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001. memo	Jamie Metzl et al to Dick Clarke re Political Military Plan (3 pages)	09/15/1997	P1/b(1)
002. briefing slides	re Day 3 planning simulation seminar (32 pages)	00/00/0000	P1/b(1)
003. briefing slides	re North Korea (12 pages)	00/00/0000	P1/b(1)
004. paper	re Policy Goals (17 pages)	06/09/1998	P1/b(1)
005. paper	re Korean Peninsula (4 pages)	00/00/0000	P1/b(1)
006. outline	re planning components (3 pages)	12/10/1997	P1/b(1)
007. cable	re Insider's Perspective (3 pages)	12/29/1997	P1/b(1)

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Let North Korea Collapse

By KAREN ELLIOTT HOUSE

North Korea is dying, and Washington would be wise to stop extending its death throes with pills of promised aid and placebos of diplomatic dialogue.

For a terminally ill regime there are no miracle cures. As the world's last Stalinist society, North Korea's *raison d'être* is the subjugation of its people and the perpetuation of the ruling clique's power by terror and force. These days, the rulers cannot even feed the system's serfs. As a result, both the hapless North Korean people and Western interests in the Pacific are best served by burying the regime sooner rather than later.

While a post-Deng China is unlikely to waste political capital aiding its old communist ally, ironically Pyongyang's prop is the Clinton administration. Officials argue that a desperate, cornered North Korea may lash out militarily at South Korea, where 37,000 U.S. troops are stationed. Thus the regime, say these strategists, must be pacified—and its despotic rule perpetuated.

Suicidal Military Attack

But the real point is that a military attack by North Korea, fulfilling its oft-stated aim of destroying South Korea, remains a risk so long as the Pyongyang regime remains in place. It is a risk whether or not the administration winks while Cargill Co. ships U.S. grain to Pyongyang; whether or not energy-starved North Korea receives, courtesy of Japan and South Korea, two nuclear reactors; and whether or not the U.S. provides oil, as promised. There is no reason to believe that the regime can be bribed into better behavior, or that the risk of a suicidal military attack will diminish a year or two from now.

Consider recent history: Three years ago, the Clinton administration signed a much-heralded nuclear accord committing the U.S. to lead an international effort to finance and build light-water reactors to produce electricity in North Korea. In exchange Pyongyang pledged to abandon its own nuclear program, suspected of producing plutonium to build nuclear weapons. Never mind. Washington said, that the pact didn't require inspection of North Korean nuclear facilities for five years, allowing any secret bomb program to continue. At least, proponents claimed, it began a dialogue with the North that would lead to eventual reform.

Hardly. In the intervening years, North Korean leader Kim Jong Il has proved even more intransigent and irrational than his late father, Kim Il Sung. The talks Pyongyang promised with Seoul have yet to occur. The liaison offices North Korea

and the U.S. agreed to open in each other's capital haven't materialized. North Korea's economy has been shrinking for seven years; its people are now limited to one bowl of rice a day, and even the regime is warning of impending starvation. Yet Washington continues to forecast "reform."

Last fall, meanwhile, a North Korean spy submarine ran aground in South Korean waters. Defections mount, including one of the regime's ruling Central Committee members, Hwang Jang Yop, who last week sought asylum in the South Korean embassy in Beijing. And last week, a former North Korean defector was shot in Seoul.

These are not the actions of a sane leadership pursuing rational national interests, but the flounderings of a frightened few focused on self-preservation at all costs. As a result, the risk is perhaps higher than at any time in North Korea's history that Pyongyang will engulf the Korean peninsula in a war it cannot win but that severely damages its South Korean and U.S. defenders.

Yet protection doesn't lie in more appeasement. President Clinton could be excused as naive a few years back for trying a kinder, gentler policy toward Pyongyang. But that's no longer a credible explanation for U.S. policy. By now, the diplomacy is theater of the absurd: Pyongyang promises, then procrastinates, then provokes, then pauses. After a prolonged pause come new promises, and the cycle starts anew.

Experience argues for a policy based on realities, not pipe dreams. The reluctance of government and think-tank policy makers to take a hard look at North Korea is reminiscent of the Bush administration's efforts to "reform" Saddam Hussein through diplomatic dialogue and grain sales and its determination to see the best in Iraq almost up to the day Saddam invaded Kuwait. President Clinton's blinkered insistence on engagement and somehow reforming Pyongyang is eerily similar: U.S. officials insist on seeing hope in a chamber of horrors.

There is a further sense of *déjà vu* in the Pentagon's inflated descriptions of North Korean military capabilities. In the prelude to the 1991 Gulf War, military analysts in Washington sonorously predicted tens of thousands of casualties, yet fewer than 300 Americans died. The horror scenarios for Korean military conflict are spun with equal certitude. Among them: North Korea's million-man army could dash the 35 miles from the Demilitarized Zone to Seoul in a matter of hours; missiles would immediately rain down on the capital, home to one-quarter of South Korea's 46 million peo-

ple; if U.S. troops enter North Korea, China might join its ally, producing a replay of the bloody Korean War of the 1950s.

Clearly no one risks war lightly. But if the doomsday scenarios are real, it's all the more urgent that the U.S. and South Korea have the capability to destroy North Korean planes and missiles quickly and to confront North Korean troops before they reach Seoul. In short, a military buildup in South Korea and the surrounding seas seems overdue to enhance deterrence against a desperate regime lashing out—or to deal with an attack.

North Koreans, who denounce U.S.-South Korean exercises as a provocation, surely will protest any military buildup. But it's important that Pyongyang be forced to recognize the superiority of force to its south and America's willingness to employ it.

This message can be delivered directly and through Beijing, which itself must be made to understand that its economic and strategic relations with the U.S. are much more important than the remnants of a Maoist alliance with North Korea. War on the Korean peninsula minimally would chill foreign investment in China, on which Beijing relies for its own political stability. In light of potential political unease following Deng's death, that message resonates deeply in Beijing.

Even those in Washington who agree that a more realistic policy is wise argue that the U.S. can't act without the support of South Korea and Japan, which fear the North but are more fearful of provoking it.

It's true President Kim Young Sam's government in Seoul often seems as willing as Washington to engage in wishful thinking. While the president tells visitors that North Korea's collapse is a question of "when, not if," his government vacillates in its policy toward Pyongyang even as it privately frets the U.S. is betraying Seoul by talking directly with Pyongyang. Like the U.S., Seoul has provided Pyongyang grain and then sulked when the North didn't express thanks.

Because North Korea is so isolated, it's impossible to know whether Pyongyang's claims of impending starvation are accurate. It's impossible as well to know if intelligence sources are correct that grain is plentiful but reserved for the military to ensure its loyalty. It's impossible to know North Korea's military state of readiness.

But U.S. intelligence has a history of overestimating the capabilities of our enemies, whether the former Soviet Union, East Germany or Iraq. So it's significant that these

The Military and the Women

WALL STREET JOURNAL

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Pg. 1/14

The delusion that dare not speak its name is finally getting some attention. Thanks to continuing news of sex scandals in the military and evidence of general demoralization in the ranks, it has evidently begun to dawn that certain previously sacrosanct policies ordaining the integration of women into all aspects of the military, combat roles and integrated barracks included, might warrant scrutiny.

The most recent published pieces to put the lie to this idea appeared in the conservative Weekly Standard and in the New Republic—not exactly a font of right-wing attitudes. In the January 20th issue of the Standard, former Navy Secretary James Webb forcefully describes the ways in which sexual integration undermines military cohesiveness. He points out that the United States is the only country attempting full training integration, a policy abandoned even by the Israeli army. Then in the February 24th New Republic, Stephanie Guttman describes at length the available evidence of demoralization and disruption caused by the military's pursuit of full gender integration.

In short, it is becoming permissible for people to notice and even state the obvious: A completely gender-neutral military extending to combat, barracks and basic training denies basic realities, not least the physical difference between men and women. Similar sentiments are now being raised by members of Congress concerned with the damage being done to the morale and efficacy of the armed services—notably Rep. Bob Livingston and Senators Rick Santorum and Charles Robb.

It is now also possible to state that a military program won't work when it is driven, as this one so obviously has been from the outset, by a wholly political agenda—once described by Assistant Secretary of the Navy for manpower and reserve affairs Barbara Pope as the important task of "weeding out the white male as norm."

A program of "integration" wholly directed toward the goal of success for women—rather than the good of the armed services as a whole—will have consequences. Just how strange such priorities can be was clear from a 1994 interview given by Army Secretary

Togo D. West Jr. in which he explained that there were now "two basic principles" governing the army: "One, that everyone in the country is entitled to an opportunity to serve and should be given it. And two, the Army is a war-fighting entity that exists to fight and win the nation's wars." The great question is, the Secretary explained, how best "to utilize the available resources to do the latter [win wars] with the least compromise of the former." This may be a good question, but one, evidently, to which our policymakers don't have an answer.

There was a time when it was understood that the prime purpose of the Army, and of the military as a whole, was to fight and win the nation's wars; and that this was a purpose neither in competition with nor concerned with the compromise of any other purpose—including the delivery of entitlements and opportunities.

A 1995 internal report by Rear Admiral Lyle G. Bien, just obtained from the Navy by the Center for Military Readiness, is instructive in what it reveals about the political terrors now affecting military leaders from the top on down caught up in controversies involving women personnel. Among other matters, Admiral Bien's report addressed the question of whether the standards used to qualify naval aviators for assignment to F-14 Tomcat Squadrons were—as charged—far lower for women than for male trainees.

In his report, worded with tortured care, the Admiral says he found in his interviews no one to give any testimony about special preferences accorded women aviators. On the other hand, he concedes, after Tailhook (and the ensuing purges that cost so many careers) no officer wanted to appear to block the progress of integrating women into the Fleet. The Admiral

noted that naval officers did seem to notice there were different physical standards for women, and special accolades and attention directed to them from officers, from Navy officials and via calls from Washington. As the Admiral's report (among many others) proves, full *military* equality for men and women can take strange forms.

The night before Admiral Boorda committed suicide, he spoke on the telephone with former U.S. Senator, Admiral Jeremiah Denton. To his surprise, reports Admiral Denton, who had called to talk about something entirely different, the Chief of Naval Operations unleashed a barrage of anguished explanations concerning his efforts with regard to women in the Navy. Clearly, the pressures on the CNO had to do with more than his worries about medals. The pressures causing the rest of the military's leadership—and the Congress—to dance to the tune of the activists are similarly clear. So too are the causes that have led to the sexual scandals at Aberdeen, in the Pentagon, at the Fort McClellan Training center, in Germany and elsewhere.

One of the greatest immediate dangers of this hyper-politicized subject is that amid a flood of sexual accusation, it becomes extremely difficult to distinguish between charges solidly grounded and deserving punishment and those that simply are not. Instead, the service brass recite nervous mantras about the invaluable strengthening this integration has brought to our armed services. What is easy to see is that one day soon our political leaders and the military will have to summon the courage to stop dancing and begin confronting reality.

BOSTON GLOBE

February 20, 1997

Pg. 8

Turkish general will visit Israel

ANKARA, Turkey — The chief of Turkey's armed forces, General Ismail Hakkı Karadayı, is to visit Israel this month in a further sign of

strengthening military cooperation between the countries. Turkey and Israel have signed two military accords, which involve allowing Israeli jets on training flights in Turkish airspace and upgrading of the Turkish Air Force's fleet of F-4 Phantom jets by Israel. (Reuters)

U. S. Strategy in Korea: Reducing Threats, Promoting Stability

Overview

- **Opportunity and Challenge**
- **U.S. Interests**
- **Where We Are Today**
- **Future Paths**
- **A Summing Up**
- **Policy Recommendations**

The Strategic Opportunity--and the Challenge

- **The ground is shifting**
 - North Korea decaying, but prospects/implications remain unclear
 - South Korea simultaneously assertive and indecisive
 - **Current conditions present major opportunities**
 - U.S. has potential leverage in Pyongyang and Seoul
 - Near term interests of major powers in Korea currently compatible
 - Opportunity to secure long-term U.S. interests
 - **Uncertainties/risks remain ample and worrisome**
 - Risks posed by instability/conflict very high
 - Major power interests likely to diverge if/when conditions change (China, Japan prefer *status quo*)
 - U.S. policy lacks clarity
-

U.S. Interests

- **Currently: deterring war, reducing threats, strengthening the alliance, while avoiding peninsular instability**
- **Near term: a stable Korea free of major tension**
 - **Dilemma inherent in policy choices:**
 - *Stabilization* could prolong national division, inject major tensions in U.S.-ROK relations
 - *Early unification* fraught with uncertainties, perils
- **Long-term: a unified, democratic, non-nuclear Korea** *prosperous*
 - **Able to defend itself without threatening its neighbors--or being threatened by them**
 - **Aligned with U.S., supportive of U.S. security goals**
 - **Friendly with--but not overly close to--China**

Where We Are Today (1)-- North Korea: Decay and Danger

- **Immediate threat to stability more one of weakness than of strength**
 - **More than 30% economic decline since 1990, no end in sight**
 - **Acute shortages in food and energy**
 - **Growing potential for internal upheaval with external implications**
 - **Military ascendance in N.K. leadership**
 - **Top brass defiant in face of regime vulnerabilities**
 - **Bulk of KPA combat power remains forward deployed**
 - **WMD assets remain worrisome**
 - **Capability for short-warning attack undiminished**
 - **Regime vulnerabilities could lead to:**
 - **Negotiating breakthrough among two Koreas, U.S., PRC**
 - **Internal instability, humanitarian crises**
 - **Defiant, aggressive North Korean military**
-  **U.S. could confront all three conditions simultaneously**
-

Where We Are Today (2)-- South Korea: Drift, Uncertainty, and Frustration

- **ROK has won the long-term competition--but it isn't acting like a winner**
- **Leadership vacuum, domestic preoccupations**
 - **President Kim Young Sam beleaguered, lame duck**
 - **Utter absence of strategy to manage threats, advance unification**
- **Latent ROK resentment at subordinate status**
 - **Fears of victimization**
 - **Suspicious over U.S.-North Korean relations**
 - **Residual bitterness over Agreed Framework, sub incident**
 - **Contentious security issues persist: command relations, burden sharing, weapons purchases, MTCR, SOFA**



Risk of degraded alliance at time of looming opportunity and danger

Where We Are Today (3)-- U.S. Policy: Unrealized Advantage

- **U.S. has potential leverage with both Koreas and influence with major powers**
 - **Opportunity for U.S., ROK to develop common strategy**
 - **North's vulnerabilities could lead to negotiation/threat reduction**
 - **Major powers share common interest in deterring armed conflict/preventing WMD proliferation/managing disruption of *status quo***
 - **U.S. has failed to exploit present opportunities**
 - **Absence of satisfactory understandings with ROK**
 - **Game plan for 4-party talks only beginning to take shape**
 - **Negotiating tradeoffs not clearly specified**
 - **DoD's equities not satisfactorily addressed**
 - **Underdeveloped consultations with Japan, China, Russia**
 - **Need to fully exploit all-source intelligence on North Korea**
 - **Need for focal point within USG for Korean Peninsula**
-

U.S. Policy Challenges

- **Hedging against major uncertainties and risks (warranted whether or not negotiations prove fruitful)**
 - Humanitarian crisis
 - North Korean attack
 - WMD “breakout” options
 - Non-5027 contingencies
 - Chinese unilateral action
 - **Achieving stabilization/threat reduction (if negotiations prove fruitful)**
 - **Ensuring long-term U.S. regional interests with or without unification**
-

Where DoD Can Lead and Shape

- **DoD needs to be prepared for full array of possible changes to *status quo***
 - **War**
 - **Contingencies short of war**
 - **Productive negotiations**
 - **Unification**

Deterrence and Defense

- **Any military conflict could prove very costly--even with victory virtually assured**
 - **U.S.-ROK combined deterrence/defense capabilities currently adequate, but ROK needs to:**
 - **Address long-standing deficiencies (e.g., operational readiness, counter-battery radar, chemical gear, artillery/ammo production)**
 - **Shift planning, procurement focus away from hypothetical future threat from Japan**
 - **Forswear any intention of unilateral action**
-

Contingencies Short of War

- **Array of troubling, largely unprecedented contingencies now looms, requiring heightened planning, policy attention**
 - **Refugee flows**
 - **Civil unrest**
 - **Rogue military commanders**
 - **Control of WMD**
- **Augmented combined planning--based on clear political guidance--would reduce possibility of ROK preemption/unilateral action**
- **Need to establish primacy of CFC/UNC**
 - **CINCCFC/UNC responsible for both 5027 *and* contingencies short of war**

Contingencies Short of War (cont.)

- **Need to clarify Japan's role**
 - **Must be compatible with ROK sensitivities, U.S. interests/needs**
 - **Opportunity to build on trends in U.S.-ROK-Japan trilateral security cooperation, Japanese deliberations over Defense Guidelines**
 - **Need to engage China in parallel process (bilateral and/or trilateral)**
 - **Military-to-military understandings (movement of forces, etc.)**
 - **Control of WMD, control of borders, humanitarian issues**
 - **Capitalize on Russian representation/influence in NK**
-

Negotiations

- **Paramount goal should be threat reduction**
 - **Emphasis on offensive capabilities, esp. CBW, missiles**
 - **Reductions must be measurable and verifiable, with U.S.-ROK actions contingent on explicit *quid pro quos***
 - **Requires enhanced DoD role in negotiations**
 - **Major issues:**
 - **Getting priorities right (i.e., threat reduction) rather than focus on “process,” internal reform in North**
 - **Giving away too much food for too little**
 - **Diverging ROK and U.S. objectives/approaches**
 - **Need to demonstrate relevance of U.S.-North Korean bilateral channels to ROK**
 - **Political/diplomatic/commercial commitments under Agreed Framework remain unfulfilled**
-

Post-Unification Korea

- **U.S. forces in Korea still desirable after unification**
 - **Protect U.S. geostrategic interests, including regional stability and ROK independence**
 - **Ease political burdens on Japan's hosting of U.S. forces**
- **Ideally, U.S. forces would be:**
 - **Restructured (for a regional power projection mission)**
 - **Relocated (consolidated at existing bases, out of urban areas)**
- **But potential difficulties loom:**
 - **Korean nationalism could push forces out**
 - **U.S. domestic politics could pull forces out**
 - **China's reactions will be largely determined by state of Sino-U.S. relations, U.S.-Japan alliance**

The Bottom Line

- **The peninsula has entered its most dynamic phase since the Korean War**
 - **Unprecedented combination of opportunities and risks**
 - **Forward-leaning U.S. policy essential to shaping a preferred outcome--with ROK and with major powers**
 - **Failure to develop clear U.S.-ROK strategy will let initiative pass to others, put U.S. interests at risk**
 - **Traditional framework of U.S.-ROK security planning and major power consultations will not guarantee the outcome we seek**
 - **USG not appropriately organized to manage risks/exploit opportunities**
-

Policy Recommendations

- **Food Aid**

- **Tolerate/encourage humanitarian food aid by NGOs and other countries**
- **Tie USG assistance beyond humanitarian level to threat reduction**

- **Command Relations**

- **Clarify command relations in favor of CINCCFC/UNC for contingencies short of war:**
 - **with ROK MND/JCS**
 - **with CINCPAC**

- **Regional policy coordination**

- **Sustain current US/ROK/GOJ consultative process on contingencies short of war**
 - **Retain momentum in review of U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines**
 - **Pursue closer military-to-military dialogue with China on Korean contingencies**
 - **Engage Russia in bilateral political/military talks**
-

Policy Recommendations (cont.)

- **Long-term U.S. military presence in Korea**
 - **Request Joint Staff/OSD study on future U.S. military presence (size, composition, location) in post-unification Korea**
 - **Discuss completed study with ROK officials at next SCM**
- **Intelligence**
 - **More rigorous, systematic, and comprehensive intelligence effort, to include:**
 - **Full exploitation of information acquired by NGOs and international groups with access to North**
 - **Thorough and early USG debriefing of defectors**

Policy Recommendations (cont.)

- **U.S. policy coordination**
 - **Back appointment of high-level administration “point man” on Korean policy**
 - **Appoint a special assistant for Korea reporting directly to SecDef**
 - **DoD’s representative to Four Party talks should be a ranking member of U.S. negotiating team**

Back-Up Slides

U.S. Strategic Alternatives: Some Perspectives From the Panel

- **All panel members believe deterrence and defense remain paramount policy goals**
 - **Tradeoffs posed by near-term policy choices, degree of uncertainty and risk entailed under different policy options**
 - **Different views on optimal policy direction**
 - **Primacy of U.S.-ROK alliance**
 - **But new contingencies (non-5027) warrant increased attention**
 - **Buying time**
 - **Vest North Korea in negotiating process**
 - **Provide means/opportunity/incentive for North to initiate meaningful reform, cushion possibilities of instability**
 - **Stabilization**
 - **No time to buy**
 - **U.S. must avert meltdown in North that could trigger severe consequences**
 - **Tilting toward unification**
 - **North Korea on the edge; no heroic measures warranted**
 - **U.S. and ROK can prepare for all possible contingencies**
-

The Role of Other Major Powers: Japan, China, Russia

- **All offer lip service to unification, but none eager for it**
- **Tacit concurrence with present U.S. strategy**
 - **Deterrence and defense**
 - **Countering WMD proliferation**
 - **Avoiding humanitarian crisis**
- **Common interest in maintaining stability, especially in near- to mid-term**
 - **But response options in context of instability far less certain**
 - **Views of post-unification Korea explored minimally, if at all, with all three states**



Perspectives and calculations of each differ, U.S. needs to build support with all three states

Japan

- **As cornerstone U.S. ally, Japan's role in crisis could prove crucial**
 - **Major concern over implications of instability on peninsula, N.K. missile development**
- **Response options remain constrained, unclear**
 - **Constitutional restrictions**
 - **Insufficient legislative framework**
 - **Absence of satisfactory national security mechanism**
 - **Major ROK sensitivities**
- **Clear incentives to remain closely aligned with U.S., no matter what the outcome**



U.S. priorities: clarify NEO guidelines; build on recent U.S.-ROK-Japan discussions, Japanese deliberations over Defense Guidelines; encourage ROK-Japanese bilateral defense dialogue

China

- **Future Chinese behavior (and incentives to cooperate or compete with U.S. in a crisis) among largest uncertainties U.S. could face on the peninsula**
 - **Has larger capacity to shape outcomes than any other major power**
 - **Decided preference for *status quo*, unease about prospect of rapid unification**
 - **Beginning to acknowledge signs of instability in North**
 - **Despite growing economic and political ties with South, some wariness over ROK ambitions in “Seoul-centered” unification scenario(s)**
 - **U.S. dialogue with China on Korean futures still at incipient stage**
-

China (cont.'d)

- **Chinese equities under conditions of increased instability**
 - **Presumed willingness to pursue loose coordination (e.g., humanitarian assistance) with U.S., ROK**
 - **Less clarity in response to internal upheaval that spills outward**
 - **Incentive to avoid embroilment, but some Chinese assert readiness to “intervene” in the event of serious instability and/or U.S.-ROK involvement in North**



U.S. policy priorities: seek regular mil-mil discussions/ understandings; expand U.S.-Chinese dialogue on control of WMD, humanitarian concerns; border control in contingencies short of war

Russia

- **Russians feel triply excluded from policy developments**
 - **Blockage of reactor sales to North**
 - **Exclusion from Four Party Talks**
 - **U.S. objections to ROK purchase of Russian weapons systems**
 - **Redefined treaty relationship with North (though without security guarantees)**
 - **Russia still retains influence with North, and hopes to play its way back into peninsular affairs (economic links, defense and diplomacy, weapons sales)**
-  **U.S. policy priorities: vest Russia in longer-range discussions; define options for enlisting Russian cooperation**
-

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U.S. Strategy in Korea:

Reducing Threats, Promoting Stability

The Strategic Opportunity --and the Challenge

- The ground is shifting--on your watch
 - ◆ North Korea decaying, but implications remain unclear
 - ◆ South Korea simultaneously assertive, indecisive
- Current conditions present major opportunities
 - ◆ U.S. has potential leverage in Pyongyang and Seoul
 - ◆ Interests of major powers currently compatible
 - ◆ Opportunity to secure long-term U.S. interests
- Uncertainties/risks remain ample and worrisome
 - ◆ Risks of instability/conflict remain very high
 - ◆ Major power interests likely to diverge when present conditions change (i.e. China, Japan prefer *status quo*)
- U.S. policy lacks clarity

U.S. Interests on the Peninsula

- Currently: deterring war, reducing threats, strengthening the alliance, while reducing peninsular instability
- Near term: a stable Korea free of major tension
 - ◆ Dilemma inherent in policy choices:
 - *Stabilization* could prolong national division
 - *Early unification* fraught with uncertainties, perils
- Long term: a unified, democratic, non-nuclear Korea
 - ◆ Able to defend itself without threatening its neighbors--or being threatened by them
 - ◆ Aligned with U.S., supportive of U.S. security goals
 - ◆ Friendly with--but not overly close to--China

Where We Are Today

- North Korean vulnerabilities (food/energy) could lead to:
 - ◆ Negotiating breakthrough among two Koreas, U.S., China
 - ◆ Internal instability, humanitarian crises
 - ◆ Defiant, aggressive North Korean military
- South Korean leadership vacuum has resulted in:
 - ◆ Preoccupation with domestic political, economic problems
 - ◆ Inability to devise strategy toward the North
- U.S. lack of policy consensus highlights need to:
 - ◆ Fully exploit all-source intelligence on North Korea
 - ◆ Formulate comprehensive gameplan for Four Party Talks
 - ◆ Enhance consultations with Japan, China, Russia
 - ◆ Create USG focal point for Korean Peninsula

Implications for DoD

- U.S.-ROK combined deterrence/defense capabilities currently adequate, but ROK needs to:
 - ◆ Concentrate on extant North Korean military threat and contingencies short of war
 - ◆ Shift planning, procurement focus away from hypothetical future threat from Japan
 - ◆ Forswear any intention of unilateral action
- In addition to war, DoD needs to be prepared for full array of other possible changes to *status quo*:
 - ◆ Contingencies short of war
 - ◆ Productive negotiations
 - ◆ Post-unification Korea

Contingencies Short of War

- Array of contingencies now looms, requiring heightened planning, policy attention
 - ◆ Refugee flows
 - ◆ Civil unrest
 - ◆ Rogue military commanders
 - ◆ Control of WMD
- Augmented combined planning--based on clear political guidance--would reduce possibility of ROK preemption, unilateral action
- Need to establish primacy of CFC/UNC
 - ◆ Clarify CINCCFC/UNC responsibility for both 5027 *and* contingencies short of war

Contingencies Short of War (cont.)

- Need to clarify Japan's role
 - ◆ Must be compatible with ROK sensitivities, U.S. interests/needs
 - ◆ Opportunity to build on trends in U.S.-ROK-Japan trilateral security cooperation, Japanese deliberations on Defense Guidelines
- Need to engage China in parallel process (bilateral and/or trilateral)
 - ◆ Military-to-military understandings (movement of forces, etc.)
 - ◆ Control of WMD, control of borders, humanitarian issues
- Need to capitalize on Russian representation/influence in Pyongyang

Negotiations

- Paramount goal should be threat reduction
 - ◆ Emphasis on offensive capabilities, esp. CBW, missiles
 - ◆ Measurable, verifiable, with each additional step contingent on explicit *quid pro quos*
 - ◆ Requires enhanced DoD role in negotiations
- Major issues:
 - ◆ Getting priorities right (threat reduction, rather than concern with “process,” economic reform)
 - ◆ Giving away too much food for too little
 - ◆ Diverging ROK and U.S. objectives/approaches
- Political/diplomatic, commercial commitments in Agreed Framework remain unfulfilled

Post-Unification Korea

- U.S. forces in Korea still desirable after unification
 - ◆ Protect U.S. geostrategic interests, including regional stability and ROK independence
 - ◆ Make Japan's hosting of U.S. forces easier
- Ideally, U.S. forces would be:
 - ◆ Restructured (for a regional, power projection mission)
 - ◆ Relocated (consolidated at existing bases, out of urban areas)
- But potential difficulties loom:
 - ◆ Korean nationalism could push forces out
 - ◆ U.S. domestic politics could pull forces out
 - ◆ China's reactions will be largely determined by state of Sino-U.S. relations, Japan-U.S. alliance

Policy Recommendations

- **Food Aid**

- ◆ Tolerate/encourage humanitarian food aid by NGOs and other countries
- ◆ Tie USG assistance beyond humanitarian level to threat reduction

- **Command Relations**

- ◆ Clarify command relations in favor of CINCCFC/UNC for contingencies short of war:
 - With ROK MND/JCS
 - With CINCPAC

Policy Recommendations (cont.)

- **Regional Policy Coordination**
 - ◆ Sustain current US/ROK/GOJ consultative process on contingencies short of war
 - ◆ Retain momentum in review of US-Japan Defense Guidelines
 - ◆ Pursue closer military-to-military dialogue with China on Korean contingencies
 - ◆ Engage Russia in bilateral political/military talks
- **Long-Term US Military Presence in Korea**
 - ◆ Request Joint Staff/OSD study on future US military presence (size, composition, location) in post-unification Korea
 - ◆ Discuss completed study with ROK officials at next SCM

Policy Recommendations (cont.)

- **Intelligence**

- ◆ More rigorous, systematic, and comprehensive intelligence effort, to include:
 - Full exploitation of information acquired by NGOs and international groups with access to North Korea
 - Thorough and early USG debrief of defectors

- **U.S. Policy Coordination**

- ◆ Back appointment of high-level Administration “point man” on Korea policy
- ◆ Appoint a Special Assistant for Korea reporting directly to SecDef
- ◆ DoD’s representative to Four Party Talks should be a ranking member of US negotiating team

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002. briefing slides	re Day 3 planning simulation seminar (32 pages)	00/00/0000	P1/b(1)

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▲
Bell's
V-22 Osprey

▲
Boeing's
AH-64 Apache

Consolidation Hovers Over A Flat Helicopter Market

Boeing's Civil Unit a Possible Acquisition Target of Bell

By Tim Smart
Washington Post Staff Writer

On a cool, cloudless day at the Patuxent River Naval Air Station in Southern Maryland, U.S. Marine Corps pilots put the V-22 tilt-rotor helicopter through its paces as it hovers a few feet off the tarmac. The V-22 "Osprey" is a unique bird, combining the speed of an airplane with the takeoff and landing capability of a helicopter.

The V-22, which has survived repeated attempts to kill it, is unusual for another reason. As a \$40 billion program at a time of shrinking defense budgets, it represents one of the few bright prospects in the otherwise flat helicopter industry.

Unlike other parts of the aerospace business, helicopter manufacturers have not suffered the kind of Darwinian consolidation that in a few years has reduced the number of military plane makers to two.

A key reason is that major helicopter makers all are divisions or subsidiaries of larger, multinational companies such as United Technologies Corp., Boeing Co. and Textron Inc. Their rich parents have helped them withstand lean times, in which only about a third of the production capacity is being used, industry experts said.


"At least for the time being, all of the helicopter companies are generating profits and cash," said Terry D. Stinson, president and chief executive of Textron's Bell helicopter unit, which is teamed with Boeing on the V-22.

While there have been some combinations, such as the 1992 merger of the helicopter units of France's Aerospatiale and Germany's Daimler-Benz into Eurocopter, as well as last year's acquisition of McDonnell Douglas Corp. by Boeing, the world market still has four major helicopter companies along with a slew of

MAJOR FLIERS


Helicopter manufacturing, with four major players, has so far avoided the major consolidation of other aerospace companies

Revenue share, 1997-2006*



... with the military market expected to pick up slightly.

Revenue by market, 1997-2006*
IN BILLIONS OF 1997 DOLLARS



SOURCE: Teal Group

*Projected

GRAPHIC BY ROBERT DORRELL—THE WASHINGTON POST

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See HELICOPTERS, G2, Col. 1

Consolidation Prospects Hover Over the Helicopter Industry

HELICOPTERS, From G1

smaller niche players that all fight for a piece of a slow-growth business.

"The helicopter industry was slower than most of the other aerospace industries in getting to the consolidation table and it's probably still lagging," said Dean Borgman, Boeing senior vice president.

That soon may change. Industry speculation in recent weeks has focused on a possible sale of Boeing's civil helicopter business to Bell. The companies would not comment on any talks.

Boeing has strengthened its competitive position through its 1997 acquisition of McDonnell Douglas, whose Apache helicopter is a mainstay of the Army. Boeing is a partner with Bell in the V-22 program while also jointly working with the Sikorsky division of United Technologies on the RAH-66 Comanche, a stealthy scout helicopter.

"On the military side, I would say that if you looked at the three out there today and the new company, we represent the most enviable," Borgman said.

Teal Group, a Fairfax-based aerospace consulting firm, estimates that Boeing will lead the helicopter market over the next 10 years, with about a 25 percent share of the \$52 billion worth of helicopters forecast to be sold worldwide.

But analysts said that Boeing is weak in civil helicopters, a liability that some in the industry thought would be resolved by Boeing selling its helicopter business to Sikorsky or acquiring Sikorsky. Either of those options seems less likely, analysts said, now that Boeing has acquired McDonnell Douglas and also given speculation about a Bell-Boeing deal.

"While all companies have been hurt by the precipitous decline in military spending, Sikorsky

has experienced the worst fall from grace," said a recent market forecast issued by the Teal Group.

For example, in 1990 Sikorsky held a 41 percent share of the world rotorcraft market, with deliveries worth about \$2.5 billion, according to Teal. By 1996,

"The helicopter industry was slower than most of the other aerospace industries in getting to the consolidation table."

—Dean Borgman, Boeing senior vice president

this had declined to a 27 percent share, worth just over \$1 billion.

The Teal forecast predicts Sikorsky's share of the market will fall even further over the next decade, to 14 percent in 2006, or about \$750 million in sales.

"Sikorsky is the weak sister, and we know that," says Pete Bzdak, a Pentagon engineer who helped prepare a 1995 "industrial assessment" of the helicopter market for the Defense Department.

To help steady Sikorsky and keep the production lines at its Stratford, Conn., factory moving, Congress in recent years has appropriated enough money for the Army to buy a couple dozen Sikorsky Blackhawks annually until production of the high-tech Comanche starts up in 2004 or 2005.

This past budget cycle was no exception. The Clinton administration initially requested \$183 million to buy 18 UH-60 Blackhawks, but House members added \$90 million for an extra 12 helicopters. The Senate added even more, \$127 million, to buy a

total of 36 helicopters. The final budget appropriation came to \$272 million for 28 helicopters.

That is still way below the 10 to 12 Blackhawks a month that Sikorsky built during the heyday of the program in the late 1980s and early 1990s, but with foreign sales, it should allow the company to muddle through until Comanche kicks in.

"My view on Sikorsky right now is that the Blackhawk gives them the financial stream to go forward," Stinson said.

Bell, by comparison, has a strong civil aviation business and with the V-22 it is sitting pretty. The company also is marketing a civil version of the tilt-rotor craft, dubbed the 609, to corporate clients.

Stinson says the combination of speed and range make the 609, priced between \$8 million and \$10 million, a natural for the offshore oil-exploration business.

"That business is extremely strong," Stinson said. "It's as strong as it's ever been. Right now, we are sitting on about 55 orders [for the 609]."

Balancing commercial and military business is critical in the helicopter industry. While there are more civil helicopters built, military machines tend to be of higher value and the programs help finance research on new models, from which civil designs are often derived.

While the U.S. military has been buying fewer helicopters in recent years, foreign governments have been aggressive purchasers, especially of advanced American models such as the Blackhawk and Apache.

U.S. makers have successfully pressured the Clinton administration for the right to bid on an upcoming contest in Turkey for attack helicopters worth about \$3 billion. But congressional opposition over Turkey's less-than-stellar record on human rights has scuttled some arms deals with that nation.

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Leadership Issues

1100 Thursday.

"Re communication of Nt Leadership" **Deliberate Pol-Mil Planning**

Incl

Structure of Key Pol-Mil Planning Elements

Pol Planning or
V.S.

- Global-Asia Steering Group (pre-ExComm): Established and chaired by the NSC. Provides oversight of interagency Pol-Mil planning effort. Consists of ASD-level participants from critical agencies. The Steering Group is the forerunner to the ExComm.
- Global-Asia Interagency Working Group: Established by the Steering Group, co-chaired by designated NSC Directors. Determines planning milestones, sets planning priorities and coordinates interagency planning efforts. Reports to and receives planning guidance from the Steering Group. Staffed by one representative from each Steering Group participant, normally at the Office Director level with critical functional or regional expertise. The agency Working Group representative would lead the agency Planning Team.
- Agency Planning Team: Established by the ASD-level participant on the Steering Group and headed by the agency rep on the Interagency Working Group. Develops agency assessments, prepares a detailed estimate of the situation, and writes agency plans for the Pol-Mil Plan.

Deliberate Pol-Mil Planning Process

- Phase I—Initiation: Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs states the planning task and authorizes the NSC to establish a Pol-Mil planning effort for a potential complex emergency. Based on the APNSA's planning guidance, NSC assesses preliminary planning requirements, prepares a framework for Pol-Mil planning, and forms a Steering Group. Upon review of the framework for Pol-Mil planning, the Steering Group provides initial scenario planning guidance and forms a Interagency Working Group.
- Phase II—Pol-Mil Concept Development: Based on the planning scenario guidance provided by the Steering Group, the Working Group deduces a strategic purpose, mission, and desired end state. It identifies major components of the Pol-Mil planning task. It conducts initial staff assessments of the sub-components of the Pol-Mil planning task. Upon completion of initial planning assessments, the Working Group recommends a Pol-Mil Concept to the Steering Group for further development.
- Phase III—Pol-Mil Plan Development: Steering Group issues its Pol-Mil Concept and provides guidance for further plan development to the Working Group. The Working Group and Agency Planning Teams develop plans for assigned areas of responsibility. Agencies conduct simulations on key elements of the plan.
- Phase IV—Plan Review and Approval: Agencies present their portion of the Pol-Mil Plan to the Steering Group. Steering group issues guidance for agency plan development and pre-deployment interagency rehearsal.

Korea Pol-Mil Concept Development Phase

Step 1 – *Initial Mission Analysis for Implosion & Unification*—based on the planning scenario, the Working Group deduces the U.S. strategic purpose, mission, and desired endstate for North Korean implosion and subsequent Korean unification.

Step 2 – *Working Group Planning Guidance*—Within the Working Group, NSC outlines the major components for planning and issues planning guidance to agency Planning Teams for preparing initial staff assessments.

- Major Components for Planning (See attached)
- Agency Team Planning Guidance
 - Illustrative planning scenario for North Korean implosion
 - Planning assumptions for pol-mil planning
 - Unification process options
 - Over-riding considerations for planning
 - Planning Schedule

3 – *Initial Staff Assessments*—Agency Planning Teams perform an initial assessment of the major component assigned by the Working Group. These Planning Team assessments identify critical planning sub-tasks, intelligence requirements, policy issues, and so forth. Agency Planning Teams prepare a staff assessment as part of the overall interagency assessment for review by the Steering Group. The content of agency Planning Team Assessments include the following issues:

- objectives and desired endstate*
- What key mission tasks, in priority, need to be undertaken and successfully accomplished?
 - *who are key players*
 - In this area, what are the lessons from the German (or other) unification experience(s)?
 - How does the Korean situation modify or nullify these lessons?
 - What are the special considerations for Korean implosion / reunification
 - What are the risks associated with executing any plan? What's at stake?
 - *what is the status of S. Korean planing* *who is mostly responsible for planing*
 - What critical drivers will determine the success or failure of a plan for these tasks?
 - What are the intelligence requirements for further planning?
 - What are likely courses of action that should be considered?
 - What are the critical support / resource needs associated with these courses of action
 - What special procedural / process mechanisms need to be in place to ensure success?
 - What actions need to be taken early on to ensure the success of the plan?
 - What steps are needed, if any, to strengthen South Korean capacity for reunification?
 - What policy issues need to be resolved?

4 – *Interagency Assessment*—the Working Group conducts an offsite to evaluate agency Planning Team assessments. It prepares an interagency estimate of the situation that includes all the major components of the Pol-Mil planning task for consideration by the Steering Group.

5 – *Steering Group Pol-Mil Concept*—based on the interagency assessment, the Steering Group decides on the course of action to accomplish the mission and gives the rationale for that decision. The Steering Group's Pol-Mil Concept forms the basis for subsequent estimates and agency plans.

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