

FOIA MARKER

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Folder Title:

North Korea, January 1995 [6]

Staff Office-Individual:

Nonproliferation and Export Controls-Aoki, Steven

Original OA/ID Number:

711

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41	5	6	3	v

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. fax	cover, Gati to Poneman (1 page)	02/10/1995	P1/b(1)
001b. memo	Gati to Tarnoff re North Korea (includes cover) (3 pages)	02/03/1995	P1/b(1)
001c. paper	re North Korea (7 pages)	02/03/1995	P1/b(1)
001d. memo	Gati to Tarnoff et al re Update (3 pages)	02/08/1995	P1/b(1)
001e. cable	re North Korea (8 pages)	02/10/1995	P1/b(1)
002a. memo	Gati to Tarnoff et al re Update [duplicate of 001d] (3 pages)	02/08/1995	P1/b(1)
002b. cable	re North Korea [duplicate of 001e] (8 pages)	02/10/1995	P1/b(1)
003a. note	re attached memo (1 page)	02/16/1995	P1/b(1)
003b. memo	action, Anthony Lake to POTUS re Team Spirit 95 (2 pages)	02/15/1995	P1/b(1)
004a. letter	Amir of Kuwait Shaikh Jaber Al-Ahmad Al-Sabah to POTUS [Arabic] (1 page)	02/14/1995	P1/b(1)
004b. letter	Amir of Kuwait Shaikh Jaber Al-Ahmad Al-Sabah to POTUS [English translation] (1 page)	02/14/1995	P1/b(1)
005a. fax	cover, Marten to Aoki et al (1 page)	02/22/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Expert Controls)
OA/Box Number: 711

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, January 1995 [6]

2009-0528-F

kc1578

RESTRICTION CODES

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005b. paper	re license request (1 page)	02/22/1995	P1/b(1)
005c. memo	Tarullo to Tarnoff re license request (4 pages)	02/22/1995	P1/b(1)
005d. letter	The Stanton Group to Richard Newcomb OFAC re Special License [50 USC 2411c] (4 pages)	11/23/1994	P3/b(3)
005e. paper	fact sheet on Stanton Group [50 USC 2411c] (1 page)	00/00/0000	P3/b(3)

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EAP PRESS GUIDANCE -- FINAL VERSION
(FOR USE ONLY AFTER 8:30 PM EST 2/24/95)
February 24, 1995

KOREA -- TEAM SPIRIT '95

Q: Can you confirm the South Korean announcement that Team Spirit '95 will not be held? Was this a unilateral decision?

A: -- THE STATEMENT ISSUED THIS EVENING BY THE ROK GOVERNMENT REFLECTS THE JOINT DECISION OF THE U.S. AND ROK, ARRIVED AT AFTER CLOSE CONSULTATION AND COORDINATION BETWEEN MILITARY AND CIVILIAN OFFICIALS OF THE TWO COUNTRIES, INCLUDING COMMANDER OF THE COMBINED FORCES COMMAND GEN. GARY LUCK AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE WINSTON LORD DURING HIS FEB. 22-25 VISIT.

ONLY IF PRESSED

Q: Could Team Spirit '95 be held later this year?

A: -- THAT IS A HYPOTHETICAL QUESTION. THE STATEMENT SPEAKS FOR ITSELF.



EAP/P:KBailes

CLEARANCES

EAP:THubbard

EAP/K:JGoldstein;RChristenson

S/AL:JPierce

DOD/PA:Lt. Col. Sims

STATEMENT BY THE ROKG

Feb. 25, 1995, 10:30 a.m.

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA HAS CAREFULLY REVIEWED THE ISSUE OF CONDUCTING TEAM SPIRIT '95 THROUGH CLOSE CONSULTATIONS WITH THE U.S. SIDE, WHILE ASSESSING THE SECURITY SITUATION OF THE KOREAN PENINSULA AFTER THE CONCLUSION OF THE AGREED FRAMEWORK.

CONSIDERING THAT THE AGREED FRAMEWORK HAS ENTERED INTO THE INTIAL STAGE OF ITS IMPLEMENTATION, BOTH THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE ROK AND THE U.S. EXPECT NORTH KOREA TO FAITHFULLY FULFILL THE AGREED FRAMEWORK. WITH SUCH EXPECTATIONS, THE TWO SIDES HAVE AGREED NOT TO HOLD THE TEAM SPIRIT EXERCISE SLATED FOR MARCH THIS YEAR.

Statement by the ROKG

Feb. 25, 1995, 10:30 AM

- o The government of the Republic of Korea has carefully reviewed the issue of conducting Team Spirit '95 through close consultations with the US side, while assessing the security situation on the Korean Peninsula after the conclusion of the Agreed Framework.
- o Considering that the Agreed Framework has entered into the initial stage of its implementation, both the governments of the ROK and the US expect North Korea to faithfully fulfill the Agreed Framework. With such expectations, the two sides have agreed not to hold the Team Spirit exercise slated for March this year.

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S/AL Press Guidance

February 17, 1995

North Korean Diversion of Heavy Fuel Oil

Question

In February 16 Congressional testimony, the U.S. commander in Korea, General Gary Luck, was asked about a North Korean diversion to military purposes of heavy fuel oil that was delivered to the DPRK in January? What do you know about this, and doesn't it violate the Agreed Framework?

Answer

-
- As called for in the Framework Agreement, North Korea has stopped construction of their new reactors, shut down reprocessing facilities, and not refueled their existing reactor. These actions have been monitored by IAEA inspectors.

 - We have some concern about the disposition of a small portion of the heavy fuel oil that we have shipped them for heating and power generation. We have no concern, however, that the oil has been used to power North Korea's military machine. One of the reasons that we sent them heavy fuel oil is that it can't be used in military planes and vehicles.

 - We have raised this issue with North Korea and told them that we expect them to comply fully with the terms of the Framework Agreement.

Question

Doesn't this mean that they've broken the agreement?

Answer

-- We've said from beginning that the agreement isn't based on trust. We're monitoring North Korean compliance carefully, and, in fact, they are sealing their nuclear program as required. We have raised our concern about the disposition of a small portion of fuel oil and told them that we expect full compliance.

-- Based upon our overall assessment of the situation, we are proceeding with implementation of the Agreed Framework, while continuing careful monitoring.

Drafted: S/AL - JPierce:jp
SALGEN 615 x71829 2/16/95

Cleared: S/AL - RLGallucci
EAP/K - LTurk
EAP - THubbard
P - BHall (subs)
EAP/PA - KBailes
S/P - DAnderson (subs)
OSD - SLoeffler
S(!) - WChristopher
SecDef(!) - WPerry

Neal Wolin

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*** ACTIVITY REPORT ***

TRANSMISSION OK

TX/RX NO.	4032	
CONNECTION TEL		6 9490
CONNECTION ID	LAKE/BERGER	
START TIME	03/01 15:38	
USAGE TIME	00'39	
PAGES	2	
RESULT	OK	

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RICHARD L. REYNARD, STAFF DIRECTOR
ARNOLD L. PUNARO, STAFF DIRECTOR FOR THE MINORITY

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6050

*Steve, Fr I,
Jeff*

February 13, 1995

The Honorable Hazel R. O'Leary
Secretary of Energy
Department of Energy
1000 Independence Avenue, SW
Washington, DC 20585

Dear Madam Secretary:

The Senate Armed Services Committee has reviewed the Department's reprogramming request dated January 18, 1995 and poses no objection to the proposed funding sources and purpose.

The Committee believes that arresting the corrosion of the spent nuclear fuel and storing it in canisters under IAEA safeguards and supervision for safe storage and eventual shipment out of North Korea is critical. The Committee supports this effort regardless of the outcome on the current debate between North Korea and the United States over the source of the light water reactors.

Sincerely,

Strom Thurmond
Strom Thurmond
Chairman

ST/p

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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001a. fax	cover, Gati to Poneman (1 page)	02/10/1995	P1/b(1)

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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OFFICE OF AMBASSADOR AT-LARGE
ROBERT L. GALLUCCI

(S/AL)

2201 "C" STREET, N.W., ROOM 6313
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

UNCLASSIFIED

Date Sent: 2/22

Pages transmitted (including
cover): 14

TO: Steve Aoki NSC
(Name) (Office)

FAX #: 202-456-9180

TEL #: 202-456-9181

FROM: Doug Scheerer S/AL

FAX #: (202) 647-1838

TEL#: 202-647-4743

SUBJECT: Gallucci Testimony

NSC

*Clearance
By 5:00 today
Joel*

"The U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework"

Testimony of Ambassador At-Large
Robert L. Gallucci

Mr. Chairman, it is a pleasure to testify on the Agreed Framework concluded by the United States and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea just over four months ago in Geneva.

The Clinton Administration believes the approach we have taken in the Agreed Framework serves our interests, the interests of our allies in the region and those of the international community. If fully implemented, it will create a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula, erase an important threat to the international non-proliferation regime and, potentially, open the door to discussions on other issues of concern, such as the North's export of ballistic missiles.

Since there has been a great deal of testimony recently on this issue-- including Secretary Christopher's extensive remarks before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee-- I would like to just briefly explain our approach to the negotiations and to elaborate on why we believe the Agreed Framework is in the U.S. national interest. I would also like to discuss in more detail the process of implementation which has already begun.

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U.S. Policy: An Overview

Mr. Chairman, when the Clinton Administration entered office in January 1993, it was immediately confronted with the problem of North Korea's nuclear program. That program, which had been underway for more than a decade, had the potential to produce hundreds of kilograms of plutonium and a significant stockpile of nuclear weapons by the end of this decade. Such a nuclear stockpile, in the hands of an totalitarian regime which had engaged in aggression in the past, whose conventional forces already threaten our close allies in the region, and which saw fit to export ballistic missiles and might do the same with nuclear material, would have been intolerable.

The Clinton Administration's direct involvement with the nuclear issue began in March 1993, when North Korea announced its intention to withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). That declaration-- coming after the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was unable to resolve discrepancies in the way the North accounted for its plutonium stocks-- raised international alarm about North Korea's nuclear program.

I do not want to recount the events over the next 18 months which led to the October 1994 Agreed Framework but let me make three points.

-3-

First, throughout this period, the United States conducted a firm and determined diplomatic effort to resolve the nuclear issue. We conducted that effort from a position of strength and particularly evident military readiness on the ground. When North Korea took the unacceptable step of unloading fuel from its 5 megawatt reactor last spring, we were prepared to pursue a sanctions resolution in the Security Council and to counter any hostile reaction. And the North Koreans knew it. When talks resumed again, it was only after North Korea accepted our new terms, namely that it not reload and operate the 5 MW reactor.

Second, our determined diplomacy enabled us to expand our objectives. Our initial goal when we began this process was to bring North Korea back into compliance with its IAEA safeguard obligations. But the North's interest in light water reactors (LWRs) opened the door to a more far-reaching solution: dismantlement of its existing facilities. Even under IAEA safeguards, these facilities posed a threat since they enabled the North to continue to produce accumulate weapons-grade plutonium. As a result, when we went back to the table in Geneva, we were determined to secure both a return to IAEA obligations and to dismantle North Korea's existing nuclear facilities. We succeeded in both these objectives.

-4-

Third, we conducted our policy, and continue to do so, in close consultations with our allies South Korea and Japan. These consultations were unparalleled in my twenty years in government. They were conducted through embassies in capitals, working-level discussions, regular trilateral meetings chaired by myself and contacts between the highest levels of all three governments.

The October 21 U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework

The result of these efforts was the U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework which addresses all our concerns about North Korea's nuclear program. The Agreed Framework immediately froze its nuclear program by ending further plutonium production-- no restarting the 5 MW reactor-- sealing the reprocessing plant and requiring the safe storage and eventual shipment of spent fuel out of the country. Second, the Framework freezes construction of two larger reactors-- 50 and 200 MW-- which would have been able to produce enough plutonium for dozens of bombs each year. Finally, under the Agreed Framework, North Korea will remain in the NPT: it must take any measures deemed necessary by the IAEA-- including special inspections-- to fully disclose past nuclear activities.

-5-

In return, we will lead an international effort to provide North Korea with proliferation-resistant light-water reactors and heavy fuel oil shipments until those reactors come on line. In this context, I would like to emphasize that no delivery of any significant nuclear components for the reactors will take place until North Korea complies fully with its safeguards obligations. Also, the United States will move toward more normal relations with North Korea, including the opening of liaison office in both countries. But full normalization will only come when the DPRK moves to resolve other issues of concern to us, particularly its ballistic missiles exports and destabilizing conventional force deployments.

Why Is the Agreed Framework a Good Deal?

As Secretary Christopher has testified, we believe the Agreed Framework maximizes the benefits and minimizes the risks to the United States.

The Framework Agreement provides for a solution which maintains the integrity of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty but also goes well beyond the requirements of that agreement. As I stated earlier, under the NPT, North Korea would be allowed to keep its existing gas graphite reactors and to accumulate stockpiles of plutonium under IAEA safeguards. The Agreed Framework's freeze of the DPRK's nuclear program, its

-6-

requirement that the North dismantle its facilities and to eventually ship out spent fuel go beyond these existing obligations. We have agreed to lead an international consortium in providing other sources of energy-- including more proliferation resistant reactors-- only because the DPRK will take these far-reaching steps.

Our interests in Northeast Asia, those of our close allies and those of other Asian countries also are best served by reducing tensions in the region. The Agreed Framework may make this possible by opening the way for the establishment of more normal political and economic relationships between the United States and North Korea, and prospectively between North and South. As part of the Framework, North Korea has pledged to resume dialogue with South Korea on matters affecting peace and security on the peninsula. We have made it clear that resuming North-South dialogue is essential to the success of the Framework.

We are determined to use our engagement with the North to address other troubling aspects of its behavior including its conventional force posture, ballistic missile activities and past support for terrorism. Indeed, it is our view that, without the Agreed Framework, we would have no basis for moving forward on these issues. But, as the Secretary of State has

-7-

noted "development of more normal relations between North Korea and the United States will not affect our close ties with the Republic of Korea."

As for the structure of the Framework, it reflects our effort to carefully craft a document which takes into account these broader priorities, the interests of our close friends in the region and our concerns about the DPRK's past behavior. That approach can be summarized as follows.

First, the burden of up front performance falls on North Korea, not the United States. North Korea is required to freeze its nuclear program immediately. That means shutting down its 5 MW reactor, sealing its reprocessing plant, ending construction at the two larger reactors and not reprocessing existing spent fuel. In the near-term, we are providing the North with small amounts of heavy fuel oil, moving towards establishing liaison offices and very selectively easing commercial sanctions. We are also helping the North store existing spent fuel until it is shipped out of that country. The most significant benefit for North Korea-- construction of light-water reactors-- will not come for several years and sensitive nuclear components for them will not be delivered until the North fully accounts for its past nuclear activities.

-8-

Second, the Framework places highest priority on the elements of the North's program that most acutely threaten U.S. security. Our most immediate concerns were the North's current capability to produce more plutonium for nuclear weapons-- the existing spent fuel, the operating 5 MW reactor and the reprocessing plant-- and its potential ability to produce more in the future-- the two larger reactors under construction. Both are dealt with in the Agreed Framework. That document also requires the DPRK to come clean on past nuclear activities, but not immediately. Quite frankly, while it was vital to achieve such a commitment, from a national security perspective, when those inspections were conducted was less critical. The information to be obtained is not perishable.

Finally, we will be able to closely monitor North Korean compliance with the Agreed Framework, both through IAEA inspection and the use of our own national technical means. Moreover, the structure of the Agreed Framework provides us with added insurance since the path to implementation has defined checkpoints. If at any time North Korea fails to meet its obligations, we can take appropriate action. Since the burden of up front performance falls on the North, if the agreement breaks down before the LWRs are complete, we will still be ahead of the game. North Korea's entire nuclear program will have been frozen for years.

-9-

Implementation of the Agreed Framework

Mr. Chairman, while the conclusion of the Agreed Framework is an important step forward, successful implementation will be critical. For our part, the United States intends to live up to its end of the bargain if North Korea fulfills its commitments. Currently, our overall assessment is that, while we have some concerns, we are satisfied with implementation of the Agreed Framework.

Nuclear Freeze: North Korea has frozen its entire nuclear program: the 5 MW reactor has not been restarted, the reprocessing plant is not operating and construction has stopped at the two additional reactors. While the IAEA already has inspectors on the ground monitoring the freeze, that presence will be expanded. We understand that talks between the DPRK and the IAEA on expanding the Agency's monitoring measures have gone well and, hopefully, will be completed soon.

Spent Fuel Storage: The United States and North Korea have agreed to a plan for safely storing the existing spent fuel unloaded from the 5 MW reactor last spring. That fuel, if reprocessed, could have yielded sufficient plutonium for 4-5 nuclear weapons. The U.S.-DPRK agreement followed a series of meetings between both country's experts and the first ever

-10-

visits by our team to the Yonbyon nuclear facility to evaluate the situation on the ground. The process of placing the fuel in cannisters for safe storage and eventual shipment out of the country should begin this spring and be completed by next fall.

Easing Commerical Restrictions: The United States and North Korea have eased restrictions on commercial transactions. In Agreed Framework, the U.S. and North Korea agreed to begin reducing restrictions on telecommunications services and financial transactions within three months, or by January 21. On January 9, the DPRK announced it was lifting legal barriers to trade with the U.S., including prohibitions on imports from the U.S. and port-calls by U.S.-flag vessels. On January 20, the U.S. announced the easing of sanctions against North Korea including areas such as telecommunications, travel and journalism, and financial transactions. Whether we build on this level or reimpose sanctions will depend on North Korea's performance on a wide range of issues of concern.

LWR Supply Contract: Under the terms of the Agreed Framework, "best efforts" should be made to reach a LWR supply contract by April 21, 1995. While discussions with the DPRK on the light water reactor project have made progress, critical differences remain. The most important is which country will

-11-

provide North Korea with those reactors. From the U.S. perspective, the only viable vendor is the Republic of Korea which has offered to provide significant funding for the provision of Korean model reactors. This point has been emphasized time and time again to the North. The DPRK remains concerned about the technical viability of those reactors, but, more importantly, finds it politically difficult to agree to build South Korean model reactors in its country. We plan to have another meeting with the DPRK on this issue soon."

Heavy Fuel Oil Deliveries: As specified in the Agreed Framework, the United States delivered 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil to North Korea in January. We have some concern about the disposition of a small portion of the heavy fuel oil that we have shipped them for heating and power generation. We have no concern, however, that the oil has been used to power North Korea's military machine. One of the reasons we sent them heavy fuel oil is that it can not be used in military planes and vehicles. We have raised this issue with North Korea and told them that we expect them to comply fully with the terms of the Agreed Framework.

Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO):
We have made important progress towards establishing the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), the international consortium that will have a key role in

-12-

implementing the Agreed Framework. It is KEDO that will ensure the provision of light-water reactors to North Korea, the heavy fuel oil shipments, the safe storage of spent fuel and its eventual shipment out of North Korea. While the United States, South Korea and Japan are the consortium leaders, the South will play a central role, and Japan will play a significant role, in the financing and construction of the LWR project. Both countries strongly support the Framework as in their national interest, and have demonstrated that support with their significant commitment to finance its implementation.

KEDO's structure will also allow for broader international participation. The U.S., supported by its trilateral partners, has also begun to approach other potential members of KEDO in Asia, the Middle East, and Europe. We hope to hold the first meeting of interested countries next month.

North-South Dialogue: The Agreed Framework obliges the DPRK to take steps to implement the North-South Denuclearization Declaration and to engage in North-South dialogue. North-South dialogue is therefore essential if the Framework is to be fully implemented. Even more to the point, however, North-South dialogue is the key to creating a solid, stable state of peace on the Korean Peninsula. So far, however, the DPRK has not taken any steps to fulfill its obligations under the Framework to engage in North-South

-13-

dialogue. We are using every possible occasion to emphasize the the DPRK that dialogue is vital to the full implementation of the Framework and remain in close consultation with the ROK on this issue.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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003a. note	re attached memo (1 page)	02/16/1995	P1/b(1)
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COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Expert Controls)
OA/Box Number: 711

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, January 1995 [6]

2009-0528-F
kc1578

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003b. memo	action, Anthony Lake to POTUS re Team Spirit 95 (2 pages)	02/15/1995	P1/b(1)

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National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Expert Controls)
OA/Box Number: 711

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North Korea, January 1995 [6]

2009-0528-F
kc1578

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TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: SABAH, JABER

DOC DATE: 11 FEB 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KUWAIT
KOREA NORTH

HS
NUCLEAR WEAPONS

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: LTR TO PRES FM SHAIKH JABER SABAH OF KUWAIT RE NORTH KOREA DECISION
TO FREEZE & DISMANTLE EXISTING NUCLEAR PROGRAMS UNDER IAA

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR LAKE

DUE DATE: 25 FEB 95 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: LAIPSON

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

LAIPSON

FOR CONCURRENCE

ANDREASEN

AOKI

PONEMAN

ROTH

FOR INFO

BELL

INDYK

SENS

SODERBERG

WOLIN

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJDA

CLOSED BY:

DOC 1 OF 1



S/S 9502928
United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

February 21, 1995

1399

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary
National Security Council Staff
The White House

SUBJECT: Alerting NSCS on Presidential
Correspondence

Enclosed is the original of a letter to President Clinton from Shaikh Jaber Al-Ahmad Al-Sabah, Amir of Kuwait, which is transmitted for your information.

This correspondence was received in the Information Resources Management Section of the Executive Secretariat on February 21, 1995. A copy has been assigned to the appropriate bureau for action.

Chief, S/S-IRM/RMD
Information Resources Management Section
Records Management Division
Executive Secretariat
647-2991

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

1399

سفارة دولة الكويت
واشنطن

EMBASSY OF THE STATE OF KUWAIT
2940 TILDEN STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20008



KEC: 01/95

The Embassy of the State of Kuwait presents its compliments to the Department of State and has the honor to request the Department's assistance in forwarding the enclosed telegraphic communication from His Highness Shaikh Jaber Al-Ahmad Al-Sabah, Amir of the State of Kuwait, to the Honorable William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States of America.

The Embassy of the State of Kuwait avails itself of the opportunity to renew to the Department of State the assurances of its highest consideration.

Washington, D. C.

February 14, 1995



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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004a. letter	Amir of Kuwait Shaikh Jaber Al-Ahmad Al-Sabah to POTUS [Arabic] (1 page)	02/14/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Expert Controls)
OA/Box Number: 711

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, January 1995 [6]

2009-0528-F
kc1578

RESTRICTION CODES

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004b. letter	Amir of Kuwait Shaikh Jaber Al-Ahmad Al-Sabah to POTUS [English translation] (1 page)	02/14/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Expert Controls)
OA/Box Number: 711

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, January 1995 [6]

2009-0528-F
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005a. fax	cover, Marten to Aoki et al (1 page)	02/22/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Expert Controls)
OA/Box Number: 711

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005b. paper	re license request (1 page)	02/22/1995	P1/b(1)

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National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Expert Controls)
OA/Box Number: 711

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005c. memo	Tarullo to Tarnoff re license request (4 pages)	02/22/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Expert Controls)
OA/Box Number: 711

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, January 1995 [6]

2009-0528-F
kc1578

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
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TAB B

January 21, 1995

UNCLASSIFIED
MEMORANDUM

TO: R. Richard Newcomb
Director
Office of Foreign Assets Control
Department of the Treasury

FROM: Robert S. Deutsch
Director
Office of Economic Sanctions Policy

SUBJECT: North Korea License Request by the Stanton Group

REF: FAC No. 142988

The Department of State does not object to issuance of a license authorizing the Stanton Group of Boston, Massachusetts, to enter into a joint venture with a North Korean firm to operate the Sombong oil-fired electric power plant and the Sombong oil refinery. The license should include the following conditions with respect to operation of the Sombong oil refinery:

- 1) All refined products shall be exported from North Korea;
- 2) All hard currency earnings shall be managed by the licensee, and the DPRK's portion thereof shall be deposited in an escrow account established in a bank subject to U.S. jurisdiction and used solely to expand or upgrade conventionally powered electric generating plants in the DPRK.

This project will substantially advance our foreign policy objectives pursuant to the U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework of October 21, 1994.

We do not support issuance of a license authorizing Stanton to promote foreign investment in North Korea at this time.

Stanton Group officials have kept us regularly informed of their contacts with the DPRK and they advised us they were also in contact with OFAC with respect to licensing requirements. We understand that all Stanton's arrangements with respect to undertaking projects in North Korea's energy sector were contingent on required U.S. Government approvals.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005d. letter	The Stanton Group to Richard Newcomb OFAC re Special License [50 USC 2411c] (4 pages)	11/23/1994	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Expert Controls)
OA/Box Number: 711

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, January 1995 [6]

2009-0528-F
kc1578

RESTRICTION CODES

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005e. paper	fact sheet on Stanton Group [50 USC 2411c] (1 page)	00/00/0000	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Expert Controls)
OA/Box Number: 711

FOLDER TITLE:

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THE STANTON GROUP

CHARTER AND MANAGEMENT TEAM

The Stanton Group
Two Faneuil Hall
Third Floor
Boston, MA 02109
617-742-7008
617-742-7006 fax

January 1995

THE STANTON GROUP CHARTER AND MANAGEMENT TEAM

The Stanton Group Charter

The Stanton Group, Inc. develops and manages independent power plants, qualified cogeneration facilities, and waste-to-energy projects as part of an integrated economic development strategy.

The Company's power facilities are based on alternative and waste fuels such as:

1. municipal, commercial, and demolition solid waste;
2. industrial sludge, mainly paper and petroleum processing waste;
3. whole tree wood chips, bark, lumber mill waste wood, and other biomass;
4. peat; and
5. waste coal;

as well as conventional fuels such as gas and coal.

The Stanton Group uses the electric power sector to help stimulate economic activity and to provide the basis for development of new industries, in part by emphasizing the use of indigenous fuels and in part by attracting companion industries to co-locate with its power plants.

The Company's primary domestic markets are in the mid-Atlantic states, the South East and the Great Lakes. The Company's primary international markets are Canada; Mexico; Eastern Europe; and the Pacific Rim, including Korea, China, and Russia.

Corporate headquarters are in Boston, Massachusetts. Research facilities are in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

AFFILIATES

PowerMass: The corporation through which Stanton develops and implements new energy technologies. For example, PowerMass is patenting a significant technology, based on thermodynamic principles, that reduces the cost of insulating steam pipes and hot water heaters.

Faneuil Group: An 800-person corporation engaged in telecommunications, telemarketing, information services, and database generation and delivery. With offices throughout the U.S. and Canada and headquarters in Boston, Faneuil Group is providing leading edge services to electric utility, telephone, automobile, financial, and other industries.

Faneuil Economic Development Co.: A joint venture of Stanton and Faneuil which undertakes the economic development aspect of these companies' power generation and telecommunications businesses. Stanton Group is the managing partner of FEDCO.

The Stanton International Center for Engineering Management at Drexel University: Stanton's program to transfer technology and human resource skills to prepare people in developing nations to assume leadership roles in their countries' engineering endeavors. Founded upon Drexel's long-established and highly regarded Career-Integrated Education program, the Center provides a practical graduate curriculum with training in the U.S. and the host nation, both in academic settings and industrial partners' locations, with an emphasis on the skills required for national self-sufficiency in power plant and other infrastructure investment activities.

The Stanton Group

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The Stanton Group Management Team

The Stanton Group has formed a team of experienced management and technical professionals covering all of the disciplines needed to develop power generating facilities, their related power supply industries, and the economic infrastructure that is central to Stanton's economic development strategy.

The Company has broad based experience in business management, corporate and project finance, strategic planning, engineering, research and development, project management, power plant construction, environmental engineering, fuel supply, economic analysis, real estate, marketing, and entrepreneurship.

The team's skills are represented by the following individuals.

PRESIDENT

Dr. Stephen J. Browne

Ph.D. - Economics - Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Experienced chief executive officer, new business developer, entrepreneur, and management consultant. Former co-founder and President of Dun & Bradstreet Technical Economic Services (sold to Dun & Bradstreet in 1986)....former founder and President of The Planning Economics Group (sold to Infodynamica in 1981)....former member of the development group and vice president, Data Resources, Inc. (sold to McGraw-Hill, Inc. in 1979)....formerly a Director of several publicly held real estate investment, mortgage, and finance companies.

VICE PRESIDENT

Dr. Charles B. Warden

Ph.D. - Economics - Harvard University

Experienced business executive, new business and real estate developer, entrepreneur, management consultant, academician, and government administrator. Former member of founding team and vice president, Data Resources, Inc. (sold to McGraw-Hill, Inc. in 1979)....former co-founder and Chief Operating Officer, Strategic Information Inc. (owned by Ziff-Davis)....former Dean and Professor of Economics and Management at the Graduate School of Business, University of New Hampshire....former Chief of Staff of the Council of Economic Advisors under Presidents Johnson and Nixon.

VICE PRESIDENT

Dr. Harry L. Brown

Ph.D. - Nuclear Engineering - Stanford University

Experienced professional in the field of heat transfer and energy conversion technologies, with over 20 years experience applying this knowledge to the emerging discipline of cogeneration in the private sector....specialized in technical and business problems of manufacturers of energy equipment and erectors of industrial and utility turnkey sites. Professor of Mechanical Engineering, Drexel University....Director, Engineering Management Program, Drexel University....Director, Drexel University Technology Center....Director, Drexel University Energy Sources and Systems Institute....Member, Philadelphia Mayor's Solid Waste Advisory Committee.. Former co-founder and Executive Vice President of Dun & Bradstreet Technical Economic Services (sold to Dun & Bradstreet in 1986)....former co-founder and President of the energy consulting firm General Energy Associates....consultant to numerous major corporations and utilities in the fields of power equipment manufacturing and energy distribution and use....former Project Manager in Breeder Reactor Development Program in the Atomic Energy Commission....co-author of Energy Analysis of 108 Industrial Processes, Fairmont Press, 1985....co-author of Cogeneration Potential 1980-2000. Targeting Opportunities at the Plant Site, NTIS, 1983.

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VICE PRESIDENT, EAST ASIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Dr. Roy U. T. Kim

Ph.D. - International Relations, University of Pennsylvania

An acknowledged specialist on East Asian, Pacific and Russian affairs. Professor, International Political Economy, Drexel University. Former adjunct professor, Columbia University. Scholar-Diplomat, U.S. State Department (1972, 1989). Dr. Kim is the recipient of several distinguished research grants including Senior Fulbright Research Fellowship to Korea, Moscow State University, the Ford Foundation, the L.B. Johnson Foundation...As a highly respected authority has been invited to testify before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, to serve on the research grant evaluating board of the International Area Studies, the U.S. Department of Education, and to write essays for a variety of daily newspapers around the world...Member, International Institute for Strategic Studies, American Committee on U.S.-Soviet Relations, Association for Asian Studies...Author of several books including: Soviet-Japanese Relations Under Gorbachev (1988), New Ties in the Pacific, edited with Hilary Conroy (1987), and Calendar of Diplomatic Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 1945-1975, coauthored with George Ginsburgs (1977).

EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT

Diana N. Reynolds

Over 20 years of experience in administration....responsibilities include Accounting, Financial, and Legal Interface; corporate communications and market intelligence; and computer services....joined organization during its initial stage providing administrative services for its founders. Formerly Assistant to the President, Dun & Bradstreet Technical Economic Services....joined organization during its initial stages, assisting with the formulation of policies and procedures, and providing administrative services for the founder....coordinated efforts of architects, developers, and contractors in designing and building 20,000 square feet of high tech office space, managed furniture and telephone installations and move into new headquarters....assisted in major reorganization after its purchase by D&B and oriented new senior officer to the company. 10 years at the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Executive Secretary to the Senior Vice President....monitored status of projects throughout the bank....research assistance....handled media relations.

OTHER KEY PERSONNEL

Dr. Robert J. Schoenberger

Ph.D., P.E. - Chemical Engineering - Drexel University.

Over 25 years of experience in environmental engineering specializing in design and engineering for solid and hazardous waste treatment and disposal systems....responsibilities include environmental permitting and project structuring. Experience includes project manager for design and evaluation of sanitary landfills and resource recovery systems....construction supervisor for waste management facility....directing operation and management of resource recovery systems...consultant on theoretical and applied combustion systems and air pollution controls....former professor at Drexel University Environmental Studies Institute....Diplomate, American Academy of Environmental Engineers. Formerly Vice President, Municipal and Hazardous Waste, and Vice President, Waste Disposal Technology, Roy Weston Associates....most recently President, R-S Engineers and Consultants.

CHAIRMAN AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, FANEUIL INC.

G. Dennis O'Brien

M.A., Economics, Fordham University.

Before joining The Faneuil Group, Mr. O'Brien was Executive Vice President and General Manager for McDonnell Douglas Network Applications Group, which included McDonnell Douglas Payment Systems, Telecheck Inc., and McDonnell Douglas Electronic Data Interchange. Prior to joining McDonnell Douglas, Mr. O'Brien was TRW Information Systems Group Vice President in charge of marketing, planning and business development. Mr. O'Brien has also served as Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer of Dun & Bradstreet Technical Economic Services. At Ziff-Davis, he was Executive Vice President, Chief Operating Officer, and later Chairman of Strategic Information. At Data Resources, Inc. (DRI), Mr. O'Brien was Senior Vice President in charge of Industrial Economics, Marketing and Sales, and DRI's International Operations. He began his career as an Economist at Union Carbide Corporation. Mr. O'Brien served on the Board of Directors of The WEFA Group (formerly Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates, and Chase Econometrics), and currently serves on the Board of Directors of Infotech, a Summit Partners Investment. He did his doctoral studies in Economics at New York State University, Graduate School of Public Affairs.

PRINCIPAL, POWERMASS

Dr. George N. Facas

Ph.D., Mechanical Engineering, Drexel University

Dr. Facas is an engineering consultant to numerous large companies in the fields of thermal design, systems and analysis, heat transfer, and thermodynamics. Currently Professor, Dept. of Mechanical Engineering, Trenton State College. Previously Adjunct Assistant Professor at Drexel University. Formerly employed at General Electric Company's Astro-Space Division, General Energy Associates, Dun & Bradstreet, and Philadelphia Gas Works. Dr. Facas has presented papers at many conferences and written articles in numerous publications including the Journal of Thermophysics and Heat Transfer and the ASME Journal of Heat Transfer. He has been the recipient of several large grants for research and development laboratories. Dr. Facas' current focus is in the area of heat transfer analysis and thermal insulation. He is conducting research and has a patent pending which is being developed by PowerMass.