

FOIA MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Folder Title:

North Korea, November 1993 [7]

Staff Office-Individual:

Nonproliferation and Export Controls-Aoki, Steven

Original OA/ID Number:

283

Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:	Stack:
41	5	5	2	V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. paper	re briefing for congress (4 pages)	11/00/1993	P1/b(1)
002a. memo	information, Anthony Lake to POTUS re North Korea principals meeting (3 pages)	12/00/1993	P1/b(1)
002b. memo	information, Anthony Lake to POTUS re North Korea (2 pages)	12/03/1993	P1/b(1)
003a. note	re deputies meeting (1 page)	11/00/1993	P1/b(1)
003b. paper	re strategy (4 pages)	11/00/1993	P1/b(1)
004. paper	re North Korean package (5 pages)	11/00/1993	P1/b(1)
005a. memo	Robert Galulucci to Distribution re DC paper on North Korea (1 page)	01/00/1994	P1/b(1)
005b. paper	re next steps (8 pages)	01/00/1994	P1/b(1)
006a. memo	information, Steven Aoki to Samuel Berger re deputies committee meeting (4 pages)	01/18/1994	P1/b(1)
006b. memo	Robert Galulucci to Distribution re DC paper on North Korea [duplicate of 005a] (1 page)	01/00/1994	P1/b(1)
006c. paper	re next steps [duplicate of 005b] (8 pages)	01/00/1994	P1/b(1)
006d. note	re deputies meeting [duplicate of 003a] (1 page)	11/00/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 283

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, November 1993 [7]

2009-0528-F

kc1553

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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006e. paper	re strategy [duplicate of 003b] (4 pages)	11/00/1993	P1/b(1)
006f. paper	re North Korean package [duplicate of 004] (5 pages)	11/00/1993	P1/b(1)

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WASHFAX RECEIPT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

B

S/S #

93 NOV 19 P6:55

108823

MESSAGE NO. _____ CLASSIFICATION Secret No. Pages 4
FROM: Gary Samore PM 6741 7319
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)
MESSAGE DESCRIPTION Final DPRK Points

TO: (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Extension	Room No.
<u>NSC</u>	<u>Steve Aoki</u>	<u>395-4564</u>	

FOR: CLEARANCE ☐ INFORMATION ☒ PER REQUEST ☐ COMMENT ☐

REMARKS: _____

S/S Officer: CCA

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: CA Date: 07/06/15
2009-0528-F

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~~SECRET~~

SA

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

21387
LIMITED ACCESS

December 4, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: DANIEL PONEMAN ^{2?}

SUBJECT: North Korea: President's Participation in
Principals' Meeting

I do not know how much the President will wish to say and how much he will wish to listen. The attached memorandum focuses on the broadest issues and offers some themes he may wish to strike.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the proposed memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Proposed Memorandum to the President
Tab A Memorandum on Current State of Play

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By (U) NARA, Date 07/06/15
2009-0528-F

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~



TAB I

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

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002b. memo	information, Anthony Lake to POTUS re North Korea (2 pages)	12/03/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

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TO: AGENCIES

FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 03 DEC 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOREA NORTH

PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION OF PC MTG ON 6 DEC RE NORTH KOREA

ACTION: KENNEY SGD MEMO

DUE DATE: 07 DEC 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PONEMAN

LOGREF:

FILES: IFG

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

AOKI
NSC CHRON
PONEMAN

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By (W) NARA, Date 07/06/15
2009-0528-F

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJEB

CLOSED BY: NSASK

DOC 2 OF 2

~~SECRET~~

21373

~~SECRET~~
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D C 20506

December 3, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs
Office of the Vice President

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the U.S. to the UN
U.S. Department of State

MR. MARC GROSSMAN
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COLONEL T. R. PATRICK
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

COLONEL ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. JOHN A. LAUDER
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT: Meeting of the Principals on North Korea (S)

A Principals' meeting will be held on Monday, December 6, 1993,
from 3:30 p.m to 4:30 p.m. in the White House Situation Room.
Attendance will be limited to principals only. (S)

State will circulate a paper separately. An agenda is attached
at Tab A. (U)

for William H. Ito
William H. Ito
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Agenda

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By W NARA, Date 07/06/15
2009-0528-F

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL PRINCIPALS' COMMITTEE MEETING

DATE: December 6, 1993
LOCATION: SITUATION ROOM
TIME: 3:30 p.m. - 4:30 p.m.

NEXT STEPS ON NORTH KOREA

Agenda

- I. Introduction NSC
- II. Intelligence Update CIA
- III. Diplomatic Update State
- IV. Security Update Defense
- V. Next Steps State
- VI. Public Diplomacy and
Congressional Strategy All Participants
- VII. Discussion All Participants
- VIII. Conclusion NSC

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
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September 11, 2006
By W NARA, Date 07/06/15
2009-0528-F

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21373

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

December 3, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: DANIEL PONEMAN *DP*
FROM: STEVEN AOKI *SA*
SUBJECT: Principals' Meeting on North Korea,
December 6, 1993

Attached at Tab I is a proposed meeting notice for the Principals' meeting on North Korea. An agenda for the meeting is at Tab A.

Concurrence by: Kent Wiedemann *KW*

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize William Itoh to sign the memorandum at Tab I and approve the Agenda at Tab A.

Approve *R* Disapprove

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for Signature
Tab A Agenda

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White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By *CU* NARA, Date 07/06/15
2009-0528-F

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Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 283

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, November 1993 [7]

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- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING

DATE: January 19, 1994
LOCATION: SITUATION ROOM
TIME: 1:00 p.m. - 2:30 p.m.

NORTH KOREA

Agenda

- I. Introduction NSC
- II. Intelligence Update CIA
- III. Diplomatic Update State
- IV. Elements of a "Broad and Thorough" Approach . . . State
- V. Strategy and next steps State
 - a. Preparing for a Third Round
 - b. Other Options and Contingencies
- VI. Congressional and Public Affairs Strategy State
- VII. Discussion All Participants
- VIII. Conclusion NSC

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White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By (M) NARA, Date 07/06/15
2009-6528-F

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006b. memo	Robert Galulucci to Distribution re DC paper on North Korea [duplicate of 005a] (1 page)	01/00/1994	P1/b(1)

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006c. paper	re next steps [duplicate of 005b] (8 pages)	01/00/1994	P1/b(1)

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006d. note	re deputies meeting [duplicate of 003a] (1 page)	11/00/1993	P1/b(1)

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006e. paper	re strategy [duplicate of 003b] (4 pages)	11/00/1993	P1/b(1)

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006f. paper	re North Korean package [duplicate of 004] (5 pages)	11/00/1993	P1/b(1)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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DPC #3

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 5, 1994, 1:08 P. M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. McCURRY: Good afternoon, everybody. I don't have a lot to talk about today, so I brought a special guest star today. I think, as many of you know, I have labored mightily at this podium to try to give you a better sense of where we are in the ongoing discussions with North Korea on outstanding nuclear issues; and I have obviously failed miserably, because I've read a bunch of stories today that suggest, among other things, that the U.S. is somehow backing off on atomic sites on North Korea.

I think what happens frequently is you all work hard to write your stories, and then your editors squeeze them into narrow little columns and headlines get goofed up. So I give up, and I figured the best thing for me to do is to bring someone who is very knowledgeable on this, who I think will be able to help you understand in much greater detail where we are in these discussions. I've asked Under Secretary of State for International Security Affairs Lynn Davis to give you a sense of what some of the history is, what we have been trying to accomplish, our overall goals in these discussions, and some sense of where things stand at the moment as best as she can do, given some of the obvious constraints that exist at a time that an issue is fairly delicate.

So, with that, Under Secretary Davis.

UNDER SECRETARY DAVIS: Let me begin by introducing two folks that have been laboring mightily over the past few months working on the subject of bringing North Korea back into the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and that's Tom Hubbard and Gary Samore, who are sitting over here to my left. They've been variously referred to in various of your columns as working level. But without confirming that they are the working level folks doing some of these negotiations, they are people that have been helping all of us as we sought to, as I said, bring the North Koreans back into adherence and carrying out their obligations in the Non-Proliferation Treaty. *

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Wednesday, 1/5/94

I thought it might be useful if I just spend a couple of moments going back to where we began and taking you to where we hope to be and then focusing more specifically on precisely where we find ourselves today, and then I'll certainly take your questions.

In March of 1993, we woke up one morning to discover that the North Koreans had decided to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and since then our goal has been to bring them back into that treaty and into full acceptance of the regime of that treaty, including what we've come to call the International Safeguards Regime.

Following a U.N. resolution urging all parties to seek a diplomatic solution, the United States began bilateral discussions with the North to resolve this nuclear issue. We've held two rounds of discussions since last spring.

At the first round in June, the North suspended its withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty and agreed to refrain from any steps that could lead to their either acquiring nuclear material in order to build nuclear weapons or taking nuclear material and reprocessing it in a way so that they would be able to build nuclear weapons.

So they agreed specifically to no reprocessing of nuclear fuel, to no refueling of their reactor without the IAEA being present, and to maintaining what has become somewhat of a term of art, a continuity of safeguards, with respect to their nuclear activities.

So with that as the first round and our accomplishment -- that is, they suspended their withdrawal -- we went into a second round in July where they reaffirmed their commitment to these constraints and agreed to renew their discussions with the IAEA with respect to carrying out the full range of inspections necessary to assure their obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty and also to undertake a genuine dialogue with South Korea in order to carry out their agreement, their denuclearization agreement with respect to the Peninsula.

It was understood that a third round of discussions between the United States and North Korea would take place only if these three commitments were made.

They have carried out their discussions with the IAEA, and we have been working since that meeting in July to ensure that they are maintaining the continuity of safeguards as defined by the IAEA, and that they are prepared to begin a genuine dialogue with the South in order to carry out the denuclearization agreement.

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So it's with those immediate goals that we've been working with the North these past few months, and we are very close to having accomplished those requirements in order to begin a third round of discussions. The North Koreans have now agreed to accept the required inspections to ensure a continuity of safeguards at their seven declared nuclear sites, and that they are prepared now to begin discussions with the South.

So the most immediate step at this point is for the North Koreans to meet with the IAEA and work out the details of those inspections of the seven declared sites, and through our discussions with the North believe that this will happen in the coming few days, and that through those discussions the inspections will take place that the IAEA believes necessary in order to have confidence that there continues to be a continuity of safeguards.

At the same time, we have reason to believe that the North is prepared now to meet again with the South, and on the basis of those two steps a third round of discussions could take place.

In that third round of discussions, we will be seeking to bring the North Koreans into full compliance with their obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, including the requirement to receive inspections at the two non-declared nuclear sites, and for us to find ways to resolve once and for all out outstanding issues with respect to the nuclear policies of North Korea.

So once we get into the third round, our objectives are as they've been from the start, and that is to gain the North's full cooperation, including the special inspections, and full implementation of the denuclearization agreement reached between the North and the South; and that itself will include a bilateral inspection regime.

That's what we will be seeking once we've passed the hurdles of getting into the third round. We believe we are very close to having accomplished what was necessary in our view to have that third round of discussions. And let me say that again, and that is that the North Koreans are prepared to accept the inspections necessary for the IAEA to be able to confirm that there is now a continuity of inspections by their definition, and that a genuine dialogue is beginning between the North and the South to carry out the denuclearization agreement.

So that's where we began, that's where we're going, and that's where we are at the present time.

Q Dr. Davis, isn't this somewhat less than what you started out with back in March, and why should one not judge that you've backed down from some of the original demands that the United States made in the North Koreans?

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UNDER SECRETARY DAVIS: I think there's been some confusion here. We have not backed down in terms of any of our demands with respect to what we seek to resolve the nuclear issue between the international community and North Korea, and that is that they are prepared to carry out all the obligations required under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, inspections of their declared sites, and the two special inspections that the IAEA seeks.

That was our first set of goals, and our second set had to do with their willingness now to work together with South Korea to implement the denuclearization agreement. In no way have we changed those goals, and in no way will we change those goals, because those will still be our goals when we get into the third round.

Where the confusion has been, then, has been in how we are seeking to get to that third round, and what it is that we have called for in terms of that next round of dialogue, and that's what we've been working so hard since July to put into place.

Q But if I might follow up, one of the main levers that the United States has had is the North Korean desire that the U.S. and South Korea cancel "Team Spirit." Do you intend to cancel "Team Spirit" exercises in return for their agreeing to this sort of interim step, if I might call it that -- the continuity of safeguards.

UNDER SECRETARY DAVIS: First of all, it's not an interim step. The continuity of safeguards has to continue to be in place for our dialogue to continue. That's been clear from the very start of the dialogue last June. So this is not an interim step. This is a condition for further discussions, and a breaking of these continuity of safeguards is one of the actions that would have led us to return to the Security Council.

So this is not an interim step. This is a necessary condition for the dialogue, as is the North's willingness to carry out this dialogue with the South in order to implement the agreement.

With respect to what it is that we will be prepared to do with the "Team Spirit" exercise, we haven't made a decision on that because we're not yet in a position to say that we've met the conditions to move into the third round. But we have said that in the context of our discussions in the third round leading to a full resolution of the nuclear question between the international community and North Korea, that we would look seriously at what the North has seen to be their security concerns, and among those have been the "Team Spirit" exercises.

Q Have you gotten more than a commitment for a single walk-through on each of these seven sites?

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UNDER SECRETARY DAVIS: What we've gotten from the North is a commitment to the inspections of these seven sites necessary for the IAEA to say that the continuity of safeguards has been maintained. The IAEA needs to work with the North on the specific details of what that's going to require. So the concept of a single inspection or a walk-through is really not appropriate.

What's appropriate is to say that the continuity of safeguards is an ongoing process. It requires the kinds of inspections that we're talking about in the near term and at these seven declared sites, but this is not the only thing that will be needed. It's for the IAEA to continue to tell the world and tell the North what's necessary in order to make that determination.

Q How long has it been since those seven sites have been either walked through or photographed first-hand?

UNDER SECRETARY DAVIS: I hope I have this right, and I have some folks here that know the details. In August, there was an inspection that I believe included --

MR. SAMORE: Only some of the sites.

UNDER SECRETARY DAVIS: Only some of the sites. And then in September when the IAEA sought to return and do these inspections when they were not able to do the kinds of inspections that they felt were necessary to make this determination, that's where we reached this impasse.

Q So how long has it been since the least inspected site has been inspected, do you know?

MR. SAMORE: It really varies from site to site, and in at least one case it's been more than a year. There's one site that only has to be inspected once a year, and it's been somewhat more than a year. I'm not exactly sure.

UNDER SECRETARY DAVIS: But I think the important point here is that it's for the IAEA to lay out what's required in these inspections, because it's ultimately the IAEA that will be asked to make the judgment about the continuity of safeguards.

Q Dr. Davis, the IAEA says that in order to ensure a continuity of safeguards, you need to have regular, periodic inspections. Is it your understanding from the North Koreans that they are willing to assure regular or periodic inspections from now on?

UNDER SECRETARY DAVIS: They said that they are prepared to take the steps necessary to assure continuity of safeguards, and I interpret that to be their willingness to do

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what it is that the IAEA will require to make that determination.

At the same time, it's up to the IAEA and North Korea to work out the details of that, but that's our understanding. Clearly, that's what the North Koreans have to be prepared to do in order to resolve the nuclear issue between the international community and the United States.

Q Let me just follow up. This may get into a hypothetical, but if the IAEA says that regular inspections are necessary, is it your understanding that North Korea will go along with that and allow those?

UNDER SECRETARY DAVIS: That's what they said, that they are prepared to undertake the inspections necessary to assure continuity of safeguards, and on that basis they are now prepared to work out the details of those inspections with the IAEA; and that's what it is that we've been seeking in the course of our discussions these past few weeks.

Q So you don't have a pledge beyond -- we'll let you look at it maybe one more time, and beyond that we'll negotiate with you again -- maybe, maybe not. I mean, you have no idea what the future holds in terms of --

UNDER SECRETARY DAVIS: I'm not going to say that I can predict what the future is going to hold. I can say, though, that we have now from them the very good news that they are going to permit the inspectors to go back. The necessary condition for another round and how it is that we can work to a final resolution of this issue.

We are not going to return to the third round and continue this process of every day having to decide whether or not an inspection can occur. We have to gain from the North -- and it's quite clear that they understand this -- that they will have to agree to carry out their obligations under the NPT, and that means an ongoing, regular process of inspections; and not ones that they can continue to sort of nickel-and-dime the IAEA and the world community each time that there's the requirement for such inspections.

Q You're saying that they've not agreed?

UNDER SECRETARY DAVIS: I've said very clearly what they've agreed to, and that is, they have agreed to carry out the inspections necessary for the IAEA to assure a continuity of safeguards. That is what we've been asking. That's what we've been asking since we began the dialogue in June. It's a condition for us to continue this dialogue and it's the basis upon which we would return to the third round if, in addition, they are prepared to undertake a genuine dialogue between the North and the South on the denuclearization agreement.

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Q So that third round would not take place until those inspections happen?

UNDER SECRETARY DAVIS: That's correct.

Q If I could ask a follow-up. A lot of us are not specialists on these nuclear matters, and we're throwing around the "continuity of safeguards" phrase. We were given to understand a few months ago that the batteries in the cameras had long ago run down. Now, I guess, there are also seals and things. Is that what we're really talking about -- that they can go and look to see whether the seals have never been broken even though the batteries have --

UNDER SECRETARY DAVIS: That's correct. That is, the IAEA is a fairly technical set of procedures and requirements and that's precisely what it is, the details of which have to be assured before the inspections can take place. But you're absolutely right. These are the kinds of activities that will be necessary in order for the Director General, Mr. Blix, to be able to give us that assurance.

Q So when the IAEA makes an inspection, they will be able to say with a high degree of certainty that, in fact, the continuity of safeguards has been maintained up to that point?

UNDER SECRETARY DAVIS: That's the purpose of the inspections: so that they can come back and report to the international community and all of us who are not experts in all of the details, that that condition is still being maintained.

Q What's the status of the contacts between the IAEA and North Korea at this moment? Have they actually gone to talk about these specific procedures or have they decided where they're going to meet to talk about these procedures?

UNDER SECRETARY DAVIS: We expect in the next few days for these discussions to get underway.

Q Is there a time certain for these discussions?

UNDER SECRETARY DAVIS: I hope that it will be very soon, but I can't tell you a day or an hour; but I have reason to believe that it will be very soon.

Q You referred briefly to the non-declared nuclear sites. Could you go over the significance of that? Plus, could you touch on the diplomacy of all this, particularly with reference to the Chinese and where they stand and how our dialogue with China on this has gone?

UNDER SECRETARY DAVIS: I think part of the confusion over the last couple of days has been this issue of declared

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sites and non-declared sites and what it is that we're seeking on the part of the IAEA in the near term, and then what we would wish to accomplish with respect to the final resolution of the outstanding issues between the North Koreans and the international community.

We now have their agreement to inspections of the seven declared sites. There are two additional non-declared sites where the IAEA would wish to inspect in order to have confidence about the declarations that the North Koreans made with respect to their nuclear material at the time of becoming members of the NPT. It's those special inspections that we will be seeking to have the IAEA undertake in terms of the final resolution of this issue.

Q Is that both sites will be non-declared?

UNDER SECRETARY DAVIS: If we knew precisely what it was that was at the non-declared sites, we wouldn't be as interested in trying to go there. But these are sites where we have reason to believe that there might be some nuclear materials that need to be recorded.

Q Dr. Davis, is the IAEA happy with this? Are they happy with what you've negotiated?

UNDER SECRETARY DAVIS: I'd like the IAEA and the Director General to speak to that. But, clearly, what we've been seeking is the possibility for the IAEA to do what they believe is necessary to have in place this continuity of safeguards. That's been our goal. It's now up to the IAEA to work out the details and to make that determination for the international community.

I had another question here that I didn't get to answer, and that had to do with the Chinese. We've been working very closely, as you know, with the Chinese because we share the same goals with respect to the Korean Peninsula, and that is that it be non-nuclear and that the North Koreans adhere and undertake their full obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. So we share the same goals; and, indeed, the Chinese have worked closely with us privately and diplomatically to achieve these goals.

So I have no reason to believe that the Chinese would differ with how it is that we've approached this or with what's necessary with respect to assuring security in that part of the world. That is, clearly a North Korea that's a party and in full compliance with its obligations to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Q Dr. Davis, correct me if I'm wrong, but when this all began, wasn't the entire issue the two undeclared sites, and then the safeguards came into question? So what the Administration has actually got is (inaudible), to go back to

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square one, and the issue of the two undeclared sites -- the original issue -- has not moved at all.

UNDER SECRETARY DAVIS: The IAEA has been very helpful in suggesting to us that we should not be too concerned about the Koreans withdrawing from the treaty. They have been very helpful in creating a treaty arguing that they were not going to do it. They have been doing special inspections that the IAEA thought was necessary in order to have confidence that they were carrying out their obligations, and obligations that all parties to the NPT are required to carry out.

So we asking nothing of North Korea at the IAEA was asking nothing of North Korea that it doesn't ask for all other members of the NPT.

It was at that point that we had the issue of the two non-declared sites, as well as the issue of the fact that they had withdrawn and therefore were not prepared to do anything with respect to the treaty.

So we have brought them back into the treaty. We have kept the safeguard regime in place, notwithstanding our worries over the past few weeks, and hope in the next couple of weeks to provide assurances through the IAEA that the continuity of safeguards has been maintained with the still same goal in the third round, and that is that the North Koreans accept their full obligations under the treaty. That will be the basis for us resolving the nuclear issue between the international community and North Korea.

Q So there's been no progress on the two undeclared sites. Over all these many months, there has been no progress on that because they have just been backsliding the whole way.

UNDER SECRETARY DAVIS: They haven't been backsliding in the sense of what it is they firmly believe; and that is, that they don't believe that they have a requirement to accept those inspections. So it's correct to say that we have not convinced them to undertake those inspections. What we have convinced them to do is remain within the Non-Proliferation Treaty, to suspend their withdrawal, to keep the continuity of safeguards in place, and now, most importantly, to provide the IAEA with the kinds of inspections necessary to continue to have that confidence.

Q These non-declared sites are nuclear dump sites, are called, right? Is it important to go there to see the by-products of certain processes, to see whether they are producing more nuclear material? Is that why it's important to have that confidence?

UNDER SECRETARY DAVIS: I think that's a very good question that I am. That's how I would be seeking to do.

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Q Now, what was the date of the
photocopying of the tapes?

A I don't know the date. I know
that the tapes were photocopied
somewhere between the time that
they were first taken and the time
that they were first used.

Q Now, did you know that the
tapes were photocopied?

A Yes, I know that the tapes
were photocopied. I know that
because I saw the photocopies.

Q Now, did you know that the
tapes were photocopied before they
were first used?

UNDER SECRETARY DAVIS: I don't
know. I don't know the date of the
photocopying. I don't know the date
that they were first used. I don't
know the date that they were first
photocopied. I don't know the date
that they were first used.

Q Now, did you say a long time ago
that the batteries had run down by now?

UNDER SECRETARY DAVIS: Apparently some of the
batteries have run down. It depends on which site, right,
Anslow?

Q So you would have lost data? If batteries had
run down, you've lost data?

He said