

# FOIA MARKER

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Folder Title:

North Korea, January 1995 [10]

Staff Office-Individual:

Nonproliferation and Export Controls-Aoki, Steven

Original OA/ID Number:

711

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# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

| DOCUMENT NO.<br>AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE                                                                  | DATE       | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|-------------|
| 001. report              | re proliferation (43 pages)                                                    | 02/00/1995 | P1/b(1)     |
| 002a. note               | re update (1 page)                                                             | 04/15/1995 | P1/b(1)     |
| 002b. cable              | re ROKG position (3 pages)                                                     | 04/15/1995 | P1/b(1)     |
| 002c. draft              | letter, Ambassador Gallucci to Minister Kang (1 page)                          | 05/08/1995 | P1/b(1)     |
| 002d. draft              | letter, Ambassador Gallucci to Minister Kang (1 page)                          | 05/12/1995 | P1/b(1)     |
| 003. memo                | Robert Gallucci to Secretary Christopher et al re Trilateral Meeting (2 pages) | 04/10/1995 | P1/b(1)     |

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)  
OA/Box Number: 711

### FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, January 1995 [10]

2009-0528-F

kc1582

### RESTRICTION CODES

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- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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## OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY

U. S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY  
1000 INDEPENDENCE AVENUE, S.W.  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20585

DATE: 1 MAY 1995NO. OF PAGES 6 + cover

TO:

FAX NUMBER:

DAN POREMAN456-9180STEVE AOKIFROM: CURTIS G. HUGHES

PHONE: (202) 586-6479

FAX: (202) 586-6828

COMMENTS:

• COPY FAXED TO BERGER



**The Under Secretary of Energy**  
Washington, DC 20585

May 1, 1995

MEMORANDUM TO: Sandy Berger, Deputy Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs

FROM: Charles B. Curtis *Charles B. Curtis*

SUBJECT: North Korean Spent Fuel: DOE Preparations

Attached is a memorandum that provides a detailed status report on the Department of Energy's activities to plan for the safe and secure canning of the 8,000 spent fuel rods discharged from North Korea's 5 megawatt research reactor. The bottom line is:

- Plans have been developed to provide both for the cleaning and stabilization of the fuel basin and canning of the spent fuel rods.
- The plans have been integrated and confirmed by domestic and international experts.
- A contract is in place for the fuel basin cleaning and stabilization activities, and we can have people on the ground in North Korea within 7-14 days of action on our reprogramming request.
- We have identified a sole source contractor for canning the spent fuel and will be ready to issue the contract and begin work within two weeks' time.
- We had earlier estimated that we could complete the canning of the spent fuel by October 1995 on the assumption that reprogramming action occurred in early February.
- If reprogramming action is obtained in the next week, it may be still possible to expedite our plans to permit completion of our canning activities by the end of this calendar year or at least in the first or second month of calendar year 1996.
- Alternatively, the Administration might conclude to dispense with the formality of reprogramming "approvals." Only policy requires us to seek Congressional permission; there is no legal requirement to do so.

In sum, our planning work is complete, contracts have been readied, a laboratory and agency task force has been assembled, and we are ready to go.

Attachment

## DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY ACTIVITIES RELATED TO NORTH KOREA'S SPENT FUEL

May 1, 1995

### Summary

This memo sets out the readiness status of the Department of Energy's plan to undertake the process of canning North Korea's spent nuclear fuel pursuant to the October 21, 1994 Agreed Framework. The Department has responsibility for two activities related to the 8,000 spent fuel rods discharged from the 5 megawatt reactor at Yongbyon last spring. First, is the clarification and chemical stabilization of the pool where the fuel rods are stored. The second is the placing of these rods in containers, or "cans," in preparation for shipment out of North Korea. Together, these activities would forestall North Korean reprocessing of the fuel rods. An implementation plan is ready and personnel are poised to begin work. We have a technical plan validated by our relevant labs, field sites and international experts. We have readied contracts to employ the experts – who were involved in two site visits to North Korea – to stabilize the fuel basin and initiate canning. Upon approval, we could have our contract operative within 24 hours and our lead team in-country within days, assuming all visa approvals and export licenses were granted. The Department's reprogramming notification of \$10M to carry out this activities has been acted upon by the relevant Senate committees, but not in the House. What follows is a status report of where the situation currently stands, and specifically (1) what has been done by the Department and (2) how soon work could commence when expenditure of the \$10 million is approved.

### Spent Fuel: Implementation Planning

The fundamental task is to halt the corrosion of the cladding of the 8,000 Magnox fuel rods by stabilizing the basin temperature and chemistry, and then build approximately 330 cans for the some 50 metric tons of spent fuel. The fuel rods are designed to be reprocessed after temporary storage in the basin, where they have now been for approximately a year. If we do not implement our plan for this fuel, which to-date has North Korean assent, North Korea may soon seek to reprocess the fuel before corrosion breaches the cladding. We have sought to ready the personnel and plans to forestall North Korea from obtaining separated plutonium, to preserve the information deducible about their past nuclear activity from the rods, and to enable canning to facilitate international inspection and ultimate transport out of North Korea.

### (1) Work Completed To Date

- Departmental Structure:

To support the U.S.-North Korean negotiations and the implementation of the Agreed Framework, the Department of Energy organized a North Korea task force. The task force reports to the Under Secretary of Energy. Day-to-day operations are directed by Ken Luongo, the Director of the Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation, with support from Bob Alvarez, Deputy Assistant Secretary for National Security and Environmental Restoration; Terry Lash, Director of the Office of Nuclear Energy; and Notra Trulock, Director of the Office of Energy Intelligence. Technical experts from these offices, the national laboratories – particularly Pacific Northwest Laboratory and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory – and key contractors are also deeply involved in the DOE Task Force's efforts.

- Site Visits

In order to understand the nature of the spent fuel problem in North Korea, two visits have been made to that country, the first in November 1994 and the second in January 1995. The U.S. delegations have been led by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The Department of Energy has had the technical lead in these visits and, as a result, scopes of work for both the spent fuel pool cleaning and fuel canning have been agreed to. Also, during the second visit to Yongbyon instruments were installed in the spent fuel basin that allowed for visual observation of the fuel and measurement of water properties.

- Contractors

The Department has identified two contractors to carry out the technical work needed to clean the basin and can the fuel:

*CenTec 21*, a California company with expertise in many types of water treatment, has been chosen as the prime contractor for the basin cleaning work. A better contract with CenTec has been issued and approximately \$200,000 has been provided to the company under the contract. CenTec has developed a detailed work plan for stabilizing the basin. Activities include filtration, chemical additives, water temperature control, and ion exchange.

*The Nuclear Assurance Corporation International* is the Department's choice to perform the fuel canning activities. NAC, based in Atlanta, Georgia, and has

extensive experience in handling spent fuel in foreign countries, having packaged and shipped the spent fuel from Iraq and Taiwan to accomplish nonproliferation objectives. At present, no contract with NAC is in place, because no funding has been available. However, all the necessary preliminary work to allow a contract to quickly be put into place has been completed. Once funding is available, NAC should be able to begin work within one week.

The Department will also continue to draw upon the expertise that exists in the U.S. Government and the national laboratories for the purpose of quickly implementing the basin cleaning and spent fuel canning operations.

- **Work Plans and Assessments**

As noted, key elements of the basin cleaning and fuel canning were agreed to in the meetings with the North Koreans. Based on these meetings, and further technical discussions and evaluations, both CenTec and NAC have developed plans for carrying out their operations. The Department has taken these plans and coordinated the following activities to ensure that there are not critical flaws in the plans and that work can proceed smoothly.

- Reviewed the plans by U.S. Government cost and procurement analysts to assess the cost estimates. Their findings were that the cost estimates by the contractors were acceptable and realistic.
- Conducted a three-day meeting with CenTec and NAC officials to ensure that the plans of both were integrated and harmonized.
- Presented the integrated, harmonized plan to U.S. and international technical experts and asked for their assessment of the safety and workability of the plan. Members of the international panel included officials from Britain and France which have long histories with Magnox spent fuel. All agreed the plan would work.
- Presented the plans to the IAEA to ensure that their needs were accounted for. The plans were acceptable to them.

## **(2) How Quickly Can Work Commence**

The Department submitted to the Congress a request for approval to reprogram \$10 million for spent fuel activities in North Korea on January 18, 1995. Because neither House Committee has approved the request, our spent fuel activities have

been curtailed. This delay has been costly and valuable time has been lost. If the Department had received reprogramming approval in January, we might be finished with water treatment by now and be shipping canning equipment.

Our original schedule anticipated beginning work in February and completing canning by October 1995. At the very least, the delay in Congressional approval has cost us two and a half months, and perhaps more, because the lack of funding has hampered the ability of contractors to carry out preparatory work.

Still, if Congressional approval for the reprogramming were forthcoming very soon, the Department could almost immediately begin work on arresting the corrosion of the North Korean fuel and expediting the preparations for fuel canning. Near-term activities, outlined below, would include:

- Water Treatment

From the time funds are approved, it should be less than 24 hours before CenTec can begin work. The first action would be for CenTec to immediately procure a water chiller that would be used to lower the temperature of the basin water and thereby slow the fuel's corrosion. This chiller could be on its way to North Korea within days.

The next task would be to provide the North Koreans with the final plan for the overall water treatment system. While awaiting final North Korean approval for this plan, the contractor will begin to procure long-lead items required for the actual installation of the water treatment system.

- Fuel Canning

A contract with NAC should be in place within one week after the funds are approved. NAC's first task will be to finalize the fuel can and equipment designs that have already been prepared. At present we estimate that NAC will be able to commence the installation of fuel canning equipment about 90 days after funds are approved. This assumes, however, that the clarity of the basin water is comparable to January when experts last surveyed the site.

- Possible Expediting Measures

If the basin water is clear, the schedule for installing fuel canning equipment can be collapsed by three or four weeks.

The current plan calls for canning fuel 12 hours per day, six days per week. If logistics permit, we may be able to can 24 hours per day, cutting up to the six weeks out of the schedule.

Of course expediting the schedule assumes good cooperation by the North Koreans with our technical experts.

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| 001. report              | re proliferation (43 pages) | 02/00/1995 | P1/b(1)     |

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)  
OA/Box Number: 711

### FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, January 1995 [10]

2009-0528-F  
kc1582

### RESTRICTION CODES

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9502932  
RECEIVED: 17 APR 95 17

TO: LAKE  
BERGER

FROM: AOKI

DOC DATE: 15 APR 95  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOREA NORTH  
PROLIFERATION

KOREA SOUTH

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NORTH KOREA UPDATE - 15 APR

ACTION: LAKE APPROVED RECOMS 1 & 2

DUE DATE: 20 APR 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: AOKI

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T   D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

AOKI

NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526  
White House Guidelines,  
September 11, 2006

By (U) NARA, Date 08/04/15  
2009-0528-F

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
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DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJDA

CLOSED BY: NSJDA

DOC 1 OF 1

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RECORD ID: 9502932

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 LAKE  
001

Z 95041717 FOR DECISION  
X 95041717 LAKE APPROVED RFCOMS 1 & 2

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| 002a. note               | re update (1 page) | 04/15/1995 | P1/b(1)     |

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| 002b. cable              | re ROKG position (3 pages) | 04/15/1995 | P1/b(1)     |

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draft -  
incorporates ROK  
language

## Joint U.S.-DPRK Press Statement

The delegations of the United States of America (U.S.) and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) held talks in Berlin from March 25-28 and April 12-14, 1995 to discuss the supply of a light-water reactor (LWR) project to replace the DPRK's graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities.

At the conclusion of the talks, the two sides reached agreement in principle on key issues related to the LWR supply agreement, as called for in the U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework of October 21, 1994.

### 1. U.S. Role

The U.S., representing the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), the international consortium called for in the Agreed Framework, will serve as the principal point of contact with the DPRK for the LWR project. A U.S. citizen will lead delegations and teams of KEDO. A U.S. company will serve as program coordinator for the LWR project.

The U.S. reaffirms that the letter of assurance from the U.S. President, dated October 20, 1994, continues in effect.

### 2. Reactor Type

The light water reactors to be provided to North Korea on a turnkey basis will be selected by KEDO in accordance with the U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework. The project will consist of two units of a 1,000 MW(e) pressurized light water reactor, reference plants of which will be Ulchin 3 and 4. Appropriate design modifications will be made according to industry practice for safe and reliable performance in the DPRK.

### 3. Contractual Arrangements

The government of the DPRK and KEDO will conclude an international agreement for the financing and supply of the LWR project.

Pursuant to this supply agreement, KEDO will designate a prime contractor and conclude a commercial contract with the prime contractor for the design, manufacture, and construction of the LWR project.

Such other appropriate commercial arrangements will be concluded as necessary to implement the supply agreement.

### 4. Conclusion of the Supply Agreement

The two sides will seek to secure the conclusion of the LWR supply agreement as soon as possible.

On the basis of this joint statement, the DPRK and the U.S., representing KEDO, agree that the DPRK and KEDO will begin direct negotiations in New York on the LWR supply agreement as soon as possible.

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
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**OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY**

**U. S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY  
1000 INDEPENDENCE AVENUE, S.W.  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20585**

DATE: 5/8NO. OF PAGES Cover + 5

TO:

FAX NUMBER:

Steve Aoki456-9180FROM: J. Hughes

PHONE: (202) 586-6479

FAX: (202) 586-6828

**COMMENTS:**

- DPRK Reprogramming approved by Hill
- We will try to get the pool stabilization team and equipment there ASAP

DOE F 1325.6  
(10-80)

United States Government

Department of Energy

# memorandum

DATE: May 5, 1995  
REPLY TO:  
ATTN OF: Tonya Jackson, CR-12  
SUBJECT: Congressional Action on Reprogramming (95-R-17)

TO: Distribution

The cognizant Congressional Committees have concurred on following reprogramming request from the Department.

95-R-17      Reprogramming/appropriation transfer to provide \$10 million to the Arms Control program for implementing spent fuel related activities in North Korea.

House Energy and Water Development Appropriations Subcommittee

Letter of concurrence dated May 3, 1995 (Letter attached).

Senate Energy and Water Development Appropriations Subcommittee


Letter of concurrence dated February 28, 1995 (Letter attached).

Senate Armed Services Committee

Letter of concurrence dated February 13, 1995 (Letter attached).

House National Security Committee

Letter of concurrence dated May 5, 1995 (Letter attached).

  
for Tonya M. Jackson  
External Coordination Staff  
Office of Budget  
(202) 586-4176

**Attachments**

**Distribution**

J. Vivona  
B. Smedley  
L. Henderson

T. DeHanas  
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**Congress of the United States**  
**House of Representatives**  
**Committee on Appropriations**  
**Washington, DC 20515-6015**

May 3, 1995

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 (202) 226-5771

Honorable Hazel O'Leary  
 Secretary  
 Department of Energy  
 Washington, DC 20585

Dear Madam Secretary:

By letter dated January 18, 1995, the Department proposed a reprogramming of \$10,000,000 to the Arms Control program for the purpose of implementing spent fuel related activities in North Korea.

The Committee interposes no objection to the request as outlined in the Department's letter. This action, however, does not imply and should not be taken to approve or commit to the overall North Korean Accord. The Committee expects to be kept informed of the Department's actions on this project and urges the Department to seek control of the spent fuel as soon as possible.

Sincerely,

*Tom Bevill*

Tom Bevill  
 Ranking Minority Member  
 Subcommittee on Energy  
 and Water Development

*John Myers*

John Myers  
 Chairman  
 Subcommittee on Energy  
 and Water Development

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# United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-8025

February 28, 1995


The Honorable Hazel R. O'Leary  
Secretary of Energy  
Department of Energy  
1000 Independence Avenue, SW  
Washington, DC 20585


Dear Ms. O'Leary:

This letter is in response to the Department's letter of January 18, 1995 regarding the reprogramming of \$10,000,000 to undertake spent fuel related activities in North Korea.

The committee will interpose no objection to the request as outlined in the Department's letter. This action, however, does not imply and should not be taken to approve or commit to the larger agreement related to supply of power reactors currently being reviewed.

Sincerely,

  
Pete V. Domenici  
Chairman,  
Energy and Water Development  
Subcommittee

  
J. Bennett Johnston  
Ranking Member,  
Energy and Water Development  
Subcommittee

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# United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6050

February 13, 1995

The Honorable Hazel R. O'Leary  
 Secretary of Energy  
 Department of Energy  
 1000 Independence Avenue, SW  
 Washington, DC 20585

Dear Madam Secretary:

The Senate Armed Services Committee has reviewed the Department's reprogramming request dated January 18, 1995 and poses no objection to the proposed funding sources and purpose.

The Committee believes that arresting the corrosion of the spent nuclear fuel and storing it in canisters under IAEA safeguards and supervision for safe storage and eventual shipment out of North Korea is critical. The Committee supports this effort regardless of the outcome on the current debate between North Korea and the United States over the source of the light water reactors.

Sincerely,

*Strom Thurmond*  
 Strom Thurmond  
 Chairman

ST/p

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U.S. House of Representatives

Washington, DC 20515-6035

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The Honorable Hazel R. O'Leary  
 Secretary of Energy  
 Department of Energy  
 1000 Independence Avenue, SW  
 Washington, DC 20585

Dear Madama Secretary:


The House National Security Committee has reviewed the Department's request to reprogram \$10 million for arresting corrosion and placing in canisters spent nuclear fuel in North Korea, and poses no objection to the request as outlined in the Department's letter of January 18, 1995.

However, this action does not imply and should not be construed as endorsement of the so-called "agreed framework" signed with North Korea on October 21, 1994. The agreed framework appears to reward North Korea for violating its nonproliferation obligations by providing material benefits and technical assistance, before North Korea has demonstrated that it has not yet become a nuclear weapons state. Moreover, the recent stalemate in discussions indicate that North Korea may be preparing to repudiate the agreed framework.

The Committee will continue to closely monitor the evolving situation with North Korea and fully expects to be consulted on any further commitment of Department resources associated with this agreement.

With regards, I am

Sincerely,



Floyd D. Spence  
 Chairman

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9503326  
RECEIVED: 02 MAY 95 16

TO: BERGER

FROM: CURTIS, C

DOC DATE: 01 MAY 95  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: DISARMAMENT

KOREA NORTH

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: LTR TO BERGER FM ENERGY RE NORTH KOREAN SPENT FUEL

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR BERGER

DUE DATE: 05 MAY 95 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: PONEMAN

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T   D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

PONEMAN

FOR CONCURRENCE

AOKI  
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BERGER  
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COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
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3326



The Under Secretary of Energy  
Washington, DC 20585

PLEASE STAFF

to Dan Fomenko

May 1, 1995

cc: Sandy  
Berger

MEMORANDUM TO: Sandy Berger, Deputy Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs

FROM: Charles B. Curtis *Charles B. Curtis*

SUBJECT: North Korean Spent Fuel: DOE Preparations

Attached is a memorandum that provides a detailed status report on the Department of Energy's activities to plan for the safe and secure canning of the 8,000 spent fuel rods discharged from North Korea's 5 megawatt research reactor. The bottom line is:

- Plans have been developed to provide both for the cleaning and stabilization of the fuel basin and canning of the spent fuel rods.
- The plans have been integrated and confirmed by domestic and international experts.
- A contract is in place for the fuel basin cleaning and stabilization activities, and we can have people on the ground in North Korea within 7-14 days of action on our reprogramming request.
- We have identified a sole source contractor for canning the spent fuel and will be ready to issue the contract and begin work within two weeks' time.
- We had earlier estimated that we could complete the canning of the spent fuel by October 1995 on the assumption that reprogramming action occurred in early February.
- If reprogramming action is obtained in the next week, it may be still possible to expedite our plans to permit completion of our canning activities by the end of this calendar year or at least in the first or second month of calendar year 1996.
- Alternatively, the Administration might conclude to dispense with the formality of reprogramming "approvals." Only policy requires us to seek Congressional permission; there is no legal requirement to do so.

In sum, our planning work is complete, contracts have been readied, a laboratory and agency task force has been assembled, and we are ready to go.

Attachment

## **DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY ACTIVITIES RELATED TO NORTH KOREA'S SPENT FUEL**

May 1, 1995

### **Summary**

This memo sets out the readiness status of the Department of Energy's plan to undertake the process of canning North Korea's spent nuclear fuel pursuant to the October 21, 1994 Agreed Framework. The Department has responsibility for two activities related to the 8,000 spent fuel rods discharged from the 5 megawatt reactor at Yongbyon last spring. First, is the clarification and chemical stabilization of the pool where the fuel rods are stored. The second is the placing of these rods in containers, or "cans," in preparation for shipment out of North Korea. Together, these activities would forestall North Korean reprocessing of the fuel rods. An implementation plan is ready and personnel are poised to begin work. We have a technical plan validated by our relevant labs, field sites and international experts. We have readied contracts to employ the experts -- who were involved in two site visits to North Korea -- to stabilize the fuel basin and initiate canning. Upon approval, we could have our contract operative within 24 hours and our lead team in-country within days, assuming all visa approvals and export licenses were granted. The Department's reprogramming notification of \$10M to carry out this activities has been acted upon by the relevant Senate committees, but not in the House. What follows is a status report of where the situation currently stands, and specifically (1) what has been done by the Department and (2) how soon work could commence when expenditure of the \$10 million is approved.

### **Spent Fuel: Implementation Planning**

The fundamental task is to halt the corrosion of the cladding of the 8,000 Magnox fuel rods by stabilizing the basin temperature and chemistry, and then build approximately 330 cans for the some 50 metric tons of spent fuel. The fuel rods are designed to be reprocessed after temporary storage in the basin, where they have now been for approximately a year. If we do not implement our plan for this fuel, which to-date has North Korean assent, North Korea may soon seek to reprocess the fuel before corrosion breaches the cladding. We have sought to ready the personnel and plans to forestall North Korea from obtaining separated plutonium, to preserve the information deducible about their past nuclear activity from the rods, and to enable canning to facilitate international inspection and ultimate transport out of North Korea.

### (1) Work Completed To Date

- Departmental Structure:

To support the U.S.-North Korean negotiations and the implementation of the Agreed Framework, the Department of Energy organized a North Korea task force. The task force reports to the Under Secretary of Energy. Day-to-day operations are directed by Ken Luongo, the Director of the Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation, with support from Bob Alvarez, Deputy Assistant Secretary for National Security and Environmental Restoration; Terry Lash, Director of the Office of Nuclear Energy; and Notra Trulock, Director of the Office of Energy Intelligence. Technical experts from these offices, the national laboratories -- particularly Pacific Northwest Laboratory and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory -- and key contractors are also deeply involved in the DOE Task Force's efforts.

- Site Visits

In order to understand the nature of the spent fuel problem in North Korea, two visits have been made to that country, the first in November 1994 and the second in January 1995. The U.S. delegations have been led by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The Department of Energy has had the technical lead in these visits and, as a result, scopes of work for both the spent fuel pool cleaning and fuel canning have been agreed to. Also, during the second visit to Yongbyon instruments were installed in the spent fuel basin that allowed for visual observation of the fuel and measurement of water properties.

- Contractors

The Department has identified two contractors to carry out the technical work needed to clean the basin and can the fuel:

*CenTec 21*, a California company with expertise in many types of water treatment, has been chosen as the prime contractor for the basin cleaning work. A better contract with CenTec has been issued and approximately \$200,000 has been provided to the company under the contract. CenTec has developed a detailed work plan for stabilizing the basin. Activities include filtration, chemical additives, water temperature control, and ion exchange.

*The Nuclear Assurance Corporation International* is the Department's choice to perform the fuel canning activities. NAC, based in Atlanta, Georgia, and has

extensive experience in handling spent fuel in foreign countries, having packaged and shipped the spent fuel from Iraq and Taiwan to accomplish nonproliferation objectives. At present, no contract with NAC is in place, because no funding has been available. However, all the necessary preliminary work to allow a contract to quickly be put into place has been completed. Once funding is available, NAC should be able to begin work within one week.

The Department will also continue to draw upon the expertise that exists in the U.S. Government and the national laboratories for the purpose of quickly implementing the basin cleaning and spent fuel canning operations.

- **Work Plans and Assessments**

As noted, key elements of the basin cleaning and fuel canning were agreed to in the meetings with the North Koreans. Based on these meetings, and further technical discussions and evaluations, both CenTec and NAC have developed plans for carrying out their operations. The Department has taken these plans and coordinated the following activities to ensure that there are not critical flaws in the plans and that work can proceed smoothly.

- Reviewed the plans by U.S. Government cost and procurement analysts to assess the cost estimates. Their findings were that the cost estimates by the contractors were acceptable and realistic.
- Conducted a three-day meeting with CenTec and NAC officials to ensure that the plans of both were integrated and harmonized.
- Presented the integrated, harmonized plan to U.S. and international technical experts and asked for their assessment of the safety and workability of the plan. Members of the international panel included officials from Britain and France which have long histories with Magnox spent fuel. All agreed the plan would work.
- Presented the plans to the IAEA to ensure that their needs were accounted for. The plans were acceptable to them.

## **(2) How Quickly Can Work Commence**

The Department submitted to the Congress a request for approval to reprogram \$10 million for spent fuel activities in North Korea on January 18, 1995. Because neither House Committee has approved the request, our spent fuel activities have

been curtailed. This delay has been costly and valuable time has been lost. If the Department had received reprogramming approval in January, we might be finished with water treatment by now and be shipping canning equipment.

Our original schedule anticipated beginning work in February and completing canning by October 1995. At the very least, the delay in Congressional approval has cost us two and a half months, and perhaps more, because the lack of funding has hampered the ability of contractors to carry out preparatory work.

Still, if Congressional approval for the reprogramming were forthcoming very soon, the Department could almost immediately begin work on arresting the corrosion of the North Korean fuel and expediting the preparations for fuel canning. Near-term activities, outlined below, would include:

- Water Treatment

From the time funds are approved, it should be less than 24 hours before CenTec can begin work. The first action would be for CenTec to immediately procure a water chiller that would be used to lower the temperature of the basin water and thereby slow the fuel's corrosion. This chiller could be on its way to North Korea within days.

The next task would be to provide the North Koreans with the final plan for the overall water treatment system. While awaiting final North Korean approval for this plan, the contractor will begin to procure long-lead items required for the actual installation of the water treatment system.

- Fuel Canning

A contract with NAC should be in place within one week after the funds are approved. NAC's first task will be to finalize the fuel can and equipment designs that have already been prepared. At present we estimate that NAC will be able to commence the installation of fuel canning equipment about 90 days after funds are approved. This assumes, however, that the clarity of the basin water is comparable to January when experts last surveyed the site.

- Possible Expediting Measures

If the basin water is clear, the schedule for installing fuel canning equipment can be collapsed by three or four weeks.

The current plan calls for canning fuel 12 hours per day, six days per week. If logistics permit, we may be able to can 24 hours per day, cutting up to the six weeks out of the schedule.

Of course expediting the schedule assumes good cooperation by the North Koreans with our technical experts.

# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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| DOCUMENT NO.<br>AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE                                                                  | DATE       | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|-------------|
| 003. memo                | Robert Gallucci to Secretary Christopher et al re Trilateral Meeting (2 pages) | 04/10/1995 | P1/b(1)     |

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Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)  
OA/Box Number: 711

### FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, January 1995 [10]

2009-0528-F  
kc1582

### RESTRICTION CODES

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- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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