

FOIA MARKER

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Folder Title:

North Korea, January 1995 [1]

Staff Office-Individual:

Nonproliferation and Export Controls-Aoki, Steven

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711

Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:	Stack:
41	5	6	3	V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. paper	re strategy for KEDO start up (5 pages)	01/05/1995	P1/b(1)
002a. memo	Mr Tarnoff to Secretary of State re meeting and luncheon (5 pages)	02/06/1995	P1/b(1)
002b. paper	re meeting (1 page)	02/06/1995	P1/b(1)
002c. talking points	re US-ROK relations (3 pages)	02/06/1995	P1/b(1)
003. memo	David Brown to Ambassador Lord re high-level talks (10 pages)	02/01/1995	P1/b(1)
004a. fax	cover, Frank Miller to Dan Poneman (1 page)	01/31/1995	P1/b(1)
004b. draft	memo, David Brown to Ambassador Lord re high-level talks [earlier copy of 003] (5 pages)	01/31/1995	P1/b(1)
004c. memo	Walt Slocombe to Distribution re senior steering group on Korea (3 pages)	01/31/1995	P1/b(1)
005a. cable	re KEDO ad ref text (1 page)	01/19/1995	P1/b(1)
005b. draft	agreement (10 pages)	01/19/1995	P1/b(1)
006a. note	John Podesta and Todd Stern to POTUS re sanctions (1 page)	01/20/1995	P1/b(1)
006b. memo	action, Anthony Lake to POTUS re Next Steps (3 pages)	01/19/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 711

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, January 1995 [1]

2009-0528-F

kc1573

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]

P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]

P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]

P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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007. letter	Ambassador Gallucci to Minister Kang re confirmation (1 page)	01/20/1995	P1/b(1)

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As modified by Christopher & Perry.

-- As called for in the Framework Agreement, North Korea has stopped construction of their new reactors, shut down reprocessing facilities, and not refueled their existing reactor. These actions have been monitored by IAEA inspectors.

-- We have some concern about the disposition of a small portion of the heavy fuel oil that we have shipped them for heating and power generation. We have no concern, however that the oil has been used to power North Korea's military machine. One of the reasons that we sent them heavy fuel oil is that it can't be used in military planes and vehicles.

-- We have raised this issue with North Korea and told them that we expect them to comply fully with the terms of the Framework Agreement. ~~[As Secretary Christopher told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Tuesday, we are monitoring the situation carefully and proceeding with implementation of the accord.]~~

Q: Doesn't this mean that they've broken the agreement?

A: We've said from beginning that the agreement isn't based on trust. We're monitoring North Korean compliance carefully, and, in fact, they are sealing their nuclear program as required. We have raised our concern about the disposition of a small portion of fuel oil and told them that we expect full compliance. Based on our overall assessment of the situation, we are proceeding with implementation of the Agreed Framework while continuing careful monitoring.

CONTINGENCY PRESS GUIDANCE

NORTH KOREA

Q. What is your reaction to reports that North Korea is diverting the U.S.-supplied fuel oil to a steel mill where they make munitions?

A.-- We've seen these reports and are concerned about them.

- The Agreed Framework provides that the oil we supply will be used exclusively for heating and electrical power generation.
- We have raised these concerns with the North Koreans and asked them to clarify what use is being made of the heavy fuel oil.

WASHFAX RECEIPT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WHITE HOUSE
COMM ROOM

1995 JAN -5 AM 9:39

B

S/S #

'94 JAN -5 A9:22

C

MESSAGE NO. 015819 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ No. Pages 16
FROM: Gary Samore S/AL 7-1829 Rm. 6313
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION _____

<u>TO: (Agency)</u>	<u>DELIVER TO:</u>	<u>Extension</u>	<u>Room No.</u>
NSC	Dan Poneman	456-9181	380
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
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_____	_____	_____	_____

FOR: CLEARANCE ☐ INFORMATION ☐ PER REQUEST ☒ COMMENT ☐

REMARKS: _____

S/S Officer: _____

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: LO Date: 07/28/15
2009-0528-F

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**TERMS AND CONDITIONS FOR AGREEMENT ON
SUPPLY OF A LIGHT-WATER REACTOR PROJECT BETWEEN
THE KOREAN ENERGY DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATION AND
THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA**

1. Scope of Supply

A. The Korean Energy Development Organization (KEDO) shall provide two Korean standard light-water reactor (LWR) units with a capacity of approximately 1000 MW(e) each to the DPRK on a turn key basis.

B. The scope of supply for the LWR project shall include the tasks and projects specified in annex 1 to this agreement.

C. The LWR project shall conform to a set of codes and standards, including those relating to safety, environmental protection and waste disposal and storage, comparable to those used for the construction, maintenance, and operation of nuclear power plants in the U.S.

D. This supply agreement shall constitute an international agreement between KEDO and the DPRK, which is binding on both parties under international law. *and shall be*

2. Terms of Payment

A. Consideration for the provision of the LWR project shall consist of:

(a) the DPRK satisfying the assurances described in article 12; and

(b) the DPRK paying KEDO the purchase price over a twenty-year period, free of interest, with payments beginning following completion of the [first] LWR project.

B. The DPRK and KEDO shall calculate the purchase price based on the price established in the supply contracts to be concluded between KEDO and the authorized prime contractor for the scope of supply specified in annex 1. The DPRK shall not be responsible for any additional costs over the purchase price of items specified in annex 1, other than such costs as result from actions or inactions by the DPRK. The DPRK shall be responsible for all costs with respect to the scope of supply specified in annex 2 and for all operation and maintenance costs except as provided for in annex 1. *not clear*

C. If the DPRK chooses to pay in kind, the value of the goods provided will be determined at the time of delivery based on an agreed formula for determining market price, net of the cost of disposition and transportation. Penalties will be applied in the event of nonpayment or late payment.

3. Delivery Schedule

A. KEDO shall supply the items specified in Annex 1 of this agreement in accordance with the terms of the U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework of October 21, 1994, which sets a target date of 2003 for completion of the LWR project. The first phase of the project will be completion of a "significant portion" of the LWR project. (Completion of a "significant portion" of the LWR project, as that phrase is used in the U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework, will be more precisely defined in this agreement.)

B. Once the DPRK has taken all steps that may be deemed necessary by the IAEA, and the IAEA has declared that the DPRK is in compliance with its fullscope safeguards agreement with the IAEA (INFCIRC 403), and the necessary bilateral agreements for nuclear cooperation have been concluded, the delivery of key nuclear components for the first reactor unit will begin. For purposes of this agreement, "key nuclear components" are all items included in the trigger list of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. When delivery of these key nuclear components for the first reactor unit begins, the transfer from the DPRK of spent fuel from the 5 MW experimental reactor for ultimate disposition will begin. The transfer of spent fuel will be completed when the first reactor unit is completed. Target date for completion of the first reactor unit is by the end of 2001.

C. When the first reactor unit is completed, the DPRK will begin dismantling its frozen graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities, as specified in the U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework. Dismantlement, including disassembly or destruction of relevant components and equipment, will be completed when the second reactor unit is completed. Target date for the completion of the second reactor unit is by the end of 2003.

D. Plans and schedules for LWR deployment, shipment of spent fuel from the DPRK, and dismantlement of the DPRK's graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities shall be agreed between KEDO and the DPRK, with appropriate reference to the provisions of the U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework.

4. Site Selection

A. KEDO shall conduct a site study to ensure that appropriate site selection criteria have been satisfied. For this purpose, KEDO will apply the criteria established by the IAEA and the United States. The site study shall also identify any infrastructure improvements that may be needed in order to complete the LWR project (e.g., port improvements, roads, power supply, water, and other amenities).

B. The site selection process will focus initially on the DPRK-preferred site at Kumho-ri, Sinpo city, South Hamgyong Province as a candidate site. The DPRK shall provide KEDO with relevant information, including the results of the studies that were performed previously at this site in connection with the DPRK-USSR agreement on Economic and Technical Cooperation in Constructing the Nuclear Power Plant.

5. DPRK Obligations

A. The DPRK shall be responsible for performing the work described in annex 2 in accordance with the plans, specifications, and schedules for the LWR project.

B. All DPRK approvals necessary for completion of the LWR project shall be provided expeditiously and free of charge, including but not limited to visas, licenses, permits, import and export licenses, access rights, and site take-over agreements.

C. All personnel sent to the DPRK by KEDO or KEDO contractors shall be allowed full, secure, unimpeded access to the project site and to designated land, sea, and air transportation routes to and from the project site. *international communication*

D. Currency exchange and other financial services for KEDO and its contractors shall be provided at the project site and in Pyongyang.

E. KEDO and its contractors shall be permitted to operate offices at the project site and in Pyongyang and other related locations.

F. DPRK shall make available at a fair price water, food, lodging, communications, and other amenities necessary for living and working by personnel sent to the DPRK by KEDO or KEDO contractors.

G. The DPRK shall protect the safety of personnel sent to the DPRK by KEDO or KEDO's contractors. Consular access to all such personnel shall be guaranteed.

H. The DPRK shall accord KEDO and its staff such privileges and immunities in the territory of the DPRK as necessary to carry out the functions entrusted in KEDO. These privileges and immunities, and the juridical personality of KEDO within the DPRK, shall be defined in a separate agreement between KEDO and the DPRK.

I. The DPRK shall cooperate fully with KEDO representatives and contractors in matters related to the project, including the conduct of the site study and any other necessary analytical studies.

6. KEDO Obligations

A. KEDO shall provide the DPRK access to project plans and drawings and to the construction site [as determined as necessary by KEDO] for training, operations, maintenance, and to carry out inspection and licensing functions.

B. KEDO shall do its utmost to ensure that design preparation, equipment delivery, project construction, and LWR completion occurs within the periods agreed upon in the contract.

C. KEDO shall ensure that guarantees with respect to LWR design and construction are issued to the DPRK by the designer and vender, as appropriate, in accordance with nuclear industry practice (i.e., guarantees for one year from the date of project completion).

D. After providing the initial load of fuel for the reactors, KEDO or its successor shall facilitate the availability of additional fuel on commercial terms as long as the DPRK is in compliance with this agreement.

E. After providing spare parts, as recommended by the architect/engineer, for the first two years of operation, KEDO or its successor shall facilitate the availability of additional spare parts on commercial terms as long as the DPRK is in compliance with this agreement.

F. [As soon as possible after the spent fuel from the LWR units is discharged, KEDO or its successor shall be responsible for transferring such spent fuel out of the DPRK for ultimate disposition.]

G. Personnel sent to the DPRK by KEDO and KEDO's contractors shall ~~be required to~~ comply with relevant laws of the DPRK, as shall be agreed between KEDO and the DPRK, and shall conduct themselves at all times in a professional manner,

7. Contractual Arrangements

A. KEDO shall be designated as the formal point of contact with the DPRK on matters relating to the construction, maintenance, and operation of the LWR project.

B. KEDO will conclude a commercial contract with a Prime Contractor responsible for the design and construction of the LWR project. KEDO will also hire a commercial entity to act as the program coordinator or owner's engineer.

C. The DPRK (or a commercial entity authorized to act on its behalf) shall enter into arrangements with KEDO (or a private company authorized to act on its behalf) with respect to specific requirements for performance by the DPRK side of the work described in annex 2.

D. KEDO will also facilitate direct communication between the DPRK and commercial entities involved in the LWR project, including the Prime Contractor, when such communications are required to facilitate implementation of the LWR project.

8. Nuclear Safety, Regulation, and Licensing

A. The DPRK shall assure that nuclear regulatory standards and procedures comparable to those of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission are in place to promote the safe operation of the nuclear plant.

This is a high hurdle.

B. The DPRK shall adhere to the the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material at the earliest opportunity, but before beginning operation of the first nuclear plant.)

C. KEDO shall cooperate in the effort to ensure safe LWR construction, operation, and maintenance, including periodic safety reviews at appropriate stages of construction prior to reactor operation.

D. The DPRK shall be responsible for the safe operation of the reactors and appropriate storage and disposal of radioactive waste, and shall accept the result of periodic safety reviews conducted by KEDO.

E. In the event of a nuclear emergency or accident, the DPRK shall permit immediate and unconditional access to the site by personnel sent by KEDO or KEDO's contractors to determine the extent of safety concerns and to provide safety assistance.

9. Nuclear Liability

A. The DPRK shall assure that a legal and financial mechanism is available for meeting claims for damages in the event of an LWR accident that releases dangerous amounts of radioactivity, including the following features:

Liability in the event of a nuclear accident will be channelled to the reactor operator, who will accept absolute liability.

or otherwise (7)

Funds will be arranged by the DPRK to satisfy such liabilities within internationally established limits.

The DPRK will provide for the defense of third-party claims and indemnify the LWR suppliers for judgments that might be assessed.

10. Intellectual Property

A. To the extent that the DPRK has access to intellectual property owned by the firms supplying the reactors, it shall provide for the protection of such intellectual property in accordance with international norms. Intellectual property will include, without limitation, plans and specifications, operational information, and maintenance information.

11. Dispute Resolution

A. Disputes shall be settled through consultations between the DPRK and KEDO, in conformity with the principles of international law.

B. Disputes that cannot be resolved in this manner shall be settled by referral to arbitration in accordance with the procedures contained in an annex to this agreement.

C. The decision of the arbitral tribunal shall be final.

12. Assurances in Connection with LWR Delivery

A. The following assurances must be satisfied by the DPRK as condition of KEDO's obligations under this agreement:

B. The DPRK shall continue the freeze on its graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities and shall permit continued IAEA monitoring thereof.

C. The DPRK shall refrain from the construction of new graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities.

D. The DPRK shall conclude a bilateral agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation with the U.S., as necessary.

E. The DPRK shall continue cooperation on spent fuel storage and ultimate disposition.

F. Upon conclusion of the supply agreement, the DPRK shall permit resumption of ad hoc and routine inspections on facilities not subject to the freeze.

G. When a significant portion of the LWR project is completed, but before delivery of key nuclear components, the DPRK shall come into full compliance with its IAEA safeguards agreement.

H. Between completion of the first LWR unit and completion of the second LWR unit, the DPRK shall dismantle its graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities.

I. Beginning after initial delivery of key nuclear components and concluding when the first LWR unit is completed, the DPRK shall transfer spent fuel from the 5 MW(e) experimental reactor from its territory for ultimate disposition.

J. As soon as possible after LWR spent fuel is discharged, the DPRK shall transfer [at its own expense] such spent fuel from its territory for ultimate disposition.

K. The DPRK shall use the reactors and nuclear material transferred in the LWR project, as well as any nuclear material used therein or produced through their use exclusively for the purposes of the LWR project and for peaceful, non-explosive purposes.

L. The DPRK shall provide adequate physical protection in accordance with international standards with respect to the reactors and nuclear material transferred pursuant to this supply agreement, as well as any nuclear material used therein or produced through the use of such items for the useful life of such reactors and nuclear material.

M. The DPRK shall assure the application of IAEA safeguards to the reactors and nuclear material transferred pursuant to this supply agreement, as well as any nuclear material used therein or produced through the use of such items, for the useful life of such reactors and nuclear material.

N. The DPRK shall at no time reprocess or increase the enrichment level of any nuclear material transferred pursuant to this supply agreement, or any nuclear material used in or produced through the use of any reactor or nuclear material transferred in the LWR project.

O. The DPRK shall not transfer any nuclear equipment or technology or nuclear material transferred pursuant to this supply agreement, or any nuclear material used therein or produced through the use of such items, outside the jurisdiction and control of the DPRK unless otherwise agreed between the DPRK and KEDO.

13. Actions in the Event of Non-compliance

A. In the event that the DPRK abrogates or violates any of the above assurances, KEDO shall have the right to suspend or terminate this supply agreement and to require the return of any nuclear materials and equipment transferred pursuant to this agreement and any special nuclear material produced through the use thereof. In this event, KEDO shall also have the right to suspend the provision of interim energy supplies and to require the return of such supplies.

ANNEX 1: SCOPE OF SUPPLY

KEDO will provide the following [as regarded as necessary by KEDO], except to the extent that the DPRK will be responsible as set forth in annex 2:

1. Site-specific designs, plans, and schedules.
2. LWR equipment and directly related auxiliary equipment.
3. Materials and construction services for construction of the nuclear plant.
4. Overall project management, including quality control.
5. Studies and assessments.
6. Architect/Engineer-recommended spare parts for a two-year period of plant operation.
7. Nuclear fuel for the initial loading of the nuclear plant.
8. Testing services for initial plant operation.
9. Training for operation and maintenance of the nuclear plant, including simulators needed for such training.
10. Technical support services for the early stage of operation and maintenance.

ANNEX 2: SCOPE OF DPRK WORK ON THE LWR PROJECT

1. Site preparation for the LWR project, including securing and clearing of the site.
2. Provision of facilities for distribution of electricity, water supply and drainage, and other incidental facilities.
3. Port and road improvement to facilitate transport of equipment and materials.
4. Electrical transmission lines, off-site substations, and off-site network connected to the nuclear plant.

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003. memo	David Brown to Ambassador Lord re high-level talks (10 pages)	02/01/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 711

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, January 1995 [1]

2009-0528-F
kc1573

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004a. fax	cover, Frank Miller to Dan Poneman (1 page)	01/31/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 711

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, January 1995 [1]

2009-0528-F
kc1573

RESTRICTION CODES

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004b. draft	memo, David Brown to Ambassador Lord re high-level talks [earlier copy of 003] (5 pages)	01/31/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 711

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, January 1995 [1]

2009-0528-F
kc1573

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004c. memo	Walt Slocombe to Distribution re senior steering group on Korea (3 pages)	01/31/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 711

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, January 1995 [1]

2009-0528-F
kc1573

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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Steve
copy
421
1



Department of Energy
Washington, DC 20585

OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
FACSIMILE TRANSMITTAL FORM

Fax Number: FTS 896-4403 Verify (Voice) FTS 896-5081 Verify (Alternate) FTS 896-5078
CML 202-586-4403 CML 202-586-5081 CML 202-586-5078

f

Date: 1-11-95

To: Don Poneman, NSC Fax: 456-9180

From: Charles Curtis

a

Transmittal consists of 1 pages, excluding this form.


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Notes:

**The Under Secretary of Energy**

Washington, DC 20585

January 10, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR:T. J. Glauthier
Assistant Director, OMB**FROM:**Charles Curtis **SUBJECT: DOE Responsibilities for US-DPRK Nuclear Agreement**

Now that the Department of Energy's FY 1996 budget request has been made final, I would like to clarify my understanding of the Department's commitment regarding funding for the US-North Korea Nuclear Agreement for FY 1996.

As a result of the agreed upon division of responsibilities for implementing the agreement in the interagency process, the Department made a commitment to specific spent fuel activities: stabilization of the chemistry of the pool and canning of the spent fuel in North Korea. To meet that commitment, the Department will request a reprogramming of \$10 M in FY 1995. While we currently expect the reprogrammed FY 1995 money to be adequate to these purposes, additional funding may be required in 1996 to provide for monitoring activities. Our best estimate at this time is that less than \$1 M will be required in 1996.

In view of the tight constraints placed on the overall DOE budget, our final budget request identifies \$15 M for DPRK-related and other high priority non-proliferation activities. Of this amount, we expect to commit \$10 M for the Industrial Partnering Program. If technical problems arise that require additional funding in FY 1996 to fulfill the Department's spent fuel responsibilities in North Korea, the Department will either request a budget amendment or a reprogramming to provide for the completion of the agreed spent fuel activities for which the Department is responsible, consistent with the OMB pass-back guidance.

cc Gordon Adams, OMB
Dan Poneman, NSC

COMMON PRESS GUIDANCE (DRAFT)

The two leaders reaffirmed their solidarity with respect to the North Korean nuclear issue.

The two leaders, noting with full satisfaction the close coordination among the ROK, Japan and the U.S. in their work to implement the U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework, shared the view that:

- KEDO must be established in a timely manner to implement the Agreed Framework, in the expectation that the DPRK will meet its obligations;
- broad international participation in KEDO, including its LWR project, must be pursued; and
- nuclear safety must be ensured as KEDO develops its projects.

Prime Minister Murayama stated that, to ensure the success of the light water reactor project which directly relates to the security and stability of the Northeast Asia region including Japan, the GOJ intends to play a significant financial role in the LWR project, under an overall project scheme in which the ROK is expected to play the central role. The Prime Minister also stated that, in order to enable timely initiation of KEDO's activities, the GOJ intends its contribution to include support for the LWR site survey and, along with other countries, KEDO operating costs.

President Clinton welcomed the Prime Minister's statements, noted the U.S. already had made contributions to activities in accordance with terms of the Agreed Framework, including safe storage and disposition of spent fuel in North Korea and provision of alternative energy supplies, and he reaffirmed his intention that the U.S. would continue to play a leading role, and contribute financially to KEDO's activities.

The two leaders were in full agreement that relations between South and North Korea must improve along with implementation of the Agreed Framework.

Sharing a common hope for a lessening of tension on the Korean Peninsula and promotion of stability in the Northeast Asia region, the two leaders expressed concern over North Korea's forward-deployment of its conventional forces and its development of long-range ballistic missiles.

WASHFAX RECEIPT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

95 JAN 19 P2:29

B

S/S #

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C

MESSAGE NO. _____ CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL No. Pages 11
FROM: Carstenuto S/AL 647-1868 6317
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION _____
Ad ref KEDO Agreement

(Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Extension	Room No.
<u>OSD</u>	<u>Cpt. Loeffler</u>	<u>695-6565</u>	<u>4E830</u>
<u>W3C</u>	<u>Dan Peneman</u>	<u>456-9181</u>	<u>380</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____
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_____	_____	_____	_____

R: CLEARANCE ☒ INFORMATION ☐ PER REQUEST ☐ COMMENT ☐

MARKS: URGENT! Please call for immediate pick-up.
Clearance by COB today please. Thank you!

S/S Officer: _____

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Initials: MM Date: 08/05/15
2009-0528-F

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Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005a. cable	re KEDO ad ref text (1 page)	01/19/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 711

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, January 1995 [1]

2009-0528-F
kc1573

RESTRICTION CODES

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005b. draft	agreement (10 pages)	01/19/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 711

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, January 1995 [1]

2009-0528-F
kc1573

RESTRICTION CODES

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006a. note	John Podesta and Todd Stern to POTUS re sanctions (1 page)	01/20/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 711

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, January 1995 [1]

2009-0528-F
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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006b. memo	action, Anthony Lake to POTUS re Next Steps (3 pages)	01/19/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 711

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, January 1995 [1]

2009-0528-F
kc1573

RESTRICTION CODES

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007. letter	Ambassador Gallucci to Minister Kang re confirmation (1 page)	01/20/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 711

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, January 1995 [1]

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