

FOIA MARKER

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Folder Title:

North Korea, 1993-95 [10]

Staff Office-Individual:

Nonproliferation and Export Controls-Aoki, Steven

Original OA/ID Number:

281

Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:	Stack:
41	5	4	3	v

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. paper	re key points at principals meeting (1 page)	12/00/1993	P1/b(1)
002. memo	information, Steven Aoki to Anthony Lake re Principals Meeting (5 pages)	12/05/1993	P1/b(1)
003. paper	re North Korea nuclear issues (8 pages)	12/00/1993	P1/b(1)
004. paper	re elements of broad and thorough approach (3 pages)	12/00/1993	P1/b(1)
005. paper	re US objectives (2 pages)	12/00/1993	P1/b(1)
006. paper	re negotiating package (2 pages)	12/00/1993	P1/b(1)
007. paper	re what North Korea wants (2 pages)	12/00/1993	P1/b(1)
008. notes	re summary of conclusions (3 pages)	11/15/1993	P1/b(1)
009. report	re sanctions (26 pages)	12/05/1993	P1/b(1)
010. paper	re sequence of events (3 pages)	12/00/1993	P1/b(1)
011. cable	re Blix meeting (4 pages)	12/03/1993	P1/b(1)
012. report	re UN IAEA Board of Governors doc (8 pages)	12/01/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 281

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, 1993-95 [10]

2009-0528-F

kc1541

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
013. cable	re post summit approach (4 pages)	12/01/1993	P1/b(1)
014. report	re North Korea (33 pages)	11/00/1993	P1/b(1)

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This marker identifies the place of a tabbed divider. Given our digitization capabilities, we are sometimes unable to adequately scan such dividers. The title from the original document is indicated below.

TAB I

Divider Title: _____

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL PRINCIPALS' COMMITTEE MEETING

DATE: December 6, 1993
LOCATION: SITUATION ROOM
TIME: 3:30 p.m. - 4:30 p.m.

NEXT STEPS ON NORTH KOREA

Agenda

- I. Introduction NSC
- II. Intelligence Update CIA
- III. Diplomatic Update State
- IV. Security Update Defense
- V. Next Steps State
- VI. Public Diplomacy and
Congressional Strategy All Participants
- VII. Discussion All Participants
- VIII. Conclusion NSC

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By Q NARA, Date 06/24/15
2009-0528-F

SECRET

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

TAB I 5

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TAB II

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NORTH KOREA SANCTIONS

<u>Category</u> [Legal Citation]	<u>Description</u>	<u>Repeal/Revise</u>
1. Diplomatic Relations. [U.S. Constitution; <u>Note</u>: For a good, general overview of the law regarding state/government recognition, see sections 202-205 of the Restatement 3d, Foreign Relations Law of the U.S. (1986.)]	The U.S. does not currently maintain diplomatic relations with the DPRK.	The establishment of diplomatic relations is a constitutional prerogative of the Executive; no formal congressional approval is required.
2. U.N. 25-mile Travel Limit. [Section 162 of the Foreign Missions Act, 22 U.S.C. 4316; U.N. Headquarters Agreement; Immigration and Nationality Act]	Although the DPRK is a member of the United Nations, the U.S. lawfully restricts the travel of DPRK UN representatives to the HQ District, i.e., a 25-mile radius from Columbus Circle.	The 25-mile limit may be removed or relaxed by the Secretary (in consultation with the FBI and CIA) without the need for congressional approval or consultation.
3. Trade Embargo. [Trading With The Enemy Act ("TWEA"), Pub. L. 65-91, <u>as amended</u>, 50 U.S.C. App. 5(b); 31 C.F.R. 500.201 et seq.]	--Empowers President to prohibit/regulate a broad range of financial/property transactions. --Since 12/17/50, President has banned trade absent Treasury (Office of Foreign Asset Controls) license.	Executive may relax or terminate the ban at any time w/o congressional consent or consultation. [But note section 710 of the pending State authorization bill, which, if enacted in its current form, would prohibit any license for trade with the DPRK except pursuant to a presidential determination that the DPRK maintains its status as a member of the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and is in full compliance with its obligations thereunder.]

4. Exports.

[Export Administration Act of 1979 (Pub. L. 96-72, as amended, 50 U.S.C. App. 2404)("EAA"); 15 C.F.R. Part 700]

Authorizes the President to "prohibit or curtail the export of any goods or technology subject to the jurisdiction of the [U.S.]" absent a license from Commerce.

Executive branch may relax or terminate the ban without congressional consent or consultation.

5. Shipping.

[Section 704 of the Defense Production Act of 1950 (Pub. L. 81-774, 50 U.S.C. App. 2154); 44 C.F.R. Part 403]

Prohibits owners, owners' agents, and officers from (i) taking to the DPRK any ship or aircraft documented or registered under the laws of the U.S.; and, (ii) from transporting in any such ship goods destined for the DPRK.

Executive may relax or terminate these restrictions without congressional consent or consultation.

6. Most Favored Nation ("MFN").

[Title IV of the Trade Act of 1974 (Pub. L. 93-618, 19 U.S.C. 1431)]

As a country the products of which were not eligible for MFN treatment on or before 1/3/75, the DPRK is ineligible for MFN extension, absent...

(i) Presidential determination that the DPRK (as a "non-market country") allows its nationals to emigrate freely (the so-called "Jackson-Vanik" amendment); and, (ii) conclusion of a bilateral trade agreement containing specified provisions.

7. Proliferation

[Sections 1701-1704 of the FY '91 National Defense Authorization Act (Pub. L. 101-510, 50 U.S.C. App. 2402 note); 15 C.F.R. Part 700; 22 C.F.R. 120.29 (ITAR), see 58 F. Reg. 39286 (7/22/93)]

-- Amended the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778) and the Export Administration Act to require sanctions if the President

-- Sanctions are for a two-year period.

-- President may waive upon a determination that such action is

determines that a foreign person knowingly exports, transfers or otherwise engages in trade "of items that contribute to missile proliferation."

"essential to the national security of the [U.S.]" and so certifies to Congress 20 days prior to issuing the waiver.

-- U.S. imposed such sanctions on two DPRK entities in 1992.

8. Terrorism.

[Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979, as amended by the Anti-Terrorism and Arms Export Amendments Act of 1989, Pub. L. 101-222, 103 Stat. 1892]

[Note: Section 901 of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. 901(j) would also deny in the case of the DPRK certain tax credits for income and other taxes paid to that country.]

-- DPRK designated a "terrorist country" since 1/20/88 per State determination that it had repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism.

-- Prohibits certain transactions with DPRK, including direct or indirect export of any munitions list items by USG or any US person (as well as to re-exports by non-U.S. persons).

-- Exports of non-munitions list items must be licensed.

-- President may waive the prohibition for a particular transaction if he determines that it is "essential to the national security interests of the [U.S.]," and both consults with and submits a report to Congress 15 days prior to the transaction.

-- There are two ways by which a country may get off the "terrorist list," i.e., (i) President certifies to Congress that "there has been a fundamental change in the leadership or policies of the terrorist country, that the government ...is not supporting acts of international terrorism, and that the government has provided assurances that it will not support acts of international terrorism in the future,"; or, (ii) President submits to Congress for review, 45 days prior to the

effective date of the
recision, a
determination that
the government has
not supported
international
terrorism during the
preceding 6-month
period and has
provided assurances
that it will not
support acts of
international
terrorism in the
future.

**THE FOLLOWING ARE POTENTIALLY APPLICABLE ALTHOUGH NO FORMAL
DETERMINATION HAS YET BEEN MADE**

**9. Foreign
Assistance.**

A. Human Rights.

[Section 116 of the
Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961, as
amended, 22 U.S.C.
2151n; also covers
OPIC insurance,
guarantees, or
loans, 22 U.S.C.
2199 (i)]

Prohibits
assistance to the
government of "any
country which
engages in a
consistent pattern
of gross violations
of internationally
recognized human
rights, including
torture or cruel,
inhuman, or
degrading treatment
or punishment..."
etc.

"Gross violator"
determination is made
by the AID
Administrator and the
Assistant Secretary
for HA, who must take
into account the
extent to which the
government has
permitted unimpeded
investigations of
alleged human rights
violations by
appropriate
international
organizations, and
the extent to which
multilateral and
security assistance
is already restricted
to that country by
the President or
Congress for human
rights reasons.

**B. Communist
States.**

[Section 620(f) of
the FAA (22 U.S.C.
2370 (f))]

Prohibits
assistance to "any
communist country,"
including the DPRK,
except for

--President may waive
upon finding that
such assistance is
vital to U.S.
national security,

[Note: There are also several other restrictions on assistance that might potentially become applicable to the DPRK that it is not necessary to address now, e.g., sec. 620A of the FAA, 22 U.S.C. 2371 (prohibits assistance to governments supporting int'l terrorism); sec. 620(t) of the FAA (break in diplomatic relations); secs. 523 and 529 of the FY 94 Foreign Ops. Appropriation bill; sec. 543 of the FY '93 FAA (Pub. L. 102-391).]

10. Security Assistance.

[Section 502B of the FAA (22 U.S.C. 2304)]

assistance to schools, libraries, and hospital centers for educational research which are outside the U.S. and are founded/operated by U.S. citizens.

that the country is not controlled by the international communist conspiracy, and that the assistance will promote the country's independence from international communism.

-- President may also remove a country for a designated period if he determines that it is in the national interest to do so; one factor to be considered is whether the country is "fostering the establishment of a generally democratic system, with respect for internationally recognized human rights."

-- Prohibits security assistance to any country "the government of which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights."

Assistance may be provided only if the President finds such a "significant improvement in [the] human rights record" that it is in the national interest to lift the prohibition.

-- Also prohibits security assistance for the police, domestic intelligence, or similar law enforcement forces of such a country. Moreover, export licenses are prohibited even for crime control and detection instruments and equipment, subject to a presidential waiver in

"exceptional
circumstances."
Id., for IMET.

11. IFI Lending.

[Section 7001 of
the International
Financial
Institutions Act
(22 U.S.C. 262d);
see also sec. 528
of the FY '94
Foreign Ops
Appropriation Act,
which contains a
similar provision.]

Requires the U.S.
Executive Directors
of IFI's (e.g.,
World Bank) to
oppose any loan,
extension of
financial
assistance, or
technical
assistance to any
country the
government of which
engages in "a
pattern of gross
violations of
internationally
recognized human
rights," or
"provides refuge to
individuals
committing acts of
international
terrorism by
hijacking aircraft."

-- U.S. Executive
Directors are only
authorized to
support assistance
"directed
specifically to
programs which
serve the basic
human needs of the
citizens of such
country."

Note: 22 U.S.C.
262d(f) requires
Treasury to consult
"in a timely manner"
with relevant
congressional
committees to inform
them of "prospective
changes in policy
direction toward
countries [sic] which
have or recently
have had poor human
rights records."

22 U.S.C. 262d(c)
requires Treasury to
report quarterly on
all loans considered
by the IFI Boards,
addressing inter alia
whether the U.S.
opposed, in each
instance, assistance
on human rights
grounds, or changed
its voting position
for such reasons.

"Gramm Amendment,"
section 43 of the
Bretton Woods
Agreement Act, as
amended, 22 U.S.C.
286aa.

Requires the
Secretary of
Treasury to direct
the U.S. Executive
Director of the IMF

The congressional
committees may
request that the
Secretary of Treasury
appear before them to

"to actively oppose any facility involving use of Fund credit by any Communist dictatorship" unless Treasury certifies to the relevant congressional committees that certain economic criteria are met.

certify and document (or to document in writing) that the requisite conditions have been met. If the Secretary does not appear in response to Congress' invitation, the Executive Director "shall vote against such program."

Gonzalez Amendment,
22 U.S.C. 283r,
284j, 285o.

Requires Secretary of Treasury to instruct Executive Directors to the IBRD and ADB to vote against assistance to any country that has expropriated the property of U.S. nationals.

Unless President determines that (i) an arrangement for proper compensation has been made; (ii) the matter has been submitted to arbitration; or, (iii) good faith settlement negotiations are in progress.

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Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 281

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, 1993-95 [10]

2009-0528-F
kc1541

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007. paper	re what North Korea wants (2 pages)	12/00/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 281

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, 1993-95 [10]

2009-0528-F
kc1541

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TAB IV

Divider Title: _____

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
008. notes	re summary of conclusions (3 pages)	11/15/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 281

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, 1993-95 [10]

2009-0528-F
kc1541

RESTRICTION CODES

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TAB V

Divider Title: _____

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
009. report	re sanctions (26 pages)	12/05/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 281

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, 1993-95 [10]

2009-0528-F
kc1541

RESTRICTION CODES

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TAB VI

Divider Title: _____

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
010. paper	re sequence of events (3 pages)	12/00/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 281

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, 1993-95 [10]

2009-0528-F
kc1541

RESTRICTION CODES

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COMPARISON OF U.S. AND DPRK POSITIONS

U.S. POSITION

DPRK POSITION

Conditions for 3rd Round

US will proceed with 3rd round when and if NK

No direct corollary. By implication, U.S. and DPRK will proceed with third round after

- agrees with IAEA on inspections necessary to maintain continuity and
- agrees with ROK on modalities for exchange of envoys.

- IAEA inspections concluded and
- working-level N-S contacts resume or, perhaps, exchange of envoys has occurred.

Timing of initial Team Spirit announcement

When US is informed that NK has reached satisfactory agreements

When IAEA inspections begin, simultaneously

- with IAEA on necessary inspections and that it will accept same, and
 - with ROK on modalities,
- then US will make a public statement that it is prepared to
- consult with view to suspend TS '94 and
 - hold 3rd round.

- suspension of TS '94 announced,
- working-level N-S contacts resume with a view toward early exchange of envoys and
- U.S. and DPRK announce date of 3rd round.

Final Team Spirit decision

When NK envoy visits Seoul for serious talks, ROK will inform him that TS '94 will be suspended.

Announcement of TS '94 suspension earlier, at time of "resumption of working level contacts".

Final Team Spirit announcement

Public confirmation of suspension of TS '94 and US announces date for third round.

Public confirmation earlier, at time of beginning of IAEA inspection.

Third round

3rd round, if NK fulfills commitments to IAEA re inspections.

No direct corollary, but NK must already understand this.

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TAB VII

Divider Title: _____

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

03-Dec-1993 14:21 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: White House Situation Room
(WHSR@A1@WHSR)

SUBJECT: DECEMBER 1993 BOARD OF GOVERNORS: STATEMENT

<DIST>

SIT: AOKI BEERS CLARKER PONEMAN RAGLE VAX WIEDEMANN

<PREC>

IMMEDIATE

<CLAS>

UNCLASSIFIED

<OSRI>

RUEHVEN

<DTG>

01820Z DEC 93

IG>

MISSION USVIENNA

TO>

RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0503

INFO RUKGNFA/NRC WASHDC

RHEBAAA/DOE HQS WASHDC

RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 0637

RUEHII/VIENNA IAEA POSTS COLLECTIVE

<SUBJ>

DECEMBER 1993 BOARD OF GOVERNORS: STATEMENT

- BY DIRECTOR GENERAL BLIX

<TEXT>

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 USVIENNA 003424

DEPT FOR PM ACDA

DOE HQS:IS-40

NRC:IP

BRUSSELS FOR USEC

FROM USMISSION UNVIE

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: IAEA, AORC, ENRG, KNNP, KSCA, MNUC, PARM, KN

SUBJECT: DECEMBER 1993 BOARD OF GOVERNORS: STATEMENT

- BY DIRECTOR GENERAL BLIX

1. SUMMARY. IN HIS DECEMBER 2 STATEMENT TO THE IAEA DECEMBER BOARD OF GOVERNORS MEETING (FULL TEXT FAXED DECEMBER 2 TO PM) DG HANS BLIX SAID THE REFUSAL OF THE DPRK TO PERMIT THE IAEA TO CONDUCT REGULAR INSPECTIONS SINCE FEBRUARY HAD LED TO A SITUATION IN WHICH THE SYSTEM COULD NOT BE SAID AT PRESENT TO PROVIDE ANY MEANINGFUL ASSURANCE OF PEACEFUL USE OF THE DPRK'S DECLARED NUCLEAR INSTALLATIONS AND MATERIAL. HOWEVER, THE SYSTEM COULD BE FULLY OR PARTIALLY RESTORED IF

TAB VII

COOPERATION WERE FORTHCOMING FROM THE DPRK. END
SUMMARY.

-
2. THE DIRECTOR GENERAL REITERATED WHAT HE HAD SAID AT THE UNGA NOVEMBER 1, NAMELY THAT "IAEA VERIFICATION ACTIVITIES IN THE DPRK SUGGEST THAT SOME NUCLEAR MATERIAL EXISTS THERE WHICH HAS NOT BEEN REPORTED TO THE AGENCY. HENCE, THE AGENCY CANNOT VERIFY THE CORRECTNESS AND ASSESS THE COMPLETENESS OF THE DPRK'S REPORT OF MATERIAL SUBJECT TO SAFEGUARDS." THIS REMAINED THE UNSOLVED, CENTRAL ISSUE.

3. BLIX TOLD THE DECEMBER BOARD: "ONE MONTH LATER, I AM BOUND TO CONCLUDE THAT THE SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM WHICH WAS IN PLACE ON DECLARED NUCLEAR MATERIAL AND INSTALLATIONS IN THE DPRK CANNOT BE SAID TO PROVIDE ANY MEANINGFUL ASSURANCE OF PEACEFUL USE OF THESE INSTALLATIONS AND THIS MATERIAL. THIS IS NOT TO SAY THAT THE SYSTEM COULD NOT WITH RENEWED EFFORTS BE FULLY OR PARTIALLY RESTORED, IF COOPERATION WERE FORTHCOMING FROM THE DPRK. NOR IS IT TO DENY THE POSSIBLE TRUTH OF A STATEMENT MADE ON NOVEMBER 11 BY THE FIRST VICE-MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, MR. KANG SOK JU, THAT THE DPRK "TOTALLY FROZE THE MOVEMENT OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL WITHIN THE DPRK" AND THAT "STILL NOW INSPECTION CAMERAS AND SEALS OF THE IAEA REMAIN ON THE NUCLEAR FACILITIES OF OUR COUNTRY." HOWEVER, IN THE ABSENCE OF VERIFICATION, SUCH STATEMENTS OFFER LITTLE ASSURANCE."

4. CONCLUDING ON THE DPRK, BLIX SAID "THE AGENCY IS READY AT ANY TIME TO RECEIVE A TEAM FROM THE DPRK FOR CONSULTATIONS ABOUT THE WHOLE SAFEGUARDS ISSUE--INCLUDING THE NEED FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AND VISITS TO ADDITIONAL LOCATIONS. IT IS ALSO READY TO SEND AN INSPECTION TEAM TO PERFORM A FULL RANGE OF INSPECTION ACTIVITIES. THESE ACTIVITIES HAVE BEEN INDICATED IN DETAIL BY THE AGENCY AND ARE OF THE SAME KIND AS THE AGENCY UNDERTOOK IN THE DPRK AT THIS TIME LAST YEAR WITHOUT OBJECTIONS BY DPRK AUTHORITIES. THEY OBVIOUSLY GO FAR BEYOND MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES, BUT THEY DO NOT INCLUDE THE QUESTION OF ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AND VISITS TO ADDITIONAL LOCATIONS, ABOUT WHICH THE AGENCY IS MANDATED TO CONSULT SEPARATELY WITH THE DPRK."

-
5. ON OTHER SUBJECTS, BLIX MADE THE FOLLOWING MAIN POINTS:
UKRAINE:

----- THE UKRAINIAN FOREIGN MINISTER HAS RECENTLY FIRMED HIS GOVERNMENT'S INTENTION TO BECOME A NUCLEAR WEAPON STATE IN THE FUTURE AND EXPRESSED THE WISH OF UKRAINE TO CONCLUDE A SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT APPLYING TO "ALL NUCLEAR MATERIALS USED FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES IN UKRAINE." THE IAEA INTENDS TO EMBARK ON DISCUSSIONS ON A DRAFT SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT FOR

SUBMISSION TO THE BOARD. THE AGENCY RECOGNIZES THAT THE STATUS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN UKRAINE REMAINS TO BE CLARIFIED AND THAT SOLUTION OF THIS QUESTION MAY HAVE A BEARING ON THE SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT.

IRAQ:

----- WITH IRAQ'S RECENT FORMAL ACCEPTANCE OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 715 (ON LONG-TERM MONITORING) A MAJOR STEP HAD BEEN ACHIEVED TOWARDS IRAQ'S FULFILMENT OF ALL OF ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER SECTION C OF THE CEASEFIRE RESOLUTION 687 OF 1991 IN

THE VIEW OF THE UN

SPECIAL COMMISSION ON IRAQ AND THE IAEA. THEY WILL PROCEED TO SATISFY THEMSELVES, AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, THAT THEY CAN IMPLEMENT SATISFACTORILY THE MONITORING AND VERIFICATION WORK IN IRAQ.

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 02 USVIENNA 003424

DEPT FOR PM ACDA

DOE HQS:IS-40

NRC:IP

BRUSSELS FOR USEC

FROM USMISSION UNVIE

E.O. 12356: N/A

----- S: IAEA, AORC, ENRG, KNNP, KSCA, MNUC, PARM, KN

SUBJECT: DECEMBER 1993 BOARD OF GOVERNORS: STATEMENT BY DIRECTOR GENERAL BLIX

IRAN:

----- AN IAEA TEAM HEADED BY DDG FOR SAFEGUARDS, PELLAUD, HAD VISITED IRAN 15-21 NOVEMBER AND HAD SEEN INSTALLATIONS RELATING TO ITS NUCLEAR PROGRAM IN TEHERAN (INCLUDING SHARIF UNIVERISTY), ESFAHAN AND KARAJ. THE TEAM HAD SEEN ALL THE LOCATIONS, BUILDINGS AND LABORATORIES IT WISHED TO VISIT AND HAD OPEN AND FRUITFUL DISCUSSIONS ON POINTS OF MUTUAL INTEREST. THE IAEA HAD A DUTY, THE DIRECTOR GENERAL SAID, NOT ONLY TO LOOK FOR INSTALLATIONS WHICH SHOULD BE DECLARED UNDER SAFEGUARDS BUT ALSO TO HELP DISPEL ERRONEOUS NOTIONS THAT MAY BE DISSEMINATED. "ALTHOUGH SOME MAY PREFER THE TWILIGHT IN WHICH SPECULATIONS BECOMES EASIER," SAID DR. BLIX, "THE IAEA MUST SEEK MAXIMUM CLARITY AND BE AN INSTRUMENT TO ACHIEVE IT."

PLUTONIUM:

----- A FURTHER INFORMAL MEETING OF EXPERTS HAD TAKEN PLACE 22-23 NOVEMBER AT WHICH THE NEED FOR CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES RELATED TO PLUTONIUM AND HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM WAS DISCUSSED. THERE HAD BEEN A CONVERGENCE OF VIEWS THAT THE PEACEFUL STORING OR OF THESE MATERIALS SHOULD BE SUBJECT TO A HIGH DEGREE OF TRANSPARENCY AND THAT THE IAEA MIGHT BE REQUESTED TO MAINTAIN AND PUBLISH AN APPROPRIATE REGISTER. STRENGTHENING OF SAFEGUARDS:

----- THE AGENCY WAS EMBARKING ON A NUMBER OF IMPROVEMENTS AND INNOVATIONS, INCLUDING ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING, AND SPECIFIC OFFERS TO

COOPERATE IN TESTING SOME OF THE MEASURES DISCUSSED
HAD ALREADY BEEN RECEIVED FROM AUSTRALIA, CANADA,
HUNGARY, JAPAN AND SWEDEN.

FINANCIAL SITUATION:

----- THE AGENCY WILL AGAIN BE OBLIGED
BY THE SUBSTANTIAL ARREARS OF SOME MEMBER STATES TO
CUT ITS PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION IN 1994 BY 12 PERCENT.

BECKER

BT

#3424

NNNN

<SECT>

SECTION: 01 OF 02

<SSN>

3424

<TOR>

931203134639 M0758172

<SECT>

SECTION: 02 OF 02

<SSN>

3424

<TOR>

931203134642 M0758173

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FOR: PONEMAN@A1@OEOB

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FOR: BEERS@A1@OEOB

FOR: AOKI@A1@OEOB

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
011. cable	re Blix meeting (4 pages)	12/03/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

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National Security Council
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OA/Box Number: 281

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, 1993-95 [10]

2009-0528-F
kc1541

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UNITED STATES MISSION TO THE
UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM ORGANIZATIONS IN VIENNA

OBERSTFERNERGASSE 11
A-1100 VIENNA, AUSTRIA
TELEPHONE 36 31 52

TELEFAX NUMBER (0043) (1) 369-83-92

DATE: 3 December 1993

TO: PM/PNW - Gary Samore
US Mission USUN New York
FROM: Mike Lawrence

PAGES: 11 (Including Cover Sheet)

MESSAGE:

The attached report is what Blix intends to send to the Security Council.

Also attached is an IAEA press release issued December 2, 1993 on DPRK.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
012. report	re UN IAEA Board of Governors doc (8 pages)	12/01/1993	P1/b(1)

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National Security Council
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TAB VIII

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
013. cable	re post summit approach (4 pages)	12/01/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 281

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, 1993-95 [10]

2009-0528-F
kc1541

RESTRICTION CODES

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b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Clinton Presidential Records Digital Records Marker

This is not a presidential record. This is used as an administrative marker by the William J. Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

This marker identifies the place of a tabbed divider. Given our digitization capabilities, we are sometimes unable to adequately scan such dividers. The title from the original document is indicated below.

TAB IX

Divider Title: _____

<DIST>

SIT: ANDREASEN AOKI KRISTOFF PONEMAN RAGLE WIEDEMANN

<ORIG>

FBIS

<TOR>

931205013210 F0592349

<SUBJ>

DPRK: International Cooperative System Criticized (Take 1 of 2)

<TEXT>

FBIS 018

UNCLAS 4C

DPRK: International Cooperative System Criticized (Take 1 of 2)

SK0512054493 Pyongyang Korean Central Broadcasting Network in
Korean 1500 GMT 4 Dec 93

[Text] Western imperialist reactionaries and their subserving trumpets have recently been showing very ill-boding moves that get on our nerves, babbling about a so-called international cooperative system.

They are raising a clamor of mislead public opinion by fabricating the so-called suspicions of our nuclear development. They are kicking up a row that an international cooperative system should be formed so as to impose collective pressure and sanctions to make us accept overall inspections [chonmyon sachal], dramatizing situation as if the continuity of the safeguards of our country's nuclear activities is about to be broken.

Worse still, very irresponsible and insane [kwanggijogin] outbursts, such as bombing the objects to deter the North's nuclear development and not excluding a possibility of a war, are enumerated. Grave obstacles are created in way of resolving the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula because of very ill-boding moves of the insidious forces who joined their hands with each other under the cloak of the international cooperative system.

The great leader Comrade Kim Il-song has noted: Our position regarding the nuclear inspections is clear and there is no reason whatsoever for one to have any question about this. However, clamoring over the issue noisily and attempting to tarnish our Republic's reputation in the international community are moves that can only be interpreted to mean that they are seeking another purpose.

As it has already been known, we have repeatedly made clear that we have neither the will, nor the ability, nor the necessity to develop nuclear weapons. The nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula was created because the United States brought in numerous nuclear weapons to South Korea and employed the policies of resorting to nuclear threats against us. These days, the nuclear issue is getting complicated and is entering a new phase because the insidious forces carried out special inspection [tukbyol sachal] promotions, finding faults with our nonexistent nuclear issue, and variably pursued the policy of hostile and crush [apsal].

Since the talks for resolving the nuclear issue started, we have exerted all the efforts and worked faithfully to implement the points agreed in the talks. In particular, to fundamentally eliminate the so-called suspicions of our nuclear development, we made a bold decision to replace our existing graphite moderated

TAB 14

reactor system with the light water moderated reactor system even to sacrifice the self-reliance of our nuclear energy industry and expressed a generous [aryanginnun] stance, taking into account of a dialogue partner's position. Moreover, we proposed a package solution out of the aspiration to fundamentally resolve the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula on the basis of peace and fairness. Thus, we have taken all possible practical measures to resolve the nuclear issue.

In the course of this, transparency [tumyongsong] and innocence [kyolbaeksong] of our nuclear activities have been clearly proved and evoked support and sympathy from the world's public opinion.

The insidious forces, nonetheless, continue to circulate a rumor on suspicions of our nuclear development, which has been clearly unveiled, and now outspokenly challenge to harm and crush [apsal] us by forming the so-called international cooperative system.

All of these facts show that they do not have an intention of actually resolving the nuclear issue but are only pursuing a goal of isolating and crushing [apsal] our socialist system.

(more)

05 DEC 0623z BPM

NNNN

>IST>

T: NODIST

<CLAS>UNCLASSIFIED<DTG>191213Z NOV 93

<ORIG>USMISSION USVIENNA

<SUBJ>STATEMENT OF KANG SOK DU, FIRST VICE-MINISTER
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE DPRK MND HEAD OF DPRK
DELEGATION TO DPRK-USA TALKS

<TEXT>

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 USVIENNA 003295

FROM USMISSION UNVIE

E.O. 12356: DECL:C/A

TAGS: IAEA, AORC, ENRG, KNNP, KSCA, MNUC, PARM, TRGY, KN

SUBJECT: STATEMENT OF KANG SOK DU, FIRST VICE-MINISTER
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE DPRK MND HEAD OF DPRK
DELEGATION TO DPRK-USA TALKS

1. MISSION RECEIVED THE FOLLOWING FROM THE IAEA ON
NOVEMBER 18, 1993. OUR UNEEC SBANDING IS THAT IT WILL
BE CIRCULATED TO ALL BOARD MEMBERS.

BEGIN TEXT:

STATEMENT

BY MR. KANG SOK JU, FIRST VICE-MINISTER OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC
OF KOREA

AND

HZAD OF DPRK SIDE'S DELEGATION TO DPRK-USA

HIGH-LEVEL TALKS

(11 NOVEMBER 1993, PYONGYANG)

VERY ILL-BODING SIGNS ARE APPEARING THESE DAYS,
BECLOUDING THE PROSPECTS OF SOLUTION OF THE NUCLEAR
PROBLEM ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA.

SOME QUARTERS ARE PAINTING AN EXTREMELY PESSIMISTIC
PICTURE OF THE SITUATION AS IF CONTINUITY OF THE
SAFEGUARDS ON OUR COUNTRY'S NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES WERE ON
THE VERGE OF SUSPENSION, ARGUING THAT IF THE DPRK
REFUSES TO ACCEPT "A TOTAL INSPECTION" BY THE
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA) WITHIN A FEW
DAYS, "UN SANCTIONS" MUST BE IMPOSED ON IT.

AND IT MUST NOT GO UNNOTICED THAT, WITH A VIEW TO
BACKING THESE ARGUMENTS OF THEIRS, THEY ARE CONCEALING
THE ESSENCE OF THE NUCLEAR PROBLEM ON THE KOREAN
PENINSULA AND ARE DISTORTING FACT TO CREATE THE
IMPRESSION THAT THE DPRK IS PLAYING A HIDE-AND-SEEK TO
DEVELOP NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND ARE SETTING AFLOAT THE
FALSE RUMOR THAT IT IS USING THE NUCLEAR PROBLEM AS A
BARGAINING CHIP TO ATTAIN A CERTAIN SELFISH AIM.

TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THE SERIOUS NATURE OF THE
POLITICAL PURPOSE SOUGHT BY THE DISHONEST FORCES IN
SPREADING SUCH ARGUMENTS AND RUMORS ZEALOUSLY, I DEEM
NECESSARY TO CLARIFY THE TRUTH OF THE SITUATION AND
A PRINCIPLED STAND FOR A SOLUTION OF THE NUCLEAR
PROBLEM.

AS IS ALREADY KNOWN, THE DPRK AND THE US SIDES
PUBLISHED A JOINT STATEMENT AFTER DISCUSSING AND
REACHING AN AGREEMENT ON THE MATTERS OF PRINCIPLE IN
THE SOLUTION OF THE NUCLEAR PROBLEM AND HELD TALKS ON

THIS BASIS.

IN THE JOINT STATEMENT THE TWO SIDES CONFIRMED IT AS THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF THE SOLUTION OF THE NUCLEAR PROBLEM TO REFRAIN FROM NUCLEAR THREATS, RESPECT EACH OTHER'S SOVEREIGNTY, ENSURE A FAIR APPLICATION OF FULL SCOPE SAFEGUARDS AND FOR THE UNITED STATES TO SUPPORT A PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION OF KOREA, AND CLEARLY DEFINED THE DPRK AND THE USA AS THE PARTIES VESTED WITH CHIEF RESPONSIBILITY AND AUTHORITY FOR THE SOLUTION OF THIS PROBLEM.

ACCORDING TO THIS, WE HAVE TAKEN PRACTICAL MEASURES FOR THE SOLUTION OF THE NUCLEAR PROBLEM AND ACTED IN GOOD FAITH IN THE COURSE OF THE TALKS TILL TODAY.

WITH THE PUBLICATION OF THE DPRK-US JOINT STATEMENT, WE UNILATERALLY AND TEMPORARILY SUSPENDED THE EFFECTUATION OF OUR DECLARATION ON OUR WITHDRAWAL FROM THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY AND RESUMED NEGOTIATION WITH THE IAEA AND THE NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE.

AND, UNDER THIS SPECIAL SITUATION, WE TOTALLY FROZE THE MOVEMENT OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL WITHIN THE DPRK TO FULFIL OUR COMMITMENT TO PROVING THE TRANSPARENCY OF OUR NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES AND ALLOWED INSPECTION FOR SURING THE CONTINUITY OF SAFEGARDS IN THIS REGARD.

ESPECIALLY, WE MADE A BIG BOLD DECISION TO REPLACE THE EXISTING GRAPHITE MODERATED REACTORS WITH LIGHT WATER REACTORS AT THE EXPENSE OF THE INDEPENDENCE OF OUR NUCLEAR POWER INDUSTRY, IN ORDER TO FUNDAMENTALLY DISPEL THE SO-CALLED "SUSPICION OF NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT" AGAINST THE DPRK.

ALL THESE SINCERE EFFORTS, HOWEVER, HAVE FAILED TO CALL FORTH A PRACTICAL RESPONSE FROM THE US SIDE, AND THE CURRENT SITUATION IS DEVELOPING IN THE OPPOSITE DIRECTION. THIS IS ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE FAITHLESS STANCE OF THE US SIDE, OUR DIALOGUE PARTNER, TOWARD THE TALKS.

CONTRARY TO THE PRINCIPLES AGREED UPON AT THE PAST UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 04 USVIENNA 003295 FROM USMISSION UNVIE E.O. 12356: DECL:N/A

TAGS: IAEA, AORC, ENRG, KNNP, KSCA, MNUC, PARM, TRGY, KN
SUBJECT: STATEMENT OF KANG SOK JU, FIRST VICE-MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE DPRK AND HEAD OF DPRK DELEGATION TO DPRK-USA TALKS
TALKS, OUTRAGEOUS WORDS THREATENING AND ANTAGONIZING THE DPRK HAVE ROLLED OFF THE TONGUES OF OFFICIAL FIGURES OF THE UNITED STATES IN SUCCESSION AND THEY ARE ERTLY REVEALING THEIR INTENTION TO CONTINUE THE "TEAM IRIT" MILITARY MANEUVERS, NUCLEAR WAR EXERCISES AGAINST THE DPRK.

ON THE OTHER HAND, THEY BROUGHT THE THIRD-STAGE DPRK-US TALKS THAT HAS TO BE HELD WITHIN TWO MONTHS TO A DEADLOCK BY SETTING UNREASONABLE PRECONDITIONS AND ORCHESTRATED THE ADOPTION OF A "RESOLUTION" LAYING THE

BLAME AT OUR DOOR AT THE GENERAL CONFERENCE OF THE IAEA AND THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

ALL THESE FACTS SHOW THAT OVER THE FIVE MONTHS AFTER THE TALKS BEGAN ONLY THE DPRK HAS UNILATERALLY MOVED TO IMPLEMENT THE POINTS AGREED UPON AT THE TALKS, AND THE UNITED STATES HAS NOT MOVED AT ALL.

THE SPIRIT OF THE AGREEMENT AT THE TALKS THAT BOTH SIDES SHOULD MOVE SIMULTANEOUSLY ON A EQUAL FOOTING HAS BEEN IGNORED BY THE US SIDE AND, IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, THIS IS THE MAIN CAUSE OF IMPASSE IN THE SOLUTION OF THE NUCLEAR PROBLEM.

THIS NOTWITHSTANDING, THE UNITED STATES IS TRYING TO MISLEAD PUBLIC OPINION AS IF DPRK WERE TO BLAME FOR IT. THIS FOSTERS THE SUSPICION THAT THE UNITED STATES STILL PURSUES A POLITICAL PURPOSE OF STIFLING OUR REPUBLIC, UNWILLING TO SOLVE THE NUCLEAR PROBLEM IN REL EARNEST.

PARTICULARLY, IT IS AN ACT OF REVERSING BLACK AND WHITE TO CRY THAT THE CONTINUITY OF THE SAFEGUARDS OF THE NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES OF THE DPRK IS BROKEN.

TO GUARANTEE THAT OUR NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES WILL NOT BE ORIENTED TO MILITARY PURPOSE UNTIL THE NUCLEAR PROBLEM HAS COMPLETELY BEEN SOLVED THROUGH THE DPRK-US TALKS, THE DPRK HAS UNTIL NOW REMAINED FAITHFUL TO ITS PROMISE TO THE UNITED STATES THAT IT WILL ALLOW THE READJUSTMENT AND REPLACEMENT OF THE INSPECTION CAMERAS OF THE IAEA.

STILL NOW THE INSPECTION CAMERAS AND SEALS OF THE IAEA REMAIN ON THE NUCLEAR FACILITIES OF OUR COUNTRY.

UNTIL NOW, WE HAVE ALLOWED INSPECTION TEAMS OF THE IAEA TO CHANGE FILMS AND BATTERIES OF THE INSPECTION CAMERAS, CONFIRM THEIR SEALS AND READJUST THE CAMERAS WHENEVER NECESSARY FOR THE CONTINUITY OF SAFEGUARDS. ONLY RECENTLY, WE INFORMED THE IAEA ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS OF OUR READINESS TO RECEIVE SUCH INSPECTION TEAM AT ANY TIME IT REQUESTS THAT.

CONSIDERING THE SCALE AND CONDITIONS OF OUR NUCLEAR FACILITIES, THEY CAN FULLY CONFIRM ONLY WITH THE CAMERAS THAT OUR NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH THE MILITARY PURPOSE.

WHEN THE CAMERAS WERE READJUSTED AND REPLACED IN AUGUST, NOBODY WAS AFRAID THAT THE CONTINUITY OF SAFEGUARDS MIGHT BE BROKEN.

THOUGH WE CONSIDER THAT THE OBSERVATION BY CAMERAS ALONE IS ENOUGH TO ENSURE THE CONTINUITY OF SAFEGUARDS WE, MAKING ALLOWANCES FOR THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE US SIDE, CLEARLY MANIFESTED OUR MAGNANIMOUS STAND THAT THE SCOPE OF INSPECTION MIGHT BE EXPANDED AND ALREADY HELD INFORMAL NEGOTIATION WITH THE US SIDE AND THEN PROPOSED A WORKING-LEVEL NEGOTIATION WITH THE IAEA.

NEVERTHELESS, THE UNITED STATES AND THE IAEA ARE CLAIMING THAT IF THE CONTINUITY OF SAFEGUARDS IS TO BE ENSURED, WE MUST ACCEPT AN OVERALL INSPECTION BY THE IAEA AND SET THIS AS A PRECONDITION FOR THE OPENING OF

THE THIRD-STAGE DPRK-US TALKS.

WHAT THE UNITED STATES AND THE IAEA DMAFD IS THAT WE WHOLLY COMPLY WITH THE SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT IMMEDIATELY AT THE PRESENT JUNCTURE.

OUR WHOLE COMPLIANCE WITH THE SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT MEANS OUR FULL RETURN TO THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY.

AS WE MADE CLEAR IN A STATEMENT OF THE DPRK GOVERNMENT, WE DECLARED OUR WITHDRAWAL FROM THE NPT BECAUSE OUR REPUBLIC'S SUPREME INTERESTS WERE IN DANGER OWING TO THE US NUCLEAR THREAT AND THE PARTIALITY OF THE IAEA.

UNCLAS SECTION 03 OF 04 USVIENNA 003295

FROM USMISSION UNVIE

E.O. 12356: DECL:N/A

TAGS: IAEA, AORC, ENRG, KNNP, KSCA, MNUC, PARM, TRGY, KN

SUBJECT: STATEMENT OF KANG SOK JU, FIRST VICE-MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE DPRK AND HEAD OF DPRK DELEGATION TO DPRK-USA TALKS

THE UNITED STATES CAME OUT TO THE DPRK-US TALKS BECAUSE

IT RECOGNIZED THAT IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO RETURN US TO THE TREATY WITHOUT A CHANGE IN ITS NUCLEAR THREAT AND HOSTILE POLICY TOWARD KOREA AND THE DPRK-QUINT STATEMENT WAS PUBLISHED AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND.

THEREFORE, THE UNITED STATES WHICH HAS PUT INTO PRACTICE NONE OF ITS COMMITMENT TO US HAS NO FACE TO DEMAND US POINT-BLANK TO RETURN TO THE TREATY.

THIS IS WHY THE UNITED STATES, CRAFTILY ENOUGH, IS SEEKING OUR SUBSTANTIAL RETURN TO THE TREATY BY REALIZING INSPECTION EQUIVALENT TO THE FULL COMPLIANCE WITH SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT UNDER THE CLOAK "CONTINUITY OF SAFEGUARDS", AVOIDING THE WORDS OF RETURN TO THE TREATY OUTWARDLY.

N THIS INCREASES THE SUSPICION THAT THE UNITED STATES HAD INTENDED TO COAX US WITH AN EMPTY TALK INTO RETURN TO THE TREATY, NOT COMPLETELY GIVING UP NUCLEAR THREAT TO OUR COUNTRY AND HOSTILE POLICY OF STIFLING IT FROM THE FIRST.

UNDER THE SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH WE UNILATERALLY AND TEMPORARILY SUSPENDED THE EFFECTUATION OF OUR WITHDRAWAL FROM THE TREATY, THERE MUST BE A CLEAR DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE GUARANTEE OF CONTINUITY OF SAFEGUARDS AND FULL COMPLIANCE WITH THE SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT.

THE FULL COMPLIANCE WITH THE SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT MUST, IN ANY CASE, BE DEBATED AND SOLVED IN DIRECT LINKS WITH THE ABANDONMENT OF THE NUCLEAR THREAT AND HOSTILE POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES THROUGH FUTURE DPRK-US TALKS.

THE NUCLEAR PROBLEM CANNOT BE SOLVED ANY TIME IF THEY TRY TO DELIBERATELY ATTRIBUTE OUR NUCLEAR PROBLEM TO SUCH TECHNICAL AND WORKING RULES AS THE SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT UNDER THE PRESENT SITUATION IN WHICH THE

POLITICAL FACTORS OF OUR WITHDRAWAL FROM THE TREATY STILL REMAIN.

IN A NUTSHELL, THE PURPOSE OF THE UNITED STATES IN DEMANDING ONLY OUR COMPLIANCE WITH THE SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT AT THE PRESENT JUNCTURE, ITSELF NOT MOVING UT ALL, CANNOT BE CONSTRUED OTHERWISE THAN TO INVENT A PRETEXT OF SANCTIONS AND PRESSURE ON US BY RENDERING THE SITUATION COMPLICATED, NOT TO SETTLE THE NUCLEAR PROBLEM IN ACTUALITY.

WE MAKE IT CLEAR ONCE AGAIN THAT WE CANNOT FULLY COMPLY WITH THE SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT UNLESS THE UNITED STATES GUARANTEES IN DEED THAT IT WOULD NOT TRY TO STIFLE OUR SYSTEM.

THE NUCLEAR PROBLEM ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA CAN NEVER BE SOLVED THROUGH PRESSURE. ONLY THROUGH DIALOGUE AND NEGOTIATION CAN IT BE SOLVED.

WE ROPOSED TO THE US SIDE THE FORMULA OF PACKAGE SOLUTION OF NUCLEAR PROBLEM PROCEEDING FROM THE JUDGEMENT THAT THE MAJOR CAUSE OF NO PROGRESS IN THE SOLUTION OF THE NUCLEAR PROBLEM LIES IN THE LACK OF TRUST BETWEEN THE DPRK AND THE UNITED STATES.

IF THE THING IS TO GO WELL, THE QUESTIONS SHOULD BE SETTLED ONE BY ONE WITH THE UNITED STATES, THE

SAILANT, MOVING FIRST AND US, THE SUFFERER, RESPONDING.

BUT THE UNITED STATES, CONTRARY TO ITS POSITION, IS NOW TELLING US TO MOVE FIRST. THIS IS TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE.

WE INSIST ON THE FORMULA OF PACKAGE SOLUTION WHEREBY THE SIDES SHOULD AT LEAST DEFINE THEIR WORK AND EACH SIDE SHOULD DO ITS SHARE.

IF THE DPRK-US TALKS OF THIRD-STAGE ARE HELD AND AN AGREEMENT IS REACHED ON THE FORMULA OF PACKAGE SOLUTION THERE, A DEFINITE PROSPECT FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF THE NUCLEAR PROBLEM WILL BE OPENED.

THE NUCLEAR PROBLEM WILL BE SOLVED SMOOTHLY WHEN, AN AGREEMENT IS REACHED ON THE FORMULA OF PACKAGE SOLUTION AND THE UNITED STATES TAKE A PRACTICAL ACTION OF RENOUNCING THE NUCLEAR THREAT AND HOSTILE POLICY AGAINST US ACCORDING TO IT AND WE FULLY COMPLY WITH THE UNCLAS SECTION 04 OF 04 USVIENNA 003295 FROM USMISSION UNVIE

E.O. 12356: DECL:N/A

TAGS: IAEA, AORC, ENRG, KNNPJK KSCA, MNUC, PARM, TRGY, KN
SUBJECT: STATEMENT OF KANG SOK JU, FIRST VICE-MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE DPRK AND HEAD OF DPRK DELEGATION TO DPRK-USA TALKS

SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT, REMAINING COMMITTED TO THE TREATY.

THERE IS NO CHANGE IN OUR STAND TO FULLY ENSURE THE CONTINUITY OF SAFEGUARDS UNTIL AN AGREEMENT IS REACHED ON THE FORMULA OF PACKAGE SOLUTION.

NOW THE MATTER DEPENDS ON HOW THE UNITED STATES RESPONDS TO OUR PROPOSAL FOR A PACKAGE SOLUTION, RENOUNCING ITS HOSTILE POLICY OF STIFLING THE DPRK.

THE FORMULA WILL BE A TOUCHSTONE SHOWING WHETHER OR
NOT THE UNITED STATES TRUPY HAS THE WILL
TO SOLVE THE
NUCLEAR PROBLEM AND THE WILL FOR DIALOGUE.

IF THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT SHOW A POSITIVE
RESPONSE TO OUR PROPOSAL, WE WILL HAVE NO ALTERNATIVE
BUT TO CONSIDER THAT THE US SIDE HAS NO WILL FOR A
GENUINE DIALOGUE FOR THE SOLUTION OF THE NKCLEAR
PROBLEM.

IF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY IGNORES
OUR SINCERE PROPOSAL FOR NEGOTIATION TO ENSURE THE
CONTINUITY OF SAFEGUARDS AND DISTORTS THE FACT AS IF
THE CONTINUITY OF SAFEGUARDS IN THE DPRK HAS BEEN
BROKEN, IT WOULD BE CONSIDERED TO BE A SIGNAL URGING
THE DPRK TO QUIT THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY PROMPTLY.

THE BALL IS IN THE COURT OF THE UNITED STATES AND
THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY.

END TEXT.

BECKER

NNNN

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 04

<SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 04

CT>SECTION: 03 OF 04

CT>SECTION: 04 OF 04

information by the ministry of atomic energy
of the democratic peoples republic of korea
on maintaining the continuity of the iaea
safeguards in the dprk

pyongyang december 1, 1993

the ministry of atomic energy of the DPRK issued an information
on the problems raised in ensuring the continuity of the safeg-
uards of its nuclear activities in order to give correct
understanding.

1. we made sincere efforts for maintaining the continuity of
the safeguards data.

0 In july and august this year, we received the 7th and 8th
IAEA inspection teams for maintenance of containment and
surveillance systems in accordance with the agency's
request and the agreement reached at the DPRK-US talks.

0 In the telexes to the IAEA of 13 and 22 september this
year, we made clear our position that we would at any
time receive the 9th IAEA inspection team for maintaining
the containment and surveillance systems.
such a position was reiterated in the telexes to the
agency of 28 and 31 october this year too, after the 37th
regular session of the IAEA general conference.

0 we also made clear our position in the telexes to the
IAEA of 10 november that, if the agency would send the
inspection team for maintenance of containment and
surveillance systems to the DPRK,

we may discuss the outstanding safeguards issue with the team on that occasion.

0 however, the agency's secretariat has not yet sent to the DPRK its inspection team for maintenance of containment and surveillance systems, turning away its face from our sincere proposal for ensuring the continuity of the safeguards data.

0 in the light of the above, if the safeguards status and data would be deteriorated, we think the responsibility would lie with the agency's secretariat.

3 our nuclear facilities are under the agency's strict containment and surveillance.

0 at present, more than 40 seals as containment measure, and 6 sets of video surveillance systems, spent fuel rod counter system, and 3 TLDs as surveillance measure have been installed in our nuclear facilities. these containment and surveillance systems complement and complete each other, twice or thrice. this shows that the strict system of containment and surveillance has been established by the agency in our existing nuclear facilities. at present, the containment and surveillance systems installed by the agency remain untouched.

0 therefore, even though some video surveillance systems run out the reactor core and inlets/outlets for nuclear material flow channels in the experimental NPP (KDE-) and ion exchange process and other main processes in the radiochemical laboratory (KDF-) are fully frozen by containment and surveillance systems of the IAEA. in particular, there are more containment and

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P. 07

surveillance systems than necessary in our nuclear facilities, in view of the specific nature of our nuclear facilities and present construction status of the radiochemical laboratory.

o in the light of the above, it is clear that the continuity of the safeguards has been maintained in our nuclear facilities.

3 the arguments by some officials of the IAEA secretariat that the continuity of the safeguards is "deteriorated" are unreasonable.

o the IAEA secretariat also recognized in the telex to us of 16 april this year the fact that, if "the maintenance and replacement" of "certain safeguards equipment" are permitted, the validity of "the safeguards-related data" will not be lost.

in particular, some officials of the IAEA secretariat too, said on several occasions that it could not be concluded that the continuity of the safeguards had been lost in the DPRK.

o from the viewpoint of the safeguards techniques, if containment and surveillance systems are installed and maintained in nuclear facilities, nuclear material is fully frozen and nuclear material movements are controlled. in particular, since containment and surveillance measures complement and complete each other, the continuity of the safeguards is maintained although one of them temporarily is in insufficient status. as a result, this shows that the continuity of the safeguards related data in our actual situation will be fully maintained by only conducting the inspections for maintenance of containment and surveillance systems.

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P.00

0 speaking of the agency's request for our full acceptance of routine and ad hoc inspections for ensuring the continuity of safeguards data, it is the same request as that we are to fully implement the NPT.

there should be a clear distinction between full implementation of the safeguards agreement and the problem for ensuring the continuity of safeguards data in the current special situation in which we unilaterally have suspended the effectuation of our withdrawal from the NPT.

even though physical inventory verification of nuclear material for the time being is delayed in other facilities having non-weapon grade material, except the KDE and KDF which are under the agency's containment and surveillance it is too natural that nobody can have suspicion that the non-weapon grade material would be diverted to military activity for so-called "manufacture of nuclear weapons," in particular, in the middle of last August, just after the 8th inspection, the IAEA secretariat side stated that there is no ground that the nuclear material has been diverted for non-peaceful purposes in the DORR.

this shows clearly that the argument by some officials of the IAEA secretariat is unreasonable that it is hard to assure non-diversion of our nuclear material to the military purpose.

4 our position to fully ensure the continuity of safeguards remains unchanged.

0 if the IAEA secretariat sincerely has its position to ensure the continuity of safeguards, they will have to respond positively to our proposal that the inspection for maintenance of containment and surveillance systems will be permitted.

0 the IAEA inspection activity for maintenance of containment and surveillance systems is adequate to the created current

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special situation in ensuring the continuity of safeguards in the DPRK.

0 whether or not the safeguards status and data will continue to be maintained without deterioration totally depends on the attitude of the agency's secretariat.

0 the agency's secretariat side has requested us to fully accept routine and ad hoc inspections instead of conducting the inspection for maintenance of containment and surveillance systems, which is fully suitable to the current special situation.

this shows that some officials of the IAEA secretariat continue to join hostile forces in the plot of stifling our socialist system.

* 0 speaking of the issue of the routine and ad hoc inspections the agency insists on, it will be resolved one by one if the further DPRK-US high-level talks will make a progress and if the further consultations with the agency will be held.

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This marker identifies the place of a tabbed divider. Given our digitization capabilities, we are sometimes unable to adequately scan such dividers. The title from the original document is indicated below.

TAB X

Divider Title: _____

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
014. report	re North Korea (33 pages)	11/00/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)
OA/Box Number: 281

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea, 1993-95 [10]

2009-0528-F
kc1541

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]