

FOIA MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Folder Title:

North Korea Framework [7]

Staff Office-Individual:

Nonproliferation and Export Controls-Aoki, Steven

Original OA/ID Number:

711

Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:	Stack:
41	5	6	3	V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. cable	re Heavy Fuel Oil (8 pages)	11/04/1994	P1/b(1)
002. talking points	re North Korea (13 pages)	11/00/1994	P1/b(1)
003. paper	re Implementation Issues (3 pages)	11/01/1994	P1/b(1)
004. memo	SecDef to National Security Advisor re DoD Support (1 page)	10/25/1994	P1/b(1)
005a. memo	information, Steven Aoki to Samuel Berger re Deputies Meeting (4 pages)	11/01/1994	P1/b(1)
005b. paper	re Implementation Issues [duplicate of 003] (3 pages)	11/01/1994	P1/b(1)
006. paper	re North Korea Checklist (2 pages)	11/02/1994	P1/b(1)
007a. memo	information, Steven Aoki to Samuel Berger re Deputies Meeting [duplicate of 005a, less annotation] (4 pages)	11/01/1994	P1/b(1)
007b. paper	re Implementation Issues [duplicate of 003] (3 pages)	11/01/1994	P1/b(1)
008. notes	handwritten, Deputies Meeting (16 pages)	11/02/1994	P1/b(1)
009a. memo	information, Daniel Poneman to Anthony Lake re Principals' Meeting (3 pages)	10/18/1994	P1/b(1)
009b. agenda	re NSC Principals Meeting (1 page)	10/18/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 711

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea - Framework [7]

2009-0528-F

kc1596

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
009c. paper	re North Korea checklist (1 page)	10/18/1994	P1/b(1)
009d. cable	re Agreed Framework (8 pages)	10/18/1994	P1/b(1)
009e. draft	letter, POTUS to DPRK (1 page)	00/00/0000	P1/b(1)
009f. draft	letter, POTUS to DPRK (1 page)	00/00/0000	P1/b(1)
009g. draft	letter, POTUS to DPRK (1 page)	00/00/0000	P1/b(1)
009h. cable	re Assurance Letters (5 pages)	10/14/1994	P1/b(1)
009i. memo	John Deutch to Warren Christopher and Tony Lake re Agreement (4 pages)	10/17/1994	P1/b(1)

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WASHFAX

~~SECRET~~
CLASSIFICATION

-4 NOV 94 12 49

NMCC/JCS

JCS/PENTAGON

TIME TRANSMITTED (LOCAL)

MSG NBR

578

TIME RECEIVED (LOCAL)

FROM I Harvey OFFICE/DESK OSD/ISA PHONE NBR 697-7757
SUBJECT Slocumbe TPs for Korea on 8-10 Nov

DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS:

PAGES 14
(INCLUDING COVER)☐ HOLD FOR NORMAL DUTY HOURS/ROUTINE☒ IMMEDIATELY/URGENTNOTE: FURNISH AFTER DUTY HOUR CONTACT TELEPHONE NUMBER
FOR EACH ADDRESSEE REQUIRING AFTER DUTY HOUR DELIVERY

TRANSMIT TO

AGENCY	INDIVIDUAL (NAME)	OFFICE	ROOM NBR	PHONE NBR
NSC	Stanley Roth	Asia Dir	493	395-5746
NSC	Dan Poneman	NP&EC	382	395-5697
		Dir		

REMARKS:

For comment & clearance

WASHFAX COVER SHEET

WASHFAX OPERATOR (703) 695-2427

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTSInitials: CA Date: 08/26/15

2009-0528-F

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WASHFAX RECEIPT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

94 OCT 32 P4:36

B

S/S #

013011

C

SAGE NO. _____ CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ No. Pages 3

NAME: G Samore S/AL 7-1829 313
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

SAGE DESCRIPTION DC Discussion Paper

(Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Extension	Room No.
<u>JSC</u>	<u>Don Posner</u>	<u>395-3440</u>	<u>380</u>
<u>DDI</u>	<u>Cpt. Steve Loeffler</u>	<u>695-6565</u>	<u>49830</u>
<u>SPS</u>	<u>Cpt. Tom Flanagan</u>	<u>695-8134</u>	<u>2E1008</u>
<u>DoE</u>	<u>Charlie Curtis</u>	<u>586-4452</u>	
<u>DMB</u>	<u>Gordon Adams</u>		

RE: CLEARANCE ☐ INFORMATION ☒ PER REQUEST ☐ COMMENT ☐

REMARKS: DC Discussion Paper

S/S Officer: [Signature]

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS

Initials: [Signature] Date: 08/26/15

2009-0528-F

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003. paper	re Implementation Issues (3 pages)	11/01/1994	P1/b(1)

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FAX MESSAGE

→ SA
action

Date: 10/25/94

To: Mr. Dan Gonsman

Organization: NSC, Room 380

FAX Phone Number: 202-456-9180

CC:

From: Mr. Frank Miller

Subject:

Number of Pages: (including cover sheet)

Message:

Per previous discussion

If you do not receive all pages, please call immediately.

Voice: (202) 697-2473

Fax: (703) 697-9680

FAX MESSAGE

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary
(New York, New York)

For Immediate Release

September 26, 1994

ADDRESS BY THE PRESIDENT
AT THE 49TH SESSION OF THE U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY

The United Nations Building
New York, New York

11:00 A.M. EDT

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. President, Mr. Secretary General, distinguished delegates. First, let me congratulate you, Mr. President, on your election as President of the 49th General Assembly. The American people look forward to working with you to celebrate the United Nations 50th anniversary.

We meet today in a time of great hope and change. The end of the Cold War, the explosion of technology and trade and enterprise have given people the world over new opportunities to live up to their dreams and their God-given potential. This is an age of hope.

Yet, in this new world, we face a contest as old as history -- a struggle between freedom and tyranny; between tolerance and bigotry; between knowledge and ignorance; between openness and isolation. It is a fight between those who would build free societies governed by laws and those who would impose their will by force. Our struggle today, in a world more high-tech, more fast-moving, more chaotically diverse than ever, is the age-old fight between hope and fear.

Three times in this century, from the trenches of the Somme to the island of Iwojima, to the shattered wall of Berlin, the forces of hope were victorious. But the victors of World War I squandered their triumph when they turned inward, bringing on a global depression and allowing fascism to rise, and reigniting global war.

After World War II, the allies learned the lessons of the past. In the face of a new totalitarian threat and the nuclear menace, great nations did not walk away from the challenge of the moment. Instead they chose to reach out, to rebuild, and to lead. They chose to create the United Nations, and they left us a world stronger, safer, and freer.

P 1

We have seen that progress can be made as well. The problem is deciding when we must respond and how we shall overcome our reluctance. This will never be easy; there are no simple formulas. All of us will make these decisions, in part, based on the distance of the problem from our shores, or the interests of our nation, or the difference we think we can make, or the cost required, or the threat to our own citizens in the endeavor. Hard questions will remain and cannot be erased by some simple formula.

But we should have the confidence that these efforts can succeed, whether they are efforts to keep people alive in the face of terrible tragedy, as in Rwanda; or our efforts to avert a tragedy, as in the Horn of Africa; or our efforts to support processes that are literally changing the future of millions. History is on our side.

We should have confidence about this. Look at the march of freedom we have seen in just the last year alone. Who, a decade ago, would have dared predict the startling changes in South Africa, in the Middle East, in Ireland; the stunning triumph of democracy and majority rule; the redemption of the purpose of Nelson Mandela's life; the brave efforts of Israel and its Arab neighbors to build bridges of peace between their peoples; the earnest search by the people of Northern Ireland and Great Britain and Ireland to end centuries of division and decades of terror. In each case, credit belongs to those nations' leaders and their courageous people. But in each instance, the United States and other nations were privileged to help in these causes.

The growth of cooperation between the United States and the Russian Federation also should give us all great cause for confidence. This is a partnership that is rooted in democracy; a partnership that is working; a partnership of not complete agreement, but genuine mutual respect.

After so many years of nuclear terror, our two nations are taking dramatic steps to ease tensions around the world. For the first time since World War II, foreign troops do not occupy the nations of Central and Eastern Europe; the Baltic nations are free. Russian and American missiles no longer target each other's people. Three of the four nuclear members of the former Soviet Union have agreed to remove all nuclear weapons from their soil. And we are working on agreements to halt production of fissile materials for nuclear explosives, to make dismantling of nuclear warheads transparent and irreversible, and to further reduce our nuclear weapons in delivery vehicles.

The United States and Russia also recognize that we must cooperate to control the emerging danger of terrorists who traffic in nuclear materials. To secure nuclear materials at their sources, we have agreed with Russia to stop plutonium production by the year 2000; to construct a storage facility for fissile materials and buying up stocks of weapons-grade fuel; and to combat the criminals who are trying to smuggle materials for nuclear explosives.

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004. memo	SecDef to National Security Advisor re DoD Support (1 page)	10/25/1994	P1/b(1)
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TO: BERGER

FROM: AOKI
PONEMAN

DOC DATE: 01 NOV 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: NON PROLIFERATION
DC

KOREA NORTH

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: DC MTG NOV 2 TALKING POINTS ON NORTH KOREA

ACTION: NOTED BY BERGER

DUE DATE: 04 NOV 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: AOKI

LOGREF:

FILES: IFM

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

AOKI
BERGER
CICIO
DARBY
GOTTEMOLLER
HAWKINS
JOSHI
NSC CHRON
PONEMAN
ROTH
SODERBERG
WOLIN

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By W NARA, Date 08/26/15
2009-0528-F

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDRS

CLOSED BY: NSDRS

DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

RECORD ID: 9421277

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 BERGER
001

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 94110115 FOR INFORMATION
X 94110218 NOTED BY BERGER

~~SECRET~~

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____

LOG # 21277

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG 1/3 A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Reed			
Sens	1	ADS	
Itoh			
Soderberg			
Berger	2	Deputy Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3		N
NSC Secretariat			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: _____

COMMENTS:

North Korea DC

cc: NES

1 OCT 94 7:57

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D C. 20506

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DEPUTIES' COMMITTEE MEETING

DATE: November 2, 1994
LOCATION: SITUATION ROOM
TIME: 3:30 p.m. - 4:30 p.m.

NEXT STEPS ON NORTH KOREA

Agenda

- I. Introduction NSC
- II. Intelligence Overview CIA
- III. Security Update DOD
- IV. Issues for Discussion State
 - A. Negative Security Assurances
 - B. Organizing KEDO
 - C. LWR Contract Issues
 - D. Financing LWRs and Interim Energy Alternatives
 - E. Short-Term Spent Fuel Arrangements
- V. Next Steps: Diplomatic (including APEC bilaterals),
Congress and Public Diplomacy State
- VI Discussion All Participants
- VII. Conclusion NSC

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

By W NARA, Date 08/26/15

2009-0528-F

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Declassify on: OADR

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006. paper	re North Korea Checklist (2 pages)	11/02/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 711

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea - Framework [7]

2009-0528-F
kc1596

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007a. memo	information, Steven Aoki to Samuel Berger re Deputies Meeting [duplicate of 005a, less annotation] (4 pages)	11/01/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 711

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea - Framework [7]

2009-0528-F
kc1596

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DEPUTIES' COMMITTEE MEETING

DATE: November 2, 1994
LOCATION: SITUATION ROOM
TIME: 3:30 p.m. - 4:30 p.m.

NEXT STEPS ON NORTH KOREA

Agenda

- I. Introduction NSC
- II. Intelligence Overview CIA
- III. Security Update DOD
- IV. Issues for Discussion State
 - A. Negative Security Assurances
 - B. Organizing KEDO
 - C. LWR Contract Issues
 - D. Financing LWRs and Interim Energy Alternatives
 - E. Short-Term Spent Fuel Arrangements
- V. Next Steps: Diplomatic (including APEC bilaterals),
Congress and Public Diplomacy State
- VI Discussion All Participants
- VII. Conclusion NSC

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

By WJ NARA, Date 08/26/15

2009-0528-F

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007b. paper	re Implementation Issues [duplicate of 003] (3 pages)	11/01/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 711

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea - Framework [7]

2009-0528-F
kc1596

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NORTH KOREA

Background

U.S. and DPRK negotiators reached ad ref agreement Monday on a framework for resolving the North Korean nuclear issue. The agreed framework achieves major U.S. nonproliferation objectives.

-- North Korea commits to freezing, and eventually dismantling, its graphite-moderated reactor program and its reprocessing plant. The freeze will be monitored by the IAEA.

-- North Korea's spent fuel will be stored securely under IAEA supervision, and eventually transferred to another country.

-- The North will remain a party to the NPT. It will resolve the IAEA's concerns about its past compliance with safeguards, including allowing special inspections, if necessary, and will come into full compliance with its IAEA safeguards agreement. (We would recommend that you avoid explicit references to special inspections, since that could provoke a strong reaction from the North.)

-- The DPRK will implement the North-South Denuclearization Declaration and engage in North-South dialogue.

In return, the U.S. undertakes to head an international consortium to provide North Korea with two light water reactors (LWRs) and to arrange for the supply of heavy fuel oil to replace the energy generation from the dismantled DPRK nuclear program. The U.S. will also open a liaison office in Pyongyang and give North Korea an assurance against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons as long as North Korea remains a party in good standing to the NPT.

The undertakings in the framework are carefully phased, reflecting the deep mutual distrust between the DPRK and the U.S. As a result, we anticipate criticism from the media and some on the Hill that we are permitting too long an interval before North Korea must resolve IAEA concerns and destroy its nuclear facilities.

Key Points

-- I am pleased with the agreement negotiated with North Korea. This agreement is strongly in our national security interest and that of our allies in South Korea. It freezes and later dismantles the North Korean nuclear program and commits North Korea to comply with all its international nonproliferation obligations.

-- The agreement deals effectively with the present, future and past proliferation threats from North Korea.

- Immediately upon signature of the agreed framework, North Korea's current nuclear program will be frozen under IAEA monitoring. That includes the spent fuel and the reprocessing plant.
- For the future, all of the threatening elements of North Korea's program will be dismantled, and the spent fuel North Korea now possesses will be shipped out of the country.
- Where the past is concerned, North Korea agrees to resolve the IAEA's concerns.
- Under this agreement, North Korea will do more than is required under the international nonproliferation system.

(If asked about why the long delay before special inspections)

- The most important thing is that we've got the North to accept the principle that it must resolve concerns about past compliance, through whatever steps the IAEA deems necessary.
- We've always said we could be flexible about the timing for this step. The waste sites aren't going anywhere.

(If asked why we're giving assistance to North Korea to get them to comply with their nonproliferation commitments)

- The carefully negotiated framework has allowed us to obtain commitments from the North Koreans that go well beyond their obligations under the Nonproliferation Treaty.
- The Light Water Reactor project and the alternative energy supply will primarily be funded by South Korea and Japan. They regard this cooperation as contributing to regional stability and as a fully justified investment in a more open and less threatening North Korea.

CC - Stanley Rich
Holt
Salmore

Facsimile Cover Sheet

Please forward the
following pages to:

Recipient Daniel Poneman

Organization National Security Council

FAX Number 456-9180

From:

Sender Scott Snyder

Organization United States Institute of Peace

FAX Number 1-202-429-6063

FAX Information:

Date October 31, 1994 7:25:01 pm

Pages 17, excluding cover sheet.

Cover Note:

Thank you for agreeing to review the following report on North Korea's nuclear program and the Geneva agreement. We want to make sure that we have characterized the key elements of the Geneva agreement correctly, and would be particularly appreciative of your comments regarding that section of the report.

We are moving quickly toward a final draft, and would appreciate any suggestions you have within the next couple of days, if possible, or whenever you have a chance to give it your attention.

Thank you for your willingness to read this draft, and we look forward to your comments.

5000
11- ME
DOESN'T

ALREADY
HAVE IT.

Pls pass any
comments to
me. DP

THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR CHALLENGE: THE POST-KIM IL SUNG PHASE BEGINS

[INTRODUCTION]

The situation on the Korean Peninsula reached a turning point on July 8, 1994, with the death of North Korea's 82-year-old president, Kim Il Sung. The passing of the North's founder and only leader had been predicted for years as a moment that could open up new possibilities for dramatic change on the Korean Peninsula. Almost four months after Kim's death, however, the nature and extent of any changes in Pyongyang's policies remain unclear. Uncertainties remain over the course of North Korea's leadership transition and prospects for North-South relations, as well as the North's willingness to implement the October 21 US-Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) framework agreement designed to resolve concerns over Pyongyang's nuclear program, advance US-DPRK relations, and encourage North-South dialogue. The United States, South Korea, and North Korea's other neighbors face significant challenges in determining policy adjustments that might encourage the new North Korean leadership to take actions that will reduce tensions and promote regional stability in Northeast Asia.

[SIDEBAR TEXT]

The United States Institute of Peace—which has held a series of study group meetings on the North Korean nuclear challenge since the fall of 1993—assembled approximately 40 policy makers and senior regional and technical specialists on September 20, 1994, for a one-day meeting to discuss US relations on the Korean Peninsula in the post-Kim Il Sung era. The meeting was held on the eve of the resumption of the third round of US-DPRK talks in Geneva and included representatives from South Korea, Japan, Russia, and the U.K., as well as the United States. This report, the second produced by the Institute on the North Korean situation,¹ draws heavily on views expressed at that meeting and reviews the major challenges facing the United States and South Korea in resolving the nuclear issue and reducing inter-Korean tensions in the context of North Korea's transition to a stabilized post-Kim Il Sung leadership.

¹The first special report, entitled "North Korea's Nuclear Program: Challenge and Opportunity for American Policy," was released in February, 1994.

KEY POINTS

- The October 21 US-DPRK framework agreement outlines the steps through which real progress *might* be made in dismantling North Korea's plutonium production capability and improving US-DPRK relations; however, it will be years before implementation has proceeded far enough to ensure that all issues of concern are finally resolved. Meanwhile, renewed crisis could occur if any elements in the agreement are not implemented. North Korea's continued adherence to its pledge not to refuel its 5 MW experimental reactor or reprocess spent fuel rods currently in wet storage and to freeze construction of its 50 MW and 200 MW graphite reactors is critical to implementing the agreement and an essential precondition for further progress.

- The US-ROK relationship, ironically, is under some strain following the progress yielded in the US-DPRK agreement. It will be important to support parallel progress in the North-South Korean dialogue to ensure that the relationship between Washington and Seoul remains one of confidence. Of particular concern is the fact that progress in US-North Korean relations has raised South Korean fears of losing control over developments on the peninsula and of a weakening of the US-ROK alliance.

Washington must be attentive to South Korean concerns and exceptionally skillful in reassuring Seoul of its undiminished commitment to South Korea. This requires not only exceptional measures to coordinate policy, but also efforts to build public support for our common policy as both parties deal with the North on nuclear and other issues.

For its part, South Korea should be actively involved in diplomacy with North Korea, relying on its economic, political, and military strength and searching for appropriate opportunities to reactivate the North-South dialogue. The South will have a major role in supplying North Korea with light water reactors. At the same time, as the United States proceeds towards normalization of relations with the North, it should take steps to ensure that the degree of progress in US-DPRK relations does not outpace the development of North-South relations.

- There remains little reliable information about how the North Korean political succession is proceeding. Kim Il Sung's death may not have precipitated a period of policy paralysis in North Korea, but it has at least created considerable uncertainty for outsiders. Doubts remain among foreign observers about whether Kim Jong Il will ultimately consolidate his power. These questions persist despite the younger Kim's recent appearance at the ceremony marking 100 days of mourning for his father and reports that the elder Kim, before his death, approved a policy of improving US-DPRK relations at the cost of relinquishing the North's nuclear program. Even if Kim Jong Il is

finally named formally as North Korea's state and party leader, the fact of the transition has made it difficult to initiate progress in the North-South dialogue.

- To encourage North Korea's commitment to following through on the October 21 agreement, **the United States must maintain close cooperation with South Korea, Japan, China, and others** so that the post-Kim Il Sung leadership does not doubt the international consensus in support of the agreement's implementation. Effective US maintenance of an **international coalition on these issues is critical to convincing Pyongyang** that it cannot succeed in diplomatic maneuvers designed to split off elements of the coalition or to stall on implementation of the agreement.

THE NORTH KOREAN LEADERSHIP TRANSITION

There continue to be signs of delay in carrying out the transition to a new leadership in the DPRK. Between Kim Il Sung's death in early July and early November², the country has been without an officially-named President or Party Secretary, although reports suggest that Kim's son and long-designated successor Kim Jong Il is indeed in charge. Kim Jong Il's first public appearance in three months, at an October 16 ceremony formally marking the passing of 100 days of mourning since Kim Il Sung's death, seemed designed to confirm that Kim Jong Il remains in power as the de facto North Korean leader. Kim Jong Il is reported to have approved the signing of the US-DPRK joint agreement, in his capacity as Chairman of the National Defense Commission. The leadership transition has included the updating of posters and the appearance of new popular songs devoted to the praise of the younger Kim. A primary focus of public political activity during the mourning period has been on demonstrations of loyalty to the regime.

Whatever the intricacies and uncertainties of the formal succession, the public mood in Pyongyang appears calm to the eyes of recent outside observers. There has been a slowdown in international travel to and from the North Korean capital, and the security apparatus appears more cautious in dealing with foreign visitors to ensure that outside influences do not infiltrate into the society at this sensitive time. But there is no visible disruption of daily life as the public goes about its routine tasks; nor is there an evident increase in armed security on the streets of Pyongyang. Moreover, it appears that the leadership has made special efforts to ensure that there is no breakdown in the availability of goods and services during this critical period in the capital.

²As of this writing, on November 1, Kim Jong Il was expected to assume the positions of General Secretary of the Korean Worker's Party and/or President at the next meeting of the Supreme People's Assembly (SPA).

Circumstances in other parts of the country are largely unknown to the outside world, however, and reports suggest that some North Korean provinces may be experiencing food and energy shortages.

The initial emphasis in both the North Korean media and in official statements toward the outside world has been on continuity rather than change. Pyongyang's willingness to resume the third round of negotiations with the United States was expressed as early as August through official policy statements and messages such as one from Kim Jong Il to former President Jimmy Carter. These communications, as well as the fact that agreement was subsequently reached with the United States, have underscored that the policies and promises made by Kim Il Sung before his death would be carried out. One important exception was Pyongyang's statement that the planned summit between North and South Korea, announced at the end of Mr. Carter's visit to Korea in June, which will not be rescheduled for now.

North Korea's leaders face key challenges

The apparent calm and sense of policy continuity in Pyongyang, even if an accurate picture of current circumstances, does not change the fact that North Korea and its new leadership must deal with major challenges that could threaten the regime's survival. The central question continues to be the status of North Korea's succession and the evolution of its leadership in the post-Kim Il Sung era. North Korean officials stationed abroad state that Kim Jong Il is firmly in control, and there is no tangible evidence to date to refute that assertion.

At the same time, Kim Jong Il has been practically invisible as a leadership figure, appearing in public only once since the first week of mourning following his father's death. While all aspects of governance have gone forward even in the absence of Kim's formal designation as party and/or state leader, it may be significant that during the mourning period, external communications that were formerly issued in Kim Il Sung's name have been put forward under the authority of the Central Committee of the Korean Worker's Party.

An evolution in the status of the North Korean leadership is inevitable as the first generation gerontocracy, in power with little change since the 1950s, is replaced in top positions by younger leaders. Many observers anticipate that this process is likely to be evolutionary rather than sudden, and that performance rather than revolutionary credentials will be the key to the Kim Jong Il generation consolidating political control.

The most pressing domestic challenge facing the new leadership is reinvigorating the economy. Although there have been some reports that this year's harvest was not

bad, the internal economy continues to be constrained by energy shortages and transportation bottlenecks. North Korea's economy has contracted for four years in a row—down by as much as 25% in 1993 from 1989 levels. The prospects for stimulating growth through foreign trade promotion have been blocked thus far by foreign reactions to the nuclear program and by the North's unpaid external debts—estimated at \$US 10.3 billion at the end of 1993, equal to roughly one-half of the DPRK's annual GNP. Unless this economic decline is reversed, prospects for a stable political transition will be bleak.

The most serious external challenge facing Pyongyang's new leadership is the need to reestablish an equilibrium in its international relations in the post-Cold War era. While South Korea benefited in the late 1980s from its policy of *Nordpolitik*—which led to normalization of relations with Russia, China, and other former socialist countries, North Korea has found itself increasingly isolated. Pyongyang must come to grips with the reality that a less confrontational relationship not only with the United States but with South Korea and Japan as well, will be necessary if the North is to improve its international situation and its economy.

Will the North choose isolation or integration?

The leadership transition raises a number of questions that have important implications for US and South Korean negotiations with North Korea. Given current conditions, should we anticipate political paralysis or turmoil in the North? Might we see a gradual economic opening (albeit under tight political control) following the Chinese model of reform? Is it likely that economic opening itself will heighten internal political tensions? Some outside observers forecast a political collapse, pointing to the experience of other countries which were organized around the failed ideology and institutions of Marxist-Leninist socialism. While an economic opening on the Chinese model is not out of the question, Kim Jong Il's claim to his father's mantle rests importantly on his role as principal interpreter and defender of the policy of ch'uche, or "self-reliance," with all that concept implies for constraints on reform and opening of the outside world. The widely differing possibilities that accompany these conflicting scenarios have created uncertainty and forestalled consensus within each of the policy making communities outside the DPRK most closely concerned with the North Korean nuclear issue—and no doubt reflect uncertainties within North Korea itself.

North Korean sincerity in international negotiations continues to be questioned in many quarters, even following the announcement of a US-DPRK agreement. The long experience of South Korean negotiators is that Pyongyang insists on framework

agreements cast in vague principles which are then skewed in unacceptable ways when the time comes for implementation, creating a pretext for North Korean refusal to proceed. Although the October 21 US-DPRK framework agreement is quite specific on some key issues, according to some South Korean interpretations North Korea is nevertheless using such a strategy of ambiguous principles and objections in implementation in approaching this latest agreement.

Others argue that, tactics aside, North Korea has no intention of giving up its nuclear weapons program or rejoining the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In their view, the North's possession of nuclear weapons—or at least ambiguity about the status of the program—is seen by Pyongyang as critical to its security if not as leverage in the North Korean quest for eventual domination of the Korean peninsula. As a result, these individuals assert, the US-DPRK nuclear agreement is a charade; and even by negotiating the US has fallen into the North Korean trap.

Conversely, other observers point to North Korea's willingness to continue the US-DPRK negotiations in Geneva after Kim Il Sung's death, even during the mourning period, as evidence of a North Korean desire—indeed, the need—to strike a deal. These individuals note that the dynamic and the stakes of US-DPRK agreement—and the international acceptance that a relationship with the United States symbolizes—are inevitably different from the dynamics of the North-South talks. While that presumed difference hasn't made the US-DPRK negotiations an easy process, observers point out that the North's need to improve relations with the United States has been reflected in the fact that Pyongyang ultimately agreed to a deal with Washington which, if implemented fully, will result in the elimination of North Korea's nuclear weapons program and a more normal US-DPRK relationship.

DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH-SOUTH RELATIONS

Kim Il Sung's death abruptly ended prospects for an historic presidential summit between Kim and South Korean President Kim Young Sam that some observers believe would have led to dramatic improvement in North-South relations. Instead, the all too familiar cycle of negative rhetoric between the two leaderships has intensified in recent months. South Korea refused to offer any official hint of condolences on the death of Kim Il Sung, highlighting instead his responsibility for initiating the Korean War and other atrocities that have wrought death and destruction in the South and sustained the division of the peninsula.

Conversely, the North Korean leadership encouraged South Korean private citizens to defy their government's policy on condolences, provocatively inviting South

Koreans to attend Kim Il Sung's funeral in Pyongyang and stepping up anti-South Korean propaganda, including vicious personal attacks on ROK President Kim Young Sam. In the face of these North Korean provocations, the domestic challenge for Kim Young Sam since Kim Il Sung's death has been two-fold: to show stalwart leadership and strength, on the one hand, but to avoid the appearance of being politically marginalized by progress in US-DPRK negotiations or of losing needed leverage with which to engage North Korea in the future on the other hand.

Nonetheless, many observers believe that Kim Young Sam's August 15 Liberation Day speech did not contribute to improving the atmosphere between North and South Korea, creating further obstacles to inter-Korean dialogue. In that speech President Kim offered to supply the North with light water reactors, but he emphasized that all aspects of the nuclear issue—including questions about the past—would have to be resolved before the South would allow light water reactor technology to be provided to the North. President Kim called on North Korea to "undertake bold reforms, including improvement of the human rights situation" and "pursue a path of reform and openness amidst stabilization." In so doing, it is argued, he raised issues that both threatened the regime's survival and challenged North Korean hopes that, by maintaining ambiguity regarding past nuclear activities, Pyongyang could retain leverage to ensure that the US lived up to its commitments under any US-DPRK agreement.

The zero-sum character of North-South relations (a gain for one being a loss for the other) has not changed since the end of the Cold War despite favorable developments in international relations surrounding the peninsula. As a result, in the absence of dramatic initiatives such as the now-deferred presidential summit, and despite commitments to resume dialogue, the prospects for progress in North-South relations which might lower tensions are limited. North Korean propaganda has continued to center on dividing the South politically, and South Korean domestic politics have also been riven by conflicting public sentiments on how to deal with the North. Some have argued that the South—having outdistanced the North decisively in the economic and political competition on the peninsula and, in alliance with the US, able to prevail in a war with the North—should be a magnanimous winner, with a special responsibility to make bold, positive moves that might restart North-South talks.

Others, however, fearful of the DPRK's strategy to divide the United States and South Korea, worry that progress between the United States and North Korea will undercut South Korea's leverage to encourage Pyongyang back to the North-South negotiating table. Having previously insisted on strict linkage between progress on

these two tracks, the South boldly determined last March to drop the formal linkage lest it be seen as blocking agreement on the nuclear question. At the same time, Washington and Seoul concur that North Korea cannot be allowed to divide the United States and South Korea by making progress only in US-DPRK talks at the expense of North-South relations.

Thus, while no formal preconditions for parallel progress have been reestablished, the need for movement on the North-South front is even more acute now that the United States and North Korea have reached an agreement. This will put pressure on Pyongyang to reengage with Seoul if it expects rapid progress in implementing those aspects of its agreement with the United States having to do with overall normalization of relations and the supply of light water reactors (where the South will be a major player). But it also means that Seoul will need to adopt a more pro-active policy toward the North, not arbitrarily blocking the light water reactor project and not simply reacting to Pyongyang's offensive propaganda. This will be no easy task, because, beyond the issues of legitimacy and face, North-South economic, cultural, or political contacts carry especially high risks of introducing—in Kim Il Sung's phrase—the "flies and mosquitoes" that could eventually undermine the North's *ch'uche* system of self-reliant isolation.

A growing number of South Koreans have pressed for engaging the North on the economic front. Economic cooperation, it has been argued, is an area of activity where North and South Korea have complementary interests that could be the basis of a process of reconciliation. There is growing pressure on the ROK government from parts of the South Korean business community to review its embargo on direct economic activity, the possible lifting of which has been linked to the resolution of the nuclear issue. It is argued that, given the economic problems the North faces, controlled economic opening with the South could build a context for broader cooperation—and tension-reduction—in other areas. Immediately following the October 21st US-DPRK agreement in Geneva, a review of South Korean policy toward economic interaction with the North was initiated to assess whether restrictions on inter-Korean economic relations might be partially lifted.

Key Issues in North-South relations

If a means can be found to reactivate a North-South dialogue, there is a broad agenda to be pursued. The December, 1991, Seoul-Pyongyang Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, Exchanges and Cooperation (the so-called "Basic Accord") provides a framework for exploring these issues, but it remains to be

implemented. Although exchanges are particularly sensitive for North Korea, the initiation of direct mail and telephone services, family reunions, and further cultural contacts could be taken up, as well as an easing of the level and tone of propaganda on both sides as pledged in the Basic Accord. Adoption of confidence-building measures (CBMs) and the phased pullback of certain military forces from areas both sides of the DMZ is important to easing tensions and starting a broader process of military stabilization, conventional arms control, and confidence-building on the peninsula. And replacement of the 1953 Armistice with permanent and reliable peace arrangements is another issue that must be dealt with primarily by North and South Korea, albeit through modalities that are likely to require UN and US participation. Moreover, the US-DPRK framework agreement of October, 1994, insists on the implementation of the 1991 North-South Agreement on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula—in which North and South have mutually pledged to forgo the development of nuclear weapons capabilities and to allow mutual inspections of nuclear sites.

The range of issues that must be resolved if a process of peace-building and reconciliation between the two Koreas is to begin has remained remarkably unchanged over the past decade, with the emergence of one important new issue already noted: the South Korean role in supplying light water reactors to North Korea as part of a settlement of the nuclear issue. Since the provision of light water reactors to North Korea is the centerpiece of the US-DPRK framework agreement, Pyongyang's earlier objections to Seoul playing a potentially key role in providing the reactors point to potential sticking point that could stall progress in implementation.

If North-South relations are to improve, an appropriate channel is necessary for addressing the major issues. A presidential summit does not seem a practical or desirable option at this time for either side, though both have indicated that the principle of a summit meeting is still valid. Although Red Cross talks proposed by the South shortly after Kim Il Sung's death were rejected by the North, such talks might be renewed in the future. Other possible options include the resumption of committee meetings under the 1991 Basic Accord or preparatory meetings that could lead to resumed North-South talks at the Deputy Prime Minister/Party Secretary level. Some have suggested that, as in June of 1994, a visit by a high-level American could serve as a catalyst to resume North-South talks, but how such an intermediary would function is the subject of some controversy.

DEVELOPMENTS IN US-DPRK RELATIONS

The North Korean nuclear challenge has been an example of the perverse phenomenon of the "power of weak nations" which has confounded US policy makers on more than one occasion in the post-Cold War era. As with Haiti, Cuba, and Bosnia, North Korea has posed a particularly vexing international security challenge out of proportion to its size or inherent international importance. The United States, reluctant to bring the full force of its power to bear because of the potential consequences of a military crisis—in the case of Korea the possibility of precipitating a second Korean War—has found its approaches constrained by the ability of smaller states to create leverage over issues that are important to a variety of American interests but do not directly threaten US national security.

The major challenge US policy makers have faced in formulating and implementing a policy to deal with the North Korean nuclear issue has been the balancing of its nonproliferation objectives with the concerns of allies and collaborators in the region that war could result if North Korea were pushed too hard. Close coordination of policy has been required both with the non-proliferation community and with American allies and others in the region, but is complicated by competing priorities. This delicate balancing act will continue to be a central feature of US policy formulation in dealing with North Korea even as the administration presses Pyongyang to implement the terms of the October agreement. That agreement, however, for the first time specifies a practical series of actions that—if fully implemented—will freeze and then eliminate North Korea's nuclear program in return for the supply of proliferation-resistant light water reactors, compensation for lost energy production capability until construction of light water reactors is completed, and improved diplomatic relations between North Korea and the United States. The agreement has been welcomed by China, Japan, and South Korea, among others, and will require significant financial, technical, and political support from South Korea and Japan to guarantee its successful implementation.

In addition, Administration officials point out, this agreement is clearly preferable to the alternatives of heightened military confrontation or the potential for unchecked proliferation not only in Northeast Asia, but also possibly in the Middle East.

Key elements of the US-DPRK agreement

The first major element of the October 21st framework agreement is a continuation of the freeze on refueling of North Korea's 5 MW experimental nuclear reactor and on the reprocessing of spent fuel rods currently in wet storage—which contain enough

plutonium to make 4-5 nuclear bombs. The freeze on construction of the larger 50 MW and 200 MW reactors, the primary focus of concern about North Korea's future capability to acquire plutonium that could be used for nuclear weapons, will also become permanent.³ International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors will remain in place to ensure that this freeze on refueling and reprocessing remains in effect, and satellite information can determine whether construction remains halted on the two larger nuclear reactors.

Another critical element of the October 21st agreement is North Korea's eventual acceptance of full-scope safeguards on its nuclear program as part of a return to full compliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). As part of its NPT commitment, North Korea is required to adhere to full-scope safeguards—including special inspections or any other inspections the IAEA deems necessary to fully account for North Korea's past nuclear activities. Resolution of questions related to the history of the North Korean nuclear program is required as part of North Korea's acceptance of its obligations as a member of the NPT, and the October US-DPRK framework agreement specifies that such resolution must occur prior to the delivery of significant nuclear components for the construction of the two 1000 MW light water reactors.⁴ Moreover, going beyond NPT requirements, the North has agreed to remove the spent fuel rods from the country before the first light water reactor goes on line. In the meantime, the IAEA will continue its inspection activities—begun in 1992—to ensure that North Korea maintains the "continuity of safeguards" required to ensure that there is no diversion of materials that could be used for a nuclear weapons program and to verify the freeze on reprocessing, refueling, and construction activities.

In addition, the North has committed itself to dismantle the 5 MW experimental reactor, the reprocessing facility, and both of the reactors under construction by the time of the completion of the second of two new 1000 MW light water reactors that will be provided through a US-led international consortium—currently known as the Korean Energy Development Organization (KEDO). South Korea and Japan will carry most of the financial burden of the project through the issuance to North Korea of long-term non-interest bearing loans to be repaid in barter. To compensate North Korea for lost energy production capacity as a result of the freeze on construction or use of North Korea's nuclear reactors, the consortium will supply Pyongyang with quantities of

³In his meetings with President Carter in June, Kim Il Sung pledged a temporary freeze on these activities, thus laying the basis for the Third Round of US-DPRK negotiations.

⁴Normally, the delivery of such components in the construction of a light water reactor would occur approximately five years from the start of the project.

heavy oil equivalent to the generating capacity that North Korea will forgo until the first light water reactor has been completed and brought on-line. Fifty-thousand tons of heavy oil⁵ will be supplied in the first three months following the signing of the framework agreement (October-December, 1994). 150,000 tons in 1995, and 500,000 tons thereafter until the completion of the light water reactors to make up for the projected loss of 255 MW of power that might have otherwise been generated under the North's graphite reactor program.⁶

Finally, the United States and North Korea will move toward the establishment of more normal diplomatic relations through the exchange of liaison offices between capitals and the easing of US restrictions on trade and telecommunications with North Korea. The pace of this progress will depend to a certain extent on progress in reinitiating dialogue between North and South Korea.

According to the framework agreement, the establishment of full diplomatic relations with North Korea will require grappling with other serious issues that burden the emerging US-DPRK dialogue. These issues include North Korean missile exports, the reduction of levels of conventional military deployments on the Korean peninsula, human rights abuses, and final resolution of the nuclear issue.

Unresolved questions following the US-DPRK agreement

As the US-DPRK negotiations move into a new phase, any number of issues could halt progress in carrying out the agreement reached on October 21. The United States and North Korea have embarked on an extremely complex process that may be more intrusive than the North Koreans realize; and it is fraught with possible pitfalls that could emanate from technical, financial, or political considerations at each step along the way. In addition, dissatisfaction has been expressed by some South Koreans and others regarding what is seen as delayed timing for the special inspections that Pyongyang did agree to, and the implications of the agreement for the possible resumption of North-South dialogue. Indeed, the latter is an especially sensitive question in US-ROK consultations, and is examined in more detail in the next section of this report.

⁵This heavy oil is unfit for use as fuel for planes or tanks, eliminating the possibility that Pyongyang might try to strengthen its conventional military force by misappropriating the oil for military uses.

⁶Assuming a generous price of US\$20/barrel, the cost of providing the agreed upon amounts of heavy oil to North Korea is approximately US\$75 million/year from 1996, or a total cost of approximately US\$600 million through 2003. This is considerably less than the cost of heightened military confrontation, and if the North fails to implement the agreement, of course, US delivery of the oil would (presumably) be suspended.

The United States and its allies and friends in Northeast Asia must remain prepared for the possibility that—as has happened so frequently in dealing with North Korea, even where there seems to be agreement in principle—there could be stalling or even a breakdown in the implementation phase that could lead to renewed tensions and the possibility of a reversion to a more confrontational path. The United States and South Korea will need to carry through on their end of the bargain and confront possible North Korean intransigence with common purpose if the agreement breaks down on technical grounds. This is the only way to ensure that there is no opportunity for Pyongyang to try to divide Washington and Seoul.

Doubts expressed regarding the timing of any special inspections emanate from concerns that the delay in accounting for the past as part of the framework agreement allows North Korea to enjoy ambiguity regarding the true state of its nuclear weapons program, and that this measure of uncertainty provides the North with undue leverage in its dealings with South Korea and the rest of the international community. This is particularly worrisome to some South Koreans who believe that any such leverage must be countered to avoid the possibility of nuclear blackmail by the North.

These concerns have stimulated a domestic political debate in Seoul over the future of the ROK's own nuclear policy and its continued adherence to the terms of the North-South Agreement on Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. The provisions of that agreement—which prohibit reprocessing of plutonium and bans the test, manufacture, production, receipt, possession, deployment or use of nuclear weapons—are considered to be an essential part of the resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue. But those provisions were criticized by opposition party members and others even when the bilateral agreement was ratified in 1992, and the criticism has since spread. The objections have been voiced on grounds that the treaty's ban on reprocessing—which goes beyond even what the NPT requires—limits nuclear energy options for the future and leaves Korea in an inferior position as compared, for example, to Japan.

Another criticism of the agreement is that by delaying the point at which North Korea must accept special inspections if the IAEA deems them necessary, the agreement weakens the international credibility of the IAEA inspections regime. Individuals who make this criticism are concerned that the extra time during which only declared nuclear facilities will be subject to IAEA inspections to ensure "continuity of safeguards" could be used by North Korea to develop a clandestine nuclear weapons program. They express concerns that North Korea may be obtaining plutonium illegally from Russia or other external sources that would allow them to continue developing nuclear weapons undetected by the international community.

The assessment offered by Ambassador Robert L. Gallucci, chief negotiator for the United States in the Geneva talks, regarding the deferral of the accounting for the past is that this issue is not time-sensitive, unlike other elements of the agreement which require the North Koreans to take actions now. Disposing of the spent fuel rods and freezing the current nuclear program were time-urgent issues, asserts Gallucci, whereas "the radioactive waste sites aren't going anywhere" and the information to be gained from inspections of those sites is not going to change. Moreover, some experts argue that such inspections may not yield technical information that will be particularly useful in determining the amount of plutonium North Korea may have processed in the past. Nonetheless, the implementation of special inspections or other measures the IAEA may require will be an important test of North Korea's commitment to adhere fully to its obligations as part of its return to full NPT membership when the time comes.

THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR ISSUE: IMPLICATIONS FOR US-SOUTH KOREAN RELATIONS

In the minds of some South Koreans, the October 21 US-DPRK framework agreement in Geneva confirmed fears that the United States would accept a settlement in which North Korea would be able to maintain ambiguity about its past nuclear weapons development activities if it were willing to cap its present and future nuclear program. The feeling in Seoul has been that Washington was too eager to make a deal with the North without obtaining appropriate concessions in return for agreeing to exchange liaison offices and offering to supply the North with fuel oil as compensation for its scrapping the plutonium-generating reactors. Some in Seoul have even speculated about a possible secret US-DPRK agreement to allow North Korea to retain nuclear capabilities in some form. That cycle of doubt, concern, and unwarranted speculation has posed not only a significant challenge and source of tension for the US-ROK relationship, but also has posed a complex dilemma for political leaders in Seoul who have supported progress in the US-DPRK negotiations despite the fact that they knew that the contents of such an agreement might be politically unpopular with the South Korean public.

Challenges for US-ROK Relations

Even with the most earnest efforts by the South Korean leadership, it is quite possible that North-South relations will not advance quickly. Indeed, tensions between Seoul and Pyongyang have risen somewhat in the period since Kim Il Sung's death, although progress in US-DPRK negotiations has recently tempered public statements in

Seoul. Nonetheless, the absence of measurable progress in the North-South dialogue has become a critical issue in the US-ROK relationship.

It has already been demonstrated that a policy of strict conditionality that formally links progress on both fronts—US-DPRK and ROK-DPRK—can be an impediment to progress on the nuclear issue. At the same time, the political reality is that to maintain a fundamentally sound US-ROK relationship, neither the United States nor South Korea can afford to allow too much progress in US-DPRK talks without some concurrent improvement in the North-South relationship. The North agreed only at the last moment in the Geneva negotiations that "the DPRK will engage in North-South dialogue, as this Agreed Framework will help create an atmosphere that promotes such dialogue," reflecting its strong resistance to dealing directly with South Korea. Hence, implementation of this element of the October agreement is likely to be difficult. And in this context, one must ask how far the United States can go in implementing an agreement with North Korea without parallel movement on the North-South front. To what extent is the United States willing to forego progress with the DPRK for the sake of improved North-South relations? What kinds of active efforts by South Korea will be necessary to demonstrate that it is constructively involved in the process or that it is not a stumbling block to continued progress between the United States and North Korea?

Some have suggested that the United States must pursue a more "balanced" policy on the Korean peninsula by maintaining a position of equidistance between the two Koreas, an argument to which Seoul is particularly sensitive now that the United States is "recognizing" the existence of a second Korean government on the peninsula. Others argue that a "balanced approach" is totally inconsistent with the US-ROK alliance relationship, and that it is inconceivable that the United States would reach agreement with Pyongyang on terms that were not either openly accepted by or endorsed by Seoul. Regardless of one's response to these arguments, the political reality for most observers, and certainly for the US government, is that close consultation with Seoul in support of the US-South Korean alliance is both obligatory and prudent. While not accepting a South Korean "veto" on its policies toward Pyongyang, the United States cannot move ahead without the active support of South Korea. Neither the American nor the South Korean public is prepared to accept any other option at this sensitive time of transition on the Korean peninsula.

There is a need, however, for a clearer explanation to the American and South Korean publics regarding US and ROK policy objectives and the extent of official cooperation between Washington and Seoul on the North Korean issue. Despite close consultations and despite a blitz of media interviews by American and South Korean

officials, the South Korean public has consistently been slow to recognize the consequences of progress in the US-DPRK talks. Only recently have South Korean leaders begun to explain to their public the benefits for the South which would accompany progress in US-DPRK negotiations on the nuclear issue. Persistent efforts will be required of both South Korean and American officials to explain these matters to the publics in both countries and to make clear the close coordination that has existed and will continue to exist between them with respect to the US-DPRK agreement and its implementation.

One option worth considering is a visit to Seoul by President Clinton en route to or from the November APEC meeting in Indonesia—even given the likelihood of a Clinton-Kim Young Sam meeting in Bogor. Such a visit would underscore the high level of cooperation and commitment that exists between the United States and South Korea in resolving the North Korean nuclear issue and could prove critical to garnering the necessary South Korean support to bring a negotiated US-DPRK solution to fruition. Such a visit, if used creatively, might also help to advance the process of North-South dialogue.

WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?

The October 21st US-DPRK framework agreement is an important step toward resolving questions surrounding North Korea's nuclear program, but it is only a first step in a long journey toward the reduction of tensions on the Korean peninsula. Continued close international coordination will be necessary as South Korea, Japan, the United States, China and others work with North Korea's new leadership to reliably implement each part of the framework agreement.

In addition, much work remains to be done to lessen tensions between North and South Korea. Much of this effort should take place within the context of an improved North-South dialogue. However, just as South Korea has played a critical supporting role in the negotiation of the US-DPRK framework agreement, the United States will need to play a constructive supporting role in encouraging conventional arms reductions on the peninsula, in eventually replacing the 41-year old armistice with a lasting peace arrangement, and encouraging broader exchanges between Pyongyang and Seoul.

The greatest challenge of all for the United States in this new phase may be to sustain confidence and flexibility in the US-ROK relationship—keeping this critical alliance on track while convincing political and public opinion in both countries that only a team effort will serve the long-term interests of peace and stability on the

Peninsula. As we move to implement the October framework agreement with North Korea, special emphasis must be placed on coordination between Washington and Seoul to ensure that the US-ROK alliance remains a firm foundation of support for the implementation of the US-DPRK framework agreement and renewed progress in North-South dialogue.

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FRAMEWORK TIMELINE

Time from Agreement Signature	LWR Project	Nonproliferation Steps	Other Steps
0	U.S. letter of assurance U.S. organizes KEDO	Freeze on reloading / refueling of 5MW reactor. Freeze on reprocessing plant, w/ IAEA monitoring. DPRK maintains safeguards continuity. Freeze on 50 MW & 200 MW construction. Commitment to future dismantlement, special inspections, transfer of spent fuel.	U.S. provides security assurance
3 months		Experts meet on spent fuel storage	Initial conventional fuel deliveries (5MW reactor equivalent) Initial lifting of Economic Sanctions N-S dialogue resumes

Time	LWR Project	Nonproliferation steps	Other Steps
6 months	Contract signed between KEDO and DPRK	Ad hoc/routine IAEA inspections resume at declared facilities	Fuel deliveries to offset 50 MW reactor begin.
1 year	Vendor selected Initial design phase begins Site evaluation concludes		Fuel offset for 200 MW reactor begins Liaison offices open (?)
2 years			
3 years	Begin purchasing major components First concrete pour		
4 years	Begin delivery of equipment for balance-of-plant.		
5 years			
6 years	Complete delivery of balance-of-plant equipment for Unit 1 specified in framework agreement	- DPRK/IAEA resolve the past, including special inspections, if required. - Transfer of spent fuel begins	Upgrade relations (?) Lift economic sanctions (?)

Time	LWR Project	Nonproliferation Steps	Other Steps
7 years	Complete nuclear steam supply system (NSSS) for Unit 1		
8 years	Complete Unit 1 Begin cold testing of Unit 1. Deliver NSSS components for Unit 2	Complete transfer of spent fuel Begin dismantling of Unit 1 Begin dismantling graphite-moderated reactors and reprocessing plant	
9 years	Complete NSSS for Unit 2 Load fuel for Unit 1		
9½ years	Begin operation of Unit 1		
10 years	Complete Unit 2 Begin cold testing of Unit 2	Complete Dismantling	

Time	LWR Project	Nonproliferation Steps	Other Steps
11 Years	Load fuel, Unit 2		
11½ years	Begin operations at Unit 2		
12 years	First discharge of Spent fuel from Unit 2		

TO: MR. DAN PONEMAN - WHITE HOUSE

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Press Conference Given by Ambassador at Large
Robert L. Gallucci
Following the Signing of the U.S.-DPRK Accord

Geneva, 10/21/94

(Uncleared text)

(begin transcript) Ladies and gentlemen, I am pleased to be here with you this evening. I'd like to tell you that we had serious and businesslike discussions today. (laughter) Actually, we did have some serious and businesslike discussions. We also signed the framework document, and left each other with the thought that we now have a long road ahead of us.

We are, I think, committed to getting on with our work of the working groups that are envisioned under the agreement, and getting on to the implementation phase. Before I get on to the implementation phase press event, I'd like to say a few words about the document itself.

We have, in this settlement document, attempted to capture agreement on how the nuclear issue would be resolved. And that document does this by providing for the two sides to take a series of steps over a period of months and years. The steps are, in a sense, interlocking; they are one related to the other. In this sense, the document is not accurately described as one that is based on trust. As I have said before, it is one that hopefully will build trust. The steps by one side can follow the steps by others. The implementation can be verified in most of the elements of the document, the provisions for verification would be accomplished by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

In terms of substance, a good way to perceive the elements of the framework document are in terms of what it accomplishes in the way of objectives that at least we have had for the current nuclear program of the DPRK, the future nuclear program of the DPRK, and the past nuclear program for the DPRK.

The current program we have been concerned about, and this concern has been shared with you over the weeks in which we have met after some of these sessions, involved the disposition of the spent nuclear fuel that is in the pond at the reactor at Yongbyon. As you know, that fuel contains 25 or 30 kilograms of plutonium, and one of our objectives, certainly, was to make sure that that fuel was not reprocessed, that the plutonium was not separated. Under the provisions of the agreement, the fuel will remain in the pond.

The second objective, certainly, was to make sure that not only new plutonium was not separated, but that new plutonium was not produced, and we were therefore concerned that the 5-megawatt reactor was not restarted. And under the agreement the 5-megawatt reactor will not be refueled or restarted.

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The third objective was that the reprocessing facility they call the radiochemistry lab--that that facility would remain dormant, and there'd be no reprocessing of any kind of fuel from any source. And under the agreement, that reprocessing facility would be sealed and subject to inspection as necessary by the IAEA to confirm its non-functioning status, its freeze and its status as a frozen facility.

In terms of future objectives, we have had concern about two larger reactors that are under construction. One is a 50-megawatt reactor, ten times larger than the existing reactor at Yongbyon, and another 200-megawatt reactor, four times larger than that. Both of these reactors are under construction. They would have been completed in the next one to two years. The 50-megawatt is slightly ahead, I understand, of the 200-megawatt reactor in construction.

Our interest was in seeing that these reactors not be completed, that the work at these reactors be frozen. Under the provisions of the agreement, work on both of these reactors would be frozen.

As we look to the future, also, we're hopeful that all these facilities would eventually be dismantled. And under the agreement, all the facilities in the gas-graphite fuel cycle in the DPRK would be dismantled. That is to say, the fuel fabrication facility, the 5-megawatt reactor, the 50-megawatt reactor, the 200-megawatt reactor, and the radiochemistry lab, will all eventually be dismantled and key components destroyed so they cannot be used again.

With respect to the spent fuel, our immediate objective was that it not be reprocessed. Over the longer term, since it does contain 25 or 30 kilograms of plutonium, our objective was to have that fuel shipped out of the country. And under the agreement, the fuel will be shipped out of the country.

In terms of the past, our objective was to have the DPRK's past nuclear activities with respect to its initial inventory--how much plutonium it had actually separated and was--in other words, answer the question, Was the declaration of the DPRK to the IAEA an accurate one--that they had only separated gram quantities of plutonium? You will recall this is the issue that was raised by the IAEA, brought to the board of governors, and ultimately, because the DPRK would not accept the special inspections required by the agency, this was the issue that was reported to the Security Council, the question of the special inspections and the DPRK's unwillingness to accept those inspections.

Under the provisions of the agreement, the DPRK accepts the requirements of the IAEA for full-scope safeguards. It agrees to accept those measures that may be necessary to resolve questions about its initial inventory. The execution of those steps, the implementation of those steps, as you know, are put off somewhat into the settlement process.

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Now let me say something about the settlement process.

While I have described objectives that we have had that have been met, under the provisions of the agreement, the agreement also provides that the objectives of the DPRK be met, with respect to alternative energy that will be provided to the DPRK during that period when their reactors, the reactors they now have under construction, would have been completed but are not completed, and the time in which the light-water reactors that are envisioned under the agreement are actually provided. So there is a first instance--the agreement provides for the provision of heavy oil in a gradually increasing way to be provided to the DPRK in an amount to compensate for the total electrical megawattage that would have been provided by the graphite reactors that the DPRK is giving up. So since the DPRK is giving up 255 megawatts of electric generating capacity, the DPRK will be provided with an equivalent quantity of oil per year to compensate for that. That full amount will not be provided in the first year or the second year, but by the third year that full amount will be provided.

With respect to the light-water reactor project, the DPRK, in agreeing to completely abandon its gas-graphite reactors and abandon the prospect of building such reactors in the future, will receive, under the terms of the agreement, a light-water reactor project rated at 2,000 megawatts, or two 1,000-megawatt electric light-water reactors. These reactors will be provided over a period of years. The normal delivery period for reactors of that size is in the eight to ten year time-frame. There is a target date that's in the framework document.

In the course of delivering those reactors, at a point when there has been some substantial investment in the light-water reactor project, the DPRK commits, under the terms of the agreement, to undertake the special inspections, if necessary. But to undertake whatever activity the IAEA requires to resolve the anomaly and come into full compliance with the safeguards obligations. Now, that point, which I said would be after a substantial investment had been made in the light-water reactor project, however, comes before--and I want to emphasize this--any nuclear equipment or technology is delivered to the DPRK for the light-water reactor project. Before any equipment for the nuclear steam supply system, before any items that are controlled under the nuclear suppliers guidelines trigger list is delivered to the DPRK, the DPRK must be in full compliance with its safeguards obligations. After that point, the project can proceed. The spent fuel in the pond, the shipment of that spent fuel, is also paced to the delivery schedule for the light-water reactor project. So that, as key nuclear components are delivered for the first reactor, the fuel in the pond will begin to be shipped. So that by the time the first reactor is completed, all the fuel will have to have been shipped out of the DPRK.

With respect to the dismantlement and the destruction of the key components, so that we go beyond freeze to actually dismantlement

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of this program, that'll begin with the completion of the first reactor and with the completion of the second reactor.

I want to say one or two more words about the agreement and assessing it. While the agreement has not, until this evening, been available for comment, it has nevertheless provoked a great deal of comment. It is true that we have been discussing it for the last few days, as President Clinton reviewed it and directed me to return here to Geneva for purposes of signature. But I have observed that, while we have tried very hard to describe the agreement in terms of what it provides, on the one hand, in terms of our objectives, nonproliferation objectives, and what it provides, on the other hand in terms of the DPRK's objectives in the energy area, those who have taken the opportunity to criticize the document before it has actually emerged had tended to emphasize what the DPRK receives. I have no difficulty in that description being presented fairly; for the public's and the international community, it must be. The projects that--the light-water reactor project is a very large one. It's a very costly one. The Republic of Korea will bear the lion's share of that burden, the light-water reactor project for the alternative energy we expect not only Japan and other countries to come together to provide the heavy oil, or the cost of the heavy oil, for the DPRK. But we recognize together that this is a substantial undertaking on the part of the international community, which is addressed at meeting DPRK energy needs that follow from, not from its compliance with its safeguards obligations per se, or only that, but also because it has gone well beyond that to forsake, give up, an entire nuclear technology that is much more damaging and risky from a proliferation perspective.

I have no difficulty, in other words, in having the benefits that fall to the DPRK displayed for assessment and evaluation. I do, however, have difficulty when that happens without any reference to the objectives that we have sought and we have achieved, and that begin to flow to the international community in terms of reducing risk and threat to the ROK, to Japan, to the United States, to the rest of the world, immediately--in other words, as soon as a freeze begins on those facilities in the DPRK. So I ask for balance--that if you are telling the story, I ask only that you tell the whole story.

At this point, I think I would stop and ask Sherry to help me recognize people for questions.

Question: A question regarding Article 2, a letter of assurance from the president. Minister Kang said at the briefing that he gave today that it was an official letter from the head of state to another head of state, which means that it was an official letter from President Clinton to Supreme Leader Kim Jong Il. Do you agree with his interpretation that it's an official letter, and if so, is this the first time that the U.S. president sent an official letter to North Korea? And would it, sort of, lead to recognition--not exactly recognition, but a kind of a recognition from the U.S. of

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North Korea? I mean, one step forward in terms of a diplomatic relationship.

Ambassador at Large Gallucci: I'm not too current on my steps in diplomatic relations. Certainly, I don't know how one could characterize a letter signed by the president of the United States to Mr. Kim Jong Il other than as an official letter. It wasn't informal; it was an official letter. On the other hand, I don't know that I want to say anything other than that it was an official letter. As you know, the agreement envisions the establishment of liaison offices in Washington and Pyongyang, and indeed goes further and talks about the prospect of improved relations between the United States and the DPRK, and ultimately, as other concerns are addressed, the possibility or the prospect of going to full diplomatic relations at the ambassadorial level. So all this is laid out as something that we would both like to see happen. But there is a long road ahead of us. Providing that letter is one step along the road; the DPRK steps which should begin immediately will be additional steps along the road.

Q: According to Minister Kang, they needed assurance from the U.S. so that the U.S. would keep its commitment in terms of compliance. Now, it's quite obvious who has a better record of keeping commitments, the U.S. or the DPRK. Do you not seek the same kind of assurance from the DPRK in the form of a letter?

Ambassador at large Gallucci: I think that was a compliment; on behalf of the United States I'll accept it! What I believe is true is that the letter is contingent--the assurances are contingent upon the DPRK continuing to act consistent with the framework document. The framework document is signed by Mr. Kang, vice foreign minister Kang, and myself, and the letter of his assurances, is, as I said, contingent on document signed by a representative of Kim Jong Il's government. So I don't believe that we need a response of some kind to indicate that they really meant the document. The document is there and speaks for itself, and the letter references that document. I think that, in diplomatic terms, does quite well.

Q: Mr. Gallucci, I wonder if you could respond more specifically to the main criticisms of the accord--namely, that, one, it allows the North Koreans up to five years of some secrecy to escape the regime of inspections. And secondly, that it sets a dangerous precedent in allowing those countries suspect of pursuing nuclear weapons programs to buy their way out of this, or bargain their way out.

Ambassador at large Gallucci: If I could stop you right there. I don't know if you were going to ask more, but I have difficulty in going beyond two points. And so let me hope that I can keep both of these in my mind.

The first question, which is essentially, How come it's going to take so long for them to conduct their inspections under the agreement? The best way to answer that is to say that we have--

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part of the answer is that we had (I hope it's clear from that complex document) a number of objectives. I mean, we had a list of things we wished to accomplish, particularly narrowly in the nonproliferation area. And then some political objectives as well. We believe that all those objectives were accomplished. Not all of them were accomplished exactly the way we would have liked them to be accomplished. And I would be the first to say that if the DPRK decided tomorrow to resolve that anomaly with the IAEA, I would be very, very pleased. I don't expect it, but I would be pleased. And when we went about negotiating an agreement, since we had quite a list of objectives that were discrete, even in just about the nonproliferation area, we naturally did what I hope you would want us to do. We prioritized them. Some of them were quite time-urgent; some of them got at real strategic nuclear capability. For example, the fuel in the pond--we didn't want to see any movement of that fuel out of the pond. That reprocessing facility is a critical facility in a nuclear weapons program. We wanted that to be dormant. The reactor, the 5-megawatt reactor, we didn't want to see that start up again. I would, if I were labeling objectives in terms of nonproliferation, real nuclear capability could be translated into nuclear weapons capability--that was key. That's where a large amount of plutonium was contained. That's where it could be separated. That's where more could be produced.

Beyond that, we were very concerned about these large reactors. Now, I gave you some figures, I said 50 megawatts and 200 megawatts. Let me just translate that into plutonium. A 50-megawatt reactor would probably produce something on the order of 60 kilograms of plutonium a year. Sixty kilograms of plutonium a year! The 200-megawatt reactor, depending on how it was run or a lot of other assumptions, would be producing something over 100 kilograms of plutonium a year. Put them together, and one is clearly well within the range of 150 or so kilograms of plutonium produced each year, when a single nuclear device, depending on how skilled one is, probably takes only five or six kilograms or so to produce. So freezing that program in place was an extraordinarily important objective for us. It was a time-urgent objective. It's achieved, in a time-urgent way, under the provisions of the agreement.

The special inspections, which is the way most of you shorthand the question of the DPRK coming into full compliance with the IAEA full-scope safeguards agreement, and getting at the question of how much plutonium the DPRK separated in the past, was also important. It was important in real terms, because we're talking about what we estimate could be as much as six, eight, nine kilograms of plutonium, and therefore enough for one, possibly two, nuclear weapons. That's important, too. And certainly the political importance of the inspections, and the resolution of the anomalies is important because the credibility of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the credibility of the nonproliferation treaty, the credibility of, if you will, the Security Council and its grappling with this issue, of all at stake. So we could not walk away with an agreement that just dealt with the present and the future, and

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said, we took care of the strategic portions of the program. We would not have a settlement--I said all along, and so did everybody else representing the U.S. government--that did not resolve the question of the past. And, indeed, we reached a settlement that did. But in terms of priority, in terms of what mattered--and I don't mean this so much politically, because clearly it matters politically, but in technical terms we could afford to put off implementation into the settlement process, because that question is not time-urgent. We are talking about inspection of two radioactive waste sites. Those waste sites, as I have said over and over again, aren't going anywhere. They'll be there to be inspected. The radio isotopes that we're going to be looking at have half-lives in the ten's and twenty-thousand's of years. We have time, if it's up to five years or so, to look at those sites.

I recognize that, politically, this would have been a much more popular agreement if we had gone at special inspections. But, ladies and gentlemen, if we had gone at that issue, and focused on that issue--and I was standing in front of you saying, And by God! we're going to find out whether they actually have 60 grams or six kilograms, and we're going to nail that sucker to the wall! And then I also told you, but unfortunately they're going to be producing 100 or 200 kilograms of plutonium under safeguards, I certainly hope you wouldn't be thanking me.

I would ask you to evaluate this agreement in terms of what it does for security. Not simply the political test. The political test, I think, we don't do badly on; we don't do as well as we would have liked. That is to say, we are supporting the IAEA. We are supporting the NPT. We are supporting the Security Council, because they get--under this agreement they are providing an immediate commitment to accept what's required for full-scope safeguards. And they eventually accept the inspections that are required. In the meantime, there is time that is lost, but I would argue to you it is not of political-military significance.

Your second question?

Q: The second part of my question was, wasn't there a dangerous precedent being established for those countries--?

Ambassador at large Gallucci: The question of precedent. I suppose, if there is another case out there where a country is violating a safeguards agreement, and has a gas-graphite system in place; it's already produced some 30 kilograms of plutonium, and promises to produce hundreds more kilograms of plutonium a year; that has a neighbor with whom it has been in a state of tension, in a situation in which probably a million troops are deployed; in which one of the neighbors, or two, are prepared to compensate for the foreswearing of the gas-graphite technology in order that a light-water reactor project can be introduced, and those neighbors are willing to provide the financial basis for that--this would be a dangerous precedent for that other case. But there isn't any

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case like that--none that I'm aware of. What I'm saying to you, in a perhaps too longwinded way, is that the concept of precedent is tricky in this case. I don't think there are any other cases like this. If I were drawing a conclusion from this, I would draw the conclusion that neither the United States nor other members of the Security Council will walk away from a serious safeguards violation. They will deal with that violation. How they deal with it, I think, we all ought to recognize, is going to depend upon the circumstances. It's going to depend upon a lot of elements that define this current situation and would define a situation, whether in the Middle East or somewhere else in the world.

So I don't think precedent per se, as you look at this particular case, is easy to apply. The example I take from it again is that we consider threats to other nations that come about from programs that have the prospect of producing nuclear weapons will be dealt with by the international community, that neighbors that become upset are willing to, if necessary, go to sanctions, and we certainly were willing to if we couldn't have negotiated a settlement. But, you know, in this case I guess I'd ask you to recognize that we only had a few choices. One choice was to walk away from the situation. Another choice we had was to go to sanctions, risk hostilities, and perhaps even go to war with surgical strikes--to physically intervene and stop the program, to the extent we'd be able to, by that method. And the third was to try to negotiate a settlement. Now, we wouldn't do the first. We would not walk away from it. We were prepared, and clearly prepared--we were on the road to do the second, on sanctions, which we knew had the risk of hostility. But I think we did what I would like to think the international community would want us to do first, and that is see if we could negotiate a settlement that achieved our objectives. That's what we think we did.

Q: Ambassador Gallucci, the access refusal was, after all, one of the main causes of the crisis to begin with, right? So I understand that negotiations, certainly this type of negotiation, are a matter of give and take, and very difficult. But the fact of the matter remains that we still won't know until the end of the century whether or not North Korea had any nuclear weapons. And then, second question, we were also told a couple of weeks ago that the pond was so murky that everything could fall apart or blow apart in a matter of weeks. Now it seems to be that the water has been cleared up but now it is safe for a couple of years, or what?

Ambassador at large Gallucci: I don't know whether the DPRK--whether their declaration of some grams of plutonium separated is simply slightly in error or grossly misstated for the purpose of diversion of plutonium so that they'd have enough material for a nuclear weapon. I don't know the answer to that. If the answer is going to emerge through the access, and the information's provided to the IAEA, under the terms of this agreement, it's going to emerge only--it is only required to emerge--at a point when the light-water reactor's under construction. Before any nuclear equipment is delivered but while it is under construction. The

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DPRK representatives told us in the course of these meetings they didn't trust the international community, the United States or others, to provide this project, and they wanted to get into the project in a substantial way before this question, which they recognized the international community would like addressed, is addressed. So, in the terms in which you put it, it is true that it is not required that the issue be resolved by then. I certainly would hope that, as we go through a process in which there are increasing contacts between the United States and the DPRK--and I would emphasize here, I certainly hope this promotes an atmosphere in which there are contacts between North and South and between the North and other countries--that the atmosphere will be such that the DPRK will be led to conclude it is in their interest to resolve this issue much, much sooner. But you are quite correct: It will take, if the light-water reactor project goes according to course--based on past experience--and they waited until the last point, or the latest time in the natural course of construction, it will be some four or five years or so before they must address that issue. And I only ask that you look at that issue in the context of the agreement, and assess it against the other things that are achieved for the price, if you will, that is paid.

With respect to the spent fuel, there has been no change recognized in this document on the status of the spent fuel. I would say there had been a change some time ago. If you recall when we first started our addressing this matter, when the DPRK discharged the fuel into the pond, the DPRK let it be known that this was a matter of great urgency, and indeed, in the technical sense, we certainly noted that any time this type of fuel, fuel with this type of cladding, is put into water, is exposed to water, there is a time factor before difficulties arise of a varying nature. And we expressed some concern about that, principally because we did not wish the fuel to get to a state where the DPRK would claim that they were technically required to reprocess it.

So we expressed a concern, an urgency about dealing with that. Our own sense of urgency dissipated substantially when the DPRK said that they were prepared to deal with this, and they would not reprocess it if we reached an agreement. And so our level of concern lowered substantially to one that had more to do with safety than it did with proliferation. But as a safety problem, it is a DPRK problem, not a USA problem. Now, under the terms of the agreement, you will note that the DPRK agrees that it will consult with the United States and that we will, in fact, look for a method with the DPRK to safely store the fuel, so that it will be available for shipment at some point in the future, as I described in the course of the light-water reactor project.

The exact condition of the fuel in the water, and whether it is now a radiological hazard, whether it is ten minutes or ten months away from being one, is something that I cannot address, but I hope, in one of those working groups that I referred to before, that we will be able to address that.

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Q: Mr. Gallucci, earlier you referred to when the first light-water reactor would be completed, and then the second. None of these things are in this document. There is no reference to the first or the second. For example, you mentioned the spent fuel would all have to be out of North Korea by the time the first one was completed. This, obviously, is some other document, or you've agreed privately. Can you tell us about all the documents we're not seeing, including this famous confidential minute?

Ambassador at large Gallucci: There is a confidential minute that is part of our settlement, attached to the framework document. It is also signed, and it is confidential. The arrangement we have with the DPRK is that we will respect the confidentiality of that document. It is not unusual for agreements between states that are public to have confidential annexes of one kind or another. In this case, there is greater specificity on a number of points that are referenced in the framework--greater specificity is contained in the confidential minute. We are, as I said, going to respect the confidentiality of that minute. When there is an agreement between two sides and one side requests that certain provisions remain confidential, we are prepared, under the circumstances that we have here, to respect that. Certainly, our Congress in the United States will be fully briefed on the contents of the minute. I have an understanding with Vice Foreign Minister Kang that, in responding to questions and speaking about the framework document, I will, while not quoting or describing what is in the minute, I will answer consistent with the minute. So I will not be misleading anybody in what I say in terms of what is contained in the minute. But I will make every effort, our government will make every effort, to keep it confidential.

Q: Mr. Ambassador, I want to ask you about last Saturday night. We'd been hearing--you remember last Saturday night?--we'd been hearing predictions for several days before then that an accord was imminent, and then the North Koreans came out, I think it was midnight or so, and said that the United States had adopted unacceptable and abnormal positions. How close were you to a breakdown?

Ambassador at large Gallucci: Let me take a drink of water first on that one!

Q: Is it light water?!

Ambassador at large Gallucci: I was hoping it was vodka, actually. But it's water. We had a number of up's and down's in the course of this session. Certainly we've had live up's and down's in the course of the discussions over the last 16 months or so. But during this session we had some up's and down's. I don't vividly remember last Saturday night, but I do somewhat remember difficulties. And there were some--as we got toward the end, there were some outstanding issues that were--you'd probably be able to guess at, but I will not describe to you, that were more difficult than others. And as is almost inevitable, we got down to even one

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that was more difficult than others. All were ultimately resolved, and it is not in the interests of, I think, any of us involved in this process now to pick apart the negotiation process and ask which ones were the most difficult and which ones held you up the longest. So I am not going to do that.

Q: Sir, I am from a newspaper in Seoul. I have two questions. First, how to you characterize your counterpart, Mr. Kang's, personality? And the second, now you are a person in Korean history, what would you like to say to Koreans?

Ambassador at large Gallucci: The first question is how would I characterize Mr. Kang's personality. I know that's not a trick question. I, over a period of time, and I have met with him now many, many hours, I am impressed with his commitment to his country's interests. I am impressed with his intelligence. Some of these issues are quite complicated, and their relations, one issue to another, makes it even more complicated. Throughout, I think--I know I kept coming out of meetings saying it was serious and businesslike. I did that not only because I wasn't going to tell you anything else, but also because that was the tone that was set. Our meetings were remarkably free of polemics, and I give him credit for that as well. I think he well represented his country. I think that one of the reasons we were able to reach a successful conclusion was because of the way he did represent his country.

With respect to a message to Korean people, I take that broadly, meaning North Korean and South Korean people. This effort that we've been engaged in is for us, I think--one way of putting it--is an effort to make a virtue of necessity. We needed very much to resolve the nuclear issue before we could do anything else with the DPRK to improve relations. The nuclear issue had become, not the only, certainly, but a very large issue obstructing the DPRK's relations with the ROK, and I suspect also with Japan.

By reaching agreement, I think we have contributed at this point to the creation of an atmosphere--that's the way I'd like to put it--a setting, in which much more becomes possible. I don't know whether much more is actually going to follow.

I can't foresee the long road ahead of us, and whether we are going to travel it smoothly, or whether there are going to be obstructions. But there's an opportunity here for the people of Korea, for North and South, and I hope, I very much hope, they both seize it.

Q: Mr. Ambassador, what countries will you invite for the KEDO consultations, and when will they start, and where?

Ambassador at large Gallucci: We will invite the Republic of Korea, Japan, Russia, China, and other countries of Asia and Western Europe. I am not being more specific because I am not sure that I have an exact list in my mind at the moment. But I expect there will be nine or ten countries or so. I believe we should meet as

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soon as possible. I am not exactly sure when as soon as possible is. We have, in the United States, some homework to do, since we plan on hosting it, and we want that first meeting to be a successful one. We have a lot on our agenda, and the formation of what we are calling KEDO--the Korean Energy Development Organization--is going to be a very complex undertaking, politically, legally, financially, diplomatically. And so we don't want to ask countries to come for such a meeting until we are ready. But I would hope that we would be able to have such a meeting, I would expect we would be able to have such a meeting within a month's time.

Q: Will the G-7 be involved with money?

Ambassador at large Gallucci: I am not going to go into individual countries, right now. I probably will not have reluctance to do so in another week or two, when we start settling on an invitation list. There's nothing particularly secret about it; I just don't want to mistake anything.

Q: Mr. Gallucci, coming back to the minute, the confidential minute and the understanding you have with Mr. Kang. Earlier in his briefing when asked on that, he elaborated that the confidential minute contained not only technical but political parts, crucial to the framework agreement. Could you elaborate a bit--if the political element is linked to the improvement in the dialogue between the North and South? And the final element of my question is, the decommissioning of the existing North Korean program, who will foot the bill?

Ambassador at large Gallucci: I would say there are political elements. I mean, this is a political document, and it's very hard to say that something is technical and doesn't have political content, if in fact it was schedule or a specificity. I think that's a very difficult division to make. I said it was--I wanted to say that it was largely technical in the sense that it gave more precision to things that are provided for in the framework document itself. But I don't recall anything that specifically goes to, if you will, the point on inter-Korean dialogue.

The question about who will pay for dismantlement: There are a number of costs associated with the implementation of this framework document. Everybody is aware of the light-water reactor project, that's one. Everybody, I think, now should be aware of the concept of alternative or interim energy, the heavy oil that will be delivered during the period beginning in about three months till the first light-water reactor comes on line. In addition, there'll be costs associated with the shipment of that spent fuel. There may be costs associated with the preparation of that spent fuel for safe storage. There may be costs associated with the disposition of the spent fuel after it is shipped. There will be costs associated with dismantlement.

I would tell you at this point, we have, in our discussions with

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the DPRK, talked about the expectation, certainly, that the document does envision--the costs associated with the light-water reactor project, with alternative energy, and with spent fuel disposition, to be borne by, I will say, broadly, the international community. And leave it at that. I am not excluding the possibility of additional assistance with respect to dismantlement, but the document does not provide for that. That's something that DPRK is, under the terms of the agreement, to take on. So I am not trying to finally dispose of that issue; I am saying there is no provision for that in the document.

Q: Will this KEDO international consortium get involved in the dismantling process? I think that the dismantling in itself may need a lot of technology assistance, and cost matters are involved. So how will the international consortium get in?

Ambassador Gallucci: I was trying just now to hold out the possibility, even though the document doesn't provide for it, of assistance if necessary to achieve some objectives by the international community and -- certainly dismantlement, and in the case of an operating facility that has operated like the 5-megawatt reactor, decommissioning and dismantlement -- the possibility of assistance is there.

As you know, it will be a much different enterprise to dismantle a facility in fact, been an active facility, had radioactive material contained in it, and been operating. A portion of the radiochemistry lab fits that description and so also does the 5-megawatt reactor. Dismantlement of facilities that have never, as they say, gone hot, gone on line, such a 50 or 200 megawatt reactor should be simpler but not necessarily easy.

Q. Can you share the content of President Clinton's letter? How did President Clinton call the so-called "Dear Leader."

Ambassador Gallucci: As in "Dear John?" President Clinton's letter is addressed as the DPRK asked that it should be addressed. They gave us the proper address and the letter is so addressed, and that's all I'll say about that. The letter will be made public. There is nothing secret about the letter. I can not make it available to you this evening, but I assume it will be made public out of Washington, and I suspect out of Pyongyang and Seoul. Certainly it will be made public out of Washington.

Q. How much safer is the world since you signed this agreement?

Ambassador Gallucci: I can tell you that I had two -- I'm going to talk about this in a personal sense. I don't know what the official answer to that question is. I assume the official answer is: "Of course." I will tell you personally I, as a negotiator engaged in this activity for almost a year and a half, had a number of very specific concerns. I was quite aware that we, the United States, were in no position to walk away from this issue, that we were going to have to deal with it in the ways I described to you.

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Walking away was not an option. If we could not reach a negotiated settlement, I was fairly certain we would go to sanctions. My own personal view is that we would have succeeded in a sanctions resolution and that that course held certain risks. It would have been a course we were prepared to pursue. the risks associated with it, of armed conflict.

I know that many of you are aware of what the forces are around the DMZ. It is a very dangerous situation. There are hundreds of thousands of troops on both sides of the DMZ. There are enormous numbers of artillery pieces in the North that can range as far south as Seoul. This is a very dangerous situation into which - put oneself, it's a difficult situation and an incident can escalate into hostilities.

I was concerned, as I know a lot of people were, that if we could not negotiate, or would not walk away from one, then eventually out of this could come armed hostilities. It would lead to a large number of casualties. That was one risk looking down the road.

Another, of course, was concern that the DPRK would proceed with a nuclear weapons program. Yes, there was certainly concern about whether one and possibly two nuclear weapons-worth of material in North Korea, whether they had indeed produced possibly a weapon. We plan certainly under the framework agreement to get at that issue.

But the image of a North Korea that was becoming increasingly isolated politically, producing hundreds of kilograms of plutonium, having a ballistic missile program of some concern, and having an armed force deployed as it was not an image that we could feel relaxed about. It was an image we needed to be very concerned about. What I think we've done with this framework document is pose the prospect of a solution, but it is the prospect of a solution. It defines the road ahead. It has the potential of greatly reducing the risk of war, of nuclear weapons proliferation in Northeast Asia, of a threat to the whole international community and the non-proliferation regime with it, so it does have the potential to do what you say. We will have to assess it. We will have to see what happens in the coming days, months, years.

Q: This consortium is to be organized under the leadership of the United States. Does it mean that the United States will have the final decision in who will build the LWRs and who will provide the heavy oil and the amount of these deliveries?

Ambassador Gallucci: Exactly how KEDOs decision-making process will be structures is something I can't answer since the only thing that exists is "KEDO," and Kedo is a name, tentative and subject to the consortium meeting and deciding what they wish to call themselves. So I can't speak to a decision-making mechanism, to an organization that hasn't been formed yet.

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However, you do ask the question about what reactors, and that question has been around for some time. There have been thoughts that there would be perhaps European reactors, Russian reactors built, American reactors built. We have taken the position that the United States in pursuing this negotiation that we didn't have a commercial interest in this. We had a non-proliferation interest, a security interest. While we saw great benefit to a project in which the ROK - its experts and its specialists were involved in a project with the North, -- this could be synergistic -- that's not the way we approached it. At one point during this summer I took a trip around the world - in fact, literally -- to consult with a number of countries to see what sort of viable package could be put together. We kept saying over and over again, it had to be technically viable, it had to be politically viable, and it had to be financially viable. There was only one project that we could come up with that made sense of that criteria, and that was one which the ROK played a central role, not only in finances but also in construction. What we envision is not the result of an arbitrary decision by the United States of America, but as the result of a great deal of consultation. That included with the governments of South Korea, Japan, China and Russia, among others.

The conclusion is that the reactors which will be built will be of the kind that are currently under construction in South Korea.

Q. When it comes to Western Europe, Germany is usually one of the countries which contribute, mostly financially, so is there anything in your mind concerning Germany, whether they should pay or provide technical assistance?

Ambassador Gallucci: Well, absolutely, it's in my mind. Whether it's in German minds is another matter. That has yet to be determined.

Q. Can you tell us something about the exchange of presents between you and Mr. Kang?

Ambassador Gallucci: I have on more than one occasion given Mr. Kang a book, and this was one such occasion. He has on more than one occasion given me tea and special after dinner drinks - special to the DPRK. I cherish those gifts, and I'm sure he cherishes mine.

Q. The rough figure for the LWR is four billion dollars. How about the cost to the international community of alternative energy and the costs associated with shipment of the spent fuel. Have you got any overall figure in mind?

Ambassador Gallucci: I think I'm going to hold a reserve on that. It is in the tens of millions of dollars, less than 100 million dollars a year, more than 10 million dollars, and I just think it's unwise for me to try to sort that out exactly.

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You could probably do it if you had access to the oil spot market and could figure out how much of your oil equals 255 megawatts electric. That whole price tag will not be due each year right away. It sort of slides up or escalates, beginning with some heavy oil within the first three months of commitment, and we get into the full compensation for 255 megawatts -- I believe -- after the second year.

Q. A question on the confidential minute again. Is this purely because the North Koreans asked for it, or are there provisions in that minute which your delegation wanted?

Ambassador Gallucci: We agreed with the DPRK that the confidential minute would remain confidential.

Q. You suggested earlier that you were keeping it confidential because the North Koreans had asked you to keep it confidential, that they had asked it to be a confidential memo to begin with.

Ambassador Gallucci: I'm not going to distribute burden. I'm going to say that both agreed to keep the confidential minute confidential.

Q. What type of circumstances are required for the relationships between the two countries reach a certain level, and how long will this take. My second question is do you think the change of leadership in the DPRK made any contribution to this round of talks for this agreement?

Ambassador Gallucci: The first question about the diplomatic relations between the U.S. and the DPRK. The framework document indicates that liaison offices will be opened as soon as outstanding issues will be resolved, such as consular issues and access, etc. So there's no time frame for the liaison office. We will begin to work with the DPRK in a working group very soon, just as we will try to establish the other working groups envisioned in the document. But there is no set time frame, either for the liaison offices for movement to full diplomatic relations at the ambassadorial level.

The second question. I couldn't discern any other impact than of course the period in which we were not able to meet because of the initial mourning period. Apart from that, from the talks themselves, I could not discern any impact.

Q. Can you confirm that the first oil shipment will be of the order of 50,000 tons, and the second question is, in the secret document, has North Korea agreed to a revised declaration to the IAEA of how much plutonium it has?

Ambassador Gallucci: I think the answer to the first question may well be "yes." In fact I can't confirm that. I just can't tell you off the top of my head.

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The second question. I'm going to answer that not in terms of what's in the document but to tell you that the agreement or the framework document the understandings that follow from it include a commitment from the DPRK to come into full compliance with the safeguards obligations, to do whatever the IAEA may deem necessary to resolve the safeguards anomaly.

Now I fully expect the DPRK to provide information and attempt, when it chooses, and it may wait until the last minute under the framework document or it may decide to act much sooner -- but to attempt to convince the IAEA through consultations that the anomaly can be explained without resort to additional inspections.

In the end, however, the DPRK takes to do the necessary, as defined by the IAEA, to resolve the anomaly. If that includes special inspections, then that includes special inspections. Thank you.

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009a. memo	information, Daniel Poneman to Anthony Lake re Principals' Meeting (3 pages)	10/18/1994	P1/b(1)

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009b. agenda	re NSC Principals Meeting (1 page)	10/18/1994	P1/b(1)

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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
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b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
009c. paper	re North Korea checklist (1 page)	10/18/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 711

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea - Framework [7]

2009-0528-F
kc1596

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
009d. cable	re Agreed Framework (8 pages)	10/18/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 711

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea - Framework [7]

2009-0528-F
kc1596

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
009e. draft	letter, POTUS to DPRK (1 page)	00/00/0000	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 711

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea - Framework [7]

2009-0528-F
kc1596

RESTRICTION CODES

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
009f. draft	letter, POTUS to DPRK (1 page)	00/00/0000	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 711

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea - Framework [7]

2009-0528-F
kc1596

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
009g. draft	letter, POTUS to DPRK (1 page)	00/00/0000	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 711

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea - Framework [7]

2009-0528-F
kc1596

RESTRICTION CODES

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
009h. cable	re Assurance Letters (5 pages)	10/14/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 711

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea - Framework [7]

2009-0528-F
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RESTRICTION CODES

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
009i. memo	John Deutch to Warren Christopher and Tony Lake re Agreement (4 pages)	10/17/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 711

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea - Framework [7]

2009-0528-F
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