call me at 456-9378 with any questions. See you next Friday.

It's hard to sell cars in China. Right now, a car made in America faces up to a 100 percent tariff before it can be sold in China, which prices us out of the market. To sell there, you have to base your operations in China. To do that, you must form a joint venture with a Chinese state-run enterprise, and give it at least a 51 percent stake. You must also agree to transfer a huge amount of your technology to China, and teach the Chinese how to use it. Because of local content law, most parts have to be made in China, too. Americans are also barred from directly running and owning distribution centers or service stations. And the only financing allowed it through state-run banks -- and they don't make loans for cars.

Under an agreement the United States negotiated last fall to bring China into the World Trade Organization, all of this will change. Tariffs will fall by nearly 75 percent, so we can compete in Chinese markets. Americans will no longer be forced to set up factories in China to sell in China – nor will we be forced to partner with Chinese middle-men, or transfer technology. And, American manufacturers will now be free to use parts made in America for assembly in China, to set up their own distribution centers and service shops, and provide their own financing to consumers. It means we're going to sell a lot more American cars and auto parts in China, which means a lot more jobs here at home.

Take that example and multiply it across all of our other industries – from agriculture to manufacturing – and you begin to get an idea of what this agreement could mean to the economies of both of our countries. The remarkable thing is it is largely a one-way street. It requires China to make wide-ranging new concessions to open its markets – but all America is required to do is maintain the market access we already apply to China.

It's hard to sell cars in China. Right now, a car made in America faces an 80 to 100 percent tariff before it can be sold in China, which prices us out of the market. To sell there, you have to base your operations in China. To do that, you need to form a joint venture with a Chinese state-run enterprise, and give it at least a 51 percent stake. You must also agree to transfer a huge amount of your technology to China, and teach the Chinese how to use it. Because of local content law, most parts have to be made in China, too. Americans are also barred from directly running distribution centers and owning service centers. And the only financing availab

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February 3, 2000

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TO:	**Paul Orzulak**
FROM:	**Jack H. Danielson** **Legislative Assistant**
SUBJECT:	**PNTR Article**
NUMBER OF PAGES INCLUDING COVER SHEET:	**2**

COMMENTS:

Albright, Madeline	State	Secretary of State	Accepts
Barshefsky, Charlene	USTR	USTR Ambassador	Accepts
Bartz, Carol	CEO	Autodesk	Accepts
Beach, Roger	CEO	Unocal	Regrets
Benhamou, Eric	CEO	3Com	Accepts
Bereuter, Rep. Douglas	SCH	US Congress	Accepts
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Berman, Rep. Howard	LEG	US Congress	Accepts
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Bornstein, Steven	CEO	ABC	Regrets
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Campbell, Lewis	CEO	Textron	Accepts
Capellas, Michael	CEO	Compaq	Regrets
Carpenter, Candice	CEO	Ivillage	Accepts
Case, Steve	CEO	AOL	Accepts
Chambers, John	CEO	Cisco	Regrets
Clark, Gen. Wesley	DEF	US Defense Department	Regrets
Coehlo, Paul	EOP		Accepts
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Daley, Mayor Richard	IGA	Chicago	Accepts
Daley, Sec. William	DOC	Secretary of Commerce	Accepts
Deavenport, Earnest	CEO	Eastman Chemical	Accepts
Dell, Michael	CEO	Dell Computers	Accepts
DiCamillo, Gary	CEO	Polaroid	Accepts
Diller, Barry	CEO	USA Networks	Regrets
Dillon, John	CEO	Intl.Paper	Accepts
Dodd, Sen. Chris	LEG	US Senate	Accepts
Donohue, Thomas	CEO	USCham	Accepts
Dreyer, Rep. David	LEG	US Congress	Accepts
Duncan, Charles	State	US State Department	Accepts
Dunn, Rep. Jennifer	LEG	US Congress	Accepts
Edelman, Richard	CEO	Edelman Worldwide	Accepts
Enrico, Roger	CEO	PepsiCo	Accepts
Ferguson, Robert	FED	Federal Reserve	Accepts
Ford, Bill	CEO	Ford Motor Company	Accepts
Gates, Bill	CEO	Microsoft	Regrets
Gilmartin, Raymond	CEO	Merck	Accepts
Gordan, Scott	CEO	ChicMerc	Accepts
Gorman, Joseph	CEO	TRW	Accepts
Grasso, Dick	CEO	NYSE	Accepts
Greenberg, Jack	CEO	McDonald's	Accepts
Harkin, Ruth	CEO	UTC - Washington	Accepts
Harkin, Sen. Tom	LEG	US Senate	Accepts
Hazelton, Richard	CEO	Dow Corning	Accepts
Henney, Jane	FDA	Commissioner, FDA	Accepts
Jager, Durk	CEO	P&G	Accepts

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Jones, Robert Trent	CEO	RTJ	
Kennard, Bill	FCC	Chair, FCC	Accepts
Keough, Donald	CEO	Blackstone Group	Accepts
Kerry, Sen. John	LEG	US Senate	Accepts
Klein, Joel	JUS	US Justice Department	Accepts
Knight, Philip	CEO	Nike	Accepts
Kolbe, Rep. Jim	LEG	US Congress	Accepts
Koogle, Tim	CEO	Yahoo	Accepts
Lane, Raymond	COO	Oracle	Accepts
Lay, Kenneth	CEO	Enron	Accepts
Lazarus, Shelly	CEO	Ogilvy & Mather	Accepts
Leach, Rep. Jim	LEG	US Congress	Accepts
Leavitt, Arthur	SEC	Chair, SEC	Accepts
Levin, Rep. Sandy	LEG	US Congress	Accepts
Mandl, Alex	CEO	Teligent	Regrets
Markey, Rep. Edward	LEG	US Congress	Accepts
Matsui, Rep. Bob	LEG	US Congress	Accepts
Medavoy, Mike	CEO	Phoenix Pictures	Accepts
Meyer, Laurance	FED	Federal Reserve	Accepts
Minor, Halsey	CEO	CNET	
Ornish, Dean	EOP		Accepts
Ornish, Molly	EOP		Accepts
Paulson, Henry	CEO	Goldman Sachs	Regrets
Pritzker, Thomas	CEO	Hyatt	Accepts
Raines, Frankin	CEO	Fannie Mae	Accepts
Rattner, Steven	CEO	Lazard Freres	Accepts
Reddy, Raj	NEC		Accepts
Redstone, Sumner	CEO	Viacom	Accepts
Richardson, Sec. Bill	DOE	Secretary of Energy	Accepts
Ridge, Governor Tom	IGA	Pennsylvania	Accepts
Riederer, Richard	CEO	Weirton Steel	Accepts
Robbins, Liz	CEO	Robbins Associates	Accepts
Roedy, Bill	CEO	MTV	Accepts
Ross, John	CEO	Deutsche Bank	Accepts
Rubin, Jamie	State	US State Department	Accepts
Sanger, Stephen	CEO	General Mills	Accepts
Schmidt, Eric	CEO	Novell	Accepts
Schwarzman, Stephen	CEO	Blackstone Group	Regrets
Shapiro, Robert	CEO	Monsanto	Regrets
Shocas, Elaine	State	US State Department	Accepts
Siebel, Thomas	CEO	Siebel Systems	
Soros, George	CEO	Soros Management	Accepts
Stamas, George	CEO	Deutsche Bank	Accepts
Stein, James	CEO	Flour Global Services	
Summers, Sec. Larry	TREA	Secretary of the Treasury	Accepts
Sweeney, John	EOP	AFL-CIO	Accepts
Temeer, Henri	CEO	Genzyme Corporation	Regrets
Trujillo, Solomon	CEO	US West	
Tyson, Laura		Haas School of Business	Accepts

Steigenberger Belvedere
Spina Room Reception

Ware, Carl	CEO	Coca-Cola	Accepts
Weisel, Elie	EOP	Boston University	Accepts
Weisel, Marion	EOP	Boston University	Accepts
Weitzen, Jeffrey	CEO	Gateway	Accepts
Whittman, Governor Christine	IGA	New Jersey	Accepts
Winnick, Gary	CEO	Global Crossing	Accepts
Wolfensohn, Jim	EOP	World Bank	Accepts
Zegna, Gildo	CEO	Ermenegildo Zegna	Accepts
Zuckerman, Mort	CEO	US News & World Report	Accepts

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004. report	Timesheet (1 page)	02/02/2000	P6/b(6)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Speechwriting (Paul Orzulak)
OA/Box Number: 4022

FOLDER TITLE:

China [Folder 1] [3]

2008-0702-F
jm194

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]