

FOIA MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Folder Title:

North Korea, November 1993 [1]

Staff Office-Individual:

Nonproliferation and Export Controls-Aoki, Steven

Original OA/ID Number:

283

Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:	Stack:
41	5	5	2	V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	information, Steven Aoki to Samuel Berger re Deputies Committee Meeting (3 pages)	04/07/1993	P1/b(1)
001b. talking points	re North Korea (2 pages)	04/07/1993	P1/b(1)
001c. notes	re Summary of Conclusions (2 pages)	03/18/1993	P1/b(1)
002. paper	re North Korea (5 pages)	00/00/1993	P1/b(1)
003a. memo	action, Steven Aoki to Samuel Berger re Next Steps on North Korea (2 pages)	05/03/1993	P1/b(1)
003b. paper	re Part I Summary of Objectives (3 pages)	05/00/1993	P1/b(1)
003c. paper	re Part II, Objectives and Procedures (4 pages)	05/00/1993	P1/b(1)
003d. paper	re Part III, Inducements and Strategy (5 pages)	05/00/1993	P1/b(1)
003e. timeline	re Dialogue (1 page)	05/00/1993	P1/b(1)
003f. paper	re US DPRK Talks (2 pages)	05/00/1993	P1/b(1)
003g. paper	re draft protocol summary (2 pages)	05/00/1993	P1/b(1)
003h. paper	re draft protocol text (2 pages)	05/00/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 283

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, November 1993 [1]

2009-0528-F

kc1545

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003i. draft	paper, re US DPRK Dialogue (6 pages)	05/00/1993	P1/b(1)
003j. paper	North Korea gameplan (2 pages)	05/00/1993	P1/b(1)
004. notes	re Summary of Conclusions (2 pages)	06/08/1993	P1/b(1)
005a. fax	cover, re options paper (1 page)	05/28/1993	P1/b(1)
005b. note	transmittal re draft paper (1 page)	05/28/1993	P1/b(1)
005c. paper	re North Korea (6 pages)	05/28/1993	P1/b(1)

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~~SECRET~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9320327
RECEIVED: 06 APR 93 18

TO: BERGER

FROM: AOKI
PONEMAN
WIEDEMANN

DOC DATE: 06 APR 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOREA NORTH
PROLIFERATION

IWG
DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: DC MTG ON 7 APR RE NORTH KOREA

ACTION: NOTED BY BERGER

DUE DATE: 09 APR 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: AOKI

LOGREF:

FILES: IFM

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

AOKI
NSC CHRON
PONEMAN
WIEDEMANN
WRIGHT

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

By (W) NARA, Date 06/29/15
2009-0528-F

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSKDB

CLOSED BY: NSKDB

DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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001a. memo	information, Steven Aoki to Samuel Berger re Deputies Committee Meeting (3 pages)	04/07/1993	P1/b(1)

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001b. talking points	re North Korea (2 pages)	04/07/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 283

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, November 1993 [1]

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TAB II

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING

DATE: April 7, 1993
LOCATION: SITUATION ROOM
TIME: 1:30 P.M. - 3:00 P.M.

NEXT STEPS ON NORTH KOREA

Agenda

I. Introduction Samuel R. Berger
II. Intelligence Update CIA
III. Diplomatic Update State
IV. Security Environment Defense
V. Gameplan State
VI. Discussion All Participants
VII. Conclusion Samuel R. Berger

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By (iW) NARA, Date 06/29/15
2009-0528-F

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

TAB III

TAB IV

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001c. notes	re Summary of Conclusions (2 pages)	03/18/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 283

FOLDER TITLE:

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D R A F T
(6/10/93, 7:45 p.m.)

JOINT STATEMENT
OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA
AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

New York, June 11, 1993

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States of America held government-level talks in New York from the 2nd through the 10th of June, 1993. Present at the talks were the delegation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea headed by First Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Kang Sok Ju and the delegation of the United States of America led by Assistant Secretary of State Robert L. Gallucci, both representing their respective Governments. At the talks, both sides have discussed policy matters with a view to a fundamental solution of the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula. Both sides expressed support for the North-South Joint Denuclearization Declaration in the interest of nuclear non-proliferation goals.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the United States have agreed to principles of:

- assurances against the threat and use of force, including nuclear weapons;
- peace and security in a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula, including impartial application of fullscope safeguards, mutual respect for each other's sovereignty, and non-interference in each other's internal affairs; and
- support for the peaceful reunification of Korea.

In this context, the two Governments have agreed to continue dialogue on an equal and unprejudiced basis. In this respect, the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has decided unilaterally to suspend as long as it considers necessary the effectuation of its withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

06 11 93

11:08 AM

-US MISSION -POLSEC-

P02

DRAFTPress Statement on U.S.-DPRK Joint Public Statement

The United States and Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) have reached agreement on a joint public statement concerning our discussions on the nuclear issue. We regard this statement as a positive step toward achievement of a nuclear-free Korean peninsula and a strong international non-proliferation regime. *↳ one which supports maintenance of*

The DPRK has agreed to suspend its withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and has accepted the principle of impartial application of fullscope safeguards. [During this period of suspension] We intend to continue our discussions with the DPRK to resolve the nuclear issue, including DPRK commitment to remain in the NPT and to accept full implementation of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, including inspections of any sites deemed necessary by the IAEA.

We have made clear to the DPRK that certain steps must be avoided if our discussions are to continue [in this period]. In particular, we would regard additional reprocessing, any break in the continuity of IAEA safeguards, or a withdrawal from the NPT as harmful and inconsistent with our efforts to resolve the nuclear issue through dialogue. We expect the DPRK to cooperate with the IAEA by continuing current inspections and safeguards under the DPRK's fullscope safeguards agreement with the IAEA, which, remains in full force under the NPT. We believe the DPRK understands the critical importance of avoiding any actions which would jeopardize international efforts to resolve the nuclear

-2-

issue.

As an additional step to achieve a nuclear-free Korean peninsula, both the U.S. and DPRK have expressed support for the North-South Denuclearization Declaration, which bans the possession of reprocessing and enrichment facilities in the peninsula. We hope that the DPRK and the Republic of Korea (ROK) will be able to reach agreement soon on an effective bilateral inspection regime to implement this important declaration.

Both the U.S. and DPRK are committed to peace and security on the Korean peninsula. In this respect, both governments have agreed to principles of peace and security, including assurances against the threat or use of force, mutual respect of each other's sovereignty, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, and support for the peaceful unification of Korea.

These principles are consistent with and supportive of our obligations under the UN Charter, ^{previous U.S. Policy statements,} ~~the U.S. negative security~~ ^{included.} assurances to NPT parties, and our security commitments to the ROK. We regard these principles as firm and clear, as long as the DPRK and U.S. continue efforts to resolve the nuclear issue.

Finally, we will be holding further discussions with North Korea in the near future. In seeking an early resolution of this issue, we are committed to continue these efforts ^{so long as} ~~while~~ they are productive. The joint U.S.-DPRK statement represents an important start in resolving the nuclear issue, ^{but we and the DPRK must continue our efforts} ~~and we believe~~ that ~~through sincere efforts and hard work we can~~ achieve a comprehensive solution, involving DPRK adherence to the NPT, acceptance of fullscope safeguards, and implementation of the North-South Denuclearization Agreement.

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9303130
RECEIVED: 05 MAY 93 17

TO: LAKE

FROM: KIM JUNG SU

DOC DATE: 25 MAR 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOREA
IAEA

NON PROLIFERATION

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: AMB JUNG SU FWDS STATEMENTS OF GOVT OF NORTH KOREA

ACTION: NFAR PER KRECZKO

DUE DATE: 08 MAY 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KRISTOFF

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

~~BARTH~~
GROSS
KRECZKO
PONEMAN
SAEED

ADMA
SA -
Tell
Bill
early
you
Wot Barth
an
Korea

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJWF CLOSED BY: NSKDB DOC 1 OF 1

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9303130
RECEIVED: 05 MAY 93 17

TO: LAKE

FROM: KIM JUNG SU

DOC DATE: 25 MAR 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOREA
IAEA

NON PROLIFERATION

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: AMB JUNG SU FWDS STATEMENTS OF GOVT OF NORTH KOREA

ACTION: ANY ACTION NECESSARY

DUE DATE: 08 MAY 93 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: KRISTOFF

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

~~FOR ACTION~~
~~KRISTOFF~~

*Alan
Krecek*

FOR CONCURRENCE

BARTH
PONEMAN

FOR INFO

GOTTEMOELLER
GROSS
HAHN
ROSNER
WIEDEMANN

COMMENTS: *Please re-task to Alan Krecek for action.*
5/10/93 - Close - no action required JH for K


DISPATCHED BY *Sued* DATE *5/4/93* BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJWF

CLOSED BY:

DOC 1 OF 1

UNCLASSIFIED



Democratic People's Republic of Korea
Permanent Mission to the United Nations
515 East 72nd Street, 37H, New York, N.Y. 10021
Tel. (212) 772-0712 Fax (212) 772-0735

New York, March 25, 1993

Mr. Anthony Lake
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20500
202-456-2255

Dear Mr. Antony Lake:

It is my pleasure to send the statement of the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea dated March 12, 1993, and Memoranda of the DPRK Foreign Ministry dated January 29, 1993 and March 15, 1993 for your reference.

I hope you will pay a deep attention to them.

Sincerely Yours,

Kim Jong Su

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'Kim Jong Su' in a stylized, cursive script.

Ambassador
Deputy Representative



Democratic People's Republic of Korea

PERMANENT MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS

225 East 86th Street, New York, N.Y. 10028

TEL (212) 722-3536 FAX (212) 534-3612

Press Release

No.7

March 12, 1993

Statement of the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

A grave situation has been created today in our country, which threatens its national sovereignty and security of our state.

The United States and south Korean authorities have defiantly resumed the "Team spirit" joint military exercises, a nuclear war rehearsal against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and, in coincidence with this, some officials of the Secretariat of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and certain member nations following the lead of the United States had a "resolution" adopted at the February 25 meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors, demanding a special inspection of our military sites unrelated to nuclear activities.

This is an encroachment on the sovereignty of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, an interference in its internal affairs and a hostile act aimed at stifling our socialism.

The Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea sharply condemns the reckless nuclear war machinations of the United States and south Korean authorities against the Korean people and decisively rejects the unjust resolution of the meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors.

Proceeding from its anti-nuclear, peace policy, the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and has since fulfilled its obligations under the NPT in good faith.

It was on the premise that the depository states of the NPT should neither deploy their nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula nor pose any nuclear threat against the DPRK that the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea signed the Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA and accepted the IAEA inspections.

Nevertheless, the United States remains unchanged in continuing its nuclear war threats against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, far from fulfilling its obligations under the NPT as a nuclear-weapon state to withdraw its nuclear weapons from south Korea and

remove its nuclear war threats against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

The United States still maintains its nuclear weapons in south Korea and continues to reinforce its nuclear storages there with modernized nuclear weapons and equipment.

This serves to prove that the "statements" such as the so-called announcement on the "complete withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons" by the United States and the "declaration on the absence of nuclear weapons" by the south Korean authorities were all nothing but a trickery to deceive our people and the world peoples.

Although an agreement on non-aggression was reached between the north and south and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has been faithfully fulfilling its international obligations under the NPT and the Safeguards Agreement, the proposed inspection of the U.S. nuclear weapons and nuclear bases in south Korea remains yet to be carried out and our people's misgivings about the U.S. nuclear threats have not yet been dispelled.

Despite the strong opposition by our people and the world peoples, the United States resumed when the inspection of our country by the IAEA was going on, the "Team Spirit" joint military exercises, which it had suspended before the IAEA inspections of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea started, thus openly increasing its nuclear threats.

The "Team Spirit" joint military manoeuvres run downright counter to the idea and purposes of the NPT which calls for respect of the territorial integrity and sovereignty and stop to nuclear threat.

The resumption of the "Team Spirit" joint military manoeuvres, a nuclear war rehearsal targeted against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, is driving the situation on the Korean peninsula to such an unpredictable extreme, which has compelled our country to enter a semi-war state.

Still more grave is the fact that the IAEA passed a resolution aimed at forcing a "special inspection" of our military installations, thus joining the United States in its anti-DPRK machinations to "internationalize" the so called "nuclear problem" of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and to impose "collective sanctions" and "pressure" on it.

It is on the basis of the "intelligence information" fabricated by the United States, a belligerent party vis-a-vis the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, that some officials of the IAEA secretariat are trying to enforce the inspection of our major military installations which are unrelated to nuclear activities.

As for an inspection of the military installations in question, it has nothing to do at all with the inspections under the Safeguards Agreement. And it is a matter outside the competency of the IAEA.

If we submissively accept an unjust inspection by the IAEA, it would legitimize the espionage acts by the United States, a belligerent party vis-a-vis the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and set the beginning of the full exposure of all our military installations.

Under our specific conditions in which the country still remains divided and exposed to the constant nuclear threats from the United States, it will be totally inconceivable to lay our military sites open to the enemies.

It is an old method of the United States to satisfy its demands one by one, that is, to demand the opening of one military site today and another tomorrow.

If we refuse to accept the "special inspection" of our military sites, the United States plans to charge the Democratic People's Republic of Korea with "non-implementation of the special inspection" and take the matter to the Security Council of the United Nations so as to impose "collective sanctions" on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

This is the very scenario which the United States has written in advance.

If we failed to hold in check such conspiracy of the United States and its followers, our entire nation would be driven into confrontation and war and be made a victim of the big powers.

Some officials of the IAEA Secretariat have broken away from their original standpoint of supervising the implementation of the NPT on the basis of impartiality and strict neutrality.

Therefore they can never evade the responsibility for joining the United States in its anti-DPRK manoeuvres.

Some officials of the IAEA Secretariat insist so stubbornly on the "inspection" of our military bases, as dictated by the United States, while ignoring our demand for an inspection of the nuclear weapons and nuclear bases of the United States in south Korea.

This is obviously an act biased in favour of the United States, a belligerent party vis-a-vis the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Moreover, we can hardly repress our indignation at the application of dual criteria by the IAEA, which is putting pressure to bear upon the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on charges of the alleged "nuclear weapons development," while tacitly approving the moves of Japan and south Korea for their nuclear armament.

The accession to the NPT by the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was intended to remove the nuclear threats of the United States against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, never to sacrifice its sovereignty and security for someone's benefit.

Because of the imprudent machinations on the part of the United States and its adherent forces, each time we undergo an inspection of the IAEA the nuclear threats against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea increase, and the peace and security on the Korean peninsula is not ensured but disturbed.

All these facts evidently show that the United States, those forces hostile to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and some officials of the IAEA Secretariat are misapplying the NPT to jeopardize the sovereignty and security of our country, a non-nuclear-weapon state, and stifle our socialist system.

Under such abnormal situation prevailing at present, we are no longer able to fulfil our

obligations under the NPT.

The Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea declares its decision to withdraw unavoidably from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a measure to defend its supreme interests.

The withdrawal from the NPT is a well-justified self-defensive measure against the nuclear war manoeuvres of the United States and the unjust act of some officials of the IAEA Secretariat against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

The principled stand of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea will remain unchanged until the United States stops its nuclear threats against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the IAEA Secretariat returns to its principle of independence and impartiality.

The United States must give up its outdated way of thinking of the cold war era and immediately stop the "Team Spirit" joint military exercises, a nuclear war rehearsal, and refrain from manipulating the IAEA to discredit and strangle the non-nuclear-weapon states.

Even if the United States, the forces hostile to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and some officials of the IAEA Secretariat threaten us with the "special inspection" or a certain "measure," we will never be frightened in the least.

No robber-like argument and strong-arm acts will go down with us.

Whatever "military threats," "political and ideological offensive" or "blockade" cannot block the march of our people.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea's Government's policy of using nuclear energy for peaceful purpose remains unchanged and our people will continue to make every effort to turn the Korean peninsula into a nuclear weapon-free zone.

We avail ourselves of this opportunity to express our thanks to many IAEA member states and a number of the members of the IAEA Board of Governors cherishing international justice for their support and sympathy for the just stand of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Our rejection of the unjust "resolution" forced by the United States upon the meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors is meant to defend our country's sovereignty and at the same time to safeguard the common interests of the developing countries.

The Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Korean people are convinced that the Governments and peoples of the countries of the world that value peace and justice will pay a profound attention to the serious situation on the Korean peninsula and extend their support and solidarity to the self-defensive measure of the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Pyongyang, March 12, 1993

**MEMORANDUM
OF
THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
OF
THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA**

*(On South Korea's Machinations for the Development of
Nuclear Weapons Now in Full Swing under the
US "Nuclear Umbrella")*

Pyongyang, January 29, 1993

It is 35 years since the United States has illegally introduced its nuclear weapons into south Korea.

Over the last 35 years the United States has systematically shipped various types of nuclear weapons into south Korea and thus turned south Korea into the biggest nuclear forward base in the Far East and continued its nuclear threats against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

The south Korean authorities has long carried forward clandestinely their development of nuclear weapons under the US "nuclear umbrella" and this move has now assumed grave dimensions.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea considers that disclosing the true picture of south Korea's drive for nuclear weapons development promoted under the tacit consent of the United States is necessary for the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and for the world peace and security, and issues this Memorandum.

1. The Criminal Records of Nuclear Arms Development

The development of nuclear weapons in south Korea under the US occupation dates back nearly three decades. South Korea's drive for nuclear development has gone into practice since the late 1960s and eventually reached the stage of its completion through the rapid year-by-year furtherance by the successive military fascist "regimes."

of a missile propellant manufactory from the Lockheed Corporation of the United States. ("*Wolgan Choson*," April issue of 1991)

In June 1975, Park Chung Hee said that south Korea has "acquired the capability of developing nuclear weapons" and predicted that south Korea "will find itself within the group of the nuclear-weapon states in a few years' time." (US Daily "*The Washington Post*," June 12, 1975, and US weekly "*Newsweek*," June 29, 1975)

On September 26, 1978, south Korea test-fired a nuclear warhead-loadable surface-to-surface missile "White Bear" developed by the "National Defence and Science Institute," and this has prompted foreign mass media to describe south Korea as a "latent nuclear weapon possessor." ("*Shin Dong-A*," April issue of 1989)

2) The Buildup of Industrial Foundation for Nuclear Development

The Chun Doo Hwan military "regime" has built up the industrial foundation for nuclear development by further expanding its programme.

On December 19, 1980, Chun Doo Hwan took the "measure of merging and dissolving the 'government'-subsidized research institutes," a camouflage to feign the abandonment of the nuclear development scheme, but in fact "maximized their research capability." (south Korean "*Yonhap yearbook*," 1981 edition)

In 1982, the "Atomic Energy Research Institute" and the "south Korea Electric Power Corporation" picked the "problem of controlling the spent nuclear fuel" in a bid to back up their advocacy for putting into operation the reprocessing facilities of annual capacity of 250 tons in 1992 and for the phased expansion of their annual capacity to 500 tons in 1995 and 1,000 tons in 2000," and in the same year they concluded a contract with the "Burns and Law Corporation" of the

In August 1990, the south Korean authorities "announced the plan of strategic investigation and research for the development of fast breeder reactor and the perfection of laser spectroscopic technology," a plan indispensable for a legal purchase of the fissionables and for their expanded production. And on November 9, 1990, they "agreed with Japan to jointly promote the development of the next generation reactor technology." ("Wolgan Choson," October issue of 1991, and south Korean "*Dong-A Yearbook*," 1991 edition)

The "first Conference on Promotion of Science and Technology" held in the presence of Roh Tae Woo at Taedok of South Chungchong Province in 1990 "adopted the 'Taedok Declaration,' pledging to complete by 1992 the project of the 'Taedok Science Town,' general headquarters of nuclear arms development, '4 or 5 years ahead of schedule,' and on November 27, 1992 they held the dedication ceremony of the Town project in the presence of Roh Tae Woo. ("*Dong-A Yearbook*," November 27, 1992)

Peter Hayes revealed that the announcement of the "non-nuclear declaration" by the Roh Tae Woo "regime" on November 8, 1991 and its subsequent conclusion with Britain on November 27 of a nuclear cooperation agreement for fuel cycle services are the "adroitly hatched double-dealing strategy." (Japanese magazine "*Sekai*," December issue of 1992)

These facts show that south Korea has crept from the status of a latent nuclear weapon possessor in the 1970s and beyond the bounds of a para-nuclear weapons possessor in the 1980s into the status of a nuclear weapon possessor in the 1990s.

2. The Reality of Nuclear Armaments

The basic criteria for nuclear armaments are the acquisition of nuclear development technology, operation of reactors, extraction of nuclear substances, manufacture of nuclear bombs, nuclear tests, possession of nuclear delivery means

the "research in the satellite development." And the "Research Institute for Natural Resources" under the south Korean "Ministry of Trade and Industry" has also been camouflaged as if "to secure energy resources," but "intently concentrates on searching for natural uranium to be used in the heavy water reactor." (south Korean military magazine "*Wolgangunsa Vision*," November and December issues of 1989, and "*Wolgan Choson*," April issue of 1992)

Engaged in the nuclear development programme in south Korea are numerous enterprises, such as the "Nuclear Fuel Company Ltd.," the "south Korea Electric Technology Co.," the "south Korea Heavy Industries and Construction Co. Ltd.," the "Kyeong Buk Machinery Mfg.Co., Ltd.," the "south Korea Explosives Co.,Ltd.," the Poongsan Metal Corporation Co.,Ltd.," the "Hyundai Electronics" and many others.

The Taedok Science Town was inaugurated 20 years ago as a nuclear weapons development base and has today cut its figure as a nuclear research complex and a command post of nuclear arms development, which accommodates 65 research institutes and colleges with 20,000 research personnel and 70,000 permanent inhabitants on the site of 2,780 hectares." ("*MBC Television*," November 27, 1992)

It bespeaks that the south Korean research base for nuclear development has been created in the stage of industrial expansion, not in the stage of a simple experimental development.

The south Korean authorities have promoted the technology for nuclear weapons development behind the scene of the ostensibly plausible development of "atomic energy development technology."

Under the signboard of the "localization" of nuclear fuel, the "Atomic Energy Research Institute" and the "Nuclear Fuel Company Ltd.," have acquired the technology that can be applied to the reprocessing process, through their "joint designing of nuclear fuel cycle with a foreign technical team" and through the

Specially dangerous is the "CANDU"-type pressurized heavy water reactor in Wolsong, because the motive and purpose of its introduction and operation are directly related to nuclear arms development. Those people engaged in the nuclear development in south Korea have confessed that "the introduction of 'CANDU'-type pressurized heavy water reactor from Canada is obviously related to the nuclear development," and admitted that "we, too, attempted to develop nuclear weapons by using the pressured heavy water reactor." ("*Shin Dong-A*," April issue of 1989, and "*Wolgan Choson*," March issue of 1991)

The south Korean "Ministry of Science and Technology," in its "medium and long-term programme for the research and development of atomic energy" confirmed in June last year, decided to "build a demonstration reactor of the 150,000 kw. fast breeder reactor by 2011," and started its construction in July 1992. (Japanese Daily "*Nihonkeizai Shinbun*," July 29, 1992)

In this context, the south Korean public "fears the strong possibility that plutonium to be used in the fast breeder reactor might be diverted in the middle of its transport." ("*Hangyore Sinmun*," January 14, 1993)

South Korea has also "developed the nuclear fusion test device through the 9-year-long research and experimental course." ("*Hangyore Sinmun*," May 28, 1992)

Considering that the principle of nuclear fusion is now applied only to manufacturing hydrogen bombs, it is clear that south Korea's ulterior intent in its desperate drive for the development of nuclear fusion test device is to develop hydrogen bombs, not to generate electricity.

3) The Acquisition of Nuclear Explosive Substances through Diversified Channels

The south Korean authorities have stockpiled a considerable amount of nuclear substances for nuclear bombs through their own independent extraction

Therefore, south Korea has now acquired no small quantity of nuclear explosive substances.

The edition No.5 of the "*Solidarity and Advance*," organ of the "National Alliance for Democracy and Reunification," noted that "south Korea and Israel are already numbered among more than 20 nuclear states with enriched uranium and plutonium, the main materials for the production of nuclear weapons."

The spent nuclear fuel in south Korea continues to be accumulated rather than to be disposed of, and the accumulated stock of plutonium 239 already amounted to "10 tons as of 1992" and it is "expected to increase to nearly 24 tons by 2000." (Peter Hayes, "*South Korea and the Nuclear Issue*")

The atomic energy officialdom in south Korea openly advocates the construction of factories for reprocessing the spent nuclear fuel.

The 3,500-page report, captioned "studies on the prospect of atomic power development in the 2000s and the establishment of corresponding programmes," was drafted in December 1989 by the "Energy Research Institute" attached to the Ajou University in south Korea. The report recommended that the "main thrust of diplomatic policy for cooperation in atomic energy affairs should be to create an environment for the transfer and independent development of the atomic power hardcore technologies (enrichment and reprocessing technologies.)"

In reality, south Korea has signed a coprocessing agreement with Britain. Under the British-south Korean accord, a special office is to be opened in Seoul, and south Korea is to have the waste from its atomic reactors reprocessed by the British Sheffield Reprocessing Plant into plutonium to be supplied back to south Korea. ("*Sekui*," December issue of 1992)

In his paper, entitled "*South Korea and the Nuclear Issue*," Peter Hayes has disclosed the fact that "MOX" (mixed-oxide fuel of enriched uranium and plutonium) can be converted into the materials for nuclear bombs through a simple process. First, the "MOX" fuel can be easily converted into plutonium if "the

A reporter of the south Korean monthly "*Wolgan Choson*" has testified that "initially, the internal detonation test was carried out through the fast operation of an imported high-speed camera capable of shooting one hundred thousandth second, and such test was conducted in the underground laboratory." ("*Wolgan Choson*," April issue of 1992)

• Today, south Korea imports parts of the camera for internal detonation test and assembles them for the full-time test, just as Lee Chang Gon hinted that "the high-speed camera capable of shooting one millionth second can be purchased from Japan, and the disassembled parts of the camera can be bought to avoid detection before being reassembled." ("*Wolgan Choson*," April issue of 1992)

Various types of nuclear bombs are designed and developed in south Korea.

A certain Choe, engaged in the nuclear development, mentioned of one type of the nuclear bombs when he told a news conference that "attention should be drawn to the diameter of missiles. The nations less developed in nuclear technology can manufacture the smallest nuclear warheads with diameter being 80 centimetres. The advanced nations can reduce the diameter so that it can be loaded into 155 mm.-calibred guns. We also tried to make 80 cm.-diametered bombs." ("*Wolgan Choson*," March issue of 1991)

Parts and equipment needed for the production of nuclear bombs are now manufactured secretly through the specialized production line, as products camouflaged or marked as ordinary goods, by different industrial enterprises, including the "south Korea Heavy Industries and Construction Co.,Ltd.," the "Changwon Machines Co.,Ltd.," the "south Korea Explosives Co.,Ltd.," the "Nuclear Fuel Company Ltd.," the "Nuclear Fuel Fabrication and Processing Plant" and the "south Korea Atomic Energy Technology Co.,Ltd."

Today, south Korean nuclear experts say that "elementary types of nuclear weapons could be developed in nine months, if things went to extremes." ("*Hangyore Sinmun*," January 14, 1993)

6) The Movement towards Actual Nuclear War Readiness

The nuclear weapon system includes nuclear warheads and nuclear delivery means, plus the "C3I" system, a system of command and control, communications and intelligence over a nuclear war theatre.

The south Korean military authorities have invested a colossal amount of fund and committed large research groups as well as a number of enterprises into the development of the "C3I" system.

The "TACCIMS Project" is "a large-scale plan to provide for a wartime situation," aimed at "establishing a system of automatic command and control" over a nuclear war theatre to "acquire a perfect capacity" by 1992 (*"Mal,"* February issue of 1990)

In an article captioned the "entity and management of the TACCIMS Project," the *"Wolgangunsa Vision"* noted that, upon the request by the Sixth Department of the "Joint Chiefs of Staff" and with the "Agency for Defence Development" as the central task force, the scheme for the establishment of the "south Korean-type C3I" system has been launched on a full scale since January 1988, and further disclosed that a fabulous amount of fund will be invested in the scheme, as there are a number of the south Korean enterprises such as "Ssangyong Computer," the "Gold Star System Institute," the "Samsung Semi-Conductor Communications" and the "Hyundai Electronics."

The south Korean armed forces have been incorporated into the combined south Korean-US joint operational system and take part in routine nuclear bomb-launching exercises.

The *"Wolgan Choson"* in its August issue of 1989 noted that key generals of the south Korean military "hold regular briefings and consultations on nuclear strategy at least once a year" under the "nuclear appendix to the operational plan

The Roh Tae Woo "regime" has recently introduced the south Korean ambassadorship for cooperation in atomic energy to represent the authorities' position on the "suspected nuclear development in the north." Chong Keun Mo, the first ambassador and the former "Minister of Science and Technology" of south Korea, said that he can "hardly believe the intelligence reports that 'North Korea has acquired the reprocessing technology.'" and estimated that "the allegation over the North Korean nuclear development" is "a political issue apart from technology." (*Hangyore Sinmun*," June 23, 1990)

In December 1990, Larocque, former US Rear-Admiral, said in his interview with the Japanese magazine "*Sapphire*" that "I have visited both the north and the south of the Korean peninsula, where I extensively toured industrial facilities. From my experience, I don't think North Korea has the capability of manufacturing nuclear weapons, although North Korea's subway is the best in the world. Anyone, who alleges that North Korea will acquire nuclear arms immediately, is thought to be pursuing a certain purpose by striking terror into the Japanese and South Korean hearts."

Japan's authoritative technical critic Kiyoshi Sakurai and Dr. Kenneth Hunt, Deputy Director of the British Institute for International Strategic Studies, have confirmed that there is no evidence to prove that north Korea is possessed of the nuclear reprocessing facilities. ("*Mal*," July issue of 1990 and March issue of 1991)

This notwithstanding, the United States and the south Korean authorities persistently talk about the "nuclear development" by the north, and this is nothing but a sham artifice "of strong political implication to bash north Korea." ("*Wolgan Choson*," April issue of 1992)

The public opinion at home and abroad exposes the foul purpose of this plot pursued by the United States and the south Korean authorities as follows:

The US purpose in kicking up a "nuclear ruckus" is "to incapacitate the north and force the north into the US-led global order to open itself up," and "to indefinitely put on hold the planned second-stage reduction of the US forces in

The Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea hopes that the peace-loving Governments throughout the world and the international community will sharpen their vigilance against the moves now under way in south Korea for the nuclear development and the acquisition of nuclear weapons, launch an international joint action to check and frustrate them and extend firm solidarity with our people in their struggle for the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

**MEMORANDUM
OF
THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
OF
THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA**

(On the Truth of the Nuclear Inspections by the
International Atomic Energy Agency in the DPRK)

Pyongyang, March 15, 1993

Proceeding from its anti-nuclear, peace policy, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) with a view to getting the nuclear weapons of the United States withdrawn from south Korea, removing its nuclear threats against the DPRK and furthermore to turning the Korean peninsula into a nuclear weapon-free zone, and concluded the Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and has since accepted sincerely the IAEA inspections.

This process has substantiated the integrity of the peaceful nuclear policy of the DPRK Government and further increased the international trust in the DPRK.

However, the United States, picking on the alleged "suspicion of nuclear weapons development" of the DPRK, has resumed together with the south Korean authorities the "Team Spirit" joint military exercises, a nuclear test war against the DPRK which is a non-nuclear-weapon State, in violation of the NPT-bound obligations it ought to strictly fulfil as a nuclear-weapon State, and coincidentally manipulated some officials of the IAEA Secretariat and certain member states to adopt an unjust "resolution" at the February meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors, forcibly calling for inspection of our military sites that have no relevance at all to the nuclear activities.

The prevailing situation prevented the DPRK Government from fulfilling its obligations under the Safeguards Agreement any longer.

We showed the IAEA Director-General and his entourage not only nuclear facilities still under construction but also underground structure.

The IAEA has conducted six rounds of *ad hoc* inspections in the DPRK up to early February 1993 since May 4, 1992 when the DPRK provided the IAEA with its initial report and other relevant documents. In this period, the IAEA inspectors examined the design information in respect of each facility, conducted their planned work such as sampling, measurement and examination of the operating records, needed for the verification of the initial report, and sealed the necessary points and installed their monitoring devices there.

Our facility operators provided the inspectors with maximum convenience and active cooperation so that the inspectors could fulfil their duty smoothly.

When the inspectors asked for sampling of the high radioactive liquid waste at the Radiochemical Laboratory, our facility operators risked their physical exposure to the excessive radiation dose considerably surpassing the permitted limit, to do the job. And when the IAEA inspectors requested arrangements for the measurement of the damaged fuel at the experimental nuclear power station, the facility operators complied with their request and made necessary arrangements for the work through the complicated process, though this was against the safety and operational rules.

Our nuclear activities are fully reflected in the initial report submitted by the DPRK to the IAEA. But, we supplied in time

the experimental stage, not in regular operation, in the viewpoint of the inspection. Some officials of the IAEA Secretariat should, as a matter of course, have taken into consideration these characteristic features of the DPRK's nuclear activities in analyzing the result of the inspections.

However, they lacked the right standpoint and attitude to clarify any point at issue and, therefore, deliberately made the matter complicated, raising a hasty fuss even before seeking any consultation with the operators.

It is the operators who know best of the specific conditions of the facilities. It is, therefore, indispensable for the inspectors to consult the operators. But, the inspectors, being obsessed with "suspicion," began putting "pressure" on us, instead of trying to clarify and solve problems.

The fourth *ad hoc* inspection team, which visited the DPRK from 2 to 14 of November, 1992, asked for official talks in Pyongyang before going to the sites. At the talks, they attempted to "threaten" us, saying that "more nuclear material should be declared," that this would be "the last chance to modify the initial report" and that "a tragic consequence would follow if the chance were passed up."

Our facility operators explained the specific operating conditions of the facilities scientifically and technologically and advised them to correctly interpret the results. The inspection teams have further acquainted themselves with the conditions at the facility locations and held detailed consultations with the operators and admitted that the most part of their views were

The inspectors failed to answer our questions; "what is wrong in our calculation," and "what is insufficient in our explanation." At the conclusion of the technical discussion, they said that they had "learned a lot this time and excerpted useful data from the operating records and will reexamine them at the IAEA Headquarters and will resume discussion."

The DPRK side handed over its calculation data as a document to the inspection team. However, the IAEA Director-General proposed "special inspection" to the DPRK on February 9, even before the sixth inspection team flew back to Vienna on February 8 for re-calculation.

The second "inconsistency in principle" raised by some officials of the IAEA Secretariat is that the isotopic composition of plutonium extracted by the Radiochemical Laboratory does not correspond to that of the liquid waste.

The main point here is to correctly understand its cause. The cause was fully clarified by the DPRK scientists who explained that the difference came when the solution from the basic experiment of plutonium extraction in 1975 was put together in the waste tank of the Radiochemical Laboratory.

At the talks between the DPRK delegation and the IAEA Secretariat in Vienna on February 20 and 21 this year, the DPRK side again explained the points at issue in a scientific, technological and logical way with specific facts and evidence, confuting the allegations by some officials of the IAEA Secretariat that the quantity and composition of plutonium extracted through the basic experimental process at the

to the IAEA. The point is that, on the basis of the false intelligence information provided by a third country, some officials of the IAEA Secretariat called for an inspection of the military installations which are not the nuclear-related facilities.

In this connection, we cannot but look back upon what had happened in the past.

In September last year, the IAEA Director-General abruptly demanded that the DPRK allow the third IAEA *ad hoc* inspection team then staying in the DPRK access to the "two locations," irrelevant to the nuclear activities, in the form of a visit. At that time, from the consideration that this was the first request from the Director-General, we did allow the inspectors, who came for the purpose of nuclear inspection, access to the sites and facilities exempt from the safeguards, although this was contrary to the spirit of the agreement reached in May last year.

One location was a shop producing daily necessities and the other was a military installation. The inspectors, who looked round the locations in the capacity of the IAEA's official personnel, searched every nook and corner of each room with their inspection instruments, like a policeman searching the house of a suspected criminal, not like a guest who came at the invitation of the host.

After seeing the military installation, the inspectors were allowed another access, on their request, to the installation, because they "asked to see again the inside of the building so

At the bilateral talks in Pyongyang from 20 to 22 January this year, the negotiating mission of the IAEA Secretariat cited the needs for the "visit to the two locations," that is to say; "first, the locations are related to the "inconsistencies" found in the course of the *ad hoc* inspections, and second; inspection should be conducted because there is a 'reliable evidence' that the locations are related to the nuclear material."

The DPRK side explained that there existed none of such "inconsistencies" allegedly found out in the course of the *ad hoc* inspections, that the "inconsistencies" would be clarified through further *ad hoc* inspections, that there were no grounds to assert that the "two locations" were related to the "inconsistencies" raised by the negotiating mission and that the "two locations" are military installations which have no relevance to our nuclear activities, and refuted the arguments about the "importance" and "urgency" of the proposed visit on which the IAEA Secretariat impatiently insisted. The DPRK side also demanded that the IAEA negotiating mission identify the source of the "reliable evidence" with which they alleged that the locations were related to the nuclear activities.

The IAEA negotiating mission did not hesitate to reveal that it was using intelligence information provided by a third country, adding that "if the country in question is identified, it would deteriorate the relations between that country and the DPRK."

As the DPRK side asked for the clarification of the legal grounds for the use of information provided by a third country, the IAEA mission avoided answering the DPRK's question, saying that "it takes much time to explain it on a legal basis."

accordance with the IAEA's Statute of the Safeguards Agreement.

The IAEA is obligated to protect secrets coming to its knowledge in the course of the inspections under the Safeguards Agreement, but it has communicated the results of its inspections in the DPRK to the United States and south Korea.

US daily "*The Herald Tribune*," dated May 5, 1992, reported that "according to an IAEA spokesman, North Korea provided the IAEA with a list of nuclear facilities as thick as a small telephone directory on May 4. The three previously undisclosed nuclear reactors were listed in the report."

South Korea's "Munhwa Broadcasting Corporation (MBC)" reported on November 8, 1992 that the IAEA was known to be planning to send a high-level delegation to Pyongyang immediately after the fourth *ad hoc* inspection. At that time, only a few officials of the IAEA Secretariat knew about this, and we received this information from the IAEA by telex on November 16, eight days after the south Korean "MBC" report.

South Korea's "MBC" also reported on November 13, 1992 that "the United States Administration has obtained the results of the nuclear inspections in North Korea from the IAEA and is now in the process of a close analysis of the data."

Some officials of the IAEA Secretariat continued to demand that the DPRK disclose the list of the nuclear material and the list of its nuclear facilities submitted to the IAEA, and,

The Central Intelligence Agency of the United States in its report submitted last year to the National Security Council at the White House said that "the United States must include its trustworthy persons in the 'special inspection' group. " Under this directive of the United States, some officials of the IAEA Secretariat attempted to designate inspectors whose countries have no diplomatic relations with the DPRK, even after they had been notified of the DPRK's position that it would not accept such officials of the IAEA as the members of the inspection team."

The recent report of the US Central Intelligence Agency to the National Security Council at the White House wrote that "for the present, the United States must induce North Korea to accept the 'special inspection,' and the shaping of the North Korea policy should be subject to the outcome of the nuclear inspection."

The United States invited the IAEA Director-General to take part in a "joint House hearing" on July 22 last year and debriefed him on the DPRK's nuclear programme, while forcing him to conduct "special inspection" and "surprise inspection" in the DPRK.

The DPRK has so far accepted the nuclear inspections sincerely and clarified the alleged "inconsistencies" on a scientific and technological basis. Nevertheless, the United States has manipulated some officials of the IAEA Secretariat and certain member states to adopt at the February 25 meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors an unjust "resolution" forcibly

suspended "Team Spirit" joint military exercises and are pertinaciously pursuing their machinations against our country in collusion with some officials of the IAEA Secretariat.

It is because of these acts that the DPRK has entered the quasi-war state to safeguard its sovereignty and security and adopted the decision to withdraw from the NPT to defend its supreme interests. This is a self-defensive measure to defend our nation's dignity and its right to survival and a just measure to safeguard the common interests of the non-nuclear-weapon states.

Neither "pressure" nor strong-arm acts whatsoever will ever go down with us.

The United States must drop its old way of thinking of the cold war era and immediately desist from its imprudent machinations of manipulating the IAEA to force our military installations open and strangle our socialist system.

Some officials of the Secretariat and certain member states must apologize for the crimes they have committed to the Korean people and should forbear from conducting themselves under the pressure and directive of a particular country.

The Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea expresses its hope that the member states of the IAEA and the world peace-loving peoples will impartially assess, on the basis of the IAEA's Statute and the Safeguards Agreement, the issues that have arisen between the DPRK and the IAEA in

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- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003b. paper	re Part I Summary of Objectives (3 pages)	05/00/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 283

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, November 1993 [1]

2009-0528-F
kc1545

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
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- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003c. paper	re Part II, Objectives and Procedures (4 pages)	05/00/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 283

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, November 1993 [1]

2009-0528-F
kc1545

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003d. paper	re Part III, Inducements and Strategy (5 pages)	05/00/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 283

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, November 1993 [1]

2009-0528-F
kc1545

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003e. timeline	re Dialogue (1 page)	05/00/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 283

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, November 1993 [1]

2009-0528-F
kc1545

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003f. paper	re US DPRK Talks (2 pages)	05/00/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 283

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, November 1993 [1]

2009-0528-F
kc1545

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003g. paper	re draft protocol summary (2 pages)	05/00/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 283

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, November 1993 [1]

2009-0528-F
kc1545

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003h. paper	re draft protocol text (2 pages)	05/00/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 283

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, November 1993 [1]

2009-0528-F
kc1545

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003i. draft	paper, re US DPRK Dialogue (6 pages)	05/00/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 283

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, November 1993 [1]

2009-0528-F
kc1545

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003j. paper	North Korea gameplan (2 pages)	05/00/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 283

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, November 1993 [1]

2009-0528-F
kc1545

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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NORTH KOREA PRESS THEMES

- Our goals are clear: a non-nuclear Korean peninsula and a robust international nonproliferation regime.
- We do not seek a confrontation with North Korea, nor do we want to use the current situation to bring about political change in the DPRK.
- We must, however, respond seriously to evidence that North Korea breached its treaty obligations, and may be pursuing a nuclear weapons capability.
- This is not a bilateral U.S.-North Korea issue. Countries around the world have joined in deploring North Korea's actions and in calling for it to return to compliance with its nonproliferation commitments.
- [-- The Security Council has gone on record calling for North Korea to reverse its course.] [For use after the resolution is adopted.]
- Nonetheless, we are prepared to meet with North Korean officials, if that will help resolve the current situation.
- We will say to them that we are not threatening their country with nuclear weapons or in any other way.
- We are also prepared to discuss their security concerns, and to listen seriously to their ideas.
- We will again tell them that if they honor their nonproliferation commitments, we are prepared to begin a broad-ranging dialogue that could lead to improved relations with the U.S. and other countries.
- But North Korea's leaders must also understand that the international community has a critical stake in the integrity of the nonproliferation regime. Neither we nor others can ignore either actions that undermine that regime or the prospect of nuclear weapons proliferation in a volatile region like the Korean peninsula.
- There should be no doubt that the U.S. is prepared to take tough actions to meet this challenge to the nonproliferation regime.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

20633

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 9, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: DANIEL PONEMAN *DP*

FROM: STEVEN AOKI *SA*

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the June 8 Deputies Meeting on North Korea

Attached at Tab I for your approval is a proposed Summary of Conclusions for the Deputies Committee meeting on North Korea held June 8. Bob Gallucci has cleared on these points.

Concurrence by: *KB* Kent Wiedemann

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Will Itoh to forward the Summary of Conclusions at Tab I to his counterparts.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to Counterparts
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

By *WM* NARA, Date *06/29/15*

2009-0528-F


~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

1

TAB I



~~CONFIDENTIAL WITH~~
~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D C 20506

20633

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the
Vice President for
National Security Affairs

MR. MARC GROSSMAN
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL MICHAEL B. SHERFIELD
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. JOHN A. LAUDER
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions from June 8 Deputies Meeting (C)

MR. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the U.S. to the UN

CAPT H. L. SHEFFIELD
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

MS. BARBARA STARR
Executive Secretary
Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency

Attached is the summary of conclusions from the June 8 Deputies Meeting on North Korea. (C)

William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

~~CONFIDENTIAL WITH~~
~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By CM NARA, Date 06/29/15
2009-0528-F

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TAB A



Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004. notes	re Summary of Conclusions (2 pages)	06/08/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 283

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, November 1993 [1]

2009-0528-F
kc1545

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005a. fax	cover, re options paper (1 page)	05/28/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 283

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, November 1993 [1]

2009-0528-F
kc1545

RESTRICTION CODES

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005b. note	transmittal re draft paper (1 page)	05/28/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 283

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, November 1993 [1]

2009-0528-F
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- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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Security Council

Distr.
GENERALS/RES/748 (1992)
31 March 1992

RESOLUTION 748 (1992)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 3063rd meeting,
on 31 March 1992

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolution 731 (1992) of 21 January 1992,

Noting the reports of the Secretary-General, 1/ 2/

Deeply concerned that the Libyan Government has still not provided a full and effective response to the requests in its resolution 731 (1992) of 21 January 1992,

Convinced that the suppression of acts of international terrorism, including those in which States are directly or indirectly involved, is essential for the maintenance of international peace and security,

Recalling that, in the statement issued on 31 January 1992 on the occasion of the meeting of the Security Council at the level of heads of State and Government, 3/ the members of the Council expressed their deep concern over acts of international terrorism, and emphasized the need for the international community to deal effectively with all such acts,

Reaffirming that, in accordance with the principle in Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter of the United Nations, every State has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in terrorist acts in another State or acquiescing in organized activities within its territory directed towards the commission of such acts, when such acts involve a threat or use of force,

1/ S/23574.

2/ S/23672.

3/ S/23500.

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Determining, in this context, that the failure by the Libyan Government to demonstrate by concrete actions its renunciation of terrorism and in particular its continued failure to respond fully and effectively to the requests in resolution 731 (1992) constitute a threat to international peace and security,

Determined to eliminate international terrorism,

Recalling the right of States, under Article 50 of the Charter, to consult the Security Council where they find themselves confronted with special economic problems arising from the carrying out of preventive or enforcement measures,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter,

1. Decides that the Libyan Government must now comply without any further delay with paragraph 3 of resolution 731 (1992) regarding the requests contained in documents S/23306, S/23308 and S/23309;

2. Decides also that the Libyan Government must commit itself definitively to cease all forms of terrorist action and all assistance to terrorist groups and that it must promptly, by concrete actions, demonstrate its renunciation of terrorism;

3. Decides that, on 15 April 1992 all States shall adopt the measures set out below, which shall apply until the Security Council decides that the Libyan Government has complied with paragraphs 1 and 2 above;

4. Decides also that all States shall:

✓ (a) Deny permission to any aircraft to take off from, land in or overfly their territory if it is destined to land in or has taken off from the territory of Libya, unless the particular flight has been approved on grounds of significant humanitarian need by the Committee established by paragraph 9 below;

✓ (b) Prohibit, by their nationals or from their territory, the supply of any aircraft or aircraft components to Libya, the provision of engineering and maintenance servicing of Libyan aircraft or aircraft components, the certification of airworthiness for Libyan aircraft, the payment of new claims against existing insurance contracts and the provision of new direct insurance for Libyan aircraft;

5. Decides further that all States shall:

✓ (a) Prohibit any provision to Libya by their nationals or from their territory of arms and related material of all types, including the sale or transfer of weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary police equipment and spare parts for the aforementioned, as well as the provision of any types of equipment, supplies and grants of licensing arrangements, for the manufacture or maintenance of the aforementioned;

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✓ (b) Prohibit any provision to Libya by their nationals or from their territory of technical advice, assistance or training related to the provision, manufacture, maintenance, or use of the items in (a) above;

✓ (c) Withdraw any of their officials or agents present in Libya to advise the Libyan authorities on military matters;

6. Decides that all States shall:

✓ (a) Significantly reduce the number and the level of the staff at Libyan diplomatic missions and consular posts and restrict or control the movement within their territory of all such staff who remain; in the case of Libyan missions to international organizations, the host State may, as it deems necessary, consult the organization concerned on the measures required to implement this subparagraph;

✓ (b) Prevent the operation of all Libyan Arab Airlines offices;

✓ (c) Take all appropriate steps to deny entry to or expel Libyan nationals who have been denied entry to or expelled from other States because of their involvement in terrorist activities;

7. Calls upon all States, including States not members of the United Nations, and all international organizations, to act strictly in accordance with the provisions of the present resolution, notwithstanding the existence of any rights or obligations conferred or imposed by any international agreement or any contract entered into or any licence or permit granted prior to 15 April 1992;

8. Requests all States to report to the Secretary-General by 15 May 1992 on the measures they have instituted for meeting the obligations set out in paragraphs 3 to 7 above;

✓ 9. Decides to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of its provisional rules of procedure, a Committee of the Security Council consisting of all the members of the Council, to undertake the following tasks and to report on its work to the Council with its observations and recommendations:

(a) To examine the reports submitted pursuant to paragraph 8 above;

(b) To seek from all States further information regarding the action taken by them concerning the effective implementation of the measures imposed by paragraphs 3 to 7 above;

(c) To consider any information brought to its attention by States concerning violations of the measures imposed by paragraphs 3 to 7 above and, in that context, to make recommendations to the Council on ways to increase their effectiveness;

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(d) To recommend appropriate measures in response to violations of the measures imposed by paragraphs 3 to 7 above and provide information on a regular basis to the Secretary-General for general distribution to Member States;

(e) To consider and to decide upon expeditiously any application by States for the approval of flights on grounds of significant humanitarian need in accordance with paragraph 4 above;

(f) To give special attention to any communications in accordance with Article 50 of the Charter from any neighbouring or other State with special economic problems that might arise from the carrying out of the measures imposed by paragraphs 3 to 7 above;

10. Calls upon all States to cooperate fully with the Committee in the fulfilment of its task, including supplying such information as may be sought by the Committee in pursuance of the present resolution;

11. Requests the Secretary-General to provide all necessary assistance to the Committee and to make the necessary arrangements in the Secretariat for this purpose;

12. Invites the Secretary-General to continue his role as set out in paragraph 4 of resolution 731 (1992);

13. Decides that the Security Council shall, every 120 days or sooner should the situation so require, review the measures imposed by paragraphs 3 to 7 above in the light of the compliance by the Libyan Government with paragraphs 1 and 2 above taking into account, as appropriate, any reports provided by the Secretary-General on his role as set out in paragraph 4 of resolution 731 (1992);

14. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

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