

FOIA MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Folder Title:

North Korea, November 1993 [9]

Staff Office-Individual:

Nonproliferation and Export Controls-Aoki, Steven

Original OA/ID Number:

283

Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:	Stack:
41	5	5	2	V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. paper	re agreed (2 pages)	12/00/1993	P1/b(1)
002. paper	re North Korea phase 2 and 3 (1 page)	12/00/1993	P1/b(1)
003. paper	re broad and thorough approach (2 pages)	12/00/1993	P1/b(1)
004. paper	re negotiations (2 pages)	12/00/1993	P1/b(1)
005. paper	re what North Korea wants (2 pages)	12/00/1993	P1/b(1)
006. cable	re Post summit approach (5 pages)	12/01/1993	P1/b(1)
007. paper	re broad and thorough approach [duplicate of 003 without annotation] (2 pages)	12/00/1993	P1/b(1)
008. paper	re sequence of events (2 pages)	11/00/1993	P1/b(1)
009a. note	Steve [Aoki] to Gary re outline (1 page)	11/00/1993	P1/b(1)
009b. paper	re North Korea (2 pages)	11/00/1993	P1/b(1)
010a. memo	Joseph Nye to Intelligence Board Principals re releasable verion of NIE (1 page)	12/07/1993	P1/b(1)
010b. report	re North Korea (6 pages)	12/07/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 283

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, November 1993 [8]

2009-0528-F

kc1555

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]

P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]

P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]

P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]

P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
011. report	re North Korea (55 pages)	12/00/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 283

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, November 1993 [8]

2009-0528-F

kc1555

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. paper	re agreed (2 pages)	12/00/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 283

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, November 1993 [8]

2009-0528-F
kc1555

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. paper	re North Korea phase 2 and 3 (1 page)	12/00/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 283

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, November 1993 [8]

2009-0528-F
kc1555

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003. paper	re broad and thorough approach (2 pages)	12/00/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 283

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, November 1993 [8]

2009-0528-F
kc1555

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Selective North Korea Sanctions

Diplomatic Relations--The United States has never established diplomatic relations with the DPRK.

U.N. 25-Mile Travel Limit--The U.S. has restricted the travel of DPRK UN representatives to the headquarters district, a 25-mile radius from Columbus Circle, under the Foreign Missions Act and the UN Headquarters Agreement.

Trade Embargo--Under the Trading with the Enemy Act, the President has banned trade and financial transactions absent a Treasury license since 1950.

Export Controls--North Korea is also subject to COCOM and foreign-policy export controls under the Export Administration Act of 1979 absent a Commerce license, though these controls, like those that follow, are of little practical consequence for the U.S. because of the comprehensive embargo.

Shipping--The Defense Production Act of 1950 prohibits owners, their agents and officers from taking to the DPRK any ship or aircraft documented or registered under U.S. laws, and from transporting any goods destined to the DPRK.

Most Favored Nation (MFN)--Under the Trade Act of 1974, the DPRK is not eligible for MFN because it was not previously eligible, because the President has not determined that (as a non-market country) it allows its nationals to emigrate freely (Jackson-Vanik), and because there is no bilateral trade agreement containing certain provisions. MFN had been withdrawn from North Korea in 1951.

Arms Trade--The International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) provision stating that it was U.S. policy to ban exports of defense articles, and services to and imports from, North Korea became effective in August 1955.

Foreign Aid--The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, which became effective on August 1, 1962, prohibited aid to communist countries. The DPRK was specifically identified in the law.

Export-Import Bank Programs--The 1986 Export-Import Bank Act prohibited guarantees, insurance, or credits for any purchases by Marxist-Leninist countries. North Korea was specifically identified.

Terrorism--On January 20, 1988, North Korea was designated as a country supporting terrorism under section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979, and is thus subject to numerous statutory sanctions (e.g. arms transfers, multilateral bank loans, tax credits, etc.)

NORTH KOREA (DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA)***CURRENT SANCTIONS***

- **Embargo on almost all exports to North Korea except for informational materials and goods identified to meet basic human needs.** (See June 28, 1950, Feb. 2, 1989 and April 24, 1989.)
- **No financial transactions allowed between North Korean and U.S. nationals except for costs directly related to the purchase and shipping of informational materials and humanitarian goods and non-commercial travel, and continuing freeze on all North Korean assets under U.S. jurisdiction.** (See Dec. 1950, Jan. 3, 1989, Feb. 2, 1989 and April 24, 1989.)
- **Arms embargoed.** (See Aug. 26, 1955.)
- **As a state sponsor of international terrorism, denied most trade, all aid and arms sales.** (See Jan. 20, 1988.)
- **As a communist country, denied MFN, trade preferences, foreign aid, and Export-Import Bank programs.** (See Sept. 1951, Aug. 1962, Jan. 1975 and Oct. 1986.)
- **Export of items on MTCR and U.S. Government contracts and certain imports prohibited.** (See March 6, 1992 and June 23, 1992.)

Background

In the aftermath of the Japanese victory in the Russo-Japanese war of 1905, the formerly independent Kingdom of Korea became a dependency of the Japanese Empire in 1910. Declarations made by all parties at the 1943 Cairo and 1945 Potsdam Conferences during World War II envisaged a free and independent post-war Korea.

At the time of the August 10, 1945, Japanese surrender offer, the U.S. Government decided that Japanese troops in Korea north of the 38th parallel should surrender to Soviet forces and those south of that line should surrender to American forces. After negotiations with the Soviet Union on Korean unification failed in 1946 and 1947, the U.N. proposed open elections, which took place in the South in May 1948. Four days after the elections in the South, the North Koreans completed the severance of all economic ties with the South by shutting off all electric power transmission. The Republic of Korea came into existence in August 1948. The United States recognized the new government on January 1, 1949. The last contingent of U.S. occupation forces left South Korea in June 1949.

On September 9, 1948, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was established in the Soviet-occupied zone after a rigged election. This government was not recognized by the United Nations.

On June 25, 1950, North Korean forces launched a full-scale invasion of the South across the 38th parallel. By early September 1950, almost all of Korea was in communist hands. On September 25, U.N. forces, led by General Douglas MacArthur, landed at Inchon and moved north toward the Yalu River border with China. In October 1950, a large number of Chinese "volunteers" entered the war to fight alongside the decimated North Korean forces, pushing back U.N. forces. After a good deal of serious fighting, the front lines stabilized around the 38th parallel. An armistice was signed on July 27, 1953, after protracted negotiations. Intermittent, fruitless discussions on Korean unification have taken place since.¹

The North's policy of confrontation and large military have been longstanding threats to South Korea's security. Pyongyang has on several occasions instigated international acts of terrorism against South Korean targets. On November 29, 1987, a Korean Air Lines plane exploded in mid-air, killing 115 persons. Investigations revealed the plane had been sabotaged by North Korean agents. In January 1988, North Korea was placed on the list of countries supporting international terrorism and informal contact between the United States and North Korea was once again terminated.² Later that year, however, the U.S. Government announced that it was taking certain positive steps in support of South Korea's initiative toward the North.

Successive administrations have underlined the U.S. commitment to South Korea's security and encouraged direct talks between North and South Korea to lessen tensions on the peninsula, particularly in the demilitarized zone. It was hoped that the largely symbolic steps begun by the Reagan administration in 1988 and implemented in the early part of the Bush administration would encourage North Korea to make progress in the South-North dialogue, put an end to anti-American propaganda, and bring about the return of the remains of American servicemen killed in the Korean War.³

These policy objectives remained active. Increasingly, however, U.S. concerns focused on North Korean missile proliferation, a nuclear facility and fuel reprocessing plants believed to be under construction at Yongbyon. North

Korea became a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1985, but after six years of stonewalling, allowed safeguards inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency in June 1992.⁴

JUNE 28, 1950 -- SANCTION: TRADE EMBARGO

Status: Active/Modified

Under the authority of the Export Control Act, the United States invoked a total embargo on exports to North Korea.⁵

Authority: Sec. 3 of the Export Control Act of 1949 [P.L. 11 - 81st Cong; 63 Stat. 7].

See April 24, 1989, for modification.

DECEMBER 17, 1950 -- SANCTION: FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL

Status: Active/Modified

Under the authority of Section 5(b) of the Trading With the Enemy Act, the Treasury Department issued foreign assets control regulations to block the assets in the United States of residents of North Korea and effectively to prohibit all trade and economics transactions with residents of North Korea. The almost total embargo on trade and payments to North Korea remains in effect under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act [P.L. 95-223].

North Korea remained in the Commerce Department's most restrictive export control country group, Group Z.

Authority: Sec. 5(b) of the Trading With the Enemy Act of 1917 [P.L. 65-91; 12 U.S.C. 95a]; Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951 (65 Stat. 72); International Emergency Economic Powers Act [P.L. 95-223].

See January 3 and February 2, 1989, for modifications.

SEPTEMBER 1, 1951 -- SANCTION: DENIED MFN

Status: Active

The Trade Agreement Extension Act authorized the suspension/withdrawal of most-favored-nation (MFN) status from countries controlled by communists for their support of North Korea and China.

Authority: Presidential Proclamation 2935 and Trade Letter (16 F.R. 7635 and 7637) under sec. 5, Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951 (65 Stat. 73); Tariff Schedules of the United States Annotated (General Headnote 3(d)).⁶

AUGUST 26, 1955 -- SANCTION: BANNED ARMS TRADE

Status: Active/Modified

The International Traffic in Arms Regulation (ITAR) stating that it was United States policy to ban exports of defense articles and services to, and imports from, certain countries and areas became effective. North Korea was one of the countries listed in the August 1955 ITAR and remained listed.⁷ The Office of Defense Trade Controls (formerly Munitions Control) in the Department of State was responsible for the drafting and implementation of ITARs, which govern the export of defense articles and services.

Authority: initial -- Sec. 414 of the Mutual Security Act of 1954 [P.L. 83-665; 68 Stat. 848], 20 F.R. 6250; current -- Sec. 38 of the Arms Export Control Act [P.L. 90-629; 22 U.S.C. 2778] implemented at 22 CFR Part 126.1.

See April 4, 1988, for modification.

SEPTEMBER 4, 1961 -- SANCTION: PROHIBITED ALL AID TO COUNTRIES CONTROLLED BY COMMUNIST MOVEMENT

Status: Repealed

Section 620(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 prohibited the extension of assistance to any country controlled by the international communist movement.

Authority: Sec. 620(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 [P.L. 87-195].

See December 29, 1981, for repeal of sanction.

AUGUST 1, 1962 -- SANCTION: PROHIBITED FOREIGN AID

Status: Active

Section 620(f) was added to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, prohibiting aid to communist countries. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea was included among the communist countries listed in the legislation.

Authority: Sec. 620(f) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended [P.L. 87-195; 22 U.S.C. 2370]; as amended by Sec. 301(d)(3) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1962 [P.L. 87-565].

JANUARY 3, 1975 -- SANCTION: DENIED TRADE PREFERENCES

Status: Active

Section 502(b)(1) of the Trade Act of 1974 barred any communist country that had been denied MFN status from receiving preferential treatment under the General System of Preferences. The withdrawal of MFN status in 1951 made North Korea subject to this sanction.

Authority: Sec. 502(b)(1) of the Trade Act of 1974 [P.L. 93-618; 19 U.S.C. 2462]; Tariff Schedules of the United States Annotated (General Headnote 3(e)(v)).⁸

DECEMBER 29, 1981 -- REPEALED: PROHIBITION ON ALL AID TO COUNTRIES CONTROLLED BY COMMUNIST MOVEMENT

Section 620(b) was repealed as it was considered redundant given the intent of Congress was contained in section 620(f) which prohibited aid to communist countries and identified the countries by name.

Authority: Sec. 734(a)(1) of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1981 [P.L. 97-133].

See September 4, 1961, for original sanction.

OCTOBER 15, 1986 -- SANCTION: PROHIBITED EXPORT-IMPORT BANK PROGRAMS

Status: Active

Section 8 of the 1986 Export-Import Bank Act amended section 2(b)(2) of the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945 to prohibit Export-Import Bank guarantees, insurance, or credits for any purchases by Marxist-Leninist countries. In cases determined by the President to be in the national interest, the prohibition could be waived. North Korea was on the list of countries identified as being Marxist-Leninist.

Authority: Sec. 2(b)(2) of the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945, as amended [P.L. 79-173; 12 U.S.C. 635]; as amended and restated by Sec. 8 of the Export-Import Bank Act Amendments of 1986 [P.L. 99-472].

Status: Modified

See April 4, 1988, for modification of sanction.

See January 20, 1988, for original sanction.

An amendment to the Foreign Assets Control Regulations eased some travel restrictions by allowing travel agents to apply for a license authorizing actions necessary for arranging noncommercial travel for U.S. individuals or groups

involved in academics, sports, cultural and certain other areas. This change in regulations to facilitate unofficial, non-governmental exchanges with North Korea is consistent with current U.S. foreign policy under President Bush.

The steps taken in January, February and April 1989 implemented the policy initiative announced by the U.S. Government on October 31, 1988, to encourage a dialogue between North and South Korea and their respective allies.¹¹

Authority: Sec. 5(b) of the Trading With the Enemy Act of 1917 [P.L. 65-91; 12 U.S.C. 95a]; 31 CFR Part 500.569, as amended (54 F.R. 21, 11185).

See December 17, 1950, for original sanction.

FEBRUARY 2, 1989 -- MODIFIED: FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL

An amendment in the Trade Act of 1988, ending the authority of the President to prohibit or regulate the exportation or importation of any informational materials not controlled for national security reasons, terminated previous prohibitions contained in the Trading With the Enemy Act of 1917. New Foreign Assets Control Regulations came into effect allowing the exportation of informational materials to North Korea and all financial transactions directly related to the purchase and shipping of the materials.

Authority: Sec. 2502(a)(1) of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act [P.L. 100-418; 102 Stat. 1107] amended the Trading With the Enemy Act [P.L. 65-91; 50 U.S.C. App. 5(b)]; 31 CFR Part 500.206 (54 F.R. 5229).

See December 17, 1950, for original sanction.

APRIL 24, 1989 -- MODIFIED: TRADE EMBARGO

Part 785 of the Export Administration Regulations was amended to allow the export to North Korea of commercially-supplied goods intended to meet basic human needs. The Regulations stipulated shipments would be authorized under an individual validated license on a case-by-case basis. This was the last of several policy changes intended to support South Korea's initiative to improve relations with the North and to encourage North Korea to end its policy of confrontation and international terrorism.¹²

Authority: 15 CFR Part 785.1, as amended (54 F.R. 16360).

See June 28, 1950, for original sanction.

**MARCH 6, 1992 -- SANCTION: PROHIBITED EXPORT OF
MUNITIONS LIST ITEMS, U.S.
GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS, AND
IMPORTS**

Status: Active

The Under Secretary of State for International Affairs determined on March 6, 1992, that North Korean government entities had engaged in missile technology proliferation activities with Iran. The finding required the imposition of sanctions denying: export licenses for items on the U.S. Munitions List, all U.S. Government contracts for two years, and the importation into the United States of any products made by the North Korean entities. In addition, the finding stated that because of North Korea's status as a nonmarket economy, sanctions had to be applied against all activities of the North Korean government related to the production or manufacturing of missiles, electronics, space systems or equipment, and military aircraft.

Authority: Sec. 73(a)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended [P.L. 90-629; 22 U.S.C. 2797b]; Sec. 11B(b)(1) of the Export Administration Act of 1979, as amended [P.L. 96-72; 50 U.S.C. app. 2410(b)(1)]; Department of State Public Notice 1602 (57 F.R. 11767).

**JUNE 23, 1992 -- SANCTION: PROHIBITED EXPORT OF MUNITIONS
LIST ITEMS, U.S. GOVERNMENT
CONTRACTS, AND IMPORTS**

Status: Active

The Under Secretary of State for International Affairs determined on March 6, 1992, that two North Korean government entities had engaged in missile technology proliferation activities with Syria. The finding required the imposition of sanctions denying: export licenses for items on the U.S. Munitions List, all U.S. Government contracts for two years, and the importation into the United States of any products made by the North Korean entities. In addition, the finding stated that because of North Korea's status as a nonmarket economy, sanctions had to be applied against all activities of the North Korean government related to the production or manufacturing of missiles, electronics, space systems or equipment, and military aircraft.

Authority: Sec. 73(a)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended [P.L. 90-629; 22 U.S.C. 2797b]; Sec. 11B(b)(1) of the Export Administration Act of 1979, as amended [P.L. 96-72; 50 U.S.C. app. 2410(b)(1)]; Department of State Public Notice 1647 (57 F.R. 29924).

SOURCES

¹ U.S. Army. Area Handbook. South Korea, 1975. p. 21-26; U.S. Department of State. Bureau of Public Affairs. Background Notes: [North] Korea, July 1989.

² U.S. Department of State. Bureau of Public Affairs. U.S. Condemns North Korean Terrorism. Statements by Ambassador Clayton C. McManaway, Deputy to the Ambassador at Large for Counterterrorism, and William Clark, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Washington, D.C., February 4, 1988. Current Policy No. 1042.

³ Washington Post, November 1, 1988, p. A28.

⁴ U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs. Hearings on Arms Control in Asia and U.S. Interests in the Region, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess., January 31 and March 13, 1990. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1991; U.S. Department of Defense. Bureau of Public Affairs. Remarks by Paul D. Wolfowitz, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, to the Foreign Press Club, Seoul, Korea. May 11, 1991; Washington Post, September 4, 1991, p. A22.

⁵ 15 F.R. 4189.

⁶ U.S. Foreign Trade Sanctions Imposed for Foreign Policy Reasons in Force as of April 10, 1988, by Vladimir N. Pregelj. [Washington] April 13, 1988. CRS Report 88-301 E. p. 3, 15.

⁷ 49 F.R. 47702.

⁸ U.S. Foreign Trade Sanctions Imposed for Foreign Policy Reasons in Force as of April 10, 1988, by Vladimir N. Pregelj. [Washington] April 13, 1988. CRS Report 88-301 E. p. 15.)

⁹ 134 Cong. Rec., S. 1895, March 4, 1988, S. Con. Res. 99, Condemning North Korea's Support for Terrorist Activities; 134 Cong. Rec. H. 480, February 24, 1988, H. Con. Res. 246, Condemning the Bombing by North Korean Agents of Korean Air Lines Flight 858.

¹⁰ Department of State Bulletin, June 1988, p. 47.

¹¹ 54 F.R. 5230; U.S. President, 1989- (Bush). Written responses to questions submitted by the Yonhap News Agency of the Republic of Korea, February 16, 1989. Public Papers of the President. Book 1. Washington, G.P.O., 1990. p. 131 - 132.

¹² Department of State Bulletin, January 1989, p. 17.

NORTH KOREA SANCTIONS

<u>Category</u> [Legal Citation]	<u>Description</u>	<u>Repeal/Revise</u>
1. Diplomatic Relations. [U.S. Constitution; <u>Note:</u> For a good, general overview of the law regarding state/government recognition, see sections 202-205 of the Restatement 3d, Foreign Relations Law of the U.S. (1986.)]	The U.S. does not currently maintain diplomatic relations with the DPRK.	The establishment of diplomatic relations is a constitutional prerogative of the Executive; no formal congressional approval is required.
2. U.N. 25-mile Travel Limit. [Section 162 of the Foreign Missions Act, 22 U.S.C. 4316; U.N. Headquarters Agreement; Immigration and Nationality Act]	Although the DPRK is a member of the United Nations, the U.S. lawfully restricts the travel of DPRK UN representatives to the HQ District, i.e., a 25-mile radius from Columbus Circle.	The 25-mile limit may be removed or relaxed by the Secretary (in consultation with the FBI and CIA) without the need for congressional approval or consultation.
3. Trade Embargo. [Trading With The Enemy Act ("TWEA"), Pub. L. 65-91, <u>as amended</u> , 50 U.S.C. App. 5(b); 31 C.F.R. 500.201 et seq.]	--Empowers President to prohibit/regulate a broad range of financial/property transactions. --Since 12/17/50, President has banned trade absent Treasury (Office of Foreign Asset Controls) license.	Executive may relax or terminate the ban at any time w/o congressional consent or consultation. [But note section 710 of the pending State authorization bill, which, if enacted in its current form, would prohibit any license for trade with the DPRK except pursuant to a presidential determination that the DPRK maintains its status as a member of the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and is in full compliance with its obligations thereunder.]

- | | | |
|--|---|---|
| <p>4. Exports.</p> <p>[Export Administration Act of 1979 (Pub. L. 96-72, as amended, 50 U.S.C. App. 2404)("EAA"); 15 C.F.R. Part 700]</p> | <p>Authorizes the President to "prohibit or curtail the export of any goods or technology subject to the jurisdiction of the [U.S.]" absent a license from Commerce.</p> | <p>Executive branch may relax or terminate the ban without congressional consent or consultation.</p> |
| <p>5. Shipping.</p> <p>[Section 704 of the Defense Production Act of 1950 (Pub. L. 81-774, 50 U.S.C. App. 2154); 44 C.F.R. Part 403]</p> | <p>Prohibits owners, owners' agents, and officers from (i) taking to the DPRK any ship or aircraft documented or registered under the laws of the U.S.; and, (ii) from transporting in any such ship goods destined for the DPRK.</p> | <p>Executive may relax or terminate these restrictions without congressional consent or consultation.</p> |
| <p>6. Most Favored Nation ("MFN").</p> <p>[Title IV of the Trade Act of 1974 (Pub. L. 93-618, 19 U.S.C. 1431)]</p> | <p>As a country the products of which were not eligible for MFN treatment on or before 1/3/75, the DPRK is ineligible for MFN extension, absent...</p> | <p>(i) Presidential determination that the DPRK (as a "non-market country") allows its nationals to emigrate freely (the so-called "Jackson-Vanik" amendment); and, (ii) conclusion of a bilateral trade agreement containing specified provisions.</p> |
| <p>7. Proliferation</p> <p>[Sections 1701-1704 of the FY '91 National Defense Authorization Act (Pub. L. 101-510, 50 U.S.C. App. 2402 note); 15 C.F.R. Part 700; 22 C.F.R. 120.29 (ITAR), see 58 F. Reg. 39286 (7/22/93)]</p> | <p>-- Amended the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778) and the Export Administration Act to require sanctions if the President</p> | <p>-- Sanctions are for a two-year period.</p> <p>-- President may waive upon a determination that such action is</p> |

determines that a foreign person knowingly exports, transfers or otherwise engages in trade "of items that contribute to missile proliferation."

"essential to the national security of the [U.S.]" and so certifies to Congress 20 days prior to issuing the waiver.

-- U.S. imposed such sanctions on two DPRK entities in 1992.

8. Terrorism.

[Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979, as amended by the Anti-Terrorism and Arms Export Amendments Act of 1989, Pub. L. 101-222, 103 Stat. 1892]

[Note: Section 901 of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. 901(j) would also deny in the case of the DPRK certain tax credits for income and other taxes paid to that country.]

-- DPRK designated a "terrorist country" since 1/20/88 per State determination that it had repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism.

-- Prohibits certain transactions with DPRK, including direct or indirect export of any munitions list items by USG or any US person (as well as to re-exports by non-U.S. persons).

-- Exports of non-munitions list items must be licensed.

-- President may waive the prohibition for a particular transaction if he determines that it is "essential to the national security interests of the [U.S.]," and both consults with and submits a report to Congress 15 days prior to the transaction.

-- There are two ways by which a country may get off the "terrorist list," i.e., (i) President certifies to Congress that "there has been a fundamental change in the leadership or policies of the terrorist country, that the government ...is not supporting acts of international terrorism, and that the government has provided assurances that it will not support acts of international terrorism in the future,"; or, (ii) President submits to Congress for review, 45 days prior to the

effective date of the
recision, a
determination that
the government has
not supported
international
terrorism during the
preceding 6-month
period and has
provided assurances
that it will not
support acts of
international
terrorism in the
future.

**THE FOLLOWING ARE POTENTIALLY APPLICABLE ALTHOUGH NO FORMAL
DETERMINATION HAS YET BEEN MADE**

**9. Foreign
Assistance.**

A. Human Rights.

[Section 116 of the
Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961, as
amended, 22 U.S.C.
2151n; also covers
OPIC insurance,
guarantees, or
loans, 22 U.S.C.
2199 (i)]

Prohibits
assistance to the
government of "any
country which
engages in a
consistent pattern
of gross violations
of internationally
recognized human
rights, including
torture or cruel,
inhuman, or
degrading treatment
or punishment..."
etc.

"Gross violator"
determination is made
by the AID
Administrator and the
Assistant Secretary
for HA, who must take
into account the
extent to which the
government has
permitted unimpeded
investigations of
alleged human rights
violations by
appropriate
international
organizations, and
the extent to which
multilateral and
security assistance
is already restricted
to that country by
the President or
Congress for human
rights reasons.

**B. Communist
States.**

[Section 620(f) of
the FAA (22 U.S.C.
2370 (f))]

Prohibits
assistance to "any
communist country,"
including the DPRK,
except for

--President may waive
upon finding that
such assistance is
vital to U.S.
national security,

[Note: There are also several other restrictions on assistance that might potentially become applicable to the DPRK that it is not necessary to address now, e.g., sec. 620A of the FAA, 22 U.S.C. 2371 (prohibits assistance to governments supporting int'l terrorism); sec. 620(t) of the FAA (break in diplomatic relations); secs. 523 and 529 of the FY 94 Foreign Ops. Appropriation bill; sec. 543 of the FY '93 FAA (Pub. L. 102-391).]

10. Security Assistance.

[Section 502B of the FAA (22 U.S.C. 2304)]

assistance to schools, libraries, and hospital centers for educational research which are outside the U.S. and are founded/operated by U.S. citizens.

-- Prohibits security assistance to any country "the government of which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights."

-- Also prohibits security assistance for the police, domestic intelligence, or similar law enforcement forces of such a country. Moreover, export licenses are prohibited even for crime control and detection instruments and equipment, subject to a presidential waiver in

that the country is not controlled by the international communist conspiracy, and that the assistance will promote the country's independence from international communism.

-- President may also remove a country for a designated period if he determines that it is in the national interest to do so; one factor to be considered is whether the country is "fostering the establishment of a generally democratic system, with respect for internationally recognized human rights."

Assistance may be provided only if the President finds such a "significant improvement in [the] human rights record" that it is in the national interest to lift the prohibition.

"exceptional
circumstances."
Id., for IMET.

11. IFI Lending.

[Section 7001 of
the International
Financial
Institutions Act
(22 U.S.C. 262d);
see also sec. 528
of the FY '94
Foreign Ops
Appropriation Act,
which contains a
similar provision.]

Requires the U.S.
Executive Directors
of IFI's (e.g.,
World Bank) to
oppose any loan,
extension of
financial
assistance, or
technical
assistance to any
country the
government of which
engages in "a
pattern of gross
violations of
internationally
recognized human
rights," or
"provides refuge to
individuals
committing acts of
international
terrorism by
hijacking aircraft."

-- U.S. Executive
Directors are only
authorized to
support assistance
"directed
specifically to
programs which
serve the basic
human needs of the
citizens of such
country."

Note: 22 U.S.C.
262d(f) requires
Treasury to consult
"in a timely manner"
with relevant
congressional
committees to inform
them of "prospective
changes in policy
direction toward
countries [sic] which
have or recently
have had poor human
rights records."

22 U.S.C. 262d(c)
requires Treasury to
report quarterly on
all loans considered
by the IFI Boards,
addressing inter alia
whether the U.S.
opposed, in each
instance, assistance
on human rights
grounds, or changed
its voting position
for such reasons.

"Gramm Amendment,"
section 43 of the
Bretton Woods
Agreement Act, as
amended, 22 U.S.C.
286aa.

Requires the
Secretary of
Treasury to direct
the U.S. Executive
Director of the IMF

The congressional
committees may
request that the
Secretary of Treasury
appear before them to

"to actively oppose any facility involving use of Fund credit by any Communist dictatorship" unless Treasury certifies to the relevant congressional committees that certain economic criteria are met.	certify and document (or to document in writing) that the requisite conditions have been met. If the Secretary does not appear in response to Congress' invitation, the Executive Director "shall vote against such program."
---	---

Gonzalez Amendment,
22 U.S.C. 283r,
284j, 285o.

Requires Secretary of Treasury to instruct Executive Directors to the IBRD and ADB to vote against assistance to any country that has expropriated the property of U.S. nationals.

Unless President determines that (i) an arrangement for proper compensation has been made; (ii) the matter has been submitted to arbitration; or, (iii) good faith settlement negotiations are in progress.

1 both Turkey and the entire region is enhanced by
2 the measures taken under this section.

3 **SEC. 710. ADDITIONAL SANCTIONS AGAINST NORTH KOREA.**

4 (a) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding any other provi-
5 sion of law, no license, instruction, rule, regulation, or
6 order issued under section 5 of the Trading With the
7 Enemy Act of 1917 (50 U.S.C. App. 5) may—

8 (1) authorize any transaction involving the com-
9 mercial sale of any good or technology to North
10 Korea; or

11 (2) authorize any transaction involving the pro-
12 vision of services for travel to North Korea which
13 was not otherwise authorized as of January 2, 1989.

14 (b) WAIVER.—The President may waive the applica-
15 tion of subsection (a) if the President determines that—

16 (1) North Korea continues to maintain its sta-
17 tus as a party to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of
18 Nuclear Weapons, done on July 1, 1968; and

19 (2) North Korea is in full compliance with its
20 obligations under the Treaty.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004. paper	re negotiations (2 pages)	12/00/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 283

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, November 1993 [8]

2009-0528-F
kc1555

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005. paper	re what North Korea wants (2 pages)	12/00/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 283

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, November 1993 [8]

2009-0528-F
kc1555

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

05-Dec-1993 03:44 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: White House Situation Room
(WHSR@A1@WHSR)

SUBJECT: DPRK: International Cooperative System Criticized (T

<DIST>

SIT: ANDREASEN AOKI KRISTOFF PONEMAN RAGLE WIEDEMANN

<ORIG>

FBIS

<TOR>

931205013210 F0592349

<SUBJ>

DPRK: International Cooperative System Criticized (Take 1 of 2)

<TEXT>

THIS 018

CLASS 4C

DPRK: International Cooperative System Criticized (Take 1 of 2)

SK0512054493 Pyongyang Korean Central Broadcasting Network in
Korean 1500 GMT 4 Dec 93

[Text] Western imperialist reactionaries and their subserving trumpets have recently been showing very ill-boding moves that get on our nerves, babbling about a so-called international cooperative system.

They are raising a clamor of mislead public opinion by fabricating the so-called suspicions of our nuclear development. They are kicking up a row that an international cooperative system should be formed so as to impose collective pressure and sanctions to make us accept overall inspections [chonmyon sachal], dramatizing the situation as if the continuity of the safeguards of our country's nuclear activities is about to be broken.

Worse still, very irresponsible and insane [kwanggijogin] outbursts, such as bombing the objects to deter the North's nuclear development and not excluding a possibility of a war, are enumerated. Grave obstacles are created in way of resolving the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula because of very ill-boding moves of the insidious forces who joined their hands with each other under the cloak of the international cooperative system.

The great leader Comrade Kim Il-song has noted: Our position regarding the nuclear inspections is clear and there is no reason whatsoever for one to have any question about this. However, bemoaning over the issue noisily and attempting to tarnish our Republic's reputation in the international community are moves that can only be interpreted to mean that they are seeking another purpose.

As it has already been known, we have repeatedly made clear that we have neither the will, nor the ability, nor the necessity to

develop nuclear weapons. The nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula was created because the United States brought in numerous nuclear weapons to South Korea and employed the policies of resorting to nuclear threats against us. These days, the nuclear issue is getting complicated and is entering a new phase because the insidious forces carried out special inspection [tukbyol sachal] commotions, finding faults with our nonexistent nuclear issue, and invariably pursued the policy of hostile and crush [apsal].

Since the talks for resolving the nuclear issue started, we have exerted all the efforts and worked faithfully to implement the points agreed in the talks. In particular, to fundamentally eliminate the so-called suspicions of our nuclear development, we made a bold decision to replace our existing graphite moderated reactor system with the light water moderated reactor system even to sacrifice the self-reliance of our nuclear energy industry and expressed a generous [aryanginnun] stance, taking into account of a dialogue partner's position. Moreover, we proposed a package solution out of the aspiration to fundamentally resolve the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula on the basis of peace and fairness. Thus, we have taken all possible practical measures to resolve the nuclear issue.

In the course of this, transparency [tumyongsong] and innocence [hyolbaeksong] of our nuclear activities have been clearly proved evoked support and sympathy from the world's public opinion. The insidious forces, nonetheless, continue to circulate a rumor on suspicions of our nuclear development, which has been clearly unveiled, and now outspokenly challenge to harm and crush [apsal] us by forming the so-called international cooperative system.

All of these facts show that they do not have an intention of actually resolving the nuclear issue but are only pursuing a goal of isolating and crushing [apsal] our socialist system.

(more)

05 DEC 0623z BPM

NNNN

<DIST>

SIT: NODIST

5

Distribution:

FOR: WIEDEMANN@A1@OEOB

FOR: RAGLE@A1@OEOB

FOR: PONEMAN@A1@OEOB

FOR: KRISTOFF@A1@OEOB

FOR: AOKI@A1@OEOB

FOR: ANDREASEN@A1@OEOB

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL PRINCIPALS' COMMITTEE MEETING

DATE: December 6, 1993
LOCATION: SITUATION ROOM
TIME: 3:30 p.m. - 4:30 p.m.

NEXT STEPS ON NORTH KOREA

Agenda

- I. Introduction NSC
- II. Intelligence Update CIA
- III. Diplomatic Update State
- IV. Security Update Defense
- V. Next Steps State
- VI. Public Diplomacy and
Congressional Strategy All Participants
- VII. Discussion All Participants
- VIII. Conclusion NSC

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By W NARA, Date 07/06/15
2009-0528-F

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

Q and A on NY Times Article on U.S. Forces in Korea

Q. Could you comment on the article in NYT on Dec 2 that the Pentagon is "studying plans to bolster U. S.-Korea forces"?

A. As you know, we are still trying to use diplomacy to resolve the North Korea nuclear issue. This policy has not changed, and we just finished coordinating with the Republic of Korea on the next diplomatic steps. However, it is well understood that if diplomacy fails to move North Korea to compliance with IAEA, this matter will naturally return to the United Nations. At that time, sanctions may well be sought by the United Nations. North Korea has been very aggressive in its statements regarding sanctions, calling that "an act of war" and threatening retaliation should sanctions be imposed. Therefore, it is only prudent for our commander in the Republic of Korea to study deterrent measures in case North Korea is not bluffing. These measures cover a wide range and are all defensive in nature. This type of study is conducted daily by our commanders around the globe and is part of the job of maintaining security. It is by no means meant to be provocative.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

05-Dec-1993 03:44 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: White House Situation Room
(WHSR@A1@WHSR)

SUBJECT: DPRK: International Cooperative System Criticized (T

<DIST>

SIT: ANDREASEN AOKI KRISTOFF PONEMAN RAGLE WIEDEMANN

<ORIG>

FBIS

<TOR>

931205013210 F0592349

<SUBJ>

DPRK: International Cooperative System Criticized (Take 1 of 2)

<TEXT>

FBIS 018

UNCLAS 4C

DPRK: International Cooperative System Criticized (Take 1 of 2)

SK0512054493 Pyongyang Korean Central Broadcasting Network in
Korean 1500 GMT 4 Dec 93

[Text] Western imperialist reactionaries and their subserving trumpets have recently been showing very ill-boding moves that get on our nerves, babbling about a so-called international cooperative system.

They are raising a clamor of mislead public opinion by fabricating the so-called suspicions of our nuclear development. They are kicking up a row that an international cooperative system should be formed so as to impose collective pressure and sanctions to make us accept overall inspections [chonmyon sachal], dramatizing the situation as if the continuity of the safeguards of our country's nuclear activities is about to be broken.

Worse still, very irresponsible and insane [kwanggijogin] outbursts, such as bombing the objects to deter the North's nuclear development and not excluding a possibility of a war, are enumerated. Grave obstacles are created in way of resolving the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula because of very ill-boding moves of the insidious forces who joined their hands with each other under the cloak of the international cooperative system.

The great leader Comrade Kim Il-song has noted: Our position regarding the nuclear inspections is clear and there is no reason whatsoever for one to have any question about this. However, clamoring over the issue noisily and attempting to tarnish our Republic's reputation in the international community are moves that can only be interpreted to mean that they are seeking another purpose.

As it has already been known, we have repeatedly made clear that we have neither the will, nor the ability, nor the necessity to

develop nuclear weapons. The nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula was created because the United States brought in numerous nuclear weapons to South Korea and employed the policies of resorting to nuclear threats against us. These days, the nuclear issue is getting complicated and is entering a new phase because the insidious forces carried out special inspection [tukbyol sachal] commotions, finding faults with our nonexistent nuclear issue, and invariably pursued the policy of hostile and crush [apsal].

Since the talks for resolving the nuclear issue started, we have exerted all the efforts and worked faithfully to implement the points agreed in the talks. In particular, to fundamentally eliminate the so-called suspicions of our nuclear development, we made a bold decision to replace our existing graphite moderated reactor system with the light water moderated reactor system even to sacrifice the self-reliance of our nuclear energy industry and expressed a generous [aryanginnun] stance, taking into account of a dialogue partner's position. Moreover, we proposed a package solution out of the aspiration to fundamentally resolve the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula on the basis of peace and fairness. Thus, we have taken all possible practical measures to resolve the nuclear issue.

In the course of this, transparency [tummyongsong] and innocence [kyolbaeksong] of our nuclear activities have been clearly proved and evoked support and sympathy from the world's public opinion.

The insidious forces, nonetheless, continue to circulate a rumor on suspicions of our nuclear development, which has been clearly unveiled, and now outspokenly challenge to harm and crush [apsal] us by forming the so-called international cooperative system.

All of these facts show that they do not have an intention of actually resolving the nuclear issue but are only pursuing a goal of isolating and crushing [apsal] our socialist system.

(more)

05 DEC 0623z BPM

NNNN

<DIST>

SIT: NODIST

¶

Distribution:

FOR: WIEDEMANN@A1@OEOB

FOR: RAGLE@A1@OEOB

FOR: PONEMAN@A1@OEOB

FOR: KRISTOFF@A1@OEOB

FOR: AOKI@A1@OEOB

FOR: ANDREASEN@A1@OEOB

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

03-Dec-1993 14:21 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: White House Situation Room
(WHSR@A1@WHSR)

SUBJECT: DECEMBER 1993 BOARD OF GOVERNORS: STATEMENT

<DIST>
SIT: AOKI BEERS CLARKER PONEMAN RAGLE VAX WIEDEMANN
<PREC>
IMMEDIATE
<CLAS>
UNCLASSIFIED
<OSRI>
RUEHVEN
<DTG>
031820Z DEC 93
<ORIG>
USMISSION USVIENNA
<TO>
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0503
INFO RUKGNFA/NRC WASHDC
RHEBAAA/DOE HQS WASHDC
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 0637
RUEHII/VIENNA IAEA POSTS COLLECTIVE
<SUBJ>

DECEMBER 1993 BOARD OF GOVERNORS: STATEMENT
- BY DIRECTOR GENERAL BLIX

<TEXT>
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 USVIENNA 003424
DEPT FOR PM ACDA
DOE HQS:IS-40
NRC:IP
BRUSSELS FOR USEC
FROM USMISSION UNVIE
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: IAEA, AORC, ENRG, KNNP, KSCA, MNUC, PARM, KN
SUBJECT: DECEMBER 1993 BOARD OF GOVERNORS: STATEMENT
- BY DIRECTOR GENERAL BLIX
1. SUMMARY. IN HIS DECEMBER 2 STATEMENT TO THE IAEA
DECEMBER BOARD OF GOVERNORS MEETING (FULL TEXT FAXED
DECEMBER 2 TO PM) DG HANS BLIX SAID THE REFUSAL OF THE
DPRK TO PERMIT THE IAEA TO CONDUCT REGULAR INSPECTIONS
SINCE FEBRUARY HAD LED TO A SITUATION IN WHICH THE
SYSTEM COULD NOT BE SAID AT PRESENT TO PROVIDE ANY
MEANINGFUL ASSURANCE OF PEACEFUL USE OF THE DPRK'S
DECLARED NUCLEAR INSTALLATIONS AND MATERIAL. HOWEVER,
THE SYSTEM COULD BE FULLY OR PARTIALLY RESTORED IF

COOPERATION WERE FORTHCOMING FROM THE DPRK. END
SUMMARY.

-
2. THE DIRECTOR GENERAL REITERATED WHAT HE HAD SAID AT THE UNGA NOVEMBER 1, NAMELY THAT "IAEA VERIFICATION ACTIVITIES IN THE DPRK SUGGEST THAT SOME NUCLEAR MATERIAL EXISTS THERE WHICH HAS NOT BEEN REPORTED TO THE AGENCY. HENCE, THE AGENCY CANNOT VERIFY THE CORRECTNESS AND ASSESS THE COMPLETENESS OF THE DPRK'S REPORT OF MATERIAL SUBJECT TO SAFEGUARDS." THIS REMAINED THE UNSOLVED, CENTRAL ISSUE.

3. BLIX TOLD THE DECEMBER BOARD: "ONE MONTH LATER, I AM BOUND TO CONCLUDE THAT THE SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM WHICH WAS IN PLACE ON DECLARED NUCLEAR MATERIAL AND INSTALLATIONS IN THE DPRK CANNOT BE SAID TO PROVIDE ANY MEANINGFUL ASSURANCE OF PEACEFUL USE OF THESE INSTALLATIONS AND THIS MATERIAL. THIS IS NOT TO SAY THAT THE SYSTEM COULD NOT WITH RENEWED EFFORTS BE FULLY OR PARTIALLY RESTORED, IF COOPERATION WERE FORTHCOMING FROM THE DPRK. NOR IS IT TO DENY THE POSSIBLE TRUTH OF A STATEMENT MADE ON NOVEMBER 11 BY THE FIRST VICE-MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, MR. KANG SOK JU, THAT THE DPRK "TOTALLY FROZE THE MOVEMENT OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL WITHIN THE DPRK" AND THAT "STILL NOW THE INSPECTION CAMERAS AND SEALS OF THE IAEA REMAIN ON THE NUCLEAR FACILITIES OF OUR COUNTRY." HOWEVER, IN THE ABSENCE OF VERIFICATION, SUCH STATEMENTS OFFER LITTLE ASSURANCE."

4. CONCLUDING ON THE DPRK, BLIX SAID "THE AGENCY IS READY AT ANY TIME TO RECEIVE A TEAM FROM THE DPRK FOR CONSULTATIONS ABOUT THE WHOLE SAFEGUARDS ISSUE--INCLUDING THE NEED FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AND VISITS TO ADDITIONAL LOCATIONS. IT IS ALSO READY TO SEND AN INSPECTION TEAM TO PERFORM A FULL RANGE OF INSPECTION ACTIVITIES. THESE ACTIVITIES HAVE BEEN INDICATED IN DETAIL BY THE AGENCY AND ARE OF THE SAME KIND AS THE AGENCY UNDERTOOK IN THE DPRK AT THIS TIME LAST YEAR WITHOUT OBJECTIONS BY DPRK AUTHORITIES. THEY OBVIOUSLY GO FAR BEYOND MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES, BUT THEY DO NOT INCLUDE THE QUESTION OF ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AND VISITS TO ADDITIONAL LOCATIONS, ABOUT WHICH THE AGENCY IS MANDATED TO CONSULT SEPARATELY WITH THE DPRK.

-
5. ON OTHER SUBJECTS, BLIX MADE THE FOLLOWING MAIN POINTS:
UKRAINE:

----- THE UKRAINIAN FOREIGN MINISTER HAS RECENTLY CONFIRMED HIS GOVERNMENT'S INTENTION TO BECOME A NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATE IN THE FUTURE AND EXPRESSED THE WISH OF UKRAINE TO CONCLUDE A SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT APPLYING TO "ALL NUCLEAR MATERIALS USED FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES IN UKRAINE." THE IAEA INTENDS TO EMBARK ON DISCUSSIONS ON A DRAFT SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT FOR

SUBMISSION TO THE BOARD. THE AGENCY RECOGNIZES THAT THE STATUS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN UKRAINE REMAINS TO BE CLARIFIED AND THAT SOLUTION OF THIS QUESTION MAY HAVE A BEARING ON THE SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT.

IRAQ:

----- WITH IRAQ'S RECENT FORMAL ACCEPTANCE OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 715 (ON LONG-TERM MONITORING) A MAJOR STEP HAD BEEN ACHIEVED TOWARDS IRAQ'S FULFILMENT OF ALL OF ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER SECTION C OF THE CEASEFIRE RESOLUTION 687 OF 1991 IN THE VIEW OF THE UN SPECIAL COMMISSION ON IRAQ AND THE IAEA. THEY WILL PROCEED TO SATISFY THEMSELVES, AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, THAT THEY CAN IMPLEMENT SATISFACTORILY THE MONITORING AND VERIFICATION WORK IN IRAQ.

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 02 USVIENNA 003424

DEPT FOR PM ACDA

DOE HQS:IS-40

NRC:IP

BRUSSELS FOR USEC

FROM USMISSION UNVIE

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: IAEA, AORC, ENRG, KNNP, KSCA, MNUC, PARM, KN

SUBJECT: DECEMBER 1993 BOARD OF GOVERNORS: STATEMENT

- BY DIRECTOR GENERAL BLIX

IRAN:

----- AN IAEA TEAM HEADED BY DDG FOR SAFEGUARDS, PELLAUD, HAD VISITED IRAN 15-21 NOVEMBER AND HAD SEEN INSTALLATIONS RELATING TO ITS NUCLEAR PROGRAM IN TEHERAN (INCLUDING SHARIF UNIVERISTY), ESFAHAN AND KARAJ. THE TEAM HAD SEEN ALL THE LOCATIONS, BUILDINGS AND LABORATORIES IT WISHED TO VISIT AND HAD OPEN AND FRUITFUL DISCUSSIONS ON POINTS OF MUTUAL INTEREST. THE IAEA HAD A DUTY, THE DIRECTOR GENERAL SAID, NOT ONLY TO LOOK FOR INSTALLATIONS WHICH SHOULD BE DECLARED UNDER SAFEGUARDS BUT ALSO TO HELP DISPEL ERRONEOUS NOTIONS THAT MAY BE DISSEMINATED. "ALTHOUGH SOME MAY PREFER THE TWILIGHT IN WHICH SPECULATIONS BECOMES EASIER," SAID DR. BLIX, "THE IAEA MUST SEEK MAXIMUM CLARITY AND BE AN INSTRUMENT TO ACHIEVE IT."

-

PLUTONIUM:

----- A FURTHER INFORMAL MEETING OF EXPERTS HAD TAKEN PLACE 22-23 NOVEMBER AT WHICH THE NEED FOR CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES RELATED TO PLUTONIUM AND HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM WAS DISCUSSED. THERE HAD BEEN A CONVERGENCE OF VIEWS THAT THE PEACEFUL STORING OR USE OF THESE MATERIALS SHOULD BE SUBJECT TO A HIGH DEGREE OF TRANSPARENCY AND THAT THE IAEA MIGHT BE ASKED TO MAINTAIN AND PUBLISH AN APPROPRIATE REGISTER. STRENGTHENING OF SAFEGUARDS:

----- THE AGENCY WAS EMBARKING ON A NUMBER OF IMPROVEMENTS AND INNOVATIONS, INCLUDING ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING, AND SPECIFIC OFFERS TO

COOPERATE IN TESTING SOME OF THE MEASURES DISCUSSED
HAD ALREADY BEEN RECEIVED FROM AUSTRALIA, CANADA,
HUNGARY, JAPAN AND SWEDEN.

FINANCIAL SITUATION:

----- THE AGENCY WILL AGAIN BE OBLIGED
BY THE SUBSTANTIAL ARREARS OF SOME MEMBER STATES TO
CUT ITS PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION IN 1994 BY 12 PERCENT.

BECKER

BT

#3424

NNNN

<SECT>

SECTION: 01 OF 02

<SSN>

3424

<TOR>

931203134639 M0758172

<SECT>

SECTION: 02 OF 02

<SSN>

3424

<TOR>

931203134642 M0758173

█

Distribution:

FOR: WIEDEMANN@A1@OEOb

FOR: VAX_MAIL@OEOb

FOR: RAGLE@A1@OEOb

FOR: PONEMAN@A1@OEOb

FOR: CLARKER@A1@OEOb

FOR: BEERS@A1@OEOb

FOR: AOKI@A1@OEOb

<DIST>

SIT: ANDREASEN AOKI KRISTOFF PONEMAN RAGLE WIEDEMANN

<ORIG>

FBIS

<TOR>

931205013210 F0592349

<SUBJ>

DPRK: International Cooperative System Criticized (Take 1 of 2)

<TEXT>

FBIS 018

UNCLAS 4C

DPRK: International Cooperative System Criticized (Take 1 of 2)

SK0512054493 Pyongyang Korean Central Broadcasting Network in
Korean 1500 GMT 4 Dec 93

[Text] Western imperialist reactionaries and their subserving trumpets have recently been showing very ill-boding moves that get on our nerves, babbling about a so-called international cooperative system.

They are raising a clamor of mislead public opinion by fabricating the so-called suspicions of our nuclear development. They are kicking up a row that an international cooperative system should be formed so as to impose collective pressure and sanctions to make us accept overall inspections [chonmyon sachal], dramatizing the situation as if the continuity of the safeguards of our country's nuclear activities is about to be broken.

Worse still, very irresponsible and insane [kwanggijogin] outbursts, such as bombing the objects to deter the North's nuclear development and not excluding a possibility of a war, are enumerated. Grave obstacles are created in way of resolving the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula because of very ill-boding moves of the insidious forces who joined their hands with each other under the cloak of the international cooperative system.

The great leader Comrade Kim Il-song has noted: Our position regarding the nuclear inspections is clear and there is no reason whatsoever for one to have any question about this. However, clamoring over the issue noisily and attempting to tarnish our Republic's reputation in the international community are moves that can only be interpreted to mean that they are seeking another purpose.

As it has already been known, we have repeatedly made clear that we have neither the will, nor the ability, nor the necessity to develop nuclear weapons. The nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula was created because the United States brought in numerous nuclear weapons to South Korea and employed the policies of resorting to nuclear threats against us. These days, the nuclear issue is getting complicated and is entering a new phase because the insidious forces carried out special inspection [tukbyol sachal] commotions, finding faults with our nonexistent nuclear issue, and invariably pursued the policy of hostile and crush [apsal].

Since the talks for resolving the nuclear issue started, we have exerted all the efforts and worked faithfully to implement the points agreed in the talks. In particular, to fundamentally eliminate the so-called suspicions of our nuclear development, we made a bold decision to replace our existing graphite moderated

reactor system with the light water moderated reactor system even to sacrifice the self-reliance of our nuclear energy industry and expressed a generous [aryanginnun] stance, taking into account of a dialogue partner's position. Moreover, we proposed a package solution out of the aspiration to fundamentally resolve the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula on the basis of peace and fairness. Thus, we have taken all possible practical measures to resolve the nuclear issue.

In the course of this, transparency [tumyongsong] and innocence [kyolbaeksong] of our nuclear activities have been clearly proved and evoked support and sympathy from the world's public opinion.

The insidious forces, nonetheless, continue to circulate a rumor on suspicions of our nuclear development, which has been clearly unveiled, and now outspokenly challenge to harm and crush [apsal] us by forming the so-called international cooperative system.

All of these facts show that they do not have an intention of actually resolving the nuclear issue but are only pursuing a goal of isolating and crushing [apsal] our socialist system.

(more)

05 DEC 0623z BPM

NNNN

<DIST>

SIT: NODIST

Ⓢ

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006. cable	re Post summit approach (5 pages)	12/01/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 283

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, November 1993 [8]

2009-0528-F
kc1555

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

<CLAS>UNCLASSIFIED<DTG>191213Z NOV 93
<ORIG>USMISSION USVIENNA
<SUBJ>STATEMENT OF KANG SOK DU, FIRST VICE-MINISTER
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE DPRKMND HEAD OF DPRK
DELEGATION TO DPRK-USA TALKS

<TEXT>

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 USVIENNA 003295
FROM USMISSION UNVIE

E.O. 12356: DECL:C/A

TAGS: IAEA, AORC, ENRG, KNNP, KSCA, MNUC, PARM, TRGY, KN
SUBJECT: STATEMENT OF KANG SOK DU, FIRST VICE-MINISTER
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE DPRKMND HEAD OF DPRK
DELEGATION TO DPRK-USA TALKS

1. MISSION RECEIVED THE FOLLOWING FROM THE IAEA ON
NOVEMBER 18, 1993. OUR UNEEC SBANDING IS THAT IT WILL
BE CIRCULATED TO ALL BOARD MEMBERS.

BEGIN TEXT:

STATEMENT

BY MR. KANG SOK JU, FIRST VICE-MINISTER OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC
OF KOREA

AND

HZAD OF DPRK SIDE'S DELEGATION TO DPRK-USA
HIGH-LEVEL TALKS

(11 NOVEMBER 1993, PYONGYANG)

VERY ILL-BODING SIGNS ARE APPEARING THESE DAYS,
BECLOUDING THE PROSPECTS OF SOLUTION OF THE NUCLEAR
PROBLEM ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA.

SOME QUARTERS ARE PAINTING AN EXTREMELY PESSIMISTIC
PICTURE OF THE SITUATION AS IF CONTINUITY OF THE
SAFEGUARDS ON OUR COUNTRY'S NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES WERE ON
THE VERGE OF SUSPENSION, ARGUING THAT IF THE DPRK
REFUSES TO ACCEPT "A TOTAL INSPECTION" BY THE
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA) WITHIN A FEW
DAYS, "UN SANCTIONS" MUST BE IMPOSED ON IT.

AND IT MUST NOT GO UNNOTICED THAT, WITH A VIEW TO
BACKING THESE ARGUMENTS OF THEIRS, THEY ARE CONCEALING
THE ESSENCE OF THE NUCLEAR PROBLEM ON THE KOREAN
PENINSULA AND ARE DISTORTING FACT TO CREATE THE
IMPRESSION THAT THE DPRK IS PLAYING A HIDE-AND-SEEK TO
DEVELOP NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND ARE SETTING AFLOAT THE
FALSE RUMOR THAT IT IS USING THE NUCLEAR PROBLEM AS A
BARGAINING CHIP TO ATTAIN A CERTAIN SELFISH AIM.

TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THE SERIOUS NATURE OF THE
POLITICAL PURPOSE SOUGHT BY THE DISHONEST FORCES IN
SPREADING SUCH ARGUMENTS AND RUMORS ZEALOUSLY, I DEEM
IT NECESSARY TO CLARIFY THE TRUTH OF THE SITUATION AND
OUR PRINCIPLED STAND FOR A SOLUTION OF THE NUCLEAR
PROBLEM.

AS IS ALREADY KNOWN, THE DPRK AND THE US SIDES
PUBLISHED A JOINT STATEMENT AFTER DISCUSSING AND
REACHING AN AGREEMENT ON THE MATTERS OF PRINCIPLE IN
THE SOLUTION OF THE NUCLEAR PROBLEM AND HELD TALKS ON

THIS BASIS.

IN THE JOINT STATEMENT THE TWO SIDES CONFIRMED IT AS THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF THE SOLUTION OF THE NUCLEAR PROBLEM TO REFRAIN FROM NUCLEAR THREATS, RESPECT EACH OTHER'S SOVEREIGNTY, ENSURE A FAIR APPLICATION OF FULL SCOPE SAFEGUARDS AND FOR THE UNITED STATES TO SUPPORT A PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION OF KOREA, AND CLEARLY DEFINED THE DPRK AND THE USA AS THE PARTIES VESTED WITH CHIEF RESPONSIBILITY AND AUTHORITY FOR THE SOLUTION OF THIS PROBLEM.

ACCORDING TO THIS, WE HAVE TAKEN PRACTICAL MEASURES FOR THE SOLUTION OF THE NUCLEAR PROBLEM AND ACTED IN GOOD FAITH IN THE COURSE OF THE TALKS TILL TODAY.

WITH THE PUBLICATION OF THE DPRK-US JOINT STATEMENT, WE UNILATERALLY AND TEMPORARILY SUSPENDED THE EFFECTUATION OF OUR DECLARATION ON OUR WITHDRAWAL FROM THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY AND RESUMED NEGOTIATION WITH THE IAEA AND THE NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE.

AND, UNDER THIS SPECIAL SITUATION, WE TOTALLY FROZE THE MOVEMENT OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL WITHIN THE DPRK TO FULFIL OUR COMMITMENT TO PROVING THE TRANSPARENCY OF OUR NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES AND ALLOWED INSPECTION FOR ENSURING THE CONTINUITY OF SAFEGARDS IN THIS REGARD.

ESPECIALLY, WE MADE A BIG BOLD DECISION TO REPLACE THE EXISTING GRAPHITE MODERATED REACTORS WITH LIGHT WATER REACTORS AT THE EXPENSE OF THE INDEPENDENCE OF OUR NUCLEAR POWER INDUSTRY, IN ORDER TO FUNDAMENTALLY DISPEL THE SO-CALLED "SUSPICION OF NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT" AGAINST THE DPRK.

ALL THESE SINCERE EFFORTS, HOWEVER, HAVE FAILED TO CALL FORTH A PRACTICAL RESPONSE FROM THE US SIDE, AND THE CURRENT SITUATION IS DEVELOPING IN THE OPPOSITE DIRECTION. THIS IS ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE FAITHLESS STANCE OF THE US SIDE, OUR DIALOGUE PARTNER, TOWARD THE TALKS.

CONTRARY TO THE PRINCIPLES AGREED UPON AT THE PAST UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 04 USVIENNA 003295
FROM USMISSION UNVIE
E.O. 12356: DECL:N/A
TAGS: IAEA, AORC, ENRG, KNNP, KSCA, MNUC, PARM, TRGY, KN
SUBJECT: STATEMENT OF KANG SOK JU, FIRST VICE-MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE DPRK AND HEAD OF DPRK DELEGATION TO DPRK-USA TALKS
TALKS, OUTRAGEOUS WORDS THREATENING AND ANTAGONIZING THE DPRK HAVE ROLLED OFF THE TONGUES OF OFFICIAL FIGURES OF THE UNITED STATES IN SUCCESSION AND THEY ARE OVERTLY REVEALING THEIR INTENTION TO CONTINUE THE "TEAM SPIRIT" MILITARY MANEUVERS, NUCLEAR WAR EXERCISES AGAINST THE DPRK.

ON THE OTHER HAND, THEY BROUGHT THE THIRD-STAGE DPRK-US TALKS THAT HAS TO BE HELD WITHIN TWO MONTHS TO A DEADLOCK BY SETTING UNREASONABLE PRECONDITIONS AND ORCHESTRATED THE ADOPTION OF A "RESOLUTION" LAYING THE

BLAME AT OUR DOOR AT THE GENERAL CONFERENCE OF THE IAEA AND THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

ALL THESE FACTS SHOW THAT OVER THE FIVE MONTHS AFTER THE TALKS BEGAN ONLY THE DPRK HAS UNILATERALLY MOVED TO IMPLEMENT THE POINTS AGREED UPON AT THE TALKS, AND THE UNITED STATES HAS NOT MOVED AT ALL.

THE SPIRIT OF THE AGREEMENT AT THE TALKS THAT BOTH SIDES SHOULD MOVE SIMULTANEOUSLY ON A EQUAL FOOTING HAS BEEN IGNORED BY THE US SIDE AND, IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, THIS IS THE MAIN CAUSE OF IMPASSE IN THE SOLUTION OF THE NUCLEAR PROBLEM.

THIS NOTWITHSTANDING, THE UNITED STATES IS TRYING TO MISLEAD PUBLIC OPINION AS IF DPRK WERE TO BLAME FOR IT. THIS FOSTERS THE SUSPICION THAT THE UNITED STATES STILL PURSUES A POLITICAL PURPOSE OF STIFLING OUR REPUBLIC, UNWILLING TO SOLVE THE NUCLEAR PROBLEM IN REAL EARNEST.

PARTICULARLY, IT IS AN ACT OF REVERSING BLACK AND WHITE TO CRY THAT THE CONTINUITY OF THE SAFEGUARDS OF THE NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES OF THE DPRK IS BROKEN.

TO GUARANTEE THAT OUR NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES WILL NOT BE ORIENTED TO MILITARY PURPOSE UNTIL THE NUCLEAR PROBLEM HAS COMPLETELY BEEN SOLVED THROUGH THE DPRK-US TALKS, THE DPRK HAS UNTIL NOW REMAINED FAITHFUL TO ITS PROMISE TO THE UNITED STATES THAT IT WILL ALLOW THE READJUSTMENT AND REPLACEMENT OF THE INSPECTION CAMERAS OF THE IAEA.

STILL NOW THE INSPECTION CAMERAS AND SEALS OF THE IAEA REMAIN ON THE NUCLEAR FACILITIES OF OUR COUNTRY.

UNTIL NOW, WE HAVE ALLOWED INSPECTION TEAMS OF THE IAEA TO CHANGE FILMS AND BATTERIES OF THE INSPECTION CAMERAS, CONFIRM THEIR SEALS AND READJUST THE CAMERAS WHENEVER NECESSARY FOR THE CONTINUITY OF SAFEGUARDS. ONLY RECENTLY, WE INFORMED THE IAEA ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS OF OUR READINESS TO RECEIVE SUCH INSPECTION TEAM AT ANY TIME IT REQUESTS THAT.

CONSIDERING THE SCALE AND CONDITIONS OF OUR NUCLEAR FACILITIES, THEY CAN FULLY CONFIRM ONLY WITH THE CAMERAS THAT OUR NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH THE MILITARY PURPOSE.

WHEN THE CAMERAS WERE READJUSTED AND REPLACED IN AUGUST, NOBODY WAS AFRAID THAT THE CONTINUITY OF SAFEGUARDS MIGHT BE BROKEN.

THOUGH WE CONSIDER THAT THE OBSERVATION BY CAMERAS ALONE IS ENOUGH TO ENSURE THE CONTINUITY OF SAFEGUARDS WE, MAKING ALLOWANCES FOR THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE US SIDE, CLEARLY MANIFESTED OUR MAGNANIMOUS STAND THAT THE SCOPE OF INSPECTION MIGHT BE EXPANDED AND ALREADY HELD AN INFORMAL NEGOTIATION WITH THE US SIDE AND THEN PROPOSED A WORKING-LEVEL NEGOTIATION WITH THE IAEA.

NEVERTHELESS, THE UNITED STATES AND THE IAEA ARE CLAIMING THAT IF THE CONTINUITY OF SAFEGUARDS IS TO BE ENSURED, WE MUST ACCEPT AN OVERALL INSPECTION BY THE IAEA AND SET THCS AS A PRECONDITION FOR THE OPENING OF

THE THIRD-STAGE DPRK-US TALKS.

WHAT THE UNITED STATES AND THE IAEA DMAFD IS THAT WE WHOLLY COMPLY WITH THE SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT IMMEDIATELY AT THE PRESENT JUNCTURE.

OUR WHOLE COMPLIANCE WITH THE SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT MEANS OUR FULL RETURN TO THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY.

AS WE MADE CLEAR IN A STATEMENT OF THE DPRK GOVERNMENT, WE DECLARED OUR WITHDRAWAL FROM THE NPT BECAUSE OUR REPUBLIC'S SUPREME INTERESTS WERE IN DANGER OWING TO THE US NUCLEAR THREAT AND THE PARTIALITY OF THE IAEA.

UNCLAS SECTION 03 OF 04 USVIENNA 003295

FROM USMISSION UNVIE

E.O. 12356: DECL:N/A

TAGS: IAEA, AORC, ENRG, KNNP, KSCA, MNUC, PARM, TRGY, KN
SUBJECT: STATEMENT OF KANG SOK JU, FIRST VICE-MINISTER
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE DPRK AND HEAD OF DPRK
DELEGATION TO DPRK-USA TALKS

THE UNITED STATES CAME OUT TO THE DPRK-US TALKS BECAUSE

IT RECOGNIZED THAT IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO RETURN US TO THE TREATY WITHOUT A CHANGE IN ITS NUCLEAR THREAT AND HOSTILE POLICY TOWARD KOREA AND THE DPRK-QU JOINT STATEMENT WAS PUBLISHED AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND.

THEREFORE, THE UNITED STATES WHICH HAS PUT INTO PRACTICE NONE OF ITS COMMITMENT TO US HAS NO FACE TO DEMAND US POINT-BLANK TO RETURN TO THE TREATY.

THIS IS WHY THE UNITED STATES, CRAFTILY ENOUGH, IS SEEKING OUR SUBSTANTIAL RETURN TO THE TREATY BY REALIZING INSPECTION EQUIVALENT TO THE FULL COMPLIANCE WITH SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT UNDER THE CLOAK "CONTINUITY OF SAFEGUARDS", AVOIDING THE WORDS OF RETURN TO THE TREATY OUTWARDLY.

N THIS INCREASES THE SUSPICION THAT THE UNITED STATES HAD INTENDED TO COAX US WITH AN EMPTY TALK INTO RETURN TO THE TREATY, NOT COMPLETELY GIVING UP NUCLEAR THREAT TO OUR COUNTRY AND HOSTILE POLICY OF STIFLING IT FROM THE FIRST.

UNDER THE SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH WE UNILATERALLY AND TEMPORARILY SUSPENDED THE EFFECTUATION OF OUR WITHDRAWAL FROM THE TREATY, THERE MUST BE A CLEAR DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE GUARANTEE OF CONTINUITY OF SAFEGUARDS AND FULL COMPLIANCE WITH THE SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT.

THE FULL COMPLIANCE WITH THE SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT MUST, IN ANY CASE, BE DEBATED AND SOLVED IN DIRECT LINKS WITH THE ABANDONMENT OF THE NUCLEAR THREAT AND STIFLING POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES THROUGH FUTURE DPRK-US TALKS.

THE NUCLEAR PROBLEM CANNOT BE SOLVED ANY TIME IF THEY TRY TO DELIBERATELY ATTRIBUTE OUR NUCLEAR PROBLEM TO SUCH TECHNICAL AND WORKING RULES AS THE SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT UNDER THE PRESENT SITUATION IN WHICH THE

POLITICAL FACTORS OF OUR WITHDRAWAL FROM THE TREATY STILL REMAIN.

IN A NUTSHELL, THE PURPOSE OF THE UNITED STATES IN DEMANDING ONLY OUR COMPLIANCE WITH THE SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT AT THE PRESENT JUNCTURE, ITSELF NOT MOVING UT ALL, CANNOT BE CONSTRUED OTHERWISE THAN TO INVENT A PRETEXT OF SANCTIONS AND PRESSURE ON US BY RENDERING THE SITUATION COMPLICATED, NOT TO SETTLE THE NUCLEAR PROBLEM IN ACTUALITY.

WE MAKE IT CLEAR ONCE AGAIN THAT WE CANNOT FULLY COMPLY WITH THE SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT UNLESS THE UNITED STATES GUARANTEES IN DEED THAT IT WOULD NOT TRY TO STIFLE OUR SYSTEM.

THE NUCLEAR PROBLEM ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA CAN NEVER BE SOLVED THROUGH PRESSURE. ONLY THROUGH DIALOGUE AND NEGOTIATION CAN IT BE SOLVED.

WE ROPOSED TO THE US SIDE THE FORMULA OF PACKAGE SOLUTION OF NUCLEAR PROBLEM PROEEDING FROM THE JUDGEMENT THAT THE MAJOR CAUSE OF NO PROGRESS IN THE SOLUTION OF THE NUCLEAR PROBLEM LIES IN THE LACK OF TRUST BETWEEN THE DPRK AND THE UNITED STATES.

IF THE THING IS TO GO WELL, THE QUESTIONS SHOULD BE SETTLED ONE BY ONE WITH THE UNITED STATES, THE ASSAILANT, MOVING FIRST AND US, THE SUFFERER, RESPONDING.

BUT THE UNITED STATES, CONTRARY TO ITS POSITION, IS NOW TELLING US TO MOVE FIRST. THIS IS TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE.

WE INSIST ON THE FORMULA OF PACKAGE SOLUTION WHEREBY THE SIDES SHOULD AT LEAST DEFINE THEIR WORK AND EACH SIDE SHOULD DO ITS SHARE.

IF THE DPRK-US TALKS OF THIRD-STAGE ARE HELD AND AN AGREEMENT IS REACHED ON THE FORMULA OF PACKAGE SOLUTION THERE, A DEFINITE PROSPECT FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF THE NUCLEAR PROBLEM WILL BE OPENED.

THE NUCLEAR PROBLEM WILL BE SOLVED SMOOTHLY WHEN, AN AGREEMENT IS REACHED ON THE FORMULA OF PACKAGE SOLUTION AND THE UNITED STATES TAKE A PRACTICAL ACTION OF RENOUNCINV THE NUCLEAR THREAT AND HOSTILE POLICY AGAINST US ACCORDING TO IT AND WE FULLY COMPLY WITH THE UNCLAS SECTION 04 OF 04 USVIENNA 003295 FROM USMISSION UNVIE

E.O. 12356: DECL:N/A

TAGS: IAEA, AORC, ENRG, KNNPJN KSCA, MNUC, PARM, TRGY, KN
SUBJECT: STATEMENT OF KANG SOK JU, FIRST VICE-MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE DPRK AND HEAD OF DPRK DELEGATION TO DPRK-USA TALKS
SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT, REMAINING COMMITTED TO THE TREATY.

THERE IS NO CHANGE IN OUR STAND TO FULLY ENSURE THE CONTINUITY OF SAFEGUARDS UNTIL AN AGREEMENT IS REACHED ON THE FORMULA OF PACKAGE SOLUTION.

NOW THE MATTER DEPENDS ON HOW THE UNITED STATES RESPONDS TO OUR PROPOSAL FOR A PACKAGE SOLUTION, RENOUNCING ITS HOSTILE POLICY OF STIFLING THE DPRK.

THE FORMULA WILL BE A TOUCHSTONE SHOWING WHETHER OR
NOT THE UNITED STATES TRUPY HAS THE WILL
TO SOLVE THE

NUCLEAR PROBLEM AND THE WILL FOR DIALOGUE.

IF THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT SHOW A POSITIVE
RESPONSE TO OUR PROPOSAL, WE WILL HAVE NO ALTERNATIVE
BUT TO CONSIDER THAT THE US SIDE HAS NO WILL FOR A
GENUINE DIALOGUE FOR THE SOLUTION OF THE NKCLEAR
PROBLEM.

IF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY IGNORES
OUR SINCERE PROPOSAL FOR NEGOTIATION TO ENSURE THE
CONTINUITY OF SAFEGUARDS AND DISTORTS THE FACT AS IF
THE CONTINUITY OF SAFEGUARDS IN THE DPRK HAS BEEN
BROKEN, IT WOULD BE CONSIDERED TO BE A SIGNAL URGING
THE DPRK TO QUIT THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY PROMPTLY.

THE BALL IS IN THE COURT OF THE UNITED STATES AND
THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY.

END TEXT.

BECKER

NNNN

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 04

<SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 04

<SECT>SECTION: 03 OF 04

<SECT>SECTION: 04 OF 04

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007. paper	re broad and thorough approach [duplicate of 003 without annotation] (2 pages)	12/00/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 283

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, November 1993 [8]

2009-0528-F
kc1555

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

A little distraction here. Is that your cheering section back there?

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: It's not mine, but I'm glad this show's taking on a family air. (Laughter) It's a healthy development.

MR. RUSSERT: Where's Ross Perot?

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: Well, I -- you've had him on this show before. I'm sure he'll be back again, but he's not here this morning.

MR. RUSSERT: I didn't think you traveled anywhere without him anymore.

.ETX

MEET THE PRESS/GORE PAGE 2 12/05/93

.STX

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: Come on, now. (Laughter)

MR. RUSSERT: Let's talk something -- a very serious issue. Korea.

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: Yes.

MR. RUSSERT: The Koreans yesterday, by all accounts, reports in "The New York Times" this morning, have agreed to allow us to inspect five of their seven nuclear facilities.

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: Mm-hmm (acknowledgement).

MR. RUSSERT: Is that acceptable?

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: Well, it's premature to either characterize their offer or to spell out what our response is likely to be, for two reasons. First of all, we're still in the process of consulting with our allies, principally South Korea and Japan. We'll discuss this with others as well. And you know, the United States has been leading the entire world community for a year now in the world's effort to deal with this contentious problem.

The second reason is we are in the midst of studying this very carefully, and we'll have more discussions among ourselves tomorrow about it.

It's a difficult problem, Tim, and I think everyone who has looked at it carefully understands why it is so difficult. But our basic roadmap for dealing with it is to do everything we can to explore the possibility that North Korea does not want to build nuclear weapons and to try to persuade them not to do so and to live up to not only the nonproliferation agreement, but also the agreement that they entered into with the Republic of Korea to have a non-nuclear peninsula.

In any event, going the extra mile to explore that possibility is necessary if it becomes necessary to go to the next step, which would include a number of other options, including possibly sanctions, because in order for that other option to work, you have to have the cooperation of countries like China, and it's important to go about this in a deliberate and careful and determined way, and that's the approach we're taking.

MR. RUSSERT: But bottom line, we will not let North Korea build a nuclear bomb.

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: The world community will not be well served if North Korea becomes a nuclear power.

MR. RUSSERT: The North Koreans this morning said that the United States and South Korea engaged in frenzied war exercises Thursday and Friday -- 750 airplanes, carrier ships -- is that true?

.ETX

MEET THE PRESS/GORE

PAGE 3 12/05/93

.STX

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: No, it's not true. I know there was a Reuter report out of Tokyo quoting the North Koreans on that. There's nothing that resembles what they talked about. A month ago, there was a paper command exercise and totally a defensive posture, but there was absolutely nothing resembling what they're talking about.

You know, you regularly hear some rhetoric coming out of North Korea that sounds a little odd to us at times, and I think one of the reasons is their leadership is so isolated from the rest of the world. Secretary Christopher has used the phrase "time warp" to describe the way the North Korean leadership relates to the rest of the world. It's unfortunate, and I hope it'll change.

MR. RUSSERT: "The Washington Post" reported that U.S. intelligence analysts have concluded that North Korea will not respond to pressure. True?

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: Well, nobody has a crystal ball to predict the future. All of our efforts to figure out what they will do in response to what are based on the best analysis that we have, and in any event, you don't make irrevocable choices between options in a situation like this. You may have to explore one option fully in order to make another option viable.

MR. RUSSERT: Senator Richard Lugar of Indiana, Republican, Foreign Affairs Committee, has said that we haven't taken the necessary steps to bolster our forces and to alert the American public to what a serious crisis this could be.

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: Well, I think the -- I think there has been a pretty wide discussion in the news media in this country and among policymakers as to the seriousness of the problem.

MR. RUSSERT: How about bolstering our forces?

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: Well, we have tens of thousands of forces there now, and we have a very strong alliance with the Republic of Korea. President Kim was here just within the last two weeks, and we had excellent discussions with him. He and President Clinton have a very strong rapport, and we consult with him very closely on every move we make.

MR. RUSSERT: Have we asked the Chinese and the North Vietnamese to intervene with us with the North Koreans?

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: Well, of course, the Chinese are very concerned about developments in North Korea, and we have had discussions with China about their reaction to the problem and

--

MR. RUSSERT: How about Vietnam?

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: They're not as directly involved, no.

.ETX

MEET THE PRESS/GORE

PAGE 4 12/05/93

.STX

MR. RUSSERT: The head of the International Atomic Energy Agency said on Friday, quote, ``There's no longer any meaningful assurance that North Korea has not developed a nuclear bomb.'' That's kind of sobering.

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: Well, you know, of course it is. The whole situation is sobering. That's why we have been so intently focused on it.

MR. RUSSERT: Are we going to demand that we get assurance to make a determination whether they have the bomb?

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: Well, yes, the nonproliferation agreement is designed in part for that purpose, and our discussions with the North Koreans are aimed in significant part at restoring the verification measures that are necessary to say with some reasonable degree of certainty that they're not making nuclear weapons.

Now, they also entered into an agreement with the South Koreans that I mentioned before, which also requires some verification steps, and I hope that that agreement will be implemented as an outcome of the current round of discussions.

MR. RUSSERT: If the North Koreans do not cooperate, the next step, you mentioned, may be economic sanctions. China would have to support those in the United Nations Security Council. Do we have assurances that China would support our request for economic sanctions at the U.N.?

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: Well, I tried to put this in what I think is the right context earlier in describing the relationship between a full exploration of the current strategy and the viability of other options.

It's premature to make a shift in our approach right now. We have active discussions under way, we're evaluating this latest response. There are some good things about it, some bad things about it. We're consulting with our allies, and we'll make the next step carefully and deliberately.

MR. RUSSERT: Bottom line, Mr. Vice President -- how serious is this crisis? Is there a possibility of a second Korean War if the North Koreans do not open up their nuclear facilities?

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: Well, you know, in an exchange like this, it's -- you don't want to say something that would affirm that, but we don't know what the North Koreans are apt to do, given the circumstances that develop. I think that's most unlikely, and I think that it's very likely that the world will find a way to deal with this problem, but North Korea should not misunderstand or underestimate the resolve of the world community.

.ETX

MEET THE PRESS/GORE

PAGE 5 12/05/93

.STX

MR. RUSSERT: David?

MR. BRODER: Mr. Vice President, with the approval of NAFTA, our country and Mexico's future are tied together more closely than ever before. You've just come back from Mexico City. You said in that famous debate with Mr. Perot that if we

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
008. paper	re sequence of events (2 pages)	11/00/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 283

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, November 1993 [8]

2009-0528-F
kc1555

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
009a. note	Steve [Aoki] to Gary re outline (1 page)	11/00/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 283

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, November 1993 [8]

2009-0528-F
kc1555

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
009b. paper	re North Korea (2 pages)	11/00/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 283

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, November 1993 [8]

2009-0528-F
kc1555

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

NORTH KOREA NUCLEAR ISSUE1. Backgrounda. Summary:

(i) *Status of Program*—At Yongbyon, North Korea has a research reactor (long under IAEA safeguards), a 25-MWt reactor (the primary source of contention), and another 200-MWt reactor under construction. It also possesses a reprocessing plant which, while not completed equipment-wise, is functional. The suspicion is that North Korea diverted enough spent fuel from the 25-MWt reactor in 1989 to separate one or two bombs-worth of plutonium. Intelligence assessments of whether North Korea actually has a nuclear weapon vary.

(ii) *Status of Safeguards*—The 25-MWt reactor, operating since 1986, was unsafeguarded until May 1992. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) placed monitoring equipment in Yongbyon, and diversion and reprocessing activities have not been detected since that time. However, since the current crisis began in March 1993 when North Korea announced it would withdraw from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), North Korea has allowed only a limited visit by IAEA inspectors in August, and the film and batteries in the monitoring cameras have now run out. In fact, the IAEA has already declared that it can no longer guarantee that nuclear activities in Yongbyon are "peaceful", and it may declare within days or weeks that the continuity of safeguards has been broken. If North Korea proceeds to unload the fuel from the 25 MWt reactor without IAEA inspectors present, then the North Korean nuclear program would no longer be bounded.

Meanwhile, there is still the issue of the "special inspections" which the IAEA has requested for two waste sites to verify whether there has been prior diversionary activity at Yongbyon. North Korean refusal to accept the special inspections early this year precipitated the current crisis. These special inspections would only tell us about the past; whereas ad hoc and routine inspections are needed to ensure the continuity of safeguards. The principle of special inspections, however, is important in that it establishes the precedent of "challenge inspections", which is fundamental to the North-South inspection regime proposed by the ROK to verify its joint denuclearization declaration with the North.

(iii) *Diplomatic Efforts*—The DPRK's refusal to permit special inspections was brought by the IAEA to the UN in April 93, and in June 93, the UNSC agreed that the U.S. should begin negotiations with the DPRK on the nuclear issue. The first round succeeded in getting the DPRK to "suspend" its NPT withdrawal. The second round in July has led to the current stalemate. In this round, North Korea promised to meet with the South to discuss implementation of the North-South de-nuclearization declaration and to discuss special inspections with IAEA. So far, the DPRK has not satisfied the first condition, while it minimally satisfied the second with a meeting with the IAEA in September. But the current diplomatic effort is focused on IAEA ad hoc and routine inspections needed to verify continuity of safeguards—an underlying assumption in order for talks to continue.

We have been negotiating at the working level with North Korea in New York. We may soon reach an agreement on the simultaneous occurrence of the following: (1) North Korea agreement with the IAEA on the inspections necessary to maintain safeguards; (2) DPRK-ROK discussion of an exchange of envoys; and (3) a ROK-U.S. announcement on cancelling Team Spirit 94. If we succeed in hurdling the current obstacles, we will proceed to a third round, where a "broad and thorough approach" will be discussed to not only resolve the nuclear issue, but to address political, economic, and conventional security issues as well.

(iv) *If Diplomacy Fails*—If North Korea continues to refuse IAEA access, then the IAEA will be forced to declare that the continuity of safeguards has been broken. In that case, there will be no round three, and the matter would return to the UNSC, where sanctions will be discussed. The effectiveness of sanctions, especially the degree of commitment of China, is unclear. North Korea has said that sanctions would amount to "an act of war".

b. SASC Member Interests: The SASC was briefed in December by State/DoD on the latest developments. The committee accepts that the diplomatic route must be thoroughly explored. You should be aware, however, that some may argue that we are being "diddled" by the DPRK, which is secretly using this time to build a bomb.

c. Points to Avoid: There should be no speculation on use-of-force while diplomacy is still underway. Public rhetoric—firm but not shrill—must be synchronized with the ongoing, delicate negotiations. North Korea watches carefully our public statements and has interrupted negotiations in the past after public threats on our part.

2. Administration Position

President Clinton has stated the U.S. position succinctly: that North Korea "cannot be allowed to acquire a nuclear weapon". Specifically, North Korea must give up its nuclear weapons program by implementing fullscope IAEA inspections and bilateral ROK/DPRK inspections. To get North Korea to take these actions, we are prepared to pursue a broad and thorough approach to try to resolve the nuclear as well as political and economic issues. We want to exhaust the diplomatic route before turning to sanctions.

3. Upcoming Milestones

The next milestone would occur if and when the IAEA declares that the continuity of safeguards has been broken at Yongbyon. This is not a fixed date, and the IAEA has slipped the deadline twice already. But since the film and batteries in the monitoring cameras have run out, the IAEA determination could occur within days or weeks. In the interim, we are trying to persuade North Korea to allow the level of access which the IAEA needs to maintain the continuity of safeguards. If this occurs, round three could take place as early as February 94.

4. Questions and Answers

Question: Are we prepared militarily to deal with the North Korea nuclear threat?

Proposed Response: I am not prepared to discuss any plans for offensive military action. Let me say that a nuclear-armed North Korea would be destabilizing for the security of Northeast Asia and devastating to our global nonproliferation efforts. This is why the administration is engaged in intense negotiations with North Korea on this. We know it wants diplomatic and economic relations with the U.S., and that there is still a chance that it would decide to give up its nuclear weapons program in order to achieve its other security objectives. If confirmed, I will examine our military capabilities in the South, but I am confident that our Commander in the ROK, General Luck, is fully prepared to counter any aggression from the North.

Question: The President has said that we will not allow the North to acquire a nuclear weapons capability. The press is reporting that the intelligence community has recently concluded that the North may already have one or two devices. Clearly diplomacy has failed. Is the administration prepared to use force to stop the North's nuclear program?

Proposed Response: It would not be useful for me to speculate on military actions. If the North Koreans continue to violate their international obligations, I understand the matter would return to the UN for further action, and sanctions would be considered. We can only hope that North Korea sees that the benefits of not having a nuclear weapons program far outweigh the gains it hopes to obtain from a bomb.

Question: How do you plan to enforce sanctions? What will China do? What will North Korea do?

Proposed Response: I don't think it is useful to discuss publicly how the U.S. might enforce sanctions before consulting with the PermFive, the ROKs, and Japan. Concerning China, we know that it has been frustrated with North Korean non-cooperation thus far and has been pleased with the U.S. patient diplomatic approach. I would hope that if the matter is returned to the UN, China would support a sanctions resolution.

Question: How many bombs does North Korea have? Can it deliver these bombs to targets in Japan on its NODONG missiles?

Proposed Response: I do not yet have an independent conclusion on this matter. I would comment that there is no doubt that the North Koreans have embarked on a program to acquire nuclear weapons. There is good evidence that they have some fissile material. I am told that the NODONG missile is not yet operational. I would rather not go further into these intelligence questions about North Korea's nuclear weapons potential in an open hearing, but I could address them in either an executive session or a classified statement for the record.

5. Reference Items

Intelligence Community Assessment: *NIE Summary*

OSD Papers: *Status of Program Assessment*

Issue of Special Inspections

Chronology of the North Korea nuclear issue

Sanctions Papers (with JCS)

Military Action

I think these points don't fully meet the argument that's being raised against us, which is something like:

Isn't any negotiation with a regime like North Korea a form of appeasement? Doesn't their track record on this issue amply demonstrate that (1) they have no intention of giving up their nuclear weapons capability and (2) they will cheat or renege on any commitments they make? Administration policy is therefore fundamentally flawed because (1) any concessions we make are pocketed while the North fails to deliver on its part of the bargain, but more importantly (2) our continued participation in this process undermines deterrence by suggesting to the North that we will not stand firm in the face of a nuclear threat.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
010a. memo	Joseph Nye to Intelligence Board Principals re releasable verion of NIE (1 page)	12/07/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 283

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, November 1993 [8]

2009-0528-F
kc1555

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
010b. report	re North Korea (6 pages)	12/07/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 283

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, November 1993 [8]

2009-0528-F
kc1555

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
011. report	re North Korea (55 pages)	12/00/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 283

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, November 1993 [8]

2009-0528-F
kc1555

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]