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003. paper	re North Korea (3 pages)	09/12/1997	P1/b(1)
004. draft	report re East Asia (7 pages)	10/00/1997	P1/b(1)
005. paper	re China (4 pages)	12/19/1997	P1/b(1)
006. report	re Korean Peninsula (15 pages)	05/00/1996	P1/b(1)

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RESTRICTION CODES

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KOREA AND THE THIRTIES (A)

Early in the morning of Sunday, June 25, 1950, the telephone rang in the Seoul residence of the United States Ambassador to the Republic of Korea, John J. Muccio. It was his deputy chief, E. F. Drumright. "Brace yourself for a shock, John," Drumright warned. "The Communists are hitting all along the front!" Muccio rushed to the Embassy to confirm the report; border clashes had become frequent during the preceding year. There had been over 500 in one month alone. Washington need not be bothered by a false alarm.

The invasion caught the Republic of Korea and its American sponsors by surprise. Just before dawn, 110,000 heavily equipped North Korean soldiers swept across the border at the 38th parallel in an attempt to conquer the southern half of the peninsula. As they streamed down the corridor towards Seoul, forty-five miles south of the parallel, the South Korean military began a frantic attempt to retrieve vacationing officers and round up its forces, one-third of which were on leave. Meanwhile, as Muccio carefully prepared his first dispatch to his superiors in Washington, President Harry S. Truman, as yet unaware of the developments which would lead to his "most important decision as President,"¹ was spending a quiet Saturday evening with his family in Independence, Missouri.

News of the invasion took nearly seven hours to reach officials in the United States. At 9:26 PM (EDT), Saturday, June 24, Muccio's cable arrived at the State Department. Waiting for it were the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, Dean Rusk, and Frank Pace, Jr., the Secretary of the Army. (Rusk and Pace had been alerted earlier in the evening by an unconfirmed report reaching United Press of heavy fighting along the 38th parallel.) Muccio's message relayed the sketchy information he had concerning the size and position of the North Korean forces before concluding, "It would appear from the nature of the attack and the manner in which it was launched that it constitutes an all-out offensive against the Republic of Korea."² Moments later the telephone was ringing at the Maryland farm of Secretary of State Dean Acheson; it was Rusk, suggesting that he had some news the President ought to hear.

At 11:20 PM (EDT), over eight hours after the first North Korean shells exploded across the 38th parallel, Acheson phoned the President in Independence to inform him of the invasion. Truman told Acheson that he would return to the capital at once, but the Secretary of State dissuaded him, suggesting that he wait until Sunday morning, when Acheson would call with a reappraisal of the situation. Acheson also recommended that the United States request an emergency meeting of the United Nations Security Council to declare that the North Koreans had committed an act of aggression and to call for a cease fire. The President agreed.

Acheson's second call to Independence came at 2:45 Sunday afternoon. He reported that the Security Council would assemble early that evening to consider the resolution drafted by the State Department. The news from Korea was bad.

This case was prepared by Philip F. Bennett under the supervision of Dr. Melanie Billings-Yun and Professor Richard E. Neustadt for use at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. Work on this case was made possible by a grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities. (0783)

Muccio's earlier estimate had been confirmed and, according to the Secretary of State, the South Korean front was "disintegrating." Truman said he would fly to Washington immediately; he asked Acheson to prepare a list of recommendations for his review when he arrived at the capital.

As the President sat alone in his compartment during the three-hour flight to Washington, he reflected on the events unfolding in Korea. He recalled, "In my generation, this was not the first occasion when the strong had attacked the weak." Writing in his memoirs years later, Truman continued,

I recalled some earlier instances: Manchuria, Ethiopia, Austria. I remembered how each time that the democracies failed to act it had encouraged the aggressors to keep going ahead. Communism was acting in Korea just as Hitler, Mussolini, and the Japanese had acted ten, fifteen, and twenty years earlier. I felt certain that if South Korea was allowed to fall, Communist leaders would be emboldened to override nations closer to our own shores. If the Communists were permitted to force their way into the Republic of Korea without opposition from the free world, no small nation would have the courage to resist threats and aggression by stronger Communist neighbors. If this was allowed to go unchallenged, it would mean a third world war, just as similar incidents had brought on the second world war.³

This analysis would be Truman's constant companion during the following days of decision.

Two Koreas

In 1943 the Korean peninsula came to the attention of American foreign policy planners as part of President Roosevelt's design for postwar Asia. Meeting with Winston Churchill and Chiang Kai-Shek at Cairo, Roosevelt announced that the Allied nations, "mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent."⁴ Roosevelt believed that as a model of democratic self-government, Korea would eventually contribute to stability and liberation throughout the Far East.

The Cairo Declaration promised self-determination to a country traditionally beset by foreign domination. For centuries the isolated cultural ward of the Chinese Empire, the ancient Korean nation was dubbed the "Hermit Kingdom" by early traders and voyagers. However, the increasing importance of naval power during the nineteenth century prompted Korea's other two neighbors, Japan and Russia, to challenge China's hegemony on the peninsula. Viewed by the Japanese as "a dagger pointed at the heart of Japan" and by Russia as a treasured outlet to the warm water of the Pacific, Korea became a strategic prize. In 1882 European powers vying for commercial advantage joined in the fray and forced Korea to open its doors to general imperialist interests.

During the next thirty years Koreans found themselves largely incapable of controlling the international confrontation brewing at their borders. After military victories in 1895 and 1905, Japan succeeded in driving off its two chief

rivals--first China and then Russia--and formally annexed Korea in 1910. The United States, initially pleased to see Russia humbled in the Pacific, and only peripherally interested in the disposition of Korea, recognized Japanese rule.

Japan then turned its attention to the more strategically vital Manchuria, and Korea became submerged as a source of international concern, until it resurfaced in the Allied proclamation at Cairo. Subsequent verbal agreements between Stalin and Roosevelt at Teheran and Yalta elaborated the terms of the Cairo message.

At Yalta Roosevelt suggested that an international trusteeship be established to guide the Koreans to self-government. Allied tutelage would ensure that when Korea became a sovereign state ("in due course") it would embody the principles of stable democracies throughout the world. Roosevelt hoped to create a pattern for the future of other small nations. Bargaining for Soviet entry into the Pacific war, FDR promised Stalin that the United States would recognize Russia's pre-1905 rights in the Orient. Although he and Stalin did not officially agree to the specific Allied formula for Korea's future, Roosevelt believed he had obtained Stalin's assent on two crucial points: Korea would be placed under a multinational trusteeship; and no foreign troops would be permanently stationed on the peninsula.

On August 6, 1945, the US dropped an atomic bomb on the Japanese city of Hiroshima. On August 8 the Soviet Union declared war on Japan and ordered the Red Army to enter Manchuria and northern Korea, both still in enemy control. Six days later, five days after a second atomic bomb was dropped, the Japanese government surrendered.

On the eve of the Japanese capitulation, the United States had no plans to send troops to Korea. The nearest US forces were 600 miles from the Asian mainland. But the surrender of the Japanese Army presented new problems to government planners, and Secretary of State James Byrnes suggested that American soldiers sail to southern Korea to facilitate the liberation of the peninsula and prevent the Soviet Army from driving further south. President Truman (in office just four months since Roosevelt's death) and Pentagon officials approved the proposal and ordered General Douglas MacArthur, who was coordinating the Japanese surrender, to take possession of the country up to the 38th parallel. The Soviet Union was informed of the decision and did not protest.

State Department officials chose the 38th parallel as the most convenient demarcation for the purposes of the Japanese surrender. The boundary had not been discussed at any of the Allied wartime conferences. According to President Truman's memoirs, the division was "proposed by us as a practical solution when the sudden collapse of the Japanese war machine created a vacuum in Korea."⁵ It was intended to be temporary and only to fix responsibility between Soviet and American troops. Permanent division of Korea was not considered by American strategists. Joint trusteeship throughout the country would be established in accordance with the previous agreements after the Japanese had been removed.

When General John Hodge arrived in Korea on September 8, 1945, commanding 72,000 American troops, he was surprised by a welcome from Koreans claiming to be representatives of the new national government. Hodge had been instructed by

Washington to assume military and political command of all territory south of the 38th parallel in preparation for the subsequent transfer of authority to Allied trustees. However, he found that most Koreans, unfamiliar with the notion of "in due course," believed that the Cairo declaration promised immediate independence."⁶ Hundreds of Korean political organizations had been hastily concocted since the Japanese surrender, and they now offered to take control of the entire country. Hodge was ill-prepared to deal with the unexpected development. Without any informed advice from his aides or from Washington, and suspicious of what he perceived as communist leanings in the provisional administration, Hodge refused to recognize the Korean proposals. Hodge personally wanted American forces out of Korea, but he didn't want to leave the entire country in communist hands.

Three months later Hodge and his men were no closer to going home. Trusteeship was beginning to seem increasingly remote. Hodge was frustrated by his inability to negotiate with the Soviets, the ambiguity of American policy, and the growing discontent among Koreans. The Secretary of State had discussed the Korean situation with the Russians at Moscow in December 1945 and reached an agreement that Allied troops would consult with "democratic" elements in preparation for independence. The Soviets, however, interpreted "democratic" as applying to communists and their allies, and they became intent on establishing a communist regime in the north. For Koreans the failure of north and south to cooperate posed severe economic problems, since the 38th parallel split the industrial north from the agricultural south. Political unrest caused riots in many southern cities. Dismayed by the stalemate and instability, Hodge wrote to the Joint Chiefs of Staff: "The U.S. occupation of Korea under present conditions and policies is surely drifting to the edge of a political-economic abyss from which it can never be retrieved with any credit to the United States' prestige in the Far East."⁷ He recommended that American troops get out as soon as possible.

Although Hodge's evaluation fell upon sympathetic ears among his military colleagues in Washington, the State Department at first opposed any move to evacuate American forces from Korea. Officials in State considered the American occupation valuable in negotiations with recalcitrant Russians stalling agreements elsewhere. State was also concerned with preventing a Soviet foothold in East Asia, and in 1946 departmental advisers convinced President Truman that Korea was "an ideological battleground upon which our entire success in Asia may depend."⁸ Acting on the advice of the chief of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, Truman signed a statement: "I am convinced that we may be required to stay in Korea a considerable length of time."⁹

While the State Department was trying to convince Truman of the political importance of continued American involvement in Korea, the American defense establishment argued for withdrawal on the basis of military considerations. Facing budget stringency, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consistently reiterated the danger of American commitment to an area which was both unstable and of negligible strategic value in a war with Russia or China. In April 1947 Secretary of War Robert Patterson told a new Secretary of State, General George C. Marshall, "I am convinced that the United States should pursue forcefully a course of action whereby we get out of Korea at an early date."¹⁰ The Joint Chiefs supported Patterson's recommendation. A year later, at a meeting of the National Security Council, the Joint Chiefs offered a written proposal for withdrawal which was approved by the President and the NSC. One sentence of the paper argued: "The United States should not become so irrecoverably involved in the Korean situation that an action taken by any faction in Korea or by any other power in Korea could be considered a 'casus belli' for the United States."¹¹

The NSC paper of 1948 proposed that American troops be called home by the end of the year. As a further step towards Korean self-sufficiency, Marshall recommended that elections be held in both north and south Korea under United Nations supervision. On April 15, 1948, Syngman Rhee was elected President of the American zone, and the Republic of Korea (commonly called South Korea) came into existence. Rhee was the American-educated leader of Korea's right wing, and his hostility toward political opponents made some American officials concerned that he would retard the growth of democratic institutions. When Rhee began suspending political freedoms in September 1949 (arresting 89,710 people during the following eight months for "disturbing the tranquility of the state"), and threatened to postpone the election scheduled for May 1950, he received a sharply worded warning from Secretary Acheson that American aid was predicated on the development of democracy in the new republic.

Meanwhile, the Soviet Union, rejecting United Nations involvement, supervised its own elections three weeks later. Ninety-eight percent of the voters in the north Korean zone chose Kim Il-Sung as first Premier of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea). Although apparently the hand-picked choice of Russian officialdom, Kim Il-Sung was not originally among the elite group of Koreans who had been raised and trained in the Soviet Union. He had spent much of his youth in Manchuria, where he became an anti-Japanese guerrilla, leading successful raids on Japanese outposts in northern Korea. In 1942 he fled to the Soviet Union under the pressure of Japanese mop-up campaigns, and returned to Korea in September 1945 as a major in the Red Army. With the endorsement of the Soviet leadership, he successfully established a Korean Workers Party and began the process of consolidation that would result, after some serious internal quarrels, in his victory.

The Soviet Union announced shortly after Kim's election that it would be removing its troops from Korea at the request of the North Korean government, and invited the United States to follow suit. The State Department argued against compliance with the Soviet suggestion on the grounds that American withdrawal would invite communist aggression against the weaker South. However, this time their recommendation was drowned out by a vote in the United Nations General Assembly favoring the withdrawal of all occupation forces from the peninsula.

In March 1949 the National Security Council devoted another session to review and clarification of American policy in Korea. The Joint Chiefs of Staff presented a report from General MacArthur, commander of the postwar occupation of Japan. His report asserted that he could not train and equip a South Korean Army capable of deflecting a North Korean attack. MacArthur added, "It should be recognized that in the event of any serious threat to the security of Korea, strategic and military considerations will force abandonment of any pretense of [US] military support."¹² The general recommended withdrawal of Hodge's forces by May 1949.

Influenced by MacArthur's statement as well as by their own conclusions in the 1948 meeting, members of the National Security Council, including State, recommended that all American troops be recalled from Korea by June 29, 1949. The President agreed. A 500-man military advisory group would remain to help the South Koreans bolster their defenses. A request for financial assistance was also drawn up. However, the NSC report made it clear that the United States no longer considered itself responsible for the fate of the Republic of Korea. The Joint Chiefs, summarizing their arguments, issued the following evaluation:

From the strategic viewpoint, the position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding Korea . . . is that Korea is of little strategic value to the United States and that any commitment to United States use of military force in Korea would be ill-advised and impracticable in view of the potentialities of the over-all world situation and of our heavy international obligations as compared with our current military strength.¹³

The State Department no longer challenged this attitude. The new Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, and the man whom he appointed as Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs, Dean Rusk, supported the definition of American policy outlined in the NSC papers of 1948 and 1949. Like the President, Acheson was much more concerned with what the Joint Chiefs referred to as "potentialities of the overall world situation," specifically, Soviet aggression in Eastern Europe.

During the years following World War II, the fulcrum in the balance of power between the Soviet Union and the United States was located in the Mediterranean, not the Pacific. President Truman faced confrontations with communism in Iran (1946), Italy and France (1947), Greece and Turkey (1947-48), and Berlin (1948-49), which prompted the celebrated Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and the eventual creation of NATO. The introduction of the Truman Doctrine in 1947 signaled transformation of American policy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union from one of collaboration to the containment which characterized the postwar decades. Truman's immediate concern was to secure aid for non-communist forces in Greece and Turkey, but his revised policy was also a strong statement of principle. In his speech to Congress outlining the Truman Doctrine, the President concluded, "I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities and outside pressures."¹⁴ As Truman had told his Secretary of State in 1946, "unless Russia is faced with an iron fist and strong language, another war is in the making."¹⁵

In fall 1949 two startling events--the explosion of the first Soviet atomic bomb and the communist victory in China--intensified the Administration's commitment to containment by making the task seem at once harder and more urgent. In April 1950 a National Security Council study-group under Acheson's leadership, concluded that the United States was entering a period of maximum danger in its relations with the Soviet Union. Their report, numbered NSC-68, argued that the Soviet threat could be assuaged only by massive American rearmament. The recommendation conflicted with Truman's current budgeting, which Secretary of Defense Johnson had vociferously supported. The divergent goals were about to be reviewed when the North Koreans marched. Their attack seemed to square with the logic of NSC-68, although not with its geographical emphasis.

The Administration was not prepared for the communist invasion in Korea. As Acheson recalled in his memoirs, "For some months, after tensions had mounted after the Berlin blockade, we had run exercises on danger spots for renewed Soviet probing of our determination. Korea was on the list but among the favorites."¹⁶ Acheson continued elsewhere, "The view was generally held that since the Communists had far from exhausted the potentialities for obtaining their objectives through guerrilla and psychological warfare, political pressure and stimulation, such means would probably continue to be used rather than overt military aggression."¹⁷ Indeed, insofar as Acheson, the rest of the Administration, and the

Pentagon were concerned that war might break out in Korea, they were more worried that it would be initiated by the belligerent Rhee. The State Department and the Embassy at Seoul had discussed means of restraining the South from attacking the North.

Five months before the attack by the North on South Korea, Acheson delivered a major speech on Asian policy before the National Press Club. In his address he fixed limits to American responsibility and interests in the Far East, outlining the political considerations which supported the conclusions which the Joint Chiefs of Staff had reached earlier on the basis of military logic. The Secretary of State declared that the American defense perimeter in the Pacific ran from the Aleutians to the Philippines, including Japan and the Ryukyus but not Formosa or Korea. Wars on the Asian mainland should be fought by Asians. Acheson said,

. . . [I]t must be clear that no person can guarantee these areas against military attack.

Should . . . an attack occur . . . the initial reliance must be on the people attacked to resist it and then upon the commitments of the entire civilized world under the Charter of the United Nations which so far has not proved a weak reed to lean on by any people who are determined to protect their independence against outside aggression.¹⁸

Acheson contended that stability in Asia could not be ensured by military means alone, and that "subversion and penetration" had to be countered through fostering stronger political institutions. Outside its defense perimeter, the United States would offer its wealth, knowledge, and experience, but the ultimate burden would fall on the native people themselves.

Washington Decisions

When he arrived at the airport in Washington, Truman was met by Acheson and Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson. On the drive into town, one of the President's first remarks to Johnson was that he intended to deal with the North Koreans by "hitting them hard."¹⁹

Later that evening, Truman met with thirteen of his closest advisers at Blair House, the President's temporary residence across the street from the White House. Included in the conference were Acheson, Rusk, Johnson, and three service secretaries, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Under Secretary of State James Webb, and Ambassador-at-Large Philip Jessup. Truman read Muccio's cable for the first time and was told by Acheson that the UN Security Council had voted unanimously for North Korean withdrawal. (The Russians had not participated in the vote; they had been boycotting the council since its refusal to grant the Chinese Communists membership months earlier.) Acheson then presented three recommendations for immediate US action: that General MacArthur should evacuate all Americans from Korea; that the general should begin providing limited military supplies to the ROK Army, and that the American 7th Fleet should be ordered north to protect Taiwan against any attack from the mainland. After discussion, Truman approved all three of the suggestions and instructed the service chiefs to prepare the necessary orders for the eventual use of American units if the UN should call for action against North Korea.²⁰

Truman also raised, for the first of many times, the question of the Soviet Union's role in the North Korean attack. Although there was no direct evidence of Soviet involvement, none of the participants at the Blair House conference doubted that Moscow had instigated the invasion. Truman believed that "the Russians were trying to get Korea by default, gambling that we would be afraid of starting a third world war. . . ." ²¹ The President was concerned that the Soviets were attempting to draw American attention away from Europe while they launched more important operations there. Truman ordered all American overseas intelligence sources on alert. Referring again to Korea, Truman said he felt "most emphatically" that "the line would have to be drawn." ²² Aggression could not go unchallenged. Placing his attitude in the context of the period, Truman related in his memoirs,

If . . . the threat to South Korea was met firmly and successfully, it would add to our successess in Iran, Berlin, and Greece a fourth success in opposition to the aggressive moves of the Communists. And each success, we suggested to our allies, was likely to add to the caution of the Soviets in undertaking new efforts of this kind. ²³

During the first Blair House conference, information from Korea was still limited, and it was unclear whether or not the South Koreans would be able to recover in time to repel the invasion without outside assistance. By Monday afternoon, however, it was apparent that the situation on the peninsula was deteriorating rapidly. North Korean troops were reportedly nearing the outskirts of Seoul and Rhee's government was preparing to abandon the capital. In light of the gravity of the situation, Truman asked his military and diplomatic advisers to meet with him again that evening at Blair House.

Early on Monday Truman had pointed to Korea on a globe and commented to an aide, "Korea is the Greece of the Far East. If we are tough now they won't take any next steps." ²⁴ At the second Blair House meeting hours later, the President was read a report from Douglas MacArthur, who estimated that "complete collapse [in South Korea] is imminent." Truman knew he faced the most crucial choice of his presidency. "I've spent five years trying to avoid making a decision like the one I've had to make tonight," he confided to his advisers. ²⁵ Yet he made it without reservation. "There was now no doubt!" he recalled simply. "The Republic of Korea needed to be helped at once if it were not to be overrun." ²⁶ Truman ordered MacArthur to use American naval and air forces to support the ROK Army, restricting operations to south of the 38th parallel. None of those present at the meeting openly opposed the President's decision.

On Tuesday, June 27, the United Nations Security Council met again and recommended that its members "furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international security in the area." ²⁷ Meanwhile, Truman was meeting with Congressional leaders, bringing them up to date and informing them that American planes would soon be challenging North Korean positions south of the 38th parallel. The next day the Senate voted unanimously to give the President authority to invoke the Selective Service laws and to call the armed forces reserves to active duty.

At 5 PM, Thursday, June 29, the President convened the National Security Council for a forty-minute meeting at the White House. Secretary Johnson summarized the main difficulties impeding military operations in Korea and requested that air and naval activity be extended to North Korea. He also asked that the US commit a limited number of infantrymen to assist in the continuing evacuation of Americans from the peninsula. The President gave his approval, again without any dissent from his advisers, and authorized Johnson to transmit the orders to MacArthur in Tokyo.

At 3 AM Friday an urgent cable from MacArthur reached the Pentagon. Returning from a personal reconnaissance mission at the front, MacArthur had concluded that American troops would be necessary to stem the North Korean advance. He had just received the news that North Korean tanks had broken through ROK defenses at the Han River and were preparing to capture the entire peninsula. MacArthur requested both a regimental combat team to strengthen the reserves and additional troops with which to mount a counter-offensive. An immediate, clear-cut decision was essential, the general insisted. Secretary of the Army Pace phoned the President at 5 AM and informed him of MacArthur's request. Truman came to a decision without hesitating. "I told Pace," he recalled in his memoirs, "to inform General MacArthur immediately that the use of one regimental combat team was approved."²⁸ Truman would wait until morning before addressing MacArthur's grander plan.

The President met with his advisers in the White House Cabinet Room at 9:30 Friday morning. The meeting lasted thirty minutes. Truman asked for opposition to the general's proposal to engage in a counter-offensive using American troops. There was none. The President then decided to give General MacArthur "full authority to use the troops under his command."²⁹ Previous plans to the contrary, the defense perimeter now included Korea. Americans would fight on the Asian mainland in the interests of national security.

Notes

1. Merle Miller, Plain Speaking (New York: G.P. Putman's Sons, 1973), p. 284.
2. Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, 2 vols. (Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Co., 1955-56), vol. 2, p. 334.
3. Ibid., pp. 332-33.
4. Ibid., p. 316.
5. Ibid., p. 317.
6. Ernest R. May, Lessons of the Past (London: Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 54.
7. Truman, vol. 2, p. 318.
8. Robert J. Donovan, Conflict and Crisis (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1977), p. 249.
9. May, p. 57.
10. Ibid., p. 58.

11. Ibid., pp. 59-60.
12. Ibid., p. 61.
13. Ibid., p. 62.
14. Donovan, p. 284.
15. Truman, vol. 1, p. 552.
16. Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1969), p. 405.
17. May, pp. 63-64.
18. Ibid., pp. 65-66.
19. May, p. 74
20. Truman, vol. 2, p. 335.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid., pp. 339-40.
24. Acheson, p. 14.
25. Miller, p. 279.
26. Truman, vol. 2, p. 337.
27. Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1980), p. 91.
28. Truman, vol. 2, p. 343.
29. Ibid.

(Selected, Annotated Bibliography can be found at end of Korea and the Thirties [B].)

such as promoting peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, mitigating the Asian financial crisis and easing tensions in South Asia.

See CHINA, C4, Col. 1

BY WILLIAM BRAMHALL FOR THE WASHINGTON POST



we fell into a discussion of racism, bias and crimes. As the watch commander that even put in my two-cents' worth on what constitutes hate crime under the D.C. code and how time's perception of events can influence whether a crime is classified as bias- or hate-related. Less than two hours later, I made an announcement and I thought back to our roll call discussion. I didn't consider my actions to be motivated

James Crane is a lieutenant in the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department, assigned to the 7th District in Southeast Washington.

North Korea From The Inside Out

By SELIG S. HARRISON

The most frightening prospect is not that North Korea will collapse. What I fear most is that Kim Jong Il [North Korea's ruler] will bow down to China to get the help he needs, and North Korea will slip into the Chinese orbit. He understands the need for reform. But he won't go beyond partial reform because he fears losing control, and half-way measures won't solve the problems of food and industrial regeneration that North Korea faces."

These are the words of Hwang Jang Yop, the highest ranking defector from North Korea. Last month, he talked intensely and often passionately with me in Seoul about why he does not expect a collapse of the North Korean regime despite its economic difficulties, and why a military coup to overthrow Kim Jong Il is "out of the question." Frail but alert at 76, he spoke frequently in our three-hour interview of the "millions who are hungry" in the North and called for "greatly increased" food aid.

It was our fourth conversation in 11 years. I had interviewed Hwang, then secretary of the ruling Workers Party, three times in Pyongyang, the North Korean capital, before he defected. I found his candor in these meetings, the last in 1994, unusual among North Korean officials and was surprised to find him more interested in discussing the latest intellectual trends in the West than in answering questions about North Korean policy. When I was refused permission to meet with him in 1995, I suspected that he was losing out to the military men and younger party leaders around Kim Jong Il who were taking over after the 1994 death of Hwang's longtime mentor, Kim Il Sung.

Following Hwang's defection in February 1997, then-South

See KOREA, C5, Col. 1

Selig S. Harrison, former Northeast Asia bureau chief of The Washington Post, is a fellow of the 20th Century Fund. He is the first foreign journalist granted permission to interview North Korean defector Hwang Jang Yop.




Under Their Why Some Teachers Leave

By PATRICK WELSH

Each member of the class of 1998 that graduated onto the T.C. Williams football field for graduation last Wednesday spent more than 3,000 hours with teachers over the last three years. Some heard the voice of an individual teacher much more than the voices of their parents. And as the thousands of 450 filed by, I couldn't help but wonder what lasting effect, if any, we teachers will have on these kids. Sure, we filled them with facts, recorded their grades so they could pile up

Patrick Welsh teaches English at T.C. Williams High School in Alexandria.



BACKTALK

An occasional series of reader responses to current topics.

Views on the India and Pakistan nuclear tests appear on Page 2



PHOTOCOPY
PRESERVATION

Defector's View: North Korea's Regime Unlikely to Collapse

KOREA, From C1

Korean President Kim Young Sam kept him tightly under wraps. The only foreigners allowed to meet him were CIA and Japanese intelligence analysts. However, when I attended President Kim Dae Jung's inauguration in February, his advisers readily agreed to a meeting with Hwang.

To have a credible discussion, I argued, I must be permitted to employ a nongovernment interpreter of my own choosing and to meet Hwang without anyone present from the South Korean intelligence organization, the Agency for National Security Planning. These requests were granted, but the ANSP insisted that it would choose the place of the meeting (which meant that it could listen in) and that the location not be revealed.

I also had to promise that I would not use anything designated as "off the record" by Hwang. Thus, although he responded at length to my detailed questions concerning key personalities in the Workers Party, the bureaucracy and the armed forces, naming names and identifying those he regards as sympathetic to reform, he put all of those names off the record.

Hwang's message is a confused one. He wants the United States to promote the downfall of the regime by maintaining economic sanctions but says that a collapse is unlikely and favors increased food aid—even if it helps to sustain Kim Jong Il. Nevertheless, he is a treasure trove of knowledge about the inner workings of the Pyongyang power structure.

Hwang stressed that Kim Jong Il, 56, is not the flaky, dissolute dimwit often depicted in the Western media. "He is intelligent, but he is also arrogant, obsessively conspiratorial and inflexible. He is very wily and manipulative. His only concern is to perpetuate his power. Everything is approached in terms of personal profit and loss."

By contrast, his father, Kim Il Sung, "was also a dictator, of course, but he asked for the opinions of others and showed flexibility. On the whole, I respected him. The trouble is that he completely spoiled his son by giving him absolute power to run the day-to-day affairs of the country as a relatively young man," Hwang said. Now, Kim Jong Il "won't listen to anyone else, and to make matters worse, he is often indecisive, changing his mind according to his mood."

Hwang said Kim Jong Il doesn't meet foreigners because "he is a very private person and considers ceremonial functions as time-consuming and tedious. Unlike his father, he is not really what you can call a political animal. His philosophy is not to let other people know too much about him. He likes to make himself mysterious."

Hwang speculated that Kim Jong Il might create a new governmental structure in which he can retain his position as general



Hwang Jang Yop, left, celebrates his arrival in the Philippines last year.

secretary of the Workers Party and exercise the powers of head of state while delegating ceremonial duties to a figurehead president.

Although Kim Jong Il "understands the need for reform," Hwang said, "he fears that it will open up a Pandora's box. If he could have reform and be sure of keeping his power, he would do it. Don't forget that what has happened in North Korea, all the killings, is much worse than in China or Vietnam. He's afraid it will all come out if he opens up too much."

"If you"—meaning the United States—"want to test him, you should push harder for a liaison office in Pyongyang," Hwang told me. I responded that North Korea had repeatedly offered to permit a liaison office as soon as the United States lifts economic sanctions against North Korea in accordance with the 1994 agreement suspending its nuclear program. But Hwang made it clear he doesn't want the United States to lift sanctions "or do anything else that could prolong the life of the regime."

When I asked him whether there are closet reformers in Pyongyang, he replied that "all of the working-level officials in charge of different aspects of the economy favor reforms, especially those who have contact with the outside world. Some of the higher-ups, too, but most of those people are sycophants and yes men. No one there is in favor of real reform, that is, an end to the Kim family dictatorship, a real market economy and democracy. In any case, it's not possible for like-minded people to have meet-

ings of any kind, so there are no hard-line or moderate factions, just individuals who recognize the need for change."

As for the armed forces, "all of those at the top levels of command are total puppets." Conceivably, "if the food problem goes on and on and there is a decline of morale, some of the division commanders could begin to get restless." But before it gets that bad, Hwang said, Kim Jong Il "will bow down to China to get the help he needs, and North Korea will slip into the Chinese orbit. The Chinese have been trying to pull him in to their sphere. He doesn't tell them a damn thing and has even been openly critical of them. But if things get worse, he'll knuckle under."

Hwang was categorical in his assessment that a collapse is unlikely.

"I do not think there is any danger of North Korea collapsing," he declared, "because the military is all-powerful and Kim Jong Il is in complete control of the military." While Pyongyang "is undergoing some economic difficulties, it is solidly united politically." Yet he clearly hopes for a collapse, urging the United States to deny "any economic assistance" with the notable exception of increased food aid, "to alleviate suffering and reduce the chance that the 'Great General' will resort to war out of desperation."

A food aid, he urged, should be routed through South Korea for distribution to the North. If Pyongyang accepted the food, this would increase Seoul's leverage over the North, and if it refused, "the people of the North would find out, and this would have a tremendous impact, separating the masses from Kim Jong Il."

Hwang specifically criticized the United States for agreeing to provide 500,000 tons of oil annually as part of the 1994 nuclear freeze agreement. "The policy of avoiding war over the nuclear crisis was the correct policy, but you were naïve in letting them bluff you about the potential of the nuclear program." North Korea "did not have the technical or financial means to complete the 50- and 200-megawatt reactors then under construction that you were so concerned about."

Hwang repeated statements made at the time of his defection that "all of us at party headquarters were under the impression that we already had the capability for some nuclear weapons" before the 1994 freeze.

May, I am not as pessimistic as he is about the prospects for change. Private farm markets are mushrooming along the roadsides of North Korea without official interference. The government has permitted more than 100 foreign food and humanitarian aid representatives to live in the country and to monitor food distribution in 171 out of 210 counties.

In an important new move to achieve food self-sufficiency, North Korea and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) unveiled a joint plan in Geneva on May 29 that would rehabilitate fertilizer factories, repair irrigation pumps damaged by repeated floods since 1995 and launch "double cropping"—planting two crops in the same field each year using fast-maturing seeds. In contrast to reclusive past policies, North Korean agricultural officials were ordered to open their records to UNDP experts. "The extensive statistical data and information contained herein," said the UNDP working paper for the Geneva meeting, "should assuage prevailing concerns that virtually all economic and social data are somehow regarded by North Korea as 'state secrets.'"


The United States should follow the advice of Kim Dae Jung, not Hwang Jang Yop, by lifting all of the sanctions imposed during the Korean War on trade and investment with the North except those that relate directly to its military capabilities. Pyongyang clearly signaled its readiness this week to restrict its missile exports to Pakistan, Syria, Iraq and Iran in exchange for a compensation package, including the removal of sanctions. By the same token, North Korean Foreign Minister Kim Yong Nam made clear during my May visit that a U.S. failure to honor Article Two of the nuclear freeze agreement by easing sanctions in the weeks ahead could lead Pyongyang to retaliate by resuming the operation of some or all of the nuclear facilities covered by the accord.

It is clearly in the American interest to encourage the closet reformers in Pyongyang described by Hwang. Yet U.S. sanctions directly undermine the Rajin-Songbong free trade zone that North Korea has established in the far north of the country and similar zones planned for Nampo and Wonsan. South Korean, Japanese, Taiwanese and Southeast Asian Chinese investors have shown interest in using cheap, skilled North Korean labor to make garments and other products but are wary of investing there until the removal of sanctions permits them to export to the American market.

It is economic change that can lead over time to a thaw in relations between Seoul and Pyongyang and to democratic political evolution in North Korea. Recent developments in Ireland have shown the power of economic factors in softening seemingly intractable political barriers, and it can happen in Korea, too.

PHOTOCOPY
PRESERVATION

From Invasion to Collapse: Countering North Korean Chem/Bio Weapons with Deterrence and Conflict Management



Outline

- ➔ • North Korea is ripe for collapse and war
- Deterrence requirements and approaches
 - A deterrence framework
 - Preventing conquest
 - General actions for deterrence
 - Controlling other CBW uses
 - Addressing leader survival
- Conclusions

RAND
Deterring nK CBW-2

North Korea Is Approaching Collapse

Economy Has Lost Viability

- Third year of famine; 1-3 million deaths?
- Negative GNP growth since 1990
- Little power; 3/4s of industry closed
- Thriving black market

Government Suppression

- Pyongyang is suppressing non-conformists, people with external contacts

Defections and Executions


- Defection of Hwang Jang-Yop, ...
- Several ministers shot or "died" in 1997

- Kim Il-Song policies give legitimacy but prevent reform
- A collapse by popular uprising is highly unlikely
- Continued deterioration leads to institutional failure, peripheral implosion
- The North Korean military may take action

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Deterring nK CBW-3



Institutional Failure and Peripheral Implosion




- Even the military is denied
 - Fuel (mobility)
 - Munitions, people (power)
 - Food (survival)
- Prioritizing scarce resources
 - Military is critical
 - Key units around Pyongyang
 - Most heavy corps next
 - Then key "forward" corps
 - Periphery is the northeast
- Denial degrades political/military cohesion

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Deterring nK CBW-4





Outline

- North Korea is ripe for collapse and war
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Deterring nK CBW-8

An Approach to Deterring North Korea

- **Deterrence is a function of adversary perceptions**
 - CFC must influence the thinking of nK leaders
- **nK dogma will limit CFC influence**
 - Dogma is firmly held, helps secure leaders' control
 - Political reliability system limits information flow
 - But military resistance will undermine control
- **CFC must challenge nK dogma, control**
 - Use an asymmetric strategy that attacks the key nK vulnerability: nK political/military cohesion
 - Challenge key North Korean perceptions (especially weak links)
 - Use a diverse, multidimensional approach
 - Be persistent, innovative; cover CFC vulnerabilities

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

Deterring nK CBW-9



Outline


- **North Korea is ripe for collapse and war**
- **Deterrence requirements and approaches**
 - **A deterrence framework**
 - ➡ – **Preventing conquest**
 - **General actions for deterrence**
 - **Controlling other CBW uses**
 - **Addressing leader survival**
- **Conclusions**

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Deterring nK CBW-10









Stopping the Heavy Corps


- Limit line (Focus nK commanders on point of plan failure)
 - Heavy forces will not be allowed to cross this line
 - Plan to impose the limit line: Block LOCs, interdict forces
- Block LOCs (Impede heavy corps' movement)
 - Good proactive option, response to limited attack
 - Destroy bridges, drop mountains, mine routes
 - Focus on LOCs south of 815, 820, 806 corps
 - Focus surveillance, employ special forces
- Interdict forces (Kill nK forces that cross limit lines)
 - Use high-tech weapons on heavy forces (e.g., SFW)
 - Defeat unit missions and intimidate commanders

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Detering nK CBW-17



Preventing Conquest 1: CBW Will Hurt North Korea



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Detering nK CBW-18

2

Preventing Conquest 2: U.S. Vital Interests and Adversary Asymmetric Strategies

- Asymmetric strategies (e.g., CBW) are more powerful against less than "vital" U.S. interests
 - Adversaries need not defeat the U.S. military in detail; they can focus on U.S./allied will
 - U.S. is left more vulnerable to asymmetric threats
- North Korea perceives this vulnerability, targets U.S. will
- U.S. must show that




RAND

Detering nK CBW-19

2



The Effect of Casualties on Engagement: Vital Interests in Planning/Executing*



*The values shown are approximate and notional

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Detering nK CBW-20




On Engaging China

- Engage China in post-collapse security and assistance in nK
- Encourage China to join CFC in a counteroffensive
 - Advance to contact in Pyongyang?
 - Phased Chinese withdrawal as ROK consolidates control in its sectors
 - Withdrawal timing determined by international commission
- Advantages
 - Makes a nK attack extremely unlikely (great deterrence)
 - Would give China a defined and agreed role
 - China would share costs (casualties, post-war humanitarian and control, CBW clean-up, ...)
 - China would experience CBW
- Disadvantages
 - Some risk China won't withdraw as planned
 - Extension of Chinese influence

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Detering nK CBW-23

Engaging China Could Reduce the Threat to CFC by Several Corps, Enhance Deterrence



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Deterring nK CBW-24

Outline

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Detering nK CBW-25



General Actions for Deterrence: Survival Possible If CBW Not Used

**Collapse is
not imminent**

Help nK in current crises (intel is critical)

- Offer food, economic development
- Stockpile food in the region
- Show collapse is not imminent, develop relationships especially with key leaders

**Non-use will
be rewarded**

Amnesty letters (used by West Germany in 1980s)

- Objective: Give nK commanders incentives (protection and money) for non-use
- Commit CFC to protect nK commanders and families, compensation for "heroic" services
- Prepare security and air cover

**You can
survive**

Offer rewards for surrender of CBW

- 1 million won per kg of BW, ...

Prepare a long-term reunification plan

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Detering nK CBW-26



General Actions for Deterrence: Give nK Leaders Hope of a Future

nK system
still works

Leaders can
survive

Chance for
the future

Now

Conflict

Long-term

- Help with current crises
- Build relations
- Rewards for CBW
- CFC will not attack nK

- Family security
- A "golden parachute"
- Reunification plan, with help for their people

- Amnesty letters
- Support in survival
- Trust in the ROK
- US will not use BW

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Detering nK CBW-27



General Actions for Deterrence: Horror PSYOPS

CBW use is
inhumane

CBW use violates
your principles

You will be
punished

U.S. justified
in using
nuclear wpns

- Objective: Give nK commanders, operators reasons to disobey attack orders and not use CBW, fearing genocide and retaliation
- CFC is prepared to survive nK CBW attacks
- But such attacks could kill millions of civilians (show historical victims?); it is WMD
- nK leaders have no fight against ROK civilians, so why kill them?
- CBW use would be genocide of the Korean people, a war crime (like Adolf Hitler's)
- Responsibility at all levels of command, use
- Punishment justified even with nuclear wpns
- CFC can find a target nK commanders; demonstrate bombers, UGF killing, adv wpns

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Detering nK CBW-28



General Actions for Deterrence: Addressing North Korean Fears

- North Korea fears a CFC invasion
 - ROK must show reunification cost is more than it can bear --> no desire to attack
 - Offer a defensive pull-back
- North Korea feels the U.S. used BW in the Korean War
 - The United States must investigate and prosecute or deny
- North Korean energy shortages threaten contaminated water in 1998; North Korea may sense this is a U.S./ROK use of BW
 - CFC should counter with energy, medicines, training
- North Korea feels that U.S./ROK don't live-up to their promises
 - Create an international commission to review and judge U.S./ROK/nK commitments
- North Korea fears U.S. nuclear threats
 - Make a U.S. commitment to no first use of WMD

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Detering nK CBW-29

Outline

- North Korea is ripe for collapse and war
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 - ➡ – Controlling other CBW uses
 - Addressing leader survival
- Conclusions

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Detering nK CBW-30

Controlling Other CBW Uses

- Apply strategy for preventing conquest to
 - Limited attacks against ROK today
 - Civil war/coup, with potential spill-over
 - Coercion of CFC during transition to full reunification
- Avoid giving nK incentives for coercion
 - Must seek to redress crises in the North, establish credibility
- Need PSYOPS, appropriate response
 - Perpetrators will deny Korean ethics, murder innocent people
 - Responsibility is individual
 - CFC can identify and punish perpetrators (must demonstrate)
- Reward NBC turn-in, clean-up, and destruction

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Detering nK CBW-31

Outline

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 - Controlling other CBW uses
 - ➔ – Addressing leader survival
- Conclusions

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Detering nK CBW-32


Addressing Leader Survival

Defining the Problem

- What will threatened nK leaders do?
 - nK leaders may seek the ultimate coercion or pursue a “scorched earth” policy/retaliation
- Could use BW (especially contagious), nuclear weapons
 - Could kill hundreds of thousands or more
 - Contagious BW (e.g., small pox or plague) could spread out of control
 - Exceed world ability to vaccinate or treat?
 - Require quarantine of Korea, the United States, ...?
 - Disrupt casualty treatment, trade, the economy
 - Complicate the handling of “boat people”
 - United States/ROK would be blamed
 - Set a precedent that encourages BW, nuclear proliferation?

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Deterring nK CBW-33

Addressing Leader Survival



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Deterring nK CBW-34

Outline

- North Korea is ripe for collapse and war
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 - Controlling other CBW uses
 - Addressing leader survival



- Conclusions

RAND

Detering nK CBW-35

Conclusions

- North Korea is ripe for collapse
 - Political leaders may attempt war to avert collapse
 - Other circumstances could also lead to CBW use
- Deterrence is key; CBW use would make victory Pyrrhic
- This strategy challenges key nK perceptions
 - Use an asymmetric strategy that attacks the key nK vulnerability: nK political/military cohesion
 - Military commanders cannot expect to survive
 - War will precipitate collapse
 - Must also control nK CBW coercion, other uses
 - Must address nK leader survival
- Begin information operations now; prepare to respond to any nK CBW use

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Detering nK CBW-36

Benefits and Risks of This Strategy

- **Benefits**

- Substantially enhances deterrence of CBW use, North Korea invasion threat
- Would likely transform a North Korean invasion rapidly into a civil war or collapse
- Should greatly reduce the damage of war, collapse
- Organizes post-collapse/war support for Korea
- Costs very little

- **Risks**

- May accelerate (or may slow) North Korean collapse
- Does not prevent North Korean use of CBW or invasion
- Depends upon the character of a follow-on North Korean military regime
- Offers China some control of post-collapse/war events

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Detering nK CBW-37

Force Protection of WMD. Vulnerability

Defense Threat Reduction Agency

- Chemical Biological Defense Command - Army
2 Star at Fort Meade
- Strategic ...
~~Strategic~~
- Department of Energy for U.S.
- SOLIC (DOE) ...

Tracing Capability in USFK ...

Capability in PACOM/USFE..

ACOM will be the force provider for ^{DOD's Contribution} Consequence Mgt.

- Staff Support ..
- Troops to handle the situation $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} Nuc \\ Chem \\ Bio \end{array} \right.$

SOCOM - - Special Attack Options

Analytic Support to USFK

- Air Mobility Study
- SPOD Study
- WMD Study

- Deployment of Patriots in S.K.

Hampton...

Determining NK Use of WMD

* Get More

Emergency Response

- Conditions for Pre-deployment?
- Exercise...
- Go out....
- Assets in Guam...

Counterproliferation

Hard Target Defeat Program

Local population issues... intel requirements.

Cooperative Threat Reduction - China (?)

- ~~RAC~~ Takes over
- Chinese
- ~~WHE~~ Fly... Arms Control Agreement.

How much per year? ... To do CTR...

Priority

Cleaning up infrastructure...

Loose nukes... safety; security of nukes... Russia.

Chart of tasks...

↳ Kazakhstan...

Employ people who put it together... back to work..

Process

(DOE
Army China/Dunl)

→ China?
Agencies?
Funding/How long.
Legislative Rules

Johnson, Anthony

Subject: Rescheduled Defense Spec. Weapons Agency
Location: Alexandria, VA
Start: Mon 7/13/98 1:00 PM
End: Mon 7/13/98 4:00 PM
Recurrence: (none)

Len we coordinated this date & time based on your 13JULY schedule.
Please advise if this is good.

6801 Telegraph Rd. (South)
3-5 miles south of the Cap. Beltway. 1/2 mile prior to the Coast Guard Station. Agency is located directly across from a Golf Course.

POC: Jan at (703)325-7065

Steve
736-7743

DSWA Agenda

13 JULY

FROM:

CDR David A. Householder, USN
Chief, Nuclear Forces Support
Section (OPSFN)
Defense Special Weapons Agency
6801 Telegraph Road
Alexandria, VA 22310-3398



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DSN: 221-1210
UNCLAS FAX: (703) 325-2964
VERIFY: (703) 325-7179
CLASSIFIED FAX: (703) 325-6646
E-MAIL: householder@hqy.dswa.mil

TO: Mr Tony Johnson

Office: NSC

Phone: (202) 456-9351

Fax: (202) 456-9360


Date: 6/29/98

This is page 1 of 5

Attached is our draft agenda for Mr Hawley's visit on 13 Jul, a bio on RADM Allison, and a large area and small area map (the maps have our old name, DNA, instead of our new name, DSWA). We are about 3 miles south of the Beltway on Telegraph Road. We'll have a spot reserved for Mr Hawley in the drive in front of our main entrance.

for 2pm mtg**FROM:**

CDR David A. Householder, USN
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TO:

Mr Tony Johnson

Office:

NSC

Phone:

(202) 456-9351

Fax:

(202) 456-9360

Date:

7/10/98

This is page 1 of


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
Attached is an updated agenda for Mr Hawley's visit Monday. We were able to tighten it up a bit and get him out 15 minutes earlier.

A handwritten signature, likely of the sender, CDR David A. Householder, is written in the bottom right corner of the page.

**Visit by
Mr. Len Hawley
Director, Global Issues and Multilateral Affairs, NSC
13 July 1998**

1300-1305	Courtesy Call with RADM Allison
1305-1315	DSWA Introduction (RADM Allison)
1315-1330	Analytic support to USFK (CDR Dowling)
1330-1345	Deterrence Framework (CDR Householder)
1345-1400	Emergency Actions Capabilities (Mr. Keel)
1400-1420	Hard Target Defeat Program (Mr. Bruder)
1420-1430	Break
1430-1450	Counterproliferation ACTD (Lt Col Swenson)
1450-1520	Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (Brig Gen (Ret) Kuenning)
1520-1540	Modeling and Simulation Center (Mr. Zimmers)
1540-1545	Questions / Closing remarks





Rear Admiral Jacqueline O. Allison U.S. Navy



Rear Admiral Jacqueline O. Allison is a native of North Caldwell, New Jersey. She was commissioned an Ensign following her graduation from Officer Candidate School in Newport, Rhode Island, in 1972. Her first assignment was as the Communications/Public Affairs Officer at Naval Support Activity, Mare Island, California. From there, she went on to be the Assistant Officer in Charge of the Counseling and Assistance Center at the Naval Training Center, Great Lakes, Illinois. She returned to California as the Administrative Department Head responsible for many of the base services at the Naval Weapons Station, Concord, California.

In 1977, Rear Admiral Allison was assigned to the Human Resource Management Center in Subic Bay, Philippines, as the Project Officer and then Executive Officer. After a short tour as the Quality Assurance Officer and then Transportation Officer for the newly established Personnel Support Activity, Jacksonville, Florida, she reported as Flag Secretary for Commander, Service Group TWO in Norfolk, Virginia. During the tour, she participated in underway periods on the USS Trenton, USS Yellowstone and USS Detroit for various operations including TEAMWORK 80 exercise in the North Atlantic. Returning once again to California, Rear Admiral Allison became the Executive Officer of the Navy Recruiting District, San Diego, which became the number one District in the nation. Following studies at the Naval War College, she was assigned as the Strategic Mobility Officer at Military Sealift Command, Atlantic in Bayonne, New Jersey. She established the Worldwide Military Command and Control Center while attached and assisted in developing and/or participating in over 20 sealift exercises during this tour.



Rear Admiral Allison assumed command of Navy Recruiting District, San Antonio, Texas, in 1989, which was honored as the Best District in the Nation in 1990.

After graduation from the National War College, Washington, DC, in 1992, she was assigned as the Director, Programs, Plans and Requirements for the Defense Nuclear Agency. Rear Admiral Allison assumed command of Navy Recruiting Area ONE in Scotia, New York, in October 1994 and was responsible for recruiting in the northeastern quarter of the nation. Rear Admiral Allison returned to the Defense Special Weapons Agency (formerly the Defense Nuclear Agency) and is currently the Director of Operations.

Rear Admiral Allison received a Bachelor of Arts degree in Education/Psychology from Elmira College, Elmira, New York, in 1971. Postgraduate studies include a Master of Arts in Counseling Psychology from Chapman College, Orange, California, in 1977, a Master of Arts in International Relations from Salve Regina College in 1985 and a Master of Arts in National Security and Strategies from the Naval War College in 1991.

Rear Admiral Allison's personal awards include the Defense Superior Service Medal, Legion of Merit, Meritorious Service Medal (with gold star), Navy Commendation Medal (with gold star) and the Navy Achievement Medal.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. report	re Department of Defense (DOD) (22 pages)	10/00/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Leonard Hawley (Multilateral & Humanitarian Affairs)
OA/Box Number: 1828

FOLDER TITLE:

Korea-Instability Planning [loose] [1]

2009-0528-F

kc1475

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9800422
RECEIVED: 20 JAN 98 18

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: SOWLES, LEWIS W III

DOC DATE: 06 JAN 98
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOREA MIAS
PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

PERSONS: SOWLES, LEWIS W

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR HELP OBTAINING INFO RE FATHER / MISSING FM KOREAN WAR

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR BERGER DUE DATE: 31 JAN 98 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: PRITCHARD LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION
PRITCHARD

FOR CONCURRENCE
CARAVELLI
HAWLEY
KRISTOFF

FOR INFO
BOUCHARD

COMMENTS: RECD FM SUE SMITH 6-7486

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSCPS

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DOC 1 OF 1

UNCLASSIFIED

EPH
NSC
P. 22/24

0422

LEWIS WILLIAM SOWLES, III
23715 WOODWAY PARK ROAD
WOODWAY, WA 98020
(206) 542-0712

PRESIDENT WILLIAM CLINTON
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON DC

January 6, 1998

RE: Sergeant Lewis W. Sowles, RA 20922355

Dear President Clinton:

I want to write you to thank you all that you are doing for the MIA's from the Korean War. It was with great joy when I read on the internet, the DPMO weekly update for December 10, 1997, which states in part: "...expanded scope of joint recovery operations was agreed upon....and sites to be investigated are near Kaechon City (Kunui-ri) North Korea. In late 1950, units from the 2nd Infantry Division were withdrawing southward and approximately 1700 soldiers were lost..."

It was in the battle of Kunui-ri, North Korea that my father, Sergeant Sowles, Company Clerk of the 38th Medical Company, 38 IR, 2nd ID, went missing in action.

To this date, I have not received verifiable information of Dad's status, other than eyewitness accounts from the men who were with him in battle. One being, Magt., Jacob Brewer, First Sgt., of the Medical Company. Sgt. Brewer tells me that Dad saved his life before being wounded himself and had Dad not taken the action he did, Brewer never would have made it out of North Korea alive.

Your work on behalf of my father, Sgt., Sowles and the other MIA's from Korea is to be commended. Your struggle to keep the funds for DPMO in the budget is strongly applauded by this family member of a Korean War MIA.

I can remember the heartbreak that both my Grandmothers went through when my uncles were killed in action in WWII. Pvt., Lloyd William Johnson, mother's brother was KIA in Lemache France, on December 14, 1944 and Lt., Halloran Edward Soules, Dad's older brother was killed flying a B-29 over Rangoon Burma on the same day December 14, 1944.

As a child and now as an adult I have always understood and appreciated the sacrifices made by Dad and my uncles. And to this, I fully realize that those wars were shortened so our generation could live in a free America.


I am truly grateful for the work which General Wold of DPMO and the good folks from Task Force Russia have done in resolving the cases of our MIA's from all wars. This work would not have continued, had it not been for your perseverance and dedication to our men and their families.

The recent breakthrough with North Korea, is significant, because I believe, that through this humanitarian effort, perhaps a friendship with all of the Korean people will arise, which may result in the unification of Korea itself.

I also believe that once the Russians and the Chinese really understand that this is an issue which will not go away and that their recalcitrance is impeding our relations, they too will come to believe that they have every thing to gain, in the hearts of Americans, and nothing to loose by accounting for those Americans of which they have knowledge.

Again, I thank you for your work on behalf of our missing service members and their families.

Sincerely, *Lewis W. Sowles, III*
Lewis William Sowles, III



Defense POW/MIA Weekly Update

December 10, 1997

AGREEMENT ON 1998 OPERATIONS IN NORTH KOREA REACHED

In New York, U.S. negotiators, led by Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense J. Alan Liotta, reached an agreement with the North Koreans covering 1998 joint accounting efforts for American missing from the Korean Conflict. Primary agenda items for the negotiation session were: 1) resolving questions regarding the possibility that live Americans remained in North Korea following the war; 2) increased access to archival holdings; and 3) expanded remains recovery operations. This meeting between the Americans and the North Koreans follows the successful completion of three joint recovery operations in which the remains of six Americans were recovered, and the first-ever visit by an American archival research team to the national war museum in Pyongyang.

Mr. Liotta continued to press the North Koreans on the issue of live Americans in Korea and for access to the four Americans known to have defected to North Korea since the 1960s. The North Koreans maintained their position that no American prisoners of war are in their country and continue to deny requests for interviews with the American defectors. However, we continue to stress to the North Koreans that they must address American concerns on this issue.

The North Koreans have agreed to further archival reviews of their holdings. They previously permitted a team of five American researchers to examine documents and exhibits of U.S. war materiel in the national war museum in Pyongyang. The North Koreans will allow another team of archivists to return to the museum as well as permit entrance to the People's Grand Study Hall, a repository of governmental holdings.

A considerably expanded scope of joint recovery operations was also agreed upon. Five operations will be conducted, beginning in April 1998 and continuing through October. The sites to be investigated are in Kujang County and near Kaechon City. In late 1950, units from the 2nd Infantry Division were withdrawing southward and approximately 1,700 soldiers were lost.

To enhance the recovery efforts, American and North Korean experts will meet in technical talks to exchange search information prior to the actual operations. Tactical maps of the area, archival documents, forensic technical and other information directly bearing on the search activities will be exchanged to better utilized time in the field. Midway through the year, American and North Korean experts will convene to re-evaluate the process to optimize future operations.

U.S. CONCLUDES WORLD WAR II CRASH SITE EXCAVATION IN CHINA

A U.S. remains recovery team has completed its work for 1997 in China in an effort to recover the remains of a 10-man World War II bomber crew which perished in a 1944 crash in southern China.

The wreckage of the B-24 bomber was found by Chinese farmers in late 1996, and Chinese officials invited experts from the U.S. to send a recovery team to the site. In January 1997, a team of specialists from the Defense Department's Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office and the U.S. Army's Central Identification Laboratory Hawaii (CILHI) visited the crash site in the rugged mountains of southern China. They returned with some remains recovered earlier by the Chinese, as well as some personal equipment of the aircrew.

Sgt. Lewis W. Sowles



Company Clerk, 38th Medical Company, 38th Infantry Regiment,
2nd Infantry Division

Reported missing on 30 November, 1950. Fellow soldiers witnessed
Sowles' capture by the Chinese troops, near Kunui-ri, N Korea.

Sgt. Lewis William Sowles was born on April 18, 1918, at Salt Lake
City, Utah. He served with the US Army IV Corps from 1941 to
1945, during WW II.

Family members identified Sowles in a 1990 photo of American
MIA's (presumed).

Return to: [US MIA Page](#)

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Again, I thank you for your work on behalf of our missing service members and their families.

Sincerely, *Lewis W. Sowles, III*
Lewis William Sowles, III

S T O P

FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION SHEET

LOG #

Ref./P.O No: _____

Date: 11/6/98

Time:
Written: _____

TO:

THE WHITE HOUSE

COMPANY NAME

(202) 456-2441

FAX #

PRESIDENT W. CLINTON

ATTENTION

DEPT #

FROM:

Bill Sowles

COMPANY NAME

(206) 542-0712

FAX #

INDIVIDUAL

DEPT #

No. of pages including this
JOTTAFAFAX™ transmission sheet

5

Please reply
on this fax

Originators
Signature

Leung ul Sowles

MESSAGE:

for president Clinton, ASAP!

KLEER FAX FORM #90001 NO CARBON REQUIRED

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

1. 16. 58

DATE

MEMORANDUM

FOR:

Nsc

FROM:

SUE J. SMITH *SP*
DIRECTOR, AGENCY LIAISON

SUBJECT:

REFERRAL OF CASEWORK

I am forwarding the attached letter to your office for appropriate action. Please send us a copy of your written response or your telephone report along with the writer's original correspondence and envelope to the following address:

Ms. Sue J. Smith
Director, Agency Liaison
Room 6, OEOB
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20502

If you have any questions, call my office at 202/456-7486.

Thank you for your help.

JAN 20 15:15

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. report	re North Korea (18 pages)	08/00/1997	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Leonard Hawley (Multilateral & Humanitarian Affairs)
OA/Box Number: 1828

FOLDER TITLE:

Korea-Instability Planning [loose] [1]

2009-0528-F

kc1475

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003. paper	re North Korea (3 pages)	09/12/1997	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Leonard Hawley (Multilateral & Humanitarian Affairs)
OA/Box Number: 1828

FOLDER TITLE:

Korea-Instability Planning [loose] [1]

2009-0528-F

kc1475

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004. draft	report re East Asia (7 pages)	10/00/1997	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Leonard Hawley (Multilateral & Humanitarian Affairs)
OA/Box Number: 1828

FOLDER TITLE:

Korea-Instability Planning [loose] [1]

2009-0528-F

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005. paper	re China (4 pages)	12/19/1997	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Leonard Hawley (Multilateral & Humanitarian Affairs)
OA/Box Number: 1828

FOLDER TITLE:

Korea-Instability Planning [loose] [1]

2009-0528-F

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006. report	re Korean Peninsula (15 pages)	05/00/1996	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Leonard Hawley (Multilateral & Humanitarian Affairs)
OA/Box Number: 1828

FOLDER TITLE:

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2009-0528-F

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