Case Number: 2006-1066-F.

FOIA MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Folder Title: FBI Files: Talking Points [2]				
Staff Office-Individual: Counsel's Office-Wallman, Kathleen				
Original OA/ID Number: CF 849				
Row: 21	Section: 4	Shelf: 4	Position: 2	Stack: V

FBI files

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 13, 1996

BY TELECOPY AND HAND DELIVERY

Howard Shapiro, Esq.
General Counsel
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Ninth St. and Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20535

Dear Howard:

As you requested, we reviewed the index attached to your June 11, 1996 letter to determine which of the 138 individuals identified in bold typeset[1] were White House employees or otherwise in need of access to the White House complex at the time the FBI received White House requests for their reports. On the basis of available records, we have determined the following about those 138 individuals:

Requests for forty-seven of the individuals were made properly. Available records confirm that forty-seven of the individuals were employed by the White House or otherwise in need of access at the time the FBI received the requests for reports.

Requests for seventy-four of the individuals were made mistakenly. At the time the FBI received requests for 74 of the individuals, we believe they were no longer employed by or otherwise associated with the White House. Ten of the 74 individuals apparently were new hires by the Clinton administration, but were no longer at the White House at the time the requests were made. Eight of the 74 individuals apparently were holdover employees from the Bush administration (Barnaby Brasseux among them) who had left by the time the requests were made.

Enclosed is a memorandum confirming the receipt by the FBI today of 71 of these 74 files. We retained two of these

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[1] There was a total of 142 names in bold on the list attached to your June 11, 1996 letter. Two names were entered twice and two names, Sarah Shill Fehrer and Lynne Margaret Fletcher, were among those identified on the list of files turned over to the custody of the FBI on June 6, 1996.

files and one already had been returned to the custody of the FBI as follows:

-- We understand that Lunelisa Abiera is still employed by the White House, but had a break in service. A request for her reports was made during this break. As she is still employed, we have maintained custody of her file.

-- We understand that James Cicconi currently is former President Bush's lawyer for purposes of his presidential records and that this position requires White House clearance. Accordingly, we have maintained custody of his file. It appears, however, that the White House requested Mr. Cicconi's reports after his termination and before the White House had notification of his new position.

-- The file of Barnaby Brasseux was returned to the FBI under cover of my letter to you dated June 10, 1996.

The propriety of the requests for seventeen of the individuals is inconclusive. For 17 of the individuals (identified on the Attachment to this letter), we have been unable to locate information sufficient to determine whether the requests were proper when made. We would be happy to provide you with the limited information we have been able to locate about these individuals at your request.

At your request, we also confirmed that Gloria Chonka, Lue Culbreath, Janet Curtis, Hilliard Daniels, Charles Droehe, Madeline Evans and Joseph Ford, whose files were removed from those originally archived and are now maintained in the Personnel Security Office, are employed currently at the White House.

Please let me know if your have questions regarding this material.

Sincerely yours,

Jane C. Sherburne
Special Counsel to the President

Enclosure
cc: Roger Adelman, Esq.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 13, 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

RE: COUNSEL'S OFFICE REQUEST

At the request of Special Associate White House Counsel, Sally Paxton, the Personnel Security Files of the attached individuals were retrieved from the vault of the Personnel Security Office and Room 563 of the Office of Records Management as indicated. These files were put into one box. Subsequently, Paul D. Allen, Jr. of the FBI, in the presence of Sally Paxton, reviewed the contents of the box and confirmed that they contained the Files identified on the attached list.

The entire contents of the box were removed and transferred to the custody of the FBI.

Paul D. Allen, Jr.
Assistant Inspector
Federal Bureau of
Investigation

Sally Paxton
Special Associate Counsel to
the President

AARHUS, Carol Blym
ADDINGTON, David Spears
ALDERMAN, Clifford Thomas
ALEXANDER, Cara Leslie
ALLISON, James Newby - Archived in CF Box #281
ALLISON, Melissa Co - Archived in CF Box #281
ALSOBROOK, David Ernest
AMEND, Deborah Ann
AMICK, Joan Marie
ANDERSON, Debra Rae
ANDERSON, Rebecca Lee - Archived in CF Box #281
ANDERSON, Stanton Dean
ANDERSON, Susan Elizabeth - Archived in CF Box #281
ANDRES, Gary John
ARDLEIGH, Kirsten Clark
ARENDS, Jacqueline Grace
ARMENDARIZ, Rebecca Anne - Archived in CF Box #281
ARMFIELD, Robert Kelly
ASTRUE, Michael James - Archived in CF Box #282
ATKINSON, Dennis Maurice
ATKINSON, Carolyn Florence
AUGUSTINE, Barbara McCauley
AUPPERLE, Tammy Bloo
BAKER, Barbara Wash
BARNES, Karen Lee
BARNETT, Jane Elizabeth
BARTH, Shanette Michaele
BASSUK, Gregory David - Archived in CF Box #282
BATES, David Quentin - Archived in CF Box #282
BAUR, Kathleen Elizabeth
BEACH, Chester Paul
BECHERER, Thomas L. - Archived in CF Box #282
BEDARD, Catherine Therese
BENEDI, Antonio - Archived in CF Box #282
BEREZNY, Caroline Clare
BINION, Elizabeth Ann
BIZIC, Mark Gustav
BLACK, Judy Ann - Archived in CF Box #283
BLACKBURN, Barbara Ann
BLAKEY, Marion Clifton - Archived in CF Boc #283
BLUMENTHAL, Gary Robert
BOSTICK, Gladys Rebecca
BRADY, Phillip Donley
CARLSON, Daniel Lee - Archived in CF Box #284
CARLSON, Kathleen Shaughnessy
CARNES, Kelly Hawkins - Archived in CF Box #285
CARPENTER, Judith Lee
CARPENTER, Margaret Van Wagenen - Archived in CF Box #285
CARR, Michael Damon - Archived in CF Box #285
CAVENDISH, Sara Joan - Archived in CF Box #285
CHANG, Jennifer - Archived in CF Box #285
CIPRIANI, Aida Marie - Archived in CF Box #286
COLBY, Clifford William
CORNICK, Susan Ann - Archived in CF Box #286

COURTEMANCHE, Jack L. - Archived in CF Box #286
CURRY, Dorothy Jane - Archived in CF Box #287
DIETZ, Kristine Marie
DONALDSON, Helen Colle - Archived in CF Box #288
DORN, Nancy Patricia - Archived in CF Box #288
DOYLE, Megan Eileen
EDDY, Laura Hersloff - Archived in CF Box #289
ELKINS, Lucy Mae - Archived in CF Box #289
EVANS, Gregory Charles - Archived in CF Box #289
FENDLER, Gary Ellis - Archived in CF Box #289
FOSTER, Patricia Helen
FREE, Charles Martin - Archived in CF Box #290
FULLER, Karen Hart - Archived in CF Box #290
GARLINGTON, Audey Joyce - Archived in CF Box #290
GERRARD, Constance - Archived in CF Box #291
GILLETTE, Katherine James - Archived in CF Box #291
GLEN, Alixe Reed - Archived in CF Box #291

Unless otherwise indicated, the files were retrieved from the Personnel Security Office vault.

INDIVIDUALS WITH INCONCLUSIVE INFORMATION

ASHLEY, MARC ANTHONY
ASLANI-FAR, M. ADEL
BALILES, ROY KENNETH
BARRE, BART CHRISTOPHER
BELL, MARIAM MCKOWEN
BRACKEN, ANN ROSEMARY
CARR, CHRISTOPHER STEVEN
CARROLL, SALLY CLAUDE
CATE, JOSEPH NELSON
CAVE, JULIAN ATTAWAY
CHADWICK, ALYSON HILLARY
CHAMBERS, RICHARD LEE
CHAPMAN, JAMES DANIELS
CHAPPELL, LOGAN STANLEY
CHARLES, PETER FARNAM
DEAN, BENJAMIN PAUL
FLETCHER, MARILYN ANNE

MESSAGE CONFIRMATION

JUN-13-96 22:25

FAX NUMBER : 2024561213

NAME : COMMUNICATIONS

FAX NUMBER : 93245366

PAGE : 07

ELAPSED TIME : 02'26"

MODE : G3 STD

RESULTS : O.K

TO: JANE SHERBURNE

FROM: JODIE TORKELSON

RE: Excerpts from the GAO's Pass Audit Report

As you requested, attached are relevant pages from the GAO's access pass audit report. Please note that these are excerpts from the full report. Relevent sections (containing both favorable and unfavorable information) have been underlined.

Please call me if you have questions (x. 62861).

GAO

Report to Congressional Requesters

October 1995

PERSONNEL SECURITY

Pass and Security Clearance Data for the Executive Office of the President

GAO/NSIAD-96-20

GAO

United States
General Accounting Office
Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and
International Affairs Division

B-265771

October 19, 1995

The Honorable William F. Clinger, Jr.
Chairman, Committee on Government
Reform and Oversight
House of Representatives

The Honorable Frank R. Wolf
The Honorable Porter J. Goss
House of Representatives

You asked us to review the White House's procedures for access passes and security clearances issued since January 20, 1993. Because of reported delays of over a year in issuing passes, you expressed concerns about how the White House was managing the access pass and security clearance processes. As agreed with your offices, this report presents our (1) analysis of the steps in the access pass approval process for 1993 and 1994 and (2) observations on internal controls over the access pass and security clearance processes.

Background

One of the ways the Secret Service protects the President and other senior officials is the use of a system of access passes to the White House complex. According to the Secret Service, about 7,000 people have passes allowing access to the White House complex, which includes the White House, the Old Executive Office Building, and the New Executive Office Building. The number varies daily and includes members of the press, military personnel, Secret Service employees, as well as employees of the Executive Office of the President, detailees from other government agencies, volunteers, contractor employees, and residence staff. Our review covers staff and contractors from selected offices of the Executive Office of the President, totaling 638 individuals.

The various types of White House access passes[1] fall into two categories—temporary passes, which are issued initially for 90 days and can be extended beyond the initial period, and permanent passes. The process, as first documented in March 1994, for obtaining a temporary access pass requires employees to

[1]The Secret Service identified 35 different types of access passes, including several for access to the White House, several for access to the Old Executive Office Building, several for access to the New Executive Office Building, and 3 for members of the press to gain access to limited parts of the White House complex.

Figure 1: Average Time Required to Complete Selected Steps in the Permanent Access Pass Process During 1993 and 1994



Note: The times for individual steps do not add to the total processing times because not all individuals were involved in every step. Also, no interval is shown for the submission of the SF-86 in 1994 because the SF-86 was signed on average before an individual entered on duty.

The longer time needed to process 1993 entrants was primarily attributable to the time individuals took to complete the SF-86 and to subsequent actions taken by the Executive Office of the President. These actions include the time taken to review the SF-86; and then to review the FBI investigative report and other reports, and recommend that a permanent access pass be approved.

During 1993, there were no written time standards for completing the various access pass processes, except for goals set by the FBI relating to its segment of the process. The White House set a standard in March 1994

that gave each employee 30 days to complete the SF-86. The Treasury, Postal Service and General Government Appropriations Act for 1995 (P.L. 103-329), enacted in September 1994, made this standard a legal requirement and also mandated that, with certain exceptions, an appropriate access pass be recommended for approval within 6 months after a person entered on duty with the Executive Office of the President. The FBI raised its goal for completing background investigations from 45 days to 60 days in late 1994. Although the FBI did not always meet this goal, FBI and Secret Service actions did not substantially add to the processing time in 1993.

White House and congressional actions have established process changes and controls to improve the access pass and security clearance processes. For the time intervals and offices we reviewed, with few exceptions, the time intervals declined, and the procedures were adhered to. However, our observations indicate a potential for strengthening controls in several selected areas, particularly at the start of a new administration. The areas related to renewing temporary passes, revoking passes after separation, and granting security clearances. The scope of our work did not address whether problems occurred as a result of the potential control weaknesses. While we did not identify specific problems, we believe it is appropriate to consider improving these controls.

Processing Times Were Longer in 1993 Than in 1994

The processing time between when a person entered on duty, obtained a temporary pass, and received Secret Service approval for a permanent pass was substantially shorter in 1994 than in 1993.[5] The White House attributed the time reductions in the process to the following reasons: the number of individuals entering on duty decreased in 1994; the White House corrected inefficiencies and implemented computerized tracking; the White House and Congress established time standards; and staff and officials became more experienced with the process. The two steps that most contributed to the lengthy processing time during 1993 were the time taken by employees to submit paperwork and the Executive Office of the President to review it.

Employee Timeliness

The amount of time individuals took to complete the SF-86 after entering on duty was reduced from about 100 days to a few days or less from 1993 to 1994. According to White House officials, this change occurred because

[5]Unless otherwise specified, a specific year refers to when an action began, but did not necessarily conclude.

the White House issued standards in March 1994 that required individuals to submit the SF-86 within 30 days of entering on duty. Public Law 103-329 put this 30-day requirement in law. Prior to these actions, there were no documented Executive Office of the President standards for this part of the process. However, White House officials said that informal standards existed. (See app. III.)

Agency Timeliness

The times needed by the Executive Office of the President to (1) review the SF-86 for completeness before submitting it to the FBI and (2) review the FBI's investigative report and other documentation and recommend to the Secret Service that a permanent pass be issued declined from 1993 to 1994. The second step took 174 days in 1993 and 46 days in 1994.

The FBI was not always able to meet its goal for conducting background investigations during either 1993 or 1994 and increased its goal from 45 days to 60 days in late 1994. FBI officials cited several reasons for not meeting the goal, including an increased overall caseload and reduced resources.

The average number of days it took the Secret Service to approve a permanent pass after the Executive Office of the President recommended that a pass be approved decreased from 29 days in 1993 to 7 days in 1994. The Secret Service attributed the 1993 average in part to the Executive Office of the President not promptly sending pass requests to the Secret Service and the 1994 average to the time needed to address questions related to protective interest issues. We analyzed information provided by the Secret Service for 1994 that showed relatively short processing times within the Service, but it was not sufficiently detailed to verify the reasons for delay. Similar data for 1993 were not available. (See app. III.)

Observations on Controls

White House and legislative actions have resulted in a number of process changes and additional controls designed to improve the timeliness of the access pass and security clearance processes. The data we analyzed show that these changes, with few exceptions, are being adhered to. For example, when it was discovered that a career employee had taken longer than the 6 months allowed under Public Law 103-329 to be recommended for a permanent pass, the Executive Office of the President initiated action to suspend the employee. The issue causing the delay was resolved within a month and a pass was issued. Also, most individuals have complied with a March 14, 1994, Chief of Staff directive to complete the SF-86 within a

specified time, up to 30 days, although 11 did not. As described below, we have several observations on potential opportunities to strengthen controls.

First, we noted that the White House procedures and legislative provisions recognize the possibility of delays beyond employee or Executive Office of the President control, such as reviews by other agencies taking several months to complete. Additional attention may be warranted to strengthen controls when it is necessary to renew temporary access passes in these situations. Temporary passes give people access to the White House complex while they wait for a permanent pass and are usually issued to individuals within a few days of when they enter on duty. Temporary passes are usually issued for 90 days but may be extended in 30-day increments. Individuals included in our analysis held temporary passes for an average of 341 days prior to obtaining final approval for a permanent pass in 1993 and for 110 days in 1994. Our discussions with Secret Service officials and our analyses indicated that during the longer processing times in 1993, the Service routinely granted eight or more extensions to individuals for temporary passes as requested by the Executive Office of the President. Secret Service officials stated that during the initial transitions of administrations it was normal to have more frequent extensions. (See app. IV.)

Second, additional attention may be warranted to strengthen controls to ensure that both temporary and permanent passes are revoked when an individual leaves, when appropriate. Of the 638 records we analyzed, 188 (29 percent) show that the individuals had left their designated Executive Office of the President organization. We did not verify whether permanent passes were voided or returned in these cases.[6] However, the data showed that seven permanent passes were approved by the Secret Service after the person left. In these cases, Secret Service officials said that they either did not know these people had left the Executive Office of the President or were told the person still needed a pass. The Secret Service has no process to verify an individual's continued need for a pass. Secret Service officials stated that they rely on the White House to notify them when an individual leaves or a pass should be terminated. White House officials stated that they monitor arrivals and departures of staff closely and that passes are returned unless retention is justified. We confirmed that the White House has procedures in this area, but we did not discuss specific cases. (See app. IV.)

[6]We used individual records with specific identifying data excluded and thus could not follow up on specific cases.

After the reviewing office has resolved any questions, the relevant security office in the Executive Office of the President sends a written request to the Secret Service for a permanent access pass for the employee. The Secret Service, if it agrees there is no danger to the President or other Service protectees, issues the permanent pass. According to White House and Secret Service officials, during the period of our review, the White House never directed the Secret Service to issue a pass in circumstances that it was otherwise reluctant to do.

According to White House officials, the process for obtaining a permanent pass is the same for a volunteer as for an employee or contractor. These officials said that most White House volunteers are citizens who perform duties related to correspondence and do not have permanent passes, but are allowed entry based on an access list and identification. However, they also said that there are about 80 volunteers who work in areas in which a temporary or permanent pass is more suitable for allowing them to carry out their responsibilities. For example, the current and most recent White House Counsel have accepted no salary.

Table III.2: Average Days From the Date Entered on Duty to the Date a Permanent Pass Was Approved by the Secret Service

Year	Average number of days—unadjusted data	Average number of days—adjusted data
1993	346	356
1994	98	129
Overall average	295	315

Only 2 permanent passes received final approval prior to September 20, 1993, and of the 400 staff entering on duty during 1993, 250 took over 300 days to be approved for permanent passes. Only 1 of 104 staff entering on duty in 1994 took over 300 days. White House officials attributed the longer processing times in 1993 to (1) operational and administrative inefficiencies and (2) the large volume of staff entering on duty in 1993. They said the time decreased in 1994 because (1) fewer people began work, (2) the White House corrected some inefficiencies in the process, (3) the White House Chief of Staff and Congress emphasized the pass process and established standards for it, (4) the White House began using computers to track the process, and (5) staff and officials became more experienced in the process.

With the passage of Public Law 103-329, an employee of the Executive Office of the President must be placed on leave without pay if the person has not, within 6 months of commencing employment or by October 31, 1994, whichever is later, had a background investigation, if completed, forwarded to the Secret Service for issuance of an access pass. Two individuals did not have a permanent pass request made within the required 6-month time period as of December 13, 1994—the last date covered by our analysis.[1] Six contractors also did not meet the legal deadline, but contractors were not considered to be subject to the law, according to White House officials.[2]

The following sections describe our analysis related to each time interval between the date a person entered on duty and the date the person was approved for a permanent pass. We also discuss key time intervals related

[1]According to White House officials, the first individual was a career employee with civil service protection whose background investigation was completed on November 5, 1994. According to the officials, proper administrative action was taken on November 18, 1994, to place the individual on leave without pay. The officials added that a background issue was subsequently resolved and a pass was issued to this person within 30 days of the administrative action. The second individual was a person who was waiting for Senate confirmation for a position with the Office of National Drug Control Policy and had requested that a permanent pass not be issued until confirmed by the Senate.

[2]According to White House officials, for purposes of administrative efficiency, contractors are now treated as if they were subject to P.L. 103-329. According to the officials, this change was made at some time after October 31, 1994, the effective date of the law.

to the drug test date. Although the White House does not consider the drug test to be part of the access pass process, we include information about the drug test date because our requesters asked that we analyze that data.

Completion of the SF-86

The first step in obtaining a permanent pass is for the individual to complete the SF-86 and related paperwork. Table III.3 shows that the average number of days needed to complete the SF-86 after entering on duty decreased from 1993 to 1994.

Table III.3: Average Days From the Date Entered on Duty to the Date the SF-86 Was Signed

Year	Average number of days—unadjusted data	Average number of days—adjusted data
1993	100	107
1994	-52[a]	3
Overall average	66	86

[a]The individuals who entered on duty in 1994, on average, signed their SF-86 52 days prior to entering on duty. (See app. I for an explanation of how steps can occur in a different order, resulting in negative numbers.)

For the period of our review, there were 190 individuals who took more than 100 days to complete the SF-86, including 36 who took over 300 days. All but 3 of the 190, and all of the 36, entered on duty during 1993.

The White House attributed the time reductions from 1993 to 1994 to staff compliance with a directive issued by the Chief of Staff on March 14, 1994. The directive required that (1) all staff who entered on duty prior to March 1, 1994, complete their SF-86 by March 18, 1994; (2) all staff who entered on duty between March 1, 1994, and March 14, 1994, complete their SF-86 by March 31, 1994; and (3) all staff who entered on duty after March 14, 1994, complete their SF-86 within 30 days of entering on duty. The White House further issued guidelines on March 21, 1994, that gave each new employee 30 days from the date the individual entered on duty to complete the SF-86. Prior to these instructions, there were no written standards for completing these documents. Employees who do not meet this standard are to have their access to the White House revoked and are to be placed on leave without pay until they complete the paperwork.

Eleven individuals (not counting 22 contractors) did not meet the deadline required by the Chief of Staff's directive or White House guidelines. White House officials said that in all of these cases, the situation was resolved

Table III.4 shows that the average number of days needed for the Executive Office of the President to review submitted SF-86s for correctness and completeness before forwarding them to the FBI decreased from 1993 to 1994.

Table III.4: Average Days From the Date an Individual Signed an SF-86 to the Date the Executive Office of the President Forwarded the SF-86 to the FBI

Year	Average number of days—unadjusted data	Average number of days—adjusted data
1993	38	37
1994	18	18
Overall average	33	32

In 1993, the Executive Office of the President's review of SF-86s took over 100 days in 34 of 434 cases, and in 1994, it took over 100 days in only 2 of 155 cases. White House officials stated that the unfamiliarity of staff and reviewing officials with the information requirements of the SF-86 caused reviewing officials to request additional data, thus delaying the requests for FBI investigations.

Table III.5 shows that the average number of days for the Executive Office of the President to recommend approval of a permanent pass after receiving the FBI's investigative report decreased from 1993 to 1994.

Table III.5: Average Days From the Date the FBI Concluded the Background Investigation to the Date the Executive Office of the President Recommended Approval of a Permanent Pass

Year	Average number of days—unadjusted data	Average number of days—adjusted data
1993	174	175
1994	46	48
Overall average	127	125

During 1993, the Executive Office of the President took over 100 days to recommend the approval of a permanent pass in 202 of 294 cases, whereas in 1994, it took over 100 days in only 26 of 217 cases. According to White House officials, the longer times were attributable to waiting for information other than the background investigation, such as tax checks, and the decrease from 1993 to 1994 resulted from correcting procedural inefficiencies.

FBI Indicators

Table III.6 shows that the average number of days needed by the FBI to conduct a background investigation increased from 1993 to 1994.

Table III.7: Average Days From the Date of Executive Office of the President Recommendation to Secret Service Approval of a Permanent Pass

Year	Average number of days—unadjusted data	Average number of days—adjusted data
1993	29	31
1994	7	7
Overall Average	12	12

During 1993, the Secret Service took over 30 days to approve 34 of 115 passes, whereas in 1994, this occurred in 15 of 388 cases.

The Secret Service attributed the 1993 average in part to the Executive Office of the President not promptly sending pass requests to the Secret Service and the 1994 average to the time needed to address questions related to protective interest issues. We analyzed information provided by the Secret Service for 1994 showing that it took the Secret Service an average of 3 days to approve a permanent pass after receiving the pass recommendation from the Executive Office of the President. This information was not sufficiently detailed to verify the reasons for delay, and similar data for 1993 were not available.

Drug Test Indicators

All 572 noncontract employees included in the unadjusted database reported for drug tests. Contractors are responsible for conducting their employees' drug tests, and we did not separately request the dates for these tests. Table III.8 shows that the average number of days between when the person entered on duty to when the drug test was taken decreased from 1993 to 1994.

Table III.8: Average Days From the Date Entered on Duty to the Date the Drug Test Was Taken[a]

Year	Average number of days—unadjusted data	Average number of days—adjusted data
1993	24	29
1994	-49	-12
Overall average	10	23

[a]A negative number indicates that individuals, on average, took the drug test prior to entering on duty. (See app. I for an explanation of how steps can occur in a different order, resulting in negative numbers.)

The Executive Office of the President Drug-Free Workplace Plan, as amended in December 1992, states that due to the large number of new employees at the beginning of a new administration, it is impractical to test all of them prior to their appointments. According to White House

the administration individuals were not required to complete an SF-86 before receiving a temporary pass.

Our analysis of the database indicates that two noncontractors were issued temporary passes after March 14, 1994, even though they had not yet submitted an SF-86. White House officials said that these individuals had both been interns and had a prior SF-86 on file, which had not been reflected in the database. Ten contractor employees were also issued temporary passes after March 14, 1994, even though they had not yet submitted an SF-86. White House officials said that Office of Administration policy at that time was to not process the SF-86 for contractors until after they had concluded a probationary period. The officials stated that this is no longer the policy.

Temporary Passes Were Often Extended

Temporary passes are usually issued for 90 days but can be extended. Table IV.2 shows the average time between issuance of the temporary pass and approval for the permanent pass.

Table IV.2: Average Days From the Date a Temporary Pass Was Issued to the Date a Permanent Pass Was Approved by the Secret Service

Year	Average number of days—unadjusted data	Average number of days—adjusted data
1993	341	343
1994	110	114
Overall average	293	294

In 1993, 361 of 398 individuals took 200 days or more to be approved for a permanent pass, whereas in 1994, only 5 of 104 individuals receiving temporary passes took 200 days or more to be approved for a permanent pass. White House officials attributed the decrease from 1993 to 1994 to changes in the processing procedures.

Our discussions with Secret Service officials and our analyses indicated that during the longer processing times in 1993, the Service routinely granted eight or more extensions to individuals for temporary passes as requested by the Executive Office of the President. In commenting on a draft of this report, Secret Service officials stated that during the initial transitions of administrations it was normal to have more frequent extensions.

In addition, as of December 13, 1994, the cutoff date for our analysis, 22 individuals, including 10 contractors, were employed but had not been

individual is no longer employed and thus no longer needs a permanent pass. Without this notification, the Secret Service has no way of knowing who continues to need access.

White House officials stated that they maintain a checkout procedure for employees who leave Executive Office of the President employment, and unless the White House allows continued access, the employee must surrender his or her access pass upon separation. The White House provided us with a document supporting these procedures. According to a White House official, this process is checked by regular reviews of attrition and accession lists of White House pass holders. The official also said that White House pass holder lists are frequently updated.

Access to Classified Security Information

The White House allows employees with permanent White House passes and a need-to-know to have access to classified information up to the top secret level. Generally, executive branch agencies are required by executive order to follow uniform governmentwide procedures and apply specific criteria when granting security clearances to individuals. Executive branch agencies grant security clearances under Executive Order 10450, as amended, and at the time of our review, handled classified data under Executive Order 12356, which was revoked and replaced by Executive Order 12958 on April 17, 1995.[1] According to White House officials, the White House Office, the Office of the Vice President, and the Office of Policy Development are not subject to the requirements of Executive Order 10450 but nevertheless use the same procedures and criteria to issue the passes that give employees access to classified information on a need-to-know basis.

As of December 1994, 381 of 638 records in the database indicate that the person had been authorized access to classified information. These included 359 staff assigned to the White House Office, the Office of the Vice President, and the Office of Policy Development who have access to classified information on a need-to-know basis by holding a permanent White House pass. An additional 22 records indicate staff assigned to the Office of Administration and the Office of National Drug Control Policy who have security clearances granted under governmentwide procedures. The first of the permanent White House passes was not approved until September 30, 1993, and the first of the 22 Office of Administration and

[1]These orders establish uniform requirements for personnel security programs in the federal government. A security clearance is a certification that an individual who requires access to information classified at a certain level has been found eligible and may be permitted access to classified information

United States General Accounting Office

GAO

Report to Congressional Requesters

October 1995

PERSONNEL SECURITY

Pass and Security Clearance Data for the Executive Office of the President

GAO/NSIAD-96-20

- complete and submit required paperwork, including the Questionnaire for Sensitive Positions Form (Standard Form (SF)-86) and
- undergo limited background checks by the Secret Service and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

The process for obtaining a permanent access pass generally requires the following:

- The relevant Executive Office of the President security office reviews the required paperwork and forwards it to the FBI.
- The FBI conducts a background investigation.
- The Executive Office of the President reviews the FBI report and other information and determines whether to recommend approval of a permanent pass.
- The Secret Service issues the pass, if it has no objections relating to protective interest issues.

See appendix II for a detailed discussion of the above processes.

The White House allows employees of the White House Office, the Office of the Vice President, and the Office of Policy Development with permanent White House passes and a need-to-know to have access to information classified up to the top secret level. Staff from other offices within the Executive Office of the President grant security clearances under Executive Order 10450, as amended.[2]

To measure timeliness of the pass process, we analyzed dates in the process for employees who entered on duty between January 20, 1993, and September 16, 1994. These 638 individuals were paid from appropriations available to 5 offices of the Executive Office of the President.[3] As agreed with your offices, the scope of our work was to determine the time it took to obtain passes and analyze time intervals for selected steps in the process. The White House explained the reasons for some of the processing times and we incorporated these statements as appropriate. However, we did not evaluate the reasons for time frame delays or the

[2]Executive Order 10450 provides the basic security standards for agencies to follow. Executive Order 12968, issued on August 4, 1995, updated and revised the government's personnel security program, but did not supersede Executive Order 10450.

[3]These included employees who were, according to White House officials, on track to receive a permanent pass. The employees included current and former staff, contractors, and detailees who worked for one of the following offices within the Executive Office of the President: the White House Office, the Office of the Vice President, the Office of Policy Development, the Office of Administration, and the Office of National Drug Control Policy. Not included were unpaid volunteers and individuals who were employed for short periods early in the administration.

White House explanations. Appendix I describes, in detail, the scope and methodology of our review.

Results in Brief

Individuals entering on duty during 1993 received final approval for permanent White House access passes an average of 346 days from their start date, but the average time of approval fell to 98 days for staff entering in 1994.[4] According to White House officials, the White House has not historically tracked time interval data related to the access pass process, thus we could not compare the information we analyzed to prior experience.

Figure 1 shows the relative time needed to obtain a permanent pass in 1993 and 1994 for each process step.

[4]These are the averages for all individuals approved for access passes. In the appendixes, we also discuss averages based on adjustments reflecting cases where an individual deviated from the steps generally followed in the process. For example, an individual may have completed certain paperwork for the process because of prior employment before entering on duty with the Executive Office of the President.

Third, procedures may be needed to require interim security clearances for White House Office staff who later receive access to classified information if they hold permanent access passes. Through December 1994, 381 of 638 records we analyzed show that the person had been authorized access to classified information. These included 359 personnel in the White House Office, the Office of the Vice President, and the Office of Policy Development who could have been given access to classified information on a need-to-know basis if they held a permanent White House pass.[7] Also, 22 individuals in the Office of Administration and the Office of National Drug Control Policy could have been granted access under Executive Order 10450. The first of the permanent White House passes was not approved until September 30, 1993, and the first of the 22 security clearances was not granted until June 22, 1993.[8] We asked how the offices conducted business involving classified information during these 8- and 5-month periods. White House officials stated that about two dozen senior staff received interim clearances during this time. They also stated that the overwhelming majority of the classified work done in the Executive Office of the President is done by the staff of the National Security Council, which is not one of the offices included in the data we analyzed. Procedures for dealing with similar circumstances in future administrations may be needed. (See app. IV.)

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

In oral comments on a draft of this report, White House officials generally agreed with our statistical analysis. However, they raised concerns about our observations on the potential for strengthening of selected controls. They specifically stated that we had not identified actual problems resulting from these potential weaknesses. We agreed that is the case because the scope of our work did not extend beyond a review of the process. We clarified this point in the report where appropriate.

Our position is that selected control measures can be improved and not that a specific problem has occurred. For example, we discussed controls over passes and clearances because the procedures we examined indicated the potential for additional internal controls in these areas. Our limited review did not examine either the controls or their effects in-depth, but we believe that the issues warrant consideration. We believe that the need for such controls is most apparent at the beginning of a new

[7]Secret Service officials stated that their procedures for granting access passes do not involve security clearance issues.

[8]In addition, one individual had a clearance at the time he entered on duty.

administration; thus our discussion of them is not based on the existence of documented problems.

White House officials also suggested several technical corrections, which we made as appropriate.

In oral comments on a draft of this report, Secret Service officials generally agreed with our report. They suggested several technical corrections, which we made as appropriate.

In written comments on a draft of this report, the FBI asked that we clarify certain information. We revised the report to reflect the FBI's comment. (See app. V.)

Unless you publicly announce its contents earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days after its issue date. At that time, we will send copies to appropriate congressional committees, the White House Chief of Staff, the Assistant to the President for Management and Administration, the Attorney General, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Director of the Secret Service, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and other interested parties. We will make copies available to others on request. If you have any questions concerning this report, please call me on (202) 512-8412. Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix VI.



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and NASA Issues

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Abbreviations

FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
SF	Standard Form

Scope and Methodology

To assess timeliness of processing White House access passes and security clearances, we examined the time intervals associated with each processing step; reviewed the process and associated laws, regulations, policies, and procedures; and interviewed officials from the Executive Office of the President, Secret Service, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Office of Government Ethics, and Defense Finance and Accounting Service.

To calculate the processing time for passes and clearances, we collected the following key event dates associated with processing steps for staff[1] assigned to the White House Office, Special Assistance to the President (Vice President's Office), Office of Policy Development, Office of Administration, and Office of National Drug Control Policy, on or after January 20, 1993, who were paid with Executive Office of the President appropriated funds and needed a permanent pass.

1. Date the person entered on duty.
2. Date the Standard Form (SF)-50 was signed.[2]
3. Date the person took a drug test.[3]
4. Date the person signed the SF-86.
5. Date the person was issued a temporary pass.
6. Date the FBI initiated a background investigation.
7. Date the FBI finished the investigation.
8. Date the permanent pass was approved.[4]
9. Date the permanent pass was issued.[5]
10. Date the security clearance was granted.[6]
11. Date the person separated, if applicable.

For reasons of confidentiality, the White House provided a number and office designation for individuals covered in our analysis.

[1]Staff included long-term contractors, reimbursable detailees (terms of 6 months or more), and consultants, as well as career and political appointment staff needing a permanent pass.

[2]The SF-50 indicates that a personnel action has been completed; in this case, it relates to the date entered on duty.

[3]As indicated in appendix III, this is not a formal part of the access pass process.

[4]For this interval, we used the date the Executive Office of the President recommended to the Secret Service that a permanent pass be approved.

[5]For this interval, we used the date the Secret Service approved a permanent pass for issuance.

[6]Secret Service officials said that this is not part of the access pass process.

The White House compiled a database containing an identifier and the key dates, when available,[7] for each of 638 individuals. Dates were provided for (1) individuals entering on duty as of January 20, 1993, through September 16, 1994, and (2) process steps completed by December 13, 1994. Dates associated with processing steps involving the Secret Service and FBI were supplied to the White House by those agencies. We received the database containing the key event dates from the White House in January 1995 and worked with the White House to correct administrative mistakes found in the database. We also verified a random sample of event dates using original personnel documents and other records.

We analyzed intervals between key event dates to determine average, minimum, and maximum processing times as well as trends over time. We discussed our analyses with White House, Secret Service, and FBI officials to determine reasons for individual processing times and for overall trends. We also discussed procedures and controls over granting access passes and security clearances. In our analyses, we obtained White House explanations of individual cases and overall trends, but we did not further examine supporting documentation for these individual cases, as agreed with the requesters' offices. The effects of the limited examinations are noted in the report where appropriate.

After the database was finalized, White House officials proposed that dates for 54 individuals not be included since they reflected anomalies that skew the analysis.[8] We agree that these individuals followed a different pattern than the majority of individuals in the database. However, they do represent the actual pass approval process for these individuals; consequently, we present both sets of data in our detailed analyses.

Excluding the 54 individuals, in most instances, increased the average amount of time for an interval. Some individuals received a pass when employed by an office that was not subject to this review. For example, a person who was employed in January 1993 by the Office of Management and Budget, an office not included in our analysis, could have received a

[7]Dates were not always available for such reasons as staff separated before a date was met, contractor staff did not receive an SF-50, drug testing dates were not provided for contractor staff because such tests are administered by contractors and not the Executive Office of the President, and not all staff needed security clearances.

[8]Of the 54, 45 transferred from a position within the Executive Office of the President or another government agency to the position shown in the database, 2 transferred from their position as shown in the database to another office within the Executive Office of the President, 5 were originally 90-day hires that became permanent employees, and 2 had background investigations completed prior to entering on duty. We were not able to determine whether these 54 represented all individuals in these situations.

permanent pass and then transferred in 1994 to the White House Office. As a result, the record would show a 1994 entered-on-duty date and earlier times for all other key event dates. The effect of this in our analysis is that when the entered-on-duty date is analyzed against the other key event dates, the result is a negative number.[9] In our overall analyses, we added all the time differences, negative and positive, to calculate an average.

We conducted our review from May 1994 to August 1995 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

[9]For example, if an individual entered on duty on January 20, 1994, and signed the SF-86 on January 17, 1994, the difference would be calculated as a -3. The average number of days in the unadjusted database from entering on duty to signing the SF-86 was -52 days, whereas in the adjusted database, the average was 3 days.

The Access Pass Process

This appendix describes the process typically followed by White House complex employees for obtaining a White House access pass and/or security clearance, according to agency procedures that were first issued in March 1994 and the statements of agency officials. This process involved activities related to three generally uniform steps: (1) initiating pre-employment tasks, (2) obtaining a temporary pass, and (3) obtaining a permanent pass. Procedures for employees requiring access to classified information vary by organization. (See app. IV.)

Step 1: Initiating Pre-Employment Tasks

The following tasks must be completed concerning each applicant's appointment:

- Applicants must undergo a security interview conducted by the relevant Executive Office of the President security office.
- Applicants must submit to a drug test. It normally takes about 10 days to get the results, and if the test is positive, the person would be disqualified from appointment.[1]
- Applicants must undergo an initial name check in which their name, date of birth, place of birth, and Social Security number are checked through the Secret Service's Workers, Appointment, and Visitors Entrance System. This consists of checks through four computer databases: the FBI's National Crime Information Center database, a criminal history database, a Secret Service database, and a Washington-area law enforcement database. According to White House officials, the results are usually back within a day.
- Applicants must undergo a more extensive FBI name check. The Executive Office of the President forwards the person's name and date of birth to the FBI, which checks the name through the FBI Central Records System, computer databases, and the Criminal Justice Information Services' database to identify any derogatory information and prior arrest records. The FBI has 60 million names in its files. Almost 13,000 name checks were done for the Executive Office of the President and associated offices in fiscal year 1993, and over 7,200 checks were done in fiscal year 1994. The processing time for this more extensive name check typically takes several days, according to White House and FBI officials.

[1]In addition to having a drug test as an applicant, a person is subject to random drug testing once employed by the Executive Office of the President, in accordance with Executive Order 12564, issued September 15, 1986, and the Executive Office of the President Drug-Free Workplace Plan, as amended in December 1992.

Step 2: Obtaining a Temporary Pass

Each new employee who is expected to work 90 days or more has 30 days from the date entered on duty to complete the SF-86, an FBI investigation consent form, a tax check waiver, and a personal data statement questionnaire (for employees of certain offices) and provide other personal data as needed. This 30-day standard was established by the White House on March 14, 1994. Employees not meeting this standard are to have their access to the White House revoked and are to be placed on leave without pay until the paperwork is completed. Prior to March 1994, there were no written standards for completing the SF-86.

If the person has completed the SF-86 and related paperwork, the results of the initial name check are satisfactory, and the FBI name check has been submitted, the person is placed on the White House access list. This means the person must present positive identification each time he or she enters the White House complex. Prior to this time, the person is allowed into the complex only with an appointment and identification.

After a satisfactory FBI name check is returned, the relevant Executive Office of the President security office recommends to the Secret Service that a temporary pass be issued to the employee for a period not to exceed 90 days, although 30-day extensions are allowed. The person is fingerprinted by the Secret Service, and the fingerprints are sent through the national database. Each new employee is required to attend a security briefing, and his or her attendance is documented. In the case of an extension, the Executive Office of the President requests the Secret Service to extend the temporary pass. After one extension, the Secret Service contacts the requesting office to provide a rationale for an additional extension, according to Service officials.

The SF-86 forms from White House Office, Office of the Vice President, and Office of Policy Development staff go to the White House Counsel's office. A security officer in the Office of Administration reviews the SF-86s of individuals from the Office of Administration and the Office of National Drug Control Policy. According to White House officials, each SF-86 is reviewed to verify its correctness and completeness and to determine if any immediate issues need to be addressed.

Step 3: Obtaining a Permanent Pass

Before a permanent pass or a security clearance can be issued, the FBI, or some other agency, must conduct a full-field background investigation. The Executive Office of the President's request to the FBI for such an investigation includes the SF-86 and related documents.

FBI officials told us that their goal for first-time full-field background investigations was changed in late 1994 from 45 to 60 calendar days. An updated investigation, which is done every 5 years, has a goal of 90 days. According to FBI officials, these goals were changed before 1993 due to FBI staff shortages and an increased demand for investigations. The goals had been 35 calendar days for a first-time investigation and 75 days for a reinvestigation. FBI officials explained that the difference in goals is due to the urgency of completing first-time investigations. The FBI estimates that it conducts about 1,000 to 1,500 background investigations a year for the Executive Office of the President—about 25 percent of the FBI total.

According to FBI officials, if the investigation reveals information that warrants attention, the FBI notifies the White House Counsel's Office, the White House Office of Personnel Security, or the Security Office of the Executive Office of the President and might provide an interim report. At the completion of its investigation, the FBI sends an investigation summary to the appropriate reviewing office, which in turn forwards a copy to the Secret Service. Depending on the case, the FBI may also send copies of individual interview summaries but does not typically send the complete investigative file.

According to White House officials, once the reviewing office receives the FBI background investigation summary, its review process may involve a wide range of issues. Such issues may include prior arrests, credit problems, inability to verify previous employment, mistakes in paperwork, or employment suitability. The reviewing office determines any needed follow-up, such as contacting the subject for additional information or having the FBI investigate further. White House officials said that they rarely found it necessary to request a follow-up investigation.

White House officials stated they have several sources of information available to them during the review process, such as the FBI's background investigation report; the SF-86; the personal data statement provided by the employee (if applicable); the tax check results; financial disclosure information; and the National Crime Information Center check results. As information is returned from the agencies and departments, White House procedures, since March 1994, have required that it be reviewed within 5 days by the White House Counsel's office and the White House Personnel Security office. The decision to grant a permanent pass involves not just security concerns, but also suitability for continued employment, since the White House may decide, based on its review, not to permanently hire certain individuals.

After the reviewing office has resolved any questions, the relevant security office in the Executive Office of the President sends a written request to the Secret Service for a permanent access pass for the employee. The Secret Service, if it agrees there is no danger to the President or other Service protectees, issues the permanent pass. According to White House and Secret Service officials, during the period of our review, the White House never directed the Secret Service to issue a pass in circumstances that it was otherwise reluctant to do.

According to White House officials, the process for obtaining a permanent pass is the same for a volunteer as for an employee or contractor. These officials said that most White House volunteers are citizens who perform duties related to correspondence and do not have permanent passes, but are allowed entry based on an access list and identification. However, they also said that there are about 80 volunteers who work in areas in which a temporary or permanent pass is more suitable for allowing them to carry out their responsibilities. For example, the current and most recent White House Counsel have accepted no salary.

Analysis of Key Event Time Intervals

We analyzed time intervals using both the complete, unadjusted database and an adjusted database that excluded the 54 individuals referred to in appendix I. Most of these individuals transferred from one position to another position within the Executive Office of the President.

White House, FBI, and Secret Service officials provided us with their explanations regarding the results of our analyses presented in this appendix and appendix IV. Our analyses did not include verifying the accuracy of the explanations.

Not all records were applicable to include in averaging the interval comparisons. Table III.1 shows the number of applicable and nonapplicable records by category. Records considered to be nonapplicable include those in which a person separated prior to one or more key event dates, action was not completed and therefore pending as of the closure date of the database, or action was taken in some other way, such as a person having a background investigation conducted by an agency other than the FBI. (Dates were not provided in these cases.)

Table III.1: Applicable and Nonapplicable Records for Specified Intervals

	Unadjusted database		Adjusted database	
Interval comparison	Applicable records	Nonapplicable records	Applicable records	Nonapplicable records
Date entered on duty to date the permanent pass was approved	504	134 —112 separated — 22 pending — 0 other	458	126 —107 separated — 19 pending — 0 other
Date entered on duty to the date the SF-86 was signed	613	25 — 23 separated — 0 pending — 2 other	559	25 — 23 separated — 0 pending — 2 other
Date the SF-86 was signed to the date the FBI initiated a background investigation	600	38 — 35 separated — 0 pending — 3 other	546	38 — 35 separated — 0 pending — 3 other
e FBI finished a ound investigation to uate the permanent pass was recommended	522	116 — 95 separated — 18 pending — 3 other	473	111 — 93 separated — 16 pending — 2 other
Date the FBI initiated a background investigation to the date the FBI finished the investigation	574	64 — 50 separated — 11 pending — 3 other	523	61 — 50 separated — 9 pending — 2 other
Date a permanent pass was recommended to the date the pass was approved	504	134 —112 separated — 22 pending — 0 other	458	126 —107 separated — 19 pending — 0 other

Time Needed to Be Approved for a Permanent Pass

The processing time needed for an individual to be approved for a permanent White House access pass after entering on duty decreased from 1993 to 1994, as did most of the individual interval time frames leading up to final approval of a pass. As shown by table III.2, the average number of days it took to approve a permanent pass decreased from 1993 to 1994.

promptly after discovery and the SF-86 was then submitted in a timely matter, with no one placed on leave without pay.

Three of 471 noncontractor employees who entered on duty prior to March 1, 1994, did not complete the SF-86 by March 18, 1994, as required. All 3 signed the SF-86 by March 30, 1994, but took 434 days, 432 days, and 35 days to do so from the date they entered on duty.

Employees who entered on duty between March 1, 1994, and March 14, 1994, were required to complete the SF-86 by March 31, 1994. Two of six employees did not meet this requirement. Both signed the SF-86 by April 25, 1994. These two individuals took an average of 43 days from the date they entered on duty to complete the SF-86.

Employees who entered on duty after March 14, 1994, were required to complete the SF-86 within 30 days of the date entered on duty. Six of 73 employees did not meet this requirement.

- Five of the six were from the Office of National Drug Control Policy, and according to White House officials, the five cases involved administrative error. These five people signed their SF-86 an average of 60 days after entering on duty.
- Another entered on duty on May 16, 1994, and signed the SF-86 on June 28, 1994, an interval of 43 days. According to White House officials, it was known at the time of entry that this person was leaving White House employment. The person separated on October 2, 1994.

With the passage of Public Law 103-329 in September 1994, Congress required that employees of the Executive Office of the President complete the SF-86 within 30 days of entering on duty or by October 31, 1994, whichever occurred later. None of the cases in our database are covered by this provision of the law. White House officials told us that they have complied with this provision.

Executive Office of the President Indicators

We analyzed two key event intervals that are the responsibility of the Executive Office of the President: (1) the time between when an SF-86 is signed and the Executive Office of the President forwards it to the FBI for a background investigation and (2) the time between when the FBI completes a background investigation and the Executive Office of the President recommends that a staff member receive a permanent pass.

Table III.6: Average Days From the Date the FBI Initiated a Background Investigation to the Date the FBI Concluded the Investigation

Year	Average number of days—unadjusted data	Average number of days—adjusted data
1993	56	56
1994	70	71
Overall average	59	59

In 1993, the FBI took over 100 days to complete 17 (4 percent) of 402 investigations. In 1994, the FBI took over 100 days to complete 18 (11 percent) of 159 investigations. The FBI's goal of completing investigations within 45 days of initiation was not met 66 percent of the time in 1993 and 87 percent of the time in 1994. According to an FBI official, the goal was changed in late 1994 to 60 days. We did not assess the impact of the goal change because there were no records of investigations started and completed during the last quarter of 1994.

An FBI official said background investigations exceeded the FBI's goal for the following reasons:

- The FBI has a limited investigative and administrative staff in the background investigative area, and their overall caseload in that area increased.
- FBI field personnel who conduct background investigations also have numerous other investigative and administrative responsibilities.
- Forms submitted early in the period of our review were sometimes incomplete.
- Individuals and documents were not always readily available.
- Obtaining information from overseas sources slowed the collection of information.
- Issues and/or additional information was identified that needed to be addressed.
- Expediting some investigations slowed the progress of others.

Secret Service Indicators

Table III.7 shows that the average number of days needed for the Secret Service to approve a permanent pass after the Executive Office of the President recommended that a pass be issued decreased from 1993 to 1994.

officials, this meant that applicants were not required to take drug tests prior to their appointments throughout much of 1993.

Table III.9 shows that in 1993, individuals typically were issued a temporary pass prior to taking a drug test. The adjusted database shows that individuals taking the drug test in 1994 on average did so prior to obtaining a temporary pass.

Table III.9: Average Days From the Date the Drug Test Was Taken to the Date a Temporary Pass Was Issued[a]

Year	Average number of days—unadjusted data	Average number of days—adjusted data
1993	–5	–3
1994	–17	3
Overall average	–6	–1

[a]A negative number indicates that individuals, on average, were issued a temporary pass prior to taking a drug test. (See above and app. I for an explanation of how steps can occur in a different order, resulting in negative numbers.)

Observations on Controls

White House and congressional actions have established process changes and controls to improve the access pass and security clearance processes. For the time intervals and offices we reviewed, with few exceptions, the time intervals declined, and the procedures were adhered to. However, our observations indicate a potential for strengthening controls in several selected areas, particularly at the start of a new administration. The areas related to renewing temporary passes, revoking passes after separation, and granting security clearances. The scope of our work did not address whether problems occurred as a result of the potential control weaknesses. While we did not identify specific problems, we believe it is appropriate to consider improving these controls.

Temporary Pass Issuance Data

Table IV.1 shows that the average number of days needed for an individual to be issued a temporary pass after entering on duty decreased from 1993 to 1994.

Table IV.1: Average Days From the Entered on Duty to the Date a ..iporary Pass Was Issued

Year	Average number of days—unadjusted data	Average number of days—adjusted data
1993	19	26
1994	-26[a]	20
Overall average	10	25

[a]The individuals who entered on duty in 1994, on average, received a temporary pass 26 days prior to entering on duty. (See app. I for an explanation of how steps can occur in a different order, resulting in negative numbers.)

Temporary passes allow individuals access to the White House complex while waiting for a permanent pass. Although, since March 14, 1994, individuals should have completed the SF-86 (and other tasks) prior to obtaining a temporary pass, some did not. Temporary passes are initially issued for a period of 90 days and can be extended. A number of extensions were granted. Individuals held these passes for an average of 341 days in 1993 and 110 days in 1994 before being approved for a permanent pass.

SF-86 Often Not Completed Prior to Temporary Pass Issuance

Since March 14, 1994, an individual has been expected to have an SF-86 completed before receiving a temporary pass. Of the 439 individuals who signed their SF-86 in 1993, 310 (71 percent) received a temporary pass prior to signing the SF-86. White House officials told us that in the early days of

approved for a permanent pass. Two had not received a temporary pass, and the other 20 held a temporary pass an average of 132 days, as of the cutoff date. Of 15 who held temporary passes more than 90 days,

- 3 had permanent passes recommended by the Executive Office of the President but not yet approved by the Secret Service and had waited 37 days on average since the Executive Office of the President recommendation;
- 3 had background investigations completed for an average of 58 days since the completion; and
- 9 were still undergoing their background investigations for an average of 57 days.

Given the potential for repeated temporary pass extensions, consideration should be given to strengthening controls in this area.

'a Related to Staff ₋parations

Out of the database of 638 records, 188 (29 percent) indicate that the individuals have separated from the office or contractor position shown in the database. The individuals left at various stages in the process of obtaining a permanent pass or security clearance. Once an individual leaves Executive Office of the President employment, according to White House officials, there are procedures to ensure that the individual turns in the pass. However, the Secret Service has no means of verifying an individual's employment status and continued need for a permanent pass. Attention to stengthening controls in this area would be appropriate. We examined documents related to these procedures, but did not independently verify whether permanent passes were voided or returned in these cases.

Individuals Have Left at Various Stages of the Access Pass and Security Clearance Process

Of the 188 records that indicate separation, 7 individuals moved from one office within the Executive Office of the President to another office. Four additional records concern two individuals who moved from one office within the Executive Office of the President to another office, and then left the second office. Thus, both individuals show two departure dates in the database. The other 177 records are for people who left the Executive Office of the President.

All seven individuals who are now with a second office within the Executive Office of the President were approved for a permanent pass

either with the first office or the second office. All received a temporary pass.

Of the two individuals who worked for and separated from two offices, one was approved for a permanent pass while with the second office. The other individual had a background investigation conducted while at the second office and left this position 13 days after the background investigation was completed. A permanent pass has not been recommended or approved. Both individuals received a temporary pass.

Of the other 177 people who separated from the Executive Office of the President,

- 67 were approved by the Secret Service for a permanent pass;
- 17 were recommended by the Executive Office of the President for a permanent pass, which was never approved by the Secret Service;
- 43 had a completed background investigation, but were never recommended for a permanent pass;
- 21 had a background investigation initiated, but never completed; and
- 29 separated without the FBI initiating a background investigation.

Concerning this data, White House officials said that in the overwhelming majority of instances, the departure was unrelated to the pass process. The officials also said that, for example, the fact that an individual left after the background investigation was completed, but before a recommendation for a pass was made does not suggest that something in the background investigation precipitated the departure. The officials said that similarly, the fact that an individual departed after the Executive Office of the President recommended issuance of a pass, but before the Secret Service approved the pass does not imply that the individual left because the Secret Service declined to approve the pass. The officials concluded by saying that as a general proposition, a detailed exposition of the relationship between departure dates and various steps in the pass process suggests a correlation that bears no relationship with reality.

Sixty-seven people were approved for a permanent pass.

- Seven were approved an average of 186 days after they had departed. In five of these cases, according to White House officials, the person went to another government agency but continued to need access to the White House. Another case involves a person who came back to the White House

as a detailee from another agency. We do not have information on the seventh person.

- Sixty left an average of 125 days after a permanent pass had been approved by the Secret Service. We do not have information on how many returned the pass after departure.

Seventeen people had a permanent pass recommended but never approved.

- Six had a permanent pass recommended after they left. One person, according to White House officials, left the Office of Policy Development but was expected to return in some capacity. We do not have information on the other five individuals. These six individuals separated an average of 44 days before the permanent pass was recommended.
- Eleven left an average of 93 days after a permanent pass had been recommended.

The FBI completed the background investigation for 43 people who never had a permanent pass recommended.

- Five had an FBI background investigation initiated and completed after they departed. White House officials told us that the background investigation was done in three cases because the individuals needed a pass in some other capacity—one as a White House detailee, one as a White House volunteer, and one as an employee of another government agency. We do not have information on the other two individuals. These five individuals left an average of 164 days before the background investigation had been completed.
- Thirty-three departed an average of 106 days after a background investigation had been completed.
- Five had a background investigation initiated before they departed and completed after they departed. These individuals left an average of 23 days before the completion of the background investigation.

Out of the 177 who separated, 171 had temporary passes at the time of separation and had held the temporary pass for an average of 266 days prior to departure. Four individuals received temporary passes an average of 36 days after their separation, and two never received a temporary pass.

Permanent Pass ~ ›cation Procedure

According to a Secret Service official, the agency depends on each office of the Executive Office of the President to notify the Service if an

Office of National Drug Control Policy security clearances was not granted until June 22, 1993.[2] We requested data on how the offices conducted business during these 8- and 5-month periods before security clearances were granted. White House officials stated that interim clearances were provided to about two dozen senior staff during this time. The officials further stated that, for reasons of confidentiality, data on the specific cases was not provided to us. They also said that the overwhelming majority of the classified work done in the Executive Office of the President is done by staff of the National Security Council, which is not one of the offices represented in the data we analyzed.

Given that future administrations may face similar circumstances during the first few months in office, consideration should be given to strengthening controls in this area.

[2]In addition, one individual had a clearance at the time entered on duty.

Comments From the Federal Bureau of Investigation

U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Washington, D. C. 20535

September 1, 1995

Mr. R. Bruce Brown
National Security and International
Affairs Division
General Accounting Office
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Brown:

This is a follow-up to your August 31 conversation with Mrs. Margaret Tremblay, of my staff, concerning Job Code 709077, a review of procedures and practices regarding the issuance of White House access passes and security clearances.

After consultation with appropriate FBI personnel, it was determined that a correction was necessary to clarify a portion of information appearing on page 31 of the draft report prepared for this review. At your suggestion, Mrs. Tremblay contacted your associate, Mr. David Hand, on August 31, and communicated the requested change to him.

Now on p. 25.

Mr. Hand was asked to delete line 17 from page 31, "Unfavorable information sometimes..." and to replace it with "Issues and/or additional information was identified which needed to be addressed." Additional information could include addresses, jobs, associates, and/or training, not contained in the original application, but which were identified during the course of the background investigation. Thank you for the opportunity to review the draft report.

Sincerely yours,

Swanson D. Carter
Acting Deputy Chief
Office of Public and
Congressional Affairs

1 - Ms. Vickie L. Sloan
Room 6513
Justice Management Division
Department of Justice

Major Contributors to This Report

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