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Folder Title:

North Korea Framework [3]

Staff Office-Individual:

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. draft	paper re framework agreement pages (3 pages)	10/10/1994	P1/b(1)
002. draft	paper re agreed minute (4 pages)	10/00/1994	P1/b(1)
003. draft	letter, Gallucci to Kang (1 page)	10/00/1994	P1/b(1)
004. draft	letter, DPRK Kim to POTUS (1 page)	10/00/1994	P1/b(1)
005. draft	letter, ROK Kim to POTUS (1 page)	10/00/1994	P1/b(1)
006. draft	letter, POTUS to DPRK Kim (1 page)	10/00/1994	P1/b(1)
007. draft	letter, DPRK Kim to POTUS (1 page)	10/00/1994	P1/b(1)
008. draft	letter, Gallucci to Kang [duplicate of 003] (1 page)	10/00/1994	P1/b(1)
009. draft	statement (1 page)	10/00/1994	P1/b(1)
010. cable	re consortium (7 pages)	09/09/1994	P1/b(1)
011. paper	re agreement (4 pages)	09/13/1994	P1/b(1)
012. letter	POTUS to President Kim (ROK) (2 pages)	09/19/1994	P1/b(1)
013. cable	re Japanese support (5 pages)	09/12/1984	P1/b(1)

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Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
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FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea - Framework [3]

2009-0528-F

kc1590

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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014. cable	re letter of assurance (2 pages)	09/19/1994	P1/b(1)
015. cable	re Letter of Assurances (4 pages)	09/22/1994	P1/b(1)
016. cable	re Pass to Tarnoff (5 pages)	09/12/1994	P1/b(1)
017. cable	re request for directions (3 pages)	09/12/1994	P1/b(1)
018. cable	re Berlin expert testifies (2 pages)	09/13/1995	P1/b(1)
019. cable	re dialogue (2 pages)	09/13/1995	P1/b(1)
020. cable	re Heavy Fuel Oil (2 pages)	09/14/1994	P1/b(1)
021. cable	re Berlin Expert talks (3 pages)	09/14/1994	P1/b(1)
022. cable	re Kim (3 pages)	09/14/1994	P1/b(1)
023. cable	re US-DPRK-Berlin (2 pages)	09/14/1994	P1/b(1)
024. talking points	re Structural diagram (4 pages)	10/00/1994	P1/b(1)
025. paper	re alternative models (8 pages)	10/00/1994	P1/b(1)
026. talking points	re spent fuel (3 pages)	10/10/1994	P1/b(1)

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027. cable	re Liaison Office Announcement (4 pages)	09/13/1994	P1/b(1)
028. cable	re DPRK Dep Foreign Minister (3 pages)	09/13/1994	P1/b(1)
029. cable	re Liaison Meetings (6 pages)	09/13/1994	P1/b(1)
030. draft	paper, re Liaison Office in DPRK (6 pages)	09/00/1994	P1/b(1)
031. draft	report, re agreement implementation (9 pages)	09/08/1995	P1/b(1)
032a. letter	POTUS Carter to POTUS (2 pages)	09/16/1994	P1/b(1)
032b. letter	President Kim (ROK) to POTUS Carter (2 pages)	09/19/1994	P1/b(1)

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PRESS STATEMENT
August 12, 1994
Geneva

o We have had a productive week of talks. Our "Agreed Statement" captures elements which we agree will form part of the final settlement of the nuclear issue.

o The DPRK reaffirmed their interest in converting to Light Water Reactor technology, based on U.S. willingness to assist in that conversion by providing assurances for the financing and construction of an LWR project.

o Upon the receipt of our assurances about provision of an LWR project and interim energy arrangements, the DPRK agrees:

- o to forego reprocessing of all spent fuel;
- o to seal and allow IAEA monitoring of the radiochemical laboratory;
- o to cease construction of its 50MW graphite reactor;
- o to cease construction of its 200MW graphite reactor;

o In the context of the overall settlement, the DPRK has also agreed to:

- o remain a full member of the NPT;
- o accept implementation of its IAEA safeguards agreement under the NPT;
- o implement the Declaration on Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

o As is made clear in the statement, the DPRK will continue the current freeze on its nuclear program and maintain the continuity of safeguards during the interim period until our next meeting. And I have made clear to the DPRK that provision of an LWR must be based on return to the NPT and compliance with fullscope safeguards, including accounting for all nuclear material in North Korea.

o We now must move ahead with the hard work of putting those elements in place. For our part, that includes detailed consultations with our friends and allies on the light water reactor project, on the assurances that we would be prepared to offer for the financing and construction of that project, and on other aspects of the settlement that we hope to reach.

o Vice Minister Kang and I agreed that it will be useful to hold expert-level discussions in capitals on some of the specific issues that we have agreed to work on. So I think that the period ahead will be an extremely busy one.

o Although our talks have been worthwhile, the lion's share of work lies ahead of us. These discussions have served to make clear exactly what each sides needs to do.

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CLEARED

ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROBERT GALLOCCI'S PRESS CONFERENCE AT 2:15 A.M. ON SATURDAY, AUGUST 12, AT THE U.S. MISSION IN GENEVA.

Assistant Secretary Gallucci: First of all, let me begin by apologizing for keeping some of you who got here earlier than others--we wanted to wait until everybody had a chance to make their way over here from the DPRK Mission.

Let me also apologize again, in the same way I did when I was at that mission, for not being as responsive as I normally would like to be to questions about how we were doing and what we were doing at any particular moment. Let me say again that, when involved in a negotiation, I never have found it very useful to share with everybody exactly the progress of the particular day, when there's another day to go. So I know we have not provided you with as much detail as you would have liked, and I apologize for that. I also apologize to anybody who's gotten run over by a car!

I would like to begin by reading a short statement which summarizes what I think we have accomplished. We have had a productive week of talks. Our agreed statement, which I hope you all have, captures elements which we agree will form part of the final statement and settlement of the nuclear issue. The DPRK, in this statement, reaffirmed their interest in converting to light-water reactor technologies, based on U.S. willingness to assist in that conversion by providing assurances for the financing and construction of a light-water reactor project.

Upon the receipt of our assurances about provision of a light-water reactor project, and interim energy arrangements, the DPRK agrees to the following elements:

- To forego reprocessing of all spent fuel;
- To seal and allow IAEA monitoring of the radio-chemistry laboratory;
- To cease construction of its 30-mw graphite reactor;
- To cease construction of its 200-mw reactor.

Then, in the context of the overall settlement, the DPRK, in this

agreement, has also agreed to take the following steps:

To remain a full member of the Nonproliferation Treaty;

To accept implementation of its IAEA safeguards agreement under the Nonproliferation Treaty;

To implement the declaration on de-nuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

As is made clear in the statement, the DPRK will continue the current freeze on its nuclear program and maintain the continuity of safeguards during the interim period until our next meeting. And we have made clear to the DPRK that provision of an LWR must be based on return to the Nonproliferation Treaty and compliance with full-scope safeguards, including accounting for all nuclear material in North Korea.

We now must move ahead with the hard work of putting those elements in place. For our part, that includes detailed consultations with our friends and allies on the light-water reactor project, on the assurances that we would be prepared to offer for the financing and construction of that project, and on other aspects of the settlement that we hope to reach. In addition to those consultations, those international consultations, we will be very active in consulting with our own U.S. Congress.

Vice Minister Kang and I agreed that it will be useful to hold expert-level discussions in capitals on some of the specific issues that we have agreed to work on. So I think that the period ahead will be an extremely busy one. Although our talks have been worthwhile, the lion's share of work lies ahead of us. These discussions have served to make clear exactly what each side needs to do.

Ladies and gentlemen, I would stand for some questions.

Question: Ambassador, could you tell us what kind of agreement you have reached in terms of the fuel rods in the pond? Have you agreed on any kind of measures to prolong the life of the rods?

Assistant Secretary Gallucci: If you look at the statement, you will see that there is a sentence on the bottom of the page, that begins the last paragraph, that says important issues raised during the talks remain to be resolved. The ultimate disposition of that spent fuel remains to be resolved. However, you will also note if you look at the statement that the DPRK is prepared to give up reprocessing, and in fact to give up its facility for reprocessing. That means that the outcome that we believe would have been the most dangerous to international security is being excluded by this agreement. On the other hand, our view, of course, is that the best disposition of that fuel is for it to be shipped out of the

DPRK. There is no agreement that the fuel will be shipped out of the DPRK. That means that, from the DPRK's perspective, that they favor storage in the DPRK.

Now, I think, as most of you know, this type of fuel does not store well for very long, as compared to light-water reactor fuel, once it becomes wet, and it has been in a pond for some weeks. We have offered, as one of the areas, to provide expert consultation; to provide that expert consultation in the stabilization of the pond, or in the methodology for extending the life of the fuel in the pond. That offer is outstanding. The DPRK may decide that it is capable of extending the life of the fuel without assistance, or it may elect to accept our offer. And at this moment I cannot tell you which, but the offer is outstanding.

Q: You used the term construction just a minute ago, about their being prepared to give up the reprocessing and the facility. But it doesn't say give up the facility; it says seal it. And I wondered if you could sort of clarify why you said give up. And then maybe you could also talk about the issue that brought you back to the negotiating table this evening, before your final visit with full delegation to the North Korean Mission. What was the last--what did your last-minute discussions concern? And then, finally, if you could clarify why North Korea has not accepted the offer, when it seemed to be promising earlier in the week that you would send experts to the pond?

Assistant Secretary Gallucci: With respect to the first question, about the reprocessing facility or what they call the radio-chemistry lab--in the context of this agreement, some steps are taken immediately upon their receipt of the assurances with respect to the light-water reactor project and with respect to arrangements for interim energy alternatives. And among those steps, are taken immediately, as you will note, is the sealing of the radio-chemistry laboratory and its monitoring in that status by the IAEA. Over the longer term, our expectation, based upon our consultations, is that the DPRK will forego or give up all facilities related to its graphite technology, and that ultimately those facilities will be dismantled. What is not decided and captured in this agreement is exactly the timing for dismantlement, but we understand that there is a connection between--and they understand--that there is a connection between the willingness of countries to participate in arrangements to provide the light-water reactor project and their willingness to ultimately dismantle all facilities associated with graphite technology. The significance of this agreement that we have here is that that first step, which is of critical importance in eliminating the possibility of additional plutonium separation in the DPRK, is taken, once we provide the assurances envisioned in the agreement.

With respect to the second question, which is, exactly what issues were outstanding between the DPRK and the United States that would

lead us to have a session this evening, prior to the session at which we joined together to reach--a formal session on this agreement--I would say. Jeff, that there were a number of areas in the agreement in which a language was not yet agreed after consultation with capitals. And I'm not prepared to describe to you which areas those were. However, if you do ask me again what the third question is, I'll try to answer that one.

Q: (inaudible)

Assistant Secretary Gallucci: I'm not certain. It may be because, as I indicated before, the decision about what is the disposition, over what time-frame, of that spent fuel, is not agreed. But I think it best address that to the representatives from the DPRK. They may well elect to accept that expert team, or they may believe they can do it themselves. We are not on the scene--we, the United States. The inspectors who are on the scene are not themselves expert in or equipped to do an assessment. So if the DPRK wishes our assistance, we are prepared to offer it, and that's really the best I can do.

Q: Is it safe enough to keep this fuel, spent fuel, in the pond? And second question, has the DPRK declined the prolongation measures provided or offered by the United States, and why is it so?

Assistant Secretary Gallucci: The question sounds very familiar. Again, let me say, I am not aware of exactly the conditions of the fuel in the pond. That is something the DPRK alone, right now, is capable of judging. That is to say, also, that, with respect to at what point there might be a safety hazard posed, that is a problem the DPRK will have to address with its experts. I say again that, as the agreement indicates, this is one area where we are prepared to provide experts. I have discussed that briefly this evening with Vice Foreign Minister Kang. He said he would get back to us about his country's interest in having those experts. And the calculations that'll go into that decisions, I am afraid, could be something only addressed by the DPRK.

Q: How many reactors are likely to make up the 2,000, I think, Megawatts, and is the figure being bandied around this town for being accurate, and how much will the U.S. fund of this, or will a lot of it come from financial institutions or capitals in the neighborhood of North Korea?

Assistant Secretary Gallucci: It is highly likely that the answer to the first question is, two. And with respect to the question about whether four billion is a good number or not, it is probably in the correct neighborhood. But you will appreciate that there is a lot of work to be done to sort out the cost of this project and to figure out how, in fact, it will be structured, or the architecture of the deal. And I mean by that, not only the

financing but also the construction itself. And, once we figure all that out, we'll have a better fix on the overall cost. I say again, with respect to the U.S. burden in this connection, in the first instance we are interested in putting together a consortium of countries with an interest in dealing with this issue, and we have, of course, already done some substantial consultations in Seoul, in Tokyo, in Beijing, and Moscow. We've talked to other countries, and we will be attempting to pursue those consultations during this period before we meet again in September, so that we can better answer questions about how the burden will be shared and just how large that burden is.

Q: Mr. Gallucci, is there anything in this agreement which will give the IAEA access to the buildings in North Korea which has been denied it before, and which I gather the DPRK was arguing were not covered by the NPT?

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* Assistant Secretary Gallucci: If by the buildings you mean the two sites identified by the IAEA for what they call special inspection--again, I refer you to that portion of the document which, accurately and honestly, describes important issues still to be resolved. I will say that, if you direct your attention to numbered paragraph four, you will see that the DPRK is not only prepared to remain a party to the Nonproliferation Treaty but also to allow the implementation of safeguards agreements under that treaty. That is to say, full-scope safeguards, in an inspection 153-type safeguards agreement, as it's known in the IAEA trade. And it is that agreement that provides for special inspections. So that, as a matter of principle, this agreement commits the DPRK to accept special inspections. What this agreement is silent on, and remains unresolved, is exactly the timing of the implementation of that agreement. That is to say, when those inspections would take place. But I wish to leave no ambiguity on the point that there will be no overall settlement, there will be no ultimate settlement, there will be no provision of light-water reactors, until the question of special inspections is settled, until the question of the past, as it is sometimes known, is settled.

* until the question of special inspections is settled, until the question of the past, as it is sometimes known, is settled.

Q: Mr. Gallucci, you made special reference to active consultations with Congress on this deal. Do you expect a battle, getting Congress to accept this transfer of nuclear technology?

Assistant Secretary Gallucci: What I expect and hope is that the members of Congress whom we consult with will look at the situation in the same way this administration has, and in the same way those states in the region have, to the extent we have already consulted with them. In other words, that they recognize that this is a matter that we are dealing with, of high importance to our national security, the national security of the United States, as well as to international security, to peace and stability in Northeast Asia and to the whole fabric of the nonproliferation regime. That when one looks at those stakes, and one looks at the moves that the DPRK

is committing itself to--giving up the very dangerous graphite technology and a willingness to move to light-water reactor technology--that assisting the DPRK in making that transition and meeting legitimate energy needs, is a very wise and prudent step. And we hope that they will see it just that way. But I don't think this evening I will make any predictions.

Q: I'd like to ask you to say a little bit more about the issue of special inspections. You said that there will be no provision of the light-water reactor until the question of special inspections, and of the past, is settled. What does a settlement constitute in your way of thinking? And when this issue was addressed, apparently, earlier this evening at the North Korean Mission, the North Korean negotiator reiterated their position that they are not inclined to allow the special inspections. If the whole deal that you've worked out here cannot proceed until the light-water reactor issue is settled, and that can't be resolved until the issue that has been the single biggest sticking point in the negotiations so far is settled, can we feel confident--do you feel confident--that this actually will go forward?

Assistant Secretary Gallucci: It's sometimes said, Jeff, the timing is everything, and in this matter it is, I think, a matter of timing. I don't think there's any way to read the agreement that we reached tonight other than an agreement in principle by the DPRK to the concept of special inspections. The agreement is, I say again, silent on when those special inspections will be implemented. When I say there will be no overall settlement of this issue until that question is resolved, I mean that there are simply steps that cannot be taken until the DPRK is in full compliance with its IAEA safeguards obligations, such as the transfer of equipment and technology in connection with a light-water reactor. Such as the position of the United States and the rest of the international community with respect to the safeguards issue that was reported by the board of governors to the Security Council. These issues require the special inspections question to be resolved. They do not necessarily require that special inspections be conducted in the coming weeks. What we hope to do, quite frankly, is work with the DPRK to be clear about what is at stake for them, to put arrangements before the DPRK to demonstrate that there is indeed a light-water reactor project that the international community, or at least a portion of it, is willing to support. And in so doing to move down the road to a settlement recognizing that, at some point in the road, there can be no more progress unless special inspections are implemented.

Q: (inaudible)

Assistant Secretary Gallucci: Some of what you say may be a technical question of law, and with the kind of technology. I will say to you that there is no chance that there will be a light-water reactor constructed in a country that does not accept full-scope

safeguards. In this case, the requirement of full-scope safeguards in the DPRK includes the acceptance of special inspections. Ultimately, that's the requirement.

Q: At the risk of being redundant, I would like a clarification. When you talk about "forego reprocessing" this is number one which is under the final resolution of the nuclear issue and one of the big problems from what I understand concerning the reprocessing of the spent fuel rods. so how does that work in the immediate? Are you talking about forgoing reprocessing in the future or does it also apply for the immediate?

Assistant Secretary Gallucci: It applies for the immediate and that's one of the more significant features of the agreement before you. Once we provide the assurances as this agreement of indicates with respect to the light water reactor project and the assurances connected to the alternative interim energy, once we do that we expect as the agreement indicates that there will be a freeze on the construction of the two large graphite reactors. A freeze on activity at the radiochemistry laboratory and that laboratory which is where the reprocessing takes place will be sealed as indicated. That we would anticipate could well and should well happen in the coming few months. We understand that the DPRK with this agreement is committing itself not to reprocess the fuel which is now in the pond. Storage is an approach favored by the DPRK and I say again that is not an approach which the United States favors. The United States favors a removal of the fuel from the DPRK. Therefore with respect to those two outcomes there remains a difference. The most dangerous outcome, reprocessing of that fuel, the separation of additional plutonium, is precluded by the agreement.

Q: Do you actually feel this agreement is ...are you disappointed? or do you see it important in so far as it allows you to keep on talking?

Assistant Secretary Gallucci: We are pleased with the agreement. We think it is important. We think it clarifies issues which before up until now have been put in hypothetical terms and not been sorted out. We think it provides a basis upon which we can build and go farther. Probably the most important thing to say about the agreement is that it is a first step, a basis upon which we can build and go farther. I know that's a cliché. I am not above using it this evening; it's quite late. And we hope that from this first step we can take all the other steps and there's a bunch that need to be taken before we can resolve the issue.

Q: It has been expressed in various quarters that North Korea has a nuclear arsenal, a rudimentary one. As far as your concerned, have those fears been laid to rest.

Assistant Secretary Gallucci: Those fears or concerns relate to

uncertainty about whether a declaration made by the DPRK with respect to how much plutonium it has separated in the past was accurate or not, and also relate to what the DPRK may or may not have done with any of that larger amount of plutonium which it may or may not have separated. This agreement per se does not address that question except in its requirement that ultimately a member of the NPT accepts full scope safeguards, that the DPRK will indeed permit the special inspections which will in turn assist the IAEA in determining that the declaration with respect to plutonium in the past is accurate or not.

Q: can that still be done retroactively?

Assistant Secretary Gallucci: Yes you might wish to make a distinction with what the DPRK did in June, with the discharge of fuel from the reactor which was in one real irretrievable in terms of the evidence that was lost by the standard applied by the IAEA and the difference between that and the sampling of the two radioactive waste sites.

Q: Was this agreement possible a month ago? Do you feel any changes in the attitude of the North Koreans and also were there any changes in the U.S. attitudes after the changes in the North Korean leadership?

Assistant Secretary Gallucci: I don't know in fact how to answer the question about whether this was possible a month ago. As you know our talks were interrupted a month ago when President Kim Il Sung died. What I do know is that we were set on a course before the death of President Kim Il Sung and that is seem to me in a general way that the DPRK followed that course during this past week with this agreement, but I cannot answer that question with any more specificity.

Q: Sir can you qualify the level of trust between your respective delegations in this round of talks?

Assistant Secretary Gallucci: I'd say it's higher than it was before this round of talks.

Q: Have you discussed when DPRK Missions or Liaison offices will open in Washington D.C.?

Assistant Secretary Gallucci: What we agreed was we would be prepared to send experts to the DPRK to discuss the establishment and the process of establishing liaison offices and that is about the status of that. We would hope over time as we took more steps towards an ultimate settlement of the issue that we would move and continue to move farther down the road to more normal relations.

Q: How are you going to provide assurances for the light water reactor? In the consultations here in Geneva are any country or

countries positive for financing?

Assistant Secretary Gallucci: As I think you know before we came to Geneva we conducted a round of consultations with Seoul and Tokyo and Beijing and Moscow. We have consulted with the countries we believe a viable consortium can be gathered both to finance and to build the light water reactor project. The details of how we will do that are going to require more consultation to work out and that in turn will provide the basis for the consultations we will undertake on the Hill and ultimately for the assurances we will be able to offer to the DPRK.

Q: Can you please clarify arrangements which have been made for energy alternatives? A light water reactor can take up to six to eight years to construct. Does that mean that North Korea will get a big chunk which you will supply gratis?

Assistant Secretary Gallucci: What that phrase that you see in the agreed statement--arrangements for interim energy alternatives--means is that the DPRK in giving up the option of completing the fifty megawatt reactor and the two hundred megawatt reactor, both of them graphite reactors, that in giving up those reactors they are giving up a source of energy for a period of time. Presumably when the light water reactor project is completed, reactors producing as we have indicated approximately two thousand megawatts will meet that energy need plus other energy needs. However if you conceptualize this the way I have described it there would be a period of time between when those reactors the fifty and the two hundred would have come on line and the time when the two thousand megawatts of electricity from light water reactors would come on line. There is therefore a period in which we are agreeing that we will work with other countries to make arrangements to meet that lost energy.

Q: Have you considered what will happen at the end of this month to this agreement if the rods start corroding in the pond outside Yongbyon?

Assistant Secretary Gallucci: Can you repeat the question?

Q: Have you considered what will happen at the end of the month when the rods start corroding. I mean your not meeting until September twenty-three. What's happening in the interim?

Assistant Secretary Gallucci: In the first instance I must tell you that this is a DPRK reactor and a DPRK storage pond and DPRK spent fuel. We are offering to be of assistance in this connection to help them with the stabilization of the fuel in the pond, to extend the life of the fuel in the pond and therefore to assist in the ultimate disposition of the fuel. How we proceed from here with respect to the safety of that situation is the responsibility of the DPRK. I don't think we could be expected to do more than offer

our assistance, which we have already done.

Q: Sorry to harp on the question of those fuel rods but this isn't really a static situation so isn't it really inevitable that some months down the line if the DPRK continues to say "no thank you" to your offers of help these rods will reach the point where they have to be reprocessed and they are too dangerous to move so they will have to be reprocessed inside the DPRK, agreement or not?

Assistant Secretary Gallucci: It is not an easy question to answer, to answer what would be the ultimate disposition of this fuel. There are storage options for the fuel. Perhaps wet, perhaps dry, perhaps in casks, perhaps in other types of containers. There are countries with more expertise, with magnox fuel, as this type fuel is known, than the United States for example, Great Britain and France. We have consulted with experts in other countries and we are prepared, based on those consultations to provide assistance to deal with these rods. Another option in addition to storage, the one in fact favored by the United States which is the shipment of the fuel out of the DPRK. Once shipped out the fuel could be stored or reprocessed. The one option which we and the DPRK have agreed to exclude is the reprocessing of that spent fuel. And that is, of course, an extremely important conclusion, it's one contained in this agreement and it precludes the further separation of plutonium. I would not make any assumptions about the requirement for that fuel to be reprocessed in the DPRK, in fact I would assume at this point that it will not be.

Q: Haply you have answered all my questions except one tiny point remains, is an agreed statement between the United States of America and the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea the same thing as a joint statement?

Assistant Secretary Gallucci: That sounds Talmudic as a question, at least to me. I am not a legal scholar and so I don't actually know whether it is the same as a joint statement. I like the sound of agreed statement, but then of course, when we did a joint statement, I liked that sound too. I really don't know the answer to that exact question. If it was possible to get it for you I would.

Thank you all very much.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. draft	paper re agreed minute (4 pages)	10/00/1994	P1/b(1)

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National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 711

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea - Framework [3]

2009-0528-F
kc1590

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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003. draft	letter, Gallucci to Kang (1 page)	10/00/1994	P1/b(1)

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
008. draft	letter, Gallucci to Kang [duplicate of 003] (1 page)	10/00/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
009. draft	statement (1 page)	10/00/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

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National Security Council
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Overview of Korean Energy Development Organization

1. Establishment

KEDO would be established by multilateral agreement.

This agreement would serve as a charter for the organization, providing a framework for energy assistance projects.

2. Participating Countries

We encourage participation by a core group of countries with vital interests in the NE Asia region and/or global non-proliferation. These would include the U.S., Japan, the ROK, China, Russia, the U.K., France, Germany, the Netherlands, Canada, and Australia.

The participation of other Asian and European countries could be useful and welcome.

3. Objectives

- a. Provision of light-water reactor (LWR) project.
- b. Provision of interim alternative energy to replace energy from the DPRK's graphite-moderated reactors.
- c. Disposal of spent fuel from the 5 MW reactor.
- d. Other related projects (e.g., dismantlement or decommissioning of existing DPRK nuclear facilities).

4. Funds

Funding would be provided primarily by KEDO member states, but KEDO would be authorized to seek contributions from any source. In-kind contributions (e.g., coal or technical assistance) would also be encouraged.

The DPRK has offered to pay for the LWR project through barter. The terms of such an arrangement would likely be highly favorable to the DPRK, so the project would have a significant grant element.

The alternative energy assistance, spent fuel disposal, and dismantlement/decommissioning would be provided primarily on a grant basis.

5. Budget

The budget for the LWR project would include: a feasibility study, extensive technical assistance and training; construction of the LWR; and work on the DPRK power grid so it can accommodate the LWRs.

The budget for interim energy assistance would include: an energy survey (by IEA or others); fuel (coal, but not oil); (possibly) technical assistance to upgrade existing capability; and (possibly) additional generating capacity.

Administrative costs would be kept to a minimum by using a small secretariat and contracting for most of the necessary technical and financial expertise.

Precise cost estimates of the components of the energy package offered to North Korea will be available only after completion of an energy survey and an LWR site survey. Our best preliminary estimates of specific elements include:

Construction of twin "Korean standard" 1,000 MW LWR's: \$4 billion;

Energy survey: \$300 thousand.

Estimated interim conventional energy assistance to compensate for freezing the DPRK's graphite-moderated nuclear reactor program: \$400 million. (This figure includes an estimated annual supply of coal at about \$35 million, plus an estimated transportation cost of \$15 million, provided over an eight year period.)

6. Structure

The KEDO agreement would establish a Board of Governors with each member country represented. The Board would oversee KEDO activities.

Day-to-day management would be the responsibility of a General Manager or Secretary General.

A small secretariat would be established with some financial and technical expertise.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
010. cable	re consortium (7 pages)	09/09/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

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National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
011. paper	re agreement (4 pages)	09/13/1994	P1/b(1)

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werk/94-265

Dutch competence in the fields of nuclear-, fossil- and renewable energy

1. Nuclear competence

Capabilities and experience of the Dutch nuclear industry, cooperating in the Dutch Nuclear Consortium (DNC), comprise the full range from initial feasibility studies, design and engineering, to safety analysis, safety upgrade and backfitting projects for nuclear facilities. In particular, ample experience has been built in the fields of In- service inspections, Nuclear engineering (e.g. Leibstadt power station, Swiss), Safety analyses and research (OKG, Sweden). DNC's qualifications cover not only light water reactors but also heavy water reactors. In the latter field, DNC has been accepted by AECL and CANDU as a cooperation partner.

Range of nuclear energy services

Special and pre-project studies

- Safety analyses and research
- Advanced reactor design and feasibility studies
- Backfitting/plant life extension programs
- Decommissioning programs

Nuclear engineering services

- Design and engineering of complete nuclear power plant systems
- Safety systems upgrades and backfitting projects
- Project and construction management
- Procurement, quality control

Nuclear fuel cycle engineering

- Radioactive waste management including R&D for final disposal
- Fuel cycle economics and management

Plant and system operation support

- In service inspections
- Repair and maintenance, on-line signal analysis
- Nuclear Plan Analyzer advanced engineering simulator

Materials and components testing

Education, training, technology transfer, quality management

Decontamination services and facilities

Partners in DNC are Nucon, KEMA, ECN. For more information please contact:

Nucon Nuclear Technology BV
P.O. box 58026, 1040 HA Amsterdam, The Netherlands
tel. +31 20 5807238, fax +31 20 5807041



2. Industrial and engineering capabilities in fossil- and renewable energy

Dutch industrial-, consulting- and design capabilities and experience covers the full range from strategic- and feasibility studies to actual design and engineering, project construction, commissioning, transfer to the operator, maintenance and repair, quality control, education and technology transfer. Dutch industry and consultants are active in the following fields:

Energy supply

- Design and production of main components for large power production plants: steam- and flue gas boilers, piping, heat exchangers, instrumentation, complete units for flue gas- and fuel gas cleaning (both NO_x- and SO₂ control), flue-gas and fuel gas cleaning, low- NO_x burners and so on
- Design of large power production units based on a variety of technologies including coal gasification, coal combustion, natural gas combined cycle, residue gasification, and incineration
- Design and production of industrial combined heat (or cold) and power production plants (CHP)
- Design and construction of infrastructure for transport and distribution of electricity, heat, gas and oil
- Design and construction of district heating systems and transport- and distribution grids
- Design and production of wind turbines, photovoltaic solar energy systems, thermal solar energy appliances
- Oil well gathering, stabilisation and transport as well as natural gas processing, installation of offshore oil platforms, liquefaction and storage of natural gas

End-use efficiency

- Design and production of high-efficiency end-use appliances such as super-efficient boilers for space heating, efficient lighting, thermal insulation, specific appliances for energy conservation in many industrial processes including the utilization of low temperature waste heat with organic rankine cycles, heat pumps and so on, instrumentation
- Design, implementation and management of energy-efficiency improvement projects: energy audits, feasibility studies, education and so on
- Consulting services including energy planning, strategic studies, policy development, infrastructure planning, demand side management

A large number of Dutch enterprises are active in these fields, covering the full range from energy source to end-use. For more information please contact:

FME, The Association of Enterprises in the Mechanical, Metal working, Electronic and Electrical Engineering and Allied Sectors,
mr. J. Kitselaar,
P.O. Box 190, 2700 AD Zoetermeer, The Netherlands
tel. +31 79 531100, fax +31 79 531365

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
012. letter	POTUS to President Kim (ROK] (2 pages)	09/19/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 711

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea - Framework [3]

2009-0528-F
kc1590

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
013. cable	re Japanese support (5 pages)	09/12/1984	P1/b(1)

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Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 711

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea - Framework [3]

2009-0528-F
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RESTRICTION CODES

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
014. cable	re letter of assurance (2 pages)	09/19/1994	P1/b(1)

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
015. cable	re Letter of Assurances (4 pages)	09/22/1994	P1/b(1)

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OA/Box Number: 711

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2009-0528-F
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016. cable	re Pass to Tarnoff (5 pages)	09/12/1994	P1/b(1)

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017. cable	re request for directions (3 pages)	09/12/1994	P1/b(1)

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018. cable	re Berlin expert testifies (2 pages)	09/13/1995	P1/b(1)

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
019. cable	re dialogue (2 pages)	09/13/1995	P1/b(1)

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
020. cable	re Heavy Fuel Oil (2 pages)	09/14/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

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OA/Box Number: 711

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North Korea - Framework [3]

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15-SEP-94 13:37 FROM: US EMB OFFICE BERLIN

ID: 49 30 2386290

PAGE 2/6

Berlin

September 15, 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR : Gary Samore
FROM : USIS Berlin - Bill Wanlund *BW*
SUBJECT : Today's DPRK Press Conference on Technical Talks

Here's a rundown on the press conference held today at the North Korean Representation in Berlin on the conclusion of the technical talks. Please pass them further as you see fit.

Kim Jong U conducted the press conference, flanked by his English-language interpreter and Mr. Chong, from the MFA, I believe. About 50 journalists filled the small room. During the conference, he emphasized several times how costs were not a factor since the USA had agreed to provide the LWRs and solve the financing problems.

Kim by reading and then distributing the agreed-upon joint statement. He characterized the talks as having been conducted in a "sincere, useful and technical manner." Kim then discussed the topics of discussion, describing as the "major issue" the replacement of the graphite reactor, the "basis of our independent nuclear industry," with the Light Water Reactor; and also the compensation for the investment in the graphite system.

He then discussed the DPRK's "peaceful nuclear policy." "Frankly speaking," he said, the nuclear issue has its roots in the deployment of US nuclear weapons in South Korea and the "threat" or "strangling" of North Korea by such deployment. He mentioned that when Kim Il Sung met Jimmy Carter in June, he made the point that the nuclear issue in the Korean peninsula is caused by the absence of trust and confidence between the DPRK and the USA. The negotiations, he said, are crucial to the establishment of this trust and confidence on both sides; The most important aspect is the "realization of the LWR project."

Kim then went on at some length about how these policies will continue to be carried out under the leadership of "our great General Kim Sung Il, the successor to the revolution of our great leader Kim Il Sung" and how Kim Sung Il is now leading the Party, State and Armed Forces and how all the Korean people are working with great confidence toward the building of the socialist state.

Returning to business, he then discussed in some more detail the negotiations:

- Provision of the LWR by the USA and the freeze on the graphite reactor (the key to their independent power industry). The Korean side, Kim said, is to cease

construction of the graphite reactor upon receiving the 2000 MW LWR from the USA. He ~~then~~ on to note the Koreans were near completion of construction of a 50 MW graphite reactor and that the construction of a 200 MW reactor is about half finished. Whether they continue with construction is "totally dependent" on provision of LWRs by the USA, which he said "was already agreed" to by the two sides. The DPRK, he said, proposed to the USA that they provide either 3 600 MW or 2 1000 MW "latest model" reactors. Although the USA has made a "full commitment" to provide these as a result of the August 12 agreements, they have failed to agree on the type and capacity, he said.

He then addressed the issue of compensation as the second issue of discussion. There are two types of compensation, he said:

— For loss of electricity caused by the shutdown of the graphite reactors. Their planning is for the provision of 1950 MW by 2002. The period of compensation he said would start from the moment of the freeze on the graphite reactors until the commissioning of the LWR "supplied by the USA."

— For the capital investments already made in the construction of the graphite model reactors.

Compensation details, he said, would be taken up at the next expert-level talks.

The third issue under discussion was the safe storage and disposal of spent fuel from the 5 MW experimental reactor. Spent fuel, he said, can be safely stored until the September in wet storage tanks (?) but continued safe storage thereafter would be difficult. This would be discussed at the next Geneva meeting.

He then took questions. Would the Russian model be suitable for the 600 MW reactors?

— Taking into consideration the DPRK's requirements for safety, performance, capacity and expert opinion, the Russian model would probably not be acceptable, Kim said. He left open the question whether 600 MW reactors from other countries would be suitable.

Would South Korean reactors be suitable?

— The South Korean LWRs don't yet exist. The next generation will go on line in 1995; the successor not before 1998. "The father hasn't even been born; it's a mistake to speculate about the offspring."

Would the German type of reactor be suitable?

— Several types are quite suitable: Westinghouse, KW Siemens, Franatom, ABB Construction, Mitsubishi.

Would you object to the dominant participation of the South Koreans in the provision of LWRs?

- The USA during these discussions has proposed a new concept of an organization for the provision of financing of the LWR. There would be no problem for the South Koreans to participate in this sort of organization. We have already made it clear to the USA during these talks that the US side will be responsible for financing the project but that the DPRK will do the LWR selection, based on open bidding, price, payment terms, and the level of technology. ✓

Mr. Carlucci has said one LWR unit might come from South Korea and another from a third country. What do you think?

- Mr. Carlucci is head of the US delegation. As head of the DPRK delegation, I'd like to make it clear that the right of selection is in the hands of the DPRK. Therefore, what Mr. Carlucci said cannot be "said to be realized." ✓

What about the issue of investment costs?

- DPRK scientists and engineers worked for 30 years to develop the nuclear industry based on our own technology. (He provided details) If you consider R&D costs over 30 years, the cost could be several billion dollars. The exact amount has not yet been discussed at the expert level. We expect to discuss it at the time of delivery of the LWR.

What was the response of the USA?

- In most cases the US has just heard our request and not expressed their stand. We will probably discuss it at the next Geneva meeting.

Has the issue of DPRK's selection rights been agreed to by both sides?

- It is the DPRK Demand. It is our right as the buyer to look at the world market. If you look at international practice, I think the USA will accept this demand.

Can South Korea participate in the financing?

- The United States is responsible for the provision of the LWR on its own account, per the August 12 agreement. Doesn't matter if South Korea finances the project or not. If Japan or South Korea isn't going to finance the project, the USA will have to. It's the only way to solve the nuclear issue.

Site selection?

- We have already decided the site, same place as discussed with Russia for the LWR project, in accordance with IAEA. We haven't discussed sites with the USA.

Have you discussed the specific type of reactor with the USA?

- Only the principal requirements - no specific proposals.

Was there a request from the US side concerning shipment of spent fuel to a 3rd country?

-- Shipment of spent fuel is closely related to our sovereignty. In any case, we cannot accept it. The US side has never made the request to us during the discussion.

In conclusion, Kim said the DPRK would not select the LWR only on the basis of financing but on the basis of proven performance of technology and safety and the reports of experts. "Since the USA is going to solve the financial problems, we don't need to worry about it. The only thing we can do is select the best type of LWR."

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
021. cable	re Berlin Expert talks (3 pages)	09/14/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 711

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea - Framework [3]

2009-0528-F
kc1590

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
022. cable	re Kim (3 pages)	09/14/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
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North Korea - Framework [3]

2009-0528-F
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RESTRICTION CODES

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
023. cable	re US-DPRK-Berlin (2 pages)	09/14/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
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FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea - Framework [3]

2009-0528-F
kc1590

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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024. talking points	re Structural diagram (4 pages)	10/00/1994	P1/b(1)
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COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
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FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea - Framework [3]

2009-0528-F
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
025. paper	re alternative models (8 pages)	10/00/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 711

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North Korea - Framework [3]

2009-0528-F
kc1590

RESTRICTION CODES

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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026. talking points	re spent fuel (3 pages)	10/10/1994	P1/b(1)
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COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 711

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea - Framework [3]

2009-0528-F
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RESTRICTION CODES

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CONVENTIONAL ENERGY ASSISTANCE TO KOREA

TALKING POINTS

- o At their meetings in August, Vice Minister Kang and Ambassador Gallucci discussed the possibility of interim non-nuclear energy support while the LWR project is being completed.
- o You identified an "energy gap" equivalent to 500,000 metric tons of petroleum annually which would result from your shutdown of the 5 MWe reactor and your decision not to commission the 50 MWe and 200 MWe reactors scheduled to be completed and come on line by 1996.
- o You further indicated that North Korea expected to be compensated for this energy gap, which you point out would arise as a consequence of your decision to agree to our proposal that you terminate your present nuclear program based on graphite-moderated reactor technology.
- o The US Government agreed that, in the event that the DPRK decides to terminate its present nuclear power program and to shift to light water reactor technology, we would facilitate energy assistance on a scale equivalent to the loss of power from the experimental reactor and the two reactors now under construction.
- o We accept for discussion purposes your estimate of a 255 MWe shortfall below plan in electric power output from the beginning of 1996 and continuing until the LWR project is on line sometime after 2000.
- o We note that 255 MWe is roughly equal to 500,000 metric tons of crude oil or one million tons of soft coal per year.
- o It is possible to compensate for this notional shortfall in many different ways, and today we would like to suggest a process by which we might arrive at the best solutions to this middle term need.

NEAR TERM ASSISTANCE

- o First, however, I suggest we address the urgent, near-term requirement to compensate for lost heat and power from the 5 MWe Yongbyon experimental reactor on the premise that you will not refuel it.
- o We see two viable alternatives to fill this short term "energy gap" in the near term.
- o We are prepared to act on either of them (or even some combination if necessary) immediately.

Diesel Generator/Boiler Option

- o One alternative would be us to provide mobile diesel-fired generator(s) and associated steam boiler(s) to Yongbyon, or to an appropriate alternative site, to help meet winter needs.
 - To make the best arrangements, we would need to send at least one expert to the proposed site to assess how best to proceed.
 - We would also need some technical information specific to the site so that we can ensure that the equipment is installed quickly and efficiently. We have prepared a list of questions to indicate the kind of information we are seeking.
 - We are prepared to train DPRK technical experts to operate and maintain the equipment we provide.
 - We are also prepared to provide the necessary fuel.
 - With your help, we can have this equipment available to you in approximately two months.

Coal Delivery Option

- o A less complex alternative would be for us to arrange for the delivery to a convenient port or border point of an appropriate quantity and grade of coal as fuel for a thermal power plant.
 - We have begun exploring possible coal suppliers close to you.
 - We are also prepared to provide U.S. origin coal if necessary.
 - We estimate that it would take six to eight weeks to ship coal from the United States.
- o We've looked at the economics and logistics of energy alternatives and conclude that, from our perspective, coal is the much preferred option.
 - Our objective is to meet the notional electricity output gap that would result from your decision not to commission the graphite reactors now under construction.
 - We would propose to employ the import infrastructure already in place in the DPRK. We understand that most of your electric power plants are coal-fired, and many are now operating below capacity because of fuel supply shortages. Making use of existing transportation relationships and mechanisms should facilitate delivery.
 - Coal is also a less expensive alternative. We estimate that an equivalent amount of coal to fuel an electric power plant would be roughly half the cost of providing crude oil for this purpose.

MEDIUM TERM ASSISTANCE

- o The first priority is the immediate needs of the upcoming winter. We hope that success in meeting short term needs will establish a good foundation for energy cooperation in the middle term.
- o Many options exist which would assist you in meeting your energy needs until construction of the LWR is complete.
 - We are prepared to make up some of the shortfall from termination of your present nuclear programs through provision of coal on a continuing basis.
 - In addition, we offer to work with your managers and engineers to increase the efficiency of your existing energy production, distribution and use.
- o We also see great potential for the transfer of relevant Western experience in national energy planning and demand side management.
 - These could include work to computerize your national energy grid

(details on computer offer)
 - These could also include transmission and distribution upgrades, work to improve your hydro-electric and fossil production, diffuse fluidized bed coal combustion technology, transfer coal beneficiation and stack emission control technology, provision of end-user improvements and so on.
- o We would assist your engineers and managers to visit our energy institutes and facilities. We hope you would welcome visits by American and other world experts to your ministries, institutes and facilities.

- o We propose that the US and North Korea set as a near term objective the development of comprehensive middle-term plan to cope with the shortfall from your electric power production plan that would result if you do not bring the 50 MWe and 200 MWe nuclear plants on line.
 - The execution phase could follow immediately, and could include a major energy technology transfer component.
 - In this regard, we envision broader, multilateral cooperation which would allow North Korea to benefit from the diverse experiences and resources of Western nations.
 - All of this work would be, as agreed, part of a successful solution to the nuclear issue in North Korea.

SURVEY MISSION

- o Conventional energy cooperation is a means to fill the gap that will result if you shut down your present nuclear program. But it is more than that. It also has great value as a way to build trust and understanding between the US and North Korea.
- o We want energy cooperation to become an important element of a constructive relationship between our countries. We intend to facilitate energy assistance to North Korea by American enterprises and by the governments and enterprises of other nations.
- o But -- I am sure you will understand -- we need to know more about the present situation of your energy sector.
- o For an effective action plan, your experts and our experts must work together to analyze present problems and identify and design the most effective solutions that are compatible with your economic system and objectives.
- o As the first step, we ask that the DPRK invite the International Energy Agency (IEA) to survey the North Korean energy sector.
- o The IEA is a multilateral energy policy organization headquartered in Paris, France with 23 member countries. It has a lot of experience in long-term energy planning. It has conducted national energy policy studies for several Eastern European countries and is about to begin a study of Russia.
- o To give you an idea of the IEA's energy policy surveys, here are copies of IEA studies of the energy policies of Romania, Poland, Hungary and the study of Russia performed as part of a multilateral effort to help Russia cope with its energy problems.
- o We hope you will find them of interest.
- o IEA staff are prepared at US request to conduct a study of the North Korean energy sector, working closely with experts from your ministries and institutes. Within four to five months, they would present their recommendations on energy policy options within the parameters of your existing economic system.

- o This would serve as the basis for the development of a detailed plan of US-DPRK energy cooperation, and would also be of great help to mobilizing help from the IEA's other 22 member countries for improving the DPRK energy structure.
- o We realize that you might not be familiar with the IEA, a multilateral institution that is held in high esteem in the West and in a number of the countries of Eastern Europe.
- o We can arrange for some of your officials to visit the IEA headquarters in Paris, France to learn more about the IEA and to see how its studies are used to create cooperative strategies for developing and improving a country's energy sector.

(IF IEA IS UNACCEPTABLE)

- o I am sure that you understand our need to learn more about the present situation of your energy sector in order for us to work together to develop an appropriate and effective action plan.
- o There are some other approaches which we could take.
- o We understand that several years ago Russia conducted an energy study in preparation for construction of the previously proposed nuclear power plants. If you would share that study, it would help us to understand your energy sector situation better.
- o I also understand that you have been working with UNDP on an energy sector survey. UNDP's expertise and familiarity with North Korea make it a logical choice for conducting a survey such as I have described.

Drafted: EB/IEP/ECC:DFCastiglione/EAP/K:DBrown *GC*
9/1/94 x71825 SEENERGY 6558

Cleared: EAP/K:DBrown
EB/ESP:TMarten
PM/NE:LGallini
DOE:KLuongo
S/AL:GSamore
OSD:SLoeffler
JCS:KSandkuhler
ACDA:NWulf
Treas:LRoberts

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027. cable	re Liaison Office Announcement (4 pages)	09/13/1994	P1/b(1)
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COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 711

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea - Framework [3]

2009-0528-F
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RESTRICTION CODES

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028. cable	re DPRK Dep Foreign Minister (3 pages)	09/13/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 711

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea - Framework [3]

2009-0528-F
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
029. cable	re Liaison Meetings (6 pages)	09/13/1994	P1/b(1)

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National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 711

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North Korea - Framework [3]

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TALKING POINTS

U.S. EXPERT-LEVEL TEAM VISIT TO PYONGYANG

o The U.S. delegation is here as a result of the statement agreed to between our two countries August 12 in Geneva. That statement calls for expert level discussions between our two countries to prepare for the establishment of liaison offices in each others capitals, should the political decision be made by our two governments to do so.

o We are not here to discuss what the criteria might be on which the U.S. government may or may not decide to establish a liaison office in Pyongyang. That decision is for the policy levels of the U.S. Government and the DPRK government to decide. We have no authority to address that issue.

o We are here to discuss technical issues and to gather information. Should the United States and Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea decide at a later date to exchange liaison offices, our talks can speed the establishment of those offices by identifying in advance technical areas which must be addressed at the time liaison offices would be established.

o During our trip to Pyongyang, we would like to gather as much information as possible on legal and technical issues, as well as on living, working and transportation arrangements for diplomatic missions in Pyongyang. In that way the State Department can begin staff preparations for establishing a liaison office in Pyongyang should our government decide to do so.

o We would also like to inform the DPRK of how the U.S. views several technical issues -- legal, logistical, consular -- that will arise should liaison offices be established.

o We welcome technical questions the DPRK may have on setting up a liaison office in Washington. If we cannot answer a question, we will refer it to our experts in Washington after our return there and will send you an answer.

o As noted in our communication with the DPRK mission to the United Nations concerning this trip, we would like during our visit to Pyongyang to call on the Russian, Chinese and German missions so that we may get the perspectives of those missions on technical questions concerning diplomatic working and living conditions in Pyongyang.

o It is the view of the United States that if liaison offices are established, their purpose will be to establish effective working-level diplomatic and consular liaison between our two countries. Such offices will not represent full normalization of relations. Rather, per the August 12 Agreed Statement, they will represent a move toward full normalization.

o Accordingly, liaison offices need not be of a size to carry out the full range of functions of an embassy.

o However, the U.S. liaison office in Pyongyang and the DPRK liaison office in Washington must have the personnel.

facilities, and capability to carry out those functions necessary to provide effective liaison between our two countries. These functions may be asymmetrical. In other words, the U.S. office may need to carry out certain functions that the DPRK office in Washington may not need to carry out and the vice versa.

o We propose to do this on the basis of "functional reciprocity." Reciprocity will be based on functional need, not on a strict application of quantitative criteria -- number of personnel, square footage of building, etc.

o We would now like to discuss a number of technical issues on which we will give the U.S. view and request the DPRK view. **These are preliminary U.S. views and are not final positions. Please understand this point -- should our two governments later decide to exchange liaison offices, these positions may be modified.** However, they represent U.S. views at this time.

Legal Basis

o We believe that liaison offices should be set up under **the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.** Both the U.S. and the DPRK are parties to these two agreements. This will preclude lengthy bilateral negotiations and provides an established legal framework for the operation of the liaison offices. If the VCDR and VCCR are used, the U.S. will expect each side to respect all privileges and immunities contained therein.

Size

o We have not yet decided on the number of personnel that would man a U.S. liaison office in Pyongyang. It will be no larger than necessary to perform the liaison functions which it must perform. We do not intend that there should be strict numerical reciprocity in the number of personnel in each others missions, but the numbers should be no greater than that required to perform necessary functions. Over time, as relations normalize, the number of U.S. personnel would increase.

Visas

o Both liaison offices should be empowered to issue visas for the purpose of expediting necessary travel between our two countries.

Communications

o Both liaison offices should be allowed to have electronic communications equipment if so desired. Functional reciprocity may be applicable due to local zoning restrictions.

Access to Host Country Nationals

o The U.S. liaison office should have ready access to DPRK officials and citizens whom it must contact to fulfill its liaison functions.

o In-country travel should be allowed to the maximum extent possible. Any restrictive zones imposed by either

host state should not restrict the effective fulfillment of necessary liaison functions. However, they will be mutually reciprocal and negotiated.

Consular Access

o The U.S. expects that in the context of a broad and thorough solution to the nuclear issue there will be increased travel to the DPRK by American citizens. A U.S. liaison office in Pyongyang will require prompt notification by DPRK authorities of the detention of any American citizen and prompt consular access to American citizens wherever in the DPRK they may be. Likewise any American citizen in the DPRK should not be deprived of rapid and easy communication to the U.S. liaison office.

o Does the DPRK have any laws which may cause disputes as to the citizenship of Korean-born American citizens -- those born in what is now the territory controlled by the DPRK, those born in what is now the territory controlled by the Republic of Korea?

o This is particularly important for the large Korean-American community, many of whom may request to visit the DPRK. Additionally, there are Korean-born members of the U.S. Foreign Service as well as Korean-born spouses of Foreign Service Officers.

MIA Remains

o The U.S. is interested in repatriating the remains of U.S. troops killed during the Korean War. We will want a U.S. liaison office to keep active liaison with the government of the DPRK on this issue until all available remains are returned to U.S. custody. This may mean assigning military personnel to the U.S. liaison office to accomplish this function.

Crossing the DMZ

o For policy reasons, the U.S. would like to have free access for its personnel assigned to Pyongyang to travel back and forth across the DMZ at Panmunjom. We could possibly arrange corridor travel between New York and Washington.

o This would allow our liaison office in Pyongyang to keep close communication and coordination with our embassy in Seoul. This will facilitate liaison in expediting a broad and thorough resolution of the nuclear issue and increase the policy input of those U.S. personnel in Pyongyang most familiar with the DPRK point of view.

Logistics

o We would also like the U.S. liaison office in Pyongyang to be logistically supported by our established base in Seoul. Logistical support through Beijing will be more difficult.

o Logistical support through Beijing may at times be inadequate to the needs of a U.S. liaison office in Pyongyang, requiring support flights by either U.S. military logistic aircraft, or U.S. government chartered aircraft, into Pyongyang.

Building

- o We are not prepared on this trip to make any site survey or selection, even of a preliminary nature, of a building for a U.S. liaison office. We are, however, authorized to tour representative diplomatic mission areas.
- o At a future date, if a political decision is made to exchange liaison offices and when site selection is warranted, we will exchange complete site selection teams.
- o The U.S. does not intend to establish its liaison office in a building designated to be the eventual permanent home of a U.S. embassy to the DPRK. Instead, it will first search for temporary quarters. Permanent site selection would take place only after full normalization, when the long range size of a U.S. mission could more adequately be determined.
- o When a decision is made by our two governments that we must find sites for our respective liaison offices, the State Department stands ready to assist the DPRK in finding a suitable building in Washington.
- o The DPRK should understand that real estate in Washington operates on a free market system and that local zoning laws in some cases restrict building use.

Housing

- o What housing would be available for the families of U.S. personnel assigned to Pyongyang? We are authorized to view representative housing, but not to make any commitments of any kind.

Schooling

- o What schooling is available for the children of foreign diplomats in Pyongyang -- preschool/kindergarten, grade school?

Medical Facilities

- o What medical facilities are available to the foreign diplomatic community in Pyongyang? What payment system is used? We are authorized to make a preliminary tour of such facilities.
- o In the U.S. medical care is readily available to the foreign diplomatic corps at any U.S. facility. However, the cost of such care must be paid for: either privately by the individual treated, by the foreign mission, or through health insurance which can be purchased in the United States.

Automobiles

- o Are foreign diplomats in Pyongyang allowed to have private autos? If so, under what circumstances?
- o In the U.S. private autos and mission autos are allowed; foreign mission vehicles and operators are registered and licensed by the Department's Office of Foreign Missions. There are mandatory liability insurance standards.

Procurement of Services

o Is there a government agency in the DPRK to assist foreign missions in the procurement of goods and services? If so, is it mandatory to use this agency or may missions procure goods and services directly?

o Goods and services may be procured directly in the U.S. However, in cases of reciprocity, the U.S. may require the procurement of goods and services through the intermediation of the Office of Foreign Missions.

Personnel

o What is the procedure for hiring DPRK personnel to serve in clerical and maintenance positions at a foreign mission?

Travel

o Is there a DPRK government agency in the DPRK to arrange travel for foreign diplomats? If so, under what circumstances?

9/6/94

Drafted: EAP/K:LTurk x77718 SEKPOL 7661

Cleared:

S/AL: RGallucci
EAP: THubbard
EAP/K: DBrown
EAP/EX: PHayes
NSC:SAoki
L/EAP: JKovar
INR/EAP: RCarlin
DS/OP/EAP: RBenker
A/IM/SO: SMuench
M/OFM: HPorter
DoD/OSD: SLoeffler, USN
CIA/Korea Task Force: RDePaul
P: BHall
T: TBuckley
CA/OCS: DHobbs

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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030. draft	paper, re Liaison Office in DPRK (6 pages)	09/00/1994	P1/b(1)
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COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 711

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea - Framework [3]

2009-0528-F
kc1590

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

September 15, 1994

Draft General Conference Resolution

GC(XXXVIII)/RES/XXX

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE AGENCY AND
THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA FOR THE
APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS IN CONNECTION WITH THE TREATY
ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The General Conference

(a) Recalling the Board of Governors' resolutions GOV/2636 of 25 February 1993, GOV/2639 of 18 March 1993, GOV/2645 of 1 April 1993, GOV/2692 of 23 September 1993, GOV/2711 of 21 March 1994, and GOV/2742 of 10 June 1994 and General Conference resolution GC(XXXVII)/RES/624 of 1 October 1993,

(b) Noting the Director General's report contained in document GC(XXXVIII)/xxx,

(c) Recalling further resolution 825(1993) adopted by the Security Council of the United Nations on 11 May 1993, and the 31 March 1994 and 30 May 1994 statements by the President of the Security Council, particularly the request to keep Agency inspectors in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) in order to monitor activities at the five-megawatt reactor,

(d) Deeply concerned that essential elements of these resolutions remain to be implemented, and that DPRK has failed to discharge its safeguards obligations,

(e) Regretting the withdrawal of the DPRK from the Agency and expressing hope that the DPRK will rejoin,

(f) Supporting all efforts including ongoing bilateral discussions which can contribute to the full implementation by the DPRK of its safeguards agreement (INFCIRC/403).

1. Strongly endorses the actions taken by the Board and commends the Director General and the Secretariat for their impartial efforts to implement the safeguards agreement still in force between the Agency and the DPRK;

2. Commends the Secretariat for its continuing efforts to conduct inspection activities in the DPRK as requested by the United Nations Security Council;

3. Expresses continuing concern over the DPRK's noncompliance with its safeguards agreement.

4. Urges the DPRK to cooperate immediately with the Agency in the full implementation of the safeguards agreement, and to allow the Agency to have access to all safeguards relevant information and locations;

5. ~~Decides~~ to include in the agenda for its thirty-ninth regular session an item entitled "Implementation of the Agreement between the Agency and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons."

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
031. draft	report, re agreement implementation (9 pages)	09/08/1995	P1/b(1)

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OA/Box Number: 711

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2009-0528-F
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
032a. letter	POTUS Carter to POTUS (2 pages)	09/16/1994	P1/b(1)

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National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 711

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2009-0528-F
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
032b. letter	President Kim (ROK) to POTUS Carter (2 pages)	09/19/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 711

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea - Framework [3]

2009-0528-F
kc1590

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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