

FOIA MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Folder Title:

North Korea, August 1994 [4]

Staff Office-Individual:

Nonproliferation and Export Controls-Aoki, Steven

Original OA/ID Number:

283

Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:	Stack:
41	5	5	2	V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. fax	message re Unification Day Speeck (1 page)	08/13/1994	P1/b(1)
001b. memo	David Brown to Ambassador Laney re ROKG August 15 speech (2 pages)	08/13/1994	P1/b(1)
002. memo	Ambassador Gallucci to Secreatry State re Draft US-DPRK "Agreed Statement" (1 page)	08/11/1994	P1/b(1)
003a. memo	action, Captain Loeffler to Dan Poneman et al re nuclear inspection regime (1 page)	07/16/1994	P1/b(1)
003b. memo	Vice Admiral Macke to Asst Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy re nuclear inspection regime (2 pages)	04/14/1994	P1/b(1)
004. cable	re Third Round Talks (13 pages)	08/10/1994	P1/b(1)
005. cable	re dialogue (3 pages)	08/09/1994	P1/b(1)
006a. memo	to Tony Lake and Sandy Berger re negotiations (1 page)	08/00/1994	P1/b(1)
006b. memo	Ambassador Gallucci to Tony Lake et al re non-paper (1 page)	08/09/1999	P1/b(1)
006c. paper	agreed minute. (4 pages)	08/00/1999	P1/b(1)
007a. fax	cover re paper from Geneva (1 page)	08/06/1994	P1/b(1)
007b. paper	re proposed sequence of actions (3 pages)	08/06/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 283

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, August 1994 [4]

2009-0528-F

kc1565

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
008a. paper	re events of Aug 8 (1 page)	08/00/1994	P1/b(1)
008b. paper	re events of Aug 10 (1 page)	08/00/1994	P1/b(1)
009. cable	re US DPRK third round of talks (8 pages)	08/11/1994	P1/b(1)
010a. memo	action, Steven Aoki to Anthony Lake re talks (1 page)	08/09/1994	P1/b(1)
010b. memo	action, Anthony Lake to POTUS re talks (3 pages)	08/09/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 283

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, August 1994 [4]

2009-0528-F

kc1565

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

TO: STEVE AOKI NSC RM 380
TEL 395-3440
FAX 395-1185

From: JOEL WITT PM
TEL 736-7141

2 pgs + cover

NY - Nanyzer

non-paper
cleared

1. Expert meetings { call North - give piece of paper
call Ham Monday
Propose dates for expert visits (week
of Sept. 5?) — NY channel (Wit Goldstein)

EAP

- ① Liaison team to NK (Turk) - just liaison
office - no mtr. work
substance of Teams in non-paper
- ② spent fuel team to NK (Wulf) - Pool cleaners -
likely to refuse - OK
- ③ LWR / Alternative energy team to US (Sievering)
Tour included
architecture / A. - LWR - (Bolin/Neuill)
presentation
U.S. laws / nuclear coop. agreement (Samore or
tour of LWRs (Gallini) McGoldrick)

- B. Alternative energy (Brown) - together
- energy survey - get ideas - near-term stuff
on table
- Canada, Australia, Netherlands - ~~to~~ Finland

2. LWR assurances / KEDO

present
week of 5TH

- ① Highsmith drafts KEDO charter and proposed LWR architecture before Asia trip (week of Sept. 12?)
- ② We need draft KYS ~~to~~ Letter to Clinton (letter counter-guarantee for financing etc. - conditions - LWR provided when certain things happen) - share with ROKs before -
- Newell should draft / Brown-Bells & whistles

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. fax	message re Unification Day Speeck (1 page)	08/13/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 283

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, August 1994 [4]

2009-0528-F
kc1565

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001b. memo	David Brown to Ambassador Laney re ROKG August 15 speech (2 pages)	08/13/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 283

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, August 1994 [4]

2009-0528-F
kc1565

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

UNCLASSIFIED

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DIST: AOKI, NODIST, PONEMAN, ROTH, SUETTINGER

PREC: WIRE CLASS: UNCLASSIFIED DTG:

FM: FBIS

TO:

FBIS 015

UNCLAS 4D

ROK: Kim Yong-sam Speaks on Liberation Anniversary (Take 4 of 5-
-012AUG15)

///the same people.

SK1508060994

[Text] When we attain an economic commonwealth by achieving economic prosperity through cooperation between the North and the South, we can achieve natural and desirable reunification.

The reunification should not work as a hindrance to advancing the national commonwealth into the rank of advanced countries but should help supplement and develop the nation's creative power and ability. This is precisely why we do not want reunification through absorption.

The first step for improving North-South relations should begin with trust. Trust is to be generated from sincerely putting what is mutually pledged into practice.

The North-South agreement and joint declaration for denuclearization of the Korean peninsula are the great chapter for reconciliation and cooperation which both the North and the South pledged to implement before the nation and the world.

A clue for a solution to the nuclear problem, which heightened tension on the Korean peninsula over the past year and half should be found in observing the joint declaration for denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

Mutual slander that spoils the atmosphere of reconciliation between the North and the South must be brought to an end. Military trust that will end the military confrontation should be built at an early date.

We always keep our door widely open any time and anywhere. North Korea should come forward to the world. We never want North Korea's isolation.

North Korea must stop its adventurous, isolation-oriented [pyesoe chihyangui] acts of assuming nuclear development as a weapon.

If North Korea ensures transparency of its nuclear activities, we are prepared to support North Korea's peaceful energy development, which includes the construction of light-water reactors, with our capital and technology.

This will be the first project of the common plans for national

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

development to jointly design the future of our national commonwealth.

Fellow countrymen: I would like to emphasize again that we are hoping for gradual, step-by-step reunification. However, reunification may be realized at an unexpected moment. We should examine all possibilities and should prepare ourselves for them.

Reunification, no matter when or how it is realized, should start with the work of recovering and developing heterogeneous societies between the North and the South into a national commonwealth.

For this, all of our people should first foster our society into an exemplary democratic commonwealth. We should also have strength and courage to share pains and sacrifice that may result from reunification, in addition to the glory and joy for reunification.

We must always think of the difficulties that the North Korean people suffer for their livelihood.

(more)

(THIS REPORT CONTAINS INFORMATION WHICH IS OR MAY BE COPYRIGHTED IN A NUMBER OF COUNTRIES. THEREFORE, COPYING AND/OR FURTHER DISSEMINATION OF THE REPORT IS EXPRESSLY PROHIBITED WITHOUT OBTAINING THE PERMISSION OF THE COPYRIGHT OWNER(S))

15 AUG 0623z dg

NNNN

FROM:
SITREPT

UNCLASSIFIED

DRAFT

Instruction cable will say OK to sign as is,
but if DPRK makes changes, you
should seek the changes shown. Tom
believes text OK as drafted.

Agreed Statement Between USA and DPRK
Geneva, August 12, 1994

SAoki

The delegations of the United States of America (USA) and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) met in Geneva from August 5-12, 1994, to resume the third round of talks.

Both sides reaffirmed the principles of the June 11, 1993, U.S.-DPRK joint statement and reached agreement ~~on the~~ that the following objectives, which will be part of a final resolution of the nuclear issue:

following elements should be part of a final resolution of the nuclear issue.

(1) The DPRK is prepared to replace its graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities with light water reactor (LWR) power plants, and the U.S. is prepared to make arrangements for the provision of LWRs ~~of approximately 2,000 MW(e)~~ to the DPRK as early as possible and to make arrangements for interim energy alternatives to the DPRK's graphite-moderated reactors. Upon receipt of U.S. assurances for the provision of LWRs, the DPRK will freeze construction of the 50 MW(e) and 200 MW(e) reactors, forego reprocessing, and seal the Radio-Chemical Laboratory, to be monitored by the IAEA.

per
OMB

(2) The U.S. and the DPRK are prepared to establish diplomatic representation in each other's capitals and to reduce barriers to trade and investment, as a move toward full normalization of political and economic relations.

(3) The DPRK is prepared to remain a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and to allow implementation of fullscope safeguards. *by the U.S.*

(4) To help achieve peace and security on a nuclear-free Korean peninsula, the U.S. is prepared to provide an assurance to the DPRK against the threat or use of nuclear weapons, and the DPRK remains prepared to implement fully the North-South Declaration on Denuclearization.

Other Important issues raised during the talks remain to be resolved. Both sides agree that expert-level discussions are necessary to advance the replacement of the DPRK's graphite-moderated program with LWR technology and the safe storage and disposition of spent fuel, provision of alternative energy, and the establishment of liaison offices. Accordingly, expert-level talks will be held in the U.S. and DPRK or elsewhere as agreed. The DPRK and U.S. agreed to recess their talks and resume in Geneva [23], 1994.

- 2 -

In the meantime, the U.S. will continue to pursue international arrangements necessary to provide an LWR project to the DPRK as part of a final resolution of the nuclear issue and the DPRK will continue to observe the freeze on nuclear activities and maintain the continuity of safeguards, as agreed in the June 20-22, 1994, exchange of letters between First Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sok Ju and Assistant Secretary of State Robert Gallucci.

Head of the Delegation of the
Democratic People's Republic
of Korea
First Vice-Minister of Foreign
Affairs for the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea

Head of the Delegation of the
United States of America,
Assistant Secretary of State
for Political-Military Affairs
of the United States of
America

Kang Suk Ju

Robert L. Gallucci

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. memo	Ambassador Gallucci to Secreatry State re Draft US-DPRK "Agreed Statement" (1 page)	08/11/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 283

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, August 1994 [4]

2009-0528-F
kc1565

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Agreed Statement Between USA and DPRK
Geneva, August 12, 1994

The delegations of the United States of America (USA) and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) met in Geneva from August 5-12, 1994, to resume the third round of talks.

Both sides reaffirmed the principles of the June 11, 1993, U.S.-DPRK joint statement and reached agreement on the following objectives, which will be part of a final resolution of the nuclear issue:

(1) The DPRK is prepared to replace its graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities with light water reactor (LWR) power plants, and the U.S. is prepared to make arrangements for the provision of LWRs of approximately 2,000 MW(e) to the DPRK as early as possible and to make arrangements for interim energy alternatives to the DPRK's graphite-moderated reactors. Upon receipt of U.S. assurances for the provision of LWRs, the DPRK will freeze construction of the 50 MW(e) and 200 MW(e) reactors, forego reprocessing, and seal the Radio-Chemical Laboratory, to be monitored by the IAEA.

(2) The U.S. and the DPRK are prepared to establish diplomatic representation in each other's capitals and to reduce barriers to trade and investment, as a move toward full normalization of political and economic relations.

(3) The DPRK is prepared to remain a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and to allow implementation of fullscope safeguards.

(4) To help achieve peace and security on a nuclear-free Korean peninsula, the U.S. is prepared to provide an assurance to the DPRK against the threat or use of nuclear weapons, and the DPRK remains prepared to implement fully the North-South Declaration on Denuclearization.

Other important issues raised during the talks remain to be resolved. Both sides agree that expert-level discussions are necessary to advance the replacement of the DPRK's graphite-moderated program with LWR technology and the safe storage and disposition of spent fuel, provision of alternative energy, and the establishment of liaison offices. Accordingly, expert-level talks will be held in the U.S. and DPRK or elsewhere as agreed. The DPRK and U.S. agreed to recess their talks and resume in Geneva on September [23], 1994.

- 2 -

In the meantime, the U.S. will continue to pursue international arrangements necessary to provide an LWR project to the DPRK as part of a final resolution of the nuclear issue and the DPRK will continue to observe the freeze on nuclear activities and maintain the continuity of safeguards, as agreed in the June 20-22, 1994, exchange of letters between First Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sok Ju and Assistant Secretary of State Robert Gallucci.

Head of the Delegation of the
Democratic People's Republic
of Korea
First Vice-Minister of Foreign
Affairs for the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea

Head of the Delegation of the
United States of America,
Assistant Secretary of State
for Political-Military Affairs
of the United States of
America

Kang Suk Ju

Robert L. Gallucci

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003a. memo	action, Captain Loeffler to Dan Poneman et al re nuclear inspection regime (1 page)	07/16/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 283

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, August 1994 [4]

2009-0528-F
kc1565

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003b. memo	Vice Admiral Macke to Asst Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy re nuclear inspection regime (2 pages)	04/14/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 283

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, August 1994 [4]

2009-0528-F

kc1565

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

13

AMENDMENT NO. ____

Purpose: To prohibit the availability of any funds for North Korea unless certain conditions are met.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES - 103rd Cong., 2d Sess.

H.R. 4650

Making appropri-
September 30, :

AMENDMENT No 2511

ear ending

Referred to the
and order

By *Stevens for Murkowski-Dole*Sponsor No. *H.R. 4650*

AMENDMENT
DOLE)

himself and MR.

Viz:

At the appropriate place in the bill, insert the following new section:
SEC. __, PROHIBITION ON ASSISTANCE FOR NORTH KOREA

(a) PROHIBITION. No funds appropriated under this Act or any other Act may be

made available to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea until the President

certifies and reports to Congress that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea --

(1) does not possess nuclear weapons;

(2) has halted its nuclear weapons program; and

(3) is not exporting weapons-grade plutonium.

(b) NATIONAL SECURITY WAIVER.

The President may waive the prohibition in this section if he determines and certifies

in writing to the Congress that to do so is vital to the national security interest of the

United States, and notifies the appropriate Committees of Congress 15 days in

advance in accordance with the regular notification procedures of such Committees.

Such notification shall include the nature, purpose and amount of the proposed

assistance.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004. cable	re Third Round Talks (13 pages)	08/10/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 283

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, August 1994 [4]

2009-0528-F
kc1565

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

19:03

202 647 1348

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

NORTH KOREA AGREED STATEMENTONE FOR KICAD
IMMEDIATELY

... and North Korea have concluded an agreed statement in Geneva. That statement represents good progress but we have a lot of work ahead of us.

The statement captures elements which we agree will form part of the final settlement of the nuclear issue.

For example, upon receipt of our assurances about the provision of an LWR project and interim energy arrangements by the international community, the DPRK will broaden the existing freeze on its nuclear program. It will seal its reprocessing facility, allow the necessary international monitoring of that facility and stop building new reactors currently under construction.

As part of an overall settlement, the DPRK has agreed to remain a full member of the NPT, accept implementation of its safeguards agreement under the NPT and implement the North-South Denuclearization Declaration.

We also want to emphasize that provision of an LWR must be based on return to the NPT and compliance with fullscope safeguards, including accounting for all nuclear material in North Korea.

In the near-term, the DPRK has agreed to freeze its nuclear program as agreed during President Carter's visit to the DPRK.

It would be useful to hold high-level discussions in capitals on some of the specific issues that we have agreed to work on.

We plan to meet again in September. Our talks have been worthwhile but much work remains to be done.

PHOTOCOPY
PRESERVATION

Agreed Statement
Between The United States of America and
The Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea

Geneva, August 12, 1994

The delegations of the United States of America (U.S.) and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) met in Geneva from August 5-12, 1994, to resume the third round of talks.

Both sides reaffirmed the principles of the June 11, 1993, U.S.-DPRK joint statement and reached agreement that the following elements should be part of a final resolution of the nuclear issue:

(1) The DPRK is prepared to replace its graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities with light water reactor (LWR) power plants, and the U.S. is prepared to make arrangements for the provision of LWRs of approximately 2,000 MW(e) to the DPRK as early as possible and to make arrangements for interim energy alternatives to the DPRK's graphite-moderated reactors. Upon receipt of U.S. assurances for the provision of LWRs and for arrangements for interim energy alternatives, the DPRK will freeze construction of the 50 MW(e) and 200 MW(e) reactors, forego reprocessing, and seal the Radiochemical Laboratory, to be monitored by the IAEA.

(2) The U.S. and the DPRK are prepared to establish diplomatic representation in each other's capitals and to reduce barriers to trade and investment, as a move toward full normalization of political and economic relations.

(3) To help achieve peace and security on a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula, the U.S. is prepared to provide the DPRK with assurances against the threat or use of nuclear weapons by the U.S., and the DPRK remains prepared to implement the North-South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

(4) The DPRK is prepared to remain a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to allow implementation of its safeguards agreement under the Treaty.

Important issues raised during the talks remain to be resolved. Both sides agree that expert-level discussions are necessary to advance the replacement of the DPRK's graphite-moderated program with LWR technology, the safe storage and disposition of the spent fuel, provision of alternative energy, and the establishment of liaison offices. Accordingly, expert-level talks will be held in the U.S. and

DPRK or elsewhere as agreed. The DPRK and U.S. agreed to recess their talks and resume in Geneva on September 23, 1994.

In the meantime, the U.S. will pursue arrangements necessary to provide assurances for the LWR project to the DPRK as part of a final resolution of the nuclear issue, and the DPRK will observe the freeze on nuclear activities and maintain the continuity of safeguards, as agreed in the June 20-22, 1994, exchange of messages between Assistant Secretary of State Robert L. Gallucci and First Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Kang Sok Ju.

PRESS STATEMENT
August 12, 1994
Geneva

- o We have had a productive week of talks. Our "Agreed Statement" captures elements which we agree will form part of the final settlement of the nuclear issue.
- o The DPRK reaffirmed their interest in converting to Light Water Reactor technology, based on U.S. willingness to assist in that conversion by providing assurances for the financing and construction of an LWR project.
- o Upon the receipt of our assurances about provision of an LWR project and interim energy arrangements, the DPRK agrees:
 - o to forego reprocessing of all spent fuel;
 - o to seal and allow IAEA monitoring of the radiochemical laboratory;
 - o to cease construction of its 50MW graphite reactor;
 - o to cease construction of its 200MW graphite reactor;
- o In the context of the overall settlement, the DPRK has also agreed to:
 - o remain a full member of the NPT;
 - o accept implementation of its IAEA safeguards agreement under the NPT;
 - o implement the Declaration on Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
- o As is made clear in the statement, the DPRK will continue the current freeze on its nuclear program and maintain the continuity of safeguards during the interim period until our next meeting. And I have made clear to the DPRK that provision of an LWR must be based on return to the NPT and compliance with fullscope safeguards, including accounting for all nuclear material in North Korea.
- o We now must move ahead with the hard work of putting those elements in place. For our part, that includes detailed consultations with our friends and allies on the light water reactor project, on the assurances that we would be prepared to offer for the financing and construction of that project, and on other aspects of the settlement that we hope to reach.
- o Vice Minister Kang and I agreed that it will be useful to hold expert-level discussions in capitals on some of the specific issues that we have agreed to work on. So I think that the period ahead will be an extremely busy one.
- o Although our talks have been worthwhile, the lion's share of work lies ahead of us. These discussions have served to make clear exactly what each sides needs to do.

Q: The statement says each side is "prepared" to take certain steps. When will those preparations be complete?

- Preparations to advance common objectives will begin in the next few weeks through experts-level meetings in the U.S. and DPRK.
- Can't expect complex issues to be resolved fully prior to the resumption of our talks here in Geneva on September 23, but we do expect progress by that time so that we can agree to take further concrete steps toward resolving the nuclear issue.

Q: "In the meantime," will construction of the 50/200 MW reactors and reprocessing at RCL continue?

- DPRK agreed in the statement to continue the freeze on nuclear activities and maintain continuity of safeguards, as Minister Kang and I agreed in June.
- In accordance with that agreement, the DPRK will neither reload the five megawatt reactor with new fuel nor reprocess the spent fuel from that reactor.
- IAEA inspectors will remain on the site to verify this freeze.
- Although construction activity at the 50/200 MW reactors and the RCL was not included in that freeze, these critical elements of the DPRK program were identified in our Agreed Statement to be frozen once the U.S. provides its assurance on the LWR project. We expect to do that next month.

Q: What exactly have you accomplished during these talks? The "freeze" remains in place, but DPRK still has spent fuel, an operating reprocessing line, and has not yet allowed special inspections.

- The Agreed Statement identifies areas of agreement: NPT and safeguards status, the large graphite reactors and the reprocessing facility. It acknowledges that there are areas where we do not have agreement: Most significantly, 1) the disposition of the spent fuel -- though reprocessing is excluded; 2) the timing for implementation of special inspections and the NSDD, and 3) the future of the five mw reactor, are perhaps the most important.

Q: Which side will take the first step? When will the U.S. normalize its relations with the DPRK? When will the spent fuel be stored safely and disposed of? When will the DPRK allow special inspections?

- The sequencing of our respective steps will be determined in the context of a framework for reaching all of our objectives.
- In response to U.S. assurances for the provision of LWR's, and arrangements for interim energy alternatives, the DPRK will freeze construction of the 50/200 MW reactors, seal the RCL under IAEA monitoring and accept its NPT safeguards obligations. Those will be the next steps.
- We will work on the sequence of other steps at the experts-level meetings and here in Geneva in September.
- In the meantime, there will be no reprocessing and the five mw reactor will not be reloaded.

Q: Is this a breakthrough?

A: We made good progress in Geneva, but we have a lot of work ahead of us

Q: Aren't you still being strung along here? Isn't this more talk and no action?

A: No. The agreed statement includes both actions and commitments, all of which are in the US interest.:

North Korea has agreed to continue the freeze through the next session of talks in September (no reprocessing, no refueling the 5MWe reactor, continuity of safeguards and continued presence of IAEA inspectors).

North Korea has agreed to abandon its 50MWe and 200MWe graphite reactor projects and to adopt more proliferation-resistant light-water technology.

North Korea has agreed to abandon reprocessing, to stop building its second reprocessing line, and to seal the reprocessing facility under IAEA monitoring.

North Korea has committed to remaining a party to the NPT and full implementation of its IAEA obligations and of the North-South Denuclearization Declaration.

Q: Isn't this a massive reward for pursuing a nuclear weapons program and breaking your international nonproliferation commitments?

A: No. We are talking about a comprehensive resolution that includes bringing North Korea into compliance with its nonproliferation commitments but also goes well beyond that, in the promise to abandon its gas graphite-based nuclear program. Moreover, we are talking about a strategic opening that will lead North Korea toward full normalization with the international community.

In that context, we consider the investment in alternative energy in North Korea to be both appropriate and in our own interests. Our allies in the region -- South Korea and Japan -- agree.

Q: Did you sign the document? Why?

A: Assistant Secretary Gallucci and Vice Foreign Minister Kang exchanged signed documents. (if asked: It is not appropriate to copy and release diplomatic communications.)

Q: Is the document is legally binding?

A: No.

Q: What kind of assurances are you talking about? Who would give them?

A: We are talking about assurances that the US will seek to arrange provision of an LWR project to North Korea, provided North Korea lives up to its nonproliferation commitments.

The precise nature of those assurances will be determined in consultation with congress. We also intend to seek the support of other governments, beginning, with South Korea and Japan, to provide that project.

(if asked what would happen if other governments failed to provide that support: We have not even attempted to put this consortium together yet. I am not going to speculate on what will happen if we cannot.)

- 5 -

Q: How do you know you can deliver?

A: We have a lot of work ahead of us and I am not going to speculate on how it will go. I can say that we have consulted extensively with our South Korean and Japanese allies, who are both supportive of this idea, that we believe that providing this project is in our best collective interest, and that we will work hard to bring it about.

Q: How much money are you talking about?

A: We have a lot of work to do before we have a clear sense of that. I'd rather not guess at a figure.

Q: How can you justify putting 2000MW into such a small electrical grid?

A: The North Korean plan calls for 2000 MW of increased capacity by the year 2000, and the South Koreans are willing to support that level of increase. We need to learn more about North Korea's grid and its future expansion before working out how to integrate increased capacity.

Q: How does this agreement advance US national interests?

A: You moron, see second answer above.

Q: Are your allies comfortable with this arrangement?

A: We have consulted very closely with our allies -- including during Assistant Secretary Gallucci's recent trip to Seoul and Tokyo as well as during our talks this week -- and have found a broad measure of support for our approach.

This is not surprising, since we have worked from the outset to build a strong international consensus on how to approach this problem.

You will have to ask the governments themselves for their specific views on this arrangement.

Q: What did you fail to get in this arrangement? What are the remaining areas of disagreement?

A: There is a broad measure of agreement in terms of the overall objectives of a nonnuclear Korean peninsula, full compliance with its nonproliferation commitments, shifting from gas-graphite to light-water technology and moving toward more normal relations.

There are still differences over the specific timing and sequencing of the steps toward these objectives.

Q: Isn't it premature to be moving toward normalization?

A: We believe that it is in our collective interest to bring North Korea back into compliance with its international obligations, to resolve those issues dividing North Korea from the international community and to see North Korea become a full, participating member of the community of nations.

To that end, we have made it clear that as North Korea takes steps in that direction, that we are willing to move toward normalization.

Q: What about the other things the US has complained about -- the conventional threat, missiles, human rights, terrorism?

A: All these issues remain on the table and we will continue to pursue our objectives in the context of an overall resolution to those issues dividing North Korea from the international community.

(if pressed) The issues of most urgent security concern are the forward deployment of North Korea's very large conventional forces as well as the export of ballistic missiles.

Q: What will happen to the 8000 spent fuel rods?

A: That has not been finally resolved. We are prepared right now to take steps to reduce the ecological and safety risk posed by the rods exposure to water in the spent fuel pond and we want those rods transferred out of North Korea as soon as technically feasible.

We do not have agreement, however, with the North Koreans on how to proceed.

Q: What will happen to the 5 MWe reactor?

A: The North Koreans have committed not to refuel or restart that reactor before our talks continue in September. At that time we will continue our discussions regarding the future of that reactor.

Q: What happens if North Korea breaks the freeze?

A: That would undermine the basis for the US-North Korean talks.

Q: Why are you taking North Korea's word on faith?

A: We are not. The freeze will be monitored by the IAEA, which is maintaining continuous presence at Yongbyon.

- 7 -

Q: Does this mean the US will now slack off on its plans to enhance its military forces in Korea?

A: The US commitment to the security of the ROK is unshakeable. As we have in the past, we will take all necessary measures to ensure that the combined US and ROK forces can deter and, if necessary, defend against any aggression.

To that end, we will continue to pursue long-planned modernization to our forces and equipment in Korea, and to conduct our normal exercises.

(if asked about Team Spirit)

We are continuing planning for Team Spirit '94, but have told North Korea that we would support an ROK decision to suspend it given sufficient progress in the North-South dialogue.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005. cable	re dialogue (3 pages)	08/09/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 283

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, August 1994 [4]

2009-0528-F
kc1565

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
--------------------------	---------------	------	-------------

006a. memo	to Tony Lake and Sandy Berger re negotiations (1 page)	08/00/1994	P1/b(1)
------------	--	------------	---------

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 283

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, August 1994 [4]

2009-0528-F
kc1565

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
--------------------------	---------------	------	-------------

006b. memo	Ambassador Gallucci to Tony Lake et al re non-paper (1 page)	08/09/1999	P1/b(1)
------------	--	------------	---------

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 283

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, August 1994 [4]

2009-0528-F
kc1565

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006c. paper	agreed minute. (4 pages)	08/00/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 283

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, August 1994 [4]

2009-0528-F
kc1565

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007a. fax	cover re paper from Geneva (1 page)	08/06/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 283

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, August 1994 [4]

2009-0528-F
kc1565

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007b. paper	re proposed sequence of actions (3 pages)	08/06/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 283

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, August 1994 [4]

2009-0528-F
kc1565

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

WASHFAX RECEIPT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE**B**WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
1994 AUG -8 PM 4:23

'94 AUG -8 P4:21

S/S #

MESSAGE NO. 008447 CLASSIFICATION Secret No. Pages 1
FROM: Wit / Rasmussen PM 71829 7317
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)
MESSAGE DESCRIPTION Geneva Rendout

<u>TO: (Agency)</u>	<u>DELIVER TO:</u>	<u>Extension</u>	<u>Room No.</u>
<u>NSC</u>	<u>Steve Aoki</u>	<u>395-4564</u>	<u>380</u>

OR: CLEARANCE ☐ INFORMATION ☒ PER REQUEST ☐ COMMENT ☐

MARKS: _____

RSR

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTSInitials: Q Date: 07/13/15

2009-0528-F

S/S Officer: _____

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
008a. paper	re events of Aug 8 (1 page)	08/00/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 283

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, August 1994 [4]

2009-0528-F
kc1565

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
008b. paper	re events of Aug 10 (1 page)	08/00/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 283

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, August 1994 [4]

2009-0528-F
kc1565

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
009. cable	re US DPRK third round of talks (8 pages)	08/11/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 283

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, August 1994 [4]

2009-0528-F
kc1565

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
010a. memo	action, Steven Aoki to Anthony Lake re talks (1 page)	08/09/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 283

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, August 1994 [4]

2009-0528-F

kc1565

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

TAB I

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
010b. memo	action, Anthony Lake to POTUS re talks (3 pages)	08/09/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 283

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, August 1994 [4]

2009-0528-F
kc1565

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]