

Case Number: 2009-0528-F-2.

FOIA MARKER

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Folder Title:

North Korea, August 1994 [3]

Staff Office-Individual:

Nonproliferation and Export Controls-Aoki, Steven

Original OA/ID Number:

283

Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:	Stack:
41	5	5	2	v

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	David Brown to Herb Schulz re liaison office (5 pages)	08/19/1994	P1/b(1)
002a. draft	paper re LWR financing (4 pages)	08/00/1994	P1/b(1)
002b. draft	paper re conventional energy (4 pages)	08/00/1994	P1/b(1)
002c. memo	transmittal, Newell Highsmith to Distribution re LWR document drafts (1 page)	08/00/1994	P1/b(1)
002d. draft	diagram re LWR project (2 pages)	08/00/1994	P1/b(1)
002e. draft	letter re ROK legal (1 page)	08/00/1994	P1/b(1)
002f. draft	letter re ROK political (1 page)	08/00/1994	P1/b(1)
002g. draft	agreement re Korean Energy Development Organization (5 pages)	08/00/1994	P1/b(1)
002h. memo	David Brown to Herb Schulz re liaison office [duplicate of 001 w annotations] (5 pages)	08/19/1994	P1/b(1)
002i. draft	paper re diplomatic relations (1 page)	09/00/1994	P1/b(1)
002j. memo	Kenneth Quinones to Robert Carlin re diplomatic missions (3 pages)	08/19/1994	P1/b(1)
002k. paper	re diplomatic activities (7 pages)	08/00/1994	P1/b(1)

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National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
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002l. paper	re infrastructure (3 pages)	08/00/1994	P1/b(1)
003. paper	re taskings (1 page)	08/15/1994	P1/b(1)
004a. memo	information, Anthony Lake to POTUS re memcon w ROK president (1 page)	08/15/1994	P1/b(1)
004b. talking points	re telecom w ROK President (1 page)	08/15/1994	P1/b(1)
005. memo	re memcon, Tony Lake and ROK security advisor Chung (3 pages)	08/14/1994	P1/b(1)
006a. memo	Steve Aoki to Tony Lake re call to ROK NSA Chong (1 page)	08/00/1994	P1/b(1)
006b. talking points	re call to ROK NSA Chong (2 pages)	08/00/1994	P1/b(1)
006c. cable	re ROK unification policy (3 pages)	08/12/1994	P1/b(1)
006d. fax	message, transmittal, Unification Day Speech (1 page)	08/13/1994	P1/b(1)
006e. memo	David Brown to Ambassador Laney re ROKG August 15 speech (2 pages)	08/00/1994	P1/b(1)

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**DPRK Delegate Visit To U.S.
Implementation Plan**

PURPOSE

The DPRK delegate visit to the U.S. has 3 primary functions: 1) To provide the DPRK delegation of government and technical representatives with an understanding of the commercial nuclear power program in the United States. 2) To provide the DPRK delegation a first hand opportunity to visit US nuclear facilities and talk with industry personnel involved with the design, manufacture, and operation of US commercial nuclear power plants. 3) To establish a direct intellectual and working relationship between the appropriate DPRK and US government and technical representatives.

SCOPE

The DPRK delegate visit will consist of presentations and discussions with representatives of the appropriate government agencies, nuclear power utilities, nuclear supply vendors, and other pertinent nuclear industry organizations in Washington, DC. In addition, site visits to select nuclear power plants will be planned to provide a visual reference and understanding of the current US commercial nuclear power plant. The schedule for the delegate visit is provided in Attachment 2.

Washington Visit

The DPRK delegate Washington visit should include presentations by the following organizations. The scope of the presentation and discussions should include the role of the agency/organization in the nuclear power program and key issues facing the US nuclear plants that could be of common concern or mutual interest to the DPRK.

Department of Energy (DOE) - Provide an organizational and historical brief and statistics on the US commercial nuclear program including when the program was started, plant licensing history, current age and megawatt capacity of the civilian nuclear fleet versus total US capacity, capacity by plant type.

Present a brief on the Office of Nuclear Energy and purpose of each applicable division. SM Franks to present the Light Water Reactor Program (LWR) including activities on existing plants, the Advanced Light Water Reactor (ALWR) program, and technology currently being addressed (eg. reactor vessel annealing). Additional presentation could include lessons

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learned and technology development that resulted from the TMI event.

Provide a discussion of the capability of the national laboratory complex.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) - Provide an overview of the NRC organization, responsibilities, and its operation with particular emphasis on the regulation for plant licensing and post license oversight functions. Additional information would be useful on key emerging issues that the NRC is addressing including severe accident, station blackout, plant life extension, etc.

Nuclear Energy Institute - Executive Committee (NEI) - Present the function and purpose of the Institute including the roles and responsibilities of the Committee, the interfaces with the utilities, NRC, DOE, and the commercial nuclear power utility industry and the current key issues being addressed.

Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) - Present the function and purpose of the organization, an historical perspective, how industry guidance is developed and achieved, current industry issues being evaluated.

Advanced Reactor Corporation (ARC) - Present the purpose, organization and functions of this non-profit corporation and it's role and interfaces in advancing the advanced light water reactor program.

Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) - Present the function and purpose of the organization, historical perspective, industry oversight activities and methods and current issues in the industry.

Key Nuclear Utility Representatives - Provide a brief on each utility's nuclear capabilities and organization, motivations behind the use of nuclear power and the current issues facing the nuclear utility.

A proposed tentative agenda is provided in Attachment 1.

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DPRK Delegate Site Tours - U.S.

The DPRK delegate tours include presentations by the NSSS vendors as well as tours of individual nuclear plant sites. The vendor presentations are planned for Washington, D.C.

Nuclear Steam Supply Vendors:

ABB-Combustion Engineering
Westinghouse
General Electric

NSSS vendor presentation will include corporate history & organization, nuclear design, manufacturing and operating plant experience, domestic and overseas. The presentations will provide specific detail on the individual NSSS designs, operating and maintenance requirements, their various laboratories, test facilities, and training centers.

Nuclear Plant Site Tours

The tour of the commercial nuclear utilities should include visits to the site, visitor and training centers including the simulator. Plant tours should be scheduled and include a tour through the turbine building, control room, reactor building and refueling floor operations, safeguards/auxiliary buildings, diesel generator building, fuel storage & handling and containment areas as accessible, including remote or long term spent fuel storage facilities. Tours should focus on the organization and staffing, training requirements, operations and maintenance functions including outage preparation, health physics & radiation monitoring activities.

Prospective utilities include:

Baltimore Gas & Electric	Calvert Cliffs,
MD.	
Calvert Cliffs	
Virginia Power	North Anna, VA
North Anna Station	

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Attachment 1**Tentative Agenda****Delegate Visit - Washington, D.C.****State Department**

TBD

TBD

Department of Energy

Delegate Welcome & Introduction
DOE Role/Organization
U.S. Light Water Reactor Program
National Laboratory Capabilities

Dr. Terry Lash
Dr. Terry Lash
Sterling Franks
Ray Hunter

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)

NRC Introduction
Agency Organization and Scope
Regulation and Licensing

Jim Taylor
William Russell

Nuclear Energy Institute

John Howard

Scope of Industry Support
Executive Committee

Institute of Nuclear Power Operations

Zack Pate

Role/Organization
Utility Interface
Assessment/Training Programs

Electric Power Research Institute

John Taylor

Industry Role/Organization
Key Issues

Advanced Reactor Corporation

Pat McDonald

Corporate Utilities

TBD

Nuclear Power Program Development
Key Industry Issues

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Proposed Itinerary for DPRK US Tour

ITEM	TRIP LOCATION	TENTATIVE DATE
1.	Arrive Washington	Day 1
2.	Rest & tour city	Day 2
3.	Meetings w/ DOE & other gov't. agencies, utility and industry representatives	Day 3&4
4.	Presentations by NSSS Vendors	Day 5&6
5.	Travel to Richmond, Va. - North Anna Site	Day 6PM
6.	Plant Tour - North Anna Site	Day 7
7.	Travel to Calvert Cliffs Md.	Day 7PM
8.	Plant Tour - Calvert Cliffs	Day 8
9.	Return to Washington	Day 8PM

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LynnURGENT

7-2887

TO: EB/IEP - Diane Castiglione (202) 647-4037

FROM: EAP/K - David Brown

SUBJECT: TP's for New York Channel Meeting with DPRK

Diane: Thanks for phoning on Friday nite. Here are tp's I would like you to deliver to Joel Wit in PM/RNP and Jeff Goldstein and/or Lynn Turk in EAP/K as early as possible on Monday morning. EAP/K is room 5313. Joel got moved to somewhere on the 3rd floor last week -- can't give you a room #.

There is a remote possibility that you'll find Jeff and Joel are on their way up to NYC for a Monday noon meeting. In that event, Lynn will help you get these tp's to them via our USUN helper.

It is my plan that you will be one of the "officials" referred to in the 3rd tick. If fact, I hope to rely on you for the official record of the meeting. OK?

Regards, db

SUPPLEMENTARY TALKING POINTS: ENERGY SUPPLY

- o We suggest that the experts' talks on interim energy supply be convened on the margins of the DPRK side's visit to Washington to discuss the LWR project and to tour several nuclear power plants, i.e., in the period September 6-9.
- o The US side in the interim energy supply experts' talks will be led by David Brown, Director of the State Department's Office of Korean Affairs. Mr. Brown was from 1990-1993 the Director of the Office of International Energy Policy at the State Department.
- o Mr. Brown will be assisted by officials of the Department of Energy and the State Department.
- o We think it important that the counterpart group on the DPRK side also include officials who are expert in non-nuclear energy technologies.
- o We suggest that among the DPRK participants there be representatives from the Institute of Thermal Energy and from the ministries responsible for coal and electric power, in particular.

① Treasury - get copies of papers to them

② Comments on JP, due to PM by Noon Mon.

③ ~~the~~ Comments to DOE on LWR tour.

LWRs

④ Conv. energy alternatives
Propose in NR
- Cable to Beijing on energy
options - poss. of Chi. supply

- i) Diagram of one possible legal structure for the LWR venture
- 2) Two draft ltrs from Kim Young Sam
- 3) A draft agreement establishing KEDO
- 4) Background paper: Alternative Models for the Int'l Consortium to Finance LWRs

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002g. draft	agreement re Korean Energy Development Organization (5 pages)	08/00/1994	P1/b(1)

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Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002h. memo	David Brown to Herb Schulz re liaison office [duplicate of 001 w annotations] (5 pages)	08/19/1994	P1/b(1)

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OPTIONS FOR OPENING A LIAISON OFFICE IN PYONGYANG

Agreed Statement

In the Agreed Statement of August 12, 1994, U.S. and DPRK negotiators agreed to a gradual or stepped approach to normalization, with the establishment of "diplomatic representation" as part of a "final resolution of the nuclear issue," and "full" normalization the ultimate goal. Reciprocal offices would initially be created as "liaison offices." Expert-level discussions were called for to advance the establishment of those offices.

The Agreed Statement seems to leave open as a first step the option of establishing "liaison offices" as non-diplomatic missions. "Full normalization" as called for in the Statement would mean diplomatic and consular relations, the exchange of ambassadors, and the establishment of embassies, as well as normal relations in other spheres such as trade and investment. The interim stage of "diplomatic representation" would mean, as a legal matter, relations conducted under the multilateral Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (VCDR), or under a bilateral treaty providing for all the necessary privileges and immunities and diplomatic functions of the office. A "liaison office," however, can be established without the establishment of diplomatic relations, limited to consular relations.

There are a variety of issues to consider in weighing options for opening reciprocal liaison offices. Each should be evaluated based on the needs and function of the office and the personnel assigned to it.

Vienna Diplomatic and Consular Conventions

Liaison offices could be created under either the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (VCDR) or the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR), or both. The U.S. and the DPRK are parties to the VCDR and VCCR, which create a ready-made treaty framework within which to set up the liaison offices. The application of these conventions to the liaison offices is by far the fastest, most effective, and most efficient way to proceed. Application would automatically resolve a wide variety of serious technical, legal, and operational problems that would otherwise have to be handled on an ad hoc basis or negotiated bilaterally between the two governments.

The conventions provide for critical operational rights and protections (e.g., privileges and immunities, archival and

personal inviolability, communications), and guarantee that certain functions will be permitted (e.g., the right to deal directly with host state authorities, consular functions). We would not wish to open an office in Pyongyang without privileges and immunities for our staff and premises, and under domestic law we cannot grant reciprocal immunities in the absence of the conventions unless we had a bilateral treaty (with the advice and consent of the Senate) in force or special legislation.

Establishing liaison offices without applying the conventions would require us to create the legal framework for their operations from scratch. This could result in a long and acrimonious negotiation, restrictions on the functions of the offices, uncertainty and delay in their opening, and/or areas for potential friction between the two governments.

Consular Relations Only

It would be possible to agree with the DPRK to establish relations under only the VCCR. This has been done with Vietnam. Establishment of consular relations does not legally constitute the establishment of diplomatic relations, but this distinction has been lost in the public discussion of the agreement with Vietnam to establish liaison offices under only the VCCR. The press and public have routinely characterized the agreement as one to establish "diplomatic" offices.

The principal disadvantage of applying only the VCCR to the liaison office would be that the privileges and immunities granted to officers under the VCCR are significantly less than those of officers under the VCDR. Under the VCDR, diplomatic agents benefit from full immunity from criminal jurisdiction, and with only narrow exceptions, full immunity from civil jurisdiction; under the VCCR, consular officers enjoy only "official acts" immunity. Privileges and immunities of dependents are also significantly reduced under the VCCR. These factors may have particular importance in North Korea.

Head of Office

The VCDR provides for three levels of head of mission, with the lowest level that of charge. The VCCR provides for four levels of heads of consular posts. In the case of Vietnam, it was agreed that the head of the liaison office to be established under the VCCR would have the rank of consul general, with the title of "chief of liaison office."

Location of Office

Location of the respective liaison offices would have to be agreed. The DPRK should be advised that OFM reviews the location of all diplomatic and consular offices established in the U.S.

Presidential Approval and Reprogramming

Presidential approval is required before we may open a diplomatic mission, regardless of level; presidential approval is not a legal requirement for the establishment of offices below the diplomatic level, e.g., consulates or non-diplomatic liaison offices. Congressional approval is not legally necessary unless we forgo the VCDR and VCCR and negotiate a bilateral treaty or seek special legislation. Under any scenario (except perhaps where State Department officers established a TDY presence in the DPRK), a 15-day reprogramming notification would have to be provided to Congress before any funds could be obligated or expended for the new office.

Modality for Agreement

An agreement to open reciprocal liaison offices under the VCDR and/or VCCR could be memorialized in an exchange of letters or agreed statement with the DPRK. Strictly speaking, such an agreement would probably not even be necessary if it was understood that the offices would be established under both the VCDR and VCCR. A bilateral treaty would be more involved and require the advice and consent of the Senate.

Recognition

"Recognition" should not be confused with "normalization." Although the U.S. has not publicly stated that it "recognizes" the DPRK, in fact the U.S. currently recognizes the DPRK as a state in the international law sense, since we accepted DPRK accession to the UN Charter and membership in the General Assembly, as well as accession to international conventions such as the NPT. Moreover, we acknowledge that the government of the DPRK exercises effective political control within its territory and we are negotiating with DPRK authorities in the present nuclear talks. To the extent we hold assets of North Korea frozen in U.S. banks, however, we may wish publicly to reserve our position on "recognition" in order to reserve our position on DPRK ownership of those assets pending a review of possible U.S. claims.

- 4 -

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002i. draft	paper re diplomatic relations (1 page)	09/00/1994	P1/b(1)

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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002j. memo	Kenneth Quinones to Robert Carlin re diplomatic missions (3 pages)	08/19/1994	P1/b(1)

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Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002k. paper	re diplomatic activities (7 pages)	08/00/1994	P1/b(1)

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
0021. paper	re infrastructure (3 pages)	08/00/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

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Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
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Agreed Statement
Between The United States of America and
The Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea

Geneva, August 12, 1994

The delegations of the United States of America (U.S.) and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) met in Geneva from August 5-12, 1994, to resume the third round of talks.

Both sides reaffirmed the principles of the June 11, 1993, U.S.-DPRK joint statement and reached agreement that the following elements should be part of a final resolution of the nuclear issue:

(1) The DPRK is prepared to replace its graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities with light water reactor (LWR) power plants, and the U.S. is prepared to make arrangements for the provision of LWRs of approximately 2,000 MW(e) to the DPRK as early as possible and to make arrangements for interim energy alternatives to the DPRK's graphite-moderated reactors. Upon receipt of U.S. assurances for the provision of LWRs and for arrangements for interim energy alternatives, the DPRK will freeze construction of the 50 MW(e) and 200 MW(e) reactors, forego reprocessing, and seal the Radiochemical Laboratory, to be monitored by the IAEA.

(2) The U.S. and the DPRK are prepared to establish diplomatic representation in each other's capitals and to reduce barriers to trade and investment, as a move toward full normalization of political and economic relations.

(3) To help achieve peace and security on a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula, the U.S. is prepared to provide the DPRK with assurances against the threat or use of nuclear weapons by the U.S., and the DPRK remains prepared to implement the North-South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

(4) The DPRK is prepared to remain a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to allow implementation of its safeguards agreement under the Treaty.

Important issues raised during the talks remain to be resolved. Both sides agree that expert-level discussions are necessary to advance the replacement of the DPRK's graphite-moderated program with LWR technology, the safe storage and disposition of the spent fuel, provision of alternative energy, and the establishment of liaison offices. Accordingly, expert-level talks will be held in the U.S. and

DPRK or elsewhere as agreed. The DPRK and U.S. agreed to recess their talks and resume in Geneva on September 23, 1994.

In the meantime, the U.S. will pursue arrangements necessary to provide assurances for the LWR project to the DPRK as part of a final resolution of the nuclear issue, and the DPRK will observe the freeze on nuclear activities and maintain the continuity of safeguards, as agreed in the June 20-22, 1994, exchange of messages between Assistant Secretary of State Robert L. Gallucci and First Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Kang Sok Ju.

PRESS STATEMENT
August 12, 1994
Geneva

- o We have had a productive week of talks. Our "Agreed Statement" captures elements which we agree will form part of the final settlement of the nuclear issue.
- o The DPRK reaffirmed their interest in converting to Light Water Reactor technology, based on U.S. willingness to assist in that conversion by providing assurances for the financing and construction of an LWR project.
- o Upon the receipt of our assurances about provision of an LWR project and interim energy arrangements, the DPRK agrees:
 - o to forego reprocessing of all spent fuel;
 - o to seal and allow IAEA monitoring of the radiochemical laboratory;
 - o to cease construction of its 50MW graphite reactor;
 - o to cease construction of its 200MW graphite reactor;
- o In the context of the overall settlement, the DPRK has also agreed to:
 - o remain a full member of the NPT;
 - o accept implementation of its IAEA safeguards agreement under the NPT;
 - o implement the Declaration on Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
- o As is made clear in the statement, the DPRK will continue the current freeze on its nuclear program and maintain the continuity of safeguards during the interim period until our next meeting. And I have made clear to the DPRK that provision of an LWR must be based on return to the NPT and compliance with fullscope safeguards, including accounting for all nuclear material in North Korea.
- o We now must move ahead with the hard work of putting those elements in place. For our part, that includes detailed consultations with our friends and allies on the light water reactor project, on the assurances that we would be prepared to offer for the financing and construction of that project, and on other aspects of the settlement that we hope to reach.
- o Vice Minister Kang and I agreed that it will be useful to hold expert-level discussions in capitals on some of the specific issues that we have agreed to work on. So I think that the period ahead will be an extremely busy one.
- o Although our talks have been worthwhile, the lion's share of work lies ahead of us. These discussions have served to make clear exactly what each sides needs to do.

Q: The statement says each side is "prepared" to take certain steps. When will those preparations be complete?

- Preparations to advance common objectives will begin in the next few weeks through experts-level meetings in the U.S. and DPRK.
- Can't expect complex issues to be resolved fully prior to the resumption of our talks here in Geneva on September 23, but we do expect progress by that time so that we can agree to take further concrete steps toward resolving the nuclear issue.

Q: "In the meantime," will construction of the 50/200 MW reactors and reprocessing at RCL continue?

- DPRK agreed in the statement to continue the freeze on nuclear activities and maintain continuity of safeguards, as Minister Kang and I agreed in June.
- In accordance with that agreement, the DPRK will neither reload the five megawatt reactor with new fuel nor reprocess the spent fuel from that reactor.
- IAEA inspectors will remain on the site to verify this freeze.
- Although construction activity at the 50/200 MW reactors and the RCL was not included in that freeze, these critical elements of the DPRK program were identified in our Agreed Statement to be frozen once the U.S. provides its assurance on the LWR project. We expect to do that next month.

Q: What exactly have you accomplished during these talks? The "freeze" remains in place, but DPRK still has spent fuel, an operating reprocessing line, and has not yet allowed special inspections.

- The Agreed Statement identifies areas of agreement: NPT and safeguards status, the large graphite reactors and the reprocessing facility. It acknowledges that there are areas where we do not have agreement: Most significantly, 1) the disposition of the spent fuel -- though reprocessing is excluded; 2) the timing for implementation of special inspections and the NSDD, and 3) the future of the five mw reactor, are perhaps the most important.

Q: Which side will take the first step? When will the U.S. normalize its relations with the DPRK? When will the spent fuel be stored safely and disposed of? When will the DPRK allow special inspections?

- The sequencing of our respective steps will be determined in the context of a framework for reaching all of our objectives.
- In response to U.S. assurances for the provision of LWR's, and arrangements for interim energy alternatives, the DPRK will freeze construction of the 50/200 MW reactors, seal the RCL under IAEA monitoring and accept its NPT safeguards obligations. Those will be the next steps.
- We will work on the sequence of other steps at the experts-level meetings and here in Geneva in September.
- In the meantime, there will be no reprocessing and the five mw reactor will not be reloaded.

Q: Is this a breakthrough?

A: We made good progress in Geneva, but we have a lot of work ahead of us

Q: Aren't you still being strung along here? Isn't this more talk and no action?

A: No. The agreed statement includes both actions and commitments, all of which are in the US interest.:

North Korea has agreed to continue the freeze through the next session of talks in September (no reprocessing, no refueling the 5MWe reactor, continuity of safeguards and continued presence of IAEA inspectors).

North Korea has agreed to abandon its 50MWe and 200MWe graphite reactor projects and to adopt more proliferation-resistant light-water technology.

North Korea has agreed to abandon reprocessing, to stop building its second reprocessing line, and to seal the reprocessing facility under IAEA monitoring.

North Korea has committed to remaining a party to the NPT and full implementation of its IAEA obligations and of the North-South Denuclearization Declaration.

Q: Isn't this a massive reward for pursuing a nuclear weapons program and breaking your international nonproliferation commitments?

A: No. We are talking about a comprehensive resolution that includes bringing North Korea into compliance with its nonproliferation commitments but also goes well beyond that, in the promise to abandon its gas graphite-based nuclear program. Moreover, we are talking about a strategic opening that will lead North Korea toward full normalization with the international community.

In that context, we consider the investment in alternative energy in North Korea to be both appropriate and in our own interests. Our allies in the region -- South Korea and Japan -- agree.

Q: Did you sign the document? Why?

A: Assistant Secretary Gallucci and Vice Foreign Minister Kang exchanged signed documents. (if asked: It is not appropriate to copy and release diplomatic communications.)

Q: Is the document is legally binding?

A: No.

Q: What kind of assurances are you talking about? Who would give them?

A: We are talking about assurances that the US will seek to arrange provision of an LWR project to North Korea, provided North Korea lives up to its nonproliferation commitments.

The precise nature of those assurances will be determined in consultation with congress. We also intend to seek the support of other governments, beginning, with South Korea and Japan, to provide that project.

(if asked what would happen if other governments failed to provide that support: We have not even attempted to put this consortium together yet. I am not going to speculate on what will happen if we cannot.)

Q: How do you know you can deliver?

A: We have a lot of work ahead of us and I am not going to speculate on how it will go. I can say that we have consulted extensively with our South Korean and Japanese allies, who are both supportive of this idea, that we believe that providing this project is in our best collective interest, and that we will work hard to bring it about.

Q: How much money are you talking about?

A: We have a lot of work to do before we have a clear sense of that. I'd rather not guess at a figure.

Q: How can you justify putting 2000MW into such a small electrical grid?

A: The North Korean plan calls for 2000 MW of increased capacity by the year 2000, and the South Koreans are willing to support that level of increase. We need to learn more about North Korea's grid and its future expansion before working out how to integrate increased capacity.

Q: How does this agreement advance US national interests?

A: You moron, see second answer above.

Q: Are your allies comfortable with this arrangement?

A: We have consulted very closely with our allies -- including during Assistant Secretary Gallucci's recent trip to Seoul and Tokyo as well as during our talks this week -- and have found a broad measure of support for our approach.

This is not surprising, since we have worked from the outset to build a strong international consensus on how to approach this problem.

You will have to ask the governments themselves for their specific views on this arrangement.

Q: What did you fail to get in this arrangement? What are the remaining areas of disagreement?

A: There is a broad measure of agreement in terms of the overall objectives of a nonnuclear Korean peninsula, full compliance with its nonproliferation commitments, shifting from gas-graphite to light-water technology and moving toward more normal relations.

There are still differences over the specific timing and sequencing of the steps toward these objectives.

Q: Isn't it premature to be moving toward normalization?

A: We believe that it is in our collective interest to bring North Korea back into compliance with its international obligations, to resolve those issues dividing North Korea from the international community and to see North Korea become a full, participating member of the community of nations.

To that end, we have made it clear that as North Korea takes steps in that direction, that we are willing to move toward normalization.

Q: What about the other things the US has complained about -- the conventional threat, missiles, human rights, terrorism?

A: All these issues remain on the table and we will continue to pursue our objectives in the context of an overall resolution to those issues dividing North Korea from the international community.

(if pressed) The issues of most urgent security concern are the forward deployment of North Korea's very large conventional forces as well as the export of ballistic missiles.

Q: What will happen to the 8000 spent fuel rods?

A: That has not been finally resolved. We are prepared right now to take steps to reduce the ecological and safety risk posed by the rods exposure to water in the spent fuel pond and we want those rods transferred out of North Korea as soon as technically feasible.

We do not have agreement, however, with the North Koreans on how to proceed.

Q: What will happen to the 5 MWe reactor?

A: The North Koreans have committed not to refuel or restart that reactor before our talks continue in September. At that time we will continue our discussions regarding the future of that reactor.

Q: What happens if North Korea breaks the freeze?

A: That would undermine the basis for the US-North Korean talks.

Q: Why are you taking North Korea's word on faith?

A: We are not. The freeze will be monitored by the IAEA, which is maintaining continuous presence at Yongbyon.

Q: Does this mean the US will now slack off on its plans to enhance its military forces in Korea?

A: The US commitment to the security of the ROK is unshakeable. As we have in the past, we will take all necessary measures to ensure that the combined US and ROK forces can deter and, if necessary, defend against any aggression.

To that end, we will continue to pursue long-planned modernization to our forces and equipment in Korea, and to conduct our normal exercises.

(if asked about Team Spirit)

We are continuing planning for Team Spirit '94, but have told North Korea that we would support an ROK decision to suspend it given sufficient progress in the North-South dialogue.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003. paper	re taskings (1 page)	08/15/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 283

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, August 1994 [3]

2009-0528-1

kc1564

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004a. memo	information, Anthony Lake to POTUS re memcon w ROK president (1 page)	08/15/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 283

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, August 1994 [3]

2009-0528-F

kc1564

RESTRICTION CODES

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004b. talking points	re telecom w ROK President (1 page)	08/15/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 283

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, August 1994 [3]

2009-0528-F

kc1564

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005. memo	re memcon, Tony Lake and ROK security advisor Chung (3 pages)	08/14/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 283

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, August 1994 [3]

2009-0528-F

kc1564

RESTRICTION CODES

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006a. memo	Steve Aoki to Tony Lake re call to ROK NSA Chong (1 page)	08/00/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 283

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, August 1994 [3]

2009-0528-F
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006b. talking points	re call to ROK NSA Chong (2 pages)	08/00/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 283

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, August 1994 [3]

2009-0528-F

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RESTRICTION CODES

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006c. cable	re ROK unification policy (3 pages)	08/12/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 283

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, August 1994 [3]

2009-0528-F
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006d. fax	message, transmittal, Unification Day Speech (1 page)	08/13/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 283

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, August 1994 [3]

2009-0528-F

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006e. memo	David Brown to Ambassador Laney re ROKG August 15 speech (2 pages)	08/00/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 283

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, August 1994 [3]

2009-0528-F

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