

# FOIA MARKER

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**Folder Title:**

Aoki Notes [G-7, North Korea] [2]

**Staff Office-Individual:**

Nonproliferation and Export Controls-Aoki, Steven

**Original OA/ID Number:**

711

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# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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| DOCUMENT NO.<br>AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE                    | DATE       | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------|----------------------------------|------------|-------------|
| 001. talking points      | re Intro/G-7 role (7 pages)      | 00/00/1992 | P1/b(1)     |
| 002. paper               | re nonproliferation (10 pages)   | 00/00/1993 | P1/b(1)     |
| 003. talking points      | re G-7 experts meeting (5 pages) | 06/21/1993 | P1/b(1)     |
| 004. talking points      | re UN inspections (2 pages)      | 06/21/1993 | P1/b(1)     |
| 005. note                | re G-7 discussion (1 page)       | 06/00/1993 | P1/b(1)     |

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)  
OA/Box Number: 711

### FOLDER TITLE:

Aoki Notes [G-7, North Korea] [2]

2009-0528-F  
ke1602

### RESTRICTION CODES

#### Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]  
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P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]  
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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Annotated agenda for the meeting of the G7  
Working Group on Export Controls

25 June 1993

1. Exchange of information on countries of concern

- (1) Information exchange concerning export control policies toward Iran, Iraq, Libya and North Korea.
- (2) Discussion on the modality of information exchange concerning approvals and denials of individual export cases towards these countries.

2. Review of the work of the Experts' Group on Lists

- (1) After the review the Experts Group may be instructed to further its consideration of items for control.
- (2) The Experts Group may also be instructed to consider the question of the distinction between civilian and military end-use and be engaged in the information exchange to identify end-users and projects of concern.

3. Cooperation of other supplier countries

The G7 should discuss the cooperation of other supplier countries including China and Russia with regard to the export control policies towards countries of concern.

4. Issue concerning international non-proliferation export control regime

The WG may take advantage of its meetings to conduct an informal and preliminary exchange of views concerning the issues, including the following points.

- (1) Coordination of the lists of controlled items among the international export control regimes.
- (2) Need for guidelines in each export control regime for the implementation of export controls (including "catch-all" controls).
- (3) Coordination of approaches to gain the participation/cooperation of other supplier countries in various international export control regimes.

5. Other issues

(NON-PAPER)

Future Directions regarding  
Non-Proliferation Export Control Regimes

The GOJ is currently proposing to add a new agenda for further G7 Working Group Meetings, i.e. "Issues concerning international non-proliferation export control regimes (see attached paper)", to the main agenda concerning export controls on dual-use items related to conventional weapons. The background of the proposal is as follows:

1. The existing export control regimes on non-proliferation of WMDs and missiles should remain as a basis for considering measures to strengthen export controls within each field of non-proliferation of WMDs and missiles (such as the proposals being made at the Australia Group by Japan on the Arrangement for effective licensing procedures). This approach would ensure better harmonization of export control measures among member countries within each of the non-proliferation field.
2. In parallel with continued efforts by each non-proliferation regime to further strengthen the effectiveness of control within each field as mentioned above, a comprehensive discussion among the existing regimes should be made at the same time, bearing in mind the common nature of export controls on dual use items, through which an enhancement of similarities among these regimes could be achieved. Although the GOJ recognizes the existing differences among the regimes due to historical backgrounds and other specific circumstances surrounding each regime (eg. role of IAEA in the NSG guidelines), it would not reduce the necessity to make efforts to enhance similarities among the regimes with regard to the rules of implementing export controls. In this context, it would also be desirable that approaches to non-member countries be performed on a coordinated basis among the regimes rather than on a regime by regime basis which would be effective for the comprehensive understanding by the non-member countries approached regarding export controls in the field of non-proliferation.
3. The GOJ does not intend at present to realize a consolidation of regimes, though not excluding its possibility as a long-term aim, but to enhance efforts towards better harmonization of the regimes, in terms of practicality. Since there are no appropriate fora at present to discuss issues covering the overall existing regimes, the GOJ pro-

ANNOTATED DRAFT AGENDA FOR THE NEXT MEETING OF THE G7  
WORKING GROUP ON EXPORT CONTROLS

June 1993

1. Exchange of information on countries of concern

- (1) Information exchange concerning export control policies towards Iran, Iraq, Libya and North Korea
- (2) Discussion on the modality of information exchange concerning approvals and denials of individual export cases towards these countries

2. Review of the work of the Experts' Group on Lists

- (1) After the review the Experts' Group may be instructed to further its consideration of items for control.
- (2) The Experts' Group may also be instructed to consider the question of the distinction between civilian and military end-use and be engaged in the information exchange to identify end-users and projects of concern.

3. Cooperation of other supplier countries

The G7 should discuss the cooperation of other supplier countries including China and Russia with regard to the export control policies towards countries of concern.

4. Issues concerning international non-proliferation export control regimes

The WG may take advantage of its meetings to conduct an informal and preliminary exchange of views concerning the issues, including the following points:

- (1) Coordination of the lists of controlled items among the international export control regimes;
- (2) Need for guidelines in each export control regime for the implementation of export controls (including "catch-all" controls);
- (3) Coordination of approaches to gain the participation / cooperation of other supplier countries in various international export control regimes.

5. Other issues

poses that the issue should be discussed at the G7 Working Group.

4. The G7 Working Group will be characterized as a forum to discuss, in a flexible and informal manner, policy coordinations with respect to the overall export control policies on non-proliferation related to WMDs, missiles and conventional weapons .

Reaching consensus at the respective regimes would properly be indispensable before concrete actions take place. The G7 Working Group will function as a fora for prior exchanges of views which would enable the G7 countries to gain common understandings and facilitate such consensus to be reached.



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

June 18, 1993

TO: CIA - Rick Yannuzzi  
JCS - Steven Boyce  
DOC - Bill Clements  
DOD - Bob Joseph  
ADCA - Joe Smaldone  
PM/PRO - Vann Van Diepen  
T/ST - Steve Saboe  
NEA/RA - Libby Ward (5252A)  
S/CT - Ronald Schlicher (2705)  
INR/SPA/ATD - Nancy May (6526)

FROM: ITC - Chris Hankin

SUBJECT: Pre-briefing on G-7 Working Group Meeting in Tokyo

Japan has scheduled a meeting of the G-7 Working Group on Export Controls to be held on June 25, in Tokyo. Attached is the draft agenda and some associated papers we've received just recently from Japan and the UK.

I'd like to get together on Monday, June 21, at 2:00 in Room 5531, Main State, to talk about where we currently are in the G-7 export controls exercise and what we'd like to accomplish at the June 25 meeting.

Attachments: (1) Annotated draft agenda  
(2) Abe to Hankin letter dated June 18  
(3) Abe to Hankin letter dated June 16  
(4) UK comments on draft agenda

cc: E:Eric Melby (7256)  
T:William Lowell (7210)

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Annotated draft agenda for the next meeting of the G7  
Working Group on Export Controls

June 1993

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- (1) Information exchange concerning export control policies towards Iran, Iraq, Libya and North Korea
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- (3) Coordination of approaches to gain the

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participation/cooperation of other supplier countries in  
various international export control regimes

5. Other issues

(3)

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**EMBASSY OF JAPAN**

2620 MASSACHUSETTS AVENUE, N.W.  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20008  
(202) 939-6700

June 18, 1993

Mr. Christopher G. Hankin

DRS

ITC/EBR

DDS (647-3205)

Dear Mr. Hankin,

I have the honor to transmit a letter from Mr. Abe  
regarding the new dates for G7WG.

Allow me to extend my warmest regards.

Respectfully yours.



Shigeo Matsutomi  
Embassy of Japan

GM1841

Nobuyasu Abe  
Deputy Director-General  
Economic Affairs Bureau  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
Tokyo, Japan

18 June 1993

Dear Colleagues,

Subsequent to my letter of 13 May, I would now like to propose to convene a meeting of the G7 working group on export controls on 25 June. Our contacts so far revealed that there is no date that is suitable for every member of the G7 working group but since the date of June 25 seems to be the only chance left if we are to convene a meeting before the Tokyo Summit, I very much would like to have you make all your efforts to come to join the meeting. I regret that my proposal is being presented at such short notice.


The schedule and other details of the meeting is set out below. Please let me know if the date of the meeting is acceptable and if so who will attend the meeting at your earliest convenience. For Japan, I have asked Mr. Kazuo Ogura, Director-General of the Economic Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to chair the meeting.

Venue: Hotel "The Manhattan" , "Lunar" Room  
2-10-1 Hibino, Mihama ward, Chiba 260  
(tel. 043-275-1111)

Schedule: (1) 24 June informal dinner (planned)  
(2) 25 June 10:00 - 12:00 morning session  
12:00 - 14:00 working luncheon  
14:30 - 16:30 afternoon session

I appreciate your patience and cooperation and look forward to seeing you soon.

Sincerely yours,



**EMBASSY OF JAPAN**

2520 MASSACHUSETTS AVENUE, N.W.  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20008  
(202) 939-6700

**June 16, 1993**

**Mr. Christopher G. Hankin**  
**DRS**  
**ITC/EBR**  
**DO5 (647-3205)**

**Dear Mr. Hankin,**

I have the honor to transmit, upon an instruction from Tokyo, an annotation on the agenda item 4. In our proposed agenda for the coming G7 Working Group. Please take a close look and if you have any comment, please let me know.

Allow me to extend my warmest regards.

Respectfully yours.



**Shigeo Matsutomi**  
**Embassy of Japan**

FUTURE DIRECTIONS REGARDING  
NON-PROLIFERATION EXPORT CONTROL REGIMES

The GOJ is currently proposing a new agenda for G7 Working Group Meeting, i.e. "Issues concerning international non-proliferation export control regimes," to the main agenda concerning export controls on dual-use items related to conventional weapons. The background of the proposal is as follows:

1. The existing export control regimes on non-proliferation of WMDs and missiles should remain as a basis for considering measures to strengthen export controls with respect to each field of non-proliferation of WMDs and missiles (such as the proposals being made at the Australia Group by Japan on the Arrangement for effective licensing procedures). This approach seeks better harmonization of export control measures among member countries with respect to each non-proliferation field.

2. In parallel with continued efforts on the existing non-proliferation regimes to further strengthen the effectiveness of control as mentioned above, an informal and non-committal discussion would be both timely and useful in view of the common nature of export controls on dual-use items. Although the GOJ recognizes the existing differences among the existing regimes due to historical backgrounds and other specific circumstances surrounding each regime (eg. role of IAEA in the NSG guidelines), it would not reduce the necessity to coordinate the regimes from the standpoint of effective export controls.

In this context, it would also be desirable that approaches to non-member countries be performed on a coordinated basis among the regimes rather than on a regime by regime basis which would be effective for a comprehensive understanding by the non-member countries approached regarding export controls in the field of non-proliferation.

3. The GOJ does not intend to realize a consolidation of regimes through this discussion, but to enhance efforts towards better coordination for the sake of effective export controls.

Since there are no appropriate fora at present to discuss issues covering the overall existing regimes, the GOJ believes it would be useful to take advantage of the opportunity of the G7 Working Group to engage in a very informal and preliminary exchange of views on this important subject. It is not intended to change the informal and confidential character of the Working Group, nor to come up with any concrete agreement as a result of exchange of the exchange of views. Rather, it is hoped that our exchange of views would contribute to decision making in each export control regime for the sake of more effective export controls.

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## G7 meetings on Non Proliferation / Dual-Use

letter Donnelly to British Embassy, Tokyo

3. I have also asked the Japanese Embassy in London to feed in two suggestions for the agenda of the meeting. The first is that we should discuss, perhaps under Item II of the draft agenda (attached) the effectiveness of the three non-proliferation export control regimes, i.e., the Nuclear Suppliers' Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime and the Australia Group. I have also suggested that there is no need to discuss, on this occasion, the dismantling of nuclear weapons since it will be discussed by genuine experts on this subject on 1 July in Brussels. It would be helpful if you could convey the same information to Mr Konishi in the MFA who will be heading the Japanese delegation.

4. In parallel, but with seemingly little coordination, the economic side of the MFA are proposing that the much delayed meeting of G7 experts on dual-use goods should take place on either 25 June 1 or 2 July. The suggestion of 25 June is mine and is obviously intended to minimise my travelling to and from Tokyo. I believe it is supported by the Americans. I have told the Japanese here that 1 or 2 July are both very difficult and if 25 June is unacceptable then I would prefer the meeting to be put back until after the Summit. The proposed Japanese

agenda for this meeting (also attached) continues to include an item on the work of the non-proliferation export control regimes. Again we have told the Japanese in London (and I also spoke to Kunikida in Paris last week) that I do not think this is appropriate. The dual-use meeting should confine itself to dual-use items related to conventional weapons capability. Other non-proliferation regimes are more appropriately dealt with by the non-proliferation experts on 24 June. I think this view is likely to be shared by the French and Americans. Once more it would be helpful if you could inject these thoughts into the appropriate quarter of the Japanese machine.

cc Bob Einhorn, PM  
Chris Hankin, EB

- Brian Donnelly has asked that we let you know what we have been saying to the Japanese on the 2 G7 meetings.

Ewen Buchanan  
British Embassy.

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
TOKYO, JAPAN

Confidential

June 15, 1993

Dear Colleagues,

On the basis of discussions during the last Political Director's meeting in Kyoto and subsequent informal contacts, I should like to organize a very informal meeting of G-7 non-proliferation experts in conjunction with the upcoming Political Directors' meeting. Each of G-7 members is requested to send a representative or representatives to this meeting.

The meeting will take place at the Manhattan Hotel in Chiba, the venue for Political Directors' meeting, on June 24. It will start at noon with a working lunch, and continue until the evening. The tentative schedule and agenda are as attached. The content of the consultations will not be made public.

I anticipate that G-7 experts on non-proliferation will discuss topics of particular relevance for consideration by the Political Directors, and exchange views on how G-7 could work closely and effectively in this field. I plan to have the chair of the meeting report the result of the discussions to the Political Directors during the morning session of June 25.

I would appreciate it if you could kindly inform me of the names and titles of your experts (maximum up to three persons) and their arrival and departure schedule. As for Japan, Mr. Masaki Konishi, Deputy Director-General of the United Nations Bureau, MOFA, will head the delegation. I would also welcome your comment and suggestion on how we organize the meeting.

Sincerely,

/S/

Kunihiko Saito  
Deputy Minister  
for Foreign Affairs



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G-7 Informal Consultations on Non-Proliferation  
(Tentative Schedule and Agenda)

June 24 (Thursday)

12:00-14:00  
(Working Lunch)

1. Organization of work
2. Overview of non-proliferation issues

14:00-18:00

3. 1995 NPT extension
4. Regional Concerns
  - The former Soviet Union:
    - o Dismantling of nuclear weapons
    - o Ukraine/Kazakhstan problem
  - North Korea
  - China
  - Middle East
  - South Asia
5. Conventional Arms Transfers
6. Others

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## **AUSTRALIA GROUP**

AG/Jun93/NM/J/1  
Australia Group Doc

### **Japanese paper: CO-ORDINATION OF APPROACHES TO NON MEMBER COUNTRIES AMONG NON PROLIFERATION REGIMES**

#### **I. Background**

1. Reflecting the co-existence of independent international export control regimes for various kinds of weapons of mass destruction as well as their delivery vehicles (i.e. MTCR, NSG and AG), approaches to third countries in connection with these regimes are basically being undertaken on a regime-by-regime basis.

2. However, the possibility to undertake co-ordinated approaches to third countries by multiple export control regimes could be explored in case the third country concerned happens to be approached in connection with more than one export control regime for the following reasons:

a. while recognising that each regime deals with a different kind of weapon or delivery vehicle, there are also common elements in the approaches to the third countries, namely, the establishment of effective export controls and general commitment to non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction;

b. from the viewpoint of the third countries being approached, a co-ordinated approach by international export control regimes would contribute to enhancing their understanding on overall export controls in the field of non-proliferation;

c. time, financial resources and manpower would be conserved for both the approaching countries and the third countries being approached.

3. The Government of Japan, however, does not intend to mechanically undertake a perfectly co-ordinated approach but instead considers that various factors such as characteristics of each regime and third countries to be approached should be taken into account on a case-by-case basis when undertaking co-ordinated approaches.

## II. Concrete action

The Government of Japan would like to propose the co-ordination of various export control regimes regarding approaches to third countries through the following process:

1. The representatives (e.g. point of contact) of the MTCR, NSG and AG will exchange information intersessionally on the following points, and the result of this information exchange will be then be reported to the respective regimes
  - a. third countries which are candidates for approaches to encourage either the participation in the regimes or the implementation of export control in accordance with the regimes
  - b. the comparison of criteria for admitting new members.
2. If it is judged, as a result of the above information exchange, that an approach to a particular third country to encourage its participation in (or adherence to) more than one regime is appropriate, a joint inter-regime approach to the third country could be considered

Papers for 6-7 Nonproliferation  
Discussions  
June 24-25 1993

Iran

ACME (cable)

N. Korea

ACRS

South Asia

UNSCOM/Iraq

FSU Dismantlement (2 papers)

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- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

#### Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]



## G7 Informal Consultations on Non-Proliferation ( Schedule and Agenda )

June 24 ( Thursday )

12:00 ~13:45      Working Lunch    1. Organization of work  
( Room 708, Manhattan Hotel )    2. Overview of non-proliferation issues

13:45 ~ 14:00 Break

14:00 ~16:00

( Room Luna, Manhattan Hotel )

3. 1995 NPT extension
4. Regional Concerns
  - The former Soviet Union
    - Dismantling of nuclear weapons
    - Ukraine/Kazakhstan problems
  - North Korea

16:00 ~ 16:15      coffee break

16:15 ~18:00  
( Room Luna )

- China
- Middle East
- South Asia

5. Conventional Arms Transfers

6. Others

19:00 ~21:00 Dinner hosted by Mr. Masaki Konishi, Deputy Director-General of  
the United Nations Bureau, MOFA  
( Sky Banquet 6, Prince Hotel 46F )

# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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| 005. note                | re G-7 discussion (1 page) | 06/00/1993 | P1/b(1)     |

### COLLECTION:

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Steven Aoki (Nonproliferation and Export Controls)  
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Aoki Notes [G-7, North Korea] [2]

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

#### Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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G7 Meetings on Non Proliferation / Dual-Use

letter Donnelly to British Embassy, Tokyo

<sup>Non-Prol</sup>  
3. I have also asked the Japanese Embassy in London to feed in two suggestions for the agenda of the meeting. The first is that we should discuss, perhaps under Item II of the draft agenda (attached) the effectiveness of the three non-proliferation export control regimes, ie., the Nuclear Suppliers' Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime and the Australia Group. I have also suggested that there is no need to discuss, on this occasion, the dismantling of nuclear weapons since it will be discussed by genuine experts on this subject on 1 July in Brussels. It would be helpful if you could convey the same information to Mr Konishi in the MFA who will be heading the Japanese delegation.

4. In parallel, but with seemingly little coordination, the economic side of the MFA are proposing that the much delayed meeting of G7 experts on dual-use goods should take place on either 25 June 1 or 2 July. The suggestion of 25 June is mine and is obviously intended to minimise my travelling to and from Tokyo. I believe it is supported by the Americans. I have told the Japanese here that 1 or 2 July are both very difficult and if 25 June is unacceptable then I would prefer the meeting to be put back until after the Summit. The proposed Japanese

agenda for this meeting (also attached) continues to include an item on the work of the non-proliferation export control regimes. Again we have told the Japanese in London (and I also spoke to Kunikata in Paris last week) that I do not think this is appropriate. The dual-use meeting should confine itself to dual-use items related to conventional weapons capability. Other non-proliferation regimes are more appropriately dealt with by the non-proliferation experts on 24 June. I think this view is likely to be shared by the French and Americans. Once more it would be helpful if you could inject these thoughts into the appropriate quarter of the Japanese machine.

cc Bob Einhorn , PM  
Chris Hankin , EB

Brian Donnelly has asked that we let you know what we have been saying to the Japanese on the 2 G7 meetings.

Ewen Buchanan  
British Embassy.

**G 7 Working Group on Export Controls  
Experts' Meeting  
in Bonn on 11 May 1993**

Minutes

At their second meeting in Bonn on 11 May 1993, the experts proceeded in accordance with the provisional agenda discussing proposals on additional items to be controlled and holding an exchange of information about sensitive countries and end users.

1. Review of control lists

- a) Most of the delegations were of the opinion that selection criteria play an important role in the compilation of the control list and ought to be carefully defined. A working document with possible criteria for the selection of items was drawn up (annex). There was agreement that the working document should be examined by all sides and serve as the basis for further discussion.
- b) Some delegations introduced proposals for an additional control list. The Japanese delegation also proposed to delete certain COCOM IL items from the current control lists. It was the view of most delegations that items relating to the WMD field should not be considered. A synopsis of these proposals served the group of experts as the basis for an in-depth discussion of certain items. However, it was not possible to reach a consensus for lack of time for a detailed discussion.

It was agreed that the discussion should be continued on the basis of a revised synopsis. The synopsis is to include the new French and the above-mentioned Japanese proposals.

c) Lack of time made it impossible to discuss a catch-all provision.

2. Exchange of information on sensitive countries, end users, projects of concern

a) Information was exchanged on Iran (introduced by Germany), Libya (introduced by Italy), North Korea (introduced by the USA). Because of the general UN embargo, Iraq was not discussed.

The exchange of information covered each of the aforementioned country's attempts to procure conventional weapons. Typical procurement routes used by countries of concern were discussed as well. Information was exchanged about certain persons or organisations engaged in such procurement efforts and about cross-links and projects involving cooperation with other countries.

The exchange of information was regarded as useful. There was agreement that the exchange should focus on sensitive countries' conventional weapons programmes and not duplicate the work of other bodies.

b) Germany presented its knowledge of the procurement efforts made by Syria which have caused the adoption of a national arrangement to tighten export controls on Syria (going beyond the agreed international control lists).

c) There was no time to discuss whether it would be useful to share information (on a voluntary basis) about denials of applications for export licences.

List of possible criteria  
for selecting items on the control list

- significant contribution to the indigenous development,  
production or enhancement of conventional military capabilities
- foreign availability
- controllability
- objective specification of controlled items
- assessment of the threat to the regional security

List  
of Participants of the G7 Working Group  
on Exports Controls

1993.6.25.

Canada

|             |                                                                                       |
|-------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| D.E. Hobson | Director General, Export<br>and Import Permits Bureau,<br>Ministry of Foreign Affairs |
| T. Jones    | Deputy Director,<br>Export Controls Division,<br>Ministry of Foreign Affairs          |

European Communities

|                   |                                                                  |
|-------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Pierre Del Grande | Minister-Counsellor, Delegation<br>of the EC Commission to Japan |
|-------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------|

France

|                |                                                                                           |
|----------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Phillipe Carré | Deputy Director, Economic and<br>Financial Affairs Bureau,<br>Ministry of Foreign Affairs |
| Jean Laborde   | General Delegation for the<br>Armament, Ministry of Defense                               |

Germany

|                  |                                                                        |
|------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Werner Hachmeier | Head of Division,<br>Export Controls,<br>Federal Ministry of Economics |
| Harald Löschner  | Head of Division,<br>Export Controls,<br>Federal Foreign Office        |

Italy

|                     |                             |
|---------------------|-----------------------------|
| Emilio De Stefanis  | Ministry of Foreign Affairs |
| Mario Fugazzola     | Ministry of Foreign Affairs |
| Rossella Piacentini | Prime Minister's Office     |

Japan

|                   |                                                                                                       |
|-------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Kazuo Ogura       | Director-General,<br>Economic Affairs Bureau,<br>Ministry of Foreign Affairs                          |
| Nobuyasu Abe      | Deputy Director-General,<br>Economic Affairs Bureau,<br>Ministry of Foreign Affairs                   |
| Toshio Kunikata   | Director of<br>Economic Security Division,<br>Economic Affairs Bureau,<br>Ministry of Foreign Affairs |
| Masahiko Hosokawa | Director of<br>Security Export Control Office,<br>Ministry of International Trade<br>and Industry     |

United Kingdom

|                |                                                                                         |
|----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Brian Donnelly | Head of Non-Proliferation<br>and Defence Department,<br>Foreign and Commonwealth Office |
| Ian McDonald   | Ministry of Defense                                                                     |

United States

|                    |                                                                                                                      |
|--------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Christopher Hankin | Deputy Assistant Secretary,<br>International Trade Control,<br>Economic and Business Affairs,<br>Department of State |
| Steve Aoki         | Director,<br>International Economic Affairs,<br>National Security Council/<br>National Economic Council              |
| James Gibney       | Second Secretary and Vice<br>Consul, Embassy of the United<br>States of America                                      |