

FOIA MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the William J. Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Collection/Record Group: Clinton Presidential Records

Subgroup/Office of Origin: Counsel Office

Series/Staff Member: Chris Cerf

Subseries:

OA/ID Number: 6975

FolderID:

Folder Title:

Personnel Security Miscellaneous : Senate QFRs [Question for the Record] Drafts and Date [1]

Stack:

S

Row:

107

Section:

2

Shelf:

11

Position:

2

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. list	re: Personnel (4 pages)	04/29/1994	b(6)
002. list	re: Personnel (11 pages)	05/02/1994	b(6)
003. list	re: Personnel (21 pages)	05/02/1994	b(6)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
Counsel Office
Chris Cerf
OA/Box Number: 6975

FOLDER TITLE:

Personnel Security Miscellaneous - Senate QFRs [Question for the Record] Drafts and
Date [1]

2006-1066-F

iml369

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]


C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]



Compensation
Correspond

PROFS

Personnel Security

SENATE QTR

Security Review Draft
+ Draft

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
SECURITY CLEARANCE / PASS STATISTICS

03-May-94 17:32

03 May 94
CRAIG DID NOT PRO [REDACTED] UPDATED
#5 ON ALL HIS [REDACTED] SO
THESE COULD BE BETTER. — Matt

AGENCY	Number of Staff incl. detailees	No. of Perm. Passes Issued	Adjudicated Backgrounds Awaiting	Adjudicated Backgrounds Pending	Pending Background Investigations	Awaiting Paperwork	No. New Staff Last 30 Days
White House Office	427	302 311	167	46	67	14	
Office of Policy Development	52	26	4	1	10	5	
Council on Environmental Quality	6	5		0	1	0	
Executive Residence	89	89	0	0	0	0	
Office of the Vice President	26	21 +1	10	3	0	1	
National Security Council	144	112	3	8	21	0	
Office of Nat'l Drug Control Policy	23	18		1	4	0	
Office of Science & Tech Policy	41	26		9	6	0	
Council of Economic Advisers	34	28		3	3	0	
Office of Administration	186	171 179		5	4	0	
TOTAL	1028	804 815	36	52	116	20	
		78.2% 80.0%	4.5%	5.1%	11.3%	1.9%	

Various Totals of Statistics

	Total Perm+BI+ No. of Staff Await BI + No Paper	Total Pending or Await. Paper
White House Office	427	81
Office of Policy Development	52	15
Council on Environmental Quality	6	1
Executive Residence	89	0
Office of the Vice President	26	1
National Security Council	144	21
Office of Nat'l Drug Control Policy	23	4
Office of Science & Tech Policy	41	6
Council of Economic Advisers	34	3
Office of Administration	186	4
TOTAL	1028	136
		13.2%

— 505
20
—
485

3 SP
442 =

DeCONCINI

1. What type of security or ethics training is given to White House employees? Is this done when they are in a temporary position or permanent position?

Every employee in the Executive Office of the President, whether permanent or temporary, is required to receive annual ethics training. Additionally, individuals who are detailed to the White House from other agencies are encouraged to attend the White House ethics training sessions.

The ethics briefings are one hour in length and cover the conflict of interest statutes, the Executive Branch standards of conduct regulations, and White House policies. Employees are given the opportunity to ask questions and are provided with written materials, including the names and telephone numbers of White House ethics officials.

In accordance with a regulatory requirement, the White House has an ethics training plan on file with the Office of Government Ethics.

Prior to the issuance of a permanent pass, all EOP employees (and detailees) are briefed on security procedures and the appropriate handling of classified information. Under current procedures, all EOP employees receive the briefing within 60 days of their start date. The same principles are reiterated in written materials distributed to all White House staff. Every individual who is cleared for access to compartmented information receives an additional one-on-one security briefing.

2. Is the NSC at all involved in overseeing the protection of classified documents at the White House?

The NSC staff does not "oversee" any aspect of the White House, including practices and procedures for the protection of classified information. Pursuant to its responsibility to advise and assist the President in the area of national security, NSC staff are subject to, and observe, those rules pertaining to the safeguarding of national security information applicable to all government employees, including special restrictions on the handling of compartmented information. All NSC employees with permanent or temporary White House passes hold a **TOP SECRET** clearance with SCI access.

U.C. U.C. *L. Call the rest*

3. With reference to the number of background investigations not yet completed on White House, Vice Presidential and Office of Policy Development employees, can you tell us:

(a) How many have been fully investigated by the FBI?

~~May 3~~ 37
As of ~~April 26~~, 1994, there were 68 employees of the White House Office, Office of the Vice President and Office of Policy Development whose FBI background investigations have been completed but who have not yet received their permanent passes.

(b) How many are at the White House pending transfer to the Secret Service for permanent past requests? How long have they been there.

~~May 3~~ 26
As of ~~April 26~~, 1994, there were 26 employees of the White House Office, Office of Vice President and Office of Policy Development whose FBI background investigation is complete, but whose file has not yet been forwarded to the Secret Service.

(c) How many background investigations have not yet been initiated due to the paperwork not being complete?

~~May 3~~ 20
As of ~~April 26~~, 1994, 20 employees of the WHO, OVP and OPD had not submitted the paperwork necessary to initiate the FBI background investigation. All such individuals began work within the previous 30 days and are, therefore, in compliance with the Chief of Staff's directive that all security related paperwork be completed within 30 days of employment.

(d) How many are not yet back from the FBI?

~~May 3~~
As of ~~April 26~~, 1994, there were 77 employees of the WHO, OVP and OPD whose FBI investigations have been initiated by the FBI, but are not yet complete.

(e) How many backgrounds have been requested by the White House which been at the FBI for longer than 45 days?

~~May 3~~
As of ~~April 26~~, 1994, there were 23 individuals employed by the White House Office whose background investigation has been pending at the FBI for more than 45 days. There are three such individuals employed by the OPD and none employed by OVP.

(f) What is the status of these investigations?

These investigations are pending.

- (g) Could you tell the Committee where this Administration is vis-a-vis the background investigations on its employees versus the previous Administrations?

The White House does not maintain records that would permit a precise comparison. It is our understanding that, at present, the time frame for issuing permanent passes (including completion of background investigations) is comparable to that of previous administrations.

- (h) What is your plan to eliminate the backlog of employees who have temporary passes?

359 As the result of a comprehensive review undertaken by White House Counsel's Office, the backlog has been substantially reduced. At present, 289 WHO, OVP, and OPD employees (or detailees) have received a permanent pass. Of those still holding a temporary pass, a substantial number began work since January 1, 1994. If such new arrivals are factored out, over 76% of all such employees and detailees have their permanent pass. 81%

As these figures reflect, the current procedures have addressed certain operational inefficiencies, which had contributed to a backlog. Employees now receive a permanent pass, on average, within 120 days of their start date. While precise data are not available, issuing passes in that time frame compares favorably with the record of past administrations.

4. With reference to access to top-secret security information, it is my understanding that at the White House, once a favorable full-field background investigation has been completed by the FBI, that an individual has access to up to top-secret information on a "need-to-know" basis, which is determined by the White House Chief of Staff.

- (a) Ms. Thomasson, can you tell us how the Chief of Staff makes a determination as to whether or not an individual has a "need-to-know" for access to classified information?

This determination is not made by the Chief of Staff. It is the responsibility of the person who wishes to share classified information with another individual to ascertain whether he or she (1) has the appropriate security clearance and (2) truly has a "need to know." All White House employees are advised that, when in doubt, they should contact the White House Personnel Security Office to verify the level of any given individual's security clearance.

- (b) Which intelligence community agency, if any, reviews these full-field backgrounds prior to any individual being given access to classified information?**

White House employees with Top Secret security clearances are eligible for SCI access. This access is only provided where an employee has a specific need to know the relevant compartmented information and the CIA (on behalf of the DCI) has considered the employee's background investigation and approved such access. In the case of government employees detailed to the White House (including the NSC), SCI access may already have been approved by the detailing agency, which certifies such clearance to the White House or NSC before that employee is given SCI access at the White House.

- 5. It seems to me that many people within the White House may have access to classified documents and briefings, which go well beyond the "top secret" classification.**

- (a) Do any individuals at the White House have security clearances which exceed top secret? Can you identify those individuals for me?**

Some White House employees hold Top Secret clearances with access to Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI). It would not be appropriate to identify such individuals.

- (b) What process ensures that others who do not possess security clearances do not have access to classified information above the top secret level?**

A number of procedures and policies guard against the unauthorized disclosure of classified information. Most significantly, it is the responsibility of the person who wishes to share classified information with another individual to ascertain whether he or she (1) has the appropriate security clearance and (2) truly has a "need to know." That fundamental principle is explained in detail in the security briefing all White House staff are required to attend and reiterated in written materials distributed to the entire staff. (Individuals with clearance to review compartmented information are given an additional one-on-one briefing on security precautions.) In addition, all White House employees are advised that disclosure of classified information to unauthorized persons may result in criminal prosecution and that, when in doubt about a potential recipient of classified information, they should contact the White House Personnel Security Office to verify the level of his or her security clearance.

- (c) Do any individuals, who are not employed by the White House have access to classified information?

Some individuals detailed from other federal agencies (e.g. the Department of Defense) have access to classified information on a need to know basis. (All such individuals have an appropriate security clearance.) In addition, a limited number of contractors have been granted security clearances. All such individuals have (1) been the subject of a full field FBI background check and (2) received a security briefing.

- (d) What system of controls do you have in place at the White House that ensures that sensitive classified information is secure?

Please see response to Subpart (b) above.

D'AMATO

6. How many detailees are in positions that would require security clearances? How many detailees have security clearances? Do any members of the First Lady's staff require security clearances?

A number of detailees come to the White House with a security clearance. Even if they already have a clearance, however, detailees who are at the White House for more than 90 days are subject to a full field FBI background investigation. Detailees are covered by the same rules governing access to classified information as are other employees. Members of the First Lady's staff, like other White House employees, are authorized to have access to Top Secret information on a "need to know basis" only upon favorable adjudication of their background investigations. While such situations do arise, members of the First Lady's staff do not routinely have a "need" for access to classified information.

7. Chief of Staff Mack McLarty has referred to "non-governmental persons who render regular services to the Administration" that work in the White House. Please define a "non-governmental person" and provide a breakdown of how many there are, or have been since the Administration has taken office. How many of these "non-governmental persons" require security clearances, and how many have obtained them?

The term "nongovernmental persons," when used to refer to people with access to the White House, includes contractors and political advisors. ~~A limited number of~~ ^{ACCESS} contractors have been

Fifty Four

*order the same back from I am not approximately 50
at least, and, on that basis would have access to C.I.*

if they had a need to feel seen. As a
facial math the need for seen seen 17 feet
is unusual.

to classified information or a need to know basis ~~all such individuals have~~ *Such access is granted only after*
~~granted security clearances after~~ satisfactory adjudication of their background investigations. Political advisors with regular access to the White House undergo full field background investigations, but no political advisor presently has access to classified information.

INSERT: SENATOR DECONCINI

What is the average number of individuals in the "pipeline" for security clearances?

Under present procedures, it takes, on average, 120 days from an employee's start date to the day he or she is issued a permanent pass. The number of individuals in the "pipeline" depends on the number of new hires and detailees during the period in question. As a working estimate, the White House Personnel Security Office projects that, at any given time, approximately 15% of all EOP employees will be in the pipeline.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. list	re: Personnel (4 pages)	04/29/1994	b(6)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
Counsel Office
Chris Cerf
OA/Box Number: 6975

FOLDER TITLE:

Personnel Security Miscellaneous - Senate QFRs [Question for the Record] Drafts and
Date [1]

2006-1066-F
jm1369

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

16 + 1 + 3
W H O O V

OGEs
Hacked
Against the 1044
+ OMB
+ USTR

This document has been compiled by the Personnel Management Division, Office of Administration, Executive Office of the President, and contains both private and personal information on employees within the White House Office and/or associated offices. Its contents are under control of the White House Office, Executive Office of the President, and is provided for YOUR OFFICIAL USE ONLY. It must be properly safeguarded and appropriately disposed of when superseded or no longer needed. Reproduction and/or distribution of this document, or dissemination of its contents is unauthorized without prior approval of the Director, Office of Administration, as agent for the White House Office and the Executive Office of the President.

20

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. list	re: Personnel (11 pages)	05/02/1994	b(6)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
Counsel Office
Chris Cerf
OA/Box Number: 6975

FOLDER TITLE:

Personnel Security Miscellaneous - Senate QFRs [Question for the Record] Drafts and
Date [1]

2006-1066-F
jm1369

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY SENATOR D'AMATO

Question. Please provide this subcommittee, in writing, with the name, title and job description for each member of the First Lady's staff along with a biography. Please also provide this subcommittee with a list of any detailees or assignees, and their positions, currently working on the First Lady's staff.

Answer. [Matt Moore?]

Question. Please provide this subcommittee with the budget figures for the First Lady's staff for fiscal years 1994 and 1995.

Answer. [FMD/WHO]

Question. How many persons have been hired in the Office of Administration on a full-time basis since January 20, 1993? How many persons have been hired as "Temporary" appointments?

Answer. [FMD/PMD]

Question. Ms. Thomasson, in your testimony you note that "currently you are below the staffing level goals that you agreed to last year in the Administration's plan to reduce staffing levels by 25%." You go on to say that "...as the work ebbs and flows, you may exceed the agreed to limit..." How often do you exceed that limit? Where do those employees come from when you exceed that limit?

Answer. [FMD/PMD]

Question. Is it true that in order to reduce the size of the Office of Administration staff, some persons were transferred to other agencies for payroll purposes, when in fact they are currently performing the same duties, and occupying the same offices as they did before the staff reduction? Please elaborate.

Answer. The facilities management and historical preservation services were located in GSA prior to being shifted to the Office of Administration during prior Administrations. Upon analysis of their functions, it was the view of this Administration that those services rightly belonged in the GSA and were thus transferred back to the GSA on October 1, 1993, the end of the first fiscal year of this Administration. This transfer involved two Facilities Management Specialists, one Historical Preservation Research Specialist, and one Preservation Officer.

Facilities management and historical preservation of government buildings were functions that were already being performed by GSA. It was in the best interest of

the government to incorporate these functions into GSA to promote the efficiency of the service. GSA already provided similar services from its offices in the Executive Office Building.

Question. Please provide a month-by-month breakdown identifying the persons who have service as volunteers in each EOP agency since January 10, 1993. Include a description of the assigned duties for each volunteer.

Answer. Those agencies of the EOP with authority to accept the services of volunteers, regularly do so without centralized coordination. We have no statistical basis or records to account for all EOP volunteers by agency, or to provide a description of the duties assigned each volunteer. (For example, a tenth grade class may come for one day to help answer children's correspondence.) If the services of a volunteer are of a substantive or policy nature, our policy is to treat the individual as a government employee, with the attendant paperwork and ethics checks performed.

Question. How many detailees are in positions that would require security clearances? How many detailees have security clearances? Do any members of the First Lady's staff require security clearances?

Answer. [C. Cerf]

Question. Chief of Staff Mack McLarty has referred to non-governmental persons who render regular services to the Administration" that work in the White House. Please define a "non-governmental person" and provide a breakdown of how many there are, or have been since the Administration has taken office. How many of these "non-governmental persons" require security clearances, and how many have obtained them?

Answer. [C. Cerf]

QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED BY SENATOR BOND

As I look at the budget request, I am intrigued by the request for additional money to pay GSA for rent. We have been advised by OMB's most recent budget amendment that rents will be frozen and adjusted. It may be that this budget does not include that reduction. However, I am interested why the Executive Office needs more office space after they have supposedly cut the staff by 25%.

Question. Could you tell me why the Executive Office needs more space?

Answer: [FMD]

I would like to review the personnel cuts over the last year. In your statement you indicate the Executive Office is currently under the 1,044 self-imposed FTE level.

Question. How many people are working in the Executive Office? How many of these people are full-time? How many are part-time? How many detailees are currently being utilized at the White House?

Answer: [FMD/PMD]

When Dr. Brown testified before this subcommittee I asked him why the name of José Cerda appeared in the White House phone directory as his executive assistant and also as a senior policy analyst at the Office of Policy Development. I also asked whose payroll Mr. Cerda appeared on. He indicated that Mr. Cerda worked for him and was paid by ONDCP, but worked at OPD. I don't want to question the President as to how people are used in the White House, but I am most interested in truth in budgeting.

Question. Are there other detail situations like this in the Executive Office?

Answer. [PMD]

In your effort to reach the 25% personnel reduction you returned a number of detailees to their agencies and rified several career employees.

Question. How many detailees were returned to their agencies?

Answer: [FMD/PMD]

Question. How many career employees were placed with other government agencies?

Answer: [FMD/PMD]

Question. How many career employees were riffed?

Answer: [FMD/PMD]

Question. Were any of these given outplacement assistance?

Answer: [FMD/PMD]

You are also asking to increase the number of higher paid employees at the White House. You note in the justification that there is a need for top quality advisors who require a higher level of compensation, within the White House Office imposed salary caps established at the beginning of the Administration.

Question. What is that cap?

Answer: [FMD/PMD]

Question. What would these individuals be earning if there was no cap?

Answer. [FMD]

Question. Would you provide the subcommittee with a listing of what employees in the White House Office are paid?

Answer. The following table shows the current salary of the senior White House staff which are 6-10 percent less than those of the previous Administration.

Title	Pay Range	Approximate Average
Assistants to the President	\$110,000-\$125,000	\$123,050
Deputy Assistants to the President	\$ 85,000-\$110,000	\$ 97,907
Special Assistants to the President	\$ 65,000-\$ 85,000	\$ 73,301

Last year there was considerable consternation expressed about the number of phone calls and the amount of mail the White House was receiving. You were utilizing volunteers to handle these roles.

Question. Are you still utilizing volunteers? How many? What are they doing?

Answer: [Could be extracted from House responses, although this question is general and could be answered in the same manner]

You are requesting 3 additional FTE to comply with *Armstrong v. the Executive Office*. We provided supplemental funding earlier this year for costs associated with this case.

Question. How is that money being used?

Answer: [FMD]

Question. Why will additional funding and personnel be necessary?

Answer: [FMD/IST]

Funds are being requested to start up the remote mail delivery site.

Question. What will this request give us? What will be the annualized cost of this facility?

Answer: [FMD/OGS]

Answer. These positions were OA positions whose costs were reimbursed by the serviced agencies, primarily the Office of Management and Budget and the White House.

Question. If so, how many and from what agencies?

Answer. As previously stated, these were OA positions whose costs were reimbursed.

Question. Why is their average grade so high, when GS14s and above are targeted for reduction?

Answer. The former reimbursable staff members were computer specialists with high levels of technical expertise, justifying the high average grade. There are no longer any reimbursable positions within the OA.

The Office of Administration is requesting a \$351,000 increase to upgrade personal computers. How many computers will be purchased with these funds and will this request complete the upgrades required to meet the technological advancements? If not, how much will be required in future years?

Answer. The Office of Administration (OA) is requesting \$351,000 to upgrade personal computers. Of this amount, \$10,000 will be used by the Publishing Branch to upgrade its specialized graphics equipment to enable it to produce greater levels of design/composition/layout work for Executive Office of the President publications. This will allow more work to be performed in-house and avoid contracting out to commercial firms at significantly higher cost.

The additional \$341,000 will upgrade approximately 150 workstations. This includes improvements to individual stations as well as network servers and components. This upgrade will not fully satisfy the technological requirements that are continuously evolving. A complete changeout of equipment should be planned for every 3 to 4 years to maintain the technological environment necessary to meet user demand. Future years should allow for at least the amount specified for fiscal year 1995 and may reach \$500,000, depending upon the intensity of other enhancements demanded by the users.

SPECIAL ASSISTANCE TO THE PRESIDENT

Director, the Special Assistance to the President account is yet another which has requested an increase in funding over last year's appropriation. You are requesting an increase of \$44,000. Part of this 1.3% increase request is for an additional \$96,000 in travel funds for the Vice-President, or a 35 percent increase.

Question. Why is the existing travel budget of \$275,000 for the Vice-President insufficient to meet his travel requirements?

Answer. In fiscal year 1993, the Office of the Vice President (OVP) obligated approximately \$349,000 of the \$360,000 of the amount available for travel. This consisted of an original budget of \$275,000 and \$85,000 reprogrammed from the personnel object classes. It is anticipated that travel requirements and costs for fiscal year 1995 will meet or exceed those of fiscal year 1993.

Question. How much has been expended for the Vice-President's travel so far this year?

Answer. As of March 31, \$160,000 has been obligated to cover travel costs.

Question. What steps are you taking to seek reimbursement from other Federal agencies when the Vice President travels on their behalf?

Answer. When legally permissible, other federal agencies are asked to pay OVP travel costs.

Question. Can you identify for us the number of political, official, or mixed trips taken by the Vice President in 1993?

Answer. Thirty-six trips were taken in fiscal year 1993. Of this number, 23 were official and 13 were mixed political/official.

Question. What would be the impact if the increase of \$96,000 for travel was not provided.

Answer. The Vice President would be hampered in his ability to perform the duties of his office.

UNANTICIPATED NEEDS

In FY 1993, no allocations were made from the \$1 million Unanticipated Needs account.

Question. Have any of these funds been obligated so far this year? If so, for what purposes?

Answer. During the current fiscal year, \$250,000 has been allocated to the JFK Assassination Records Review Board.

OFFICE OF POLICY DEVELOPMENT

Ms. Thomasson, regarding the National Economic Council (NEC), which is a "pod" of the Office of Policy Development, and the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA), which is separate from this office, can you please tell me:

Question. What is the fundamental difference in the mission of the two Economic offices?

Answer. [FMD/OPD]

Question. What kind of results are the two offices getting?

Answer. [FMD/OPD]

Question. Are NEC personnel pulled from CEA staff, or vice versa?

Answer. [FMD/OPD]

Question. Do the two offices ever work in concert on a project?

Answer. [FMD/OPD]

Question. Is there any duplication of effort?

Answer. [FMD/OPD]

Question. Who many of the total staff of the Office of Policy Development (OPD) are slated for the NEC?

Answer. [FMD/OPD]

Question. What is the ratio of professional to administrative staff in each of the "pods" of the OPD?

Answer. [FMD/OPD]

Question. What is the ratio for the CEA?

Answer. [FMD/OPD]

Question. Could the NEC and CEA be merged? If not, why not?

Answer. [FMD/OPD]

In fiscal year 1995 you are requesting an increase of \$57,000 in the "Rent" object class stating that this amount reflects the increase in the temporary use of additional short-term policy projects based on the rates charged by GSA.

Question. Can you tell us where you are getting the additional space for this temporary use and what temporary use projects is it used for?

Answer. [FMD/OPD]

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

The National Security Council is requesting an increase of \$25,000 for travel. This would bring the travel budget for the NSC up to \$350,000.

Question. Can you please explain in detail why this travel increase is necessary and what additional travel you expect NSC staff to undertake that cannot be accommodated in your existing budget?

Answer. The NSC staff has been very active during fiscal year 1994 establishing contacts with their foreign counterparts and accompanying the Secretaries of State and Defense on overseas trips. This has involved extensive traveling and we anticipate that this same level of travel will be sustained in FY 1995. We consider this travel essential to support the President's aggressive foreign policy agenda.

As in FY 1994 where we have had unanticipated travel expenditures for visits such as APE in Seattle, the Russia/Prague/Kiev/Mink/Geneva visits we will also have travel requirements that are difficult to identify at this early stage of the budgetary process.

Question. Is the travel of the National Security Advisor also included in the NSC budget?

Answer. No, the travel of the National Security Advisor is not included in the NSC budget.

Staffing Levels

What amount is budget in fiscal year 1995 to reimburse other agencies for the costs of detailees? Can you provide this amount by EOP agency.

Answer. [FMD]

Armstrong v. Executive Office of the President

In the fiscal year 1994 supplemental appropriations act, the Congress established a separate account, the "Armstrong Resolution Account" and provided an additional \$13,125,000 for activities related to this court case/ The Congress also directed that you separately identify in this account, any funds which have been in the past, or will be requested in the future for the Armstrong activities.

Question. What amount in your fiscal year 1995 budget is related to the Armstrong case? Can you identify these amounts by EOP agency?

Answer. [FMD]

Question. How much has ben appropriated to date and how much has been obligated?

Answer. [FMD]

White House Security Passes

Question. What type of security or ethics training is given to White House employees? Is this done when they are in a temporary position or permanent position?

Answer. [C.Cerf]

Question. Is the NSC at all involved in overseeing the protection of classified documents at the White House?

Answer. {C. Cerf]

Question. With reference to the number of background investigations not year completed on White House, Vice Presidential and Office of Policy Development employees, can you tell us?

Answer. [C. Cerf]

Question. How many have been fully investigated by the FBI?

Answer. [C. Cerf]

Question. How many are at the White House pending transfer to the Secret Service for permanent pass requests? How long have they been there?

Answer. [C. Cerf]

Question. How many background investigations have not yet ben initiated due to the paperwork not being complete?

Answer. [C. Cerf]

Question. How many are not year back from the FBI?

Answer. [C. Cerf]

Question. How many backgrounds have been requested by the White House which have been at the FBI for longer than 45 days?

Answer. [C. Cerf]

Question. What is the status of these investigations?

Answer. [C. Cerf]

Question. Could you tell the Committee where this Administration is vis-a-vis the background investigations on its employees versus the previous Administrations?

Answer. [C. Cerf]

Question. What is your plan to eliminate the backlog of employees who have temporary passes?

Answer. [C. Cerf]

With reference to access to top secret security information, it is my understanding that at the White House, once a favorable full-field background investigation has been completed by the FBI, that an individual has access to up to top-secret information on a "need-to-know" basis, which is determined by the White House Chief of Staff.

Question. Ms. Thomasson, can you tell us how the Chief of Staff makes a determination as to whether or not an individual has a "need-to-know" for access to classified information?

Answer. [C. Cerf]

It seems to me that many people within the White House may have access to classified documents and briefings, which go well beyond the "top secret" classification.

Question. Do any individuals at the White House have security clearances which exceed top secret? Can you identify those individuals for me?

Answer. [C. Cerf]

Question. What process ensures that others who do not possess security clearances do not have access to classified information above the top secret level?

Answer. [C. Cerf]

Question. Do any individuals, who are not employed by the White House, have access to classified information?

Answer. [C. Cerf]

Question. What system of controls do you have in place at the White House that ensures that sensitive classified information is secure?

Answer. [C. Cerf]

*All
OGE's
plus
Exec
Res*

This document has been compiled by the Personnel Management Division, Office of Administration, Executive Office of the President, and contains both private and personal information on employees within the White House Office and/or associated offices. Its contents are under control of the White House Office, Executive Office of the President, and is provided for YOUR OFFICIAL USE ONLY. It must be properly safeguarded and appropriately disposed of when superseded or no longer needed. Reproduction and/or distribution of this document, or dissemination of its contents is unauthorized without prior approval of the Director, Office of Administration, as agent for the White House Office and the Executive Office of the President.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003. list	re: Personnel (21 pages)	05/02/1994	b(6)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
Counsel Office
Chris Cerf
OA/Box Number: 6975

FOLDER TITLE:

Personnel Security Miscellaneous - Senate QFRs [Question for the Record] Drafts and
Date [1]

2006-1066-F

jm1369

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

ONACP

24 Staff

21 have Perm Passes

3 One Pending B.I.

OSTP 41 Staff

27 Perm Passes

Temp { 8 FBI One in Council of
6 Pending B.I.



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION
Washington, D.C. 20503

MEMORANDUM FOR DISTRIBUTION

FROM: PATSY L. THOMASSON *Patsy Thomasson*
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR MANAGEMENT
AND ADMINISTRATION AND DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF
ADMINISTRATION

SUBJECT: Senate QFRs

Attached are draft responses to the Senate QFRs. I would be grateful for any suggestions you may have on them. Because of the impending deadline, I would appreciate hearing back from you by noon on Friday. Please forward your comments to Chris Cerf (x5-2273) by that time.

Distribution: David Dreyer
Joel Klein
Phil Lader
John Podesta
Doug Sosnik
Paul Toback

MAY - 2 1994

- Factually okay
- Beth has not reviewed
- Last Q, she will supply

DeCONCINI

1. What type of security or ethics training is given to White House employees? Is this done when they are in a temporary position or permanent position?

Every employee in the Executive Office of the President, whether permanent or temporary, is required to receive annual ethics training. Additionally, individuals who are detailed to the White House from other agencies are encouraged to attend the White House ethics training sessions.

The ethics briefings are one hour in length and cover the conflict of interest statutes, the Executive Branch standards of conduct regulations, and White House policies. Employees are given the opportunity to ask questions and are provided with written materials, including the names and telephone numbers of White House ethics officials.

In accordance with a regulatory requirement, the White House has an ethics training plan on file with the Office of Government Ethics.

Prior to the issuance of a permanent pass, all EOP employees (and detailees) are briefed on security procedures and the appropriate handling of classified information. Under current procedures, all EOP employees receive the briefing within 60 days of their start date. The same principles are reiterated in written materials distributed to all White House staff. Every individual who is cleared for access to compartmented information receives an additional one-on-one security briefing.

2. Is the NSC at all involved in overseeing the protection of classified documents at the White House?

The NSC does not "oversee" any aspect of the White House, including practices and procedures for the protection of classified information. Pursuant to its responsibility to advise and assist the President in the area of national security, NSC staff are subject to, and observe, those rules pertaining to the safeguarding of national security information applicable to all government employees, including special restrictions on the handling of compartmented information. All NSC employees with permanent or temporary White House passes hold a TOP SECRET clearance with SCI access.

3. With reference to the number of background investigations not yet completed on White House, Vice Presidential and Office of Policy Development employees, can you tell us:

(a) How many have been fully investigated by the FBI?

There are 68 employees of the White House Office, Office of the Vice President and Office of Policy Development whose FBI background investigations have been completed but who have not yet received their permanent passes.

(b) How many are at the White House pending transfer to the Secret Service for permanent past requests? How long have they been there.

There are 36 employees of the White House Office, Office of Vice President and Office of Policy Development whose FBI background investigation is complete, but whose file has not yet been forwarded to the Secret Service.

(c) How many background investigations have not yet been initiated due to the paperwork not being complete?

Twenty nine employees of the WHO, OVP and OPD have not submitted the paperwork necessary to initiate the FBI background investigation. All such individuals began work within the last 30 days and are, therefore, in compliance with the Chief of Staff's directive that all security related paperwork be completed within 30 days of employment.

(d) How many are not yet back from the FBI?

There are 77 employees of the WHO, OVP and OPD whose FBI investigations have been initiated by the FBI, but are not yet complete.

(e) How many backgrounds have been requested by the White House which been at the FBI for longer than 45 days?

There are 23 individuals employed by the White House Office whose background investigation has been pending at the FBI for more than 45 days. There are three such individuals employed by the OPD and none employed by OVP.

(f) What is the status of these investigations?

These investigations are pending.

(g) Could you tell the Committee where this Administration is vis-a-vis the background investigations on its employees versus the previous Administrations?

The White House does not maintain records that would permit a precise comparison. It is our understanding that, at present, the time frame for issuing permanent passes (including completion of background investigations) is comparable to that of previous administrations.

(h) What is your plan to eliminate the backlog of employees who have temporary passes?

As the result of a comprehensive review undertaken by White House Counsel's Office, the backlog has been substantially reduced. At present, 338 WHO, OVP, and OPD employees (or detailees) have received a permanent pass. Of those still holding a temporary pass, a substantial number [43 plus detailees] began work within the last 120 days. If such new arrivals are factored out, over 80% of all such employees and detailees have their permanent pass.

As these figures reflect, the current procedures have addressed certain operational inefficiencies, which had contributed to a backlog. Employees now receive a permanent pass, on average, within 120 days of their start date. While precise data are not available, issuing passes in that time frame compares favorably with the record of past administrations.

4. With reference to access to top-secret security information, it is my understanding that at the White House, once a favorable full-field background investigation has been completed by the FBI, that an individual has access to up to top-secret information on a "need-to-know" basis, which is determined by the White House Chief of Staff.

(a) Ms. Thomasson, can you tell us how the Chief of Staff makes a determination as to whether or not an individual has a "need-to-know" for access to classified information?

This determination is not made by the Chief of Staff. It is the responsibility of the person who wishes to share classified information with another individual to ascertain whether he or she (1) has the appropriate security clearance and (2) truly has a "need to know." All White House employees are advised that, when in doubt, they should contact the White House Personnel Security Office to verify the level of any given individual's security clearance.

- (b) Which intelligence community agency, if any, reviews these full-field backgrounds prior to any individual being given access to classified information?

White House employees with Top Secret security clearances are eligible for SCI access. This access is only provided where an employee has a specific need to know the relevant compartmented information and the CIA (on behalf of the DCI) has reviewed the employee's background investigation and approved such access. In the case of government employees detailed to the White House (including the NSC), SCI access may already have been approved by the detailing agency, which certifies such clearance to the White House or NSC before that employee is given SCI access at the White House.

5. It seems to me that many people within the White House may have access to classified documents and briefings, which go well beyond the "top secret" classification.

- (a) Do any individuals at the White House have security clearances which exceed top secret? Can you identify those individuals for me?

Some White House employees hold Top Secret clearances with access to Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI). It would not be appropriate to identify such individuals.

- (b) What process ensures that others who do not possess security clearances do not have access to classified information above the top secret level?

A number of procedures and policies guard against the unauthorized disclosure of classified information. Most significantly, it is the responsibility of the person who wishes to share classified information with another individual to ascertain whether he or she (1) has the appropriate security clearance and (2) truly has a "need to know." That fundamental principle is explained in detail in the security briefing all White House staff are required to attend and reiterated in written materials distributed to the entire staff. In addition, all White House employees are advised that disclosure of classified information to unauthorized persons may result in criminal prosecution and that, when in doubt, they should contact the White House Personnel Security Office to verify the level of any given individual's security clearance.

add special
one on one
briefing for
SCI access

- (c) Do any individuals, who are not employed by the White House have access to classified information?**

Some individuals detailed from other federal agencies (e.g. the Department of Defense) have access to classified information on a need to know basis. (All such individuals have an appropriate security clearance.) In addition, a limited number of contractors have been granted security clearances. All such individuals have (1) been the subject of a full field FBI background check and (2) received a security briefing.

- (d) What system of controls do you have in place at the White House that ensures that sensitive classified information is secure?**

Please see response to Subpart (b) above.

D'AMATO

- 6. How many detailees are in positions that would require security clearances? How many detailees have security clearances? Do any members of the First Lady's staff require security clearances?**

 A number of detailees come to the White House with a security clearance. Even if they already have a clearance, however, detailees who are at the White House for more than 90 days are subject to a full field FBI background investigation. Detailees are covered by the same rules governing access to classified information as are other employees. Members of the First Lady's staff, like other White House employees, are authorized to have access to Top Secret information on a "need to know basis" Only upon favorable adjudication of their background investigations. While such situations do occasionally arise, as a general rule, members of the First Lady's staff do not routinely have a "need" for access to classified information.

- 7. Chief of Staff Mack McLarty has referred to "non-governmental persons who render regular services to the Administration" that work in the White House. Please define a "non-governmental person" and provide a breakdown of how many there are, or have been since the Administration has taken office. How many of these "non-governmental persons" require security clearances, and how many have obtained them?**

[Beth Nolan to provide]

INSERT: SENATOR DECONCINI

What is the average number of individuals in the "pipeline" for security clearances.

Under present procedures, it takes, on average, 120 days from an employee's start date to the day he or she is issued a permanent pass. The number of individuals in the "pipeline" depends on the number of new hires and detailees during the period in question. As a working estimate, the White House Personnel Security office projects that, at any given time, approximately [20%?] of all ~~White House~~ FTE's will be in the pipeline. 159

EO 8

DeCONCINI

1. **What type of security or ethics training is given to White House employees? Is this done when they are in a temporary position or permanent position?**

Every employee in the Executive Office of the President, whether permanent or temporary, is required to receive annual ethics training. Additionally, individuals who are detailed to the White House from other agencies are encouraged to attend the White House ethics training sessions.

The ethics briefings are one hour in length and cover the conflict of interest statutes, the Executive Branch standards of conduct regulations, and White House policies. Employees are given the opportunity to ask questions and are provided with written materials, including the names and telephone numbers of White House ethics officials.

In accordance with a regulatory requirement, the White House has an ethics training plan on file with the Office of Government Ethics.

Prior to the issuance of a permanent pass, all EOP employees (and detailees) are briefed on security procedures and the appropriate handling of classified information. Under current procedures, all EOP employees receive the briefing within 60 days of their start date. The same principles are reiterated in written materials distributed to all White House staff. Every individual who is cleared for access to compartmented information receives an additional one-on-one security briefing.

2. **Is the NSC at all involved in overseeing the protection of classified documents at the White House?**

staff
The NSC_{staff} does not "oversee" any aspect of the White House, including practices and procedures for the protection of classified information. Pursuant to its responsibility to advise and assist the President in the area of national security, NSC staff are subject to, and observe, those rules pertaining to the safeguarding of national security information applicable to all government employees, including special restrictions on the handling of compartmented information. All NSC employees with permanent or temporary White House passes hold a TOP SECRET clearance with SCI access.

The term "nongovernmental persons," when used to refer to people with access to the White House, includes contractors and political advisers. A limited number of contractors have been granted security clearances after satisfactory adjudication of their background investigations. Political advisers with regular access to the White House undergo full field background investigations, but no political adviser presently has access to classified information.

~~SECRET~~ sp

3. With reference to the number of background investigations not yet completed on White House, Vice Presidential and Office of Policy Development employees, can you tell us:

(a) How many have been fully investigated by the FBI?

As of May 1.
There are 68 employees of the White House Office, Office of the Vice President and Office of Policy Development whose FBI background investigations have been completed but who have not yet received their permanent passes.

(b) How many are at the White House pending transfer to the Secret Service for permanent past requests? How long have they been there.

There are 36 employees of the White House Office, Office of Vice President and Office of Policy Development whose FBI background investigation is complete, but whose file has not yet been forwarded to the Secret Service.

(c) How many background investigations have not yet been initiated due to the paperwork not being complete?

Twenty nine employees of the WHO, OVP and OPD have not submitted the paperwork necessary to initiate the FBI background investigation. All such individuals began work within the last 30 days and are, therefore, in compliance with the Chief of Staff's directive that all security related paperwork be completed within 30 days of employment.

(d) How many are not yet back from the FBI?

There are 77 employees of the WHO, OVP and OPD whose FBI investigations have been initiated by the FBI, but are not yet complete.

(e) How many backgrounds have been requested by the White House which been at the FBI for longer than 45 days?

There are 23 individuals employed by the White House Office whose background investigation has been pending at the FBI for more than 45 days. There are three such individuals employed by the OPD and none employed by OVP.

(f) What is the status of these investigations?

These investigations are pending.

(g) Could you tell the Committee where this Administration is vis-a-vis the background investigations on its employees versus the previous Administrations?

The White House does not maintain records that would permit a precise comparison. It is our understanding that, at present, the time frame for issuing permanent passes (including completion of background investigations) is comparable to that of previous administrations.

(h) What is your plan to eliminate the backlog of employees who have temporary passes?

As the result of a comprehensive review undertaken by White House Counsel's Office, the backlog has been substantially reduced. At present, 338 WHO, OVP, and OPD employees (or detailees) have received a permanent pass. Of those still holding a temporary pass, a substantial number [43 plus detailees] began work within the last 120 days. If such new arrivals are factored out, over 80% of all such employees and detailees have their permanent pass.

As these figures reflect, the current procedures have addressed certain operational inefficiencies, which had contributed to a backlog. Employees now receive a permanent pass, on average, within 120 days of their start date. While precise data is not available, issuing passes in that time frame compares favorably with the the record of past administrations.

4. With reference to access to top-secret security information, it is my understanding that at the White House, once a favorable full-field background investigation has been completed by the FBI, that an individual has access to up to top-secret information on a "need-to-know" basis, which is determined by the White House Chief of Staff.

(a) Ms. Thomasson, can you tell us how the Chief of Staff makes a determination as to whether or not an individual has a "need-to-know" for access to classified information?

This determination is not made by the Chief of Staff. It is the responsibility of the person who wishes to share classified information with another individual to ascertain whether he or she (1) has the appropriate security clearance and (2) truly has a "need to know." All White House employees are advised that, when in doubt, they should contact the White House Personnel Security Office to verify the level of any given individual's security clearance.

- (b) Which intelligence community agency, if any, reviews these full-field backgrounds prior to any individual being given access to classified information?**

White House employees with Top Secret security clearances are eligible for SCI access. This access is only provided where an employee has a specific need to know the relevant compartmented information and the CIA (on behalf of the DCI) has reviewed the employee's background investigation and approved such access. In the case of government employees detailed to the White House (including the NSC), SCI access may already have been approved by the detailing agency, which certifies such clearance to the White House or NSC before that employee is given SCI access at the White House.

- 5. It seems to me that many people within the White House may have access to classified documents and briefings, which go well beyond the "top secret" classification.**

- (a) Do any individuals at the White House have security clearances which exceed top secret? Can you identify those individuals for me?**

Some White House employees hold Top Secret clearances with access to Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI). It would not be appropriate to identify such individuals.

- (b) What process ensures that others who do not possess security clearances do not have access to classified information above the top secret level?**

A number of procedures and policies guard against the unauthorized disclosure of classified information. Most significantly, it is the responsibility of the person who wishes to share classified information with another individual to ascertain whether he or she (1) has the appropriate security clearance and (2) truly has a "need to know." That fundamental principle is explained in detail in the security briefing all White House staff are required to attend and reiterated in written materials distributed to the entire staff. In addition, all White House employees are advised that disclosure of classified information to unauthorized persons may result in criminal prosecution and that, when in doubt, they should contact the White House Personnel Security Office to verify the level of any given individual's security clearance.

DRAFT

- What is your plan to eliminate the backlog of employees who have temporary passes?

As the result of a comprehensive review undertaken by White House Counsel's Office, the backlog has been substantially reduced. At present, ____ (or ____ %) of WHO, OVP, and OPD employees have received a permanent pass. Of these, ____ began work within the last 120 days. Under current procedures, which have eliminated certain operational inefficiencies, employees are expected to receive a permanent pass, on average, within 120 days of employment. While precise data is not available, issuing passes in that time frame compares favorably with the the record of past administrations.

4. With reference to access to top-secret security information, it is my understanding that at the White House, once a favorable full-field background investigation has been completed by the FBI, that an individual has access to up to top-secret information on a "need-to-know" basis, which is determined by the White House Chief of Staff.

- (a) Ms. Thomasson, can you tell us how the Chief of Staff makes a determination as to whether or not an individual has a "need-to-know" for access to classified information?

This determination is not made by the Chief of Staff. It is the responsibility of the person who wishes to share classified information with another individual to ascertain whether he or she (1) has the appropriate security clearance and (2) truly has a "need to know." All White House employees are advised that, when in doubt, they should contact the White House Personnel Security Office to verify the level of any given individual's security clearance.

- (b) Which intelligence community agency, if any, reviews these full-field backgrounds prior to any individual being given access to classified information?

White House employees with Top Secret security clearances are eligible for SCI access. This access is only provided where an employee has a specific need to know the relevant compartmented information and the CIA has reviewed the employee's background investigation and approved such access. In the case of government employees detailed to the White House (including the NSC), SCI access may already have been approved by the detailing agency, which certifies such clearance to the White House or NSC before that employee is given SCI access at the White House.

5. It seems to me that many people within the White House may