

FOIA MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Folder Title:

North Korea-Kuala Lumpur, May-June 1995 [2]

Staff Office-Individual:

Nonproliferation and Export Controls-Aoki, Steven

Original OA/ID Number:

711

Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:	Stack:
41	5	6	3	V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. paper	re LWR Project (26 pages)	00/00/1995	P1/b(1)
002. draft	ad ref (proposal), agreement for supply of LWR (14 pages)	06/00/1995	P1/b(1)
003. notes	handwritten, re Kuala Lumpur negotiations (19 pages)	05/20/1995	P1/b(1)
004. notes	handwritten, re Kuala Lumpur negotiations (19 pages)	05/22/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 711

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea - Kuala Lumpur, May-June 1995 [2]

2009-0528-F

kc1586

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
--------------------------	---------------	------	-------------

001. paper	re LWR Project (26 pages)	00/00/1995	P1/b(1)
------------	---------------------------	------------	---------

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 711

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea - Kuala Lumpur, May-June 1995 [2]

2009-0528-F
kc1586

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

UNCLASSIFIED

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DIST: AOKI, BAKER, HAHN, KRECKO, NSC, PONEMAN, ROTH, SEATON, SUETTINGER, VAX

PREC: IMMEDIATE CLASS: UNCLASSIFIED DTG:220146Z OCT 94

FM: SECSTATE WASHDC

TO:

ALL EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC DIPLOMATIC POSTS IMMEDIATE

ALL OECD CAPITALS IMMEDIATE

RUEHVEN/USMISSION USVIENNA IMMEDIATE 3939

RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 7934

RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 7219

RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6779

RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 0775

RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC 9198

RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE 8825

RUEATRS/TREASURY DEPT WASHDC 1209

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 STATE 286803

USVIENNA/UNVIE/USOECDE/EMBASSY;CANBERRA/BRISBANE, PERTH

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: PARM, PREL, MNUC, KS, KN, US

SUBJECT: U.S./DPRK AGREED FRAMEWORK

1. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE U.S./DPRK AGREED FRAMEWORK WHICH WAS PUBLICLY RELEASED FOLLOWING A SIGNING CEREMONY IN GENEVA OCTOBER 21, AND FACT SHEETS ON THE FRAMEWORK AND LIGHT WATER REACTORS FOR USE WITH HOST GOVERNMENTS AND LOCAL OPINION LEADERS.

2. BEGIN TEXT:

- AGREED FRAMEWORK BETWEEN
- THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND
- THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA

- GENEVA, OCTOBER 21, 1994

DELEGATIONS OF THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (U.S.) AND THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (DPRK) HELD TALKS IN GENEVA FROM SEPTEMBER 23 TO OCTOBER 21, 1994, TO NEGOTIATE AN OVERALL RESOLUTION OF THE NUCLEAR ISSUE ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA.

BOTH SIDES REAFFIRMED THE IMPORTANCE OF ATTAINING THE OBJECTIVES CONTAINED IN THE AUGUST 12, 1994 AGREED

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

STATEMENT BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE DPRK AND UPHOLDING THE PRINCIPLES OF THE JUNE 11, 1993 JOINT STATEMENT OF THE U.S. AND THE DPRK TO ACHIEVE PEACE AND SECURITY ON A NUCLEAR-FREE KOREAN PENINSULA. THE U.S. AND DPRK DECIDED TO TAKE THE FOLLOWING ACTIONS FOR THE RESOLUTION OF THE NUCLEAR ISSUE:

I. BOTH SIDES WILL COOPERATE TO REPLACE THE DPRK'S GRAPHITE-MODERATED REACTORS AND RELATED FACILITIES WITH LIGHT-WATER REACTOR (LWR) POWER PLANTS.

- 1) IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE OCTOBER 20, 1994 LETTER OF ASSURANCE FROM THE U.S. PRESIDENT, THE U.S. WILL UNDERTAKE TO MAKE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE PROVISION TO THE DPRK OF A LWR PROJECT WITH A TOTAL GENERATING CAPACITY OF APPROXIMATELY 2,000 MW(E) BY A TARGET DATE OF 2003.

- --THE U.S. WILL ORGANIZE UNDER ITS LEADERSHIP AN INTERNATIONAL CONSORTIUM TO FINANCE AND SUPPLY THE LWR PROJECT TO BE PROVIDED TO THE DPRK. THE U.S., REPRESENTING THE INTERNATIONAL CONSORTIUM, WILL SERVE AS THE PRINCIPAL POINT OF CONTACT WITH THE DPRK FOR THE LWR PROJECT.

- --THE U.S., REPRESENTING THE CONSORTIUM, WILL MAKE BEST EFFORTS TO SECURE THE CONCLUSION OF A SUPPLY CONTRACT WITH THE DPRK WITHIN SIX MONTHS OF THE DATE OF THIS DOCUMENT FOR THE PROVISION OF THE LWR PROJECT. CONTRACT TALKS WILL BEGIN AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AFTER THE DATE OF THIS DOCUMENT.

- --AS NECESSARY, THE U.S. AND THE DPRK WILL CONCLUDE A BILATERAL AGREEMENT FOR COOPERATION IN THE FIELD OF PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY.

- 2) IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE OCTOBER 20 1994 LETTER OF ASSURANCE FROM THE U.S. PRESIDENT, THE U.S., REPRESENTING THE CONSORTIUM, WILL MAKE ARRANGEMENTS TO OFFSET THE ENERGY FOREGONE DUE TO THE FREEZE OF THE DPRK'S GRAPHITE-MODERATED REACTORS AND RELATED FACILITIES PENDING COMPLETION OF THE FIRST LWR UNIT.

- --ALTERNATIVE ENERGY WILL BE PROVIDED IN THE FORM OF HEAVY OIL FOR HEATING AND ELECTRICITY PRODUCTION.

- --DELIVERIES OF HEAVY OIL WILL BEGIN WITHIN THREE MONTHS OF THE DATE OF THIS DOCUMENT AND WILL REACH A RATE OF 500,000 TONS ANNUALLY, IN ACCORDANCE WITH AN AGREED SCHEDULE OF DELIVERIES.

- 3) UPON RECEIPT OF U.S. ASSURANCES FOR THE PROVISION OF LWR'S AND FOR ARRANGEMENTS FOR INTERIM ENERGY ALTERNATIVES, THE DPRK WILL FREEZE ITS GRAPHITE-MODERATED REACTORS AND RELATED FACILITIES AND WILL EVENTUALLY

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

DISMANTLE THESE REACTORS AND RELATED FACILITIES.

- --THE FREEZE ON THE DPRK'S GRAPHITE-MODERATED
UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 06 STATE 286803

USVIENNA/UNVIE/USOECD/EMBASSY;CANBERRA/BRISBANE, PERTH

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: PARM, PREL, MNUC, KS, KN, US

SUBJECT: U.S./DPRK AGREED FRAMEWORK

REACTORS AND RELATED FACILITIES WILL BE FULLY IMPLEMENTED WITHIN ONE MONTH OF THE DATE OF THIS DOCUMENT. DURING THIS ONE-MONTH PERIOD, AND THROUGHOUT THE FREEZE, THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA) WILL BE ALLOWED TO MONITOR THIS FREEZE, AND THE DPRK WILL PROVIDE FULL COOPERATION TO THE IAEA FOR THIS PURPOSE.

- --DISMANTLEMENT OF THE DPRK'S GRAPHITE,MODERATED REACTORS AND RELATED FACILITIES WILL BE COMPLETED WHEN THE LWR PROJECT IS COMPLETED.

- --THE U.S. AND DPRK WILL COOPERATE IN FINDING A METHOD TO STORE SAFELY THE SPENT FUEL FROM THE 5 MW(E) EXPERIMENTAL REACTOR DURING THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE LWR PROJECT, AND TO DISPOSE OF THE FUEL IN A SAFE MANNER THAT DOES NOT INVOLVE REPROCESSING IN THE DPRK.

- 4) AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AFTER THE DATE OF THIS DOCUMENT U.S. AND DPRK EXPERTS WILL HOLD TWO SETS OF EXPERTS TALKS.

- --AT ONE SET OF TALKS, EXPERTS WILL DISCUSS ISSUES RELATED TO ALTERNATIVE ENERGY AND THE REPLACEMENT OF THE GRAPHITE-MODERATED REACTOR PROGRAM WITH THE LWR PROJECT.

- --AT THE OTHER SET OF TALKS, EXPERTS WILL DISCUSS SPECIFIC ARRANGEMENTS FOR SPENT FUEL STORAGE AND ULTIMATE DISPOSITION.

II. THE TWO SIDES WILL MOVE TOWARD FULL NORMALIZATION OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS.

- 1) WITHIN THREE MONTHS OF THE DATE OF THIS DOCUMENT BOTH SIDES WILL REDUCE BARRIERS TO TRADE AND INVESTMENT, INCLUDING RESTRICTIONS ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES AND FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS.

- 2) EACH SIDE WILL OPEN A LIAISON OFFICE IN THE OTHER.S CAPITAL FOLLOWING RESOLUTION OF CONSULAR AND OTHER TECHNICAL ISSUES THROUGH EXPERT LEVEL DISCUSSIONS.

- 3) AS PROGRESS IS MADE ON ISSUES OF CONCERN TO EACH SIDE, THE U.S. AND DPRK WILL UPGRADE BILATERAL RELATIONS TO THE AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

III. BOTH SIDES WILL WORK TOGETHER FOR PEACE AND SECURITY
ON A NUCLEAR-FREE KOREAN PENINSULA.

- 1) THE U.S. WILL PROVIDE FORMAL ASSURANCES TO THE DPRK, AGAINST THE THREAT OR USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY THE U.S.
- 2) THE DPRK WILL CONSISTENTLY TAKE STEPS TO IMPLEMENT THE NORTH-SOUTH JOINT DECLARATION ON THE DENUCLEARIZATION OF THE KOREAN PENINSULA.
- 3) THE DPRK WILL ENGAGE IN NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE, AS THIS AGREED FRAMEWORK WILL HELP CREATE AN ATMOSPHERE THAT PROMOTES SUCH DIALOGUE.

IV. BOTH SIDES WILL WORK TOGETHER TO STRENGTHEN THE
INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME.

- 1) THE DPRK WILL REMAIN A PARTY TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (NPT) AND WILL ALLOW IMPLEMENTATION OF ITS SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT UNDER THE TREATY.
- 2) UPON CONCLUSION OF THE SUPPLY CONTRACT FOR THE PROVISION OF THE LWR PROJECT, AD HOC AND ROUTINE INSPECTIONS WILL RESUME UNDER THE DPRK'S SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT WITH THE IAEA WITH RESPECT TO THE FACILITIES NOT SUBJECT TO THE FREEZE. PENDING CONCLUSION OF THE SUPPLY CONTRACT, INSPECTIONS REQUIRED BY THE IAEA FOR THE CONTINUITY OF SAFEGUARDS WILL CONTINUE AT THE FACILITIES NOT SUBJECT TO THE FREEZE.
- 3) WHEN A SIGNIFICANT PORTION OF THE LWR PROJECT IS COMPLETED, BUT BEFORE DELIVERY OF KEY NUCLEAR COMPONENTS, THE DPRK WILL COME INTO FULL COMPLIANCE WITH ITS SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT WITH THE IAEA (INFCIRC/403), INCLUDING TAKING ALL STEPS THAT MAY BE DEEMED NECESSARY BY THE IAEA, FOLLOWING CONSULTATIONS WITH THE AGENCY WITH REGARD TO VERIFYING THE ACCURACY AND COMPLETENESS OF THE UNCLAS SECTION 03 OF 06 STATE 286803

USVIENNA/UNVIE/USOEC/EMBASSY;CANBERRA/BRISBANE, PERTH

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: PARM, PREL, MNUC, KS, KN, US

SUBJECT: U.S./DPRK AGREED FRAMEWORK

DPRK'S INITIAL REPORT ON ALL NUCLEAR MATERIAL IN THE DPRK.

END TEXT.

3. BEGIN TEXT OF FACT SHEETS:

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

- U.S./DPRK AGREED FRAMEWORK

- FACT SHEET

-- ON OCTOBER 21, 1994, AFTER SIXTEEN MONTHS OF NEGOTIATIONS THE UNITED STATES AND NORTH KOREA SIGNED AN AGREED FRAMEWORK THAT WILL HELP ACHIEVE A LONG-STANDING AND VITAL U.S. OBJECTIVE: AN END TO THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA AND PROVIDES THE BASIS FOR MORE NORMAL RELATIONS BETWEEN NORTH KOREA AND THE REST OF THE WORLD.

-- THIS AGREED FRAMEWORK NOT ONLY SERVES THE INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES, BUT THOSE OF OUR ALLIES, SOUTH KOREA AND JAPAN, AS WELL. IT WILL CONTRIBUTE TO GREATER SECURITY TO NORTHEAST ASIA AND TO OUR EFFORTS TO END NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION GLOBALLY.

-- IT WILL BRING THE DPRK INTO FULL COMPLIANCE WITH ITS NON-PROLIFERATION OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT). THE DPRK AFFIRMS ITS NPT MEMBER STATUS AND COMMITS TO ALLOW IMPLEMENTATION OF ITS IAEA SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT.

-- WHEN FULLY IMPLEMENTED, THE AGREED FRAMEWORK WILL TERMINATE THE EXISTING NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM. FOR NOW, THAT PROGRAM WILL BE FROZEN UNDER IAEA SUPERVISION, AND EVENTUALLY IT WILL DISMANTLED.

-- IT ENSURES SAFE DISPOSITION OF SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL NOW IN NORTH KOREA. THE DPRK WILL FOREGO REPROCESSING AND INSTEAD WILL SAFELY STORE AND EVENTUALLY SHIP THE FUEL OUT OF COUNTRY. BOTH OF THESE STEPS GO BEYOND ANY OBLIGATIONS INCURRED UNDER THE NPT.

-- THE DPRK WILL ACCEPT WHATEVER INSPECTIONS OR OTHER STEPS DEEMED NECESSARY BY THE IAEA BEFORE IT RECEIVES ANY NUCLEAR COMPONENTS FOR A LIGHT WATER REACTOR (LWR).

-- THE AGREED FRAMEWORK ADDRESSES THE FOLLOWING CONCERNS ABOUT THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM WITH RESPECT TO PAST ACTIVITIES, CURRENT ACTIVITIES AND FUTURE ACTIVITIES.

THE PRESENT

-- WITH RESPECT TO THE PRESENT, NORTH KOREA HAS A 5 MW(E) REACTOR THAT PRODUCED PLUTONIUM IN THE PAST AS WELL AS THE SPENT FUEL NOW IN A STORAGE POND WHICH, IF REPROCESSED, WOULD PRODUCE 25-30 KILOGRAMS OF PLUTONIUM. NORTH KOREA ALSO HAS A REPROCESSING FACILITY.

-- UNDER THE TERMS OF THE AGREED FRAMEWORK, THE NORTH'S CURRENT NUCLEAR PROGRAM IS FROZEN: THE 5 MW REACTOR WILL

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

NOT RESTART THE REPROCESSING FACILITY WILL BE SEALED AND NOT OPERATED AGAIN; THE SPENT FUEL WHICH CAME FROM THE 5 MW REACTOR WILL STAY IN THE POND. THE U.S. AND DPRK WILL COOPERATE IN SAFELY STORING THE SPENT FUEL AND SUBSEQUENTLY DISPOSING OF IT IN A MANNER THAT DOES NOT INVOLVE REPROCESSING IN THE DPRK.

-- THESE MEASURES ADDRESS OUR CONCERNS ABOUT THE POTENTIAL FOR FURTHER SEPARATION OF PLUTONIUM FROM SPENT FUEL AND FURTHER PRODUCTION OF PLUTONIUM IN THE 5 MW REACTOR.

-- ALL THESE PROVISIONS WILL BE MONITORED BY THE IAEA.

T

-- WITH RESPECT TO THE FUTURE, THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM INCLUDES TWO LARGE GAS GRAPHITE REACTORS NOW UNDER CONSTRUCTION, ONE RATED AT 50 MW(E) AND THE OTHER AT 200 MW(E). IF THOSE REACTORS WERE TO BE COMPLETED THEY WOULD PRODUCE HUNDREDS OF KILOGRAMS OF PLUTONIUM A YEAR.

-- THE CONSTRUCTION OF THOSE REACTORS WILL BE FROZEN AND ALONG WITH RELATED FACILITIES CURRENTLY EXISTING IN NORTH UNCLAS SECTION 04 OF 06 STATE 286803

USVIENNA/UNVIE/USOECD/EMBASSY;CANBERRA/BRISBANE, PERTH

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: PARM, PREL, MNUC, KS, KN, US

SUBJECT: U.S./DPRK AGREED FRAMEWORK

KOREA, INCLUDING THE REPROCESSING FACILITY, WILL BE DISMANTLED OVER THE COURSE OF CONSTRUCTION OF THE LWR PROJECT. THAT IS TO SAY, THE 5 MW REACTOR, THE REPROCESSING FACILITY, THE 50 MW AND 200 MW REACTORS ALL WILL BE DISMANTLED. IN ADDITION, THE DPRK HAS AGREED NOT TO BUILD ANY OTHER GRAPHITE-MODERATED REACTORS OR RELATED FACILITIES IN THE FUTURE.

-- DISMANTLEMENT OF THE FROZEN GRAPHITE-MODERATED REACTORS AND RELATED FACILITIES IS PACED TO THE LWR PROJECT SUCH THAT DISMANTLEMENT WILL BEGIN WHEN THE FIRST LWR UNIT IS COMPLETED AND END WHEN THE SECOND LWR UNIT IS COMPLETED.

-- IN ADDITION, THE SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL IN THE POND WILL BE

SHIPPED OUT OF NORTH KOREA. THE SHIPMENT OF SPENT FUEL FROM THE DPRK WILL BEGIN WHEN SIGNIFICANT NUCLEAR COMPONENTS BEGIN TO BE DELIVERED FOR THE FIRST LWR. THE FUEL MUST BE COMPLETELY SHIPPED OUT OF NORTH KOREA BY THE TIME THE FIRST LWR IS COMPLETED.

-- THE AGREED FRAMEWORK DOES NOT RELY ON TRUST; RATHER, ALL OF THESE STEPS WILL BE VERIFIABLE.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

-- THE QUESTION OF WHAT NORTH KOREA DID IN THE PAST CAN BE RESOLVED BY THE IAEA ONLY IF THE IAEA HAS THE ACCESS TO INFORMATION IN SITES THAT IT NEEDS.

-- UNDER THE AGREED FRAMEWORK, THAT ACCESS WILL BE PROVIDED. THE DPRK HAS AGREED TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ITS FULL-SCOPE SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT AND WHATEVER THE IAEA DEEMS NECESSARY TO RESOLVE QUESTIONS ABOUT PAST ACTIVITIES.

-- IMPLEMENTATION OF THAT PORTION OF THE AGREED FRAMEWORK TAKES PLACE OVER A PERIOD OF TIME, BUT MUST BE COMPLETED BEFORE SIGNIFICANT NUCLEAR COMPONENTS OF THE FIRST LIGHT WATER REACTOR (LWR) TO BE CONSTRUCTED IN NORTH KOREA ARE DELIVERED.

-- THAT IS, BEFORE ANY NUCLEAR COMPONENTS ARE DELIVERED FOR THE FIRST LWR, THE QUESTION OF NORTH KOREA'S PAST ACTIVITIES AND NORTH KOREA'S FULL COMPLIANCE WITH ITS IAEA SAFEGUARDS OBLIGATIONS WILL BE RESOLVED.

-- IF THE LWR PROJECT IS TO PROCEED BEYOND THAT POINT SPECIAL INSPECTIONS MUST BE CONDUCTED IF REQUESTED BY THE IAEA. WHILE WE WOULD PREFER TO HAVE THEM CONDUCTED EARLIER, THERE IS NO TECHNICAL DISADVANTAGE OR RISK IN DELAYING INSPECTIONS OF THE TWO RADIOACTIVE WASTE SITES.

-- THE AGREED FRAMEWORK PROVIDES THAT IN RETURN FOR THE FREEZING AND DISMANTLING OF ITS PRESENT NUCLEAR PROGRAM, NORTH KOREA WILL RECEIVE ASSISTANCE FROM THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IN ACHIEVING LEGITIMATE ENERGY OBJECTIVES.

-- THE U.S. WILL LEAD AN INTERNATIONAL CONSORTIUM, TENTATIVELY CALLED THE KOREAN ENERGY DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATION (KEDO), WHICH WILL OVERSEE CONSTRUCTION OF TWO 1,000 MW LIGHT WATER REACTORS OF

PROLIFERATION-RESISTANT DESIGN IN THE DPRK OVER THE NEXT DECADE.

-- LIGHT-WATER REACTORS ARE MORE PROLIFERATION-RESISTANT THAN NORTH KOREA'S GRAPHITE-MODERATED REACTORS. THE KIND OF PLUTONIUM IN SPENT LWR FUEL IS MUCH LESS USEFUL IN FABRICATING NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND BECAUSE LWRS MUST SHUT DOWN TO REFUEL NON-DIVERSION OF LWR NUCLEAR FUEL CAN BE VERIFIED MORE EASILY.

-- EVEN THOUGH THE U.S. WILL TAKE THE LEAD IN COORDINATING THE CONSORTIUM'S WORK, THE REACTORS WILL BE LARGELY FINANCED AND CONSTRUCTED BY THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA, WITH HELP FROM JAPAN AND PRESUMABLY OTHER COUNTRIES AS WELL.

ALTERNATIVE EMERGE

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

-- THE AGREED FRAMEWORK ALSO PROVIDES THAT THE ENERGY NEEDS OF NORTH KOREA THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN MET BY THE FROZEN AND DISMANTLED NUCLEAR REACTORS ARE TO BE ADDRESSED BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.

-- TO COMPENSATE THE DPRK FOR LOSS OF ENERGY PRODUCTION
UNCLAS SECTION 05 OF 06 STATE 286803

USVIENNA/UNVIE/USOECD/EMBASSY;CANBERRA/BRISBANE, PERTH

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: PARM, PREL, MNUC, KS, KN, US

SUBJECT: U.S./DPRK AGREED FRAMEWORK

FROM NOT OPERATING ITS 5 MW REACTOR AND FROM ABANDONING THE 50 MW AND 200 MW REACTORS UNDER CONSTRUCTION, THE CONSORTIUM WILL PROVIDE THE NORTH 500,000 TONS OF HEAVY FUEL OIL ANNUALLY FOR USE IN A SPECIFIC POWER PLANT (50,000 TONS IN THE FIRST THREE MONTHS, AND 150,000 TONS IN THE FIRST YEAR OF THE AGREEMENT).

-- MOST OF THE FUNDING FOR THIS WILL COME FROM OTHER CONSORTIUM MEMBERS, ALTHOUGH THE U.S. PLANS TO CONTRIBUTE APPROXIMATELY DOLLARS 5 MILLION TO THIS EFFORT BY ARRANGING FOR THE FIRST 50,000 TON SHIPMENT OF HEAVY FUEL OIL.

-- THE AGREED FRAMEWORK SHUTS DOWN NORTH KOREA'S PLUTONIUM PRODUCTION IMMEDIATELY AND, OVER TIME, SHIPS OUT ALL SPENT FUEL AND DISMANTLES THE GRAPHITE-MODERATED SYSTEM. INCENTIVES PROVIDED TO THE DPRK BY THE U.S. AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY ARE IN RETURN FOR THESE ACTIONS. FOR EXAMPLE, BECAUSE NORTH KOREA AGREED TO TERMINATE AND DISMANTLE ITS INDIGENOUS NUCLEAR EFFORT -- UNDERTAKINGS WELL BEYOND ITS NPT OBLIGATIONS -- WE AGREED, WITH THE COOPERATION OF OTHER CONCERNED COUNTRIES TO HELP IT MEET A CONSEQUENTIAL SHORTFALL IN ELECTRICITY PRODUCTION. THEY ARE NOT A "BRIBE" TO NORTH KOREA FOR TAKING THOSE ACTIONS IT NEEDED TO TAKE UNDER ITS NPT AND IAEA SAFEGUARDS

OBLIGATIONS.

-- THE AGREED FRAMEWORK WILL HELP INTEGRATE PYONGYANG INTO THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL MAINSTREAM OF EAST ASIA.

-- THE U.S. AND THE DPRK WILL ESTABLISH LIAISON OFFICES IN EACH OTHER'S CAPITALS, SOMETHING THAT WILL HELP US OVERSEE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS AGREEMENT AND OPEN A CHANNEL TO DEAL WITH OTHER ISSUES THAT CONCERN US.

-- ESTABLISHMENT OF LIAISON OFFICES WILL TAKE PLACE AS ISSUES, FOR EXAMPLE, WITH RESPECT TO CONSULAR ACTIVITY AND ACCESS, ARE RESOLVED. THERE IS ALSO A COMMITMENT ON THE PART OF THE U.S. AND DPRK TO MOVE TO FULL DIPLOMATIC

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

RELATIONS AT THE AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL AS OTHER ISSUES OF CONCERN ARE RESOLVED. THE AGREED FRAMEWORK DOES NOT SPECIFY A TIME FRAME FOR THESE ACTIONS TO TAKE PLACE

- WE PLAN TO REDUCE ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL RESTRICTIONS SELECTIVELY ON U.S. CITIZENS' DEALINGS WITH THE DPRK IN CLOSE CONSULTATION WITH THE CONGRESS.

-- WE WILL PROVIDE A "NEGATIVE SECURITY ASSURANCE." IT WOULD PLEDGE US NOT TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AGAINST NORTH KOREA AS LONG AS IT REMAINS A MEMBER IN GOOD STANDING OF THE NPT REGIME. (WE HAVE PROVIDED SIMILAR ASSURANCES TO OTHER PARTIES TO THE NPT).

-- THIS AGREED FRAMEWORK ATTAINS ALL OUR GOALS, INCLUDING THE NORTH'S COMMITMENT TO PURSUE SOUTH-NORTH DIALOGUE, WITHOUT WHICH THERE CAN BE NO PERMANENT RESOLUTION OF QUESTIONS OF PEACE AND SECURITY ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA. NORTH KOREA ALSO WILL TAKE STEPS TO IMPLEMENT THE NORTH-SOUTH JOINT DECLARATION ON THE DENUCLEARIZATION OF THE KOREAN PENINSULA.

-- WE CONSULTED WITH OUR ALLIES, SOUTH KOREA AND JAPAN, AT EVERY STAGE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS INCLUDING FREQUENT CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND PRESIDENT KIM YOUNG SAM. KOREA AND JAPAN'S STRONG SUPPORT HAS BEEN ESSENTIAL TO THE SUCCESS OF THE TALKS WITH NORTH KOREA.

-- AS THE PRESIDENT HAS STATED ON MANY OCCASIONS, OUR COMMITMENT TO THE SECURITY OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA REMAINS UNSHAKEABLE.

- WHY LWRS ARE BETTER

LIGHT-WATER REACTORS (LWRS) ARE MORE PROLIFERATION-RESISTANT THAN THE DPRK'S GRAPHITE-MODERATED REACTORS FOR FOUR REASONS:

-- 1. ENRICHED VS. NATURAL URANIUM. CURRENT DPRK REACTORS USE NATURAL URANIUM FUEL, WHICH NORTH KOREA PRODUCES INDIGENOUSLY. LWRS REQUIRE ENRICHED URANIUM FUEL, WHICH IS SUPPLIED BY ONLY A HANDFUL OF COUNTRIES -- THE U.S. A EUROPEAN CONSORTIUM, RUSSIA AND CHINA. ALL OF UNCLAS SECTION 06 OF 06 STATE 286803

USVIENNA/UNVIE/USOECDE/EMBASSY;CANBERRA/BRISBANE, PERTH

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: PARM, PREL, MNUC, KS, KN, US

SUBJECT: U.S./DPRK AGREED FRAMEWORK

THESE COUNTRIES REQUIRE SAFEGUARDS AS A CONDITION OF FUEL SUPPLY; INDEED, ALL BUT CHINA REQUIRE FULL-SCOPE (I.E. NPT) SAFEGUARDS, COVERING NOT ONLY THE FACILITY IN

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

QUESTION BUT ALL NUCLEAR FACILITIES IN THE RECIPIENT COUNTRY.

-- 2. REACTOR- VS. WEAPON-GRADE PLUTONIUM. BECAUSE NATURAL URANIUM CONTAINS SO LITTLE U-235, THE FUEL MUST BE REPLACED FREQUENTLY. THE PLUTONIUM IN SPENT NATURAL-URANIUM FUEL IS MOSTLY PU-239 -- THE MOST DESIRABLE ISOTOPE FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS. URANIUM THAT IS ENRICHED IN U-235 IS CAPABLE OF MUCH HIGHER BURNUPS. THE PLUTONIUM IN SPENT LWR FUEL IS LESS DESIRABLE FOR USE IN NUCLEAR WEAPONS BECAUSE IT CONTAINS A HIGHER CONCENTRATION OF PU-240 AND PU-241 -- ISOTOPES THAT MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT TO HANDLE AND INCORPORATE THE PLUTONIUM INTO A DELIVERABLE DEVICE WITH A PREDICTABLE YIELD.

-- 3. BATCH VS. ON-LINE REFUELING. BECAUSE NATURAL-URANIUM FUEL MUST BE REPLACED FREQUENTLY, REACTORS THAT USE IT ARE DESIGNED TO BE REFUELED "ON-LINE" -- THAT IS, WHILE THEY ARE OPERATING. (WE DO NOT BELIEVE THE DPRK ACHIEVED THE CAPABILITY IN PRACTICE WITH THE 5 MW REACTOR BUT THE 50 MW AND 200 MW REACTORS UNDER CONSTRUCTION WOULD HAVE BEEN CAPABLE OF ON-LINE REFUELING.) REACTORS WITH ON-LINE REFUELING ARE MORE DIFFICULT TO SAFEGUARD (I.E., VERIFY THAT NO FUEL IS DIVERTED) THAN REACTORS THAT MUST BE SHUT DOWN FOR REFUELING, SUCH AS LWRS.

-- 4. SPENT-FUEL STORAGE VS. REPROCESSING. EXISTING DPRK REACTORS USE "MAGNOX" FUEL -- URANIUM METAL WITH A MAGNESIUM-ALLOY CLADDING. THIS TYPE OF FUEL CORRODES RELATIVELY QUICKLY, ESPECIALLY WHEN IT IS EXPOSED TO

WATER. BECAUSE OF THIS, VIRTUALLY ALL MAGNOX FUEL IS REPROCESSED SOON AFTER IT IS DISCHARGED FROM THE REACTOR. LWR FUEL, ON THE OTHER HAND, IS CLAD WITH A ZIRCONIUM ALLOY THAT IS FAR MORE RESISTANT TO CORROSION, AND WHICH CAN BE STORED IN WATER INDEFINITELY.

END TEXT OF FACT SHEETS.

CHRISTOPHER
BT
#6803

NNNN
<^SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 06
<^SSN>6803
<^TOR>941021220054 M1320035
<^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 06

UNCLASSIFIED

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. draft	ad ref (proposal), agreement for supply of LWR (14 pages)	06/00/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 711

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea - Kuala Lumpur, May-June 1995 [2]

2009-0528-F
kc1586

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003. notes	handwritten, re Kuala Lumpur negotiations (19 pages)	05/20/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 711

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea - Kuala Lumpur, May-June 1995 [2]

2009-0528-F
kc1586

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004. notes	handwritten, re Kuala Lumpur negotiations (19 pages)	05/22/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 711

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea - Kuala Lumpur, May-June 1995 [2]

2009-0528-F
kc1586

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]