

FOIA MARKER

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Folder Title:

North Korea- Food [1996-98] [2]

Staff Office-Individual:

Multilateral & Humanitarian Affairs-Smith, Peter

Original OA/ID Number:

2253

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41	1	4	2	V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. note	Todd Stern to POTUS re emergency food package (1 page)	06/06/1996	P1/b(1)
001b. memo	action, Anthony Lake to POTUS re North Korea Food Situation (3 pages)	06/05/1996	P1/b(1)
001c. notes	re Summary of Conclusions of NSC Principals' Committee Meeting (2 pages)	05/28/1996	P1/b(1)
002. cable	re North Korea's Intensifying Food Crisis (8 pages)	08/13/1996	P1/b(1)
003. report	re international issues (10 pages)	08/21/1996	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Peter Smith (Multilateral & Humanitarian Affairs)
OA/Box Number: 2253

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea-Food [1996-98] [2]

2009-0528-F

kc1523

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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05/23/96 THU 14:49 FAX 212 963 8019

WFP NORTH AMERICA

001



**World Food
Programme**

The Food Aid Organization

OPTIONAL FORM 99 (7-90)

FAX TRANSMITTAL

of pages ▶

To <i>Richard Roga</i>	From <i>Ann Kambara</i>
Dept./Agency	Phone #
Fax #	Fax #

برنامج
الأغذية العالمي

NSN 7540-01-317-7368

5009-101

GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION

BY FACSIMILE	
DATE: 23 May 1996	REF. NO.: 3722
TO: Ms Ann M. Kambara Assistant Director for Economic Issues Department of State Washington D.C.	FAX NO.: (202) 647-7388
FROM: Douglas C. Coutts Director WFP North American Office	FAX NO.: (212) 963-8019
Number of pages, including this one: 3	

For your information as discussed.

Regards.



**World Food
Programme**

**Programa
Mundial
de Alimentos**

**Programme
Alimentaire
Mondial**

**برنامج
الغذية
العالمية**

The Executive Director

23 May 1996

**The Hon. Anthony Lake
National Security Council
The White House
Washington D.C., 20500**

Dear Mr. Lake:

The support that the United States of America gave to the World Food Programme's last appeal for food aid for North Korea was critical to our early success in reaching hundreds of thousands of hungry people. Thank you very much for your involvement, your concern and, ultimately, for the decision of the United States Government to support this effort.

As you know, the food shortage problem in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea continues. In fact, there will be less and less food available to the general population, at least until the harvest in October. The need for additional food aid is critical, even more critical than when we made the first alert as many more people are impacted by the food shortage and, as a result, by hunger. We understand that per person rations have decreased from 900 to 500 to currently 250 grams per day.

Again, I would like to appeal to you and to the United States Government for additional humanitarian food assistance for the people of North Korea. The WFP/FAO Special Alert is attached. An emergency appeal based on this Alert will be submitted to donors on 30 May. We have assessed an initial food aid need of approximately 46,000 tons. This would include some 34,000 tons of cereals for about 500,000 flood victims and some 12,000 tons of fortified cereal mix for a similar number of children under five who are the most affected by the reduction of their food entitlement under the Public Distribution System.

We are hoping that other donors in the region might also consider contributing programme food aid to the DPRK. Four hundred thousand tons would be necessary between now and the next harvest in October. WFP would be prepared to help negotiate the targetting of these commodities through the government's Public Distribution System.

J/

2

The food is needed urgently. We would be most appreciative of your immediate consideration. I can assure you that the World Food Programme will continue to monitor the food distribution and to provide full reports of the distribution and the food aid needs of the people. Again, thank you for the earlier contribution of the United States and for your consideration of further support.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Catherine Bertini".

Catherine Bertini

06/10/96

15:05

2026477388

KOREAN AFFAIRS

->>> NSC DEMOCRACY

001/001

VS OFFICE

Monday

06/10/96 03:51 pm Page:

1

Intended For: DISTRIBUTION

This Item is In Progress

Author: Ann M. Kambara

Subject: NK aid (final songsheet)

The final figure for our assistance will be:

13,100 Metric tons TOTAL @ 6.2 Mill USD (\$6,212,500 USD)

3,000 MT Corn meal

3,500 MT CSB

6,600 MT Rice

The CSB contribution will be about 30 % of the 11,800 WFP CSB request.

The corn meal and rice will be about 28 % of the 33,750 WFP cereals request.

We reduced the CSB component because the WFP appeal in that area is less
"flood-related" and somewhat harder to monitor (to country-wide nurseries).

OPTIONAL FORM 99 (7-90)

FAX TRANSMITTAL

of pages ►

To <i>Richard Rign</i>	From <i>Ann Kambara</i>
Direct/Agency <i>Robert Suettinger</i>	Phone #
Fax #	Fax #

NSN 7540-01-317-7366

5099-101

GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION

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001b. memo	action, Anthony Lake to POTUS re North Korea Food Situation (3 pages)	06/05/1996	P1/b(1)

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National Security Council
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001c. notes	re Summary of Conclusions of NSC Principals' Committee Meeting (2 pages)	05/28/1996	P1/b(1)

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Congressional Talking Points on North Korea Food Aid

BACKGROUND

The U.S. Government plans to provide USD 6.2 million of humanitarian assistance to the World Food Program (WFP) for North Korea. This assistance will be financed through PL 480 Title II Emergency Food Aid and is expected to consist of 3,500 tons of corn-soy blend (CSB), 2,400 tons of maize meal and 6,600 tons of rice.

TALKING POINTS

- We would appreciate it if members and staff would treat this briefing with discretion and not disclose any facts to the public pending our final announcement. The ROK has requested that we coordinate closely with them on this issue and so any premature leak could cause the South domestic complications.
- The USG has given serious consideration to the question of further humanitarian assistance to flood victims in North Korea in the wake of the WFP Special Emergency Alert and new WFP/UN DHA appeal.
- We are convinced that the need is real, in part due to flooding last summer and in part to declining per capita food production.
- In providing assistance, we made a specific effort to accommodate concerns that Members and staff expressed during our last tranche of assistance of emergency food aid on the need for careful monitoring of distribution. In response, we sent our own contract food monitor, who has provided Congressional briefings on her findings.
- We also consulted closely with the ROK and Japan, beginning with our trilateral consultations in Cheju, and intensively in the past few days leading up to the June 6 issuance of the UN DHA appeal.
- We understand the ROK will make its own contribution of corn soy blend and powdered milk. The ROK government has asked us to allow it to make its announcement first, and we want to support, not undercut its decision.

- The ROKG has told us it believes that modest responses to the UN appeal by the U.S. and Japan will not undercut leverage with North Korea.
- We understand Japan is also seriously considering a contribution and may be announcing plans in the next few days after consulting with the Japanese legislature.
- Based on need and consultations with the ROK and Japan, the USG plans to provide \$6.2 million of PL 480 Title II Emergency Food Aid to the World Food Program for use in distribution to farmers and rural residents of flood affected areas of North Korea.
- Specifically, the USG plans to provide 3,500 tons of CSB, 2,400 tons of maize meal to the WFP's special feeding program for children under age 5, as well as 6,600 tons of U.S.-origin rice.
- The entire U.S. contribution will be targeted to the rural population with specific focus on farm families
- The USG contribution is modest and targeted. It is humanitarian assistance that represents about one-half of the CSB request and one-third of WFP's emergency food request.
- We anticipate this modest humanitarian assistance will: 1) respond to a humanitarian crisis and help efforts to bring in this year's crop; 2) continue encouraging the DPRK's constructive engagement with the international community; 3) encourage a positive DPRK response to the Four Party Peace Proposal; and 4) keep the World Food Program in place in North Korea.
- We are confident in the WFP's ability to monitor distribution to ensure this assistance reaches the intended recipients. We will work closely with them avoid divergence of food assistance to the North Korean military.
- WFP has told us that they will increase their staff in North Korea and would welcome monitors from NGOs and donor countries. We are actively considering sending USG monitors to help in the distribution of our assistance.
- Our modest humanitarian contribution would be limited to meeting the still-urgent emergency needs generated by last year's flooding. It does not directly address North Korea's long-term structural food problems. Organizations like the

WFP and some NGOs are urging North Korea to undertake real agricultural reform to address these long-term needs.

- As Ms. Lautze, our OFDA contractor and Mr. Coutts of the WFP have made clear in their briefings, we believe that there is no famine yet, but the food situation in North Korea continues to deteriorate alarmingly. Their assessment is consistent with what we have learned from intelligence sources.
- Without international assistance, we believe widespread malnutrition could lead to large-scale outbreaks of disease and serious human suffering before the October harvest. This presents an undesirable and highly unstable scenario that will not advance our political goals on the Korean peninsula.

North Korea -- Food Assistance

Q: Can you confirm stories that the United States will be providing \$6 million in food assistance to North Korea?

A: The World Food Program of the United Nations issued an appeal yesterday for \$43 million in food and other assistance for North Korea to help overcome serious food shortages caused by extensive flooding last year in the DPRK. The United States is reviewing the appeal and other information available on the situation and will announce a decision on humanitarian aid at a suitable time.

Q: What kind of assistance is being considered?

A: The WFP appeal calls for food assistance, land reclamation aid and medical assistance. U.S. legislation prohibits provision of anything but disaster relief assistance. That is what was provided earlier this year. Assistance will be provided out of PL 480, Title II funds, as they are most readily available.

Q: Will food be provided directly to North Korea?

A: Any assistance will be provided to the World Food Program, which has demonstrated an ability to deliver assistance to those in most need.

Q: Is the assistance linked to North Korea's response to the April 16 proposal by President Clinton and President Kim of South Korea for Four-Party peace talks?

A: This is humanitarian assistance to be provided to the World Food Program in response to its appeal on behalf of North Korea.

Obviously, we hope North Korea will respond positively to the proposal. But there is no linkage.

Q: What about South Korea and Japan?

A: We are in consultation with our allies in the region to agree upon a coordinated response to the WFP appeal. We have worked closely with them in the past on issues relating to North Korea and will continue to do so.

Q: Did Congressman Richardson strike a deal with the North for food aid in return for POW-MIA remains recovery?

A: The North Koreans raised their concerns about food assistance with Congressman Richardson during his visit, which was primarily concerned with implementation of the U.S.-DPRK agreement on remains recovery. There were no secret deals.

Q: Aren't the South Koreans suspicious of the reporting about the food crisis and want to limit food assistance until the DPRK comes to the Four-Party talks?

A: Refer to Republic of Korea spokespersons. Given the closed nature of North Korean society, we do not have completely reliable information about the overall food situation there. We consider the WFP appeal to be as carefully derived as possible in the circumstances, and to be based on direct observations made during previous aid deliveries.

Q: Can you guarantee that assistance won't be diverted to the North Korean army?

A: We believe channeling of assistance through the WFP provides the best means of assuring that the aid is delivered to those most in-need, particularly to rural areas still affected by last year's floods. We note that the WFP will increase the number of in-country monitors involved in delivering this tranche of assistance?

Q: Isn't this just propping up -- or appeasing -- a completely discredited and vile government on its last legs? Do you really think this will prevent a North Korean collapse? Why not just let it fall?

A: The WFP appeal is based upon humanitarian concerns for the people of Korea who may face severe malnutrition if external assistance is not made available in the next two or three months. The cooperation of the DPRK government is essential to insure proper distribution of the assistance.

The WFP will be targetting this assistance to farmers and the rural population of areas most heavily damaged during last year's floods. It is not general assistance to the North Korean Government.

Obviously, we have concerns about a broad array of problems and disagreements we have with the North Korean government. It is not our policy, however, to use the suffering of the people of North Korea to bring about a collapse or further weakening of that government.

We hope the North Korean government will respond positively to international goodwill and take steps to ease its isolation.

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 25 MAY 96
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOREA
PL-480

PC
FOOD

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: AGENCY DISCUSSION PAPER FOR 28 MAY PC MTG ON KOREA

ACTION: SENS SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DUE DATE: 28 MAY 96

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: SUETTINGER

LOGREF:

FILES: IFM

NSCP:

CODES: KOR

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FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

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White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

By W NARA, Date 06/15/15

2009-0528-F

COMMENTS: _____

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001	X 96052512 LAKE APPROVED RECOM
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002	X 96052517 SENS SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

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002	960525	BURNS, W	
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002	960525	MCALEER, R	
002	960525	SCHNOOR, K	
002	960525	LAVIN, A	
002	960525	INDERFURTH, R	
002	960525	PANETTA, L	
002	960525	YANNUZZI, R	
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PAGE 02 OF 02 PAGES

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(202) 456-9425

WH SITUATION ROOM

(NAME)

(PHONE NUMBER)

(ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Discussion Papers for 28 May PCMeeting on KoreaNSC LOG # 20507

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
State	Executive Secretary		
Treasury	Executive Secretary		
DOD	Executive Secretary		
DOE	Dir., Exec. Secretariat		
USON	Off. of the Rep. of the U.S. (Wash.)		736-7699
CIA	Executive Secretary		
AEDA	Executive Secretary		
JCS	Secretary, Joint Staff		

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SUBJECT: *Discussion Paper -* Notice of Meeting, 29 May Korea PC PAGES: 11
(w/ Cover)

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(202) 647-2021

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Date sent: 5/10/96 Number of pages: 3 (including cover sheet)
Time sent: 5:30 p.m.

To: Richard Ragan, NSC

Phone # 456-9141
FAX # 456-9140

From: Lee Schwartz
INR/OGI

Phone # (202) 647-2021
FAX # (202) 647-5286

Subject:

Comments:

Richard -
Bob Carlin from INR is going
over with Winston Lord to the
trilateral talks and will be distributing
this "non-paper."

fati

- Lee

NON-PAPERNorth Korea: Looming Humanitarian Crisis

North Korea's current food shortage will likely become a humanitarian crisis in three-four months unless concerted international efforts to provide food aid assistance are undertaken now. The DPRK's food production system--including the economic means to purchase foreign food stocks--is spiralling downward. A number of anecdotal and official reports have depicted malnutrition, sharply reduced rations, declining labor productivity, and increasing black market prices. North Koreans, apart from coping with the impacts of last year's flood and this year's seasonal weather aberrations, are facing a chronic, structural food deficit. The WFP and FAO will announce within a week a new alert on the deteriorating food security situation; WFP estimates North Korea has an urgent food assistance need of 470,000 tons. This would be enough to provide 10 million people with a basic ration for 6 months -- when the next harvest is in. At current market prices for grain, the cost of meeting the full appeal would be well in excess of \$100 million.

Flood damage, declining yields, and international response

Last year's flood ravaged rice producing land and cut sharply into domestic and military stocks. Silt from the flood still covers large areas of farmland. This spring's planting has been delayed 2-3 weeks and FAO estimates -- conservatively -- that 1996 crop yields will be down by 10 percent. Anecdotal famine indicators--peasants stripping bark from trees, factory workers foraging for wild food, barter arrangements--have been noted by international relief experts, who also observe that government food rations are about half that of normal levels and that government stockpiles are critically low. Comparisons have been made suggesting this is the worst hunger situation since 1951.

North Korea asked for international food aid after last year's extensive floods. The request was modest, but it was the first such request ever. WFP assessed the severity of the flood damage in September 1995 and issued an appeal for 20,000MT of grain to feed an affected population of 500,000 for three months.

The international response to North Korea's food aid request has been minimal in comparison to need, and in recent months, declining. According to WFP, since November 1995 a total of 280,000MT of donated food from all sources has arrived -- enough to meet only 20 percent of the daily requirement shortfall. While informal grain imports between Korean and Chinese border provinces have been reported, official food aid imports from all sources are down from approximately 50,000MT per month in November-March to under 10,000 tons/month since March.

Preventive Measures

Relief experts fear that a North Korean humanitarian crisis-

-potentially generating population displacements and internal instability--could develop as early as August. The US Institute of Peace recently convened a meeting where participants recommended that contingency planning begin immediately.

Past experience with food shortage and civil unrest dilemmas in other regions, such as in the Horn of Africa, suggest that a festering problem can evolve slowly over several months and then suddenly cross a "crisis" threshold, with severe consequences. North Korea, a small country whose 24 million people live in close proximity to international borders, could face a sudden exodus with profound consequences on neighboring states; for example, in July 1994, 25,000 people per hour surged across the Rwanda/Zaire border and in April 1991 about 1.5 Kurds fled across the Iraq/Turkey border in four days.

While there is no solid empirical base for determining North Korea's food deficit, this should not preclude a multilateral effort to better understand the magnitude of the problem as well as to develop a common strategy for alleviating its most dire consequences--massive famine and instability. A consistent lesson from other humanitarian interventions is that it is better to intercede early rather than wait passively for "all the facts," after which intervention becomes costly, inefficient, and less likely to be successful.

Preliminary reporting by relief agencies suggests that sufficient justification exists to develop a multilateral North Korean food assistance strategy which would demonstrate international concern, reduce the likelihood of uncontrolled migration, and prevent unnecessary civilian deaths. At the very least, North Korea's looming crisis demands that humanitarian responses be discussed among those involved in the region's security and that international relief agencies be brought in to assess needs and implement coordinated responses.



OFFICE OF THE GEOGRAPHER
Bureau of Intelligence and Research
US Department of State

Date: 5-1-50

Time: _____

From: D E B JONES

INR/GE Room 8742
US Department of State
Washington, DC 20520-6510

Voice: (202) 647-

Fax: (202) 647-5286

To:

Voice: _____

Fax: 456-1140

Y. A. Izrael, *Academy of Sciences of the USSR*

MYTH - I THINK THE PROBLEM
IS REALLY SERIOUS. WHAT TO DO
ABOUT IT IS ANOTHER QUESTION.

1

North Korea: Looming Humanitarian Crisis

North Korea's current food shortage will likely become a humanitarian crisis in three-four months unless concerted international efforts to provide food aid assistance are undertaken now. The DPRK's food production system--including the economic means to purchase foreign food stocks--is spiralling downward. A number of anecdotal and official reports have depicted malnutrition, sharply reduced rations, declining labor productivity, and increasing black market prices. North Koreans, apart from coping with the impacts of last year's flood and this year's seasonal weather aberrations, are facing a chronic, structural food deficit. The WFP and FAO will announce within a week a new alert on the deteriorating food security situation; WFP estimates North Korea has an urgent food assistance need of 470,000 tons. This would be enough to provide 10 million people with a basic ration for 6 months -- when the next harvest is in. At current market prices for grain, the cost of meeting the full appeal would be well in excess of \$100 million.

23M
P.P

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Drafted: DKrumm

Approved: LSchwartz, WWood

Document: ggi.wp 96nklood

For official use only**SPECIAL ALERT****NO.287**

(Circulated only for countries where foodcrops
or supply situation conditions give rise to concern)

COUNTRY: DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA**OVERVIEW**

A recent on-the-spot review by FAO and WFP, has found that since the joint Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission in December 1995, the food supply situation has deteriorated more seriously than had been anticipated. The mission had identified a substantial food deficit, most of which has remained uncovered so far. The Government has not been able to import food commercially, due to economic difficulties, and the level of food assistance provided to date has only covered a very small part of the deficit. The situation is likely to become considerably worse in the lean months between May and September, as most of last year's harvest has been consumed, stocks are critically low, significant commercial imports are unlikely and there is virtually no further food assistance in the pipeline.

Together these factors have led to widespread shortages in large parts of the country and brought the Public Distribution System (PDS) under considerable strain. In recognition of mounting difficulties, the Government has had to implement various measures to reduce overall consumption, including a reduction in food rations and the use of cereals in feed and industrial use. There is an urgent need to mobilise food imports, in the absence of which the consequences are likely to be devastating for large segments of the population, especially those that are already vulnerable.

Preliminary findings of a food and nutritional assessment in March/April this year by WFP indicated that to date young children attending nurseries and kindergartens have been protected from food shortages. However, without adequate food assistance, the present nutritional situation of the population can only be expected to decline. Private, small plot cultivation will enable some communities to compensate partly for reductions in government food allocation and ensure minimum dietary intake. However, those living in mountainous areas or urban centres have limited or no access to such land and may, therefore, face more serious shortages. The micronutrient status of the population is also a cause for some concern, although this cannot be confirmed with data on prevalence rates. Vitamin D, the B group and C are thought to be the most inadequate.

**FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS, ROME****WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME, ROME**

Early prospects for the 1996 grain crops, now being planted, are unfavourable. Preparations for planting have been delayed by about 2-3 weeks due to cold weather and inadequate fuel supplies. The delay in planting alone could result in up to 10 percent reduction in yields this year. The agriculture sector also continues to face serious problems of input supply, principally fertiliser, the manufacture or import of which has been severely constrained by a shortage of foreign exchange. This, as in the past several years, will reinforce a persistent downward trend in food production in the country. In addition a substantial part, some 40 000 hectares, of the area affected by the floods last year still remains under sand and debris, effectively ruling out cultivation in these areas in 1996. Food supply difficulties could, therefore, continue well into 1997.

FOOD SUPPLY SITUATION

The Public Distribution System (PDS) is the mechanism under which the state aims to supply the majority of the population with basic consumption needs, including rice/maize, cooking oil, cabbage, meat, fish and eggs. Food items are rationed and sold to the public at highly subsidised rates. Cereal rations for collective farm workers are distributed on-farm annually, immediately following the harvest.

Presently, out of the total population of some 22 million, it is estimated that about 13.5 million or 62 percent of the population are eligible to receive subsidised food rations through the PDS throughout the year. In addition, some 3 million workers and dependants on state farms are entitled to subsidised rations for 6 months. This leaves a population of roughly 5 million on collective farms, who receive no subsidised rations whatsoever and have to depend on a quota from the harvest for their annual need. However, as a result of the 1995 floods and food shortages, collective farmers were only allocated some 100 kgs, for the period up to the next harvest in October 1996, compared to an average of 200 kgs in normal years. The allocation therefore was halved and translates to a daily per caput availability of 250 grams of food grain, well below consumption needs. In view of the food shortages, substantial reductions in PDS rations were introduced in April.

It is becoming increasingly evident that the entire public distribution system is coming under considerable strain, due to a combination of factors, including declining food production, the disruption of trade, a progressive drawdown of national cereal stocks and cessation in early 1995 of grain imports from China, estimated at between 700 000 to 1 million tons annually in the period 1992 to 1995. As this quantum of imports represented a substantial proportion of cereal requirement in Korea DPR, cessation has had devastating effects on grain supply. Indeed even before the floods in July/August last year, Korea DPR approached several countries for assistance and received some 450 000 tons of rice through bilateral channels partly as grant and partly on concessional terms, to meet requirements for 1994/95.

The serious problems of the PDS were further exacerbated by the 1995 floods, which resulted in substantial losses to standing crops and stored food.

Although, no specific data on stock holding and off-take through the PDS is available, the Government estimates that present levels for the period April to October can only provide some 25 percent of normal requirements. It also indicated that off-take from the PDS had been lowered from 240 000 tons/month to 170 000 tons.

Farm families on collective farms, made homeless after the floods in North Pyongan, North Hwanghae and Chagang provinces, have been the main recipients of food aid. To date some 33 000 tons have been delivered, including 28 529 tons of rice, 2 269 tons of CSB, 1 756 tons of wheat flour and 270 tons of miscellaneous food items, mainly maize meal and soybean.

For the 1995/96 marketing year (November/October), the total cereal import requirement was calculated at 1.91 million tons, by the FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission in December last year. At that time it was envisaged that the Government would be in a position to import some 700 000 tons commercially. However, apart from concessional imports amounting to 200 000 tons from Japan, 40 000 tons from Syria, 8 000 tons from Switzerland and an expected 5 000 tons from Pakistan, it has been unable to secure further imports. This is in spite of negotiations with several countries notably Thailand, China, India, Poland, Romania, Canada and the USA.

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Under the circumstances, widespread shortages have occurred and there are reports of emerging and growing informal cross border trade with China, in which various products, such as lumber, scrap metal and shellfish are being bartered for wheat flour. For the remainder of 1995/96 marketing year, therefore, it is assumed that although the country can only make very limited imports of food commercially, some will flow-in as cross border (barter) imports. The combined amount of these imports is estimated at 150 000 tons of grain. Further, as a process of adjustment the Government has also begun reducing the number of livestock, which are intensively fed on grain, to enable cereals to be diverted for food use. It is estimated that feed use has decreased by 25 percent and the use of cereals for other purposes by a further 10 percent. No adjustment has been made to overall food use as the reduced rations FAO/WFP reported last year are already felt to be the minimum required. Based on these assumptions, the FAO/WFP estimate of 1995 production and the quantity of emergency and programme food aid received so far, leaves an overall shortfall of some 1.04 million tons. (See below)

1995/96 Cereal Balance Sheet ('000 tons)

Total Availability	4 077
1995 Production	4 077
Stock Draw-down	-
Total Utilisation	5 548
Food Use ^{1/}	3 688
Feed Use	1 050
Other Use	810
1996 Import Requirement	1 471
Commercial Imports ^{2/}	150
Emergency and Programme Food Aid Received and pledged ^{3/}	284
Uncovered import Requirement	1 037
of which:	
. Emergency food aid	34
. Project food aid	25
. Programme food aid	978

^{1/} On minimum required rations

^{2/} Commercial imports includes cross border trade

^{3/} Does not include CSB.

As there are no further pledges in the pipeline from May onwards, the food supply situation is becoming increasingly desperate. The Government has already reduced food rations to 300 grams a day, whilst in some areas rations as low as 250 grams/day have been noted. Consumption norms, therefore, have dropped progressively from an average of 600 grams per caput/day last year.

Worsening food shortages and the inability of the PDS to provide a regular supply of basic staples, have led to the development of a number of alternative coping mechanisms. These include, the consumption of wild food, petty trading of basic commodities and food around most towns, the cultivation of small private plots and rearing of poultry, support from relatives from abroad and the use of nominal savings for supplementary food purchases at 'peasants markets', which now operate at certain times during the month.

In view of the deteriorating food supply situation, the Government is clearly anticipating significant problems in the near future and requested the United Nations, in early April, to launch a new international appeal for mainly food assistance.

Emergency Food Aid Needs

It is estimated that, until the next harvest in October 1996, 33 750 tons of cereals (maize, maize meal, wheat and rice) is required in emergency food aid for 500 000 flood victims and/or other most vulnerable people. In addition some 11 800 tons of fortified cereal mix is needed for distribution, through kindergartens and nurseries, of 150 grams/day per caput to 25 percent of 2.1 million children under five in the most vulnerable areas, as compensation for the reduction in the PDS special ration.

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For rehabilitation of the agricultural sector, especially the removal of sand and debris from flood affected areas and repair of river dykes, 25 000 tons of project food aid is required to provide 2 kilos per manday for 12.5 million mandays.

Programme Food Aid

Although, the FAO/WFP food supply assessment mission identified a substantial food deficit last year, at the time it was envisaged that the Government would be in a position to make commercial imports of 700 000 tons and obtain sufficient quantities of food assistance to help bridge the deficit. However, these imports have not materialised and a large part of the food deficit has remained uncovered. The food supply situation will, therefore, be critical in the lean months between May and September, as most of last year's harvest has been consumed, stocks are critically low, there is very little likelihood of significant commercial imports and there is virtually no further food assistance in the pipeline. The country, therefore, urgently needs programme food aid or balance of payments support for commercial imports of 978, 000 tons of cereals, if the Government is to maintain minimum ration levels, until the next harvest in October.

OUTLOOK FOR 1996/97

Even under normal circumstances the domestic production of food in Korea DPR is heavily constrained by a shortage of cultivable land. Since 1990 the problems of domestic supply have been further compounded by declining productivity due both to natural soil depletion and the inability of the country to manufacture or import sufficient quantities of fertiliser to maintain productivity, due to severe economic problems and the consequent shortage of foreign exchange. Declining productivity and the crippling effects of the floods last year, which not only destroyed standing crops but also the irrigation network and property, exacerbated an already difficult food supply situation. The floods also left an estimated 90 000 hectares of paddy land under large deposits of sand and debris. Due to extreme shortages of imported fuel for operating excavation machinery, the Government presently estimates that only 50 000 hectares can be partially reclaimed to allow some cultivation in 1996. FAO field visits in April confirmed that large areas still remained under debris and sand, estimated at 30 - 40 centimetres in depth. In addition production will be significantly constrained by the lack of fuel for irrigation purposes and agricultural machinery. The Government presently estimates that 50 000 tons of diesel are needed for agricultural operations, including rehabilitation and operation of the irrigation system. As a result of the fuel shortage, there is clear evidence that farming is reverting back to the use of animal draught power.

Unless there is a marked improvement in the supply of fertiliser and fuel in the coming months, the Government's most optimistic production scenario is an aggregate output of 5 to 5.5 million tons of food grains. This would be in line with trends outlined in the FAO/WFP assessment made last year. Under the worst case scenario output will be similar to 1995 production of some 4 million tons. There is clearly a need to review the situation near harvest. It is, therefore, recommended that an FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission visit Korea DPR from Mid October, to assess food supply prospects for 1996/97.

Annual domestic requirement is substantially higher than what the country can produce, even under the most optimistic scenario, and would still need to be supplemented by grain imports in good years. Needless to say in poor years the dependence on supplementary imports would be much higher. All indications are that in 1996/97 the country will carry forward a structural food deficit of over 2 million tons even under the Government's most optimistic scenario. It is envisaged, therefore, that cereal food availability can only be met if there is a further sharp reduction in the use for feed and other uses, which of course has significant repercussions for the country's livestock sector and future meat availability in the diet.

In view of dwindling crop prospects the Government has initiated a number of measures to enhance domestic production and access to food, apart from removing sand and debris from affected arable land. These include:

- priority to be given to agriculture in future development planning;
- the introduction of a new rice variety Pyongyang 21 (P21), claimed to be more fertiliser responsive than other varieties to reduce dependence on chemical fertilisers. The recommended fertilisers application for P21 will be 200 kg/ha, compared to 500 kg/ha for existing varieties. The target yield is 8 tons/ha;

- 5 -

- in February last year under an extensive programme involving a large part of the population, some 320 000 hectares of arable land were covered up to 2 cm in depth, with 300-500 tons/ha of rich deposit from river basins to replenish top soil;
- developing the use of microbial fertilisers to reduce dependence on chemical fertilizers;
- allowing individuals to cultivate crops and vegetables in limited areas around dwellings to increase food availability;

CONCLUSION

Unfavourable weather conditions in 1994 and 1995 seriously aggravated an already strained food supply situation in Korea DPR, which had steadily been tightening for years. In December 1995 the FAO/WFP mission strongly advocated international emergency and programme food assistance, as it predicted numerous problems in 1996, especially during the lean period preceding harvest, when individual and national stocks in the PDS would be near depletion. Not only has such assistance not materialised to the extent needed, but also Government has so far been unable to secure commercial imports. Together this has meant that the institutional food supply system is perilously close to collapse and individual stocks are extremely low for those outside the PDS. Worse still the pipeline for emergency food assistance, which to date has been supplementing the diet of the worst affected population from last year's floods, is dry and from May these people will endure severe cutbacks in food availability. There are already signs of some nutritional deficiency in various segments of the population, which could become chronic in the next few months, unless some assistance is provided.

Although there is clear and urgent need to provide both emergency and programme food assistance now, it is fully recognised that these measures would only help solve immediate problems and not inherent long term ones. In the medium to longer term, over the next few years, the country is in considerable danger of recurrent food supply difficulties, given its limited potential to expand domestic food production either extensively or intensively, declining soil fertility that cannot sustain high doses of fertiliser even if they were available and a shrinking economy that effectively rules out sufficient imports of food to meet the deficit. It is clear that in the past food supply depended heavily on the general state of the economy and its capacity to finance imports. As this is no longer the case, it is evident that the country urgently needs to address these issues and implement some radical solutions, if it is to avert serious problems in the future.

This report is prepared on the responsibility of the FAO and WFP Secretariats with information from official and unofficial sources and is for official use only. Since conditions may change rapidly, please contact the undersigned for further information if required.

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UNCLASSIFIED

Department of State
Office of Korean Affairs
Phone: 202/647-7717
Fax: 202/647-7388

TODAY'S DATE: 7/19/96

TO: Richard Ragan

PHONE#: _____

FAX#: _____

FROM: Ann Kambana

Number of pages including this cover sheet _____

COMMENTS: ~~Q~~ Pls ch/commat by COB today —
Nick Burns took this as a "taken question"
so I need to move it today. Thanks

UNCLASSIFIED

EAP PRESS GUIDANCE
July 18, 1996

NORTH KOREA - HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE DELIVERY

Q: Do you have any information on the delivery of U.S. donated grain to the WFP program in North Korea?

A: -- THE U.S. HUMANITARIAN CONTRIBUTION TO THE WORLD FOOD PROGRAM'S EMERGENCY FEEDING PROGRAM IN NORTH KOREA WILL BE CARRIED BY THE U.S. FLAG VESSEL, TAMPA BAY. THE TAMPA BAY WILL LOAD APPROXIMATELY 6,600 METRIC TONS OF RICE IN SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA AND APPROXIMATELY 3,500 METRIC TONS OF CORN SOY BLEND AND 3,000 METRIC TONS OF CORNMEAL IN TACOMA, WASHINGTON. THE TAMPA BAY IS EXPECTED TO COMPLETE LOADING THE COMMODITIES ON/ABOUT AUGUST 2, 1996 AND ARRIVE IN NORTH KOREA ON/ABOUT AUGUST 14, 1996.

-- THE U.S. CONTRIBUTION OF GRAIN WAS MADE UNDER THE U.S. GOVERNMENT'S FOOD FOR PEACE PROGRAM AND WAS COMPRISED ENTIRELY OF U.S.-PRODUCED GRAIN. THE TAMPA BAY IS THE FIRST U.S. FLAG CARRIER TO TRAVEL TO NORTH KOREA IN 50 YEARS.



*Richard, you mentioned this on the phone.
Is this a DOT "factoid" that we know or
just a rough guess. If a guess I should
delete it because I don't think I can confirm it
by CERS. The.*

Drafted: EAP/K - AMKambara

Cleared: EAP:CKartman
EAP/K:MMinton
NSC:RRagan
USAID:LRogers/DHagen
EAP/P:JOhta

UNCLASSIFIED



Department of State
Office of Korean Affairs
Phone: 202/647-7717
Fax: 202/647-7388

TODAY'S DATE: 7/19/96

TO: Richard Reagan

PHONE#: _____

FAX#: _____

FROM: Ann Kambarka

Number of pages including this cover sheet _____

COMMENTS: Copy of my brief for Batumi mtg w/
Kantman. I'll also get to you this morning
a draft Q/A on the shipment of NK Aid,

UNCLASSIFIED



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

TO: EAP - Charles Kartman

FROM: EAP/K - Mark Minton

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with WFP Executive Director, Catherine Bertini at 11 a.m., Friday, July 19, in Your Office.

Background

Executive Director of the World Food Program (WFP), Catherine Bertini has asked to meet with you to brief you on WFP activities in North Korea. As the North Korea program has been controversial with the Congress and difficult to negotiate with the DPRK, you should use this meeting to express our strong support for WFP's role in North Korea. We should acknowledge the special effort they have made to the program by authorizing the active involvement of their North America representative, Doug Coutts, to brief the Congress on the program, work closely with us on the details of the program, and educate the ROK embassy and NY Congen on the program -- moves that have given us credibility on the Hill, eased ROK concerns and given us unprecedented control over how our humanitarian assistance is distributed and monitored. We understand that the WFP New York representative may try to stop over in Seoul, possibly on the way back from a September North Korea monitoring trip. We believe this would also be useful to ease ROK concerns and brief the Koreans on the situation in North Korea.

During her Washington consultations, Mrs. Bertini met with several Congressmen and NGO representatives. In the meeting with Rep. Gilman he told her that he (and other congressmen) would not follow through on the threat they made to the Secretary to decrease KEDO funding by \$6.2 million to compensate for the U.S. humanitarian donation. Mrs. Bertini is willing to brief you on these consultations.

Points to Raise

- o WFP has done excellent work in the DPRK. We appreciate all of the special effort you have put into this program. We are fully aware of the difficulties of dealing with North Korea and the added resources you have put into the program, particularly for assessment and monitoring.

- o Also appreciate the extra effort that Doug Coutts and the rest of the WFP North America office has made to coordinate with the USG, the Congress, and the ROK Mission in New York on this high-visibility program. These efforts have done much to reassure the Hill and the ROK of reality of the emergency in the DPRK. If there is an opportunity, we would urge Mr. Coutts to stop in Seoul and brief our embassy and the ROKG on the program. ROK acceptance of our humanitarian assistance to the DPRK has been very important.
- o We recently worked with you to put additional flexibility into our donation. Just to clarify, the U.S. food assistance of \$6.2 million can be used generally to target flood victims. There is no requirement that the food be distributed as a "food for work" program. We only ask that it be adequately monitored and administered to ensure that the assistance reaches those most in need.
- o We are considering sending USAID personnel from the Food for Peace office to observe the program in North Korea at key points -- offloading, distribution and post-delivery evaluation. We appreciate your cooperation to facilitate their mission.
- o How did your Congressional meetings go?

Drafted:EAP/K:AMKambara
SEKEC 3594 736-4845

**Save the Children®**

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Westport, CT 06881 USA
(203) 221 - 4000

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21000 SPLIT - CROATIA
Tel: 38521 / 355 - 408; 355 - 343
Fax: 38521 / 587 - 310

To: Matt Lorin
tel/fax: ✓ 1 202 456 9140

cc: Dana Kurtin
Fax: ✓ 1 212 636 5400

From: Anne Nixon *AN*

Date: 19 July 1996

Re: Superman poster

Good morning Mr. Lorin,

I am responding to the new DC Comics cover poster. Eric Filippino (NPA and ICRC in Zagreb) and I have consulted on it and have only the following comments:

The cover is fine from our perspective with one reservation on the UXO in the picture: since TM is the JNA's AP rifle grenade, and you want this poster to have maximum distribution, we think it would be advisable to blur the letters to the point of being unreadable so that the message conveyed is that the UXO is dangerous, and not to imply who did what to whom.

We look forward to receiving the script for the comic book. Question: once the English script is agreed on, who will do the translations into Bosnian, Croatian (and Serbian?)? If native speakers now based in the U.S. will be doing it, we suggest that you still send it back to the region for review since the "language" has changed so drastically in a short period.

Thank you.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. cable	re North Korea's Intensifying Food Crisis (8 pages)	08/13/1996	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Peter Smith (Multilateral & Humanitarian Affairs)
OA/Box Number: 2253

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea-Food [1996-98] [2]

2009-0528-F
kc1523

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
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- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Peter Smith (Multilateral & Humanitarian Affairs)
OA/Box Number: 2253

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea-Food [1996-98] [2]

2009-0528-F
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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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UNITED STATES MISSION TO THE U.N. ECOSOC



799 United Nations Plaza
New York, NY 10017
FAX # (212) 415-4141
or (212) 415-4299



PAGE 1 OF ____ PAGES

DATE: _____

FROM: ANN LOW

Phone # 415-4287

TO: 1) Ann Karibara
MARGARET POLLACK ED/BSA

Phone # 713-64845

FAX # 713-77381

TO: 2) Richard Ragan

Phone # _____

FAX # 202 456-9140

SUBJECT: N Korea - DHA appeal
for floods

ROUTINE ☒ PRIORITY URGENT

COMMENTS: Reports
Ann



Press Release

Department of Public Information • News Coverage Service • New York

IHA/604
19 August 1996

FLOODING AFFECTS 3 MILLION PEOPLE IN DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA;

UN APPEALS FOR ASSISTANCE

NEW YORK, 16 August (Department of Humanitarian Affairs) -- Exactly one year after unprecedented torrential rains devastated much of the agricultural sector and infrastructure of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, heavy rainfall in July-August is once again causing widespread flooding in that country.

Heavy damage has been sustained in 117 cities and counties in eight provinces in the south-western and northern parts of the country. At least 116 people have been reported killed, and approximately 3 million people affected. The country's agricultural sector, which suffered crippling damage from last year's flooding, has been dealt another severe blow, since flooding was heaviest in the south-western area, which is considered to be its main granary. The Government estimates this latest damage to be about \$1.7 billion.

The Department of Humanitarian Affairs is approaching all nations to alert them to the damage caused by the new floods and urging them to support the United Nations consolidated inter-agency appeal for flood-related emergency humanitarian assistance to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, launched in June. This would allow United Nations agencies to take adequate measures to address the most urgent and outstanding problems resulting from the devastation wreaked by the floods. So far, the response to the June appeal has only been slightly more than 40 per cent, concentrated mainly in the food sector.

The number one emergency relief priority remains food aid. In terms of rehabilitation, the repairing of irrigation canals, dykes, bridges and access roads takes on a special urgency, as the harvesting of the maize and rice crop is due to start within the next 45 to 60 days.



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For information media—not an official record

Table IV: Major Donors of Humanitarian Assistance to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in 1996*Compiled by DHA on the basis of information reported by donors and appearing agencies.*

Response to 1996-1997 UN Consolidated Appeal for Flood-Related Emergency Humanitarian Assistance to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (1 July 1996 - 31 March 1997)		
Donor	Value US\$	% of Funding
1. USA	6,212,500	35.03%
2. Japan	6,000,000	33.83%
3. Korea (Republic of)	3,000,000	16.91%
4. Sweden	1,204,819	6.79%
5. Australia	396,825	2.24%
6. Denmark	337,837	1.90%
7. Netherlands	299,400	1.69%
8. Summit Council (NGO)	100,000	0.56%
9. New Zealand	68,027	0.38%
10. Finland	63,425	0.36%
11. Austria	50,000	0.28%
12. Philippines	3,000	0.02%
Others	0	0.00%
TOTAL	17,735,833	100.00%

Total Humanitarian Assistance to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in 1996 as of 14 August 1996		
Donor	Value US\$	% of Funding
1. China	6,266,000	21.98%
2. USA	6,212,500	21.79%
3. Japan	6,000,000	21.05%
4. Korea (Republic of)	3,050,000	10.70%
5. Sweden	1,428,700	5.01%
6. Denmark	506,756	1.78%
7. EC-ECHO	500,000	1.75%
8. Netherlands	417,529	1.46%
9. Australia	396,825	1.39%
10. Switzerland	297,165	1.03%
11. Germany	243,399	0.85%
12. Norway	216,382	0.76%
Others*	2,975,277	10.44%
TOTAL**	28,506,533	100.00%



* Others (Incl. Austria, Canada, Finland, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, Thailand, United Kingdom, UNICEF National Committee, ICRC, IFRC and NGOs)

** Total Humanitarian Assistance calculated as follows - Contributions in direct response to the 1996-1997 Appeal plus additional contributions outside of the Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal framework (i.e. IFRC, ICRC, NGOs, Bilateral, etc.)

Table III: 1996 Additional Humanitarian Assistance to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
Outside of the framework of the UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal
as of 13 August 1996

Note that this table is comprehensive to the extent that decisions have been reported to DBA by Donors.

Decision Date	Donor	Channel	Description	Value US\$
DONOR GOVERNMENTS AND THE EU				
19-Jan-96	Canada	IFRC	Cash to provide quilts, blankets and medicines to flood victims	73,329
12-Jun-96	China	Bilateral	In kind - 20,000 tonnes of grains	6,266,000
11-Jun-96	Denmark	RC/Denmark	Cash for victims of floods	168,919
08-Jul-96	Germany	Bilateral (via Sweden Embassy-Interest Section of Fed. Republic of Germany)	Cash for food for babies and children	163,399
26-Jul-96	Germany	IFRC	Cash for milk powder [not requested in the appeal] (IFRC Emergency Appeal No. 06/96)	80,000
24-Jun-96	Korea (Republic of)	WMO	Cash for meteorological equipment and supplies	50,000
29-Feb-96	Malaysia	Bilateral	Cash	75,000
01-Jun-96	Netherlands	RC/Netherlands	Cash for relief aid for flood victims (provision of food aid)	118,129
20-May-96	Norway	IFRC	Cash (IFRC Emergency Appeal No. 06/96)	216,382
04-Apr-96	Sweden	IFRC	Cash (IFRC Emergency Appeal No. 06/96)	223,881
04-Apr-96	Switzerland	IFRC	Cash (IFRC Emergency Appeal No. 06/96)	81,301
01-Apr-96	Switzerland	UNICEF	Cash for flood emergency - supplementary feeding for under-five children in affected areas (Phase II UNICEF Plan of Action)	211,864
22-Apr-96	Thailand	Permanent Mission of Thailand	Cash	20,000
06-Jun-96	United Kingdom	RC/United Kingdom	Cash for procurement and distribution of food aid to 130,000 targeted beneficiaries in 13 counties in north Pyongan, legung, north and south Hwanghae and Kangwon	153,846
25-Jul-96	EC-ECHO	IFRC	Cash for emergency programmes	500,000
Sub-Total				8,402,290
RED CROSS AND NATIONAL SOCIETIES/COMMITTEES				
19-Apr-96	UNICEF NatCom/USA	UNICEF	Cash for emergency programmes (Phase II UNICEF Plan of Action)	14,750
04-Apr-96	RC/Austria	IFRC	Cash (IFRC Emergency Appeal No. 06/96)	8,475
16-Jul-96	RC/Austria	IFRC	Cash (IFRC Emergency Appeal No. 06/96)	11,905
27-May-96	RC/Canada	IFRC	Cash (IFRC Emergency Appeal No. 06/96)	6,241
22-Jun-96	RC/Canada	IFRC	Cash (IFRC Emergency Appeal No. 06/96)	2,941
03-Jul-96	RC/Canada	IFRC	Cash (IFRC Emergency Appeal No. 06/96)	181
22-Jun-96	RC/China	IFRC	Cash (IFRC Emergency Appeal No. 06/96)	20,000
22-Jun-96	RC/Denmark	IFRC	Cash (IFRC Emergency Appeal No. 06/96)	88,771
01-Jul-96	RC/Germany	IFRC	Cash (IFRC Emergency Appeal No. 06/96)	49,020

Table III: 1996 Additional Humanitarian Assistance to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
Outside of the framework of the UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal
as of 13 August 1996

Note that this table is comprehensive to the extent that decisions have been reported to DRA by Donors.


Decision Date	Donor	Channel	Description	Value US\$
RED CROSS AND NATIONAL SOCIETIES/COMMITTEES (continuation)				
29-Apr-96	RC/Hong Kong	IFRC	Cash (IFRC Emergency Appeal No. 06/96)	194,913
17-Jul-96	RC/Iceland	IFRC	Cash (IFRC Emergency Appeal No. 06/96)	2,951
17-Jun-96	RC/Iran	IFRC	In kind - 100 MTs of wheat flour, 30 MTs of oil, 20 MTs pulses (IFRC Emergency Appeal No. 06/96)	62,381
17-Jun-96	RC/Iran	IFRC	In kind - 50,000 cans of fish, 20,000 cans of beans (IFRC Emergency Appeal No. 06/96)	<i>not provided</i>
29-Apr-96	RC/Japan	IFRC	Cash (IFRC Emergency Appeal No. 06/96)	287,288
29-Apr-96	RC/Korea (Republic of)	IFRC	In kind - 100,624 liters of oil (IFRC Emergency Appeal No. 06/96)	218,667
14-Jun-96	RC/Korea (Republic of)	IFRC	In kind - 572 MTs of wheat flour (IFRC Emergency Appeal No. 06/96)	248,016
28-Jun-96	RC/Korea (Republic of)	IFRC	In kind - 132 MTs of wheat flour (IFRC Emergency Appeal No. 06/96)	50,782
28-Jun-96	RC/Korea (Republic of)	IFRC	In kind - 36 MTs of dried milk [not requested in the appeal] (IFRC Emergency Appeal No. 06/96)	238,284
09-Aug-96	RC/Korea (Republic of)	IFRC	In kind - 40 MTs of dried milk [not requested in the appeal] (IFRC Emergency Appeal No. 06/96)	268,229
09-Aug-96	RC/Korea (Republic of)	IFRC	In kind - transport (IFRC Emergency Appeal No. 06/96)	19,146
06-Apr-96	RC/Monaco	IFRC	Cash (IFRC Emergency Appeal No. 06/96)	13,966
26-Jun-96	RC/New Zealand	IFRC	Cash (IFRC Emergency Appeal No. 06/96)	13,873
23-Jul-96	RC/New Zealand	IFRC	Cash (IFRC Emergency Appeal No. 06/96)	1,031
22-May-96	RC/Norway	IFRC	Cash (IFRC Emergency Appeal No. 06/96)	23,049
17-May-96	RC/Spain	IFRC	Cash (IFRC Emergency Appeal No. 06/96)	7,966
04-Apr-96	RC/Sweden	IFRC	Cash (IFRC Emergency Appeal No. 06/96)	74,627
05-Jun-96	RC/Switzerland	IFRC	Cash (IFRC Emergency Appeal No. 06/96)	116,667
28-May-96	RC/United Kingdom	IFRC	Cash (IFRC Emergency Appeal No. 06/96)	151,016
18-Jun-96	RC/United Kingdom	IFRC	Cash (IFRC Emergency Appeal No. 06/96)	30,079
22-Jun-96	RC/United Kingdom	IFRC	Cash (IFRC Emergency Appeal No. 06/96)	23,305
30-Jun-96	RC/United Kingdom	IFRC	In kind (IFRC Emergency Appeal No. 06/96)	8,489
06-Aug-96	RC/United Kingdom	IFRC	Cash for training centres [not requested in the appeal] (IFRC Emergency Appeal No. 06/96)	22,439
02-Aug-96	RC/USA	IFRC	Cash (IFRC Emergency Appeal No. 06/96)	25,000
Sub-Total				2,328,450
NGOs AND PRIVATE ORGANISATIONS				
06-Jul-96	OXFAM	RC/United Kingdom	Cash (IFRC Emergency Appeal No. 06/96)	40,000
Sub-Total				40,000
TOTAL				10,770,700

**Table I: 1996-1997 UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal
for Flood-Related Emergency Humanitarian Assistance
to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea**
Updated Financial Summary - By Appealing Agency
as of 12 August 1996

Compiled by DHA on the basis of information provided by the respective donors.

Appealing Agency	Requirements (1 July 96 - 31 March 97)	Income (Pledges/Contributions)	Shortfall	% Needs Covered
	(US\$)	(US\$)	(US\$)	%
FAO	4,722,000	149,700	4,572,300	3.2%
UNDP	5,843,260	149,700	5,693,560	2.6%
UNICEF	3,828,310	1,753,000	2,075,310	45.8%
WHO	2,385,000	0	2,385,000	0.0%
DHA	50,000	50,000	0	100.0%
WFP	26,804,365	15,633,433	11,170,932	58.3%
TOTAL	43,632,935	17,735,833	25,897,102	40.6%

UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Democratic People's Republic of Korea
Updated Financial Summary - By Appealing Agency



**Table II: 1996-1997 UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal
for Flood Related Emergency Humanitarian Assistance
to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
Donor Breakdown of Contributions through Appealing Agencies
as of 12 August 1996**

Compiled by DHA on the basis of information provided by the respective donors.

A. FOOD AID					
Donor	Channel	Project Code	Commodity	Food (MTs)	Amount US\$
Australia	WFP	FA/01-05	Food aid - Cereals	1,190 MTs	396,825
Denmark	WFP	FA/01-05	Food aid - Cereals	1,010 MTs	337,837
Finland	WFP	FA/01-05	Food aid - Cereals	190 MTs	63,425
Japan	WFP	FA/01-02	Food aid - 9,340 MTs of Cereals and 2,575 MTs of CSB	11,915 MTs	5,250,000
Korea (Republic of)	WFP	FA/01-05	Food aid - CSB	2,395 MTs	2,000,000
New Zealand	WFP	FA/01-05	Food aid - Cereals	200 MTs	68,027
Sweden	WFP	FA/01-05	Food aid - Cereals	3,630 MTs	1,204,819
USA	WFP	FA/01-02	Food aid - 3,500 MTs of CSB, 6,600 MTs of Rice and 3,000 MTs of Corn Meal	13,100 MTs	6,212,500
Summit Council (NGO)	WFP	FA/01-05	Food aid - Cereals	300 MTs	100,000
TOTAL				33,930 MTs	15,633,433

B. NON-FOOD				
Donor	Channel	Project Code	Description (Activity)	Amount US\$
Austria	DHA	Mon-Rep-1	Monitoring and Reporting	50,000
Korea (Republic of)	UNICEF	HEA/04	In-kind - Powdered Milk	1,000,000
Japan	UNICEF	HEA/02-03	Health activities	750,000
Netherlands *	FAO	RAL/03	Rehabilitation of irrigation canals	119,760
Netherlands *	FAO	Mon-Rep-1	Monitoring and Reporting	29,940
Netherlands *	UNDP	RAL/06	Excavation of buried arable lands	119,760
Netherlands *	UNDP	Mon-Rep-1	Monitoring and Reporting	29,940
Philippines	UNICEF	HEA/04	Nutrition - supplementary feeding for children	3,000
TOTAL				2,102,400

GRAND TOTAL (A+B)	33,930 MTs	17,735,833
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* As reported by donor

Source: Stats from DPRK - agencies
said these are reasonable

DATA OF FLOOD DAMAGE

(24-28, July 1996)

- Basic Data

Affected Areas: 117 Cities and counties in 8 provinces and
Cities under central authority
(North and South Hwanghae province,
Kaesong city, Pyongyang city, North and
South Pyongan province and Nampo city)

Affected Population: 3,270,000

Loss of life 116

Total damage: US \$ 1,732,800,000

- General Data of Damage

<u>Category</u>	<u>Unit</u>	<u>Total</u>
Damaged dwelling houses	blocks	8,626
.....	households	30,060
submerged	blocks	7,670
.....	households	28,176
collapsed	blocks	956
.....	households	1,884
Damaged public buildings	blocks	3,825
.....	㎡	112,370
submerged	blocks	1,381
.....	㎡	78,645
collapsed	blocks	2,444
.....	㎡	33,725
Damaged farm lands	Hectare	288,929
submerged		270,529
paddy field		152,680
non-paddy field		31,849
others		86,000
Loss		6,521
paddy fields		2,881
non-paddy field		2,940
others		700
Buried		11,879
paddy field		5,830
non-paddy field		5,149
others		900

Category	Unit	Total
Farm crops collapsed		16,199
rice		6,928
maize		3,234
vegetable, cash crops		6,087
Loss of livestock	heads	26,921
cattle		751
pig		1,710
chicken		12,030
others		12,430
Damaged equipment	piece	3,000
Loss of raw material		
coal	ton	110,680
chemical fertilizer		4,000
timber	m ²	3,380
electric line	km	163
Damage of structures		
roads	points	532
....	km	63
bridges	number	535
....	m	7,692
railways	number	50
....	m	2,413
waterways	number	7,660
....	km	763
reservoir	number	19
....	m	10,616
pumping stations	number	792
dams	number	1,074
....	m	26,620
Varieties of structures	number	11,229
landslide	number	333
....	m	52,452
electric poles	pieces	1,326
transmission towers	pieces	64
cable	km	50
water supply and drainage	km	250

State Rehabilitation Committee of Flood Damage

August, 1996



DEPARTMENT OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS

**EMERGENCY SITUATION IN THE
DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (DPRK)
FOLLOWING FLOODING IN JULY-AUGUST 1996**

16 AUGUST 1996

July-August 1996 have seen a repetition of the heavy flooding which devastated vast areas of arable land in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea last year. The current flooding, while not as heavy in absolute terms as in 1995, nevertheless, inflicted additional pain and suffering to a country which had not yet recovered from last year's devastation.

According to DPRK Government data, 117 cities and counties in 8 provinces in the South-West and North of the country were affected by this year's flooding. The floods inflicted a heavy toll on the population - 116 dead, with approximately 3 million people affected. The DPRK Government estimates the overall material damage from the 1996 floods to be at US\$ 1.7 billion. A copy of DPRK Government data on current flood damage is attached. (While there is no independent confirmation of the damage assessment, there is consensus among UN agencies in Pyongyang that figures provided by the DPRK Government are a reasonable reflection of the extent of the damage from the current floods).

The DPRK agricultural sector, which sustained crippling damage from last year's flooding, has been dealt another severe blow, since flooding was heaviest in the South-West of the country, considered to be its main granary.

Selective assessments undertaken by UNDP, WFP, UNICEF, IFRC and the Korean Red Cross in the affected areas, provide a bleak picture of the damage to the agricultural sector and to the infrastructure:

- Rice is the most damaged crop, followed by maize, soybeans and other crops such as insam and vegetables.
- Approximately 15,000 Ha of cultivated land were directly observed and considered to be completely lost, representing about 80,000 MT of lost grain, with an estimated value of about US\$ 26 million.

- A number of destroyed railway and road bridges were observed, as well as damage to highways and connecting roads.
- Several dams are partially damaged and water reservoirs and pumping stations are flooded. Small sea dykes were broken allowing sea water to sweep into agricultural fields.

Perhaps more serious than the damage to agriculture and to the infrastructure, is the damage to three primary irrigation canals, spanning 800 km, which were broken in 369 places (according to Government figures). Water circulation needs to be urgently restored in these canals by middle of August 1996. Otherwise, a very serious risk of losing the crop on approximately 200,000 Ha supported by this irrigation network, is imminent. In terms of volume of grain which will not be produced, this means a crop loss of between 750,000 to 1,000,000 MT (approximately US\$ 300,000,000 value).

Given the above, food aid remains the priority item as far as relief from the international community is concerned. It has also become apparent now that the country, as a whole, and not just the flood-affected areas, is affected in terms of food shortages.

The major priority in terms of rehabilitation is the repairing of irrigation canals, dykes, embankments, bridges and access roads. This task takes on a special urgency, in view of the coming harvesting of the maize and rice crop, due to commence within the next 45 to 60 days.

The Department of Humanitarian Affairs strongly appeals to all Nations to respond to this emergency situation by providing further support for the UN consolidated inter-agency appeal for flood-related emergency humanitarian assistance to the DPRK, launched in June 1996. Full funding of the appeal would allow UN agencies in the DPRK to take appropriate measures to address the most urgent and outstanding problems resulting from the devastation wreaked by the floods.

It is evident, that among these measures should be an increased effort to mobilize food assistance for larger areas of the country, and not just the flood-affected regions. This could be achieved by supplementing the food ration through additional Food-for-work arrangements, etc.

There is also an urgent need to assist in rehabilitating some of the infrastructure, which is necessary for successfully harvesting crops, and for the distribution of food to the population. Timely direct technical assistance, through the appeal, or on a bilateral basis is also welcome.

The Office of the UN Resident Coordinator in Pyongyang, together with UN agency representatives in-country, are closely monitoring the situation, analysing the needs and will advise on possible additional measures which may be needed within the framework of the current appeal to respond to the present situation.

* * *