

FOIA MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Folder Title:

North Korea, August 1994 [6]

Staff Office-Individual:

Nonproliferation and Export Controls-Aoki, Steven

Original OA/ID Number:

283

Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:	Stack:
41	5	5	2	V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	John Holum to Anthony Lake re spent fuel (2 pages)	08/00/1994	P1/b(1)
002a. memo	Warren Stern to Distribution re spent fuel (1 page)	07/27/1994	P1/b(1)
002b. paper	re spent fuel A (5 pages)	07/27/1994	P1/b(1)
002c. paper	re spent fuel B (5 pages)	07/27/1994	P1/b(1)
002d. paper	re spent fuel C (3 pages)	07/27/1994	P1/b(1)
002e. paper	re spent fuel D (2 pages)	07/27/1994	P1/b(1)
002f. paper	re spent fuel E (2 pages)	07/27/1994	P1/b(1)
002g. paper	re spent fuel F (2 pages)	07/27/1994	P1/b(1)
002h. paper	re spent fuel G (2 pages)	07/27/1994	P1/b(1)
003. report	re North Korea (26 pages)	06/00/1994	P1/b(1)
004. letter	Minister Kang to Ambassador Gallucci re meeting (2 pages)	06/22/1994	P1/b(1)
005a. letter	POTUS Carter to POTUS (2 pages)	06/21/1994	P1/b(1)
005b. report	re trip report to Korea (6 pages)	06/00/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 283

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, August 1994 [6]

2009-0528-F

kc1568

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005c. memo	Anthony Lake to POTUS re phone call to ROK president (1 page)	06/22/1994	P1/b(1)
005d. talking points	re phone call to ROK president (1 page)	06/22/1994	P1/b(1)
005e. letter	Minister Kang to Ambassador Gallucci [duplicate of 004] (2 pages)	06/22/1994	P1/b(1)
006a. memo	action, Daniel Poneman to Anthony Lake re North Korea (1 page)	06/03/1994	P1/b(1)
006b. memo	action, Anthony Lake to POTUS re North Korea (10 pages)	06/03/1994	P1/b(1)
006c. paper	re sanctions (3 pages)	06/03/1994	P1/b(1)
006d. paper	re sanctions (2 pages)	06/03/1994	P1/b(1)
006e. paper	re reactions (1 page)	06/03/1994	P1/b(1)
006f. memo	OSD Korea Task Force to Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Policy re North Korea (3 pages)	06/00/1994	P1/b(1)
006g. paper	re North Korea (10 pages)	06/00/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 283

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, August 1994 [6]

2009-0528-F

kc1568

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	John Holum to Anthony Lake re spent fuel (2 pages)	08/00/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 283

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, August 1994 [6]

2009-0528-F
kc1568

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002a. memo	Warren Stern to Distribution re spent fuel (1 page)	07/27/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 283

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, August 1994 [6]

2009-0528-F
kc1568

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002b. paper	re spent fuel A (5 pages)	07/27/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 283

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, August 1994 [6]

2009-0528-F
kc1568

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002c. paper	re spent fuel B (5 pages)	07/27/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 283

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, August 1994 [6]

2009-0528-F
kc1568

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002d. paper	re spent fuel C (3 pages)	07/27/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 283

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, August 1994 [6]

2009-0528-F
kc1568

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002e. paper	re spent fuel D (2 pages)	07/27/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 283

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, August 1994 [6]

2009-0528-F
kc1568

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
--------------------------	---------------	------	-------------

002f. paper	re spent fuel E (2 pages)	07/27/1994	P1/b(1)
-------------	---------------------------	------------	---------

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 283

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, August 1994 [6]

2009-0528-F
kc1568

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002g. paper	re spent fuel F (2 pages)	07/27/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 283

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, August 1994 [6]

2009-0528-F
kc1568

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002h. paper	re spent fuel G (2 pages)	07/27/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 283

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, August 1994 [6]

2009-0528-F
kc1568

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003. report	re North Korea (26 pages)	06/00/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 283

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, August 1994 [6]

2009-0528-F
kc1568

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

PHOTOCOPY
PRESERVATION

Office of Congressional Affairs
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Washington, D.C. 20451

TO: *Nan Poneman*

PHONE: *202-395-5697*

FAX: *202-395-1185*

NUMBER OF PAGES: *5*
(including cover)

NOTE: *Attached are my
Comments on the Draft
Korea op-ed. Call me
if you have any questions.*

FROM: *Ivo Spalatin*

PHONE: (202) 647-3612

FAX#: (202) 647-0024

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOGRAPHY

HOLM
FIR comp
ASAP

Draft Korea oped

PHOTOCOPY
PRESERVATION

DAN

As talks between the United States and North Korea resume in Geneva next week, *President Clinton's policy of ensuring a nonnuclear Korean peninsula as part of his global nonproliferation policy remains firm. Consider the facts of the past seven months.* ~~consider what has happened in the past seven months.~~

In February, the North Koreans agreed to inspections of their nuclear facilities by the International Atomic Energy Agency, and said they would meet with the South. In March, they blocked the IAEA inspectors and threatened to engulf Seoul in a sea of fire. In May, Pyongyang permitted the IAEA to finish its work. In June, it defied the IAEA by unloading a reactor without supervision. Weeks later, the North Koreans -- after meeting with President Carter -- agreed to freeze their program and resume talks. Then, last month, Kim Il Sung died, creating new uncertainties about the future.

Only one thing has remained certain throughout all these changes: President Clinton's policy. He has aggressively pursued our goals of a nonnuclear Korean peninsula and strong global action to combat the spread of nuclear weapons. ~~He has responded to actions, not words.~~

and the usual commitment
President Clinton's policy reflects the vital interests that the United States ~~has~~ ^{there} on the Korean peninsula. Forty years after the conflict that claimed hundreds of thousands of American and South Korean lives, South Korea continues to face the threat of a million troops, most massed near its border. America's commitment to protect South Korea -- our treaty ally, trading partner and fellow democracy -- is unshakable.

To maintain our commitment, the United States has stationed 37,000 American troops in Korea. Their mission -- and their safety -- are vitally important. We also have a deep

DRAFT

PHOTOCOPY
PRESERVATION

Clinton Library
interest in preserving the stability of the Asian Pacific region, and a compelling need to prevent the global spread of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles.

These are the interests that drive the President's actions, and guide his responses.

In building an international coalition in support of these interests, the President has sought and won five United Nations actions calling on Pyongyang to comply with its promises. In June, when North Korea unloaded its five megawatt reactor without adequate IAEA supervision, the President directed American diplomats to begin consultations on a sanctions resolution at the United Nations, and ordered the military to prepare options for enhancing our forces in Korea.

When the North Koreans have taken real steps to meet their commitments, the President has responded in kind. He has seized new opportunities that hold the promise of a negotiated solution to a dangerous situation -- including President Carter's meetings with Kim Il Sung. North Korea agreed not to separate more plutonium or load fresh fuel into its five megawatt reactor, and to let IAEA inspectors monitor its nuclear facilities; and Kim proposed a summit meeting between Pyongyang and Seoul. In turn, the United States offered to resume talks on the full range of issues.

negotiation
As we enter those talks, President Clinton's goals remain unchanged: a nonnuclear Korean peninsula and a strong nonproliferation regime. That means full implementation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, full inspection of North Korea's nuclear facilities by the International Atomic Energy Agency, and full implementation of the North-South Denuclearization Declaration, which bans forever plutonium separation and uranium enrichment. Taken together, these measures would constrain opportunities to build nuclear weapons and address the issue of the separation of plutonium in the past.

DRAFT

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

PHOTOCOPY
PRESERVATION

North Korea's leadership must now choose which path to take.

One
~~The first~~ leads only to increased isolation and hardship for the North Koreans. Should Pyongyang break its commitments to freeze and allow international monitoring of its nuclear program, President Clinton would return the issue to the UN Security Council for further action. The United States is well aware that talks can become a vehicle for delay - and enters these negotiations without illusions.

Other
The ~~second~~ path holds the promise of progress and increased prosperity. After four decades of tension on the North Korean peninsula, a new generation of North Korean leaders has a chance to reduce those tensions and take practical steps to join the international community.

North Korea can agree to comply with its commitments to nonproliferation and address other international concerns, including the threat posed by its conventional forces and its capacity to sell missiles to other nations. It can fully implement the Korean denuclearization declaration and follow up on its offer of a North-South summit meeting, a development we would welcome.

These steps, if implemented, would take North Korea far beyond its existing nonproliferation commitments. As part of a comprehensive resolution of all outstanding issues the United States would be willing to address North Korean desires for greater security assurances, and assistance in replacing its current nuclear technology with less dangerous light-water facilities. We would welcome the chance to defuse a dangerous situation in a manner that meets our objectives and advances our national interests.

DRAFT

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

That requires practical, consistent actions by all parties to stabilize the peninsula and
reduce the nuclear threat. Our goals -- and ^{the President's} ~~our~~ resolve to pursue them -- will not waver.

PHOTOCOPY
PRESERVATION

DRAFT

08/02/94

18:46

202 647 1346

STATE-PM

001

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

PHOTOCOPY
PRESERVATION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Office of the Spokesman

For Immediate Release

August 2, 1994

ON-THE-RECORD BRIEFING
ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROBERT GALLUCCI
ON
NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR ISSUE

Washington, D.C.
August 2, 1994

MS. SHELLY: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. Let me begin with one short announcement. Under Secretary of State for International Security Affairs Lynn Davis will open the Department's regular press briefing tomorrow, August 3, at 12:45 p.m. Under Secretary Davis will brief the press ON THE RECORD on security issues regarding Ukraine and issues addressed during her late July trip to Germany, France and the United Kingdom.

Today, I'm pleased to welcome back a frequent guest, Robert Gallucci, Assistant Secretary of State for Political/Military Affairs and Chairman of the Senior Policy Steering Group on Korea.

As you know, Assistant Secretary Gallucci recently traveled to Seoul, Tokyo, Beijing and Moscow. He will depart for Geneva shortly to head the U.S. delegation to the Third Round of U.S.-North Korean talks in Geneva.

We'll follow the usual format. Assistant Secretary Gallucci will open with some remarks, after which he'll be happy to take your questions.

Assistant Secretary Gallucci, you have the floor, and thank you.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: Thank you, Christine. First, let me apologize for being late. I'd say it couldn't be avoided, but I know you know that.

We resume, as Christine said, on Friday the discussions which we began early in July and were interrupted, as you all know, by the death of President Kim Il-Sung.

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

PHOTOCOPY
PRESERVATION

-2-

Our hope is that we will essentially continue and pick up where we left off. We had characterized, by my recollection, those talks as businesslike and serious and professional and used words like that, because they were. They were non-polemical and we thought the exchange in that first day was very useful, and we would, as I said, like to continue from that point.

Our approach to the talks this time and this session will be as they were in the past. The objective is to reach an overall settlement. We have characterized, together with our allies and South Koreans, our approach to these talks as broad and thorough; and by that we mean that we are prepared to deal not only with the security issue but broader issues of moving towards more normal relations with the DPRK towards improving our relations across the board with respect to trade and economic, as well as political contacts.

That we're all prepared to do in the context of an overall settlement of the nuclear issue and any other outstanding issues that may exist.

So our hope is that we will begin on Friday and continue for what may be about a week. I know usually the question is how long you'll be meeting, and that will be one of the first issues that we'll take up with the DPRK when we sit down to talk to them. So I'm not prepared at this moment to say the discussions will last four days or five days, but I suspect about a week, but we're prepared to be flexible on that point.

I'd now welcome your questions.

Q Are you expecting there will be continuity in North Korean policy now that the transition is well underway?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: I'm expecting continuity. I can't say much more than that. I am because my negotiating partner, Vice Foreign Minister Kang, said before we left -- we met on Sunday after Kim Il-Sung's death, and he said that we should expect continuity in policy, that the government in North Korea would pursue the policies that their President, Kim Il-Sung, had launched just before his death.

So we are expecting that, but, of course, that's a good question to put to me after a couple of days after meeting with the North Koreans.

Q Are you going to be meeting with the exact same negotiating team, or have there been any personnel changes?

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

PHOTOCOPY
PRESERVATION

- 3 -

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: I can't say it's the exact same negotiating team, but I believe it is roughly the same negotiating team. By that I don't mean to say it will not be the exact same, it's that I'm not quite sure. But I think the names we've gotten essentially match up with the names we've had before. Let me look over and -- I'm getting a nod which indicates I think that's about right.

Q Can you talk a little bit about your trip and the nature of the -- specific nature of the discussions and specifically the light-water reactor?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: As Christine said, I went to Seoul, to Tokyo, then Beijing and then Moscow, and the purpose of the trip was to consult with each of these governments in those capitals about the upcoming discussions and also to do some debriefing about how we had left off the discussions that were interrupted.

I can't really go into much detail. Yes, we certainly talked about the range of issues that we would be dealing with, and one of the issues, of course, is the possibility of including in an overall settlement the promotion of the North Korean transition from graphite technology to light-water technology. That was a concept that was first floated a year ago in July, and, yes, we did discuss that. But we discussed that in the context of the overall settlement, and more detailed than that I don't think I can provide. But maybe if you ask a specific question, I could answer.

Q Do you have a package put together -- a specific package of financing and --

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: What we have put together is an approach to the negotiations which are broad and thorough. An element to a settlement could be -- and I stress "could be" -- assisting the North Koreans in making this transition from graphite technology to light-water technology. But I don't have any details on a package for the LWR, no.

Q On next week, I wonder if you saw the piece in the OpEd page of The Washington Post this morning by Victor Gilinsky, suggesting that it really doesn't make any sense for North Korea to go into a light-water reactor; that economically and in any other common-sense phase, it would make more sense to go into fossil-fired thermopplants. Would you disagree with that?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: I'd comment on it, and I'd say the following: that Victor Gilinsky is an expert in this field. He's sat on the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
PHOTOCOPY
PRESERVATION

-4-

He's written about nuclear energy issues for a couple of decades or more, and I've been reading him for that long. So first let me credit his expertise.

That said, he well knows over those years -- and I began working on this issue 20 years ago myself -- that men and women of good will can disagree over what is a prudent selection of an energy mix for a given country, and sovereign countries have a tendency to decide that they know best what technology is appropriate; and sometimes the technology choice is not on purely economic or what some would call rational grounds.

Sometimes it's a matter of sovereignty mixed in with a matter of a demonstration of ability to consume a high technology methodology of achieving energy objectives. So it's a very complicated matter, and I know Mr. Gilinsky knows that.

In purely economic terms, one can question any number of countries' choices about energy mixes. I'm not here to defend a North Korean choice of graphite technology initially or even a transition to light-water technology. What I am here to tell you now is what I said last year when we first heard the idea floated initially by the North Koreans, that they were interested in abandoning the graphite technology for light-water technology.

My reaction then and now is that from a proliferation perspective, that's a good move. There are a lot of good technical reasons why light-water reactor technology is more resistant to proliferation than graphite technology, and, if you wish, I can run through those reasons.

They are fairly technical but there are many of them, and they make it good from a proliferation perspective. But I'm not prepared, nor am I really intellectually prepared to comment on the energy mix for North Korea and determine right now whether that was a prudent choice if they decide to make it.

Q From the American point of view, I think one of the points that Gilinsky is making is that the transition will be something like eight to ten years before a light water reactor is up and running, and that is a period in which we would have to depend on the good faith of North Korea which has not been in terribly long supply?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: Apparently, Mr. Gilinsky knows something about these negotiations that I don't know. With the proposition that you have put forward and which I do recall in the article, there seems to be an assumption about how various elements of a settlement would

08/02/94

18:49

202 847 1348

STATE-PM

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

PHOTOCOPY
PRESERVATION

-5-

fit together over time. Since we haven't had that discussion with the North Koreans -- although, certainly, we have some thoughts of our own -- it's very difficult, I would think, for him to make that assertion.

To be more specific, yes, it does take the vanilla 1,000 megawatt light-water reactor, PWR variety, about eight to 10 to 11 years to come on line from conception. It depends on a number of variables.

That said, what one has to assume about what one takes on a banner of trust depends upon what the arrangements are in a settlement. What I have been trying to say is, we haven't gotten that far in discussions with the North Koreans. Maybe when we do and they are laid out, they will be open to criticism. At that point, I'll be prepared to defend them. Right now, since we don't have a settlement, I can't really speak to it.

Q Did you make any consensus with Russia, Japan, and Korea about what kind of light-water reactor is going to be given to North Korea?

AC: We discussed, as I said, the idea of assisting the North Koreans with a transition to light-water reactors. We discussed that in each of the capitals that I visited and we've discussed it here in Washington. We discussed it as one element, possible element, in a settlement. Beyond that, I'm not prepared to go. Sorry.

Q Could you give us your best guess as to what is going on in the inflamed rhetoric between North and South, if there's a continuity of policy, while this is going on, and your reaction to South Korea's trotting out of the alleged defector?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: I can say a little bit to that but very little. Forgive me but I'm not an expert in North East Asian politics. When one looks to an understanding of what is behind, as I understand your question, exchanges between North and South, I would normally turn to a regional expert and I'm not one of those.

That said, I will say that it is our hope that North and South will get back on a track of discussions where they appear to be headed. As you know, they were headed towards a summit before Kim Il-Sung died. We would hope that discussions between North and South would resume and that they would continue in a way that would reduce tensions between North and South and be supportive of or, if I can use that word "synergistic" with our efforts to settle the nuclear issue.

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

PHOTOCOPY
PRESERVATION

-6-

We are not advocating any particular level exchanges. We are advocating that the two sides have discussions that will improve the political atmosphere.

With respect to the defector, I was on the road when the defector was brought out, I suppose is the right word. My own reaction to that, initially, was the same reaction that I believe was the formal reaction of this government, which is that what he said was true does not appear to be consistent with what our analysis indicates as true.

I think if you want further insight into what the South Korean Government initially said and what I understand they later said, those questions are best addressed to the South Korean Government.

Q Did it help matters in the dialogue between North and South?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: That's a sterling question. It does not seem to me that it added clarity or warmth to the dialogue, myself.

Jeff.

Q A couple of things, Bob. Could you give us your understanding of the status of the fuel rods? Are they susceptible, still, to measures that might prevent the kind of pitting that would require their withdrawal from the storage pond?

Secondly, have you agreed that -- do you have a preference about whether there would be a South Korean-provided or a Russian-provided reactor?

And, thirdly, did you meet the defector and gain any insights from him during your trip?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: First, the spent fuel; then the --

Q Do you prefer a Korean or a Russian-provided --

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: My preference on flavor of reactor?

Q Right.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: And, third, did I meet the defector?

Q Gain any insights from him?

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

PHOTOCOPY
PRESERVATION

-7-

AG Or Elvis? No. Okay. (Laughter) On the spent fuel, what Jeff is asking about, and I suppose you're all aware of, is that this type of fuel is not like the kind of fuel that's in a light-water reactor which can sit in water and not deteriorate for literally decades. This fuel is clad or coated in a way that when it's subjected to water can begin to corrode. When the uranium becomes exposed to the water, then one could start to have a radiological hazard and then eventually, possibly, a fire hazard as well.

So what I'm saying, with that brief description, is that there are technical reasons why this fuel, if left in water and unattended and unadjusted in some way, becomes unstable and cannot be left in that form.

Our appreciation for the precise status of that fuel in the water is not good, which is to say that we understand some things about the duration in which magnox-type fuel, which is what this fuel is called, can stay in water. That varies a great deal, depending on a number of factors, including the water chemistry and its temperature and the exact nature of the cladding, etc.

We don't know when the situation will become more urgent. Our own view, of course, is that we do not wish to see reprocessing in North Korea at all for any reason. We will be addressing ways of dealing with that spent fuel as one of the first-order issues in our discussions when we meet on Friday.

We had begun that discussion when we met on July 8, and I hope to continue that. But there is a technical issue here -- you're quite right -- and we need to deal with it straightaway. What I can't tell you is any more precisely, exactly what the status of that fuel is.

Q I guess my question is, are you still hopeful that we could help them modify the water chemistry so that the fuel could stay in place for a while longer? Or do you think it's kind of past that point?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: One of the questions is whether the water chemistry and other characteristics of the water could be adjusted to lengthening the amount of time the fuel can stay in the pond. Whether that is still an option that could be elected at this point, I don't know. Certainly, it's one of the things we'll talk to them about.

About the light-water reactor, if it is to be an element in a settlement, who would provide light-water reactors, who would fund light-water reactors, what kind would they be, where would they be constructed, over what

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

PHOTOCOPY
PRESERVATION

- 8 -

time period, and what other arrangements -- all those things are things which I really am not going to talk about. It's not because we haven't thought about the ways in which a settlement would include energy elements and political elements and security elements and economic elements, but because that is part of the negotiation, and I really don't feel myself free to go into that before --

Q Stating your preference?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: Yes, even stating a preference; that's correct. That's included among the things I don't want to speak about.

With respect to the defector, did I meet him? No, I did not meet him.

Q Did you gain any insight from what he had to say?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: I don't think that my appreciation of the issue was enriched by anything that I read that he had said.

Q Are you going to discuss not only freezing the North Korean nuclear program but also the past diversion of nuclear material in this third round of talks?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: If this question is the question of the history -- if this question is the question of the special inspections, the answer is that this Administration has consistently said, and is now saying again, that an overall settlement of the nuclear issue will have to include, from our perspective, a settlement of the concern, or addressing the concern that was raised by the IAEA and which caused it to request the special inspections.

So we will need, for a settlement, to include special inspections or other steps that the IAEA may decide are necessary to resolve the anomaly of 1989 over which this issue was initially brought to the Security Council.

Q (Inaudible) special inspections are a deal breaker?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: If by a "deal breaker," you mean that the question of special inspections must be resolved positively, in the context of a settlement from our perspective, yes.

Q I mean, are special inspections required to take place to resolve the dispute?

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
PHOTOCOPY
PRESERVATION

- 9 -

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: I'm phrasing this not to slip the question but because I want to put the emphasis where it belongs, which is what the IAEA requires to address the anomaly. What it says right now, it requires a special inspection. So as far as we're concerned, special inspections have to be part of the settlement, but the test is what the IAEA requires. It's not what we require. That's where I want to put the emphasis.

Q Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. Two basic questions. One was just raised here by this gentleman concerning the status of the fuel rods and the nuclear program. I take it that all is still certified to be frozen up in North Korea or you wouldn't be going to Geneva on Friday; is that correct?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: It is true that what we have described as "frozen" is still frozen. I put it that way because we have talked about the central elements of their program, the active elements. That is to say, the spent fuel is still in the pond and the fresh fuel has not been put in the reactor. That's what's frozen. We have not claimed that the North Koreans have stopped the construction of those two other graphite reactors or stopped construction of the second reprocessing line. We expect that all that construction is still continuing.

The active and most important critical elements are still frozen, as verified by the IAEA inspectors who are in continuous presence at Yongbyon.

Q My second question is a little different topic. Back to being on the road and being in Beijing and Tokyo and Moscow, is there a consensus that has developed that you can tell us about that the major powers -- those major powers -- will be implementing or joining with us in a policy, a strategy, an approach to North Korea? And then I have a little side question that goes off of that.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: I think the answer to that is yes. By saying yes, that there's support in Seoul, Tokyo, Beijing and Moscow for the approach that the United States is following in our bilateral talks with the DPRK, yes, there is support in each capital. That is not to say that there aren't some differences between -- from one capital to another. I think everybody knew that when we were headed down the road to a sanctions resolution, that the Chinese expressed some serious reservations about that. So you know that the Chinese orientation to this issue may be somewhat different than our own or others.

That said, since we are now on the road to, we hope, a negotiated settlement, there is a uniform view that that

08/02/94

18:52

202 847 1348

STATE-PM

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

PHOTOCOPY
RESERVATION

-10-

is a good thing, and there is a wish that we would succeed at negotiating a settlement. Your side question.

Q Okay. And, finally, in your time in Moscow, did you speak with the Russians on the subject of proliferation of fissionable nuclear materials, especially with regard to this matter of alleged missing plutonium being offered on the black market in Europe? And your office has said and this Department has said that there is no evidence so far to suggest that there are larger amounts of weapons-grade material other than what was captured in Germany.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: I did not discuss that subject in Moscow. I stayed with the Korean issue, which is my current brief.

Q At the coming round of talks, do you expect on the North Korean side a quick move with regard to removal of fuel rods to the third country? And during your trip to Tokyo, Seoul, Beijing, Moscow, did you find any agreement with those countries which would say, yes, I'm going to accept the fuel rods from North Korea?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: What I'm prepared to say about that spent fuel is that we do not wish it to be reprocessed. I'm also prepared to say that we recognize that there's a technical problem with leaving the fuel in the pond. That said, we plan on addressing the question of the spent fuel and what can be done with it that is safe from a proliferation perspective.

We talked about that with the DPRK in that last round, and we certainly talked about that in each of the capitals that we visited. Exactly what we said and who said what to whom and who's prepared to do what under what circumstance is something I can't share with you. I'm sorry.

Q Could you clarify how much longer that fuel can remain in the pond?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: I wish I could clarify that. I can tell you what I understand to be true about magnox fuel that is produced by France or Great Britain who have probably the most experience with this type of fuel -- that type of cladding -- and that stays in water, I'm told, for a year or two years or so.

But it stays in water in which the water chemistry and temperature is optimal, and it also is a fuel that has a certain type of magnox cladding, a certain alloy. The alloy in this magnesium fuel in North Korea is different, and the

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

PHOTOCOPY
RESERVATION

-11-

water chemistry is at this moment unknown to us. So I'm not about to tell you it's going to last that long or six months shorter.

That's why the issue of the technical viability of the fuel in the pond is one of the first ones we plan on addressing.

Q Can the inspectors get in there and actually do tests, or do they have any physical access to the place to get more information?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: The inspectors can look -- not only can but do look down into the pond and see the fuel, and they can in fact verify with a gamma scan that it's real fuel and not dummy fuel. So we're comfortable about them doing what they do for a living, which is verify the presence of the fuel. Their job is not to assess water chemistry, and they're not equipped to do that.

Q What happens if they decide to reprocess under safeguards after all? For example, the Japanese do that.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: Our view about reprocessing is that it would be destabilizing in this context. We certainly would note in the first instance that the North Koreans agreed with the South Koreans in the Joint Declaration on Denuclearization to forswear reprocessing. Of course, reprocessing would be inconsistent with that undertaking, and we have told the North Koreans, of course, that the viability of our discussions turns, among other things, upon their avoiding the reprocessing and separation of any more plutonium.

MS. SHELLY: Last question.

Q Bob, have the North Koreans themselves indicated to us that there could be a problem with the rods in the pond? Have they said that pitting is occurring and that they may need to reprocess?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: The North Koreans have alerted us to the fact that they have magnox fuel, and that fuel does not last a long time in water. I don't know if they have told us how many weeks or months or years they have, but they've told us this is a technical problem for them, and we're prepared to stipulate that.

The question is what happens next, and that's why we want to work with them on a solution that does not exacerbate the security situation or the proliferation problem.

08/02/94

18:53

202 647 1346

STATE-PM

012

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

PHOTOCOPY
PRESERVATION

-12-

MS. SHELLY: Thank you very much.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: Thank you all.

(The briefing concluded at 1:16 p.m.)

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004. letter	Minister Kang to Ambassador Gallucci re meeting (2 pages)	06/22/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 283

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, August 1994 [6]

2009-0528-F
kc1568

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: CARTER, JIMMY

DOC DATE: 23 JUN 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOREA NORTH
NON PROLIFERATION

KOREA SOUTH

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: CARTER RPT ON NORTH KOREA

ACTION: NOTED BY PRESIDENT

DUE DATE: 27 JUN 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: NONE

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

AOKI
GOTTEMOELLER
KRISTOFF
MISLOCK
PONEMAN
ROSNER
ROTH
TENET
WALES

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSGP

CLOSED BY: NSASK

DOC 1 OF 2

UNCLASSIFIED
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9405081

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001

X 94062320 NOTED BY PRESIDENT

UNCLASSIFIED

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005a. letter	POTUS Carter to POTUS (2 pages)	06/21/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 283

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, August 1994 [6]

2009-0528-F
kc1568

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005b. report	re trip report to Korea (6 pages)	06/00/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 283

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, August 1994 [6]

2009-0528-F

kc1568

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005c. memo	Anthony Lake to POTUS re phone call to ROK president (1 page)	06/22/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 283

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, August 1994 [6]

2009-0528-F

kc1568

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005d. talking points	re phone call to ROK president (1 page)	06/22/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 283

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, August 1994 [6]

2009-0528-F
kc1568

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005e. letter	Minister Kang to Ambassador Gallucci [duplicate of 004] (2 pages)	06/22/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 283

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, August 1994 [6]

2009-0528-F
kc1568

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006a. memo	action, Daniel Poneman to Anthony Lake re North Korea (1 page)	06/03/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 283

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, August 1994 [6]

2009-0528-F

kc1568

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006b. memo	action, Anthony Lake to POTUS re North Korea (10 pages)	06/03/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 283

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, August 1994 [6]

2009-0528-F
kc1568

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

1. 1. 1.

2.

3.

4.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006c. paper	re sanctions (3 pages)	06/03/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 283

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, August 1994 [6]

2009-0528-F
kc1568

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

TAB B

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006d. paper	re sanctions (2 pages)	06/03/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 283

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, August 1994 [6]

2009-0528-F
kc1568

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

TAB C

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006e. paper	re reactions (1 page)	06/03/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 283

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, August 1994 [6]

2009-0528-F
kc1568

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006f. memo	OSD Korea Task Force to Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Policy re North Korea (3 pages)	06/00/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 283

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, August 1994 [6]

2009-0528-F
kc1568

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006g. paper	re North Korea (10 pages)	06/00/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 283

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, August 1994 [6]

2009-0528-F
kc1568

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]