

FOIA MARKER

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Folder Title:

Bosnia/Croatia-PC/DC Packages

Staff Office-Individual:

Transnational Threats-Cressey, Roger

Original OA/iD Number:

3188

Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:	Stack:
49	6	10	2	V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. email	Donald Kerrick to APNSA Special Assistants, re: Update for Today's PC on Bosnia (1 page)	03/17/1995	P1/b(1)
001b. cable	Re: Bosnia - Izetbegovic Rejects Ceasefire Extension During Bonn Visit (2 pages)	03/17/1995	P1/b(1)
001c. cable	Re: Key NATO Ambassadors Discuss OPLAN 40104, NATO Expansion, Russia (1 page)	03/17/1995	P1/b(1)
001d. memo	Don Kerrick to Anthony Lake, re: March 17 Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia (6 pages)	03/16/1995	P1/b(1)
001e. paper	Re: Steps to Prevent Renewed War in Bosnia (1 page)	03/00/1996	P1/b(1)
001f. paper	Re: Croatia Strategy (2 pages)	03/00/1996	P1/b(1)
001g. paper	Re: Issue Paper [Should the Executive Branch...] (3 pages)	03/17/1995	P1/b(1)
001h. paper	Re: Issue Paper [Should the US...] (2 pages)	03/16/1995	P1/b(1)
001i. chart	Re: NATO Prepositioning Step 2 [NATO] (2 pages)	03/00/1996	P1/b(1)
001j. letter	Sven Alkalaj to President Clinton (1 page)	01/17/1994	P1/b(1)
001k. paper	Re: Support for the Federation - 505 Agreement (3 pages)	03/00/1995	P1/b(1)
001l. email	Alan Kreczko to Donald Kerrick, re: Bosnia DC Briefer II (1 page)	02/21/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Transnational Threats (Cressey, Roeger)
OA/Box Number: 3188

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia/Croatia - PC/DC Packages

2012-0798-F

ke3172

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]

P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001m. email	Alan Kreczko to Donald Kerrick and Alexander Vershbow, re: Bosnia (1 page)	03/09/1995	P1/b(1)
002a. memo	[duplicate of 001d] (6 pages)	03/16/1995	P1/b(1)
002b. paper	[duplicate of 001g] (3 pages)	03/17/1995	P1/b(1)
002c. paper	[duplicate of 001h] (2 pages)	03/16/1995	P1/b(1)
002d. letter	[duplicate of 001j] (1 page)	01/17/1994	P1/b(1)
002e. paper	[duplicate of 001k] (3 pages)	03/00/1995	P1/b(1)
002f. email	[duplicate of 001l] (1 page)	02/21/1995	P1/b(1)
002g. email	[duplicate of 001m] (1 page)	03/09/1995	P1/b(1)

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TO: LAKE

FROM: KERRICK
VERSHBOW

DOC DATE: 16 MAR 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
AGENDA

CROATIA
PC

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

PERSONS:

By KOE NARA, Date 05/01/15
2012-0798-F

SUBJECT: AGENDA & BRIEFING MEMO FOR 17 MAR PC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA

ACTION: NOTED BY LAKE

DUE DATE: 20 MAR 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK

LOGREF: 9520345

FILES: IFM

NSCP:

CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

DANVERS
JOSHI
KERRICK
KRECZKO
NSC CHRON
SIMON *
SODERBERG
VERSHBOW

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMBN

CLOSED BY: NSDRS

DOC 1 OF 1

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 LAKE
001

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 95031619 FOR INFORMATION
X 95031719 NOTED BY LAKE

**National Security Council
The White House**

PROOFED BY: MBN

LOG # 20347

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG MBN A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Reed	<u>1</u>	<u>JWR</u>	
Dohse			
Sens			
Soderberg	<u>2</u>	<u>COPY</u>	
Berger	<u>3</u>	<u>CC</u>	
<i>MBN</i> Lake	<u>4</u>	<u>Nat Sec Advisor has seen</u>	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>5</u>		<u>N</u>
NSC Secretariat			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

CC: _____

COMMENTS:

*Lake mts package
for Bosnia/Croatia
PC*

Exec Sec Office has diskette _____

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001a. email	Donald Kerrick to APNSA Special Assistants, re: Update for Today's PC on Bosnia (1 page)	03/17/1995	P1/b(1)

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001c. cable	Re: Key NATO Ambassadors Discuss OPLAN 40104, NATO Expansion, Russia (1 page)	03/17/1995	P1/b(1)

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
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Border Crossing Points Between Croatia, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina



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001d. memo	Don Kerrick to Anthony Lake, re: March 17 Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia (6 pages)	03/16/1995	P1/b(1)

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PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA AND CROATIA

DATE: March 17, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 2:30-4:00pm

Agenda

- I. Former Yugoslavia Policy Review.....NSC/All**
 - Steps to Prevent Renewed War in Bosnia.....State**
- II. Near-Term Diplomatic Strategy.....State**
 - B. Croatia Strategy (Next Steps)
 - C. Contact Group Prospects/Response to the Milosevic Proposal
- III. OPLAN 40104 Approval Process
 - A. Next Steps on NATO Prepositioning - Step Two and Beyond.....OSD/JCS**
 - (1) Talking Points for Congressional Calls
 - (2) Notifying NATO
 - B. NATO/U.S. Decision Timeline for OPLAN 40104...OSD/JCS**
 - Strategy for Gaining Congressional Authorization and Appropriation.....OSD/ALL
- IV. Responding to Dole/Bosnian Government Requests for Military Training (Implementing 505 Agreement).....OSD/JCS**

** - Paper Due 12 noon March 16.

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By KDE NARA, Date 05/10/15
2012 0708-5

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

FORMER YUGOSLAVIA POLICY REVIEW:
UPDATE FOR PRINCIPALS

The Setting: Tudjman's March 12 announcement has reduced the chances of a renewed war in Croatia and a widening of the Balkan conflict. But an escalation of the war in Bosnia remains likely as the end of the cessation of hostilities approaches with no movement on the diplomatic track. The ceasefire is already showing signs of unraveling and both sides seem confident of success in a new round of fighting. Silajdzic has declared that the Bosnian Government will not extend the ceasefire beyond April 30 and that Western emphasis on containment amounts to an unacceptable attempt to freeze the status quo. Milosevic's response to the offer of sanctions relief for mutual recognition has been utterly inadequate and Serbian enforcement of the border closure with Bosnia has fallen off markedly since the second 100-day period began in January. The Contact Group is on its last legs and advocates of a lifting of the arms embargo are beginning to stir in both houses of the Congress.

The Gap Between Ends and Means: The NSC paper of February 27 noted that the U.S. has pursued a range of important, but not always compatible, objectives in trying to deal with the Bosnian conflict over the past two years. Moreover, the tools we have applied have varied in response to events and as our priorities have shifted. Since Bihac, we have backed away from attempts to bring NATO air power to bear to enforce UNSC resolutions and pressure the Bosnian Serbs to settle on terms more favorable to the Bosnian Government. Yet we did not scale back our political objectives to match our reduced leverage -- contributing to the present diplomatic impasse.

Broad Strategic Choices: The NSC paper set forth four basic strategic options:

1. Stick with present policy: continue to support Bosnians rhetorically, continue diplomatic efforts with reduced expectations of success, focus on containment.
2. Shift to a policy of neutrality regarding terms of settlement and active containment of conflict; end or suspend Contact Group activities; acknowledge we cannot produce a better deal for Bosnians.
3. Containment of conflict and long-term quarantine of Greater Serbia, including reinforced sanctions on Belgrade for the long haul.
4. Renewed push for military measures in support of Bosnians: withdraw UNPROFOR, multilateral lift and strike.

Deputies did not arrive at any firm conclusions in their one discussion of the NSC paper, but agreed with the thrust of the paper that now is the time to review our overall policy.

They agreed we do not presently have the means to attain the political goals we have set. Discussion tended to favor the first two options.

State argued in favor of option 1, a continuation of our current policy, with the **highest priority attached to preventing a major upsurge in fighting** that could lead to the departure of UNPROFOR, greater human suffering, and increased pressure for U.S. military involvement. An underlying assumption is that we would put larger equities at risk if we tried to win Allied or Russian agreement to increased military pressure on the Serbs; that an accommodation among the parties will only happen after more fighting and/or a gradual recognition of the need for compromise; and that prolonging today's "relative peace" is better than the alternatives. We would not, however, take the politically and morally questionable step of pressing the Bosnians to accept more "unjust" terms, although we would try to lower Bosnian and public perceptions that the international community has the ability to deliver a "fair" settlement. This strategy could encompass the following:

- continued efforts to engage Milosevic in negotiations over cross-recognition and to gain his support for political settlements in Bosnia and Croatia, using sanctions relief as a carrot;
- follow-up on the agreement with Tudjman on new UN force by seeking to launch political negotiations based on Z-4 principles;
- reinforced efforts to isolate Pale and Knin by strengthening Serbian/Bosnian border closure, closing "back door" that permits Serbian goods to reach Bosnian Serbs through Krajina;
- strengthening the outer ring of sanctions by increasing West European support for sanctions enforcement and working with the front-line states;
- continued efforts to enhance UNPROFOR equipment and rules of engagement in Bosnia, but without pressuring UNPROFOR to adopt a belligerent anti-Serb posture;
- maintaining the structure of the Contact Group even if its effectiveness is limited, so as to deter diplomatic breakouts by Russia or others;
- consideration of selected U.S.-only or U.S.-European diplomatic initiatives;
- increased support for the Bosniac-Croat Federation;
- beefing up UNPROFOR in Macedonia.

In addition, we would strongly warn the Bosnian Government of the need to extend the ceasefire and refrain from initiating large-scale hostilities, since this could force the departure of UNPROFOR and jeopardize our readiness to provide assistance to the Federation. We would fight Congressional efforts to lift the embargo unilaterally and seek to persuade the Bosnians that they are better off militarily by making do with a leaky arms embargo rather than forcing the issue of a formal lift.

OVP advocated a similar approach, focusing on the long-term isolation of the Bosnian and Krajina Serbs and the strengthening of the outer ring of sanctions, while providing economic and other assistance to the Federation. For the isolation strategy to be effective, there would have to be increased resources and political commitment by us and the Europeans -- to field additional sanctions monitors on the Serbian-Bosnian border and in Croatia, and to induce better enforcement of sanctions against Serbia by the front-line states.

DOD favored shifting toward option 2, a more open posture of neutrality. While we would pursue many of the same steps as State proposes to contain the conflict, we would openly acknowledge that a settlement along the lines of the Contact Group plan is not attainable without U.S. actions that it is not in our interest to take. We would thus distance ourselves from the goal of achieving a better deal for the Bosnians and abandon or downgrade the importance of the Contact Group, making clear that it is up to the parties, not the international community, to find a mutually acceptable solution.

The U.S. Contact Group representative suggested an evolutionary approach, shifting gradually from option 1 to option 2. While we would not disavow the Contact Group plan or impose unfair terms on the Bosnians, we would attempt over time to bring them to the realization that they will have to settle for less. We would, however, seek to **"maximize the minimum,"** i.e. try to get the Bosnians the best terms that the Bosnian Serbs will accept.

None of the Deputies advocated options 3 or 4: a long-term quarantine of Serbia would be difficult to sell to the Russians and Europeans; and renewed military pressure on the Serbs through lift and strike would likely lead to an Americanization of the conflict, even if pursued multilaterally.

The Director of Strategic Plans and Policy of the Joint Staff and the NSC staff, however, suggested that a **staged multilateral lifting of the arms embargo (beginning with defensive weapons), in tandem with a last-chance effort to secure Bosnian Serb acceptance of the Contact Group plan,** should remain under consideration in the event that UNPROFOR withdrawal and/or Congressional pressures push us toward option 4. Our Allies' interest in U.S. participation in UNPROFOR withdrawal gives us leverage to secure their acquiescence in multilateral lift. (The Russians would need to be bought off by means of extending additional sanctions relief to Milosevic.)

Another variant of Option 4 might also be considered: **a threat by the U.S. and its Allies to withdraw UNPROFOR and lift the arms embargo multilaterally** as a means of shocking the Serbs into negotiating on the basis of the Contact Group plan. In light of the hollowness of past Contact Group threats, however, we would have to demonstrate more convincingly our readiness to make good on the threat.

Can Containment Work? As noted, options 1 and 2 point to roughly the same concrete policy actions. They would make prevention of a new war and containment, rather than achieving a political settlement, our priority goal. **They also have the same flaw: they ignore the fact that the Bosnians would rather fight than settle for the status quo, and they will not readily cooperate with a containment strategy.** If the war escalates and Bosnian suffering once again dominates the headlines and CNN, Hill pressures to lift the arms embargo could become hard to manage.

If we are to prevent a new round of fighting and avoid a serious break with the Bosnians, **we need to find additional positive incentives for the Bosnians to exercise restraint.** These could include:

- massive economic assistance and political support to the Federation;
- measures to persuade the Bosnians that UNPROFOR is worth keeping, even if it means deferring a lifting of the arms embargo once again (e.g. deployment of additional troops to forcibly open the Blue Route to Sarajevo; a more aggressive effort to get our allies to toughen up UNPROFOR's rules of engagement throughout Bosnia; a return to NATO enforcement of the exclusion zones, etc.); and
- other steps to encourage a deferral of lift, such as a more robust program of military training (albeit one consistent with the arms embargo), intelligence support, etc.

Financial incentives alone will not likely sway the Bosnians, even if we are able to come up with serious money. The latter steps, however, would mean renewed frictions with our Allies and may be unattainable without, in the end, precipitating UNPROFOR's withdrawal. Threatening the Bosnians with punitive actions, on the other hand, would be politically indefensible.

In the final analysis, therefore, we may not be able to prevent the Bosnians from going on the offensive in the spring. The best case may be that the renewed fighting does not lead to any major Bosnian reverses and the current stalemate remains when winter returns. The worst case is that the Serbs respond by overrunning the eastern enclaves and strangling Sarajevo again. Although UNPROFOR countries may hunker down and not decide to withdraw even in the latter scenario, Congress may force the issue with unilateral lift.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001f. paper	Re: Croatia Strategy (2 pages)	03/00/1996	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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001g. paper	Re: Issue Paper [Should the Executive Branch...] (3 pages)	03/17/1995	P1/b(1)

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001h. paper	Re: Issue Paper [Should the US...] (2 pages)	03/16/1995	P1/b(1)

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TALKING POINTS FOR CALLS TO MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Support for Step Two of NATO Prepositioning for UNPROFOR Withdrawal

- As you know, in early December the President informed our Allies that the U.S. would be prepared, in principle, to commit U.S. ground forces to a NATO operation to help UNPROFOR withdraw from *Bosnia*.
- Assisting UN forces in Bosnia, in particular those of our closest Allies, would be an essential demonstration of Alliance solidarity. Failure to offer such support would risk grave damage to NATO.
- We do not want UNPROFOR to depart; it performs a critical function in Bosnia. Our decision to assist an UNPROFOR withdrawal was a decision in principle.
- The Administration has no intention of keeping U.S. ground forces in Bosnia or Croatia following a withdrawal operation. The sole purpose of deploying troops would be to participate as a NATO-member nation in support of UNPROFOR withdrawal.
- I hasten to note that the UN has not made a formal decision to withdraw UNPROFOR from either Bosnia or Croatia. Fighting, however, could resume in Bosnia later this spring. Heavy fighting could well prompt a UN decision to withdraw.
- It could take as much as 8-12 weeks after a UN request for help and a NATO decision to implement the OP Plan before preparations are complete and forces are in place to commence a withdrawal of UNPROFOR, our senior military commanders recommend that we act now to ensure that the essential first prepositioning steps are taken to ensure the communications network is ready to support a likely major military operation.
- Accordingly, I am asking for your support for a Presidential decision in principle to preposition up to 15 U.S. DOD personnel in Croatia -- to execute the preliminary communications steps associated with NATO's operational plan for extraction of UNPROFOR from Bosnia.
- We will consult with you if further prepositioning steps are required and before any final decision is reached on implementation of the actual withdrawal plan.
- In the interim, NATO's Operational Plan is being updated continuously; and NATO is still working such key issues as final numbers of troops that would be provided from

among the various NATO allies, how the overall operation would be funded, and when precisely the actual prepositioning of communications personnel would begin.

IF ASKED

- Funding for the prepositioning steps would come from existing NATO funds (about \$11 million).
- In light of Tudjman's agreement, we see no requirement for U.S. or NATO combat units to assist in the change of UN forces in Croatia.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001i. chart	Re: NATO Prepositioning Step 2 [NATO] (2 pages)	03/00/1996	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

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United States Senate

OFFICE OF THE MAJORITY LEADER

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-7010

March 15, 1995

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

We are writing in regard to commitments made by your administration to assist in the withdrawal of U.N. troops from Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is our understanding that the recent compromise with the Croatian government may require only a partial withdrawal of U.N. forces from Croatia -- that is if the militant Serbs agree -- and that U.S. involvement is likely to be very limited in such an operation. However, we are aware that you have already committed to providing U.S. military assistance, to include U.S. combat troops, to participate in the withdrawal of U.N. troops from Bosnia and Herzegovina should such a decision be made by either nations participating in UNPROFOR or the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

While we have consistently opposed your policy toward the former Yugoslavia, and have been critical of the inability and unwillingness of the U.N. forces to fulfill their mandate there, we recognize that U.S. participation to assist the withdrawal of U.N. forces may be necessary. However, we believe that such assistance should not be offered without strict conditions.

The first condition is that the entire withdrawal operation be under unified NATO command -- from start to finish. The "dual-key" arrangement under which NATO currently operates and is subordinate to the United Nations has been a military and political fiasco. Should such an arrangement be extended to any component of the withdrawal operation -- even under peaceful circumstances -- we would strongly oppose U.S. participation.

It is critical that the United States establish concretely and in advance that NATO command is a prerequisite to U.S. participation. As such, we would strongly recommend that this decision be explicitly stated in a U.N. Security Council resolution on the matter. A letter from the U.N. Secretary General in our view would be wholly insufficient; a binding commitment from the countries in the Security Council who are the largest troop contributors to UNPROFOR should be a minimum requirement.

Second, the rules of engagement must be robust. There must be no question that self-defense includes the right of retaliation -- at the discretion of the NATO commander. Those forces that may consider interfering with the withdrawal of U.N.

forces must know in no uncertain terms that if any U.N. or NATO troops are provoked or attacked that they will face massive and disproportionate retaliation, to include all their military assets, not just their immediately-engaged forces.

Third, there must be a common sense rule applied to the withdrawal of heavy equipment belonging to the U.N. protection forces. We understand that those of our allies participating in UNPROFOR would like to remove all of their equipment when they depart. If the environment is calm and peaceful, we would not object to using American forces to facilitate the withdrawal of equipment. Should we be faced with a hostile environment, however, we believe that American lives should not be endangered to rescue equipment.

Finally, U.S. assistance should be premised on an understanding with our allies that UNPROFOR's withdrawal clears the way for lifting the U.N. arms embargo on the Bosnian Government. To date, allied objections to lifting the arms embargo have centered on concerns about the safety of allied troops deployed in Bosnia-Herzegovina. If the United States assists in the withdrawal of U.N. forces, the allies must know that we will not tolerate equivocation on the matter of terminating the arms embargo. For three years the Bosnians have been denied their fundamental and inherent right to self-defense and watched as U.N. forces provided cover to the aggressor Serb forces. In sum, U.S. assistance in the withdrawal of UNPROFOR should be explicitly conditioned on the support of those nations for terminating the arms embargo.

Mr. President, we believe that these military and political conditions -- NATO command, robust rules of engagement, limitations on withdrawal of equipment, and allied agreement on next steps -- are not only essential to securing support from the U.S. Congress, but essential to the success of such a potentially dangerous operation. We look forward to hearing from you soon.

Sincerely,

Strom Thurmond *Ben Tan*
J. Hill *John Stevens*
Jesse Helms

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Congress of the United States
Washington, DC 20515

February 17, 1995

The President
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

We are writing to urge immediate action by you on the war in Bosnia. While diplomats talk in the wake of former President Carter's visit to the region, there is strong reason to believe that the Bosnian Serbs will continue to reject peace. If the war in Bosnia resumes full scale, we do not believe the situation will continue as it has for the last three years. UNPROFOR's already weakened position will become even more untenable, and pressure for its withdrawal will increase.

In the event of either significant Serbian escalation or of UNPROFOR withdrawal, the case for ending the international arms embargo of Bosnia becomes even more compelling. We trust that, in such circumstances, your Administration would move expeditiously to end the United Nations embargo. Should that not be possible, however, we would expect the Congress to vote to unilaterally end participation by the United States in the embargo.

In any event, the United States has an obligation to prepare for the most likely scenarios in Bosnia. If the embargo is to be ended, either multilaterally or unilaterally, we will want to see direct U.S. involvement in the conflict held to a minimum. The surest way to minimize direct U.S. involvement after the embargo is ended is to act now to train the pro-government forces in strategy and tactics and the use of some of the weapons they are likely to obtain.

Such training would reduce the risk to the pro-government forces of any preemptive Serbian offensive and would be an alternative to sending U.S. forces into Bosnia to provide training after the embargo is ended. Such training should be provided outside of Bosnia in order to avoid any risk to U.S. trainers. We understand that such training can be provided at a small fraction of the cost we currently are paying for the U.N. peacekeeping operation in Bosnia, and that it could be completed in less than six months. We also understand that the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina would welcome such training, and indeed already has submitted a formal request to you in this regard.

There can be no question about your authority to direct the provision of such training. Section 1404 of the 1995 Defense Department Authorization Act (the so-called Nunn-Mitchell provision) required the Administration to present options to the Congress for training the pro-government forces in Bosnia. Other provisions of law, including section 503 of the National Security Act of 1947, give you authority to deliver such training. Further, the provision of such training by the United States would not violate existing Security Council resolutions or relevant principles of international law.

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
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
We believe you should take this step in order to be better prepared for the likely next phase of the war in Bosnia and in order to reduce the likelihood that U.S. forces will become directly involved in that war. It is important to note, however, that a program of training the pro-government forces in Bosnia would give the United States additional leverage in the ongoing negotiations with the Bosnian Serbs. Beginning a training program now would make clear to the Bosnian Serbs our determination to bring about a just and sustainable peace, and would underscore to them the probable cost of prolonging the conflict.

In other words, in the hands of able diplomats, a policy of training the pro-government forces for war could prove to be a powerful instrument for bringing about peace.


For all these reasons, we urge you to initiate promptly a program of military training for the pro-government forces in Bosnia and Hercegovina.

Sincerely,


BOB DOLE



BENJAMIN A. GILMAN


JOSEPH LIEBERMAN


HENRY J. HYDE


SUSAN MOLINARI


MICHAEL R. MCNULTY


JIM MORAN

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001j. letter	Sven Alkalaj to President Clinton (1 page)	01/17/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Transnational Threats (Cressey, Roeger)
OA/Box Number: 3188

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ISSUE PAPER: TRAINING THE PRO-GOVERNMENT FORCES IN BOSNIA

Background: Senator Dole, Rep. Gilman, and others wrote the President on February 17, 1995, to urge him to "act now to train the pro-government forces in strategy and tactics and the use of some of the weapons they are likely to obtain." The Members argued that the surest way to minimize direct U.S. involvement is to train the pro-government forces now so as to reduce their risk from any preemptive Serbian offensive.

Ambassador Alkalaj of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (B-H) also wrote President Clinton on January 17, 1995, to request that the U.S. review the means by which training for the B-H Army personnel could begin outside of the borders of B-H. He argued that such training "can be most decisive in preparing B-H for continuing its defense against aggression, or, in the event of a negotiated settlement, for an effective deterrent and source of stability as peace is secured...."

An interagency General Counsels' (OGC) group in February recommended that only a "narrow" IMET be concluded for reasons of neutrality and force protection. OGC posited the negative consequences associated with violating the spirit and intent of UNSCRs and losing the protections afforded by "experts on mission" status. They believe, however, that adequate domestic legal authority exists to provide the training contemplated by Senator Dole.

Issue: The type of training, if any, that the USG should provide to the pro-government forces in B-H; where that training should be provided; and when such training should begin.

Options:

1. *Limit training at this time to that outlined in a narrow Section 505 of the Foreign Assistance Act agreement--*The U.S. has \$70,000 available for IMET should such an agreement be signed. However, moving forward with the narrow agreement would require finessing the issue of the broader draft 505 agreement which was provided to the government of B-H earlier. Such training would not violate the spirit and intent of UNSCRs regarding the arms embargo. It would be limited to IMET training for only a few senior Federation officers at our senior professional military schools and some English language training. The training would not affect USG neutrality regarding this conflict. Providing this limited training would avoid the appearance of totally abandoning B-H but would have negligible effect on the battlefield.
2. *Expand IMET training beyond the few senior Federation officers attending war colleges or receiving English language training.* Courses would be "non-lethal" technical training courses and could include courses in computer programming, finance, and health care. Training would be at the individual level. This would have little practical effect on the battlefield but might placate some who felt the USG had a moral obligation to do something.

3. *Provide some limited individual tactical and operational training for weapons likely to be used.* Individual training would be conducted at U.S. facilities and schools. Such training could also include enrollment of junior and mid-level officers in professional development and leadership courses. This would prolong the conflict by encouraging B-H to fight on but would likely have minimal effect on the battlefield. It is unclear how unit commanders could be rotated through this training without a detrimental effect on the battlefield for B-H. It would, however, partially meet the demands of those who posit that the USG has a moral responsibility to assist B-H in its self-defense.
4. *Train the pro-government forces in accordance with the plan outlined by Senator Dole.* This would be unit level training and would need to be accomplished in a neighboring country, most likely Croatia. Such training would respond fully to the moral arguments that demand the USG assist B-H. It would also relieve some pressure from Congress. However, it directly contradicts the spirit and intent of UNSCRs and would clearly remove our forces from the protections of their current "experts on mission" status and make the U.S. a co-belligerent in the conflict.

Discussion: The effects of training the pro-government forces of B-H are problematic. However, there are other more likely and less favorable results from the training than those outlined by Ambassador Alkalaj and Senator Dole.

- Training is virtually synonymous with arming. Once the U.S. begins a significant training effort, the U.S. becomes an ally of B-H and, by extension, Croatia. The U.S. would become a co-belligerent.
- Once a decision to train is made, but before the training is complete, defines a period of enhanced vulnerability for B-H. Many will interpret such a decision to train as a harbinger of lifting the arms embargo. That, in turn may trigger UNPROFOR's withdrawal.
- UNPROFOR's imminent withdrawal means that UN related humanitarian assistance programs will terminate. The humanitarian crisis will worsen.
- Training is a signal to all the Federation (including the HVO) that the U.S. is preparing the pro-government forces for a return to war.
- The Bosnian Serbs are likely to react to the above with preemptive action against B-H. Probable targets are the isolated enclaves. Almost all analysts project they would fall quickly.
- Others might feel compelled to take similar action on the side of the Serbs.
- The negative consequences outlined by the OGC are compelling--training as contemplated by Senator Dole puts USG neutrality in question and would destroy the fabric of even-handedness upon which UNPROFOR and NATO operations in support thereof are based.
- The March 4, 1995, Deputies' discussion focused on the reality of accepting a minimalist outcome for B-H and that its longer-term prospect was absorption by Croatia and Serbia.

Recommendation: Approve Option 1--narrow 505 agreement--as the basis of the President's response to Senator Dole.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001k. paper	Re: Support for the Federation - 505 Agreement (3 pages)	03/00/1995	P1/b(1)

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National Security Council
Transnational Threats (Cressey, Roeger)
OA/Box Number: 3188

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
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
0011. email	Alan Kreczko to Donald Kerrick, re: Bosnia DC Briefer II (1 page)	02/21/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001m. email	Alan Kreczko to Donald Kerrick and Alexander Vershbow, re: Bosnia (1 page)	03/09/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Transnational Threats (Cressey, Roeger)
OA/Box Number: 3188

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia/Croatia - PC/DC Packages

2012-0798-F
ke3172

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002a. memo	[duplicate of 001d] (6 pages)	03/16/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Transnational Threats (Cressey, Roeger)
OA/Box Number: 3188

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia/Croatia - PC/DC Packages

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ke3172

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FORMER YUGOSLAVIA POLICY REVIEW:
UPDATE FOR PRINCIPALS

The Setting: Tudjman's March 12 announcement has reduced the chances of a renewed war in Croatia and a widening of the Balkan conflict. But an escalation of the war in Bosnia remains likely as the end of the cessation of hostilities approaches with no movement on the diplomatic track. The ceasefire is already showing signs of unraveling and both sides seem confident of success in a new round of fighting. Silajdzic has declared that the Bosnian Government will not extend the ceasefire beyond April 30 and that Western emphasis on containment amounts to an unacceptable attempt to freeze the status quo. Milosevic's response to the offer of sanctions relief for mutual recognition has been utterly inadequate and Serbian enforcement of the border closure with Bosnia has fallen off markedly since the second 100-day period began in January. The Contact Group is on its last legs and advocates of a lifting of the arms embargo are beginning to stir in both houses of the Congress.

The Gap Between Ends and Means: The NSC paper of February 27 noted that the U.S. has pursued a range of important, but not always compatible, objectives in trying to deal with the Bosnian conflict over the past two years. Moreover, the tools we have applied have varied in response to events and as our priorities have shifted. Since Bihac, we have backed away from attempts to bring NATO air power to bear to enforce UNSC resolutions and pressure the Bosnian Serbs to settle on terms more favorable to the Bosnian Government. Yet we did not scale back our political objectives to match our reduced leverage -- contributing to the present diplomatic impasse.

Broad Strategic Choices: The NSC paper set forth four basic strategic options:

1. Stick with present policy: continue to support Bosnians rhetorically, continue diplomatic efforts with reduced expectations of success, focus on containment.
2. Shift to a policy of neutrality regarding terms of settlement and active containment of conflict; end or suspend Contact Group activities; acknowledge we cannot produce a better deal for Bosnians.
3. Containment of conflict and long-term quarantine of Greater Serbia, including reinforced sanctions on Belgrade for the long haul.
4. Renewed push for military measures in support of Bosnians: withdraw UNPROFOR, multilateral lift and strike.

Deputies did not arrive at any firm conclusions in their one discussion of the NSC paper, but agreed with the thrust of the paper that now is the time to review our overall policy.

They agreed we do not presently have the means to attain the political goals we have set. Discussion tended to favor the first two options.

State argued in favor of option 1, a continuation of our current policy, with the highest priority attached to preventing a major upsurge in fighting that could lead to the departure of UNPROFOR, greater human suffering, and increased pressure for U.S. military involvement. An underlying assumption is that we would put larger equities at risk if we tried to win Allied or Russian agreement to increased military pressure on the Serbs; that an accommodation among the parties will only happen after more fighting and/or a gradual recognition of the need for compromise; and that prolonging today's "relative peace" is better than the alternatives. We would not, however, take the politically and morally questionable step of pressing the Bosnians to accept more "unjust" terms, although we would try to lower Bosnian and public perceptions that the international community has the ability to deliver a "fair" settlement. This strategy could encompass the following:

- continued efforts to engage Milosevic in negotiations over cross-recognition and to gain his support for political settlements in Bosnia and Croatia, using sanctions relief as a carrot;
- follow-up on the agreement with Tudjman on new UN force by seeking to launch political negotiations based on Z-4 principles;
- reinforced efforts to isolate Pale and Knin by strengthening Serbian/Bosnian border closure, closing "back door" that permits Serbian goods to reach Bosnian Serbs through Krajina;
- strengthening the outer ring of sanctions by increasing West European support for sanctions enforcement and working with the front-line states;
- continued efforts to enhance UNPROFOR equipment and rules of engagement in Bosnia, but without pressuring UNPROFOR to adopt a belligerent anti-Serb posture;
- maintaining the structure of the Contact Group even if its effectiveness is limited, so as to deter diplomatic breakouts by Russia or others;
- consideration of selected U.S.-only or U.S.-European diplomatic initiatives;
- increased support for the Bosniac-Croat Federation;
- beefing up UNPROFOR in Macedonia.

In addition, we would strongly warn the Bosnian Government of the need to extend the ceasefire and refrain from initiating large-scale hostilities, since this could force the departure of UNPROFOR and jeopardize our readiness to provide assistance to the Federation. We would fight Congressional efforts to lift the embargo unilaterally and seek to persuade the Bosnians that they are better off militarily by making do with a leaky arms embargo rather than forcing the issue of a formal lift.

OVP advocated a similar approach, focusing on the long-term isolation of the Bosnian and Krajina Serbs and the strengthening of the outer ring of sanctions, while providing economic and other assistance to the Federation. For the isolation strategy to be effective, there would have to be increased resources and political commitment by us and the Europeans -- to field additional sanctions monitors on the Serbian-Bosnian border and in Croatia, and to induce better enforcement of sanctions against Serbia by the front-line states.

DOD favored shifting toward option 2, a more open posture of neutrality. While we would pursue many of the same steps as State proposes to contain the conflict, we would openly acknowledge that a settlement along the lines of the Contact Group plan is not attainable without U.S. actions that it is not in our interest to take. We would thus distance ourselves from the goal of achieving a better deal for the Bosnians and abandon or downgrade the importance of the Contact Group, making clear that it is up to the parties, not the international community, to find a mutually acceptable solution.

The U.S. Contact Group representative suggested an evolutionary approach, shifting gradually from option 1 to option 2. While we would not disavow the Contact Group plan or impose unfair terms on the Bosnians, we would attempt over time to bring them to the realization that they will have to settle for less. We would, however, seek to "maximize the minimum," i.e. try to get the Bosnians the best terms that the Bosnian Serbs will accept.

None of the Deputies advocated options 3 or 4: a long-term quarantine of Serbia would be difficult to sell to the Russians and Europeans; and renewed military pressure on the Serbs through lift and strike would likely lead to an Americanization of the conflict, even if pursued multilaterally.

The Director of Strategic Plans and Policy of the Joint Staff and the NSC staff, however, suggested that a staged multilateral lifting of the arms embargo (beginning with defensive weapons), in tandem with a last-chance effort to secure Bosnian Serb acceptance of the Contact Group plan, should remain under consideration in the event that UNPROFOR withdrawal and/or Congressional pressures push us toward option 4. Our Allies' interest in U.S. participation in UNPROFOR withdrawal gives us leverage to secure their acquiescence in multilateral lift. (The Russians would need to be bought off by means of extending additional sanctions relief to Milosevic.)

Another variant of Option 4 might also be considered: a *threat* by the U.S. and its Allies to withdraw UNPROFOR and lift the arms embargo multilaterally as a means of shocking the Serbs into negotiating on the basis of the Contact Group plan. In light of the hollowness of past Contact Group threats, however, we would have to demonstrate more convincingly our readiness to make good on the threat.

Can Containment Work? As noted, options 1 and 2 point to roughly the same concrete policy actions. They would make prevention of a new war and containment, rather than achieving a political settlement, our priority goal. They also have the same flaw: they ignore the fact that the Bosnians would rather fight than settle for the status quo, and they will not readily cooperate with a containment strategy. If the war escalates and Bosnian suffering once again dominates the headlines and CNN, Hill pressures to lift the arms embargo could become hard to manage.

If we are to prevent a new round of fighting and avoid a serious break with the Bosnians, we need to find additional positive incentives for the Bosnians to exercise restraint. These could include:

- massive economic assistance and political support to the Federation;
- measures to persuade the Bosnians that UNPROFOR is worth keeping, even if it means deferring a lifting of the arms embargo once again (e.g. deployment of additional troops to forcibly open the Blue Route to Sarajevo; a more aggressive effort to get our allies to toughen up UNPROFOR's rules of engagement throughout Bosnia; a return to NATO enforcement of the exclusion zones, etc.); and
- other steps to encourage a deferral of lift, such as a more robust program of military training (albeit one consistent with the arms embargo), intelligence support, etc.

Financial incentives alone will not likely sway the Bosnians, even if we are able to come up with serious money. The latter steps, however, would mean renewed frictions with our Allies and may be unattainable without, in the end, precipitating UNPROFOR's withdrawal. Threatening the Bosnians with punitive actions, on the other hand, would be politically indefensible.

In the final analysis, therefore, we may not be able to prevent the Bosnians from going on the offensive in the spring. The best case may be that the renewed fighting does not lead to any major Bosnian reverses and the current stalemate remains when winter returns. The worst case is that the Serbs respond by overrunning the eastern enclaves and strangling Sarajevo again. Although UNPROFOR countries may hunker down and not decide to withdraw even in the latter scenario, Congress may force the issue with unilateral lift.

TAB A

~~SECRET~~

White House Guidelines,

20327

September 11, 2006

By KDE NARA, Date 05/01/15

2012-0798-F

PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA AND CROATIA

DATE: March 17, 1995

LOCATION: White House Situation Room

TIME: 2:30-4:00pm

Agenda

- I. Former Yugoslavia Policy Review.....NSC/All**
 - Steps to Prevent Renewed War in Bosnia.....State**
- II. Near-Term Diplomatic Strategy.....State**
 - B. Croatia Strategy (Next Steps)
 - C. Contact Group Prospects/Response to the Milosevic Proposal
- III. OPLAN 40104 Approval Process
 - A. Next Steps on NATO Prepositioning - Step Two and Beyond.....OSD/JCS**
 - (1) Talking Points for Congressional Calls
 - (2) Notifying NATO
 - B. NATO/U.S. Decision Timeline for OPLAN 40104...OSD/JCS**
 - Strategy for Gaining Congressional Authorization and Appropriation.....OSD/ALL
- IV. Responding to Dole/Bosnian Government Requests for Military Training (Implementing 505 Agreement).....OSD/JCS**

** - Paper Due 12 noon March 16.

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

TAB B

TAB C

TO BE PROVIDED

TO BE PROVIDED

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002b. paper	[duplicate of 001g] (3 pages)	03/17/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Transnational Threats (Cressey, Roeger)
OA/Box Number: 3188

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia/Croatia - PC/DC Packages

2012-0798-F
ke3172

RESTRICTION CODES

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002c. paper	[duplicate of 001h] (2 pages)	03/16/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Transnational Threats (Cressey, Roeger)
OA/Box Number: 3188

FOLDER TITLE:

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ke3172

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TAB G

TALKING POINTS FOR CALLS TO MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Support for Step Two of NATO Prepositioning for UNPROFOR Withdrawal

- As you know, in early December the President informed our Allies that the U.S. would be prepared, in principle, to commit U.S. ground forces to a NATO operation to help UNPROFOR withdraw from *Bosnia*.
- Assisting UN forces in Bosnia, in particular those of our closest Allies, would be an essential demonstration of Alliance solidarity. Failure to offer such support would risk grave damage to NATO.
- We do not want UNPROFOR to depart; it performs a critical function in Bosnia. Our decision to assist an UNPROFOR withdrawal was a decision in principle.
- The Administration has no intention of keeping U.S. ground forces in Bosnia or Croatia following a withdrawal operation. The sole purpose of deploying troops would be to participate as a NATO-member nation in support of UNPROFOR withdrawal.
- I hasten to note that the UN has not made a formal decision to withdraw UNPROFOR from either Bosnia or Croatia. Fighting, however, could resume in Bosnia later this spring. Heavy fighting could well prompt a UN decision to withdraw.
- It could take as much as 8-12 weeks after a UN request for help and a NATO decision to implement the OP Plan before preparations are complete and forces are in place to commence a withdrawal of UNPROFOR, our senior military commanders recommend that we act now to ensure that the essential first prepositioning steps are taken to ensure the communications network is ready to support a likely major military operation.
- Accordingly, I am asking for your support for a Presidential decision in principle to preposition up to 15 U.S. DOD personnel in Croatia -- to execute the preliminary communications steps associated with NATO's operational plan for extraction of UNPROFOR from Bosnia.
- We will consult with you if further prepositioning steps are required and before any final decision is reached on implementation of the actual withdrawal plan.
- In the interim, NATO's Operational Plan is being updated continuously; and NATO is still working such key issues as final numbers of troops that would be provided from

among the various NATO allies, how the overall operation would be funded, and when precisely the actual prepositioning of communications personnel would begin.

IF ASKED

- Funding for the prepositioning steps would come from existing NATO funds (about \$11 million).
- In light of Tudjman's agreement, we see no requirement for U.S. or NATO combat units to assist in the change of UN forces in Croatia.

TAB H

TO BE PROVIDED

BOB DOLE
KANSAS

No. 1 2 1

United States Senate

OFFICE OF THE MAJORITY LEADER

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-7010

March 15, 1995

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

We are writing in regard to commitments made by your administration to assist in the withdrawal of U.N. troops from Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is our understanding that the recent compromise with the Croatian government may require only a partial withdrawal of U.N. forces from Croatia -- that is if the militant Serbs agree -- and that U.S. involvement is likely to be very limited in such an operation. However, we are aware that you have already committed to providing U.S. military assistance, to include U.S. combat troops, to participate in the withdrawal of U.N. troops from Bosnia and Herzegovina should such a decision be made by either nations participating in UNPROFOR or the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

While we have consistently opposed your policy toward the former Yugoslavia, and have been critical of the inability and unwillingness of the U.N. forces to fulfill their mandate there, we recognize that U.S. participation to assist the withdrawal of U.N. forces may be necessary. However, we believe that such assistance should not be offered without strict conditions.

The first condition is that the entire withdrawal operation be under unified NATO command -- from start to finish. The "dual-key" arrangement under which NATO currently operates and is subordinate to the United Nations has been a military and political fiasco. Should such an arrangement be extended to any component of the withdrawal operation -- even under peaceful circumstances -- we would strongly oppose U.S. participation.

It is critical that the United States establish concretely and in advance that NATO command is a prerequisite to U.S. participation. As such, we would strongly recommend that this decision be explicitly stated in a U.N. Security Council resolution on the matter. A letter from the U.N. Secretary General in our view would be wholly insufficient; a binding commitment from the countries in the Security Council who are the largest troop contributors to UNPROFOR should be a minimum requirement.

Second, the rules of engagement must be robust. There must be no question that self-defense includes the right of retaliation -- at the discretion of the NATO commander. Those forces that may consider interfering with the withdrawal of U.N.

forces must know in no uncertain terms that if any U.N. or NATO troops are provoked or attacked that they will face massive and disproportionate retaliation, to include all their military assets, not just their immediately-engaged forces.

Third, there must be a common sense rule applied to the withdrawal of heavy equipment belonging to the U.N. protection forces. We understand that those of our allies participating in UNPROFOR would like to remove all of their equipment when they depart. If the environment is calm and peaceful, we would not object to using American forces to facilitate the withdrawal of equipment. Should we be faced with a hostile environment, however, we believe that American lives should not be endangered to rescue equipment.

Finally, U.S. assistance should be premised on an understanding with our allies that UNPROFOR's withdrawal clears the way for lifting the U.N. arms embargo on the Bosnian Government. To date, allied objections to lifting the arms embargo have centered on concerns about the safety of allied troops deployed in Bosnia-Herzegovina. If the United States assists in the withdrawal of U.N. forces, the allies must know that we will not tolerate equivocation on the matter of terminating the arms embargo. For three years the Bosnians have been denied their fundamental and inherent right to self-defense and watched as U.N. forces provided cover to the aggressor Serb forces. In sum, U.S. assistance in the withdrawal of UNPROFOR should be explicitly conditioned on the support of those nations for terminating the arms embargo.

Mr. President, we believe that these military and political conditions -- NATO command, robust rules of engagement, limitations on withdrawal of equipment, and allied agreement on next steps -- are not only essential to securing support from the U.S. Congress, but essential to the success of such a potentially dangerous operation. We look forward to hearing from you soon.

Sincerely,

Storn Edmund Ben Jay
J. Hill *John Stevens*
Jesse Helms

TAB J

SENT BY: Xerox Telecopier 7021 : 2-17-95 : 13:50 :

2022252035-

202 647 9667: # 2

Congress of the United States

Washington, DC 20515

February 17, 1995

The President
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

We are writing to urge immediate action by you on the war in Bosnia. While diplomats talk in the wake of former President Carter's visit to the region, there is strong reason to believe that the Bosnian Serbs will continue to reject peace. If the war in Bosnia resumes full scale, we do not believe the situation will continue as it has for the last three years. UNPROFOR's already weakened position will become even more untenable, and pressure for its withdrawal will increase.

In the event of either significant Serbian escalation or of UNPROFOR withdrawal, the case for ending the international arms embargo of Bosnia becomes even more compelling. We trust that, in such circumstances, your Administration would move expeditiously to end the United Nations embargo. Should that not be possible, however, we would expect the Congress to vote to unilaterally end participation by the United States in the embargo.

In any event, the United States has an obligation to prepare for the most likely scenarios in Bosnia. If the embargo is to be ended, either multilaterally or unilaterally, we will want to see direct U.S. involvement in the conflict held to a minimum. The surest way to minimize direct U.S. involvement after the embargo is ended is to act now to train the pro-government forces in strategy and tactics and the use of some of the weapons they are likely to obtain.

Such training would reduce the risk to the pro-government forces of any preemptive Serbian offensive and would be an alternative to sending U.S. forces into Bosnia to provide training after the embargo is ended. Such training should be provided outside of Bosnia in order to avoid any risk to U.S. trainers. We understand that such training can be provided at a small fraction of the cost we currently are paying for the U.N. peacekeeping operation in Bosnia, and that it could be completed in less than six months. We also understand that the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina would welcome such training, and indeed already has submitted a formal request to you in this regard.

There can be no question about your authority to direct the provision of such training. Section 1404 of the 1995 Defense Department Authorization Act (the so-called Nunn-Mitchell provision) required the Administration to present options to the Congress for training the pro-government forces in Bosnia. Other provisions of law, including section 503 of the National Security Act of 1947, give you authority to deliver such training. Further, the provision of such training by the United States would not violate existing Security Council resolutions or relevant principles of international law.

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202 647 9667: 3


We believe you should take this step in order to be better prepared for the likely next phase of the war in Bosnia and in order to reduce the likelihood that U.S. forces will become directly involved in that war. It is important to note, however, that a program of training the pro-government forces in Bosnia would give the United States additional leverage in the ongoing negotiations with the Bosnian Serbs. Beginning a training program now would make clear to the Bosnian Serbs our determination to bring about a just and sustainable peace, and would underscore to them the probable cost of prolonging the conflict.

In other words, in the hands of able diplomats, a policy of training the pro-government forces for war could prove to be a powerful instrument for bringing about peace.


For all these reasons, we urge you to initiate promptly a program of military training for the pro-government forces in Bosnia and Hercegovina.


Sincerely,


BOB DOLE



BENJAMIN A. GILMAN


JOSEPH LIEBERMAN


HENRY J. HYDE


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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002d. letter	[duplicate of 001j] (1 page)	01/17/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Transnational Threats (Cressey, Roeger)
OA/Box Number: 3188

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia/Croatia - PC/DC Packages

2012-0798-F
ke3172

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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TAB K

DRAFT
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ISSUE PAPER: TRAINING THE PRO-GOVERNMENT FORCES IN BOSNIA

Background: Senator Dole, Rep. Gilman, and others wrote the President on February 17, 1995, to urge him to "act now to train the pro-government forces in strategy and tactics and the use of some of the weapons they are likely to obtain." The Members argued that the surest way to minimize direct U.S. involvement is to train the pro-government forces now so as to reduce their risk from any preemptive Serbian offensive.

Ambassador Alkalaj of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (B-H) also wrote President Clinton on January 17, 1995, to request that the U.S. review the means by which training for the B-H Army personnel could begin outside of the borders of B-H. He argued that such training "can be most decisive in preparing B-H for continuing its defense against aggression, or, in the event of a negotiated settlement, for an effective deterrent and source of stability as peace is secured...."

An interagency General Counsels' (OGC) group in February recommended that only a "narrow" IMET be concluded for reasons of neutrality and force protection. OGC posited the negative consequences associated with violating the spirit and intent of UNSCRs and losing the protections afforded by "experts on mission" status. They believe, however, that adequate domestic legal authority exists to provide the training contemplated by Senator Dole.

Issue: The type of training, if any, that the USG should provide to the pro-government forces in B-H; where that training should be provided; and when such training should begin.

Options:

1. *Limit training at this time to that outlined in a narrow Section 505 of the Foreign Assistance Act agreement--*The U.S. has \$70,000 available for IMET should such an agreement be signed. However, moving forward with the narrow agreement would require finessing the issue of the broader draft 505 agreement which was provided to the government of B-H earlier. Such training would not violate the spirit and intent of UNSCRs regarding the arms embargo. It would be limited to IMET training for only a few senior Federation officers at our senior professional military schools and some English language training. The training would not affect USG neutrality regarding this conflict. Providing this limited training would avoid the appearance of totally abandoning B-H but would have negligible effect on the battlefield.
2. *Expand IMET training beyond the few senior Federation officers attending war colleges or receiving English language training.* Courses would be "non-lethal" technical training courses and could include courses in computer programming, finance, and health care. Training would be at the individual level. This would have little practical effect on the battlefield but might placate some who felt the USG had a moral obligation to do something.

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3. *Provide some limited individual tactical and operational training for weapons likely to be used.* Individual training would be conducted at U.S. facilities and schools. Such training could also include enrollment of junior and mid-level officers in professional development and leadership courses. This would prolong the conflict by encouraging B-H to fight on but would likely have minimal effect on the battlefield. It is unclear how unit commanders could be rotated through this training without a detrimental effect on the battlefield for B-H. It would, however, partially meet the demands of those who posit that the USG has a moral responsibility to assist B-H in its self-defense.
4. *Train the pro-government forces in accordance with the plan outlined by Senator Dole.* This would be unit level training and would need to be accomplished in a neighboring country, most likely Croatia. Such training would respond fully to the moral arguments that demand the USG assist B-H. It would also relieve some pressure from Congress. However, it directly contradicts the spirit and intent of UNSCRs and would clearly remove our forces from the protections of their current "experts on mission" status and make the U.S. a co-belligerent in the conflict.

Discussion: The effects of training the pro-government forces of B-H are problematic. However, there are other more likely and less favorable results from the training than those outlined by Ambassador Alkalaj and Senator Dole.

- Training is virtually synonymous with arming. Once the U.S. begins a significant training effort, the U.S. becomes an ally of B-H and, by extension, Croatia. The U.S. would become a co-belligerent.
- Once a decision to train is made, but before the training is complete, defines a period of enhanced vulnerability for B-H. Many will interpret such a decision to train as a harbinger of lifting the arms embargo. That, in turn may trigger UNPROFOR's withdrawal.
- UNPROFOR's imminent withdrawal means that UN related humanitarian assistance programs will terminate. The humanitarian crisis will worsen.
- Training is a signal to all the Federation (including the HVO) that the U.S. is preparing the pro-government forces for a return to war.
- The Bosnian Serbs are likely to react to the above with preemptive action against B-H. Probable targets are the isolated enclaves. Almost all analysts project they would fall quickly.
- Others might feel compelled to take similar action on the side of the Serbs.
- The negative consequences outlined by the OGC are compelling--training as contemplated by Senator Dole puts USG neutrality in question and would destroy the fabric of even-handedness upon which UNPROFOR and NATO operations in support thereof are based.
- The March 4, 1995, Deputies' discussion focused on the reality of accepting a minimalist outcome for B-H and that its longer-term prospect was absorption by Croatia and Serbia.

Recommendation: Approve Option 1--narrow 505 agreement--as the basis of the President's response to Senator Dole.

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Classified by OASD
Declassify on: OADR

TAB L

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002e. paper	[duplicate of 001k] (3 pages)	03/00/1995	P1/b(1)

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002f. email	[duplicate of 001f] (1 page)	02/21/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Transnational Threats (Cressey, Roeger)
OA/Box Number: 3188

FOLDER TITLE:

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White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

~~SECRET~~By KOE NARA, Date 09/11/152012-0918-5Meeting of NSC Principals Committeeon Bosnia and Croatia

Friday, April 7, 1995

2:30-4:00 p.m.

White House Situation Room

AGENDA

I. Diplomatic Strategy

- A. Contact Group Status/Next Steps.....State
- B. Next Steps following Passage of UNSC Resolutions on
UNPROFOR.....State

II. OPLAN 40104 Approval Process

- A. Next Steps on NATO Prepositioning - Step Two (Mini/Maxi
Options) and Beyond.....JCS
- B. NATO/U.S. Decision Timeline for OPLAN 40104.....JCS
 - Strategy for Briefing President and Gaining
Congressional Authorization or
Appropriation.....OSD/JCS

III. Preventing or containing renewed fighting in Bosnia

- A. Diplomatic Strategy.....State
- B. Strategy/Options for Strengthening
UNPROFOR.....OSD/JCS/State

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Declassify on: OADR