

FOIA MARKER

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Collection/Record Group: Clinton Presidential Records

Subgroup/Office of Origin: Counsel Office

Series/Staff Member: Chris Cerf

Subseries:

OA/ID Number: 6971

FolderID:

Folder Title:

Personnel Security [2]

Stack:

S

Row:

107

Section:

2

Shelf:

11

Position:

1

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. list	re: Personnel (4 pages)	03/19/1994	b(6)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
Counsel Office
Chris Cerf
OA/Box Number: 6971

FOLDER TITLE:

Personnel Security [2]

2006-1066-F

jml366

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

**EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
SECURITY CLEARANCE / PASS STATISTICS COMPARISON**

17-May-94 17:55

11-May-94

AGENCY

	Number of Staff incl. detailees	No. of Perm. Passes Issued	Adjudicated Backgrounds Completed (Awaiting)	Pending Background Investigations	Awaiting Paperwork
White House Office	431	322	40 (19)	58	11
Office of Policy Development	51	32	9 (2)	9	1
Council on Environmental Quality	6	5	0	1	0
Executive Residence	89	89	0	0	0
Office of the Vice President	25	21	3 (1)	0	1
National Security Council	149	103	12 (5)	22	12
Office of Nat'l Drug Control Policy	23	18	1	4	0
Office of Science & Tech Policy	41	26	9	6	0
Council of Economic Advisers	34	28	3	3	0
Office of Administration	186	177	5	4	0
TOTAL	1035	821	82	107	25
		79.3%	7.9%	10.3%	2.4%
			81.9% (including those awaiting USSS action)		

18-MAR-93

AGENCY

	Number of Staff incl. detailees	No. of Perm. Passes Issued	Adjudicated Backgrounds Completed	Pending Background Investigations	Awaiting Paperwork
White House Office	424	233	80	94	18
Office of Policy Development	53	17	20	11	5
Council on Environmental Quality	6	5	0	1	0
Executive Residence	89	89	0	0	0
Office of the Vice President	26	13	11	0	1
National Security Council	149	86	51	1	4
Office of Nat'l Drug Control Policy	23	18	1	4	0
Office of Science & Tech Policy	41	25	10	6	0
Council of Economic Advisers	34	28	3	3	0
Office of Administration	185	177	5	3	0
TOTAL	1030	691	181	123	28
		67.1%	17.6%	11.9%	2.7%
Change in Percentage		12.2%	-9.7%	-1.6%	-0.3%

**EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
SECURITY CLEARANCE / PASS STATISTICS**

11-May-94 10:27

11-May-94

AGENCY	Number of Staff incl. detailees	No. of Perm. Passes Issued	Adjudicated Backgrounds Awaiting	Adjudicated Backgrounds Pending	Pending Background Investigations	Awaiting Paperwork
White House Office	431	322	19	21	58	11
Office of Policy Development	51	32	2	7	9	1
Council on Environmental Quality	6	5		0	1	0
Executive Residence	89	89	0	0	0	0
Office of the Vice President	25	21	1	2	0	1
National Security Council	149	103	5	7	22	12
Office of Nat'l Drug Control Policy	23	18		1	4	0
Office of Science & Tech Policy	41	26		9	6	0
Council of Economic Advisers	34	28		3	3	0
Office of Administration	186	177		5	4	0
TOTAL	1035	821 79.3%	27 3.3%	55 5.3%	107 10.3%	25 2.4%

Various Totals of Statistics

	Total Perm+BI+ No. of Staff Await BI + No Paper		Total Pending or Await. Paper
White House Office	431	431	69
Office of Policy Development	51	51	10
Council on Environmental Quality	6	6	1
Executive Residence	89	89	0
Office of the Vice President	25	25	1
National Security Council	149	149	34
Office of Nat'l Drug Control Policy	23	23	4
Office of Science & Tech Policy	41	41	6
Council of Economic Advisers	34	34	3
Office of Administration	186	186	4
TOTAL	1035	1035	132 12.8%

White House Personnel Security
Pass Statistics

10-May-94
06:42:57 PM

AGENCY	NUMBER OF STAFF not classified	NUMBER OF PER PASSES ISSUED	ADJUDICATED		PENDING	
			BACKGROUND AWAITING	BACKGROUND PENDING	BACKGROUND INVESTIGATING	AWAITING PASSWORK
WHITE HOUSE OFFICES	431	322	19	21	58	11
OFFICE OF POLICY DEVELOPMENT	51	32	2	7	9	1
EXECUTIVE RESIDENCE	89	89	0	0	0	0
OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT	25	21	1	2	0	1
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL	142	103	5	7	22	12
TOTAL	745	567	27	37	89	25
PERCENTAGES OF TOTALS	—	76.11%	3.62%	4.97%	11.95%	3.36%

**EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
SECURITY CLEARANCE / PASS STATISTICS**

03-May-94 17:32

AGENCY	Number of Staff incl. detailees	No. of Perm. Passes Issued	Adjudicated Backgrounds Awaiting	Adjudicated Backgrounds Pending	Pending Background Investigations	Awaiting Paperwork	No. New Staff Last 30 Days
White House Office	427	302	28	16	67	14	
Office of Policy Development	52	26	4	7	10	5	
Council on Environmental Quality	6	5		0	1	0	
Executive Residence	89	89	0	0	0	0	
Office of the Vice President	26	21	1	3	0	1	
National Security Council	144	112	3	8	21	0	
Office of Nat'l Drug Control Policy	23	18		1	4	0	
Office of Science & Tech Policy	41	26		9	6	0	
Council of Economic Advisers	34	28		3	3	0	
Office of Administration	186	177		5	4	0	
TOTAL	1028	804 78.2%	36 4.5%	52 5.1%	116 11.3%	20 1.9%	

Various Totals of Statistics

	Total Perm+BI+ No. of Staff Await BI + No Paper		Total Pending or Await. Paper
White House Office	427	427	81
Office of Policy Development	52	52	15
Council on Environmental Quality	6	6	1
Executive Residence	89	89	0
Office of the Vice President	26	26	1
National Security Council	144	144	21
Office of Nat'l Drug Control Policy	23	23	4
Office of Science & Tech Policy	41	41	6
Council of Economic Advisers	34	34	3
Office of Administration	186	186	4
TOTAL	1028	1028	136 13.2%

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
SECURITY CLEARANCE / PASS STATISTICS

29-Apr-94 09:34

AGENCY	Number of Staff incl. detailees	No. of Perm. Passes Issued	Adjudicated Backgrounds Awaiting	Adjudicated Backgrounds Pending	Pending Background Investigations	Awaiting Paperwork	No. New Staff Last 30 Days
White House Office	427 428	302 292	28 27	16 26	67 87	14 18	
Office of Policy Development	52	26	4	7	10	5	
Council on Environmental Quality	6	5		0	1	0	
Executive Residence	89	89	0	0	0	0	
Office of the Vice President	26	21	1	3	0	1	
National Security Council	144	112	3	8	21	0	
Office of Nat'l Drug Control Policy	23	18		1	4	0	
Office of Science & Tech Policy	41	26		9	6	0	
Council of Economic Advisers	34	28		3	3	0	
Office of Administration	186	177		5	4	0	
TOTAL	1029	794 77.2%	35 4.4%	62 6.0%	116 11.3%	22 2.1%	

Various Totals of Statistics

	Total Perm+BI+ No. of Staff Await BI + No Paper		Total Pending or Await. Paper
White House Office	428	428	83
Office of Policy Development	52	52	15
Council on Environmental Quality	6	6	1
Executive Residence	89	89	0
Office of the Vice President	26	26	1
National Security Council	144	144	21
Office of Nat'l Drug Control Policy	23	23	4
Office of Science & Tech Policy	41	41	6
Council of Economic Advisers	34	34	3
Office of Administration	186	186	4
TOTAL	1029	1029	138 13.4%

100
of 132 commissions have
82% approved or have
9 awaiting
23 others

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
SECURITY CLEARANCE / PASS STATISTICS

~~29-Apr-94~~ 09:34 STATS FROM
26-APR-94

AGENCY	Number of Staff incl detailees	No. of Perm. Passes Issued	Adjudicated Backgrounds Awaiting	Adjudicated Backgrounds Pending	Pending Background Investigations	Awaiting Paperwork	No. New Staff Last 30 Days
White House Office	428	292	27	26	67	16	
Office of Policy Development	52	26	4	7	10	5	
Council on Environmental Quality	6	5		0	1	0	
Executive Residence	89	89	0	0	0	0	
Office of the Vice President	26	21	1	3	0	1	
National Security Council	144	112	3	8	21	0	
Office of Nat'l Drug Control Policy	23	18		1	4	0	
Office of Science & Tech Policy	41	26		9	6	0	
Council of Economic Advisers	34	28		3	3	0	
Office of Administration	186	177		5	4	0	
TOTAL	1029	794	35	62	116	22	
		77.2%	4.4%	6.0%	11.3%	2.1%	

Various Totals of Statistics

	Total Perm+BI+ No. of Staff Await BI + No Paper		Total Pending or Await. Paper
White House Office	428	428	83
Office of Policy Development	52	52	15
Council on Environmental Quality	6	6	1
Executive Residence	89	89	0
Office of the Vice President	26	26	1
National Security Council	144	144	21
Office of Nat'l Drug Control Policy	23	23	4
Office of Science & Tech Policy	41	41	6
Council of Economic Advisers	34	34	3
Office of Administration	186	186	4
TOTAL	1029	1029	138
			13.4%

**EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
SECURITY CLEARANCE / PASS STATISTICS**

~~29-Apr-94~~ 09:35

AGENCY	Number of Staff incl. detailees	No. of Perm. Passes Issued	Adjudicated Backgrounds Completed	Pending Background Investigations	Awaiting Paperwork	No. New Staff Last 30 Days
White House Office	426	282	57	72	15	
Office of Policy Development	51	26	11	9	5	
Council on Environmental Quality	6	5	0	1	0	
Executive Residence	89	89	0	0	0	
Office of the Vice President	26	20	5	0	1	
National Security Council	144	101	17	26	0	
Office of Nat'l Drug Control Policy	23	18	1	4	0	
Office of Science & Tech Policy	41	26	9	6	0	
Council of Economic Advisers	34	28	3	3	0	
Office of Administration	186	177	5	4	0	
TOTAL	1026	772 75.2%	108 10.5%	125 12.2%	21 2.0%	

Various Totals of Statistics

	Total Perm+BI+ No. of Staff Await BI + No Paper		Total Pending or Await. Paper
White House Office	426	426	87
Office of Policy Development	51	51	14
Council on Environmental Quality	6	6	1
Executive Residence	89	89	0
Office of the Vice President	26	26	1
National Security Council	144	144	26
Office of Nat'l Drug Control Policy	23	23	4
Office of Science & Tech Policy	41	41	6
Council of Economic Advisers	34	34	3
Office of Administration	186	186	4
TOTAL	1026	1026	146 14.2%

**EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
SECURITY CLEARANCE / PASS STATISTICS**

26-Apr-94 14:04

AGENCY	Number of Staff incl detailees	No. of Perm. Passes Issued	Adjudicated Backgrounds Awaiting	Adjudicated Backgrounds Pending	Pending Background Investigations	Awaiting Paperwork	No. New Staff Last 30 Days
White House Office							
Office of Policy Development							
Council on Environmental Quality	6	5		0	1	0	
Executive Residence			0	0	0	0	
Office of the Vice President							
National Security Council							
Office of Nat'l Drug Control Policy	25 24	18		1	4	0	
Office of Science & Tech Policy	41	26		9	6	0	
Council of Economic Advisers	34	28		3	3	0	
Office of Administration	186	177		5	4	0	
TOTAL	290	254	0	18	18	0	

Various Totals of Statistics

	Total Perm+BI+ No. of Staff Await BI + No Paper		Total Pending or Await. Paper
White House Office		0	0
Office of Policy Development		0	0
Council on Environmental Quality	6	6	1
Executive Residence		0	0
Office of the Vice President		0	0
National Security Council		0	0
Office of Nat'l Drug Control Policy	23	23	4
Office of Science & Tech Policy	41	41	6
Council of Economic Advisers	34	34	3
Office of Administration	186	186	4
TOTAL	290	290	18 6.2%

	NUMBER OF STAFF Incl. detailees	NUMBER OF PERMANENT PASSES ISSUED	ADJUDICATED BACKGROUNDS AWAITING	ADJUDICATED BACKGROUNDS PENDING	PENDING BACKGROUND INVESTIGATIONS	AWAITING PAPERWORK
AGENCY						
WHITE HOUSE OFFICES	428	292	27	26	67	16
OFFICE OF POLICY DEVELOPMEN	52	26	4	7	10	5
EXECUTIVE RESIDENCE	89	89	0	0	0	0
OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT	26	21	1	3	0	1
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL	144	112	3	8	21	0
TOTAL	739	540	35	44	98	22
PERCENTAGES OF TOTALS	—	73.07%	4.74%	5.95%	13.26%	2.98%

94 APR 26 PI2 : 21

- # of total Staff in WHO = 426
 - # of staff w/ Permanent Passes = 282
 - # of staff Awaiting Perm Passes = 29
 - # of staff w/ BIC yet pending = 28
 - # of staff w/ incomplete BI pending = 72
 - # of staff w/ No paperwork in = 15
- > 311

Democratic National Committee - Badges/Access

19-Apr-94

Name	Full Time Y/N	Access	Type	Badge Y/N	Type	Purpose
Democratic National Committee - Badges/Access						
19-Apr-94						
Name	Full Time Y/N	Access	Type	Badge Y/N	Type	Purpose
Anderson, Karen	Y			X	E-Vol	Political Affairs
Bachar, Steve	Y			X	T-Vol	Presidential Advance
Begala, Paul	N			X	W-NGS	Consultant
Berman, Eric	N	X	WH			Research & Communications
Booth, Heather	N	X	WH			Public Liaison
Carville, James	N			X	W-NGS	Consultant
Celeste, Richard	N	X	WH			Status under review.
DeLee, Debra	N	X	WH			Executive Director. (Badge requested)
Ferguson, Jeff	N	X	WH			Communications
Greenberg, Stan	N			X	W-NGS	Consultant
Grote, Sarah	Y			X	T-Vol	First Lady's Scheduling
Grunwald, Mandy	N			X	W-NGS	Consultant
Hanlin, Kirk	Y			X	T-Vol	Presidential Advance
Hartigan, Laura	N	X	WH			Financial issues
Keith, Maark	N	X	WH			Wilhelm's aide
Landgarten, Sue	N	X	WH			Vice Presidential Liaison
Lazaraus, Ed	N	X	WH			Communications
Levine, Susan	N			X	W-NGS	White House Liaison
McAuliffe, Terrance	N	X	WH			Communications
Moore, Catherine An	N	X	WH			Communications
Moore, Minyon	N	X	WH			Voter participation and Public Liaison
O'Brien, Peter	N			X		Wilhelm's travel aide (Badge requested)
Phipps, Martha	N	X	WH			Deputy Executive Director (DeLee's principle deputy)
Rutherford, Skip	N	X	WH			Consultant
Sandler, Joseph	N	X	WH			General Counsel
Sinoway, Linda	N	X	WH			Communications & health care liaison
Suggs, Elbert	N			X	E	Courier (Badge requested)
Sweitzer, Donald	N	X	WH			Communications
Teague, Jeff	N	X	WH			Vice Presidential Liaison
Trahern, Joe	Y			X	E-Vol	Political Affairs
Travis, Alice	N	X	WH			Governmental Affairs
VanGeisen, Kris	Y			X	T-Vol	Vice Presidential Scheduling & Advance
Whitney, Jim	N	X	WH			Communications
Wilhelm, David	N	X		X	W	DNC Chairman

13
-5
8

**EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
SECURITY CLEARANCE / PASS STATISTICS**

19-Apr-94 10:12

AGENCY	Number of Staff Incl. detailees	No. of Perm Passes Issued	Adjudicated Backgrounds Completed	Pending Background Investigations	Awaiting Paperwork	No. New Staff Last 30 Days
White House Office	424	268	70	70	16	
Office of Policy Development	51	26	11	9	5	
Council on Environmental Quality	6	5	0	1	0	
Executive Residence	89	89	0	0	0	
Office of the Vice President	26	20	5	0	1	
National Security Council	144	101	17	26	0	
Office of Nat'l Drug Control Policy	23	18	1	4	0	
Office of Science & Tech Policy	41	26	9	6	0	
Council of Economic Advisers	34	28	3	3	0	
Office of Administration	186	177	5	4	0	
TOTAL	1024	758 74.0%	121 11.8%	123 12.0%	22 2.1%	

Various Totals of Statistics

	Total Perm+BI+ No. of Staff Await BI + No Paper		Total Pending or Await. Paper
White House Office	424	424	86
Office of Policy Development	51	51	14
Council on Environmental Quality	6	6	1
Executive Residence	89	89	0
Office of the Vice President	26	26	1
National Security Council	144	144	26
Office of Nat'l Drug Control Policy	23	23	4
Office of Science & Tech Policy	41	41	6
Council of Economic Advisers	34	34	3
Office of Administration	186	186	4
TOTAL	1024	1024	145 14.2%

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Office of Management and Administration
FAX TRANSMITTAL

DATE: April 19, 1994

TO: Paul Toback
Fax 202.456.1121

FROM: Matt Moore
Voice 202.456.2021
Fax 202.456.1655

SUBJECT: Pass Statistics

TOTAL PAGES: One Page Follows

COMMENTS: meeting will be in
Rm 345 at 2PM.
Matt

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
SECURITY CLEARANCE / PASS STATISTICS

18-Apr-94 11:06

IOBALY
NOLAN
CERDA
WATKINS
MOORE
LIVINGSTONE

AGENCY	Number of Staff incl. detailees	No. of Perm. Passes Issued	Adjudicated Backgrounds Completed	Pending Background Investigations	Awaiting Paperwork	No. New Staff Last 30 Days
White House Office	424	268	70	70	16	
Office of Policy Development	51	26	11	9	5	
Council on Environmental Quality	6	5	0	1	0	
Executive Residence	89	89	0	0	0	
Office of the Vice President	26	20	5	0	1	
National Security Council	144	101	17	26	0	
Office of Nat'l Drug Control Policy	23	18	1	4	0	
Office of Science & Tech Policy	41	26	9	6	0	
Council of Economic Advisers	34	28	3	3	0	
Office of Administration	186	177	5	4	0	
TOTAL	1024	758	121	123	22	

Various Totals of Statistics

	Total Perm+BI+ No. of Staff Await BI + No Paper		Total Pending or Await. Paper
White House Office	424	424	86
Office of Policy Development	51	51	14
Council on Environmental Quality	6	6	1
Executive Residence	89	89	0
Office of the Vice President	26	26	1
National Security Council	144	144	26
Office of Nat'l Drug Control Policy	23	23	4
Office of Science & Tech Policy	41	41	6
Council of Economic Advisers	34	34	3
Office of Administration	186	186	4
TOTAL	1024	1024	145

NEED OPD #s

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
SECURITY CLEARANCE / PASS STATISTICS

17-Apr-94

16:21

AGENCY	Number of Staff incl. detailees	No. of Perm. Passes Issued	Adjudicated Backgrounds Completed	Pending Background Investigations	Awaiting Paperwork	No. New Staff Last 30 Days
White House Office	424	268	70	70	16	
Office of Policy Development	52	20	11	9	5	
Council on Environmental Quality	6	5	0	1	0	
Executive Residence	89	89	0	0	0	
Office of the Vice President	26	20	5	0	1	
National Security Council	144	101	17	26	0	
Office of Nat'l Drug Control Policy	23	18	1	4	0	
Office of Science & Tech Policy	41	26	9	6	0	
Council of Economic Advisers	34	28	3	3	0	
Office of Administration	186	177	5	4	0	
TOTAL	1025	752	110	114	17	

Various Totals of Statistics

	Total Perm+BI+ No. of Staff Await BI + No Pa	No. of BIs and Awaiting BIs/No Paper	Total Pending or Await. Paper
White House Office	424	156	86
Office of Policy Development	52	0	0
Council on Environmental Quality	6	1	1
Executive Residence	89	0	0
Office of the Vice President	26	6	1
National Security Council	144	43	26
Office of Nat'l Drug Control Policy	23	5	4
Office of Science & Tech Policy	41	15	6
Council of Economic Advisers	34	6	3
Office of Administration	186	9	4
TOTAL	1025	241	131

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
SECURITY CLEARANCE / PASS STATISTICS

07-Apr-94 18:06

293
29
382
119
55
957
732

AGENCY

AGENCY	Number of Staff incl. detailees	No. of Perm. Passes Issued	No of Temp. WH Passes/ WH Access List	No of Temp. OEGB Passes/ OEGB Access Ls	Adjudicated Backgrounds Completed	Pending Background Investigations	Awaiting Paperwork		
White House Office	432	424	280	268	118	34	70	70	16
Office of Policy Development	52	20	23	9	0	0	0	0	0
Council on Environmental Quality	6	5	0	1	0	0	1	0	0
Executive Residence	89	89	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Office of the Vice President	26	20	18	19	6	0	15	0	1
National Security Council	149	144	86	101	46	10	17	51	26
Office of Nat'l Drug Control Policy	23	18	1	4	1	4	4	4	0
Office of Science & Tech Policy	41	26	9	6	9	6	6	6	0
Council of Economic Advisers	34	28	3	3	3	3	3	3	0
Office of Administration	186	177	5	4	5	4	4	4	0
TOTAL	1038	747	211	71	157	73	16		

1029

Various Totals of Statistics

	No. of Staff	No. of Passes (all types)	No. of Temp. Passes/Access	No. of BIs and Awaiting BIs/No Paper	Total Pending or Await. Paper
White House Office	432	432	152	152	65
Office of Policy Development	52	52	32	0	0
Council on Environmental Quality	6	6	1	1	1
Executive Residence	89	89	0	0	0
Office of the Vice President	26	24	6	2	1
National Security Council	149	142	56	56	5
Office of Nat'l Drug Control Policy	23	23	5	5	4
Office of Science & Tech Policy	41	41	15	15	6
Council of Economic Advisers	34	34	6	6	3
Office of Administration	186	186	9	9	4
TOTAL	1038	1029	282	246	89

No of Staff
here less than
30 days

Database help (a person)
for Craig

Sit down with
Mari on #5 after
Beth speaks w/ Craig.

11
158
168
426

1349
1119
28

Call
podata
this
podata
podata

**EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
SECURITY CLEARANCE / PASS STATISTICS**

07-Apr-94 18:06

AGENCY	Number of Staff incl. detailees	No. of Perm. Passes Issued	No of Temp. WH Passes/ WH Access List	No. of Temp. OEGB Passes/ OEGB Access List	Adjudicated Backgrounds Completed	Pending Background Investigations	Awaiting Paperwork
White House Office	432	280	118	34	87	54	11
Office of Policy Development	52	20	23	9	0	0	0
Council on Environmental Quality	6	5	0	1	0	1	0
Executive Residence	89	89	0	0	0	0	0
Office of the Vice President	26	18	6	0	1	0	1
National Security Council	149	86	46	10	51	1	4
Office of Nat'l Drug Control Policy	23	18	1	4	1	4	0
Office of Science & Tech Policy	41	26	9	6	9	6	0
Council of Economic Advisers	34	28	3	3	3	3	0
Office of Administration	186	177	5	4	5	4	0
TOTAL	1038	747	211	71	157	73	16

Various Totals of Statistics

	No. of Staff	No. of Passes (all types)	No. of Temp. Passes/Access	No. of BIs and Awaiting BIs/No Paper	Total Pending or Await. Paper
White House Office	432	432	152	152	65
Office of Policy Development	52	52	32	0	0
Council on Environmental Quality	6	6	1	1	1
Executive Residence	89	89	0	0	0
Office of the Vice President	26	24	6	2	1
National Security Council	149	142	56	56	5
Office of Nat'l Drug Control Policy	23	23	5	5	4
Office of Science & Tech Policy	41	41	15	15	6
Council of Economic Advisers	34	34	6	6	3
Office of Administration	186	186	9	9	4
TOTAL	1038	1029	282	246	89

Draft Document: Subject to Attorney/Client Privilege

April 6, 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT

FROM: DAVID WATKINS
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR MANAGEMENT
AND ADMINISTRATION

SUBJECT: POTENTIAL GAO AUDIT OF WHITE HOUSE SECURITY PROCEDURES

I. ACTION-FORCING EVENT: According to published reports, Representatives Frank Wolf and Bill Clinger have asked the GAO to conduct an investigation of White House security procedures. A GAO investigation would raise a number of significant legal, political and practical concerns. Formulating an appropriate response to the potential GAO audit is therefore a matter of some urgency.

II. BACKGROUND/CONCERNS

1. Legal. A GAO investigation would represent a potentially serious incursion into a core area of presidential authority. On that basis alone, the GAO's legal power to conduct an investigation is subject to serious question. In addition, the statutory basis for a GAO inquiry is doubtful. (The GAO's authority to "evaluate the results of a program or activity . . . carried out under existing law" should be construed to include only statutorily authorized programs and activities, not those carried out by the Executive Branch under its general constitutional powers.) Finally, the controlling statute provides that a "program-or-activity" evaluation can only be initiated in one of a limited number of ways, e.g., when requested by a committee of Congress with jurisdiction over that particular program. It is highly questionable that a unilateral request by Representatives Wolf and Clinger constitutes a legally sufficient basis for initiating a GAO evaluation of this nature.

2. Political. The political fallout associated with a decision to rebuff the proposed GAO investigation may be substantial. Whatever the legal merits of our position, critics on the Hill and many members of the press would view any failure to cooperate as "stonewalling." The Aldrich Ames affair, widespread media criticism of White House security procedures, and the recent letter to Director Woolsey have already created a highly charged environment. If the White House is viewed as being less than fully cooperative with the GAO, critics undoubtedly would use this as a vehicle for turning up the decibel level still further.

3. Practical. An investigation of White House security practices necessarily implicates significant privacy concerns. Several critics (purportedly relying on an Administration source) contend, incorrectly, that the FBI has identified a very large number of White House employees with problematic backgrounds. To investigate the claim, the GAO (or any independent auditor) may seek to review individual files. While such a review would be both unprecedented and inappropriate, the issue is likely to come to a head if the GAO investigation proceeds.

III. OPTIONS/ANALYSIS

1. Cooperate with the proposed GAO investigation without qualification.

Analysis: Permitting a GAO evaluation to proceed in this sensitive area would be an unprecedented and legally questionable intrusion into presidential authority. The long-term consequences of allowing this precedent to be set are difficult to predict or control, but may well be substantial. Acquiescing to a GAO evaluation, however, would have the short-term political benefit of allowing the White House to appear fully cooperative. That benefit is at least partially offset by the potential fallout down the road when the GAO report, which may be used for highly partisan purposes, is issued.

2. Cooperate with the proposed GAO investigation, but attempt to negotiate its scope, e.g., by securing an agreement that review of individual files would be out of bounds.

Analysis: Self evidently, this approach has the advantage of protecting the considerable privacy interests at issue in this context. Otherwise, the advantages and disadvantages are essentially the same as in (1) above.

3. Attempt to persuade the GAO and/or Congress that the GAO lacks jurisdiction to conduct such an investigation, and, if persuasion fails, decline to cooperate on legal grounds.

Analysis: Drawing a clear line in the sand preserves the principle that the GAO does not have boundless jurisdiction to investigate certain presidential functions. As stated above, however, the political consequences of this approach may be significant.

4. Oppose the GAO investigation, but develop and implement an alternative form of critical evaluation, such as: (a) an internal review; (b) a review conducted by representatives of the FBI, Secret Service, and other relevant security agencies; (c) a review conducted by an outside expert or panel of experts, e.g. Jim Wolf (security consultant to the Senate Intelligence Committee) or "OPSEC," a division of the National Security Agency specializing in conducting security audits for other federal agencies.

Analysis: Under this approach, the White House would express concern about the appropriateness of a GAO evaluation, but acknowledge that some form of comprehensive review of security procedures may be fruitful. Optimally, the Members who initially requested the GAO investigation would accept this as a reasonable alternative. (Other members of the relevant Senate and House Committees might be willing to approach their colleagues with the suggestion that this is a sensible compromise.) But even if the requesting Members remain adamant, the existence of an alternative form of evaluation may alleviate some of the political fallout associated with a decision to resist the GAO. The more "independent" the evaluation, the greater the likelihood that it will be viewed as acceptable. In that regard, if this option is followed, serious consideration should be given to Senator DeConcini's offer to make Jim Wolf available to the White House.

IV. RECOMMENDATION

Option Four would appear to strike the best balance between the competing political and legal concerns.

Name	Date
<i>Wendy White</i>	<i>7/30/96</i>

Counsel

**EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
SECURITY CLEARANCE / PASS STATISTICS**

07-Apr-94 10:20

matl: 4/7/94

AGENCY	Number of Staff incl. detailees	No. of Perm. Passes Issued	No. of Temp. WH Passes/ WH Access List	No. of Temp. OEGB Passes/ OEGB Access List	Adjudicated Backgrounds Completed	Pending Background Investigations	Awaiting Paperwork
White House Office	432	280	118	34	87	54	11
Office of Policy Development	52	20	23	9	0	0	0
Council on Environmental Quality	6	5	0	1	0	1	0
Executive Residence	89	89	0	0	0	0	0
Office of the Vice President	26	18	6	0	1	0	1
National Security Council	149	80	46	10	51	1	4
Office of Nat'l Drug Control Policy	23	18	1	4	1	4	0
Office of Science & Tech Policy	41	25	10	6	10	6	0
Council of Economic Advisers	34	28	3	3	3	3	0
Office of Administration	186	177	5	4	5	4	0
TOTAL	1038	342	19	18	197	101	24

Various Totals of Statistics

	No. of Staff	No. of Passes (all types)	No. of Temp. Passes/Access	No. of BIs and Awaiting BIs/No Paper	Total Pending or Await. Paper
White House Office	432	0	0	181	85
Office of Policy Development	52	0	0	36	16
Council on Environmental Quality	6	6	1	1	1
Executive Residence	89	89	0	0	0
Office of the Vice President	26	0	0	12	1
National Security Council	149	0	0	56	5
Office of Nat'l Drug Control Policy	23	23	5	5	4
Office of Science & Tech Policy	41	41	16	16	6
Council of Economic Advisers	34	34	6	6	3
Office of Administration	186	186	9	9	4
TOTAL	1038	379	37	322	125

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Procedures for Obtaining Building Passes for New Employees or Other Government Employees

1. The Administrative Contact for employing department submits the following completed forms to the Office of Management and Administration. These forms are available from Room 145:
 - a. *Pre-employment Form*, completed by administrative contact and signed by the Assistant to the President for that department;
 - b. *Drug Testing Form*, completed and signed by the prospective employee and
 - c. *Supplemental Personnel Form ("blue form")* with appropriate sections completed by the administrative contact and the prospective employee and signed by the department head and the prospective employee.
2. Management and Administration coordinates with White House Personnel Security (WHPS) to schedule and conduct security interview. *Blue forms* for new employees or OGEs will be stamped "SECURITY INTERVIEW REQUIRED."
3. Management and Administration coordinates with the Office of Administration (OA), Personnel Management Division (PMD) to have prospective employee tested for illegal drug use.
4. Upon conclusion of security interview and favorable recommendation from WHPS, Management and Administration approves *Pre-employment Form* and notifies administrative contact for employing department accordingly. WHPS will notify Management and Administration by telephone.
5. OA, PMD conducts new employee orientation every Monday at 9:00 a.m. Management and Administration will advise new employees that they should attend the next scheduled Monday session. During orientation, the new employee reads and signs the oath of office, fills out tax forms, and receives information regarding health care, retirement, and life insurance. Also during this time, the new employee receives a copy of the Standards of Conduct and views a video from the Office on Government Ethics. In addition, annual ethics training is conducted for all employees.
6. Management and Administration sends security packet to administrative contact for prospective employee's department for completion by prospective employee. NOTE: Additional filings may be required of a new employee depending on the rate of pay, and/or the nature of their responsibilities. Management and Administration will work with White House Counsel's office to identify new employees who may be required to file additional forms. In addition, new OGEs may be asked to submit copies of similar forms filed at their parent agencies.

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7. Management and Administration approves the *Supplemental Personnel Form*¹ and sends it to WHPS for action. **Effective date of hire** is noted as "Effective Date" on *the blue form*. Management and Administration may make changes to *the blue form* regarding personnel status, or effective date, if necessary.
8. WHPS initiates the FBI name check and other investigatory procedures. Individual's name is placed on the "access list." This means the individual must present positive identification each time he or she enters the Complex. The extent of the individual's access (e.g, White House or Old Executive Office Building) is determined by the type of badge requested on the *blue form*.
9. New employee has 30 days from **effective date of hire** to submit completed² security forms (SF-86, FBI consent, tax check waiver, personal data statement questionnaire, and other required forms³) to WHPS.
10. If the FBI name check is concluded without negative consequences and a badge was requested on the *blue form*, the new employee receives a TEMPORARY picture badge with a "T" on it and a 30-day expiration date. The individual is also fingerprinted by the United States Secret Service (USSS). The fingerprints are then sent through the national database and afterwards kept on file by the USSS. In the event additional negative information is revealed when the fingerprints are checked, this information is brought to WHPS.
11. If the FBI name check or the USSS fingerprint review reveals negative information not previously reported in the security interview or other preliminary investigations, WHPS will interview the individual and determine whether continued employment is appropriate.
12. Approximately 5-6 days before the 30-day expiration date is reached, the USSS notifies WHPS, in writing.
 - a. WHPS will review the individual's security file to determine whether all necessary forms have been turned in.

¹Approval by White House Management and Administration indicates only that the individual has been selected for employment and authorizes White House Personnel Security to initiate an FBI name check and other investigatory procedures.

²"Completed forms or completed paperwork" are defined to mean that all necessary forms are typed, filled out correctly, and signed and dated by the individual. WHPS may ask individuals to make changes or corrections to paperwork before it will be considered "complete."

³See Item 6 above.

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- b. If forms have **not** been turned in, the individual's supervisor will be notified by WHPS that appropriate forms have not been turned in and asked to take necessary action.
 - c. If by the end of the 30-day period, completed forms have **still** not been turned in,
 - i. USSS will be advised not to renew the individual's access (i.e., issue a new expiration date).
 - ii. WHPS will issue a memorandum to the file that access has been revoked. A copy of this memorandum will be sent to Management and Administration and to the White House Division/Access Control Branch (ACB) of the USSS.
 - iii. Management and Administration will take the necessary steps to place the individual in a Leave Without Pay status.
 - d. Once completed forms are returned to WHPS,
 - i. WHPS will notify USSS, in writing, to restore access to the Complex. A copy of this notification will be sent to Management and Administration and the ACB/USSS.
 - ii. Management and Administration will take the necessary steps to restore the individual to a pay-receiving status.
13. Once all necessary, completed forms are returned to WHPS, they are distributed to the appropriate agencies and departments for action:
- a. The SF-86 is sent to the FBI to initiate a full-field background investigation.
 - b. The Tax Check Waiver is sent to the Internal Revenue Service to initiate a review of the individual's tax records.
 - c. The Personnel Data Statement Questionnaire is reviewed by WHPS and, as appropriate, White House Counsel.
 - d. Financial disclosure forms and other forms, as necessary, are reviewed by White House Counsel.
14. During this time, the individual is required to attend a security briefing. Attendance is mandatory and the individual's presence is noted and included in his or her security file. A notice about attendance at these briefings is included in the security packet. In addition, a post card is sent to the individual approximately 30 days after they enter on duty. The security briefings are held on the last Thursday of each month at 10:00 a.m. in Room 450. Arrangements may be made with WHPS to view a video briefing.
15. As each agency or department concludes its investigations, the findings are returned to WHPS for inclusion in the individual's security file. WHPS keeps a record of these findings as they are returned.

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16. As findings are returned from agencies and departments, they are reviewed within **five days** by the WHPS director and the White House Counsel's Office. In the event specific issues are revealed during this review, action in accord with appropriate security procedures will be initiated immediately.
17. Upon conclusion of all investigations and review and if a badge was requested on the *blue form*, WHPS makes a recommendation to the USSS to issue a **PERMANENT** picture badge. The USSS may accept or reject the recommendation.
 - a. If the recommendation is accepted, the individual is issued a permanent badge.
 - b. If the recommendation is rejected,
 - i. WHPS may work with USSS and the individual to resolve outstanding issues.
 - ii. In the event outstanding issues cannot be resolved:
 - (1) a permanent badge may not be issued, but the individual may be placed on restricted access; or
 - (2) continued employment may be deemed inappropriate and WHPS will advise Management and Administration to initiate a Separation Action.

DRAFT

Name	Date
Wendy White	7/30/96

Cornmeal

07 APR 1994

Cery
Cuda
Watkins
Rutledge
Dankowski
Easley
Livingstone
MLM

Ad Hoc committee w/ various parts & assignments
on the security pass issue.

I. Update on where we stand:
give real numbers

70% WITH COMMISSIONED OFFICERS have HP or
at USSS for a hard pass.

(expect 80-85% in mid-MAY.)
"RED ON" all that need it have it or in process.

Donald Baer - has until next week to turn in
paperwork.

17 STEPS ARE ALL APPROVED AND IN PLACE.

Access List -

deleted 65 names, by tightening up.

Mostly govt employees who have regular business
at the Complex, @ 300

OSTP
Temp WH → Perm WH

STAFF

60% of WHO has perm. pass or awaiting.

✓ Expect 80% mid-May.

80% will probably be the max because
of detailees and turnover.

Commission books for senior staff.

→ Memo for Lloyd Cutter re GAO review request.

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Name	Date
Wendy White	7/30/96 Counsel
SIT	DAT

Pl.: 1007, 1008, 1009, 1010, 1011, 1012

$$10^2 \frac{1}{\text{cm}^2} \cdot 10^6 \frac{1}{\text{cm}^2} = 10^8 \frac{1}{\text{cm}^2}$$

TUESDAY

WEDNESDAY

CONCLUSION

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Incomplete passes: Polling the Clinton staff

Democrat-Gazette Staff

Of 45 White House staff members from Arkansas that the *Arkansas Democrat-Gazette* attempted to reach last week by telephone, only eight confirmed that they have permanent passes authorizing access to the White House compound.

Three said they had temporary passes; one said she had no pass at all. Fifteen declined to

answer questions about the passes. Eighteen did not return telephone calls.

Staff members seemed more responsive to reporters' queries on the first day of the survey — Wednesday — than they did late Friday after word of the inquiries spread.

Several referred reporters to the White House press office. On Thursday, the *Democrat-Gazette*

sent the press office by facsimile machine a list of those people and those who could not be contacted. It asked the press office to determine whether those on the list had permanent passes and, if so, when the passes were issued. A second request was faxed to the press office Sunday afternoon.

The press office had not responded to either request as of

Sunday night.

White House press secretary Dee Dee Myers acknowledged recently that delays in filling out forms and processing paperwork have led to more than 100 of the White House's 1,044 employees — including Myers and White House Chief of Staff Thomas F. "Mack" McLarty — working for up to a year in White House offices

See **PASSES**, Page 5A

More questions than answers

The *Arkansas Democrat-Gazette* called 45 Arkansans working in the White House to ask if they'd been issued permanent White House passes. Their responses,

Passes

• Continued from Page 1A

without permanent passes.

A White House staff sheet says processing the passes, which entails Secret Service scrutiny, requires an average of five months.

White House staff members who served in the Carter, Reagan and Bush administrations scoffed at that.

"It's closer probably to five weeks than five months," said Chase Untermeyer, who served as director of presidential personnel under George Bush. "White House staffers should get front-of-the-line treatment. The thing that puzzles me is why it's not being done expeditiously."

Myers said the process is being streamlined. And a McLarty spokesman said last week that McLarty recently received his permanent pass.

Administration critics have said the delay in issuing permanent passes is unprecedented and could compromise White House matters meant to be confidential.

They have also expressed concern that some White House staff members have been slow to apply for security clearances. A security clearance, which allows access to matters of national security, takes longer to process, is handled in a different manner and should not be confused with a White House pass.

Another Bush staff member, who asked that his name not be used, said that no one was allowed to work in the Bush White House more than 90 days on a temporary pass, unless the exception could be justified to chief of staff John H. Sununu.

"No one served six to 12 months on a temporary pass," he said. "If you didn't fill out paperwork, you didn't get a temporary pass. And if you couldn't pass muster, you had to leave."

Sununu, he said, proved to be "a maniac" at ensuring that no one delayed the process.

"If there was a delay," he said, "we were called in. It was an incentive for us to crack the whip."

"Giving the Clinton administration its due," he added, "there was a backlog, a processing glut, of getting passes approved at the beginning. But that clears up. I think they're having trouble now getting these through because they're having background investigation problems."

Until last week, Associate Counsel William Kennedy was responsible for checking the

backgrounds of appointees and supervising issuance of passes. But Kennedy, under pressure from McLarty and Counsel Lloyd Cutler, relinquished those duties Wednesday.

Kennedy had been criticized for paying past-due taxes on a nanny under his wife's maiden name. His payment was made at a time when "nanny taxes" were a politically sensitive White House issue.

Another associate counsel, Beth Nolan, will now oversee passes, McLarty and Cutler said in a statement.

James L. "Skip" Rutherford of Little Rock, senior vice president of the Cranford Johnson Robinson Woods advertising and public relations firm and a personal adviser to Clinton, said that he still has a temporary White House pass for his occasional trips to Washington.

"I don't have a permanent pass," Rutherford said. "But all these things are coordinated through the White House security office. It's not unusual for security clearance to be issued before a permanent pass is issued." But that, he added, did not necessarily indicate a casual attitude about White House security.

A presidential historian at Rice University in Houston suggested a similarity between the Clinton administration and that of Jimmy Carter.

Dr. Francis Loewenheim, who was a White House staff member in the Eisenhower administration, said that Carter's staff in the 1970s had a "more relaxed atmosphere" when it came to White House security.

"Many of the things we see now in the Clinton administration may have been foreshadowed in the Carter years," he said. "My impression is that it's a kind of generic thing — that new people tend to view (security) restrictions as reactionary, fuddy-duddy."

"They come into the White House with the attitude that 'we all know each other from Yale or Oxford; we all trust one another' and don't need the rules."

"On the whole, Republican administrations have tended to have stricter approaches to security, stricter interpretation of the rules."

Often when reports of security concerns arise, Loewenheim said, it's because "old-line professionals" — career civil servants who have spent many years working for federal agencies — "observe security rules very scrupulously" and are "appalled when administrative practices are not followed strictly."

FACT SHEET
WHITE HOUSE PASSES
Wednesday, March 23, 1994

Over the last several weeks, the White House has thoroughly reviewed the issuance of White House passes to tighten procedures.

Even before these steps were taken, existing practices and procedures ensured that White House personnel would not have access to the Complex until they had passed a preliminary security check. That check, which occurs before issuance of even a temporary pass, satisfies one of the principle objectives of a background investigation: minimizing the risk that dangerous or unstable individuals would have access to the White House Complex.

General Procedures

The White House and EOP follow a rigorous, multi-step process before issuing a permanent pass. Under current procedures, it takes, on average, four to five months to complete all phases of the process. The majority of that time (60 to 90 days) consists of a full field background check conducted by the FBI. In virtually every detail, the procedures followed by the Clinton Administration were and are consistent with those followed by previous administrations.

While these procedures are not new, it would be fair to say that the Administration has achieved greater operational efficiency over the last few months. As a result, the bottlenecks that previously delayed issuance of passes have been corrected, and we anticipate that the White House will be able to continue to process passes in approximately four months. In general, the current procedures are as follows:

1. Applicants participate in a security interview and provide preliminary background information.
2. Every applicant's security information is then forwarded to the FBI and checked on the National Crime Indicator Center (NCIC) computer. Simultaneously, the same information is used to ascertain whether any intelligence files are maintained on the individual.
3. Office of Administration Personnel Management Division arranges to have the applicant tested for illegal drug use.

-more-

Fact Sheet, Page 2

4. If the results of the above inquiries and procedures do not indicate a problem, the new employee has 30 days from the "effective date of hire" to complete the necessary forms for a full background check. If the employee does not complete the form in 30 days, he or she will be put on leave without pay status and access to the complex will be revoked (this guideline was effective as of 3-14-94).
5. Upon receipt of the forms, a security officer reviews them to insure completeness, and then forwards them to the FBI and other relevant authorities.
6. At that point, the employee is eligible for a temporary hard pass. To obtain the pass, the employee must be fingerprinted. The prints are forwarded immediately to the FBI for another computer check. If any problems are identified, the appropriate security office is notified.
7. Generally, within 60 to 90 days of receiving the forms, the FBI submits the results of its background check. The security officer (in consultation with White House Counsel's Office) then reviews the file and addresses any concerns that may have been identified. If there are no concerns (or after any concerns have been resolved), the file is sent to the Secret Service for its review and issuance of a permanent pass.

FACTS

- All EOP staff are within compliance of the Chief of Staff guidelines for employees. These guidelines require all employees to complete security paperwork within 30 days of employment. Employees on payroll prior to March 1, 1994 and previously not in compliance with the Chief of Staff's guidelines are now in full compliance, including every member of the senior staff.
- In the Executive Office of the President there are 1044 authorized FTEs (Full Time Equivalents) and OGEs (Other Government Employees), excluding OMB and USTR.
- Of the 1044, more than 900 are eligible to be granted access to classified materials on a need to know basis. For the approximately 100 remaining individuals, we are either awaiting FBI background investigations (which generally take 60-90 days) or paperwork because the individual joined the EOP within the last 30 days.
- The Clinton White House has never ordered the U.S. Secret Service to issue a permanent hard pass over their objections.

-more-

Fact Sheet, Page 3**Non-Government Service Passholders/Temporary Hard Passes**

- There are fewer than 20 non-government service (NGS) temporary hard passholders. Of these, five are employed or retained by the Democratic National Committee, including Paul Regala, Stan Greenberg, Mandy Grunwald, James Carville, David Wilhelm. Those not employed or retained by the DNC are contractors such as AT&T employees.
- All passholders retained or employed by the DNC will submit to a full FBI background security check, an ethics counseling session, and a security briefing. This is a positive, voluntary step by the White House.
- These advisors do not now, and never have had, access to classified material in the Clinton Administration.

WHITE HOUSE PRESS OFFICE



Facsimile Transmittal Sheet

Number of Pages including Cover: 4 Date: _____

To: Matt Moore (Please copy to David Watkins)
thanks.

Fax Number: _____ Office Number: _____

Comments: _____

From the Office Of: _____

Fax Number: _____ Office Number: _____

WED 23 MAR 94
ARKANSAS DEM-GAZETTE

Your papers, please

The case of the missing passes

It's hard to believe that the branch of Arkansas politics at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue is being run by Mack McLarty, who had a reputation for cool efficiency when he went from Arkla to the White House — which looked like a promotion at the time. He always seemed so deft. Now he keeps running into gates:

First there was Travelgate, which he stepped in and handled with (a) apologies all around and (b) censures here and there. Mr. McLarty's was a beautiful comeback from an embarrassing mess-up, combining humility and effectiveness.

But now the White House, aside from being inundated with Whitewater, seems to be afloat with people who have permission to be there only on a temporary basis, not having been cleared by the FBI and Secret Service for permanent passes.

Political security clearly enjoys a high priority in this administration, which can campaign on a permanent basis. National security, however, may be something else.

Dee Dee Myers, official press spokesperson and excuse-maker, said the other day that there might be more than a hundred people without permanent passes wandering the halls, including some top officials. She turns out to be one of them. So does Ricki Seid-

man, who handles the president's schedule.

According to at least one report, Ms. Myers' lack of a permanent pass doesn't keep her from routinely reviewing classified information. One wonders how many others who haven't been cleared by the FBI and Secret Service have access to confidential materials.

More than a year into this administration and something as basic as a security system at the White House looks like no system at all.

Now why are we shocked but not surprised? Can it be because some of us here in Arkansas remember the tangle that Bill Clinton left the Department of Human Services in, and his hands-off administrative style in general?

Is there any excuse for so long a delay in distributing White House passes? Did the dog eat Ms. Myers' Form 86, the questionnaire all White House staffers are supposed to submit? Nope. She has a better reason. "Procrastination," explains Ms. Myers. Which is no excuse, but it's more assuring than the kind of suspicions inevitably raised by this widespread disregard for security. Such as: What in their background might so many Clinton staffers not want the FBI and Secret Service to know about? The quicker these forms are in and security checks done, the more assuring.

Apparently no other administration seems to have waited so long to clear its people since this double-check system was adopted after the Kennedy assassination. Yes, security forms are a lot of paper work. So are income taxes and press badges and lots of other bothersome details in life. But somebody around the White House ought to make it clear that no more excuses will be accepted. We nominate Mack McLarty, who is already on the case, according to news reports.

Passgate, however, may have to wait till Mr. McLarty puts down another outbreak of Nannygate, which could claim Travelgate veteran William Kennedy III. Another day, another gate. Don't you know Mack McLarty misses Arkansas? The gate is open, Mr. McLarty. Hurry back any time. You won't even need a pass.



REVIEW & OUTLOOK

Patsy Takes the Fiske

White House notoriety Patsy Thomasson actually showed up to testify to Congress Tuesday, and proved herself charming. She did little to still concerns about the administration's security procedures, however, and on the matter of her nocturnal visit to Vincent Foster's office in the wake of his death she pleaded the Fiske.

Ms. Thomasson "would like nothing better," she said, than to tell the subcommittee "what I did that night in that office." But due to Special Counsel Robert Fiske's probe into Mr. Foster's death, she couldn't possibly comment on that. Ms. Thomasson, in case you've spent the last month as an orbiting astronaut, is the FOB from Arkansas who was once the top aide of FOB bond dealer and drug convict Dan Lasater, and who has risen in life to be director of the Office of Administration at the White House, where she oversees personnel, computers and some security operations.

These responsibilities seem to weigh heavily in this administration. The White House Counsel's office is responsible for security passes, the immediate responsibility of Associate Counsel William Kennedy III, the former Rose Law Firm partner now tottering on the brink of resignation (maybe by tonight's 7:30 press conference?) over a nanny-tax issue. Last night, the White House said Mr. Kennedy would no longer handle passes.

The security situation is so dire that Congressmen Dan Glickman and Larry Combest, Chairman and ranking minority member of the House Intelligence Committee, have written the Director of Central Intelligence (see text below) more or less suggesting that he cut the White House off from classified information.

More specifically, they asked CIA Director James Woolsey what steps he had taken to ensure that White House staffers without clearances hadn't had access to classified material. The two Members said they were troubled, and that "The urgency of this matter has been highlighted by the arrest of Aldrich Ames." (for astronauts, the

House," Ms. Thomasson responded. "But we certainly could." Ms. Thomasson admits that she lacked a permanent White House pass or security clearance until earlier this month; despite that, she has had 24-hour access to the West Wing. At one point in her testimony, she also said she had "no need" to have the combinations to any safes in the White House; they are in the possession of Charles Easley, a security officer who works for her.

She also revealed that while Mr. Kennedy was handling clearances for White House passes, his own background check was finished in March 1993, but he didn't receive his own permanent pass until December. GOP Rep. Frank Wolf, who first agitated these issues on the House subcommittee that oversees the White House budget, told us that White House Chief of Staff McLarty's background check was completed on January 22, 1993—two days after the inauguration. He didn't get his permanent pass until just this past March 5, the day Mr. Fiske's first subpoenas arrived at the White House. House Members wanted to know what was going on.

Ms. Thomasson, however, persisted in telling Rep. Wolf on Tuesday not to worry. She said there was no reason for concern that senior White House aides lacked permanent passes because they nonetheless had gotten "requisite security" approval. She holds that Mr. McLarty's case was "fully adjudicated," which apparently means the background check was complete and accepted by Mr. Kennedy, who just hadn't gotten around to forwarding the Chief of Staff's papers to the Secret Service.

This is "malarkey," says Phil Larsen, who was administrative officer in Jimmy Carter's White House and ran personnel management under President Bush. The Secret Service must clear a final financial check, and is part of an adjudication. "None of this makes any sense," he told us; it would be "astonishing" if security clearances were issued before passes were. "The two always—and should—go together."

After sleeping overnight on Patsy's testimony, Rep. Wolf and Rep. Bill Clinger, ranking Republican on the Government Operations Committee, called for a GAO investigation of the



Patsy Thomasson

Smoke & Mirrors: EPA Wages War On Cigarettes

By JACOB SULLUM

Smoking is everywhere under attack. This week a House subcommittee considered the Smoke-Free Environment Act, which would ban smoking in almost all indoor locations except residences. New York is poised to join many other cities across the country, including Los Angeles and San Francisco, that have recently enacted sweeping restrictions on smoking. In the past year, Vermont, Maryland and Washington state have also adopted smoking bans, as have major public employers, including the Defense Department.

This flurry of antimoking activity is driven largely by a 1993 report from the Environmental Protection Agency that declared environmental tobacco smoke (ETS) to be "a known human lung carcinogen." Testifying in favor of the Smoke-Free Environment Act last month, EPA Administrator Carol Browner noted that "in the year since publication of the EPA report . . . we have seen a rapid acceleration of measures to protect nonsmokers in a variety of settings."

Most supporters of such measures probably believe that the EPA report presented definitive scientific evidence that exposure to ETS causes lung cancer. But those who have taken a closer look have come to believe that the EPA twisted the evidence to arrive at a predetermined conclusion. The overriding motive was to discourage smoking by making it less acceptable and



more inconvenient. Indeed, the main benefit that Ms. Browner claims for the Smoke-Free Environment Act is its expected impact on smokers.

Yet coercing people for their own good still raises a few hackles in this country, so paternalists need to offer some additional justification. That's why they've been pushing the idea that smoking endangers innocent bystanders. The problem is, the evidence for this claim is weak, inconsistent and ambiguous. The EPA's report seems designed to conceal that problem.

The agency's most blatant trick is to use an unconventional definition of statistical significance. Epidemiologists generally call an association between a risk factor and a disease "significant" if the probability that it occurred purely by chance is 5% or less. This is also the standard that the EPA had always used for risk assessment. Yet for the report on ETS, the agency abandoned the usual definition and called a much less likely association

Members said they were troubled, and that "The urgency of this matter has been highlighted by the arrest of Aldrich Ames," (for astronauts, the recently apprehended KGB mole in the CIA).

When Ms. Thomasson responded to similar concerns expressed this week by House subcommittee chair Steny Hoyer, a Maryland Democrat, she was hardly reassuring. "We don't think we have any Aldrich Ameses at the White

testimony, Rep. Wolf and Rep. Bill Clinger, ranking Republican on the Government Operations Committee, called for a GAO investigation of the White House pass problem.

At 8:15 p.m. last night, AP reported Press Secretary Dee Dee Myers had suddenly issued a "fact sheet" indicating that more than 100 White House staffers lack security clearances and one-third of the 1,044 employees don't have permanent passes.

THE CLINGER, LAMAR, CHAMBERS

PAUL RICHARDSON, NEW YORK

ROBERT A. BROWN, WASHINGTON

ALAN S. BLOOM, CALIFORNIA

ROBERT A. BROWN, NEW JERSEY

RONALD E. COLEMAN, TEXAS

DAVID E. BLUM, CO. BRASS

JAMES H. BLUM, TEXAS

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U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6418

March 17, 1994

Honorable R. James Woolsey
Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505


Dear Mr. Woolsey:

We are writing to register our concern over recent press reports that over 100 White House staff members have not been issued security clearances. Reportedly, at least 15 of them hold senior positions and presumably would have access to classified information as part of their jobs. Our concern is heightened in light of the fact that the White House routinely receives such items as the President's Daily Brief, the National Intelligence Daily, and classified briefings and analytical papers that are distributed to staff in the White House.

In your capacity as the Director of Central Intelligence, you have a statutory obligation to protect intelligence sources and methods. We would like to know what specific steps you have taken to ensure that information classified to protect intelligence sources and methods has not been made available to individuals on the White House staff who do not have appropriate clearances. The urgency of this matter has been highlighted by the arrest of Aldrich Ames where it appears that lax enforcement of compartmentation safeguards may have provided him with unauthorized access to additional sensitive information. In closing, we are troubled by press reports citing "procrastination" by White House staff as the explanation for the long delay in processing clearances for these individuals. Such an attitude toward legitimate security concerns makes your job of protecting sources and methods more difficult but emphasizes its importance.

Sincerely,


Dan Glickman
Chairman


Larry Combest
Ranking Republican Member

The U.N. Goes Retro

If there were any doubts that the 1970s are becoming chic again, they were erased recently when the United Nations Security Council passed a vintage Israel-bashing resolution. The resolution condemning the Hebron massacre is straight out of the old Zionism-is-racism song book.

Since when, first of all, does the U.N. go around condemning the actions of private individuals? Last year's massacre on the Long Island Rail Road was surely horrific and racist, yet somehow the U.N. didn't feel called upon to pass resolutions. Yet Baruch Goldstein becomes a chance to bash an entire nation.

trial subjects of the current talks. But the resolution is artfully worded to call for Israel's withdrawal from the city.

Since Israel is the only nation in the world that is forbidden a turn on the Security Council, it is up to permanent members such as the U.S. to assure some sort of balance. Despite the request of 60 U.S. senators, though, this resolution was not vetoed. Syria, Lebanon and Jordan said they would not return to the peace talks unless the resolution was passed (as if it were a favor they were doing for the U.S.), so U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher found a way to abstain from two of the most egregious para-

57% or less. This is also the standard that the EPA had always used for risk assessment. Yet for the report on ETS, the agency abandoned the usual definition and called a result significant if the probability that it occurred by chance was 10% or less. This change in effect doubles the odds of being wrong.

Even according to the broader definition, only one of the 11 U.S. studies that the report analyzes found a statistically significant link between ETS and lung cancer (according to the usual definition, none of them did). To bolster the evidence, the EPA combined data from these 11 sources into a "meta-analysis," a technique originally intended for randomized clinical trials. UCLA epidemiologist James Enstrom says using meta-analysis with retrospective case-control studies, such as those examined by the EPA, is "fraught with dangers," because the studies are apt to differ in the way they define smokers, the types of lung cancer they include and the confounding variables they consider, and so on.

In any event, the EPA's conclusion—that being married to a smoker raises a woman's chance of getting lung cancer by about 19%—is justified only according to the looser definition of statistical significance chosen especially for these data. By the conventional standard, the meta-analysis does not support the claim that ETS causes lung cancer.

Furthermore, the EPA excluded from its analysis a large U.S. study published in the November 1992 American Journal of Public Health that did not find a statistically significant link between ETS and lung cancer. Had this study been included, the meta-analysis might not have yielded a significant result even by the relaxed standard.

Despite what a July 1992 article in Science described as "fancy statistical footwork," the EPA was able to claim only a weak association between ETS and lung cancer. With a risk increase as low as 19%, it is very difficult to rule out the possibility that the association is due to other factors. In 1991 Gary Huber, professor of medicine at the University of Texas Health Science Center, and two colleagues examined the 30 ETS studies discussed by the EPA in its report. "At least 20 confounding variables have been identified as important to the development of lung cancer," they wrote in Consumers' Research. "No reported study comes anywhere close to controlling, or even mentioning, half of these."

Furthermore, to come up with its estimate of 3,000 additional cancer deaths a year, more than two-thirds of which are supposedly due to exposure outside the home, the EPA relied on several controversial assumptions. It assumed that cotinine, a nicotine metabolite, is a reliable measure of ETS exposure. Yet nicotine is present in a number of foods, and the report itself concedes that "cotinine is not an ideal biomarker for ETS." The EPA also assumed that lung-cancer risk is directly proportional to ETS levels and that no level of ETS can be considered safe. Yet dose-response relationships vary from one substance to another, and many scientists believe that a carcinogen has to be present at a certain level before it can do any harm.

Given these and other contrivances employed by the EPA, it is difficult to avoid

Special Counsel's Probe of Whitewater Includes Bond Dealer Linked to Clinton

By ELLEN JOAN POLLOCK

Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

Special Counsel Robert Fiske's investigation of the Whitewater matter has now extended to a highflying bond dealer with ties to President Clinton.

In a recent wave of subpoenas, Mr. Fiske sought documents about the bond dealer, Don Lasater, and his Lasater & Co., which had a piece of the Arkansas bond business while Mr. Clinton was governor. Mr. Clinton's relationship with Mr. Lasater was an issue in the 1992 presidential campaign. Mr. Lasater raised money for Mr. Clinton's 1984 gubernatorial campaign and gave a job to Roger Clinton, the president's brother.

As governor of Arkansas, Mr. Clinton lobbied the state legislature for a bond deal that benefited Mr. Lasater, while the bond dealer was under investigation for trafficking in cocaine. Mr. Lasater pleaded guilty to drug charges in 1986.

Mr. Fiske also is seeking documents involving former Associate Attorney General Webster Hubbell and White House aide Patsy Thomasson, who once worked for Mr. Lasater. P.O.M. Inc., a company owned by Mr. Hubbell's brother-in-law, is listed on Mr. Fiske's subpoenas as well.

Mr. Lasater couldn't be reached to comment, and it couldn't be determined whether he has received a subpoena from Mr. Fiske. The special counsel has issued more than 150 subpoenas since February. They list dozens of names and request "all documents and/or communications referring or relating" to the people listed. Mr. Fiske declined to comment.

Ms. Thomasson, whose name also appears on Fiske subpoenas, is director of the White House Office of Administration. She was formerly a senior executive of several of Mr. Lasater's companies and helped to run his business while he was jailed on the drug charges.

She was also one of three White House aides who went to Deputy Counsel Vince Foster's office after he committed suicide last July.

Phoenix Group Inc., an investors group once headed by Ms. Thomasson, is being investigated by the Securities and Exchange Commission in connection with possible insider trading in Arctic Alaska Fisheries Corp. stock in June 1992. Shortly afterward, Arkansas-based Tyson Foods Inc. announced an agreement to acquire

the company. Phoenix Group was once called Lasater Inc. and was headed by Mr. Lasater.

Ms. Thomasson said last week that she neither traded in, nor executed an order for, the stock. She hasn't received a subpoena from Mr. Fiske, according to White House officials.

Mr. Hubbell, whose name also appears on subpoenas issued by Mr. Fiske, is linked to several aspects of the Whitewater controversy, including conflict-of-interest allegations involving a suit he handled for the Resolution Trust Corp. while a partner in the Rose Law Firm.

The Rose firm has been trying to determine whether Mr. Hubbell inflated expenses he billed to the firm, and recently referred the matter to state disciplinary authorities. The Little Rock firm has also been mired in a dispute with Mr. Hubbell over \$1 million in expenses and unbilled time charges incurred during his unsuccessful handling of a lawsuit for P.O.M., which has become part of Mr. Fiske's inquiries. John Nields, Mr. Hubbell's Washington lawyer, and the president of P.O.M., Seth "Skeeter" Ward, the brother-in-law of Mr. Hubbell, didn't return phone calls.

The Whitewater affair is expected to dominate a news conference that President Clinton has scheduled for 7:30 p.m. EST tonight. The press conference is part of the administration's new strategy of being more open about the Whitewater controversy.

Obey Is Chosen As Next Chairman Of House Panel

By DAVID ROGERS

Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

WASHINGTON — David Obey, a pro-labor Wisconsin Democrat and protege of the legendary Rules Committee Chairman Richard Bolling, was chosen by his party caucus to be the next chairman of the House Appropriations Committee.

The 55-year-old Mr. Obey won handily over the more-senior Rep. Neal Smith of Iowa. The 152-106 vote symbolized a generational change both in the House and the Appropriations Committee, which wields immense power over federal spending.

First elected to Congress in 1969, Mr. Obey was a young ally to Mr. Bolling, a major architect of House reforms in the 1970s. Mr. Obey's own role in promoting tougher ethics rules cost him votes and the chairmanship of the Budget Committee in the early 1980s. But his career has


House Clears Cornerstone Of Clinton Education Plan

By a WALL STREET JOURNAL Staff Reporter

WASHINGTON — The House approved the cornerstone of President Clinton's education agenda yesterday, a \$422 million school-overhaul plan that will lead to the creation of voluntary national academic standards.

The legislation, called Goals 2000,

The United States proportion of vital corn and the importance w to our worldwide sale



FACT SHEET
WHITE HOUSE PASSES
Wednesday, March 23, 1994

The following is a fact sheet on the issuance of White House Permanent Hard Passes.

The process for the issuance of White House permanent hard passes is as follows:

1. Employee must fill out SF86 (FBI security background form) within 30 days of employment. New employee will receive a temporary, non-picture I.D. upon going through the National Criminal Investigation Check (NCIC). Once all security forms are completed and submitted to White House Security, a temporary hard pass (picture I.D.) can be issued by the White House Security Office.
 2. The FBI conducts a full field investigation of the new employee. The investigation typically takes 60-90 days.
 3. When FBI investigation is complete and the new employee is adjudicated by the FBI, all security forms are sent to the White House Security Office for review.
 4. The White House Security Office reviews all security forms. Approved security forms are sent to the Secret Service for approval.
 5. Secret Service makes determination on whether new employee should receive a permanent hard pass and a security clearance.
 6. Upon approval by the Secret Service, new employee is issued a permanent hard pass (picture identification).
-
- There are 1044 full time equivalent (FTE) staff in the Executive Office of the President (EOP). Nearly 700 have permanent hard passes. About 300 people have temporary hard passes because either their FBI check has not been adjudicated or final approval from the appropriate White House office has not yet been issued.
 - All EOP staff are within compliance of the Chief of Staff guidelines for employees. These guidelines require all employees to complete security paperwork within 30 days of employment. Employees previously not in compliance with the Chief of Staff guidelines are now in full compliance including every member of the senior staff.

- Never has a prospective White House employee or current White House employee been denied a permanent hard pass, period.
- Patsy Thomason, title?, has no authoritative role on the issuance of passes.
- Christopher Cerf, General Counsel of the Office of Administration, has not been detailed by White House Special Counsel Lloyd Cutler to "fix the pass problem." Since January 1, 1994, Mr. Cerf has worked for the Office of Administration under the direction of Patsy Thomason.
- The Clinton White House has never ordered the Secret Service to issue a pass. There are not any "Friends of Bill" with a permanent hard pass. Various advisors to the President have been issued temporary hard passes -- not unlike previous White House administrations.

Non Government Service Pass Holders/Temporary Hard Passes

- There are less than 20 non-government service (NGS) temporary passholders. The majority of NGS passholders include contractors who have regular business at the White House such as AT&T workers.
- Advisors of the President such as Paul Begala, Stan Greenberg, Mandy Grunwald, James Carville have been issued "non-government service" temporary hard passes. Upon receiving these passes at the beginning of the President's term, the advisors were given an ethics briefing by Beth Nolan of the counsel's office.
- These advisors have agreed to submit to a full FBI background security check -- an unprecedented step for any White House Administration. This is a positive voluntary step by the White House to avoid any appearance of conflict or impropriety, or embarrassment to the President.
- Although advisors with temporary hard passes have submitted to a full background FBI investigation, these advisors never have access to classified material due to the nature of their advisory role to the White House.
- Under previous administrations, NGS temporary hard passes have been issued to outside presidential advisors. Unlike this administration, full FBI security background checks were never conducted on these passholders.
- Betsy Wright has never had a permanent pass or temporary pass of any kind.
- Susan Thomases has never been issued a temporary hard pass. At one time, she did have a temporary residence pass; she voluntarily turned it in last year.

Other Passes/Waiting Passholders

- There are approximately 150 people who have received a pass which grants access to the West Wing. These passholders are referred to as "waiting passholders." The majority of the passholders include new employees of the EOP, and chiefs of staff and special assistants from cabinet departments and agencies -- individuals who attend regular meetings and briefings at the White House.
- The issuance of these passes is comparable to previous administrations including the Bush administration.
- Mark Grobemyer was issued such a pass; he turned in the pass last week. He has never had a West Wing office.

Conclusion

Over the last several weeks, the Chief of Staff has taken appropriate steps to tighten the issuance of passes and to tighten the guidelines of filling out the proper paperwork. He is currently reviewing all procedures. The White House has taken swift and positive steps to decrease the lag period for pass approval, and to ensure that there is not even the appearance of conflict or impropriety which could cause embarrassment to the President.

Cross-Cutting and Policy Issues

ISSUE: *White House Passes/Security*

Summary

The White House and the Executive Office of the President have recently come under criticism for delays in issuing permanent passes. *The White House has thoroughly investigated the issue and has already implemented procedures:*

- (1) to reinforce existing guidelines for insuring 100% compliance by all personnel;
- (2) to streamline and accelerate the process for completing full security checks.

Even before these steps were taken, existing practices and procedures insured that White House personnel would not have access to the Complex until they had passed a preliminary security check. That check, which occurs before issuance of even a temporary pass, satisfies one of the principal objectives of a background investigation: minimizing the risk that dangerous or unstable individuals would have access to the White House Complex.

Privacy Issues

It would be inappropriate, and in fact illegal, to comment on the background investigation of any particular individual.

General Procedures:

The White House and EOP follow a rigorous, multi-step process before issuing a permanent pass. *Under current procedures, it takes, on average, four to five months to complete all phases of the process. The majority of that time (60 to 90 days) consists of a full field background check conducted by the FBI.* In virtually every detail, the procedures followed by the Clinton Administration are identical to those followed by previous administrations.

While these procedures are not new, it would be fair to say that the Administration has achieved greater operational efficiencies over the last six months. As a result, the bottlenecks that previously delayed issuance of passes have been corrected, and we anticipate that the White House will be able to continue to process passes in approximately four months. In general, the current procedures are as follows:

1. Applicants participate in a security interview and provide preliminary background information.
2. Every applicant's name and DOB is then forwarded to the FBI and checked on the National Crime Indicator Center (NCIC) computer. Simultaneously, the same information is used to ascertain whether any intelligence files are maintained on the individual.
3. OA Personnel Management Division arranges to have the applicant tested for illegal drug use.
4. If the results of the above inquiries and procedures do not indicate a problem, the new employee has 30 days from the "effective date of hire," to complete the necessary forms for a full background check. If the employee does not complete the form in 30 days, he or she will be put on leave without pay status and access to the complex will be revoked. ~~(See attached McClarty Memo.)~~
5. Upon receipt of the forms, a security officer reviews them to insure completeness, and then forwards them to the FBI and other relevant authorities.
6. At that point, the employee is eligible for a temporary hard pass. To obtain the pass, the employee must be fingerprinted. The prints are forwarded immediately to the FBI for another computer check. If any problems are identified, the appropriate security officer is notified.
7. Within 60 to 90 days of receiving the forms, the FBI submits the results of its background check. The security officer (in consultation with White House Counsel's office where appropriate) then reviews the file and addresses any concerns that may have been identified. If there are no concerns (or after any concerns have been resolved), the file is sent to the Secret Service for its review and issuance of a permanent pass.

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3. When FBI investigation is complete and the new employee is adjudicated by the FBI, all security forms are sent to the White House Security Office for review.
4. The White House ^{PERSONNEL} Security Office reviews all security forms. ^{COUNSEL'S} Approved security forms are sent to the Secret Service for approval.
5. Secret Service makes determination on whether new employee should receive a permanent hard pass and a security clearance.
6. Upon approval by the Secret Service, new employee is issued a permanent hard pass (picture identification).

- There are 1044 full time equivalent (FTE) staff in the Executive Office of the President (EOP). Nearly 700 have permanent hard passes. About 300 people have temporary hard passes because either their FBI check has not been adjudicated or final approval from the appropriate White House office has not yet been issued.

- All EOP staff are within compliance of the Chief of Staff guidelines for employees. These guidelines require all employees to complete security paperwork within 30 days of employment. Employees previously not in compliance with the Chief of Staff guidelines are now in full compliance including every member of the senior staff.

*1 EOP there
e 1044 authorized
ES & OGCs
including OMB &
VSTR.*

adjud
Counsel's
more than
1033 current staff
1900 have completed the
necessary steps to be granted access to classified
materials on a need to know basis. For the approx
individuals we are either awaiting FBI's or paperwork by the individual joined
the last 30 days.

→ of the 200 with ^{favorably adjudicated} ~~completed~~ backgrounds, ^{investigations} over 700 have received permanent passes.

* For ~~of~~ those ^{staff} w/ favorably adjudicated BIs and no perm. pass, ~~the remaining 200 have add~~

~~There~~ There are a variety of steps including a security briefing and receiving ^{other} information from other govt agencies ~~including~~ ^{such as} the IRS ~~between receiving~~ as ~~the~~ having a favorably adjudicated BI and a receiving a perm. pass. ^{from the USSR} Those steps are on-going and the # ^{of staff} receiving perm passes increases every day.

→ ~~of~~ the remaining ~~200~~ individuals (approx 100) ^{for} ~~whom~~ ^{we} have not yet received background investigations, those with access to ~~classified~~ information have all been granted interim security clearances. ~~the~~

DOAL

~~Any delay in the issuance of perm passes is unrelated~~
~~to the army~~

- Never has a prospective White House employee or current White House employee been denied a permanent hard pass, period.
~~Special Asst to the Pres for M&A and Director of the Office of Admin.~~
- ~~Patsy Thomason, title?~~ has no authoritative role on the issuance of passes.
~~The Office of Mgmt & Admin~~
- Christopher Cerf, General Counsel of the Office of Administration, has not been detailed by White House Special Counsel Lloyd Cutler to "fix the pass problem." Since January 1, 1994, Mr. Cerf has worked for the Office of Administration under the direction of Patsy Thomason.
- The Clinton White House has never ordered the Secret Service to issue a pass ^{VS} ~~There are not any "Friends of Bill" with a permanent hard pass. Various advisors to the President have been issued temporary hard passes not unlike previous White House administrations.~~ ^{hard permanent over their objections.}

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- There are fewer than 20 NGS temporary passholders. of these, only 6 are political advisors of the President; ~~the rest~~ they are
- There are less than 20 non-government service (NGS) temporary passholders.
- The majority of NGS passholders include contractors who have regular business at the White House such as AT&T workers.
- Each of the named individuals Karen Anderson, Advisors of the President such as Paul Begala, Stan Greenberg, Mandy Grunwald, James Carville have been issued "non-government service" temporary hard passes. Upon receiving these passes at the beginning of the President's term, the advisors they received an ethics briefing by Beth Nolan of the counsel's office.
- All passholders retained by the DNC will These advisors have agreed to submit to a full FBI background security check, an unprecedented step for any White House Administration. This is a positive voluntary step by the White House to avoid any appearance of conflict or impropriety or embarrassment to the President.
- Although advisors with temporary hard passes have submitted to a full background FBI investigation, these advisors ^{do not now & never have had} never have access to classified material due to the nature of their advisory role to the White House.
- Under previous administrations, NGS temporary hard passes have been issued to outside presidential advisors. Unlike this administration, full FBI security background checks were never conducted on these passholders.
- Betsy Wright has never had a permanent pass or temporary pass of any kind.
- Susan Thomases has never been issued a temporary hard pass. At one time, she did have a temporary residence pass; she voluntarily turned it in last year.

NGS addressed this issue by the last Secret Service and contractors and their contractors. These are contractors and their contractors. These are contractors and their contractors. These are contractors and their contractors.

→ There are fewer than 20 NGS temp. pass holders;
of these approx — are employed ~~not~~ retained by
the DNC, including Begala

Cross-Cutting and Policy Issues

ISSUE: *White House Passes/Security*

Summary

The White House and the Executive Office of the President have recently come under criticism for delays in issuing permanent passes. *The White House has thoroughly investigated the issue and has already implemented procedures:*

- (1) to reinforce existing guidelines for insuring 100% compliance by all personnel;
- (2) to streamline and accelerate the process for completing full security checks.

Even before these steps were taken, existing practices and procedures insured that White House personnel would not have access to the Complex until they had passed a preliminary security check. That check, which occurs before issuance of even a temporary pass, satisfies one of the principal objectives of a background investigation: minimizing the risk that dangerous or unstable individuals would have access to the White House Complex.

Privacy Issues

It would be inappropriate, and in fact illegal, to comment on the background investigation of any particular individual.

General Procedures:

The White House and EOP follow a rigorous, multi-step process before issuing a permanent pass. Under current procedures, it takes, on average, four to five months to complete all phases of the process. The majority of that time (60 to 90 days) consists of a full field background check conducted by the FBI. In virtually every detail, the procedures followed by the Clinton Administration are identical to those followed by previous administrations.

While these procedures are not new, it would be fair to say that the Administration has achieved greater operational efficiencies over the last six months. As a result, the bottlenecks that previously delayed issuance of passes have been corrected, and we anticipate that the White House will be able to continue to process passes in approximately four months. In general, the current procedures are as follows:

1. Applicants participate in a security interview and provide preliminary background information.
2. Every applicant's name and DOB is then forwarded to the FBI and checked on the National Crime Indicator Center (NCIC) computer. Simultaneously, the same information is used to ascertain whether any intelligence files are maintained on the individual.
3. OA Personnel Management Division arranges to have the applicant tested for illegal drug use.
4. If the results of the above inquiries and procedures do not indicate a problem, the new employee has 30 days from the "effective date of hire," to complete the necessary forms for a full background check. If the employee does not complete the form in 30 days, he or she will be put on leave without pay status and access to the complex will be revoked. (See attached McClarty Memo.)
5. Upon receipt of the forms, a security officer reviews them to insure completeness, and then forwards them to the FBI and other relevant authorities.
6. At that point, the employee is eligible for a temporary hard pass. To obtain the pass, the employee must be fingerprinted. The prints are forwarded immediately to the FBI for another computer check. If any problems are identified, the appropriate security officer is notified.
7. Within 60 to 90 days of receiving the forms, the FBI submits the results of its background check. The security officer (in consultation with White House Counsel's office where appropriate) then reviews the file and addresses any concerns that may have been identified. If there are no concerns (or after any concerns have been resolved), the file is sent to the Secret Service for its review and issuance of a permanent pass.

**EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
SECURITY CLEARANCE / PASS STATISTICS**

23-Mar-94 08:38

AGENCY	Number of Staff incl. detailees	No. of Perm. Passes Issued	No of Temp. WH Passes/ WH Access List	No. of Temp. OEOB Passes/ OEOB Access Ls	Adjudicated Backgrounds Completed	Pending Background Investigations	Awaiting Paperwork
White House Office	424	243 256	151	30	96	71	14
Office of Policy Development	53	17	26	10	20	11	5
Council on Environmental Quality	6	5	0	1	0	1	0
Executive Residence	89	89	0	0	0	0	0
Office of the Vice President	26	13	11	2	11	0	1
National Security Council	149	86	49	14	51	1	4
Office of Nat'l Drug Control Policy	23 24	18	1	4 5	1	4 5	0
Office of Science & Tech Policy	41	25	10	6	10	6	0
Council of Economic Advisers	34	28	3	3	3	3	0
Office of Administration	186	177	5	4	5	4	0
TOTAL	1031	701 714	256	74	197	101	24

Various Totals of Statistics

	No. of Staff	No. of Passes (all types)	No. of Temp. Passes/Access	No. of BIs and Awaiting BIs/No Paper	Total Pending or Await. Paper
White House Office	424	424	181	181	85
Office of Policy Development	53	53	36	36	16
Council on Environmental Quality	6	6	1	1	1
Executive Residence	89	89	0	0	0
Office of the Vice President	26	26	13	12	1
National Security Council	149	149	63	56	5
Office of Nat'l Drug Control Policy	23	23	5	5	4
Office of Science & Tech Policy	41	41	16	16	6
Council of Economic Advisers	34	34	6	6	3
Office of Administration	186	186	9	9	4
TOTAL	1031	1031	330	322	125

125

1031
- 120
911

250

Other Passes/Waiting Passholders

- There are approximately 150 people who have received a pass which grants access to the West Wing. These passholders are referred to as "waiting passholders." The majority of the passholders include new employees of the EOP, and chiefs of staff and special assistants from cabinet departments and agencies -- individuals who attend regular meetings and briefings at the White House.
- The issuance of these passes is comparable to previous administrations including the Bush administration.
- Mark Grobmyer was issued such a pass, he turned in the pass last week. He has never had a West Wing office. *what kind of pass*

Conclusion

Over the last several weeks, the Chief of Staff has taken appropriate steps to tighten the issuance of passes and to tighten the guidelines of filling out the proper paperwork. He is currently reviewing all procedures. The White House has taken swift and positive steps to decrease the lag period for pass approval, and to ensure that there is not even the appearance of conflict or impropriety which could cause embarrassment to the President.

**EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
SECURITY CLEARANCE / PASS STATISTICS**

22-Mar-94 16:26

AGENCY	Number of Staff incl. detailees	No. of Perm. Passes Issued	No of Temp. WH Passes/ WH Access List	No. of Temp. OEGB Passes/ OEGB Access La	Adjudicated Backgrounds Completed	Pending Background Investigations	Awaiting Paperwork
White House Office	424	243	151	30	96	71	14
Office of Policy Development	53	17	26	10	20	11	5
Council on Environmental Quality	6	5	0	1	0	1	0
Executive Residence	89	89	0	0	0	0	0
Office of the Vice President	26	13	11	2	11	0	1
National Security Council	149	86	49	14	51	1	4
Office of Nat'l Drug Control Policy	23	18	1	4	1	4	0
Office of Science & Tech Policy	41	25	10	6	10	6	0
Council of Economic Advisers	34	28	3	3	3	3	0
Office of Administration	185	177	5	3	5	3	0
	INC			4		4	
TOTAL	1030	701	256	73	197	100	24

Various Totals of Statistics

	No. of Staff	No. of Passes (all types)	No. of Temp. Passes/Access	No. of BIs and Awaiting BIs/No Paper	Total Pending or Await. Paper
White House Office	424	424	181	181	85
Office of Policy Development	53	53	36	36	16
Council on Environmental Quality	6	6	1	1	1
Executive Residence	89	89	0	0	0
Office of the Vice President	26	26	13	12	1
National Security Council	149	149	63	56	5
Office of Nat'l Drug Control Policy	23	23	5	5	4
Office of Science & Tech Policy	41	41	16	16	6
Council of Economic Advisers	34	34	6	6	3
Office of Administration	185	185	8	8	3
TOTAL	1030	1030	329	321	124

19 MARCH 94

Warren, Michael

new CEE 3/7/94

Barry, Donald

Team 4 started get effective date 3/2

Bon-Amy, Jeremy

new CEE DPC? 3/9/94

Sarmiento, Maria

detailed in PPO.

Peterson, Emily

new CEE DPC

~~Lawrence, Virginia~~

new CEE Council.

Understaff. (Lawrence, David)

PPO. /66676 / SBA (Separating)

~~Lawrence, David~~

new CEE Leg Affairs

Sahn, Dawn

new CEE detailed.

Blatch, Mary Ann Council detailee.

Brown, David Council detailee in Council.

Jurrell, Sylvia Council detailee.

16A. # (Awant, Loretta)

16A. during transition

Young, David? Council detailee.

Gibson

Teasler, 1/31/94 reported

March 22, 1994

Representative Wolf said generally "Heard that Mr. McLarty and Mr. Kennedy had only recently gotten their passes; I (Wolf) would be more comfortable regarding the answers that I got to my questions in earlier letters if I knew they got them (their passes) earlier."

Proposed telephone response to Mr. Wolf:

Mr. McLarty received a favorably adjudicated background investigation on January 22, 1993. Mr. Kennedy started with the Administration on February 10, 1993, and received a favorably adjudicated background investigation on March 5, 1993.

A favorably adjudicated background investigation is the ~~only step necessary to be able to deal~~ *requisite step for consideration* ~~for access to~~ with classified materials.

Proposal:

Is for Patsy Thomasson to give this answer to Mr. Wolf this afternoon by telephone.

and

for Arthur Jones to be able if asked by the Press to give the information to them.

ADJ 96
Pending 71
Awaiting 14
Perm 243

424

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. list	re: Personnel (4 pages)	03/19/1994	b(6)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
Counsel Office
Chris Cerf
OA/Box Number: 6971

FOLDER TITLE:

Personnel Security [2]

2006-1066-F

jm1366

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

CHUCK
EASLEY out
all day

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Senior staff who?
Intern clearances?

Memo - RAISE TO NEW
Level.

→ FIND where it
already says that.
it is the passholders
responsibility.

PAT Nilson → 54907
Payroll list

* NOT WRITTEN PART OF
SEC. PACKET
* COULD HAVE FORM w/ PERM.
PASS.

DRAFT

March 18, 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR ALL EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT STAFF

FROM: MACK McLARTY
CHIEF OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Proper Handling of Classified Information

This memorandum is to remind all staff with valid security clearances and access to classified information that it is your responsibility to ensure that all other staff with whom you share classified information have proper security clearances. You violate proper security procedures (and can be cited for a security violation) if you share classified information with someone lacking proper clearances.

To determine whether another member of the EOP staff has the requisite security clearance for you to share classified information, call the White House Personnel Security Office at extension 6-2345.

DRAFT

**EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
SECURITY CLEARANCE / PASS STATISTICS**

18-Mar-94 10:41

AGENCY	Number of Staff incl. detailees	No. of Perm. Passes Issued	No of Temp. WH Passes/ WH Access List	No. of Temp. OEGB Passes/ OEGB Access Ls	Adjudicated Backgrounds Completed	Pending Background Investigations	Awaiting Paperwork
White House Office	424	233	160	31	80	94	18
Office of Policy Development	53	17	26	10	20	11	5
Council on Environmental Quality	6	5	0	1	0	1	0
Executive Residence	89	89	0	0	0	0	0
Office of the Vice President	26	13	11	2	11	0	1
National Security Council	149	86	49	14	51	1	4
Office of Nat'l Drug Control Policy	23	18	1	4	1	4	0
Office of Science & Tech Policy	41	25	10	6	10	6	0
Council of Economic Advisers	34	28	3	3	3	3	0
Office of Administration	185	177	5	3	5	3	0
TOTAL	1030	691	265	74	181	123	28

Various Totals of Statistics

	No. of Staff	No. of Passes (all types)	No. of Temp. Passes/Access	No. of BIs and Awaiting BIs/No Paper	Total Pending or Await. Paper
White House Office	424	424	191	192	112
Office of Policy Development	53	53	36	36	16
Council on Environmental Quality	6	6	1	1	1
Executive Residence	89	89	0	0	0
Office of the Vice President	26	26	13	12	1
National Security Council	149	149	63	56	5
Office of Nat'l Drug Control Policy	23	23	5	5	4
Office of Science & Tech Policy	41	41	16	16	6
Council of Economic Advisers	34	34	6	6	3
Office of Administration	185	185	8	8	3
TOTAL	1030	1030	339	332	151