

FOIA MARKER

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Folder Title:

North Korea Framework [11]

Staff Office-Individual:

Nonproliferation and Export Controls-Aoki, Steven

Original OA/ID Number:

711

Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:	Stack:
41	5	6	3	V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. letter	Republic of Korea Embassy to US State Department re agreement (1 page)	10/20/1994	P1/b(1)
002. cable	re letter from President Kim (ROK) (4 pages)	09/17/1994	P1/b(1)
003. letter	Republic of Korea Embassy to US State Department re agreement [duplicate of 001] (1 page)	10/20/1994	P1/b(1)
004. paper	re energy assurance issues (1 page)	10/00/1994	P1/b(1)
005. memo	John Deutch to Warren Christopher and Tony Lake re agreement (4 pages)	01/10/1994	P1/b(1)
006. cable	re agreed framework (8 pages)	10/18/1994	P1/b(1)
007a. cable	re assurance letters (5 pages)	10/14/1994	P1/b(1)
007b. draft	letter, re assurance (1 page)	10/00/1994	P1/b(1)
007c. draft	letter, re assurance (1 page)	10/00/1994	P1/b(1)
007d. draft	letter, re assurance (1 page)	10/00/1994	P1/b(1)
008. memo	Jim Pierce to Distribution re letter text clearance (1 page)	10/19/1994	P1/b(1)
009. notes	re summary of conclusions (2 pages)	10/03/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 711

FOLDER TITLE:

NorthKorea - Framework [11]

2009-0528-F

kc1600

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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010. draft	re agreed framework and confidential minute, PM (7 pages)	10/15/1994	P1/b(1)
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WHY ARE LWRs BETTER THAN GRAPHITE-MODERATED REACTORS?

Plutonium Production Rate: For a given quantity of electrical output, an LWR produces less than half the quantity of plutonium produced by a graphite-moderated reactor.

Reactor vs. Weapons-grade Plutonium: The plutonium discharged from a graphite-moderated reactor is better suited for use in nuclear weapons than that obtained from LWR spent fuel.

Enriched vs. Natural Uranium Fuel: The DPRK's current graphite moderated reactors use natural uranium fuel, which North Korea produces indigenously. An LWR requires low-enriched uranium fuel, which can be obtained only from a handful of countries: the U.S., a European consortium, Russia and China. All will require stringent nonproliferation conditions before fuel is supplied. The ability to suspend fuel supply gives the international community leverage to assure North Korea's compliance with its nonproliferation commitments.

Batch vs. On-Line Refueling: Because the natural uranium fuel elements in a graphite-moderated reactor must be replaced frequently, these reactors are designed to be refueled "on-line", that is, while they are operating. They are therefore more difficult for the IAEA to safeguard than an LWR, where fuel is replaced at periodic intervals, while the reactor is shut down.

Fuel Design: The fuel elements for a graphite-moderated reactor are clad in a magnesium alloy, rather than the zirconium alloy used in LWR fuel. Zirconium alloy-clad fuel is more difficult to reprocess. On the other hand, it is more resistant to corrosion, and hence can be stored in water indefinitely. North Korea has used the danger of fuel cladding corrosion to argue that it must reprocess the fuel from its graphite-moderated reactor.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 20, 1994

Excellency:

I wish to confirm to you that I will use the full powers of my office to facilitate arrangements for the financing and construction of a light-water nuclear power reactor project within the DPRK, and the funding and implementation of interim energy alternatives for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea pending completion of the first reactor unit of the light-water reactor project. In addition, in the event that this reactor project is not completed for reasons beyond the control of the DPRK, I will use the full powers of my office to provide, to the extent necessary, such a project from the United States, subject to approval of the U.S. Congress. Similarly, in the event that the interim energy alternatives are not provided for reasons beyond the control of the DPRK, I will use the full powers of my office to provide, to the extent necessary, such interim energy alternatives from the United States, subject to the approval of the U.S. Congress.

I will follow this course of action so long as the DPRK continues to implement the policies described in the Agreed Framework Between the United States of America and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Bill Clinton". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

His Excellency Kim Jong Il
Supreme Leader of the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea
Pyongyang

WASHFAX RECEIPT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

B

S/S #

04 OCT 17 P8:31

MESSAGE NO. 012224 CLASSIFICATION UNCL No. Pages 4
FROM: S/S-O TC Brown 7-1512
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION

TO: (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Extension	Room No.
<u>NSC</u>	<u>Sandy Vershawn</u>		
	<u>LAKE</u>		
	<u>BERGER</u>	<u>REED</u>	<u>SVETINGER</u>
	<u>WOUN</u>	<u>SODERBERG</u>	<u>POWEMAN</u>
	<u>ROSS</u>		
	<u>ITOH</u>	<u>JENS</u>	<u>ADK1</u>

FOR: CLEARANCE ☐ INFORMATION ☐ PER REQUEST ☐ COMMENT ☐

REMARKS: Transcript of Gallucci press conf
in Geneva.

S/S Officer: TCB

URGENT



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Phone: (41-22) 749-4359

TO:

Department of State - Please pass to Mr.
Thomas Donilon

STATE OPS - please fax to

National Security Council - for Mr. Sandy
Berger

FROM:

LARRY TAYLOR
PUBLIC AFFAIRS COUNSELOR

DATE:

October 18, 1994

SUBJECT:

UNITED STATES-DPRK TALKS

Page 1 of 4

Following is the uncleared transcript of the press conference by
Ambassador at Large Robert Gallucci at the U.S. Mission at
midnight, October 17.

①

Good evening. As I have in the past I am going to begin with the usual apology for not having been able to share my thoughts about these past days with you, and I am going to have to say that even this evening I am not going to be able to share very many of my thoughts about these past days. But I do have some comments to make at this time.

We have, the DPRK and the United States, have reached what we call an ad referendum agreement on a framework document that addresses the DPRK nuclear issue. It is a document that we are both referring back to capitals for consultation and decision. In my case, I will be returning to Washington tomorrow morning, and will consult with my government and with members of Congress on the substance of the agreement. Assuming our consultations -- those of Vice Foreign Minister Kang with his government, and me with mine -- proceed well, as I certainly hope they will, I will return to Geneva on Friday, at which time we will sign the agreement if the consultations have gone, as I said, well and as expected.

The agreement that we reached is one which I regret I am not at this moment able to share with you. It is not one that I can speak to in detail. I cannot address the provisions of the agreement. I will not be able to do so until my government has reviewed the document, and decided that it is a document that we will proceed to sign. When we are in that position, I will be happy to discuss the document in detail with you.

At this point, I would like to say, that as a negotiator of the document, that I am recommending it to my government for signature. I personally think it is a good agreement, that it addresses those issues and concerns we have had about the North Korean nuclear program, about the past aspects of that program, about the current nuclear facilities, and about the future of that program, those facilities that are under construction. So I think it is broadly an acceptable and very positive document that serves the interests of the United States, serves the interests of the Republic of Korea, of Japan, of other countries in the region. I think it is in the interest of international security, of our international non-proliferation regime. And so I think it is quite positive as a development. That, I emphasize again, is a view that I am offering as a negotiator, and we will soon find out whether my government and other governments think likewise. I will say at this point also that throughout the process of the negotiations we have been in closest touch with the Republic of Korea, their representatives particularly here in Geneva, also with the government of Japan, the governments of the other permanent members of the Security Council, and other concerned states, particularly in the region. We who have negotiated the agreement believe that the agreement will be broadly supported. At this point I would stand for a couple of questions.

QUESTION: You have said you don't want to go into detail: Could you at least confirm what has been in South Korean media over the past couple of days, because they are obviously being briefed much

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better than we are, on the five year delay in special inspections, and also could you say whether it is much more detailed than the August framework accord.

AMBASSADOR GALLUCCI: I would say that it is clear that somebody is briefing the press somewhere with more detail than you have been briefed. I would not necessarily say that they have been briefed better. It is, I am sorry, from my perspective an agreement which I cannot address in substance. I can tell you as I just have that there has been a well founded concern about the North Korean nuclear of the past. What it is that was undertaken by the North Koreans with respect to reprocessing and separation of plutonium, and that concern is indeed addressed in the agreement. Exactly in what way, and exactly in what terms -- to answer that question would be to get into the terms of the agreement and at this point, I am sorry I can't do that.

QUESTION: I must raise several very important issues. First of all, why don't you share this very good news with your counterpart Mr. Kang at this news conference. And my second question is once it is signed on this coming Friday, then when will it begin to be effective, and thirdly, you have mentioned that you cannot share the details with us, however, you can give us some flavor of the three issues: first, when is the opening period of liaison offices, and any conditions on this, secondly, what is the timing of the special inspections, and then...it is too much? (Laughter)

AMBASSADOR GALLUCCI: I have to tell you that I once responded to a question I think standing right here by saying don't give me three parts because I can only remember two. I believe you gave me three questions, and the third had three parts of which you could only remember two. (Laughter)

The first one, by my recollection is, if I understood it, is why Mr. Kang and I are not standing together this evening. I don't know how well I can answer that. We have been in close consultation over these many days and I believe we have, at least from my perspective, developed a good working relationship. In the last throes of these negotiations and discussions, Mr. Tom Hubbard and others from my delegation have conducted them in substantial part, ironing out the final details. So this evening, and it was only this evening, we finally did agree on a whole text, and we did that by telephone as a matter of fact, and I think we both felt a certain sense of exhaustion, a willingness to meet the press separately. Again, I will not speak for him, but I am looking forward to the opportunity to return to Geneva on Friday, to meet him, and to sign an agreement.

The second question, when will the agreement come into effect? I believe, and this sounds almost like a legal question and I don't know that I have a legal answer, but I believe upon signature of the agreement, which is actually a framework document, two sides are undertaking a series of steps and agreeing together that they will separately take a series of steps, and I believe those steps

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can begin with signature.

And the third question, which had some parts to it?

QUESTION: The timing of the opening of liaison offices, and of special inspections, and how...

AMBASSADOR GALLUCCI: Let's do the liaison office, it's late. With respect to the liaison office, yes indeed there is a political, a diplomatic dimension to the agreement. And there are provisions in the agreement that relate to representation of the United States in Pyongyang and of the DPRK in Washington, and the agreement does speak to circumstances and timing. About those details I am afraid I cannot speak.

The special inspections refer to those inspections that the IAEA has indicated it would need to undertake to resolve questions about past nuclear activity of the DPRK. The agreement does speak to the IAEA's ability to conduct whatever measures it deems necessary to resolve questions of the past. The exact way in which the agreement provides for that activity by the IAEA is something that I will not speak to this evening.

QUESTION: What will happen after the signing? Will there be some experts meetings even afterwards, or will the high level talks continue afterwards?

AMBASSADOR GALLUCCI: The agreement when you get to see it, I think, you will find is fairly complex, in many ways, and it will require continuing contact between the United States and DPRK in a number of areas. At the moment, again, I am sorry, I cannot go into the details of that, but yes, there will be continuing meetings to implement the provisions of the agreement. Ladies and gentlemen, thank you very much. I hope to be able to see you again on Friday of this week. Thank you.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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001. letter	Republic of Korea Embassy to US State Department re agreement (1 page)	10/20/1994	P1/b(1)

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TALKING POINTS
AMBASSADOR ROBERT L. GALLUCCI
OCTOBER 17, 1994
GENEVA

- THE DPRK AND U.S. DELEGATIONS, HEADED BY FIRST VICE FOREIGN MINISTER KANG AND MYSELF, HAVE TODAY REACHED AGREEMENT ON THE TEXT OF AN AGREED FRAMEWORK FOR RESOLVING THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR ISSUE.
- THIS DRAFT DOCUMENT HAS BEEN SENT BACK TO CAPITALS WHERE IT IS BEING REVIEWED. AT THE SAME TIME, CLOSE CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN THE U.S., SOUTH KOREA, AND OUR OTHER ALLIES ARE UNDERWAY. MY HOPE IS THAT WE WILL BE ABLE TO SIGN AN AGREED FRAMEWORK WITHIN THE WEEK.
- WHEN IMPLEMENTED, THIS FRAMEWORK WILL CONSTITUTE A MAJOR BREAKTHROUGH IN RESOLVING THE THREAT POSED BY THE DPRK'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM. IT IS A GOOD SETTLEMENT THAT ADDRESSES PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE. IT SERVES THE INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES, OUR ALLIES AND FRIENDS IN THE REGION, AND OF THE NORTH KOREANS THEMSELVES. I CONSIDER THIS TO BE A STEP FORWARD FOR THE CAUSE OF INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION AS WELL AS FOR PEACE, STABILITY, AND PROSPERITY IN NORTHEAST ASIA.
- ONCE THE DOCUMENT HAS BEEN FORMALLY APPROVED BY BOTH GOVERNMENTS WE WILL BE IN A POSITION TO MAKE IT PUBLIC.
- IN THE MEANTIME, I CAN CHARACTERIZE WHAT FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT WOULD ACCOMPLISH FROM OUR PERSPECTIVE. FOR OUR PART, THE U.S. WILL COMMIT TO LEAD AN INTERNATIONAL EFFORT FOR THE CONVERSION OF NORTH KOREA'S EXISTING NUCLEAR PROGRAM TO A LIGHT WATER REACTOR SYSTEM. IN TANDEM WITH THIS PROJECT, FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DOCUMENT WOULD MEAN A NUMBER OF IMPORTANT THINGS:
 - O IT WOULD MEAN COMPLETE TERMINATION OF THE EXISTING DPRK NUCLEAR PROGRAM. IT WOULD FREEZE THE DPRK'S NUCLEAR FACILITIES UNDER FULL IAEA MONITORING. IT WOULD LEAD TO THE ULTIMATE DISMANTLEMENT OF THOSE FACILITIES AS WELL AS OTHERS UNDER CONSTRUCTION. THOSE FACILITIES WOULD HAVE PRODUCED HUNDREDS OF KILOS TO PLUTONIUM.
 - O IT WOULD MEAN THAT THE SPENT WILL BE SHIPPED OUT OF NORTH KOREA WITHOUT SEPARATION OF THE PLUTONIUM IT CONTAINS. IT WOULD END THE THREAT OF REPROCESSING.
 - O IT WOULD MEAN BRINGING THE DPRK BACK INTO COMPLIANCE WITH ITS NON-PROLIFERATION OBLIGATIONS, BOLSTERING THE GLOBAL NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME.

- 0 IT WOULD ADDRESS THE QUESTION OF THE PAST. THE IAEA WOULD BE PERMITTED THE ACCESS TO SITES AND THE INFORMATION IT NEEDS TO ANSWER UNRESOLVED QUESTIONS ABOUT THE DPRK'S NUCLEAR INVENTORY AND ACTIVITIES, BRINGING THE DPRK INTO COMPLIANCE WITH ITS OBLIGATIONS.
- 0 IT WOULD MEAN STEPS TO IMPROVE BILATERAL POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE DPRK, MOVING TOWARDS FULL NORMALIZATION AS PROGRESS IS MADE ON ISSUES OF CONCERN.
- 0 IT WOULD MEAN STEPS TO IMPROVE PEACE AND SECURITY ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA, WHICH WE HOPE WILL PROMOTE DIALOGUE AND RECONCILIATION BETWEEN SOUTH AND NORTH KOREA.
- THIS IS A GOOD SETTLEMENT, BUT THE FACT IS THAT IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FRAMEWORK WILL TAKE PLACE OVER A PERIOD OF YEARS.
- ALTHOUGH I BELIEVE THAT IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS SETTLEMENT WILL BUILD TRUST, THE SETTLEMENT ITSELF IS NOT BASED ON TRUST. WE HAVE CONSTRUCTED A SERIES OF INTERLOCKING STEPS THAT WILL BE TAKEN IN PARALLEL OVER THE NEXT MONTHS AND YEARS, INCLUDING PROVISIONS FOR VERIFICATION BY THE IAEA TO INSURE COMPLIANCE.
- IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS SETTLEMENT WOULD MAKE AN IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION TO THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE DPRK'S RELATIONS WITH THE U.S., WITH THE SOUTH, WITH ITS NEIGHBORS, AND -- I BELIEVE -- WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AS A WHOLE.
- I EXPECT TO BE IN A POSITION TO SAY MORE TO YOU ON FRIDAY, OCTOBER 21, AFTER BOTH GOVERNMENTS HAVE APPROVED THE TEXT OF THE AGREED FRAMEWORK.

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- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005. memo	John Deutch to Warren Christopher and Tony Lake re agreement (4 pages)	01/10/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 711

FOLDER TITLE:

NorthKorea - Framework [11]

2009-0528-F
kcl600

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9406982
RECEIVED: 29 AUG 94 15

TO: GINGRICH, NEWT

6clmm

FROM: LAKE

DOC DATE: 07 OCT 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOREA NORTH

NCO

PERSONS: YON, PAK GIL

SUBJECT: LAKE LTR RE CONGRESSIONAL VISIT TO NORTH KOREA

ACTION: LAKE SGD LTR

DUE DATE: 01 SEP 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: AOKI

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

AOKI

DANVERS

NSC CHRON

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY

MBN

DATE

90/7

BY HAND

W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDRS

CLOSED BY: NSMBN

DOC 3 OF 3

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9406982

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 AOKI
002 LAKE
003

Z 94082915 PREPARE MEMO FOR LAKE
Z 94100718 FOR SIGNATURE
X 94100718 LAKE SGD LTR

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

003 941007 GINGRICH, NEWT

UNCLASSIFIED

**National Security Council
The White House**

PROOFED BY: _____

LOG # 6942 Rcd

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG 4 A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
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Sens	_____	_____	_____
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<u>nh</u> Berger	<u>2</u>	<u>ov</u>	_____
Lake	<u>3</u>	Natl Sec Advisor	_____
Situation Room	_____	has seen	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	<u>PA 10/7</u>	<u>D</u>
NSC Secretariat	_____	_____	<u>D</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action
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cc: _____

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette _____

National Security Council
The White House

100-1 4-26
4:55pm

PROOFED BY: JB LOG # 6982
URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT
BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG JB A/O _____

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Lake	<u>4</u>		
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>5</u>	<u>JB 9/28</u>	
NSC Secretariat			
<u>ADN</u>	<u>6</u>		<u>FEA CS</u> <u>di</u>

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: _____

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

TO: LAKE

FROM: GINGRICH, NEWT

DOC DATE: 18 AUG 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOREA NORTH

NCO

PERSONS: YON, PAK GIL

SUBJECT: FWD LTR FM AMB YON OF NORTH KOREA & SUGGEST CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION
VISIT NORTH KOREA

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR LAKE

DUE DATE: 01 SEP 94 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: AOKI

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

AOKI

FOR CONCURRENCE

DANVERS
KRISTOFF
PONEMAN
ROTH

FOR INFO

ITOH
SENS
WALES

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDRS

CLOSED BY:

DOC 1 OF 1

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 7, 1994

Dear Newt:

Thank you for your letter concerning the invitation to visit North Korea. From time to time, the North Korean UN Mission has invited prominent Americans to visit Pyongyang, including several members of Congress. Whether or not such visits can be used to advance US objectives depends on the particular circumstances of the visit and related developments.

In that connection, as you know, we are in the midst of negotiations with the North Koreans in Geneva. I therefore think it would be most productive to defer a consideration of a Congressional trip to North Korea until after these talks conclude.

Let's stay in touch on this issue.

Sincerely,



Anthony Lake
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

The Honorable Newt Gingrich
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 22, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: STEVEN AOKI *SA*

SUBJECT: Congressional Visit to North Korea

Newt Gingrich wrote you to propose a bipartisan Congressional visit to North Korea. We think this could be a useful way to convince the North that there is broad Congressional support for our nonproliferation objectives and to avoid the confusing messages that could arise from multiple visits to Pyongyang by members of Congress. (Senators De Concini and Glenn have previously expressed interest in going.) A Congressional trip is, of course, unlikely to take place before the election.

Concurrences by: *SAW* Stanley Roth, *WJ* Bill Danvers

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab I.

Attachment

Tab I Proposed Response

Tab II Incoming Correspondence

NEWT GINGRICH
SIXTH DISTRICT, GEORGIA

THE REPUBLICAN WHIP

WASHINGTON OFFICE:
2428 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BLDG.
WASHINGTON, DC 20515-1006
(202) 225-4501



6982

3823 ROSWELL ROAD
SUITE 200
MARIETTA, GA 30062
(404) 565-6398

Congress of the United States

House of Representatives

August 18, 1994

The Honorable Anthony Lake
Assistant To the President For
National Security Affairs
National Security Council
Old Executive Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20506

Dear Tony:

I wanted to bring your attention to a recent letter I received from Pak Gil Yon, the Ambassador and Permanent Representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

I think that this nice letter might be a good excuse for the United States to send a bipartisan Congressional delegation to North Korea. Such a mission should certainly include Congressman Jay Kim, a Korean-born American who is very interested in U.S. policy toward both North and South Korea.

Please let me know what you think. I look forward to hearing from you.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Newt", written over the printed name.

Newt Gingrich

NG:jkh
Enclosure

JUL 7 1994



Democratic People's Republic of Korea
Permanent Mission to the United Nations
515 East 72nd Street, 38F, New York, N.Y. 10021
Tel. (212) 772-0712 (0725) FAX (212) 772-0735

New York, 25 August 1994

Dear Sir,

I present my compliments to you and have the honour to share with you the recent developments on the nuclear and other pending issues between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States.

As you are well aware, the both sides are scheduled to have a further meeting between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States of America in Geneva on 5th August 1994.

The firm determination of the Government of the DPRK to resolve the issues through dialogue and negotiations between the two countries was manifested in a full and broad terms by the great leader late President Kim Il Sung when he met former President Mr. Jimmy Carter late June this year. It brought about a resumption of the talks between the two countries on 8th July 1994 in Geneva.

I have the honour to convey to you the position of the Government of the DPRK led by the dear leader His Excellency

Honourable Congressman
Mr. Newt Gingrich
2428 RHOB
Washington DC 20510

Mr. Kim Jong Il that it will continue to carry forward the will and intentions of the late President Kim Il Sung to resolve the nuclear and other pending issues between the DPRK and the United States of America in close cooperation with the U.S. Administration.

The timely agreement on the resumption of the talks on the 5th August 1994 can be interpreted as an evidence of the will of the leadership of the DPRK.

It is our belief that a successful dialogue is imperative of a positive environment to assure a peaceful solution of the issue.

In particular, in view of the fact that the relations between our two countries has been characterized as one of misunderstanding and distrust due to a conception of antagonism and confrontation of the past 50 years of cold-war, both sides need a favourable circumstances contributable toward thawing of ice between them.

I hope that you and other distinguished politicians of United States will make a due and positive contribution toward better understanding and trust between our two countries.

Please accept, Sir, my best regards.


Pak Gil Yon
Ambassador and
Permanent Representative

National Security Council
The White House

rec'd 9-26
4:55PM

PROOFED BY: JB LOG # 6982
URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT
BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG JB A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Reed	<u>1</u>	<u>JW</u>	
Sens			
Itoh			
Soderberg	<u>2</u>	<u>copy</u>	
Berger	<u>3</u>	<u>ok</u>	<u>NOBRS</u>
Lake	<u>4</u>		
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>5</u>	<u>JB 9/28</u>	
NSC Secretariat			
<u>AORN</u>	<u>6</u>		<u>PFA, CS</u> <u>di</u>

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

CC: _____

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

FACT SHEET

10/19/94

U.S./DPRK Talks

The following is a brief description of the U.S./DPRK agreement now awaiting signature. More information will be provided after signature.

- After sixteen months of negotiations, U.S. and North Korean diplomats have finalized an agreement designed to end the DPRK nuclear threat. The agreement will be signed soon. Below is a brief outline of what the agreement would accomplish:
- First, it would bring the DPRK back into full compliance with its non-proliferation obligations under the NPT. The DPRK affirms its NPT member status, commits to complying with its IAEA safeguards agreement, and states its willingness to implement the South-North Denuclearization Declaration.
- Second, it would terminate the existing DPRK nuclear program. The DPRK will freeze its nuclear facilities (5MW reactor, reprocessing facility, and 50 and 200 MW reactors now under construction) and it would ultimately dismantle these facilities.
- Third, it would ensure safe disposition of the spent fuel now in North Korea. The DPRK will forego reprocessing, and instead would safely store and eventually ship the spent fuel out of country.
- Fourth, it would address the question of the past. The DPRK would accept whatever steps are deemed necessary by the IAEA before it would receive any significant nuclear components for a light water reactor.
- Our part of the bargain is straightforward. We would lead an international consortium which would oversee construction of two-South Korean-style light water reactors in the DPRK over the next decade. Funding would overwhelmingly come from South Korea and Japan. We have been in close consultation with our allies on this matter, and have received initial assurances regarding funding. We will continue to work closely with our allies on the funding matter.

10/19/94

-2-

- In the short term, to compensate the DPRK for loss of energy production from the frozen 5 MW reactor, our consortium would agree to provide the North with \$5 million of non-divertable heavy oil for use in a specific power plant. We will be consulting with you on the appropriate manner for meeting this commitment.
- Over the long-term, additional energy would be provided by the consortium to offset the energy loss from the 50 and 200 MW reactors now under construction.
- In the coming months, we would move toward establishing liaison offices in each other's capitals -- something that will help us oversee the implementation of this agreement.
- Only as the DPRK complies with the agreement, in a step-by-step manner, would we begin to implement our side of the agreement and selectively reduce economic and financial restrictions against the DPPK--in close consultation with the Congress.
- We would provide a "negative security assurance" that would pledge non-use of nuclear weapons against North Korea under certain defined circumstances as long as it remains a member in good standing of the NPT, as we have provided for other members of the NPT.
- This is a long-term effort. It will take eight to ten years to complete the conversion of the DPRK's nuclear program to a civilian light-water reactor system.
- If the North breaches its agreements, we would cease implementing our part of the bargain and would return to the sanctions track.
- This agreement attains all our goals, even two that seemed remote: the North's agreement to no reprocessing of the spent fuel and IAEA inspection of the two waste storage sites. We insisted upon, and obtained, a commitment by the DPRK to engage in the South-North dialogue. It also assures a permanent freeze of the Korean nuclear program, including no refueling of the 5 MW reactor.
- We consulted with our Asian allies at every stage of the negotiation. They are fully on board. (Secretary Perry will visit Korea and Japan this week to consult further).
- Aside from resolving the dangerous nuclear problem the agreement would draw North Korea out of its dangerous isolation. It would help integrate Pyongyang into the economic and political mainstream of East Asia.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006. cable	re agreed framework (8 pages)	10/18/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 711

FOLDER TITLE:

NorthKorea - Framework [11]

2009-0528-F
kc1600

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007a. cable	re assurance letters (5 pages)	10/14/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 711

FOLDER TITLE:

NorthKorea - Framework [11]

2009-0528-F
kc1600

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007b. draft	letter, re assurance (1 page)	10/00/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 711

FOLDER TITLE:

NorthKorea - Framework [11]

2009-0528-F
kc1600

RESTRICTION CODES

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007c. draft	letter, re assurance (1 page)	10/00/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 711

FOLDER TITLE:

NorthKorea - Framework [11]

2009-0528-F
kc1600

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007d. draft	letter, re assurance (1 page)	10/00/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 711

FOLDER TITLE:

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
008. memo	Jim Pierce to Distribution re letter text clearance (1 page)	10/19/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 711

FOLDER TITLE:

NorthKorea - Framework [11]

2009-0528-F
kc1600

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Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs

Only UNCLASSIFIED Materials May Be Transmitted via FAX

TO: Mr. Paneman

(Name)

(Office)

FAX #: 456-9180

TEL #:

FROM:

Charles Evans

CPA

(Name)

(Office)

FAX #: (202) 647-1346

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SUBJECT:

This is a draft of "Hard Qs & As"It has been cleared by all but T as of this
time. Feel free to use as needed.

Number of Pages Transmitted in this FAX

PM & S/AL
October 19, 1994

U.S.-DPRK NUKE AGREEMENT: HARDLINE QUESTIONS

Q. Doesn't this agreement demonstrate that proliferators can benefit from their actions by waiting to be bribed into acceptable behavior?

A. -- WE REJECT SUCH A CATEGORIZATION; SUCH AN ASSERTION SHOWS AN OVERLY SIMPLISTIC VIEW OF A VERY COMPLEX PROBLEM.

-- WE HAVE SUCCEEDED IN WINNING NORTH KOREA'S AGREEMENT TO MEET ITS INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS FULLY.

-- IN ADDITION, NORTH KOREA HAS AGREED TO FREEZE ITS PRESENT NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES AND TO DISMANTLE ITS EXISTING NUCLEAR FACILITIES; THIS GOES BEYOND THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE IAEA AND NPT OBLIGATIONS.

-- IN CONNECTION WITH THESE ACTIONS, THE U.S. HAS AGREED TO HELP NORTH KOREA OBTAIN REPLACEMENT LIGHT-WATER REACTORS THAT POSE LESS OF A PROLIFERATION THREAT AND TO OBTAIN FUEL SUPPLIES TO REPLACE THE ENERGY GENERATING CAPACITY LOST BY ABANDONING PRESENT REACTOR ACTIVITIES.

- 2 -

- IN VIEW OF NORTH KOREA'S AGREEMENT TO ADDRESS OUR CONCERNS, WE AGREED TO MOVE TOWARD IMPROVING BILATERAL POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS.

- THESE STEPS ARE ALL IN THE INTERESTS OF THE U.S. AS WELL AS NORTH KOREA.

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Q. How much will this deal cost the U.S.?

A. -- IT IS ESTIMATED THAT THE TWO LIGHT-WATER REACTORS MAY COST AS MUCH AS \$4 BILLION. WE DO NOT HAVE AN ACCURATE ESTIMATE OF THE COST OF THE SUPPLEMENTAL FUEL PROVIDED TO FILL THE DPRK'S ENERGY NEEDS IN THE INTERIM PERIOD.

-- ALMOST ALL OF THE COST OF CONSTRUCTING THE LWRS WILL BE BORNE BY OTHER CONSORTIUM MEMBERS, SPECIFICALLY THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND JAPAN.

-- AS FOR ALTERNATIVE ENERGY, THE U.S. WILL PAY FOR THE INITIAL SHIPMENT OF HEAVY FUEL OIL TO BE SHIPPED TO THE DPRK. THAT WILL PROBABLY COME TO ABOUT \$6 MILLION. SUBSEQUENT ALTERNATE ENERGY NEEDS WILL BE FUNDED BY A MULTILATERAL CONSORTIUM WHICH WILL BE ESTABLISHED IN THE NEAR-FUTURE.

(MORE)

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- I WOULD ALSO ADD THAT THE U.S. AND NORTH KOREA WILL BEGIN TECHNICAL TALKS SOON ON THE STORAGE OF THE SPENT FUEL RECENTLY REMOVED FROM ITS NUCLEAR RESEARCH REACTOR. PROPER STORAGE WILL ALLOW THE DPRK TO KEEP THE FUEL IN ITS PRESENT FORM WITHOUT REPROCESSING AND TO EVENTUALLY SHIP IT OUT OF THE COUNTRY. BOTH OF THESE ARE IMPORTANT FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREED FRAMEWORK AND FOR OUR NON-PROLIFERATION GOALS.

- THE TOTAL COST OF SAFE STORAGE FOR THE U.S. WILL PROBABLY BE IN THE TENS OF MILLIONS OF DOLLARS.

- 5 -

Q. Don't you expect North Korea to cheat on this agreement?

A. -- AS THE PRESIDENT SAID, VERIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH THIS AGREEMENT IS NOT BASED ON TRUST. A VIGOROUS ON-SITE INSPECTION PROGRAM BY THE IAEA WILL VERIFY THAT THE REPROCESSING PLANT IS SEALED, THAT THE 5 MEGAWATT REACTOR IS SHUT DOWN, AND THAT NO FURTHER WORK IS BEING UNDERTAKEN ON THE PARTIALLY COMPLETED REACTORS. WE WILL ALSO HAVE AVAILABLE OUR OWN NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS FOR VERIFYING NORTH KOREA'S ADHERENCE TO THE AGREED FRAMEWORK.

-- I WOULD ALSO ADD THAT, ONLY AS THE DPRK COMPLIES WITH THE AGREEMENT, IN A STEP-BY-STEP MANNER, WOULD WE BEGIN TO IMPLEMENT OUR SIDE OF THE AGREEMENT AND SELECTIVELY REDUCE ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL RESTRICTIONS AGAINST THE DPRK -- IN CLOSE CONSULTATION WITH CONGRESS.

- 6 -

Q. Why couldn't Iraq and Iran and other states sit back and wait to be "bribed" to meet their international commitments as well?

A. -- WE REJECT ANY CHARACTERIZATION OF THE AGREED FRAMEWORK AS A "BRIBE;" SUCH AN ASSERTION IS INACCURATE AND AN OVERSIMPLIFICATION.

-- THIS AGREEMENT IS WITH THE DPRK AND DEALS WITH CIRCUMSTANCE RELATED TO THAT STATE'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM. THERE IS NO BASIS FOR EXTRAPOLATE FROM THIS AGREEMENT HYPOTHETICAL ACCORDS WITH OTHER STATES, WHERE CIRCUMSTANCES ARE DIFFERENT.

-- I WOULD NOTE THAT OUR AGREED FRAMEWORK GOES BEYOND EXISTING INTERNATIONAL NON-PROLIFERATION OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE NPT. IN ADDITION TO PROHIBITING NORTH KOREA FROM CONDUCTING REPROCESSING, THE AGREED FRAMEWORK REQUIRES THE DPRK TO CONVERT ITS ENTIRE GRAPHITE MODERATED REACTOR SYSTEM TO A LESS PROLIFERATION-PRONE TECHNOLOGY, LIGHT WATER REACTORS.

- 7 -

Q. Isn't it a significant concessions to wait five years to conduct IAEA special inspections not give North Korea more time to build a nuclear device in secret?

A. -- IN TERMS OF THE RELATIVE IMPORTANCE TO PROMOTING U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL NON-PROLIFERATION OBJECTIVES, OBTAINING IMMEDIATE CESSATION OF THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM AND SEALING OF THE REPROCESSING PLANT WERE OF A HIGHER PRIORITY THAN THE SPECIAL INSPECTIONS.

-- IF THE CURRENT REACTOR HAD REMAINED IN OPERATION, AND THE TWO REACTORS UNDER CONSTRUCTION COME ON LINE, THERE WOULD HAVE BEEN A POTENTIAL FOR THE PRODUCTION OF SUFFICIENT PLUTONIUM FOR MANY BOMBS.

(more)

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- ONCE AN IAEA-VERIFIED FREEZE ON THE NUCLEAR PROGRAM IS IN PLACE, THE REPROCESSING PLANT HAS BEEN SEALED AND PUT UNDER AN INSPECTION REGIME, AND THE SPENT-FUEL RODS ARE UNDER IAEA SCRUTINY AND IN THE PROCESS OF BEING REMOVED FROM THE COUNTRY, NORTH KOREA'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM WILL BE A STANDSTILL.

- WITH THE PROGRAM VIRTUALLY SHUT DOWN, THE POTENTIAL FOR BUILDING A BOMB IS PRACTICALLY NIL, MAKING THE TIMING OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTION MUCH LESS CRITICAL THAN IT WOULD HAVE BEEN HAD THE NUCLEAR PROGRAM CONTINUED TO OPERATE.

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Q. Does this mean that North Korea can keep the bombs that its has already built?

A. -- WITHOUT COMMENTING DIRECTLY ON INTELLIGENCE MATTERS, I BELIEVE THAT IT HAS BEEN SAID THAT THE DPRK MAY HAVE THE CAPACITY TO FABRICATE NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES.

-- THE UNITED STATES HAS NEVER CLAIMED TO HAVE CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE THAT A BOMB OR BOMBS HAVE BEEN BUILT. THOSE REPORTS HAVE COME FROM PRESS SPECULATION BASED ON UNSUBSTANTIATED LEAKS ALLEGEDLY BASED ON U.S. INTELLIGENCE REPORTS.

-- WITH ITS NUCLEAR PROGRAM FROZEN AND SUBJECT TO INTENSIVE IAEA INSPECTIONS, IT BECOMES DIFFICULT, IF NOT NEARLY IMPOSSIBLE, FOR NORTH KOREA TO ATTEMPT TO FABRICATE A NUCLEAR DEVICE WITHOUT A SIGNIFICANT RISK OF DISCOVERY.

- 10 -

Q. Do some U.S. Government Departments and Agencies oppose this deal with the North Koreans?

A. -- ALL SENIOR DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS AND SENIOR ADVISORS WERE BRIEFED BY AMBASSADOR GALLUCCI ON THE PROVISIONS OF THE FRAMEWORK AGREED TO. ALL OF THE PRESIDENT'S SENIOR ADVISORS RECOMMENDED PROCEEDING WITH THE FRAMEWORK AS AGREED TO.

- 11 -

Q. Couldn't the U.S. have made a better deal by being tougher with the North Koreans, especially with a new government entering the scene?

A. -- IF YOU WILL LOOK CLOSELY AT THE FRAMEWORK, YOU WILL SEE THAT THE U.S. OBJECTIVES RELATED TO THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM HAVE BEEN MET.

-- THE DPRK'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM IS FROZEN; THE CURRENT FIVE-MEGAWATT REACTOR IS AND WILL REMAINED SHUTDOWN AND CONSTRUCTION ON TWO NEW, LARGER REACTORS WILL CEASE. ALL THREE WILL EVENTUALLY BE DISMANTLED.

-- NORTH KOREA CAN NO LONGER REPROCESS SPENT FUEL INTO PLUTONIUM.

-- THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM WILL BE OPEN TO INSPECTIONS BY THE IAEA, FAR GREATER OPENNESS TO MORE INTENSIVE INSPECTIONS THAN HAD NORTH KOREA SIMPLY MAINTAINED ITS MINIMAL COMMITMENTS TO THE NPT AND THE IAEA.

(more)

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- BY BEING PRAGMATIC AND ALLOWING FLEXIBILITY ON TIMING, WE WERE ABLE TO OBTAIN OUR OBJECTIVES IN AN AGREEMENT THAT MEETS THE INTERESTS OF THE U.S. AND THE DPRK.

- MOREOVER, AND THIS ASPECT HASN'T RECEIVED AS MUCH ATTENTION, NORTH KOREA HAS BEEN MOVED CLOSER TO ENDING ITS ISOLATION.

Drafted: PM/CPA - CWEvans & S/AL - JWit

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AOKI



PRESS CONFERENCE
AMBASSADOR AT LARGE ROBERT GALLUCCI
U.S. MISSION, GENEVA, SWITZERLAND
MIDNIGHT, OCTOBER 17, 1994

(1)

Good evening. As I have in the past I am going to begin with the usual apology for not having been able to share my thoughts about these past days with you, and I am going to have to say that even this evening I am not going to be able to share very many of my thoughts about these past days. But I do have some comments to make at this time.

We have, the DPRK and the United States, have reached what we call an ad referendum agreement on a framework document that addresses the DPRK nuclear issue. It is a document that we are both referring back to capitals for consultation and decision. In my case, I will be returning to Washington tomorrow morning, and will consult with my government and with members of Congress on the substance of the agreement. Assuming our consultations -- those of Vice Foreign Minister Kang with his government, and me with mine -- proceed well, as I certainly hope they will, I will return to Geneva on Friday, at which time we will sign the agreement if the consultations have gone, as I said, well and as expected.

The agreement that we reached is one which I regret I am not at this moment able to share with you. It is not one that I can speak to in detail. I cannot address the provisions of the agreement. I will not be able to do so until my government has reviewed the document, and decided that it is a document that we will proceed to sign. When we are in that position, I will be happy to discuss the document in detail with you.

At this point, I would like to say, that as a negotiator of the document, that I am recommending it to my government for signature. I personally think it is a good agreement, that it addresses those issues and concerns we have had about the North Korean nuclear program, about the past aspects of that program, about the current nuclear facilities, and about the future of that program, those facilities that are under construction. So I think it is broadly an acceptable and very positive document that serves the interests of the United States, serves the interests of the Republic of Korea, of Japan, of other countries in the region. I think it is in the interest of international security, of our international non-proliferation regime. And so I think it is quite positive as a development. That, I emphasize again, is a view that I am offering as a negotiator, and we will soon find out whether my government and other governments think likewise. I will say at this point also that throughout the process of the negotiations we have been in closest touch with the Republic of Korea, their representatives particularly here in Geneva, also with the government of Japan, the governments of the other permanent members of the Security Council, and other concerned states, particularly in the region. We who have negotiated the agreement believe that the agreement will be broadly supported. At this point I would stand for a couple of questions.

QUESTION: You have said you don't want to go into detail: Could you at least confirm what has been in South Korean media over the past couple of days, because they are obviously being briefed much

(2)

better than we are, on the five year delay in special inspections, and also could you say whether it is much more detailed than the August framework accord.

AMBASSADOR GALLUCCI: I would say that it is clear that somebody is briefing the press somewhere with more detail than you have been briefed. I would not necessarily say that they have been briefed better. It is, I am sorry, from my perspective an agreement which I cannot address in substance. I can tell you as I just have that there has been a well founded concern about the North Korean nuclear of the past. What it is that was undertaken by the North Koreans with respect to reprocessing and separation of plutonium, and that concern is indeed addressed in the agreement. Exactly in what way, and exactly in what terms -- to answer that question would be to get into the terms of the agreement and at this point, I am sorry I can't do that.

QUESTION: I must raise several very important issues. First of all, why don't you share this very good news with your counterpart Mr. Kang at this news conference. And my second question is once it is signed on this coming Friday, then when will it begin to be effective, and thirdly, you have mentioned that you cannot share the details with us, however, you can give us some flavor of the three issues: first, when is the opening period of liaison offices, and any conditions on this, secondly, what is the timing of the special inspections, and then...it is too much? (Laughter)

AMBASSADOR GALLUCCI: I have to tell you that I once responded to a question I think standing right here by saying don't give me three parts because I can only remember two. I believe you gave me three questions, and the third had three parts of which you could only remember two. (Laughter)

The first one, by my recollection is, if I understood it, is why Mr. Kang and I are not standing together this evening. I don't know how well I can answer that. We have been in close consultation over these many days and I believe we have, at least from my perspective, developed a good working relationship. In the last throes of these negotiations and discussions, Mr. Tom Hubbard and others from my delegation have conducted them in substantial part, ironing out the final details. So this evening, and it was only this evening, we finally did agree on a whole text, and we did that by telephone as a matter of fact, and I think we both felt a certain sense of exhaustion, a willingness to meet the press separately. Again, I will not speak for him, but I am looking forward to the opportunity to return to Geneva on Friday, to meet him, and to sign an agreement.

The second question, when will the agreement come into effect? I believe, and this sounds almost like a legal question and I don't know that I have a legal answer, but I believe upon signature of the agreement, which is actually a framework document, two sides are undertaking a series of steps and agreeing together that they will separately take a series of steps, and I believe those steps

can begin with signature.

And the third question, which had some parts to it?

QUESTION: The timing of the opening of liaison offices, and of special inspections, and how...

AMBASSADOR GALLUCCI: Let's do the liaison office, it's late. With respect to the liaison office, yes indeed there is a political, a diplomatic dimension to the agreement. And there are provisions in the agreement that relate to representation of the United States in Pyongyang and of the DPRK in Washington, and the agreement does speak to circumstances and timing. About those details I am afraid I cannot speak.

The special inspections refer to those inspections that the IAEA has indicated it would need to undertake to resolve questions about past nuclear activity of the DPRK. The agreement does speak to the IAEA's ability to conduct whatever measures it deems necessary to resolve questions of the past. The exact way in which the agreement provides for that activity by the IAEA is something that I will not speak to this evening.

QUESTION: What will happen after the signing? Will there be some experts meetings even afterwards, or will the high level talks continue afterwards?

AMBASSADOR GALLUCCI: The agreement when you get to see it, I think, you will find is fairly complex, in many ways, and it will require continuing contact between the United States and DPRK in a number of areas. At the moment, again, I am sorry, I cannot go into the details of that, but yes, there will be continuing meetings to implement the provisions of the agreement. Ladies and gentlemen, thank you very much. I hope to be able to see you again on Friday of this week. Thank you.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
009. notes	re summary of conclusions (2 pages)	10/03/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 711

FOLDER TITLE:

NorthKorea - Framework [11]

2009-0528-F
kc1600

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Alternative Energy Capability
Funding

State Funds:

(1) Economic Support Funds (ESF) (appropriated under the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act (Foreign Ops Act)) and authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) - funds could only be made available pursuant to a special waiver authority (e.g., sec. 614 (largest annual ceiling), or sec. 451 of the FAA) waiving foreign aid prohibitions applicable to the country. These include prohibitions on direct and indirect assistance to the country using foreign operations appropriations, and on any assistance authorized by the FAA on account of terrorism and communism. If insufficient funds are available in the ESF account, the FAA transfer authority (sec. 610 of the FAA) may be invoked by the President to transfer funds into that account. Significant political problems could be encountered on the Hill during informal and formal consultations, particularly with regard to the use of foreign operations funds, since the Congress imposed an explicit ban this year on the use of such funds for the country at issue.

(2) Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund (NDF) - \$10M appropriated for FY 95 in the Foreign Ops Act, subject to a "notwithstanding" authority but also to the regular (15 day) notification procedures. The theory for using this fund is that the provision of alternative energy sources furthers disarmament and nonproliferation objectives of the initiative.

DoD Funds:

(1) International Nonproliferation Initiative Fund - Sec. 1505 of the FY 93 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 102-484), as amended by sec. 1501(b)(2) of the FY 95 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 102-337), authorizes assistance for

"efforts to improve international cooperative monitoring of nuclear, biological, chemical and missile proliferation through technical projects and improved information sharing".

For FY 94, \$25,000,000 was available, and for FY 95, \$20,000,000 is available. This is subject to a 30-day advance notification requirement. It is possible that use of these funds might be a bit less contentious on the Hill since, unlike the foreign operations funds, these are not subject to similar country-specific aid prohibitions. The theory for using these funds would be similar to that for using the NDF, i.e., the provision of fuel would constitute a technical project which was part of the effort to improve cooperative monitoring by reducing the country's nuclear capability.

(2) CINC Initiative Fund - 10 U.S.C. 166(a) - authorizes use of funds for "contingencies"; \$25M appropriated for this account for FY 95.

(3) Emergency and Extraordinary Expense (EEE) authority - 10 U.S.C. 127 - authorizes use of funds for "any emergency and extraordinary expense which cannot be anticipated or classified." Has been broadly interpreted to permit use of funds for Haiti and Africa peacekeeping. Separate appropriations for certain branches of the armed services (e.g., from FY 95 O & M: for Army - \$14,437,000; Navy - \$4,301,000; for Air Force - \$8,762,000; for Defense-wide - \$23,768,000 of \$25M CINC fund may be used under the broader EEE authority.

Other resources:

Section 552(c) Drawdown authority of the FAA - authorizes the President to drawdown the commodities and services of any USG agency when an "unforeseen emergency requires the immediate provision of assistance under this chapter." The chapter authorizes assistance for "peacekeeping operations and other programs carried out in furtherance of the national security interests of the United States." One day prior notification required; \$25M annual cap; most flexible of drawdown authorities, and thus there are numerous competing needs for it. This authority would have to be used in conjunction with the section 614 waiver authority.

drafted: L/PM - CSchwab #5717
cleared: L/PM - ECummings

cc: S/RPP - CJohnstone; MUsnick
L - MMatheson
L/EAP - JKovar
EAP/K - DBrown
NSC/L - JBaker
NSC - DPoneman

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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010. draft	re agreed framework and confidential minute, PM (7 pages)	10/15/1994	P1/b(1)
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COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 711

FOLDER TITLE:

NorthKorea - Framework [11]

2009-0528-F
kc1600

RESTRICTION CODES

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**Bureau of Public Affairs
U.S. State Department**

Date: 11/09

TO: Dan Poneman

National Security Council

FROM: Bennett Freeman

**Office of Speechwriting
202-647-9943**

MESSAGE: Attached is a copy

of the Secretary's

speech which was delivered

earlier today.

Number of pages (incl. cover sheet): 9

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Office of the Spokesman
(Seoul, Republic of Korea)

REMARKS PREPARED FOR DELIVERY

REMARKS
BY
U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE WARREN CHRISTOPHER
TO THE
KOREAN AMERICAN FRIENDSHIP SOCIETY
GRAND HYATT HOTEL
SEOUL, REPUBLIC OF KOREA

November 9, 1994

Good afternoon. Thank you for your kind introduction. It gives me great pleasure to be the first Secretary of State to address the Korea-America Friendship Society. You have deepened our appreciation of the heritage of Korean-Americans, who have made such remarkable contributions to our nation. Let me also commend your efforts to improve tolerance and understanding between people of different backgrounds.

Earlier today, I met with President Kim, Foreign Minister Han and their colleagues. In these meetings, I commended the President on his announcement that the Republic of Korea is willing to take step-by-step measures to encourage economic cooperation with the North. We hope that North Korea will respond positively.

I am here this afternoon to reaffirm the enduring commitment of the United States to the security of the Republic of Korea and to peace and stability on the Korean peninsula. As President Clinton said when he was in Seoul, "geography has placed our nations far apart, but history has drawn us close together." Our friendship was sealed when our troops fought and died together to defend this soil against aggression. It broadened as we took full advantage of the peace that followed to build commercial ties. It matured as the "second miracle on the Han"--Korea's democratic miracle--strengthened our common bonds.

Now our friendship and alliance have been proven once again in the crucible of a common challenge. By working together, we produced an agreement on the nuclear situation in North Korea that will assure a more secure Republic of Korea and a more secure Asia.

The development of our alliance reflects America's

engagement in the Asia-Pacific region. America is and will remain a Pacific power. We will stand by our security commitments, maintain our forward military presence, and sustain our non-proliferation efforts. We will promote integration and growth through the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, and through relations with the region's key economic powers. And we will continue to support political freedom and human rights-- the ultimate guarantors of security and prosperity.

We are working to achieve a Pacific future where our allies and partners are free from the fear of war; where nations are made more prosperous by the free exchange of goods and ideas; and where citizens can participate in the decisions that affect their lives. These elements of our comprehensive Asia-Pacific strategy-- security, prosperity, and democracy-- are mutually reinforcing.

That strategy has produced significant results in recent months:

- A nuclear agreement that can lead to a more secure Korean peninsula;
- The launching of an historic regional security dialogue in the Asia-Pacific;
- Agreements with Japan to open key domestic markets to foreign competition;
- Improved ties with Vietnam resulting from fuller accounting for POW/MIA's;
- A reinvigorated relationship with China, with movement on both arms control and human rights.

These achievements advance not just America's interests, but those of our Asian allies and friends.

But as President Clinton told your National Assembly last year, "we must always remember that security comes first." Over the past decade the United States has been working with you to halt North Korea's efforts to develop nuclear weapons. Almost two years ago, North Korea's announcement of its intentions to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty threatened to plunge the region into crisis, if not war.

Now, our determined diplomacy made possible by America's unshakeable partnership with the Republic of Korea--has put the nuclear issue on the road to resolution. The Agreed Framework will achieve the central strategic objectives shared by our countries. It pulls us back from the brink of a crisis that

could have spiralled into armed conflict. It lifts the specter of a nuclear arms race from Northeast Asia. And it bolsters a nonproliferation regime essential to global stability.

We achieved the Agreed Framework by maintaining clear and consistent objectives and priorities, and by making it plain to the North Koreans that our negotiating positions reflected the unified views of the United States and the Republic of Korea. Korea was an active partner every step of the way. Without our partnership, the negotiations could not have succeeded and there would have been no agreement.

Let me outline what the Framework requires, and why it is good for the Republic of Korea, the United States, Asia and the world.

First, the agreement immediately freezes the North Korean nuclear program. The North has agreed not to restart its 5 megawatt reactor. It will seal its reprocessing facility and not operate it again. It will not reprocess the spent fuel from the 5 megawatt reactor and will ship that fuel out of the country. In short, North Korea's current capacity to separate or produce plutonium -- the raw material for nuclear weapons and the most toxic substance on earth -- will come to an end. And all of these steps will take place with the oversight of International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors on the ground, and with the careful scrutiny of the international community.

Second, the North has agreed to freeze construction of its 50 and 200 megawatt reactors and of its reprocessing plant. Ultimately, they will be dismantled, along with related facilities in North Korea. Absent this agreement, the two large reactors, once completed, would have been capable of producing enough plutonium for not just one or two bombs, but dozens of bombs each year. Within a decade, the Republic of Korea, the United States, this region and the world could have faced the greatest threat to international security since the Cuban Missile crisis.

Third, under the agreement, North Korea must fully disclose its past nuclear activities. The IAEA is to have access to the information it needs. North Korea is obligated to cooperate with the measures the IAEA deems necessary-- including special inspections-- to resolve questions about past activities. Implementation will take place over a period of time. But the safeguards agreement must be fully implemented before any significant nuclear components of the first light-water reactor are delivered to North Korea.

Finally, North Korea will remain a party to the Nuclear

Non-Proliferation Treaty, and must also fulfill additional obligations that go well beyond it. These include an end to plutonium separation, the shipment of spent fuel containing plutonium out of the country, and the dismantlement of the entire gas graphite reactor system.

The signing of the agreement brings a new challenge for the United States and the Republic of Korea. This is an important moment. We are moving to a second and critical phase in resolving the North Korea nuclear issue. We are moving from negotiation to implementation, from words to deeds. In the coming weeks, we will be taking five concrete steps:

- --First, together with the Republic of Korea and Japan, we will establish the Korean Energy Development Organization. This multilateral consortium will provide South Korea-type light-water reactors and alternative energy to the North. South Korean companies will play a central role in the provision of the reactors, just as the Republic of Korea will play a central role in the management of KEDO. The United States, the ROK and Japan will meet this month to prepare for a multilateral KEDO conference we plan to hold before the New Year.
- --Second, American representatives will meet with North Korea this weekend in Pyongyang to discuss safe storage of the spent fuel under IAEA scrutiny until it is shipped out of the country at a later time.
- --Third, later this month in Beijing, the United States and North Korea will begin to discuss the light water reactor project.
- --Fourth, the IAEA will soon meet with the North to agree how to monitor the freeze of the North's nuclear program.
- --Finally, in early December, we will meet with the North Koreans in Washington to discuss establishing liaison offices in our capitals.

President Kim has also made it clear that the Republic of Korea is determined to move forward. As the President indicated, the agreement has provided a basis for lifting your country's ban on business contacts with North Korea. As the Framework is implemented, these links can demonstrate to the North the concrete benefit of ending its isolation and can mark the beginning of a better future for all Koreans.

The United States and the Republic of Korea are determined that North Korea's commitments be implemented fully and

faithfully. This agreement, like any good agreement, rests on compliance and verification-- not on trust.

The path to full implementation has defined checkpoints. If at any checkpoint, North Korea fails to fulfill its obligations, it will lose the benefits of compliance that it so clearly desires. If it reneges, it will remain isolated. And throughout the process, we will always take the steps necessary to assure the security of the Republic of Korea and the region.

In implementing every phase of the Agreed Framework, we will continue to work with the Republic of Korea. Our collective effort will open the door to a new and productive dialogue between the Koreas. We share the conviction that the agreement cannot be fully implemented unless that dialogue moves forward.

Let there be no doubt that we share serious concerns about other aspects of North Korea's behavior-- including the forward deployment of its conventional forces, missile proliferation, past support for terrorism, and disregard for human rights. These concerns must be resolved if North Korea is to be brought fully into the community of civilized nations.

We recognize that at times, our resolve will be tested. But I am convinced our common efforts will raise the possibility that the last bitter legacy of the Cold War, the division of the Korean peninsula, can finally be overcome.

As we go down this untravelled road together, I want to make a pledge to you on behalf of President Clinton and the American people: The United States will stand by you. We will remain unshakably committed to your defense.

We know that North Korea continues to present both a nuclear and a conventional threat. Accordingly, American soldiers, at the existing force level of 37,000 troops, will continue to stand watch with the ROK armed forces over the most fortified frontier in the world. As President Clinton has pledged, "our troops will stay here as long as the Korean people want and need us here."

The bedrock of our security commitment to the region will remain our forward military presence, supported by our treaty alliances with the ROK, Japan, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand. We now have nearly the same number of troops in Asia as in Europe. We will maintain our force levels and their military readiness in Korea and elsewhere in this vital region.

In Asia, just as in Europe and the Middle East, the future is being shaped by a central geostrategic fact: no great power

now views another as an immediate military threat. The end of the Cold War means that we and our allies can now work with China and Russia to resolve common security concerns in the Pacific. That is why we are encouraging new regional security dialogues among past and potential adversaries.

In this respect, we welcome the inauguration of the ASEAN Regional Forum last July, and we applaud the important role that the Republic of Korea has played in its creation. The inclusion of China, Russia, and Vietnam in the forum reflects the enormous changes and opportunities transforming the Asia-Pacific region. The Northeast Asian security dialogue also provides a valuable forum for advancing our common interest in regional stability.

We seek to turn enmity to understanding, and suspicion to cooperation. For example, we are encouraging Chinese leaders to allay the concerns of their neighbors by being more open about their defense planning. We have also been working with China to advance important nonproliferation goals. Last month, we agreed to work for a global ban on producing fissile materials for nuclear weapons. And Beijing pledged not to export missiles that fall under the Missile Technology Control Regime.

The United States' commitment to security and stability in the Asia-Pacific region safeguards our nation's enduring stake in the region's remarkable prosperity. Expanding trade and investment with the world's fastest growing region is vital to our economic security. Asia's markets now support 2.5 million American jobs. Through APEC, GATT, and our bilateral dialogues, the United States is working to widen our opportunities to participate in Asia's economic boom.

Last year in Seattle, President Clinton convened the historic first meeting of the leaders from the APEC members. Later this week I will be in Jakarta for this year's APEC Ministerial Meeting, and the President will soon arrive for the Leaders Meeting. With the help of the Republic of Korea and other APEC members, we hope to fuel the momentum for liberalization and cooperation generated last year. We fully support the ambitious agenda of President Soeharto, this year's APEC chairman, to establish the goal of free and open trade in the region by a set date.

Ratifying the GATT Uruguay Round agreement is another critical step in opening markets and spurring growth. As you know, the President is committed to GATT ratification and open trade. I trust that all our Pacific partners -- including Korea -- will show similar resolve in ratifying the Round now.

The United States and the Republic of Korea share a growing stake in the economic dynamism of the Asia-Pacific region, and in an open world trading system. The Korean people have made

their economy the 13th largest in the world. We are your largest export market; you are our seventh largest.

The Dialogue for Economic Cooperation (DEC) initiated in July 1993 by President Kim and President Clinton is an example of the new maturity of our bilateral and economic relationship. Now we must build on the progress we made through the DEC to overcome the barriers that remain to imports in important sectors like agriculture and autos.

Under President Kim, Korea is integrating its economy into the world trading system. It is driving an ambitious regional trade liberalization effort through its leadership of APEC's Trade and Investment committee. And in its bid to become a member of the OECD--a bid backed by the United States--it is signalling its willingness to assume the leadership responsibilities of a developed nation. Once a recipient of foreign aid, the Republic of Korea is now an aid donor.

As a successful democratic nation, Korea has many lessons to share. Korea has demonstrated that a developing market economy flourishes alongside robust political competition and free trade unions. And it has shown that sustained economic development is more likely where government is accountable to the people, where the rule of law protects property and contracts, and where people have access to uncensored media.

No one needs to tell the Korean people that democracy is not a Western export. Indeed, you have reminded us that the yearning for freedom is based on a fundamental respect for human dignity that is common to all cultures. As President Kim has said: "Respect for human dignity, plural democracy and free market economics have firmly taken root as universal values." And let me add that our alliance is stronger than ever because that conviction has prevailed in this country.

Presidents Clinton and Kim have strengthened the ties between our two nations. Each is committed to reform and economic renewal. Each is committed to our solemn alliance. I know that President Clinton especially admires President Kim's personal courage and dedication to democracy.

The common aspirations of our peoples have brought us to this hopeful point. The future holds even greater promise. A Korean peninsula finally liberated from the ever-present fear of conflict. An open door to the resolution of Korea's greatest tragedy, the division of its people. And our two nations working together in partnership for a more secure, prosperous, and democratic Asia.

On the eve of the next century, the United States and the Republic of Korea face this future in a spirit of confidence and cooperation.

Let me conclude by commenting briefly on yesterday's mid-term congressional elections in the United States. It is an almost unbroken tradition that the party that holds the Presidency -- currently the Democrats -- loses seats in the Congress in the mid-term elections. History tells us that the President's party will suffer losses at mid-term. Tonight in America, that is certainly the case.

But it is also a tradition that whatever the outcome of the mid-term elections, there is a strong continuity in American foreign policy. I want to assure this international audience that we intend to go forward in the spirit of bipartisanship and continuity. We will remain strong and steadfast in our commitments around the world.

Our policy toward Asia and particularly toward Korea has strong bipartisan support. I am confident that there will be continuity in our unshakeable commitment to the security of the Republic of Korea, and to the maintenance of our troop levels here.

I am also confident that the Agreed Framework, which puts the North Korea Nuclear issue on the road to resolution, will command strong bipartisan support. That agreement, and the North South dialogue, are in the best interest of the United States, the Republic of Korea, and all the nations in the region, and as such, they merit unswerving support.

Our partners in the global economy should know that there will also be continuity in our Administration's approach to international economic policy and our commitment to open trade.

As Secretary of State, I have devoted considerable time to close consultation with our Congress, both with Democrats and Republicans. The major elements of our foreign policy have had bipartisan support, and I look forward to working with the new Congress to forge a bipartisan foreign policy.

Thank you very much.

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