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Staff Office-Individual:

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001. program	conference program (4 pages)	01/28/1998	P1/b(1)
002. agenda	conference agenda (2 pages)	01/28/1998	P1/b(1)
003. agenda	conference agenda, annotated (5 pages)	01/28/1998	P1/b(1)
004. list	conference participants [partial] (1 page)	01/28/1998	P3/b(3)
005. bios	conference participants [partial] (3 pages)	01/28/1998	P3/b(3)
006. diagram	conference participants seating chart [partial] (1 page)	01/28/1998	P3/b(3)
007. note	re conference discussion (1 page)	01/28/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Leonard Hawley (Multilateral & Humanitarian Affairs)
OA/Box Number: 1828

FOLDER TITLE:

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2009-0528-F
kc1487

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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Dismantling DPRK's Weapons of Mass Destruction Infrastructure



January 28, 1998
The Pentagon
Room 2E687A

Mr. Leonard R. Hawley

Director • Global Issues and Multilateral Affairs • National Security Council

Dismantling DPRK's Weapons of Mass Destruction Infrastructure

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Organized by:

National Security Planning Associates, Inc.

In Support of:

General John H. Tilelli, Commander-in-Chief,
UN Command/Combined Forces Command



January 28, 1998
The Pentagon
Room 2E687A

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OPENING REMARKS

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DR. JACQUELYN K. DAVIS' OPENING REMARKS

Tilelli Workshop

January 28, 1998

On behalf of National Security Planning Associates (NSPA) and the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA), I would like to welcome you to this Workshop, which was conceived in cooperation with USFK and is designed to support the Commander-in-Chief, General John Tilelli, in his efforts to address the challenges involved in Dismantling the DPRK's WMD Infrastructure. Clearly, planning for the full range of potential contingencies on the Korean Peninsula has acquired new urgency over the past year, and concerns about the disposition and control of the DPRK's WMD capabilities are justifiable and must be addressed by the CINC and his two commands whether we are talking about a hard landing, a soft landing, or something in between. Wearing his U.S. CINC's "hat," however, it is important that

General Tilelli engage with you – the Washington policy and expert communities – on these important issues so that when the time comes he will have in hand a useful approach and plan of action for dealing with the broader strategic, political and operational-military issues that the DPRK's possession of WMD and means of delivery will, inevitably, raise. Our task here today is to focus on the nature of the problem in order to point the way toward useful "pre-crisis" planning.

So, this Workshop is designed first to focus on the situational context for dismantling North Korea's WMD weapons and infrastructure. In this regard, we don't want to get bogged-down in a detailed discussion of particular contingencies, but rather to focus on the different operational requirements that would be generated by diverse scenarios, and on what, in turn, they may mean for building political support at home and overseas for

the operations and organizations that will be necessary to identify, contain, and ultimately dismantle or destroy North Korea's nuclear, chemical and biological weapons capabilities and its missile delivery systems. In this respect, "lessons-learned" from similar activities in which the U.S. has engaged, such as the U.N. Special Commission in Iraq and the Science Centers in the FSU, may serve as useful guide-posts for the CINC. We hope, through our discussion today, to be able to flag the important indicators that might make or break a successful dismantling effort. Clearly some of the key factors—and ideas to address them—were "gamed-out" in yesterday's interagency simulation on Korean collapse. Hopefully, today's workshop can also provide an avenue for participants in that game to discuss what they said and learned on this particular set of issues.

Finally, and most importantly, this workshop provides you, the Interagency and Expert Communities, with a forum for interacting with the CINC so that you and he can set forth your respective ideas and, hopefully, generate consensus at least on the challenges facing CFC/UNC, if not on a preferred strategy for addressing those challenges using the array of political-diplomatic and military-technological tools in our U.S. “kit.”

**GENERAL TILELLI'S OPENING REMARKS
NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING ASSOCIATES SEMINAR
"DISMANTLING THE DPRK'S WMD INFRASTRUCTURE"
PENTAGON, 28 JANUARY 1998
(Room 2E687A, Time 0830)**

**DISTINGUISHED UNDER SECRETARIES AND DEPUTY
ASSISTANTS TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE AND
SECRETARY OF STATE, FELLOW FLAG AND GENERAL
OFFICERS, SPECIAL ASSISTANTS TO THE PRESIDENT,
HONORED GUESTS, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, GOOD
MORNING AND THANKS FOR BEING HERE. I AM GLAD SO
MANY OF YOU COULD JOIN US FOR THIS WORKSHOP ON A
SUBJECT OF VITAL INTEREST TO OUR NATION AND TO THE
SECURITY OF THE ROK AND THE NORTHEAST ASIA REGION.**

**AS YOU KNOW NORTH KOREA CONTINUES TO BE THE
BIGGEST THREAT TO PEACE AND STABILITY ON THE
KOREAN PENINSULA AND IN THE REGION. WITH NORTH
KOREA THERE IS ALWAYS A RISK OF CONFLICT THAT
COULD EMBROIL MUCH OF THE PACIFIC RIM AND MANY OF
OUR OTHER ALLIES.**

**CONFLICT IS UNLIKELY AS WE SIT HERE TODAY,
MAINLY DUE TO THE STRENGTH AND VIGILANCE OF THE**

ROK/US ALLIANCE, BUT THE THREAT IS TRANSFORMING AND BECOMING MORE UNCERTAIN AND PROBLEMATIC AS TIME PASSES.

THE NORTH'S ECONOMIC DILEMMA AND ITS CONSEQUENCES ARE WIDELY KNOWN AND UNDERSTOOD. WITHOUT REFORM, THE PROSPECT OF SOME KIND OF "COLLAPSE" IS STILL LIKELY. YET THE REGIME HAS NOT CHANGED ITS BASIC STRATEGY AND REMAINS ENTRENCHED IN ITS UNIQUE BRAND OF SOCIALIST "IDEOLOGY" AND PRESERVATION OF THE REGIME AT ALL COSTS.

THE NORTH CONTINUES TO SUSTAIN THE WORLD'S FIFTH LARGEST MILITARY, MUCH OF IT POSITIONED A MERE 26 MILES NORTH OF SEOUL. HOW LONG THE NORTH CAN AFFORD ITS LARGE MILITARY REMAINS TO BE SEEN. IT IS LOGICAL TO ASSUME THAT AS THE NORTH'S ECONOMIC TAILSPIN CONTINUES ITS MILITARY WILL FOLLOW THE SAME PATH AS THE REST OF THEIR INFRASTRUCTURE.

IT IS NO COINCIDENCE THAT THE NORTH HAS STEPPED UP ITS WMD PROGRAM OVER THE LAST DECADE. WE BELIEVE THAT THEY CONTINUE TO DEVELOP AND FIELD

MORE LETHAL, MORE ACCURATE AND LONGER RANGE SYSTEMS. WE THINK THE NORTH SEES WMD AS A MAJOR COMBAT MULTIPLIER TO THEIR LARGE CONVENTIONAL MILITARY, A CONVENTIONAL FORCE THAT COULD ERODE OVER TIME. THEY WATCHED DESERT STORM TOO AND UNDERSTAND THAT WMD MAY BE THEIR BEST CHANCE TO COERCE OR MANIPULATE GEO-POLITICAL CHANGE WITHOUT RESORTING TO FULL SCALE CONFLICT. CONFLICT ITSELF, WOULD RISK GAMBLING THE REGIME AWAY, BUT INSTABILITY IN THE NORTH MAKES PREDICTIVE ASSESSMENTS VERY DIFFICULT. THE DEGREE OF INSTABILITY RESULTING FROM THESE CONDITIONS CONCERN US GREATLY.

THEREFORE, IN COMBINED FORCES COMMAND WE STUDY, ASSESS, AND PLAN FOR A NUMBER OF POSSIBLE WMD CONTINGENCIES TO MITIGATE THE THREAT POSED BY THESE SYSTEMS. JUST RECENTLY WE COMPLETED OUR PYONG-HWA POLITICAL/MILITARY WAR GAME DESIGNED FOR SENIOR ROK AND U.S. LEADERS TO MEET AND WORK THROUGH THESE KINDS OF ISSUES. WE HAVE NOW BEGUN

TO ANALYZE IN DETAIL WHAT OUR TASKS WILL BE IF AND WHEN WE ARE REQUIRED TO SUPPORT THE DISMANTLING OF THE NORTH'S WMD. THERE ARE A NUMBER OF SCENARIOS TO CONSIDER INCLUDING: RENEWED CONFLICT ON THE PENINSULA BETWEEN THE ROK AND THE NORTH, CIVIL WAR IN THE NORTH, A ROUGE WARLORD, OR EVEN COMPLETE COLLAPSE OF THE NORTH'S SOCIETY INTO CHAOS. WE NEED TO BETTER UNDERSTAND THE ISSUES OF CONTAINMENT, CONTROL AND DISMANTLING WMD NOW, IF THE NORTH UNDERGOES INCREASED INSTABILITY. THIS IS AN EXTREMELY COMPLEX ISSUE INVOLVING MANY FACTORS WITH THE MILITARY ELEMENT OF NATIONAL POWER IN A SUPPORTING ROLE.

IN USFK, WE ARE STUDYING SEVERAL IMPORTANT QUESTIONS I WOULD LIKE US TO EXAMINE DURING THIS WORKSHOP. I KNOW MANY OF YOU HAVE OTHER CONCERNS ABOUT DISMANTLING THE NORTH'S WMD AND WE WANT TO HEAR THEM.

IN THE AREA OF DIPLOMACY AND POLICY, WE NEED TO CONSIDER WHAT ROLE THE U.S. WILL PLAY AND WHAT OUR

APPROACH WILL BE WITH SEOUL, TOKYO, BEIJING AND MOSCOW? EACH OF THOSE NATIONS AND THE U.N. WILL HAVE SOMETHING TO SAY ON WMD DISMANTLING IN NORTH KOREA, HOW WE HANDLE THE SITUATION WILL HAVE A LONG TERM EFFECT ON OUR “STAYING POWER” AND CREDIBILITY AS A REGIONAL PLAYER IN ASIA.

OUR MOST PRESSING PROBLEM IS INTELLIGENCE. BECAUSE THE NORTH IS THE MOST ISOLATED AND CLOSED NATION IN THE WORLD, WITH MUCH OF THEIR DEFENSE INDUSTRY UNDERGROUND, IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO KNOW EXACTLY HOW MUCH WMD THEY HAVE AND WHERE THEY ARE LOCATED. WE DO SEE SOME POTENTIAL DELIVERY SYSTEMS FROM OUR INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION MEANS BUT THOSE SYSTEMS MAY ONLY BE WHAT THE NORTH WANTS US TO SEE.

WE NEED TO UNDERSTAND WHAT METHODS AND TECHNIQUES ARE USED TO LOCATE, SECURE, AND INSURE THE DESTRUCTION OF IRAQ’S WMD. UNSCOM’S TECHNIQUES APPEAR TO BE EFFECTIVE AGAINST THE MANIPULATIVE PLOYS OF SADAAM HUSSEIN’S REGIME.

ANOTHER THING WE COULD LEARN FROM UNSCOM IS HOW THEY DEVELOPED INTELLIGENCE SHARING TECHNIQUES WITH OTHER NATION'S AND AGENCIES. IT IS CLEAR THAT WE ARE GOING TO HAVE TO FIND WAYS TO SHARE INTELLIGENCE WITH COUNTRIES THAT MAY KNOW MORE ABOUT THE NORTH'S WMD THAN WE DO. WE MUST IMPRESS UPON THE ROK, CHINA, RUSSIA, AND EVEN A FEW MIDDLE EAST NATIONS, THE NEED TO SHARE INFORMATION TO AVOID SURPRISES AND MISCALCULATION. PROLIFERATION OF THE NORTH'S WMD IS NOT IN ANY NATION'S BEST INTEREST, ESPECIALLY THOSE IN THE NORTHEAST ASIA REGION.

ANOTHER CONCERN IS HOW WE WILL HANDLE THE ROK. THE ESSENTIAL PARTNER IN OUR BI-LATERAL DEFENSE ALLIANCE, WILL UNDOUBTEDLY HAVE A STRONG DESIRE TO CONTROL THINGS IN THE NORTH. WE WILL HAVE TO STUDY THIS SENSITIVE ISSUE CLOSELY.

WE ALSO HAVE TO LOOK AT OUR COMMAND AND CONTROL ARCHITECTURE FOR DISMANTLING OPERATIONS WHICH WOULD INCLUDE A VAST NETWORK OF

**INTERNATIONAL, NATIONAL, GOVERNMENTAL AND NON-
GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS. UNITY OF EFFORT,
CLEAR LINES OF AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITY, AND
SIMPLE BUT EFFECTIVE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT ARE
CRUCIAL TO OUR SUCCESS DURING THE CONTINGENCIES
WE ARE CONTEMPLATING.**

**WE ARE WORKING ON SOLUTIONS TO THESE
QUESTIONS, BUT WE ALSO NEED INTERAGENCY EXPERTISE
WITH THESE QUESTIONS AND OTHERS. THAT IS WHY I
ASKED JACKIE AND DR. CHARLES PERRY TO MODERATE
THIS WORKSHOP AND WHY I ASKED YOU ALL TO JOIN US
TODAY.**

**WITH YOUR INSIGHTS AND EXPERIENCE I HOPE TO USE
THIS CONFERENCE TO LAY A FIRM FOUNDATION FOR
FOLLOW-ON DISCUSSIONS AND ANALYSIS THAT WILL HELP
US THINK THROUGH SOME VERY COMPLEX PROBLEMS IF
WE ARE TASKED TO DISMANTLE THE NORTH'S WMD
PROGRAM. BY PREPARING TODAY WE WILL BE READY
TOMORROW.**

**AT THIS POINT I WOULD LIKE TO TURN THE FLOOR
OVER TO JACKIE DAVIS, BUT BEFORE I DO LET ME SAY THAT
I AM TRULY THANKFUL THAT SO MANY OF YOU, INVOLVED
IN THE PLANNING FOR A DPRK TRANSITION, COULD MAKE IT
HERE TODAY. I LOOK FORWARD TO OUR DISCUSSIONS.
ONCE AGAIN THANKS FOR BEING HERE.**

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PARTICIPANTS

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DISMANTLING THE DPRK'S WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INFRASTRUCTURE

Participants

CINCUNC/CFC

General John H. Tilelli, Jr., USA
Commander-in-Chief
UN Command/Combined Forces Command

Major General Raymond P. Ayres, Jr., USMC
Assistant Chief of Staff, C/J-5
UN Command/Combined Forces Command

Col. Tom Goedkoop, USA
Executive Officer to CINC

Col. Porfirio Montes, USA
Chief, Intelligence Products Division

Mr. Bob Collins
J-5 Directorate

Lt. Col. Jim Davidson, USA
CINC Speechwriter

OSD

Dr. Kurt M. Campbell
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Asia Pacific Affairs
International Security Affairs

Ms. Michele A. Flournoy
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Strategy and Threat Reduction

Mr. Robert B. Irvine, Jr.
Director, Counterproliferation Policy and Planning

Mr. Franklin D. Kramer
Assistant Secretary of Defense
for International Security Affairs

Dr. James N. Miller, Jr.
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Requirements, Plans, and Counterproliferation
Policy

Brig. General John C. Reppert, USA
Director
On-Site Inspection Agency

Mr. Frederick C. Smith
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
for International Security Affairs

Dr. Edward L. (Ted) Warner, III
Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Strategy and Threat Reduction

JCS/Services/Other Commands

Rear Admiral Jacqueline O. Allison, USN
Director for Operations
Defense Special Weapons Agency

Captain Brian Calhoun, USN
Chief, Strategic Plans Division
U.S. Pacific Command

Brigadier General James T. Conway, USMC
Deputy Director for Operations, J-34
Directorate for Combating Terrorism

Major General Earl B. Hailston, USMC
Director for Strategic Planning and Policy, J-5
U.S. Pacific Command

Lt. General David K. Heebner, USA
Assistant Vice Chief of Staff
U.S. Army

Major General James C. King, USA
Director, J-2
Intelligence Directorate
The Joint Staff

Brigadier General T. Michael Moseley, USAF
Deputy Director for Politico-Military Affairs on
Asia-Pacific and Middle East
Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate, J-5

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Mr. Vincent P. Roske, Jr.
Deputy Director for Wargaming, Simulation
and Analysis, J-8
The Joint Staff

General Peter J. Schoomaker, USA
Commander-in-Chief
U.S. Special Operations Command

NSC

Mr. Jack Caravelli
Director for Nonproliferation
and Export Controls

Mr. Richard Clarke
Special Assistant to the President
and Senior Director
Global Issues and Multilateral Affairs

Mr. Leonard R. Hawley
Director
Global Issues and Multilateral Affairs

Mr. Charles L. (Jack) Pritchard
Director for Asian Affairs

Dr. Gary S. Samore
Special Assistant to the President
and Senior Director
Nonproliferation and Export Controls

State

Dr. Steven Aoki
Director
Office of Regional Nonproliferation
Bureau of Political-Military Affairs

Mr. Rust M. Deming
Senior Advisor to the Assistant
Secretary of State
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs

Mr. Dennis Skocz
Deputy Director
Office of International Security
And Peacekeeping Operations
Bureau of Political-Military Affairs

Other

Mr. Charles A. Duelfer
Deputy Executive Chairman
UN Special Commission

Ambassador Robert L. Gallucci
Dean
Edmund W. Walsh School of Foreign Service
Georgetown University
Former Ambassador at Large and Assistant Secretary
of State for Politico-Military Affairs

(b)(3)

NSPA

Dr. Jacquelyn K. Davis
President

Dr. Charles M. Perry
Vice President

Mr. Eric A. McVadon
Senior Staff Member

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BIOGRAPHIES

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BIOGRAPHIES

CINCUNC/CFC

GENERAL JOHN H. TILELLI, JR., USA

General John H. Tilelli, Jr., is Commander in Chief of the United Nations Command, Republic of Korea/United States Combined Forces Command, and United States Forces Korea since July 1996. In addition to commanding several training and combat commands, including the United States Army Forces Command, the Seventh Army Training Command and Combat Maneuver Training Center, and the 1st Cavalry Division, which he led during the *Desert Shield* and *Desert Storm* campaigns, General Tilelli also previously served as Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans and as Vice Chief of Staff of the Army.

General Tilelli holds degrees from Pennsylvania Military College, Lehigh University, and the U.S. Army War College, and he was awarded an Honorary Doctorate in Business Management from Widener University in 1996.

MAJOR GENERAL RAYMOND P. AYRES, JR., USMC

Prior to becoming Assistant Chief of Staff C/J-5, United Nations Command, Combined Forces Command, United States Forces Korea and as the Commander, U.S. Marine Forces Korea, Major General Ayres has held several other command positions, most recently as the Commanding General, 3rd Marine Division in Okinawa, Japan. He has served in Vietnam, Guam, and the United States.

General Ayres holds a Bachelor of Science degree from Iona College, a Master of Arts degree from the Naval War College, and a Master of Science degree from Salve Regina College.

OSD

DR. KURT M. CAMPBELL

Dr. Kurt M. Campbell was appointed Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asia/Pacific Affairs in 1995. He was formerly Head of the Plans and Analysis Group and Counselor to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. Previously, Dr. Campbell served on the National Security Council as a Director in the Democracy Office. He has also been the Deputy Special Counselor to the President for NAFTA; Chief of Staff (International) to Secretary of the Treasury; and Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs. Formerly, Dr. Campbell was an Associate Professor of Public Policy at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, in addition to serving as an Assistant Director of the Center for Science and International Affairs and a Director of the South Africa Project. Dr. Campbell was also formerly a Special Assistant on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a member of the U.S.-Soviet Dangerous Military Activities negotiating team, and a coordinator of the J-5 external advisory group on emerging avenues of military diplomacy.

He is author of two books, numerous scholarly articles, and many newspaper, magazine, and opinion pieces on a variety of international subjects. Dr. Campbell received a Bachelor of Arts from the University of California, a Certificate in Political Philosophy from the University of Erevan in Soviet Armenia, and a Ph.D. from Brasenose College at Oxford University.

MS. MICHELE A. FLOURNOY

As Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Threat Reduction in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Requirements, Ms. Michele A. Flournoy has worked on issues ranging from the National Security Strategy to lessons learned from Somalia to planning for U.S. operations in Haiti. Before coming to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Ms. Flournoy was a Research Fellow at the Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government, where she managed three collaborative research projects, edited and co-edited monographs on nuclear weapons, and wrote numerous policy analyses, book chapters, and articles on various international security issues. Also while at Harvard, Ms. Flournoy acted as principal advisor for the report prepared by the Carnegie Commission on *Reducing the Nuclear Danger*. Ms. Flournoy holds a Bachelor of Arts from Harvard University and a M.Litt. from Balliol College, Oxford University, where she was a Newton-Tatum Scholar.

MR. ROBERT B. IRVINE, JR.

Mr. Robert B. Irvine, Jr. serves as Director for Counterproliferation Policy and Planning under the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counterproliferation Policy. Since assuming this position, Mr. Irvine has been responsible for formulating policy to deal with threats associated with the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and their means of delivery. His office develops policies, strategy, and doctrine related to national, alliance, and coalition efforts related to the detection, protection, defense, denial, and responses to the prospective use of NBC weapons during crises and conflict. His duties also include defense policy related to trafficking of NBC weapons-related technologies and their use as terrorist weapons. For the 12 years prior to his current assignment, Mr. Irvine had a variety of assignments related to U.S. and NATO nuclear forces, including Deputy Director of Strategy, Forces and Operations in OSD. He holds a B.S. degree in Mechanical Engineering from Notre Dame University and an M.B.A. degree from the University of Missouri.

MR. FRANKLIN D. KRAMER

Mr. Franklin D. Kramer was appointed Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs in 1996. Prior to this appointment, he served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for European and NATO Affairs. Before assuming these roles at the Pentagon, Mr. Kramer served as a partner in a Washington, D.C. law firm, specializing in international transactions and trade, government contracts, acquisitions and finance, and antitrust. Earlier positions with the Department of Defense included Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs and Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. Mr. Kramer has written and testified on various defense and foreign policy issues and served numerous task forces and committees on matters ranging from the development and control of ballistic missiles, U.S. policy in China, the role of the Secretary of Defense in the national security process, U.S. military strategy and force development, the government's approach to security assistance, and the modernization of nuclear weapons. Mr. Kramer received his B.A. from Yale University and earned his J.D. degree from Harvard Law School.

DR. JAMES N. MILLER, JR.

Dr. James N. Miller, Jr. is currently serving as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Requirements, Plans, and Counterproliferation in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Threat Reduction. From 1988 through 1992, Dr. Miller was a senior staff member to the Armed Services Committee of the House of Representatives. He was responsible for oversight and analysis of a large portfolio of defense programs, and served as principal advisor to then-Chairman Les Aspin on nuclear weapons and arms control matters. As a faculty member at Duke University's Terry Sanford Institute of Public Policy from 1992 to 1997, Dr. Miller taught undergraduate and graduate courses in quantitative and qualitative modeling, policy analysis, political analysis, and arms control. From 1994 to 1995, Dr. Miller served as a consultant to the Deputy for Policy Planning in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, providing advice on alternative force planning approaches useful in preparing for likely future military environments. Dr. Miller received a B.A. in economics from Stanford University in 1981, where he studied graduate-level statistics in 1981-82. He earned an M.A. and a Ph.D. in public policy from Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government in 1985 and 1989, respectively.

BRIGADIER GENERAL JOHN C. REPPERT, USA

Brigadier General John C. Reppert, U.S. Army, is the director of the On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA), Washington, DC, which is responsible for carrying out inspection and escort requirements under the verification provisions of numerous international arms control treaties and confidence-building agreements. General Reppert's first assignment to OSIA came in 1990 when, as a new colonel, he served as the chief, Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty plans office located at Fort Meade, Md. Leaving OSIA, he began his second assignment in Russia as an Army Attaché operations officer, American Embassy Moscow. Returning to Washington, DC, in July 1993, General Reppert served in two positions at the Pentagon within the office of the Secretary of Defense: first, as the military assistant to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for plans and policy, then as principal director for Russian, Ukrainian, and Eurasian policy. In July of 1995, General Reppert rejoined the U.S. Defense Attaché office, Moscow, as the defense attaché where he served until his assignment as the OSIA director.

General Reppert holds a Bachelor of Arts degree and a Master of Arts degree in journalism from Kansas State University and a master's degree in Soviet area studies from the University of Kansas. He holds a doctorate in international relations from George Washington University, Washington, DC.

MR. FREDERICK C. SMITH

Mr. Frederick C. Smith, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs since 1994, has over 18 years experience in the Pentagon. In his current position, he is responsible for U.S. defense policy and bilateral security relations worldwide, and he is also responsible for U.S. treaty obligations, security assistance programs, and POW/MIA affairs. Immediately prior to assuming his current position, Mr. Smith was Director of the Bosnia Task Force, responsible for helping to formulate U.S. policy and coordinate military actions in this arena. Previously, as Director for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, he was responsible for defense policy in Northern Africa, the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, and South Asia. His duties included assessing threats to U.S. interests, providing guidance for U.S. forces present in the region, and analyzing regional defense requirements and making recommendations for U.S. arms sales. As one of the key players in the Department of Defense during Operations *Desert Shield* and *Desert Storm*, he helped formulate the U.S. response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and worked closely throughout the crisis with senior U.S. and foreign government officials to bring the conflict to a successful conclusion. Prior to this, Mr. Smith was Director of Policy Analysis in the Pentagon, responsible for analyzing international political, military, and economic issues, reviewing U.S. strategy and military planning, making recommendations for U.S. force structure, and providing guidance on U.S. force movements and military operations. Mr. Smith earned his bachelor's degree from Bucknell University and did graduate work at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, where he was the founder, publisher, and editor of *The Fletcher Forum*, a journal of international affairs.

DR. EDWARD L. (TED) WARNER, III

Dr. Edward L. (Ted) Warner, III has been the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Threat Reduction since June 1993. As such, he is the principal advisor the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Secretary of Defense on national security and defense strategy and on the resources, forces, and contingency plans necessary to implement that strategy. He works closely with the National Security Council, the Defense Acquisition Board, and the Joint Staff on strategy and force posture issues. After retiring from the Air Force with twenty years of service, Dr. Warner was a senior defense analyst with RAND Corporation, conducting studies on American national security policy, the defense and foreign policies of Russia and other successor states of the former Soviet Union, and East-West arms control issues. He has authored numerous articles, reports, and books, and has taught graduate seminars at The Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and George Washington, Columbia, and Princeton Universities. He has been advisor to the National Intelligence Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the United States Strategic Command. Dr. Warner graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy and earned both his M.A. and Ph.D. from Princeton University.

JCS/Services/Other Commands

REAR ADMIRAL JACQUELINE O. ALLISON, USN

Rear Admiral Jacqueline O. Allison is currently the Director of Operations for the Defense Special Weapons Agency (DSWA). Previous assignments include command of Navy Recruiting Command ONE; Director, Programs, Plans and Requirements for the Defense Nuclear Agency (Now DSWA); and Commander of the Navy Recruiting District, San Antonio, Texas.

Rear Admiral Allison is a graduate of the National War College and holds a Bachelor of Arts degree from Elmira College, a Master of Arts from Chapman College, a Master of Arts from Salve Regina College, and a Master of Arts from the Naval War College.

BRIGADIER GENERAL JAMES T. CONWAY, USMC

Brigadier General James T. Conway is the Deputy Director for Operations, J-34, of the Directorate for Combating Terrorism.

MAJOR GENERAL EARL B. HAILSTON, USMC

Major General Earl B. Hailston is currently the Director for Strategic Planning and Policy, J-5, USCINCPAC. He has been assigned to various command and staff positions in Vietnam, Japan, Korea, and the United States. Immediately prior to his transfer to CINCPAC, he served as Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, Installations and Logistics (Facilities), Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps. General Hailston has attended the Air Command and Staff College, the U.S. Army War College, and is a graduate of Troy State University.

LT. GENERAL DAVID K. HEEBNER, USA

Lt. General David K. Heebner is currently Assistant Vice Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army.

MAJOR GENERAL JAMES C. KING, USA

Major General James C. King assumed his duties as Director of Intelligence, J-2, Joint Staff, in February 1996. Prior to this assignment, he was the Director of Intelligence, J-2, United States Central Command at MacDill AFB, Florida. During his career, General King has served in numerous other command and staff positions both here in the United States and with the United States Army Europe. In addition to attending the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and the U.S. Army War College, General King holds a Bachelor of Science degree from Utah State University and a Master of Science degree from the University of Missouri at Kansas City.

BRIGADIER GENERAL T. MICHAEL MOSELEY, USAF

Brigadier General T. Michael Moseley is deputy director for politico-military affairs for Asia/Pacific and Middle East, Joint Staff, with a responsibility for regional planning and policy matters concerning concepts and studies on specific countries or regional groups and providing guidance and concept review of combatant commands' operational plans. With more than 3,000 flying hours in operational fighter and training assignments, General Moseley has commanded a fighter squadron, a flight operations group, and has served as chief, Air Force General Officer Matters, and chief, tactical fighter branch, tactical forces division, Headquarters, U.S. Air Force. He also held the Chief of Staff of the Air Force Chair, professor of joint and combined warfare, at the National War College. General Moseley earned both a Bachelor of Arts degree and a Master of Arts degree from Texas A&M University

MR. VINCENT P. ROSKE, JR.

Mr. Vincent P. Roske, Jr., serves the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the Deputy Director (Wargaming, Simulation, and Analysis); Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment Directorate (J-8), The Joint Staff, and, as Executive Director of the Joint C4ISR Battle Center. Mr. Roske was appointed to the Senior Executive Service in 1986. He joined the Joint Staff in 1983 as Senior Operations Research Analyst for the then Studies, Analysis, and Gaming Agency, The Joint Staff, and in 1984, he became Chief of the Technical Support Division, Joint Analysis Directorate. Mr. Roske is currently responsible for joint analysis of national security policy, joint military capability, strategic and general purpose force structure design, operations plans, and C⁴ISR assessment. He is also responsible for development and application of methods, tools and simulations supporting joint analysis and training. He provides wargaming and analysis support to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Directorates of the Joint Staff, and to Commanders-in-Chief of the unified combatant commands worldwide. In 1995, in recognition of his significant contributions to the National Security, the President conferred upon Mr. Roske the honorary rank of Presidential Distinguished Executive.

Mr. Roske earned a B.S. degree in Civil Engineering from the University of Oklahoma in 1968; a Master of Engineering degree in Mechanical Engineering in 1969 from the University of Oklahoma, and an M.S. in Operations Research in 1980 from George Washington University. He has also completed post-graduate studies in Operations Research and Statistics at George Washington University and American University.

GENERAL PETER J. SCHOOMAKER, USA

General Peter J. Schoomaker is the Commander in Chief of the United States Special Operations Command, responsible for all Special Operations Forces of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, both active duty and reserve. Immediately prior to assuming this command, he held the position of Commanding General, U.S. Army Special Operations Command. General Schoomaker's other assignments have included a variety of company and field grade assignments and general officer assignments in Germany, Korea, and the United States, such as Deputy Director for Operations, Readiness and Mobilization, Headquarters, U.S. Army; and Commanding General, Joint Special Operations Command. General Schoomaker has participated in numerous contingency operations, such as *Just Cause*, *Desert Shield*, *Desert Storm*, and *Uphold Democracy*. In addition to attending the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and the National War College, General Schoomaker has attended the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University and holds a degree from the University of Wyoming.

NSC

MR. JACK CARAVELLI

Mr. Jack Caravelli is currently the Director for Nonproliferation and Export Controls at the National Security Council.

MR. RICHARD CLARKE

Mr. Richard Clarke is currently the Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director of Global Issues and Multilateral Affairs at the National Security Council.

MR. LEONARD R. HAWLEY

Mr. Leonard R. Hawley is currently the Director of Global Issues and Multilateral Affairs at the National Security Council.

MR. CHARLES L. (JACK) PRITCHARD

Mr. Charles L. (Jack) Pritchard was appointed Director for Asian Affairs at the National Security Council in June 1996. Previously, Colonel Pritchard served as Army Attaché at the American Embassy in Tokyo. From June 1993 through December 1994, he was Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, U.S. Army, Japan. A career Army officer, Colonel Pritchard has spent the last seventeen years working on Northeast Asia security and policy issues in assignments at USCINCPAC, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. During that period, Colonel Pritchard was stationed nine years at various installations in Japan. Colonel Pritchard received his Bachelors Degree from Mercer University in 1972 with a major in Political Science, and his Masters Degree in Asian Studies from the University of Hawaii. Colonel Pritchard attended the Japan National Institute for Defense Studies, 1992-93.

DR. GARY S. SAMORE

Dr. Gary S. Samore is currently the Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Nonproliferation and Export Controls at the National Security Council. In this capacity, he leads interagency policy deliberations on the entire range of nonproliferation and export control issues, including curtailing programs of rogue states such as the DPRK and Iraq. Prior to joining the NSC in 1997, Dr. Samore was Office Director for Regional Nonproliferation in the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs at the Department of State. His office was responsible, among other matters, for supporting U.S. policy toward the UN Special Commission in Iraq and the Science Centers program in the FSU. Dr. Samore was deputy negotiator to Ambassador-at-Large Robert L. Gallucci in the negotiations with the North Koreans that resulted in the Agreed Framework.

STATE

DR. STEVEN AOKI

Dr. Steven Aoki is the Director of the Office of Regional Nonproliferation Policy in the Department of State's Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. From 1993-1995 he served on the staff of the National Security Council as Director for Nonproliferation and Export Controls. Prior to joining the State Department in 1982, Dr. Aoki worked many years at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. He holds a Ph.D. in physics from the University of Chicago.

MR. RUST M. DEMING

Mr. Rust M. Deming is presently the Senior Advisor to the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, following a brief stint in a similar position at the UN General Assembly in New York. Previously, Mr. Deming has held various embassy positions in Tokyo as well as other positions at the State Department. He will be replacing Charles Kartman as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. Mr. Deming is a graduate of the National War College and holds a bachelor's degree from Rollins College and a master's degree from Stanford University.

OTHER

MR. CHARLES A. DUELFER

Mr. Charles A. Duelfer is currently serving as Deputy Executive Chairman of the UN Special Commission on Iraq. In this role, he supports the Executive Chairman Richard Butler's efforts to implement the UN Security Council Resolutions regarding Iraq and its weapons of mass destruction programs. Before joining the Special Commission in October 1993, Mr. Duelfer served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for arms control and multilateral defense matters. From 1990 to 1992, Mr. Duelfer was in charge of defense trade issues as the Director of the Center for Defense Trade and Deputy to the Assistant Secretary for Politico-Military Affairs. In this capacity, he had responsibility for arms transfers, munitions licensing, and conventional arms control. Mr. Duelfer joined the Politico-Military Bureau of the State Department in 1983. In 1984, he became Deputy Director of the Office of International Security Policy and was responsible for European, African and Latin American regions, and in 1985, he became Office Director, with responsibility for regional security issues worldwide. Before joining the Department of State, Mr. Duelfer worked at the White House Office of Management and Budget (1977-1983) where he reviewed Defense Department Strategic Nuclear Forces and Space Programs. Mr. Duelfer received his Bachelor of Arts degree from the University of Connecticut and a Master of Science degree from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005. bios	conference participants [partial] (3 pages)	01/28/1998	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Leonard Hawley (Multilateral & Humanitarian Affairs)
OA/Box Number: 1828

FOLDER TITLE:

Dismantling DPRK's Weapons of Mass Destruction [North Korea] [Binder]

2009-0528-F
kc1487

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
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b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
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AMBASSADOR ROBERT L. GALLUCCI

Ambassador Robert L. Gallucci became Dean of Georgetown's School of Foreign Service in 1996 after completing twenty-one years of government service. After serving as Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs, Dr. Gallucci served his last two years in government as Ambassador-at-Large. Earlier in his career, he was the Senior Coordinator, Office of the Deputy Secretary of State, responsible for non-proliferation and nuclear safety initiatives in the former Soviet Union; Deputy Executive Chairman of the UN Special Commission overseeing the disarmament of Iraq; and Deputy Director General of the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO), the Sinai peacekeeping force based in Rome. He has also taught at several colleges and universities. Dr. Gallucci earned his bachelor's degree from State University of New York at Stony Brook and a master's and doctorate degree from Brandeis University, and he has authored numerous publications on political-military affairs.

INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

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NSPA

DR. JACQUELYN K. DAVIS

Dr. Davis is President of National Security Planning Associates, Inc., (NSPA) and Executive Vice President of the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA). Dr. Davis has lectured and written widely on national security issues in the United States as well as in Asia-Pacific and NATO-European countries. Her current main areas of focus include regional defense/deterrence planning and force structure requirements; non- and counter-proliferation assessments and TMD analyses; domestic factors shaping the defense policies of states in Europe and the Asia-Pacific area; and coalition operations and CJTF development. Previously, Dr. Davis has served as a member of the Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services (DACOWITS), serving as National Chairperson of DACOWITS for an unprecedented three years. She recently completed a four-year tenure with the Board of Advisors of the Naval Postgraduate School and currently serves as a member of the CNO Executive Committee. Dr. Davis received her B.A. in political science from Beaver College and an M.A. and Ph.D. in international relations from the University of Pennsylvania.

DR. CHARLES M. PERRY

Dr. Perry is Vice President of National Security Planning Associates, Inc. (NSPA), and Vice President and Director of Studies at the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA). Dr. Perry's main areas of interest and study include Middle East and Southwest Asia politics and security issues; arms transfer, technology trade, non- and counter-proliferation problems; and resource trade and security issues. He has played a major role in conducting Institute studies on regional missile defense cooperation, joint task force planning and operational planning in support of regional commanders; battle management and communications; and deterrence planning for regional conflict and crisis management. With Dr. Davis, he co-directed an external critique of the first Allied Command Europe post-Cold War assessment of Allied force structure requirements for regional contingency planning in direct support of SACEUR. Dr. Perry holds a Ph.D., M.A.L.D., and M.A. from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy as well as a B.A. in history from Middlebury College.

REAR ADMIRAL ERIC A. MCVADON, USN, (RET.)

Rear Admiral Eric A. McVadon, USN, (Retired) is Director of Asia-Pacific Studies for National Security Planning Associates, Inc., and an IFPA consultant who focuses on Chinese defense policy, Sino-U.S. military relations, and the development of U.S. business in China. Prior to his retirement from the Navy in 1992, he served as the U.S. Defense and Naval Attaché at the American Embassy in Beijing. He held policy and planning assignments on the Navy Staff, was in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, and was the Navy member of the Staff Group for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He was also Deputy Director of the Strategy, Plans and Policy Division on the Navy Staff and Deputy Director of the Defense Mapping Agency. Admiral McVadon is a graduate of Tulane University and holds a Master's degree in International Affairs from George Washington University. In addition, he attended the Naval Postgraduate School, the Naval War College, and the National War College as well as the Foreign Service Institute where he studied Icelandic and Chinese.

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Davis

Tilelli

(b)(3)

Gallucci

Kramer

Clarke

F. Smith

Samore

Deming

Allison

Miller

(b)(3)

Heebner

Ayres

Schoomaker

Warner

Hawley

Campbell

Hailston

Reppert

(b)(3)

Flournoy

King

Collins

Goedkoop

Irvine

Perry

Roske

Calhoun

McVadon

NSPA

Caravelli

Skocz

Pritchard

Aoki

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It merely allots correct number of seats.)

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North Korea

The Proliferation Primer

Few facts leak through North Korea's closed borders. But one has earned it an international reputation — the exporting of missiles. While North Korea does not figure in the nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons export markets, it has emerged as a principal supplier of ballistic missile technology. The North's sales of complete missiles and the means to produce them have made rogue nation buyers increasingly self-sufficient and less vulnerable to supply disruptions in their missile programs. The supply of production technology may even have enabled some rogue states, like Iran, to become suppliers of missile equipment themselves. A recent report to Congress by the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) notes that in 1996, Iran was an "...important supplie[r] of Scud-related equipment and materials" to Syria.¹

America's ability to punish North Korea for proliferation is limited due to the strong actions taken in the past to isolate Pyongyang. The U.S. maintains an economic embargo on the North and does not have diplomatic relations with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. These conditions rendered the Clinton Administration's proliferation-related sanctions on two North Korean organizations in June of 1992, and a third group in May of 1996, purely symbolic.² The United States does, however, have significant positive leverage, or incentives, which, if used appropriately, could influence North Korean behavior. Pyongyang's interest in them may increase as its economy declines and famine worsens.

In addition to ballistic missile sales, North Korea's extensive nuclear, biological, chemical, and ballistic missile programs are of great concern. As the DCI noted in his recent report to Congress, these programs are "largely indigenous," and without significant foreign support.³ The North has concentrated for several decades on the size and strength of its military, resulting in one of the five largest armed forces in the world, with over one million active duty personnel.⁴

Chemical & Biological Weapons Programs

Since the late 1980's, North Korea has reportedly expanded its chemical weapons program and has placed a high priority on military and civilian chemical defense. According to the U.S. Department of Defense, Pyongyang is currently capable of producing large quantities of nerve, blister, and blood chemical warfare agents.⁵ The North's biological weapons program has been active since the 1960's, and is believed to be capable of producing limited quantities of toxins and infectious agents.⁶

Nuclear Program

North Korea's nuclear program began in the 1960's, when it acquired a small research reactor from the Soviet Union. By the early 1990's, North Korea developed a complete nuclear fuel cycle which produced plutonium using a 5-megawatt (electric) reactor. According to a Pentagon report published in 1996, "[t]his plutonium reactor became operational in 1986, with some refueling in 1989, thereby providing weapons-grade plutonium for at least one nuclear weapon. Fuel from this reactor was discharged in May-June 1994 and, had it been reprocessed, could have provided enough plutonium for several additional nuclear weapons." The report noted the construction of a much larger 50-megawatt (electric) reactor was nearing completion in the early 1990's which "...would have produced enough plutonium for North Korea to build an additional ~10 nuclear weapons per year."

In October of 1994, North Korea and the U.S. signed the Agreed Framework under which Pyongyang agreed to freeze its nuclear program in exchange for various benefits. Under the terms of the agreement, the North must freeze and eventually dismantle its graphite-moderated reactors, cooperate in finding a safe method to store existing spent fuel, remain a party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), and allow International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitoring of its nuclear facilities.⁵

In return, Pyongyang will receive two 1,000 megawatt (electric) light-water nuclear reactors to be completed by 2003, U.S. liaison offices as a step toward establishment of diplomatic relations and relaxation of the economic embargo, and shipments of "heavy oil" (50,000 tons in 1995 and 500,000 tons annually, beginning in 1996 and until the first light-water reactor is built, enough to meet 20 percent of the North's fuel needs). South Korea and Japan will finance most of the estimated \$6 billion reactor cost.⁹

Missile Program

North Korea's efforts to develop and produce ballistic missiles appear to have begun in earnest in the early 1980's, when Pyongyang started to reverse-engineer Scud-B ballistic missiles.¹⁰ By 1986, the North was producing the 300 kilometer range Scud-B and reportedly began exporting it the following year.¹¹ Pyongyang also has developed an extended-range variant of the Scud-B, called the Scud-C, with a range of 500 kilometers which it has exported since the early 1990's. North Korea can target all of the South with its several hundred deployed Scud-B and C missiles.¹²

The North began development of the 1,000 kilometer range No Dong ballistic missile in the early 1990's.¹³ While it has been flight-tested only once, in May of 1993, North Korea may have started to deploy the missile. On September 27, 1997, the *Washington Times* reported that according to Admiral Joseph Prueher, Commander-in-Chief of U.S. forces in the Pacific, North Korea is deploying military units with equipment designed to carry the No Dong.¹⁴ According to Admiral Prueher, troops and trucks apparently for handling the No Dong have been observed in North Korea. But the missiles themselves are evidently not fielded yet. When deployed, the No Dong's 1,000 kilometer range will put nearly all of Japan within reach. At a Senate hearing in October, North Korean defector Colonel Choi Ju-hwal explained why North Korea developed Scud and No Dong missiles, stating, "[i]f a war breaks out in the Korean Peninsula, the North's main target will be the U.S.

forces based in the South and Japan, which is the reason the North has been working furiously on its missile programs."¹⁵

North Korea is also developing the Taepo Dong 1 missile with an estimated range of 2,000 kilometers which will be capable of targeting U.S. military bases in Guam, and the Taepo Dong 2 missile, with an estimated range of 4,000-6,000 kilometers that could reach parts of Alaska and Hawaii.¹⁶ Neither missile has been flight-tested, and, according to Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Robert Einhorn, the U.S. believes these missiles are in the "early stage of development."¹⁷ Colonel Choi testified the "...ultimate goal for the development of North Korean missiles is to reach the mainland of the United

States."¹⁸ Choi also explained that North Korea does not conduct extensive testing of its ballistic missiles because "unlike U.S. missiles which require capability for surgical strikes, the North Korean missiles are not designed for such surgical precision. What they are targeting is a general region rather than specific facilities."¹⁹ In the same hearing Ko Young-hwan, a former North Korean diplomat who defected in 1991, quoted the former Deputy Minister of the North Korean armed

"Unlike U.S. missiles which require capability for surgical strikes, the North Korean missiles are not designed for such surgical precision. What they are targeting is a general region rather than specific facilities."

— Col. Choi Ju-hwal
North Korean Defector

forces as saying "once North Korea develops rockets with a range of 1,000 kilometers, it is not so difficult to develop rockets with a range of 5,000 or over 10,000 kilometer range."²⁰

Missile Exports

North Korea's missile program appears to be fueled in large part by a desire to earn critically needed hard currency and bartered goods, such as oil, from missile sales to countries in the Middle East.²¹ Roughly the size of the state of Mississippi, the North has few natural resources or exportable commodities. Missile sales have therefore played a key role in the declining North Korean economy. As former diplomat Ko Young-hwan noted in Senate testimony, "[e]xporting missiles is crucial to the North Korean economy."²²

According to Deputy Assistant Secretary Einhorn, these sales have earned the regime almost \$1 billion over the past decade.²³ At a Senate hearing in October of 1997, Senator Thad Cochran observed, "[b]allistic missiles are essentially North Korea's only cash crop. Because of its dire economic situation, it is not likely that North Korea will be dissuaded from marketing that crop."²⁴

Since the 1980's, North Korea is said to have sold at least 370 complete Scud-B and C missiles, their components, and production technology, mostly to Iran, which has purchased both complete Scuds and the means to produce them.²⁵ Iran used them extensively during the "War of the Cities" with Iraq.²⁶ In fact, earnings from the sale of ballistic missile technology to Iran are believed to be one of the key factors that fueled the rapid pace of North Korea's missile program, enabling the regime to devote far greater resources to the development and production of missiles than would have otherwise been possible.²⁷

As a result, North Korea has allowed Iranian missile experts and technicians wide access to the North's missile program.²⁸ Syria, too, purchased complete Scuds and production equipment from North Korea. In addition, former North Korean Army Colonel Choi testified that Pyongyang has been engaged in joint missile development with Egypt since the early 1980's.²⁹

Despite the Clinton Administration's attempts to moderate North Korea's behavior, it continues to be an active proliferator, as noted in the DCI's report to Congress in June of 1997 which stated, "North Korea continued to export Scud-related equipment and materials to countries of concern [in the last half of 1996]." Thus far, while the North does not appear to have sold complete No Dongs, despite offering to sell them to nations in the Middle East like Iran and Libya, the Shahab-3 under development in Iran — with a range of 1,300 kilometers — is reportedly based on the No Dong.³⁰ Pyongyang undercut its own market with sales of Scud production technology to Iran and Syria, so it may now feel eco-

nomically impelled to sell the longer range No Dong and Taepo Dong missiles to generate hard currency earnings.³¹ Moreover, Russia, a recent direct missile technology vendor to the Middle East, is cutting into North Korea's market share, as well.

U.S. Missile Negotiations with North Korea

As part of the 1994 Agreed Framework, the U.S. linked closer ties with North Korea to progress in halting exports of missile technology.³² The Clinton Administration first proposed talks on missile issues in 1995, which North Korea rejected for about a year before eventually agreeing to meet in Berlin in April of 1996.³³ According to Assistant Secretary of State Winston Lord, the United States offered to end economic sanctions in exchange for cessation of development and sales of ballistic missiles. The North did not accept, but Lord said Pyongyang, "...expressed a greater willingness to negotiate on the issue of missile exports than limiting its weapons development."³⁴

U.S. and North Korean diplomats held a second round of talks in June of 1997, and were scheduled to meet again in August when Pyongyang abruptly withdrew to protest the Administration's decision to grant asylum to two North Korean diplomats.³⁵ The diplomats, North Korea's ambassador to Egypt and his brother, a trade official at Pyongyang's mission in Paris, reportedly defected with the help of American intelligence agents.³⁶ U.S. officials are currently seeking to reschedule the talks, but the North Koreans have not agreed to a new date.³⁷

Conclusion

North Korea's deployed missile force and its efforts to develop and sell longer-range No Dong and Taepo Dong 1 and 2 missiles threaten U.S. forces and allies abroad. In a conflict, the North could use them with mass destruction warheads to attack U.S. and allied military bases in South Korea. To interdict reinforcement of

"Ballistic missiles are essentially North Korea's only cash crop. Because of its dire economic situation, it is not likely that North Korea will be dissuaded from marketing that crop."

— Senator Thad Cochran

U.S. forces on the Korean Peninsula, these missiles could also target Japan and Guam. In addition, the Taepo Dong 2 missile will reportedly have sufficient range to reach parts of Alaska and Hawaii. Exports of No Dong or Taepo Dong missiles to the Middle East would enable rogue nations like Iran, Syria, and Libya to target U.S. allies and forces in Europe and Israel, and perhaps even the United States.

The Agreed Framework appears to have frozen North Korea's nuclear program, but at great cost, as the provision of light-water reactors may enable Pyongyang to continue its nuclear weapons program. These reactors can produce plutonium for nuclear weapons should Pyongyang evade or renounce IAEA monitoring and master the techniques necessary to process the material produced by the light-water reactors. The U.S. Department of Energy confirmed the possibility in 1994, stating, "[a] successful test was conducted [in the United States] in 1962, which used reactor-grade plutonium in the nuclear explosive in place of weapon-grade plutonium. The test confirmed that reactor-grade plutonium could be used to make a nuclear explosive."³⁸

North Korea's dedication to its international agreements is at best suspect. At a Senate hearing in October, former North Korean Army Colonel Choi Ju-hwal, who defected in 1995, testified, "...the reason why North Korea joined the [NPT] at the beginning was to earn more time for the development of the nuclear weapons."³⁹ Another key weakness of the Agreed Framework allows North Korea to retain already produced fissile material, enough to produce at least one nuclear weapon.

The United States has a limited number of points of leverage on a country that has little interaction with the rest of the world and appears to be unmoved by the condition of its citizens. Although Pyongyang is diplomatically isolated, the U.S. is unlikely to be able to generate sufficient international support for additional sanctions. Under the Agreed Framework the U.S. agreed to provide annually 500,000 tons of heavy oil, 20 percent of North Korea's required fuel. Threats of delays in its supply, or in the construction of the light-water reactors, could temper North Korean behavior, though this tactic could, of course, be used in precisely the same way by Pyongyang against the United States, and probably with better results for the North.

The United States can and should attempt to interdict North Korean missile shipments en route to customers in the Middle East. This would slow the spread of missile technology, but not eliminate the problem. As the DCI noted in a recent report to Congress, "[i]nterdiction efforts are an extremely important part of our overall nonproliferation strategy. By themselves, however, they generally do not get countries out of the business of proliferation. They do, though, buy time for other initiatives that may be more successful in halting or rolling back a WMD program."⁴⁰

Determined proliferators like North Korea can find ways to evade or circumvent interdiction attempts. Only the most stout-hearted administration will routinely assert its right to seize or detain arms shipments which threaten the world. Bush Administration attempts at an aggressive interdiction policy illustrate both its usefulness and limitations. In the early 1990's, the U.S. and Israel successfully deterred North Korea from completing delivery of Scud missile cargo to Syria. In 1991, U.S. intelligence agencies reportedly monitored preparations to ship Scuds to Syria on a North Korean freighter called the Mupo.⁴¹ The information was apparently shared with Israel which anticipated the ship's passage through the Suez Canal. An Israeli Boeing 707 electronic surveillance aircraft patrolled the Red Sea, along with gunboat patrols threatening to sink the vessel.⁴² After press disclosures of the shipment and the Israeli response, the vessel changed course, visited several African ports, and returned to North Korea with its cargo.

Other interdiction attempts have been less successful. In early 1992, U.S. intelligence agencies discovered North Korean plans to ship Scud-C missiles and production equipment to Syria via Iran on a freighter named the Dae Hung Ho.⁴³ After the ship sailed, U.S. officials announced that American warships would intercept and board it if it attempted to enter the Persian Gulf.⁴⁴ In testimony to the House Armed Services Committee, Marine General Joseph Hoar, commander of U.S. Central Command, said he was ordered to locate and intercept the freighter, last spotted on February 28, 1992 south of Sri Lanka headed toward the Arabian Sea.⁴⁵ The General said he used land-based P-3 Orion reconnaissance aircraft, H-3 Sea King helicopters, and F-14 fighters with photographic pods from a carrier battle group to look for the Dae Hung Ho. He concentrated the search in the

Gulf of Oman, near the entrance to the Persian Gulf, but moved it west and south after determining, "...within a reasonable degree of certainty that it was not already in the Gulf of Oman." But despite a concentrated effort over 10 days to locate the ship on 800,000 square miles of water, it eluded detection and docked in Bandar Abbas, Iran in early March. "We were unable to locate that ship, clear and simple," said General Hoar.

A post-shipment analysis of how the Dae Hung Ho eluded the U.S. naval blockage revealed the freighter had hugged the Iranian coastline, shadowed by Iranian warships, during the final leg of its voyage.⁴⁶ In testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, Gen. Hoar said a change in the Navy's search regimen may have allowed the North Korean ship to slip through the U.S. dragnet undetected, and accepted responsibility for the failed interdiction, stating, "[i]f you're looking for the guy who let the [freighter] go through, you're looking at him."⁴⁷

Within a week of the Dae Hung Ho's arrival in Iran, the Iran Salam, another North Korean vessel carrying Scud missiles or components, joined it.⁴⁸ The U.S. Navy had located and hailed it, but the ship refused to stop. According to press reports, the Administration was embarrassed by the failure to track the first ship after public threats to interdict the shipment, and quietly decided to let the second vessel dock and unload.⁴⁹

These events illustrate the difficulty of successful tracking and interception of arms shipments. They also show that determined proliferators will change their tactics to elude interdiction. After Israeli threats to sink the Mupo en route to Syria, Pyongyang and Damascus changed their shipping strategies. Iran agreed to receive the North Korean deliveries and tranship them to Syria, eliminating the need for ships to pass through the Suez Canal, a key choke point where the vessels could be detained or easily located.⁵⁰ In return, Syria reportedly allowed Iranian Revolutionary Guards to deliver small arms to Hezbollah terrorists in Lebanon.

In spite of its difficulty, interdiction does slow the

spread of WMD and missile technologies. The United States should, however, be wary of other policy options like lifting economic sanctions in return for a halt in North Korean missile development and sales. North Korea is called the "Hermit Kingdom" due to its isolation and suspicion of the outside world, and Pyongyang is unlikely to allow for the intrusive monitoring necessary to verify cessation of missile development and sales. As former North Korean Army Colonel Choi testified to the Senate regarding the difficulties involved in monitoring compliance with the Agreed Framework, "I understand the inspection team visited North Korea based on the framework agreement. I do not think they had a chance to inspect underground facilities, and I believe they only inspected the above-the-ground-level facilities and believe all the critical and important facilities are underground. Therefore, they didn't really see anything from my perspective. I believe those underground nuclear facilities will never be open to outsiders under any circumstances."⁵¹

Furthermore, the North Korean economy appears to be reeling from years of state planning and reports of widespread famine are common. In lifting economic sanctions, the Administration would risk extending the life of a Stalinist regime that shows signs of moving toward collapse. That end may be the best solution to the threat posed by North Korean missile proliferation.

In the meantime, the United States must do what is necessary to protect U.S. forces in the region. As Senator Thad Cochran said after hearing the two North Korean defectors at a recent Senate hearing, "[t]o me, this is more than just a wake-up call. I think it's a call to general quarters. It ought to be considered a grave matter of national security and it requires a response that is appropriate to the level of the threat."⁵² America, he added, "...need[s] to take steps to be sure that we have the capability and the systems deployed that will protect U.S. forces and U.S. interests from missile attack and other weapons-of-mass destruction attacks. That to me is the lesson [of this hearing] and why I suggest that it's probably more appropriate to say this should be a call to general quarters and not just a wake-up call."⁵³



PacNet

Number 3

Pacific Forum CSIS

Honolulu, Hawaii

January 20, 1998

Secretary Cohen's Visit to South Korea: Some Key Issues to Resolve by Ralph A. Cossa

U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen will soon be arriving in South Korea toward the end of a two week swing through Southeast and Northeast Asia. This is the first visit to Korea by a senior Defense Department official since the financial crisis struck the ROK in earnest and Cohen will need to deal with both the short and long term security implications of this crisis.

The immediate impact has already been felt. The ROK Department of Defense is cutting its budget, to include the cancellation of planned or anticipated expensive arms purchases from the U.S. This action, combined with the severe devaluation of the won (which has lost more than half its value against the dollar in the past three months), is sure to remove Korea from that rare list of Asian countries with whom the U.S. enjoyed a trade surplus. It is not likely to immediately increase the South's vulnerability, however, given North Korea's own difficulties and the strength and deterrence value of the U.S.-ROK military alliance (backed up by the presence of 37,000 U.S. troops in the South).

Cohen must also be prepared to deal with ROK requests for relief from impending security-related financial obligations. This includes ROK concerns about paying US\$399 million in host nation support to defray the costs of the U.S. presence and even greater concerns over ROK financial support to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) which faces, over the next ten years, a financial burden in the neighborhood of US\$5-6 billion to construct two light water reactors (LWRs) in North Korea. The LWRs are part of a deal, under the 1994 U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework in which Pyongyang froze its ongoing nuclear "research" effort in return for interim fuel oil deliveries (which the U.S. is in large part funding) and the eventual construction of less proliferation-prone LWRs (which the ROK and Japan were expected to finance).

South Korean defense officials have acknowledged their host nation support obligation as part of their "burden sharing" arrangements with the U.S. but are hoping for some flexibility since the US\$224 million in wages to be paid (in U.S. dollars) to Korean workers at the U.S. bases will now cost more than twice as much won as originally anticipated -- they reportedly would like to pay at least some salaries in won. Meanwhile, President-elect Kim Dae-jung has joined an ever-growing chorus (which includes many Japanese officials as well) calling for at least "token" U.S. support to the LWR project.

These contentious issues, while of immediate concern, pale in comparison with the more fundamental question of America's future role on the Peninsula. The North Koreans have stated unequivocally that they want to see a total withdrawal of U.S. forces from the Korean Peninsula (and perhaps from the rest

of Asia as well) as part of any peace agreement to emanate from the on-going four-party talks (involving the two Koreas, China, and the U.S.) and aimed at replacing the 1953 Armistice with a formal Peace Treaty.

Both the U.S. and ROK has thus far stressed that the U.S. military presence is "not negotiable" at the talks. The North is expected to continue to pursue its position, however, and this could begin to strike a more resonant chord as South Koreans fret over the cost of maintaining the U.S. forces. Such sentiments would become even stronger were the North to become genuinely cooperative at the talks, although the prospects of this occurring seem slim. Nonetheless, it is absolutely essential that Cohen and the ROK's current and future presidents (Kim Young-sam remains at the helm until Feb 25th) seize the opportunity of the Cohen visit to stress to the South Korean people why the continued U.S. presence is essential to their security today and well into the future.

[It is useful to note in this regard that the absence of a peace treaty over the past 45 years has not resulted in another war. Nor would the presence of a formal treaty assure peace, absent a fundamental change in attitude on the part of the North (along with some reduction in what is today the world's fourth largest standing army). Until there is genuine rapprochement between South and North, the surest guarantee of peace on the Peninsula remains the U.S. military presence.]

U.S. flexibility in easing the more immediate financial burdens would also help. But, while some token U.S. contribution to KEDO sounds reasonable, the probability that the U.S. Congress would approve additional funds for this purpose is somewhat less than zero. In fact, the Clinton Administration will be lucky to come up with the funds to pay for its obligated fuel oil deliveries. There is also the concern (not entirely unfounded) that U.S. agreement to provide token funding would open the door for demands for greater U.S. funding of the LWR project, since some South Korean (and Japanese) officials are already denying that they had previously promised to fully fund the LWRs.

One possible solution would be for the U.S. to agree to a one-time reduction in the ROK's host nation support, with the understanding that these funds would instead be directed toward the LWR project. A 25% reduction (about US\$100 million) is not likely to bankrupt the U.S. Defense Department. Since LWR construction costs are largely won-based and the payments in large part will go to support ROK companies, this should provide added benefit to the South. Most importantly, it helps defuse an immediate problem that could have an impact on both nations' long-term interests while also helping to assure that the U.S. and ROK do not renege on their side of the bargain with North Korea.

Ralph A. Cossa is executive Director of Pacific Forum.

INTERVIEW



US Air Force Maj Gen Tom Neary, director of nuclear and counter-proliferation in the air and space operations directorate of USAF headquarters, spoke to Barbara Starr about the challenges of maintaining air operations in an environment contaminated by weapons of mass destruction

(Photo: US DoD)

The crisis over UN inspections of suspected Iraqi chemical and biological weapons sites underscored a significant challenge facing the US armed forces: how to conduct and maintain military operations in a 'dirty' environment contaminated by toxic agents.

Developing an understanding of how to cope with such a problem is the task of Maj Gen Tom Neary, the US Air Force's director of nuclear and counterproliferation in the air and space divisions of USAF headquarters. Gen Neary's office has been operating for just a year.

Former USAF Chief of Staff Gen Ronald Fogleman established the office in January last year to ensure that the air force would have a centralised office for considering the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction (WMD). This requirement was driven not just by the perceived threat from nations such as Iraq and Iran but by the growing budget and emphasis on counterproliferation across the Department of Defense.

"We realise in today's world that an adversary could impose some sort of asymmetric leverage on us in a theatre warfare environment," said Gen Neary. "That could impact our core capabilities in the air force."

That concern is leading Gen Neary and his staff to specifically analyse issues such as the impact of WMD on issues such as: air mobility; access to bases; sortie generation; and how to conduct and sustain attack operations in a chemical/biological environment.

Gen Neary emphasised that his effort is part of an overall air force programme, including passive defence

measures to provide protection and decontamination for individuals as well as detector technologies for bases.

He said that his focus is on the warfighters. "Our direction has been to work on the operational challenges." While providing for passive defence measures such as masks and protective suits is vital, Gen Neary is determined to "bring more of a counterforce approach to the counterproliferation equation".

To accomplish that goal, he has initiated a number of analytical studies assessing particular needs for meeting the counterforce mission. For example, development is under way to analyse whether new intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) technologies are required to conduct target location, identification, predictive analysis and battle damage assessment (BDA).

While Gen Neary declined to discuss the specifics of current capabilities to prosecute a counterforce air campaign against WMD targets, he does acknowledge the challenge. "One of the hardest things for us is going to be target identification, the ISR piece," he said.

In many instances, what will be needed is an airborne "sniffer" sensor that can discriminate and locate precise threats. For the actual weapons component, Gen Neary advocates "a stand-off capability to do a good job against a relatively hardened target". Much of this is already being addressed in the "agent defeat technology" programme under way at Eglin Air Force Base,

Florida, as well as the efforts by the USAF to develop the Advanced Unitary Penetrator and the Smart Hard Target Fuze.

However, if the target cannot be destroyed due to collateral damage concerns, the next goal is a functional kill. This had led Gen Neary's group to another analytical effort to undertake "nodal" analysis on how to destroy key nodes such as power supplies to a target site. At the same time, developing both predictive analysis tools and a BDA capability geared to the WMD threat will be key to winning commanders' approval to conduct anti-WMD sorties.

He also said that solving the problem of non-corrosive decontamination of airframes, sensitive avionics, as well as base facilities remains an unmet shortfall. The result of all these efforts will be an air force "investment strategy" for future counterforce requirements which Gen Neary plans to present in early 1998.

There are additional far-reaching counterproliferation efforts under way. A service-wide integrated process team has been established to co-ordinate all activities. That document will include not only Gen Neary's investment strategy but details on counterproliferation roles and missions of the air force operational community as well as requirements for new weapons.

Much work has been completed. The USAF last year finished an initial analysis on the effects of chemical and biological warfare on air base combat operations.

The study identified necessary improvements in protection, training, exercises, and detectors.

This work has led to the development of an air force nuclear, chemical and biological 'Ability to Survive and

Operate' integrated process team to oversee passive defence activities.

Underlying all of the USAF efforts is a common belief that in the next battle the fight may not be even-handed. For

Gen Neary, that means the air force must take its core competencies such as mobility, "overlay a dirty environment and see what we need to do better and different."

"What I am looking for out of the analysis is a change in process or procedures."

Jane's

Jane's Defence Weekly 7 January 1998

'OUR DIRECTION HAS BEEN TO WORK ON THE OPERATIONAL CHALLENGES'

N Korean government 'could collapse by 2001'

The US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) has concluded that "it is a virtual certainty that the North Korean regime will not exist in its current guise in not too many years ahead".

The analysis came in a report recently released by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence detailing the most recent threat analysis by the DIA, the CIA and the State Department.

The DIA said that many intelligence analysts now assess that there is a potential for collapse of the current political system in North Korea within three years.

"North Korea's internal situation has continued to deteriorate, bringing into even greater question its long-term viability," the DIA said.

"Recent developments, particularly the impending food crisis, reinforce our judgment that the North cannot survive without significant external assistance and internal change."

The CIA endorsed the DIA view in the Senate report. "We would not rule out the possibility that there could be a

BY BARBARA STARR
WASHINGTON DC

dramatic change in the North Korean system within the next three years," the CIA said.

The CIA stressed that there is no evidence that the North Korean government is likely to collapse imminently.

However, if that happened, the military would likely focus on internal problems rather than react by attacking the south. In the past, the US intelligence community has worried that implosion in the north could trigger an attack due to instability.

Although there have been some improvements to the North Korean military in recent years, the armed forces have also endured many of the same problems affecting the civil sector.

"The military has had to endure shortages of food and fuel, increased susceptibility to illness, declining morale, often sporadic training and lack of new equipment," the CIA said.

"This has reduced the overall readiness and capability of the North Korean military, a situation that will become progressively more pronounced over time."

For its part, the State Department warned that despite the North's internal problems, the army "still packs a credible offensive punch in large part because it could inflict significant conventional damage on the south with little warning".

North Korea "could penetrate some distance across the DMZ [demilitarised zone] if it launched an all-out offensive", the State Department said.

Seoul remains within range of long-range artillery and the entire country remains vulnerable to 'Scud' missile attacks or insertion of special forces.

The State Department also projected that the north could engage in "limited offensive options if it believed that it had to 'shuffle the deck' after exhausting other strategies for regime survival".



N Korea set for more ballistic missile tests

North Korea is preparing to test a production version of its No-dong 1 intermediate-range ballistic missile, according to officials of the Japan Defence Agency.

The first indications of test preparations was the unexpected movement of a No-dong 1 mobile launcher which was detected by US satellites. There were reports of a transfer of a missile from the west of the country to the Hwadae-Gun test site in the northeast.

This was followed by the movement of Korean People's Navy vessels into the Sea of

BY JOSEPH S BERMUDEZ JNR
NEW YORK

Japan where they are reportedly already on station near the suspected impact area. This test would be the tenth test in the past 12 years.

The No-dong 1 is a development of the 'Scud Mod B' and 'Mod C' systems, themselves based upon the Soviet 'Scud B'. The No-dong 1 is believed to have a design range of approximately 1,000 km and has been under development for at least seven years.

In addition, the North Kore-

ans are developing two intermediate-range ballistic missiles: the Taep'o-dong 1 with a range of 1,500-2,000 km and Taep'o-dong 2 with a range of 2,000-4,000 km.

During the last successful test (29-30 May 1993) the North Koreans launched a total of four ballistic missiles, including at least one No-dong 1. A delegation from Iran witnessed the test. Iran has been the primary financial backer for North Korea's ballistic missile programme. It is possible that if the latest test was part of a scheduled programme then an Iranian delegation may have been there to witness it.

The timing of this test could be in response to the South Korean capture of a Sang-o class mini-submarine apparently engaged in an infiltration mission last month (JDW 25 September).

US sources have indicated that two air force RC-135 reconnaissance aircraft - the RC-135S Cobra Ball - detached from the 55th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing based at Kadena, have been deployed over the Sea of Japan to monitor any North Korean ballistic missile tests. The RC-135S is equipped with special systems to photograph and record the

flight telemetry of foreign ballistic missile tests.

The Japanese Maritime Self Defence Force is to deploy one of four Aegis destroyers, the *Kirishima*, to the Sea of Japan. The destroyer is one of the few ships that can track missiles and their warheads because it is equipped with the SPY-1D phased-array radar system.

Although there are only two Cobra Ball aircraft, it rates as one of the USAF's and intelligence community's most productive assets and is said to be uniquely qualified to address the emerging threat of ballistic missiles in the Third World.

The rapid response of the USA to the possibility of a North Korean ballistic missile test is indicative of the importance the USA and its Asian allies are attaching to the threat posed by North Korean ballistic missile development.



Jane's Defence Weekly 19 March 1994



The USAF's two RC-135S missile tracking aircraft have arrived at Misawa Air Base in the northern part of Honshu, Japan

NO-DONG DEVELOPMENT

Date	Missile type	Number	Range (km)	Comment
April and Sept 1984	'Scud Mod B'	3	200-250	Three missiles were launched in April/Sept
May 1990	No-dong 1	1	na	Probable failure
Nov 1990	No-dong 1	1	na	Cancelled
June 1990	'Scud Mod C'	1	200-250	Launched at Hwadae-Gun missile test facility
July 1991	'Scud Mod C'	1	250-350	Fired from a mobile launcher in Kwangwon-do Province
June 1992?	No-dong 1	1	na	Failed/cancelled?
29-30 May 1993	'Scud Mod B/C'	5	100	
	No-dong 1	1	500	
May 1994	No-dong 1	1	na	Cancelled?
July 1996	No-dong 1	1	na	Cancelled?

IRBM DEVELOPMENT

Name	Range (km)	Warhead (kg)	N Korea IOC
'Scud B' (a.k.a. R-17E)	220-300	1,000	1981
'Scud Mod A'	220-300	1,000	1984
'Scud Mod B' (a.k.a. 'Scud B')	320-340	1,000	1985
'Scud Mod C' (a.k.a. 'Scud C', 'Scud PIP')	500	660-770	1989
No-dong 1 (a.k.a. 'Scud Mod. D', 'Scud D', 'Rodong 1')	1,000-1,300	800	1995-97?
Taep'o-dong 1 (a.k.a. No-dong 2, 'Scud X', 'Scud Mod E', 'Rodong 2')	1,500-2,000	1,000+	1998-2000?
Taep'o-dong 2 (a.k.a. No-dong 3)	2,000-4,000	1,000+	2000+?



Ten Nodongs fielded but accuracy is low, says USA

North Korea's Nodong 1 ballistic missile system is designed as a weapon of terror rather than as an effective strategic strike system. US intelligence officials have concluded.

Its development programme, accuracy and range point to premature fielding and a lack of credible guidance, according to a recent briefing.

In a series of meetings in Seoul and Tokyo last month, senior officers of the US Defense Intelligence Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, National Reconnaissance Office and the US Air Force briefed government officials on the Nodong deployment earlier this year.

Three Nodong 1 mobile launchers were observed in northeast North Korea on 24 March and it is understood that a further seven systems have been seen at a facility about 100km from the capital Pyongyang.

However, US officials say that North Korea has not achieved full operational capability to US, Russian or even Chinese standards.

BY PAUL BEAVER
LONDON


This conclusion is based on the previous fielding of 'Scud-B' and 'Scud-C' missiles in the late 1990s. Accidents and misfirings were noticed during testing.

Accurate observation of the fielded Nodong 1 missile has determined that the missile is 15.2m long and 1.2m in diameter; slightly shorter than predicted and wider than the 'Scud-C'. The warhead weight is said to be 770kg and a warhead

canister manufacture facility has been found near Pyongyang.

Warhead types are conventional high-explosive or chemical. Guidance is another weak point in the design, said to be about 3 to 4km circular error probable. This gives rise to its classification as a terror weapon.

Although the range is classified as 1300km, it is dependent on the volume of fuel carried. It is possible that the warhead could be increased if the fuel load is decreased.



North Korea's Nodong launcher vehicle is based on a modified Russian MAZ-543 (above), fitted with a fifth axle (Photo: T Gander/Jane's)

The Nodong 1's development timetable is said to have started in 1989. However, efforts to shortcut development time resulted in a disastrous launch failure a year later.

The first propulsion tests were carried out in August 1994, training commenced in May 1995, and the missile storage facility was completed two months later. By October last year, the first launchers had been completed and the first four launch sites built.

Details of this launcher vehicle have also become available to *Jane's Defence Weekly*. The TEL (transporter, erector, launcher) is based on a modified Russian MAZ-543 vehicle and lengthened with a fifth axle. The launcher vehicle is said to be 40m long. With the support stand for the vertical launch mode, this brings the overall length to 60m.

US officials say that there is no evidence to suggest that Nodong 1 has been tested in Iran or any other foreign country. However, export orders are expected from the Middle East.

US officials also believe that fuel supply is the major difference between Nodong 1 and Nodong 2, a longer-range version. Both missiles have the same rocket motor but Nodong 2 might have a redesigned fuel supply system, which allows all the stored fuel to burn for a longer range.

WHITE PAPER

The Clinton Administration's Policy on
Managing Complex Contingency Operations:
Presidential Decision Directive - 56

May 1997

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The Clinton Administration's Policy
on Managing Complex Contingency Operations:
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Purpose

This White Paper explains key elements of PDD-56, the Clinton Administration's policy on managing complex contingency operations. This unclassified document is promulgated for use by government officials as a handy reference for interagency planning of future complex contingency operations. Also, it is intended for use in U.S. Government professional education institutions, such as the National Defense University and the National Foreign Affairs Training Center, for coursework and exercises on interagency practices and procedures. Regarding this paper's utility as representation of PDD-56, it contains all the key elements of the original PDD that are needed for effective implementation by agency officials. Therefore, wide dissemination of this unclassified White Paper on PDD-56 is encouraged by all agencies of the U.S. Government. Note that while this White Paper explains PDD-56, it does not override the official PDD.

Background

In the wake of the Cold War, attention has focused on a rising number of territorial disputes, armed ethnic conflicts, and civil wars that pose threats to regional and international peace and may be accompanied by natural or manmade disasters which precipitate massive human suffering. We have learned that effective responses to these situations may require multi-dimensional operations composed of such components as political/diplomatic, humanitarian, intelligence, economic development, and security; hence the term complex contingency operations.

PDD-56 defines "complex contingency operations" as peace operations such as the peace accord implementation operation conducted by NATO in Bosnia (1995-present) and the humanitarian intervention in northern Iraq called Operation Provide Comfort (1991); and foreign humanitarian assistance operations, such as Operation Support Hope in central Africa (1994) and Operation Sea Angel in Bangladesh (1991). Unless otherwise directed, PDD-56 does not apply to domestic disaster relief or to relatively routine or small-scale operations, nor to military operations conducted in defense of U.S. citizens, territory, or property, including counter-terrorism and hostage-rescue operations and international armed conflict.

In recent situations as diverse as Haiti, Somalia, Northern Iraq, and the former Yugoslavia, the United States has engaged in complex contingency operations in coalition, either under the auspices of an international or regional organization or in ad hoc, temporary coalitions of like-minded states. While never relinquishing the capability to respond unilaterally, PDD-56 assumes that the U.S. will continue to conduct future operations in coalition whenever possible.

We must also be prepared to manage the humanitarian, economic and political consequences of a technological crisis where chemical, biological, and/or radiological hazards may be present. The occurrence of any one of these dimensions could significantly increase the sensitivity and complexity of a U.S. response to a technological crisis.

In many complex emergencies the appropriate U.S. Government response will incur the involvement of only non-military assets. In some situations, we have learned that military forces can quickly affect the dynamics of the situation and may create the conditions necessary to make significant progress in mitigating or resolving underlying conflict or dispute. However, we have also learned that many aspects of complex emergencies may not be best addressed through military measures. Furthermore, given the level of U.S. interests at stake in most of these situations, we recognize that U.S. forces should not be deployed in an operation indefinitely.

It is essential that the necessary resources be provided to ensure that we are prepared to respond in a robust, effective manner. To foster a durable peace or stability in these situations and to maximize the effect of judicious military deployments, the civilian components of an operation must be integrated closely with the military components.

While agencies of government have developed independent capacities to respond to complex emergencies, military and civilian agencies should operate in a synchronized manner through effective interagency management and the use of special mechanisms to coordinate agency efforts. Integrated planning and effective management of agency operations early on in an operation can avoid delays, reduce pressure on the military to expand its involvement in unplanned ways, and create unity of effort within an operation that is essential for success of the mission.

Intent of PDD-56

The need for complex contingency operations is likely to recur in future years, demanding varying degrees of U.S.

involvement. PDD-56 calls for all U.S. Government agencies to institutionalize what we have learned from our recent experiences and to continue the process of improving the planning and management of complex contingency operations. PDD-56 is designed to ensure that the lessons learned -- including proven planning processes and implementation mechanisms -- will be incorporated into the interagency process on a regular basis. The PDD's intent is to establish these management practices to achieve unity of effort among U.S. Government agencies and international organizations engaged in complex contingency operations. Dedicated mechanisms and integrated planning processes are needed. From our recent experiences, we have learned that these can help to:

- identify appropriate missions and tasks, if any, for U.S. Government agencies in a U.S. Government response;
- develop strategies for early resolution of crises, thereby minimizing the loss of life and establishing the basis for reconciliation and reconstruction;
- accelerate planning and implementation of the civilian aspects of the operation;
- intensify action on critical funding and personnel requirements early on;
- integrate all components of a U.S. response (civilian, military, police, etc.) at the policy level and facilitate the creation of coordination mechanisms at the operational level; and
- rapidly identify issues for senior policy makers and ensure expeditious implementation of decisions.

PDD-56 requires all agencies to review their legislative and budget authorities for supporting complex contingency operations and, where such authorities are inadequate to fund an agency's mission and operations in complex contingencies, propose legislative and budgetary solutions.

Executive Committee

PDD-56 calls upon the Deputies Committee to establish appropriate interagency working groups to assist in policy development, planning, and execution of complex contingency operations. Normally, the Deputies Committee will form an Executive Committee (ExCom) with appropriate membership to supervise the day-to-day management of U.S. participation in a complex contingency operation. The ExCom will bring together representatives of all agencies that might participate in the operation, including those not normally part of the NSC

structure. When this is the case, both the Deputies Committee and the ExCom will normally be augmented by participating agency representatives. In addition, the chair of the ExCom will normally designate an agency to lead a legal and fiscal advisory sub-group, whose role is to consult with the ExCom to ensure that tasks assigned by the ExCom can be performed by the assigned agencies consistent with legal and fiscal authorities. This ExCom approach has proved useful in clarifying agency responsibilities, strengthening agency accountability, ensuring interagency coordination, and developing policy options for consideration by senior policy makers.

The guiding principle behind the ExCom approach to interagency management is the personal accountability of presidential appointees. Members of the ExCom effectively serve as functional managers for specific elements of the U.S. Government response (e.g., refugees, demobilization, elections, economic assistance, police reform, public information, etc.). They implement the strategies agreed to by senior policy makers in the interagency and report to the ExCom and Deputies Committee on any problems or issues that need to be resolved.

In future complex contingency operations to which the United States contributes substantial resources, PDD-56 calls upon the Deputies Committee to establish organizational arrangements akin to those of the ExCom approach.

The Political-Military Implementation Plan

PDD-56 requires that a political-military implementation plan (or "pol-mil plan") be developed as an integrated planning tool for coordinating U.S. government actions in a complex contingency operation. The pol-mil plan will include a comprehensive situation assessment, mission statement, agency objectives, and desired endstate. It will outline an integrated concept of operations to synchronize agency efforts. The plan will identify the primary preparatory issues and tasks for conducting an operation (e.g., congressional consultations, diplomatic efforts, troop recruitment, legal authorities, funding requirements and sources, media coordination, etc.). It will also address major functional tasks (e.g., political mediation/reconciliation, military support, demobilization, humanitarian assistance, police reform, basic public services, economic restoration, human rights monitoring, social development, public information, etc.). (Annex A contains an illustrative outline of a pol-mil plan.)

With the use of the pol-mil plan, the interagency can implement effective management practices, namely, to centralize planning and decentralize execution during the operation. The desired unity of effort among the various agencies that is

created through the use of the pol-mil plan contributes to the overall success of these complex operations.

When a complex contingency operation is contemplated in which the U.S. Government will play a substantial role, PDD-56 calls upon the Deputies Committee to task the development of a pol-mil plan and assign specific responsibilities to the appropriate ExCom officials.

Each ExCom official will be required to develop their respective part of the plan, which will be fully coordinated among all relevant agencies. This development process will be transparent and analytical, resulting in issues being posed to senior policy makers for resolution. Based on the resulting decisions, the plan will be finalized and widely distributed among relevant agencies.

The PDD also requires that the pol-mil plan include demonstrable milestones and measures of success including detailed planning for the transition of the operation to activities which might be performed by a follow-on operation or by the host government. According to the PDD, the pol-mil plan should be updated as the mission progresses to reflect milestones that are (or are not) met and to incorporate changes in the situation on the ground.

Interagency Pol-Mil Plan Rehearsal

A critical aspect of the planning process will be the interagency rehearsal/review of the pol-mil plan. As outlined in the PDD, this activity involves a rehearsal of the plan's main elements, with the appropriate ExCom official presenting the elements for which he or she is responsible. By simultaneously rehearsing/reviewing all elements of the plan, differences over mission objectives, agency responsibilities, timing/synchronization, and resource allocation can be identified and resolved early, preferably before the operation begins. The interagency rehearsal/review also underscores the accountability of each program manager in implementing their assigned area of responsibility. During execution, regular reviews of the plan ensure that milestones are met and that appropriate adjustments are made.

PDD-56 calls upon the Deputies Committee to conduct the interagency rehearsal/review of the pol-mil plan. Supporting agency plans are to be presented by ExCom officials before a complex contingency operation is launched (or as early as possible once the operation begins), before a subsequent critical phase during the operation, as major changes in the mission occur, and prior to an operation's termination.

After-Action Review

After the conclusion of each operation in which this planning process is employed, PDD-56 directs the ExCom to charter an after-action review involving both those who participated in the operation and Government experts who monitored its execution. This comprehensive assessment of interagency performance will include a review of interagency planning and coordination, (both in Washington and in the field), legal and budgetary difficulties encountered, problems in agency execution, as well as proposed solutions, in order to capture lessons learned and to ensure their dissemination to relevant agencies.

Training

The U.S. Government requires the capacity to prepare agency officials for the responsibilities they will be expected to take on in a planning and managing agency efforts in a complex contingency operation. Creating a cadre of professionals familiar with this integrated planning process will improve the USG's ability to manage future operations.

In the interest of advancing the expertise of government officials, agencies are encouraged to disseminate the *Handbook for Interagency Management of Complex Contingency Operations* published by OASD(S&R) Strategy at (703) 614-0421.

With the support of the State and Defense Departments, the PDD requires the NSC to work with the appropriate U.S. Government educational institutions--including the National Defense University, the National Foreign Affairs Training Center and the Army War College--to develop and conduct an interagency training program. This program, which should be held at least annually, will train mid-level managers (Deputy Assistant Secretary level) in the development and implementation of pol-mil plans for complex contingency operations. Those participating should have an opportunity to interact with expert officials from previous operations to learn what has worked in the past. Also, the PDD calls upon appropriate U.S. government educational institutions to explore the appropriate way to incorporate the pol-mil planning process into their curricula.

Agency Review and Implementation

Finally, PDD-56 directs each agency to review the adequacy of their agency's structure, legal authorities, budget levels, personnel system, training, and crisis management procedures to insure that we, as a government, are learning from our experiences with complex contingency operations and institutionalizing the lessons learned.

Annex A: Illustrative Components of a Political-Military Plan for a Complex Contingency Operation

- Situation Assessment. A comprehensive assessment of the situation to clarify essential information that, in the aggregate, provides a multi-dimensional picture of the crisis.
- U.S. Interests. A statement of U.S. interests at stake in the crisis and the requirement to secure those interests.
- Mission Statement. A clear statement of the USG's strategic purpose for the operation and the pol-mil mission.
- Objectives. The key civil-military objectives to be accomplished during the operation.
- Desired Pol-Mil End State. The conditions the operation is intended to create before the operation transitions to a follow-on operation and/or terminates.
- Concept of the Operation. A conceptual description of how the various instruments of USG policy will be integrated to get the job done throughout all phases of the operation.
- Lead Agency Responsibilities. An assignment of responsibilities for participating agencies.
- Transition/Exit Strategy. A strategy that is linked to the realization of the end state described above, requiring the integrated efforts of diplomats, military leaders, and relief officials of the USG and the international community.
- Organizational Concept. A schematic of the various organizational structures of the operation, in Washington and in theater, including a description of the chain of authority and associated reporting channels.
- Preparatory Tasks. A layout of specific tasks to be undertaken before the operation begins (congressional consultations, diplomatic efforts, troop recruitment, legal authorities, funding requirements and sources, media coordination, etc.).
- Functional Tasks / Agency Plans. Key operational and support plans written by USG agencies that pertain to critical parts of the operation (e.g., political mediation/reconciliation, military support, demobilization, humanitarian assistance, police reform, basic public services, economic restoration, human rights monitoring, social development, public information, etc.).

November 12, 1997

SECTION: SPECIAL REPORT; Vol. 28; No. 19; Pg. 54

LENGTH: 906 words

HEADLINE: North Korea's deadly industries revealed

BYLINE: Joseph S Bermudez Jr.

HIGHLIGHT:

North Korea's military-industrial process is shrouded in mystery. In a rare profile, Joseph S Bermudez Jr. lifts a corner of the veil of secrecy on the complex, all-powerful Second Economic Committee

BODY:

The economic structure of the Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea (DPRK) incorporates a process of procurement, manufacture and distribution that is centrally controlled by the state in minute fashion. A key aspect of its economy is the defence industry.

While civilian industry is managed and administered through the State Administration Council, the defence industry is essentially controlled through one organisation - the Second Economic Committee (SEC).

The SEC is the single most powerful and influential economic organisation in the DPRK. It exercises overall responsibility for the planning, financing, production and distribution of defence-related equipment. It is also responsible for all foreign military-related sales and purchasing.

The origins of the SEC date to the Second Korean Workers' Party (KWP) Congress in October 1966 when leader Kim Il-Sung stressed the need to develop the defence industry and to proceed with economic and national defence development simultaneously.

To oversee the expansion, the Second Machine Industry Ministry (also called Ministry of the Second Machine Industry) was established within the State Administration Council and a party secretary was appointed to oversee its operations.

Since then, the defence industry has been known as the "second

economy" in North Korea. In 1971, as military-related production continued to increase, the Second Machine Industry Ministry was reorganised into the SEC. It was allocated a separate budget to that of the Ministry of People's Armed Forces (MPAF) and was responsible for planning, financing, production and supplying military materials for all sales. It also had priority status for allocating raw materials and foreign capital.

In the early 1980s, the SEC became more and more influential as military production and foreign military sales became a more significant part of the DPRK's economy.

In 1993, the year after the amendment of the DPRK's Constitution separated the National Defence Commission from the Central People's Committee and elevated to an equivalent position, the SEC was subordinated to the National Defence Commission.

The channels of command and control for the SEC, like those of almost every other national organisation, extends through the government and the KWP. While this has the potential for serious problems due to frequently conflicting agenda, there appears to be little doubt as to who exercises control and what the ultimate aims are. While the SEC is formally subordinate to the National Defence Commission, the KWP's Defence Industry Policy and Inspection Department oversees practical affairs of the committee. The SEC is independent of the MPAF and the Korean People's Army (KPA). The daily operations of the committee are controlled by three directors, the most important of whom is Chon Pyong-ho. The two others are believed to be Choe Yong-nim and Kim Chol-man. This chain of command does not affect the operations of the SEC because the three directors hold positions simultaneously in several organisations. Chon Pyong-ho is a member of the KWP Central Committee and the National Defence Commission as well as director of the KWP's Defence Industry Policy and Inspection Department. As such, he is responsible for all aspects of military production for the KWP and the government. Likewise, Kim Chol-man is a senior KPA general, as well as a member of the KWP's Central Military Committee and of the National Defence Commission.

The SEC is based in a large office building complex in Kangdong-kun, in the capital, P'yongyang. It is organised into: eight bureaus (see boxes); the Academy of Defence Sciences; and the External Economic Affairs Bureau. Some sources say there is also a "Material Company", subordinate to the SEC, responsible for procurement. Whether this is correct is not known. It may refer to the General Bureau, External Economic Affairs Bureau, or the MPAF's Maebong Trading Company.

The various machine industry bureaus co-ordinate their activities

with their counterpart bureaus in the MPAF and the Academy of Defence Sciences. Each bureau exercises daily control over its subordinate facilities and organisations through a network of branch offices nationwide. The committee is estimated to control between 134 and 141 specialty factories, 59 maintenance and parts factories and 34 related factories. These factories are typically designated using numbers, or cover names, to conceal their function and the types of weapons production involved - for example, the Kanggye No. 26 General Plant produces missiles. Some factories, subordinate to the State Administration Council's Light Industry and Machine Industry Ministries, perform a secondary role within the defence infrastructure. Twenty-one such facilities are believed to have completed advance preparations for conversion to defence production in wartime.

As well as its own dedicated production facilities, the SEC exercises some control over certain production lines in factories subordinate to the State Administration Council.

Even in the factories where there is no direct SEC involvement, production orders from the committee have high priority. In wartime, it is believed that the SEC would assume control over all factories capable of defence-related production.

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Jane's Intelligence Review

August 1, 1996

SECTION: ASIA ; Vol. 8; No. 8 ; Pg. 378

LENGTH: 3628 words

HEADLINE: Inside North Korea's CW infrastructure

BYLINE: Joseph S Bermudez Jr.

HIGHLIGHT:

Over the past decade, analysis of North Korea's chemical weapons has tended to focus on its military aspect, leaving the infrastructure of production largely untouched. Joseph S Bermudez Jr. examines the avenues of decision-making and manufacture within the North Korean programme.

BODY:

Since the late 1970s or early 1980s, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) has been involved in the indigenous development, production and deployment of chemical weapons (CW). During the past decade, information concerning these efforts has gradually become available. This information has, however, concentrated primarily upon developments within the Korean People's Army (KPA) and its chemical defence organization and training programme (see JIR, Vol 5, No 5, pp 225-228 and Pointer No 12, p 3). The CW production infrastructure has largely remained clouded in confusion and misinformation. However, a preliminary description of CW production within the DPRK, based upon recently available material and interviews with defectors, can now be presented.

Command and control

The production of CW within the North involves the co-operation of three separate but interrelated branches of the government, namely the Korean Workers' Party (KWP), the Central People's Committee and the National Defence Commission. Each year, based upon current doctrine and plans, the Ministry of People's Armed Forces through its General Staff Department (especially the Artillery Command, Operations Bureau, Ordnance Bureau and Nuclear-Chemical Defence Bureau) establishes the requirements. These are then forwarded through the National Defence Commission to both the State Administrative Council of the Central People's Committee and the

Central Military Committee of the KWP's Central Committee (see chart opposite).

The State Administrative Council forwards these requirements to its Ministry of Chemical Industry for co-ordination and action. The Central Military Committee forwards its requirements through the Munitions Industry Policy and Inspection Department to the 5th General Machine Industry Bureau of the 2nd Economic Committee. Here, the requirements are reviewed and compared with the chemical-industry's production resources and finances which are available through the current multi-year economic plan. (The third seven-year plan ended in 1993 and the DPRK is currently in a two-year 'recovery period'). This review, when completed, is coordinated with the Ministry of Chemical Industry and incorporated into an industry-wide production plan. The plan is then used to issue production orders to the various chemical factories subordinate to the Ministry of Chemical Industry and the 2nd Economic Committee.

The latter committee is the central organization within the DPRK tasked with the production, distribution and trade with foreign countries of all munitions and military equipment. It is under the direct control of the Munitions Industry Policy and Inspection Department of the Central Military Committee of the KWP. The committee is headquartered in Pyongyang and is organized into nine bureaus according to weapon type. Three of these bureaus directly effect CW production. The General Bureau is responsible for planning, budget compilation, procurement and distribution of materials. The 3rd General Machine Industry Bureau is charged with the development and production of artillery and multiple-rocket launcher (MRL) systems and their munitions. The 5th General Machine Industry Bureau is charged with the development and production of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. If the production plan developed by the 2nd Economic Committee requires the acquisition of components, equipment or chemicals from outside the DPRK, it relies upon its External Economic General Bureau. This bureau is more commonly known as the 'Yongaksan Company' and is responsible for international trade within the munitions sector.

The bureaus of the 2nd Economic Committee maintain regional offices which not only manage their own production facilities but also control certain production lines in various factories throughout the country that are operated by the Administration Council. In general, plants belonging to the Administration Council give higher priority to implementing the 2nd Economic Committee's production orders than other production orders.

At present, the Institute of Defence Science is involved in CW production. This involvement appears to place it in direct contact

with both the 2nd Economic Committee and the chemical-agent factories. It would seem most probable that it serves in a scientific advisory role to both the committee and industry but this has yet to be clarified.

Finally, although the above suggests a very clear link between doctrine, requirements and production, with distinct lines of communication and chains of command, this is probably not the case. For example, Chon Pyong-ho, is simultaneously a member of the KWP Central Committee, a member of the National Defence Commission, chairman of the Munitions Industry Policy and Inspection Department, and director of the 5th General Machine Industry Bureau. General Kim, Chol-man is simultaneously chairman of the 2nd Economic Committee, a member of the KWP Central Committee and a member of the National Defence Commission. These two examples, and there are more, suggest that the links for CW production are considerably more indistinct than they would appear on paper.

Chemical-agent production

During the year, the factories of the Administration Council and 2nd Economic Committee produce and store various chemical feed-stocks and precursors. When required, these are then shipped to 'chemical laboratories' which produce the actual chemical agents. At present, it is believed that these laboratories are directly subordinate to the 5th General Machine Industry Bureau. Once the chemical agents are produced, they are stored until needed at, or near, the production facilities.

It is difficult to differentiate between locations associated with just the production of feed-stocks or precursors and those which actually produce chemical agents (see table). This difficulty arises from several factors, most significantly facilities which produce dual-use chemicals are sometimes described as being chemical-agent factories. A possible example of this is the Hyesan Chemical Factory in Yanggang Province which is sometimes identified as producing chemical agents. Yet, it is known to produce only intermediate products such as benzene, phenol, hydrochloric acid, sulfuric acid, etc. It is also important to note that the DPRK's larger chemical complexes are sizable facilities consisting of several smaller factories with different processing units. Some of these complexes, such as the 8th February Vinalon Complex, apparently produce feed-stocks, precursors and agents but in different units within the complex. In reality, however, only a small portion of any one complex is involved in chemical-agent production and these are probably purpose-built units. (See adjacent map.)

When required, stored chemical agents are shipped in bulk form to

either the Kanggye or Sakchu CW factories. As a security measure, these shipments are by normal military train and are not easily distinguishable from other military trains by casual observation. The Kanggye and Sakchu factories are under the control of the Equipment Department of the Nuclear-Chemical Defence Bureau, and it is at this point that control of the chemical agents apparently passes from nominal civilian to military control.

The Kanggye or Sakchu factories both receive chemical agents from the 5th General Machine Industry Bureau and empty mortar, artillery and artillery/rocket rounds from the factories subordinate to the 3rd General Machine Industry Bureau. It appears that these two CW factories are responsible for a wide range of activities including: the filling, packaging and shipping of 'training and war' chemical munitions which range from 80 mm to 240 mm MRL rounds; preparation, packaging and shipment of chemical agents in bulk form; and production of aircraft- and helicopter-delivered weapons (such as spray tanks, chemical bombs, etc.) which would be filled at air bases from bulk supplies immediately prior to use. It is presently unknown as to whether these factories produce chemical warheads for ballistic missiles or FROG artillery rockets. It would seem reasonable, however, to assume that, at a minimum, they provide the bulk agent to be used to fill any such warheads. As well as the obvious CW produced by these factories, it appears that they may also be responsible for the production, packaging and shipment of smoke and incendiary munitions. However, this needs to be confirmed. What division of labour, if any, exists between the Kanggye and Sakchu CW factories is presently unknown. Both facilities have a limited storage capacity for 'several tons' of CW.

Chemical agents currently reported to be in KPA inventory include but are not necessarily limited to: adamsite (DM), chloroacetophenone (CN), chlorobenzylidene malononitrile (CS), hydrogen cyanide (AC), the mustard family (H or HD), phosgene (CG and CX), sarin (GB), soman (GD), tabun (GA) and V-agents (VM and VX). It is important to note that according to KPA defectors the DPRK produces a total of 20 different chemical agents for use in weapons. For a variety of reasons, not the least of which is the DPRK's capability to produce or acquire certain precursors, it is believed that the KPA has concentrated upon mustard, phosgene, sarin and the V-agents. To date, there are no public indications that the DPRK produces binary chemical agents. Nonetheless, given the significant benefits in safety and shelf-life by doing so, it is likely that some binary chemical agents are in production. Additionally, the KPA has conducted extensive studies of the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88) and the Gulf War (1990-91). Those studies have probably led them to follow the Iraqi example with regards to binary CW.

Chemical protection equipment production

The production of chemical defence and decontamination equipment is known to occur at only one facility within the DPRK, namely Factory 279 (or Research Centre 279). This facility is located at Sokam-ri and, like the Kanggye and Sakchu CW Factories, is subordinate to the Equipment Department of the Nuclear-Chemical Defence Bureau. The factory produces a wide range of chemical-defensive equipment including: detection kits and equipment, masks, protective clothing, decontamination kits and materials (chemical solutions), etc. It is not currently known whether these facilities produce nerve-agent antidotes or if these are provided by the pharmaceutical industry. Products from Factory 279 are shipped to the Maram (Masan-dong) and Chiha-ri (Anbyon) storage facilities.

Research and testing facilities

There are conflicting reports as to where CW research and testing occur within the DPRK. Official Ministry of Defence sources in South Korea (ROK) indicate that practical CW research facilities are located in the Kanggye, Sinuiju and Hamhung areas. The exact nature of these facilities and the type of research conducted are currently unknown. There is a possibility that these three locations are being confused with either chemical-agent production facilities or educational institutes.

It would seem reasonable that the DPRK has a CW test facility which would be similar to the UK's Porton Down or the USA's Dugway Proving Grounds. To date, there is no information available concerning any such facility. KPA defectors indicate that the Kanggye and Sakchu factories conduct CW testing underground. This, in all probability, is only connected with quality control and not weapon development. There are two known nuclear-chemical training centres. One is under the direct control of the Nuclear-Chemical Defence Bureau while the second is controlled by the Ministry of People's Armed Forces. These, however, appear to be dedicated to operational training and not weapons testing and development.

Defectors report that there are several organizations involved in CW research. However, it appears that these institutes are actually involved in the academic and theoretical education of personnel who are, or will become, involved in the KPA's chemical programme. They include: the Central Analysis Centre at Pyongsong Academy of Science; the Chemical Department of Pyongsong College of Science; the Chemical Research Institute under the 2nd Academy of Natural Science; the Hamhung Branch of the Academy of Defence Science (probably at the Hamhung University of Chemical Industry); and the

Kim Il-sung University.

Finally, there have been repeated reports from defectors that the KPA has conducted chemical and biological-weapons testing on humans. Details, however, are lacking and these reports must be viewed critically until further evidence becomes available.

Strategic storage

The CW produced by the Kanggye and Sakchu factories are apparently not stored locally for any great length of time but rather are shipped by military train, with a minimal security team, to 'store offices' located at Maram and Chiha-ri. These 'store offices' are known as the 'Maram Materials Corporation' and 'Chiha-ri Chemical Corporation'. The facilities are also subordinate to the Equipment Department of the Nuclear-Chemical Defence Bureau. Both consist of a number of special underground storage tunnels dug out from mountains. These tunnels contain filled warheads, bulk agents stored in 4 m high tanks, chemical warfare protection and detection equipment, as well as decontamination agents produced by Factory 279. It is presently unclear, but possible, that these two 'store offices' are also used for biological weapons also.

CW are shipped directly to special corps munitions depots from the 'store offices'. Once again, this is done via regular military train with a minimal security escort. Shipments are made directly to a railroad siding serving the corps depot. If this depot is not served directly by a railroad siding, the weapons are off-loaded onto trucks and then delivered to the depot. At these depots, CW are stored separately from regular munitions and are under the control of the corps chemical departments and chemical battalions.

The ROK Ministry of Defence has identified six special corps munitions depots located at: Sanumni (two sites, III Corps or P'yongyang Defence Command), Hwangch'on (III Corps), Samsan-dong (II Corps or the Artillery Corps), Sariwon (IV Corps) and Wangjaebong (V Corps). KPA defectors generally agree with this deployment, indicating that such depots exist only with the corps deployed along the DMZ (I, II, IV and V corps) and not the rear area corps (III, VI, VII, VIII, X and XI corps). It is currently unknown if the mechanized corps (108th [10th?], 425th, 806th [9th?]) and 815th corps) and the 820th Armoured Corps have special munitions depots.

From corps depots, the chemical munitions are delivered to tactical units by truck. A primary reason for this forward deployment of CW is that it allows the KPA to minimize the time to transport these weapons to operational units in time of emergency. Chemical mortar and artillery munitions are shipped in wooden crates that are

painted dark green. On the end of each crate, at the left hand side, is a large orange triangle signifying CW. To the right of the triangle is an information panel with the following information: type of filling, production date, expiration date and, possibly, production facility. Practice chemical mortar and artillery munitions are shipped in wooden crates that are not painted but with similar identification markings on the end of each crate. One KPA defector has indicated that the individual chemical mortar and artillery munitions are not marked in any special manner so that if they are removed from their shipping container there is no way to identify them readily. This has not been verified and should be viewed critically until further information becomes available.

CW in the air force and navy

Chemical protection and decontamination equipment are also supplied to both the DPRK's Air Force and the Navy commands. Whether this is done directly from the Kanggye and Sakchu CW factories or from the Maram and Chiha-ri storage facilities is currently unknown. CW must also be supplied to these commands for training and operational use. These are most probably stored in special munition depots subordinate to these commands. However, details concerning this are completely lacking at the moment.

Capacities and stockpiles

At present, it is extremely difficult to arrive at accurate estimates of annual DPRK chemical-agent production or CW stockpiles. There are two basic arguments. One view suggests low levels while the other takes the opposite tack. Both, however, generally agree that the DPRK's potential for chemical-agent production is significant: in 1993, it was estimated that the chemical industry had a total annual fertilizer production capacity of 3.5 million tons of nitrogenous and phosphatic fertilizer and 8,000 tons of agricultural chemicals. It has, however, failed to meet this potential because of a variety of factors including: shortages of materials, mismanagement, power shortages, obsolescence of equipment and poor quality control.

The argument for a low estimate of DPRK chemical-agent production and CW stockpiles is that the production of chemical agents, in all probability, suffers from these same problems. Additionally, the production of chemical agents is typically a very corrosive process requiring large quantities of special materials. The DPRK, which has little access to such materials, must make do with substitutes. This results in several synergistic factors limiting overall production and stockpile levels. First, with poor substitutes, production lines must be frequently shut down for repair and the replacement of

parts, thus limiting overall output. Second, the chemical-agent output tends to be contaminated which means that it breaks down relatively quickly (depending on the amount of impurities) and thus needs to be replaced at a significant rate. Finally, unless chemical agents are relatively pure and stored in weapons that are lined with special non-corrosive materials they tend to corrode and leak. Thus they need to be replaced. These factors would tend to limit the overall levels of production and stockpiles within the KPA's chemical arsenal.

The opposing argument believes that given the importance which the DPRK leadership has attached to the development of weapons of mass destruction then significant resources and manpower have been dedicated to the CW programme. With these resources, the chemical-agent production infrastructure has received the specialized materials it required and sufficient electrical power has been allocated to its production facilities. As a result, the entire effort has been managed with a certain degree of efficiency. In support of this line of thought, proponents point out that the KPA has continually upgraded its CW organizations. It created the Nuclear-Chemical Defence Bureau in 1981 out of the old Chemical Department. It has conducted extensive studies of the war in Afghanistan, the Iran-Iraq War and the Gulf War, coupled with the implications of CW usage in these conflicts. It has incorporated 'lessons learned' from these conflicts into its doctrine, training and operations. Secondly, the DPRK has had extensive experience with the production of chemicals since the 1960s and its chemical industry is diverse. Thirdly, the North has been able to pursue successfully nuclear-weapon and ballistic-missile programmes of even greater sophistication and complexity than a CW programme. Finally, the production of the type of chemical agents believed to be within the KPA's inventory requires technology that is more than 50 years old and easily within the capabilities of the DPRK.

Taking into account all the arguments, current unclassified estimates suggest an annual production potential of 4,500 tons in peacetime and 12,000 tons in wartime (although it is unclear whether this is weapons or agent tons). Concerning CW stockpile levels, it was believed in 1989 that the KPA had stockpiled '180-250 tons of chemical weapons of several kinds'. Current estimates suggest the KPA has now stockpiled 1,000-5,000 tons of CW: the majority of these weapons are believed to be filled with mustard, phosgene, sarin and V-agents.

Facilities Associated with Chemical-agent Production

CITY	FACILITY	TYPES OF CHEMICAL AGENT
Anju	Namhung Youth Chemical Complex	Blood
Aoji-ri	Aoji-ri Chemical Complex	Blood, emetic
Ch'ongjin	Ch'ongjin Chemical Fibre Complex	Blood, tear
Hamhung	8th February Vinalon Complex	Blister, asphyxiant, lachrymatory, nerve
Hamhung	Hungnam Fertilizer Complex	Tear, asphyxiant
Hwasung	Hwasung Chemical Complex	Asphyxiant, nerve
Manpo	Manpo Chemical Complex	Blister, blood, tear
Sakchu	Chungsoo Chemical Factory	Tear, asphyxiant
Sariwon	Sariwon Potassic Fertilizer Complex	
Sinhung	Sinhung Chemical Complex	
Sinuiju	Sinuiju Chemical Fibre Complex	Tear, suffocation
Sunch'on	Vinalon Complex	Blister, blood, asphyxiant, tear

Joseph Bermudez Jr. is the author of JIR's Special Report No 9 on 'North Korea's Nuclear Arsenal'.

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January 04, 1998, Sunday, Final Edition

SECTION: OP-ED; Pg. C07

LENGTH: 1227 words

HEADLINE: Asia: Look Out for More Surprises

BYLINE: Morton I. Abramowitz

BODY:

When the year 2000 rolls around, it won't be the start of the much-heralded "Pacific" Century. One day perhaps. Right now the focus is on stopping Asia's financial paroxysms, which continue in Korea and Southeast Asia, while Japan - which needs no bailout - is shaking. Asia's woes are generating badly needed domestic economic reform, but they are also puncturing dreams and, most important, changing domestic politics.

The Asian tigers compressed a century into a generation. They achieved economically in 30 years what took the United States a hundred years or so, including defaults, depressions and other events we have forgotten, creating among the cognoscenti and many Asians a belief in the dawn of the Pacific Century. But Asia's economies ran ahead of their political and institutional growth, and aspirations to regionalism ran ahead of their development as nation states.

Economic disaster will exacerbate the already growing tension between authoritarianism and "order" vs. pluralism and political freedom. Authoritarianism is less and less "the Asian way." New political leaders are emerging. President Kim Young Sam of Korea and Prime Minister Chavalit of Thailand are the past. Japanese Prime Minister Hashimoto has not delivered, and he barely survives, probably because the job of prime minister is now too unappealing to other leading members of his party. However great their contribution to their countries' prosperity, Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir and Indonesian President Suharto are increasingly seen as the problem and not the solution.

With unhappy, better-informed publics in many Asian countries, new (and old) leaders will face difficulties maintaining political support and in certain cases incendiary domestic situations. Democratic elections, however desirable, may not bring much help, certainly in the short term. It is ironic that an imaginative democratic leader such as Korea's newly elected President Kim ae Jung, who wanted to focus on North-South problems, has to deal with the massive problem of no foreign exchange and a distraught and deeply shamed public.

Democracy in Thailand in the past decade has grown, but it has also produced more corrupt civilian governments than the periodic military ones. Maybe the new constitution and a period of stress or stringency will change the system. Japan has had countless free elections, but bureaucrats still rule the roost despite the demonstrated record of failure this decade. Even China, which so far has insulated itself from the economic debacle of its neighbors and has no meaningful national elections, is likely to have turbulent "domestic politics" as it continues to change dramatically.

Globalization isn't considered the greater good, at least not to many Asian politicians and publics, and even here in the short term. We have seen the defeat – at least momentarily – of fast-track authority, and we have yet to hear from Congress on all the bailouts. We can expect Asian domestic politics to be the arena of the struggle between the pressures of globalization and the forces of economic nationalism – all the more difficult because the forces of modernization and nation building are still very much at work. The much-needed dose of economic liberalization being forced upon countries by the world's lenders – a sort of internationally coerced "trickle-down economics" – will varyingly arouse anti-foreign, particularly anti-American, sentiment. Politicians will see to that, particularly given the sizable populations in most Asian countries that have benefited far less from vast economic growth and will suffer more from the coming austerity.

Anti-Americanism has risen sharply in Thailand, Malaysia and most recently in Korea, perhaps temporarily given the enormous bailout. Not surprising. For any years Asians have felt sustained American pressures on trade. Many see in the present disaster the foreign hand destroying their currency and buying their companies at fire-sale prices. Thais feel that as a longtime ally, the United States should not have abandoned them in their hour of need. Such sentiments in the past have usually been fleeting.

Economic turmoil and domestic politics have also brought home once again that there is no such political entity as Asia, only a number of East Asian countries that have developed important economic ties. There has been no great growth of cooperation on sensitive economic and political problems. In a time of incredible turmoil, Japan quietly backed off a major role in Southeast Asia's financial debacle and refused to change its damaging economic policies, while China, after a modest contribution, became uninterested in any role. Even the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), which had developed some cohesion, failed to coalesce to deal with the financial crisis of its members. The Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum has developed only because of incessant American prodding.

Paradoxically, less political and economic "order" may – at least temporarily – bring a greater sense of security. With the exception of Korea, governments and publics are likely for some time to come to be less reoccupied with external security considerations as they focus on economic troubles and

domestic politics – they are almost all in the same boat. Even South Korea seems for a moment less absorbed about dealing with the North.

In most countries hard-pressed governments will look for savings from the national security sector, stemming perhaps from fears of arms races. Japan has cut its defense budget, and so have Southeast Asian countries. If South Korean troubles last longer than expected, the government could find it politically harder to meet its professed determination to find the billions promised to Pyongyang for two nuclear reactors in exchange for halting its nuclear weapons program. The threat of revived Japanese militarism – so relished in much of Asia and in some prominent America quarters – may in some Asian countries be put to rest by Japan's international performance and current difficulties. So, too, the obsession with China may fade, although that is less likely. It is hard for Asians not to worry about China.

Asia's growth has surprised us, Asia's debacle has surprised us. The voices diagnosing with certainty Asia's troubles today were rhapsodic only a year ago. More surprises may be in store. We will certainly see a resurgent Asia; there is too much dynamism in the area. But Asia's domestic politics over the next decade will take place amid economic uncertainty and restructuring, continuing nationalism and growing democracy. Democratic politics is often as unpredictable there as it is most places. However urgent today's need for foreign monies, Asian domestic politics will not necessarily throw up reformers and liberalizers, particularly those who can maintain power in volatile political settings. Globalization is an inexorable force promoting international cooperation, but it is not the only force in the world. The nation state remains very much alive in Asia, and the next few years will be critical to how much it is defined by nationalism and how much by globalization.

The writer is a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and a former assistant secretary of state.

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January 19, 1998, Monday, Final Edition

SECTION: OP-ED; Pg. A25

LENGTH: 852 words

HEADLINE: A Silver Lining to Asia's Financial Cloud

BYLINE: Victor Gilinsky; Henry Sokolski

BODY:

The South Korean financial crisis is about to undermine the nuclear deal the United States struck with North Korea back in 1994. The United States promised Pyongyang two large power reactors worth \$ 5 billion in exchange for a freeze and eventual dismantling of North Korea's small indigenous plutonium production reactors. North Korea had already violated the inspection provisions of the Nonproliferation Treaty and looked like it might use its plutonium for bombs. The two large reactors may have been an unsavory payoff, but the State Department fixed it so South Korea would pay, with some help from Japan, and that deflected criticism in the United States. Several months ago, the project broke ground. Now, suddenly, South Korea is broke, the International monetary Fund is nixing South Korean projects right and left, and the nuclear deal with the North may have to go back to the drawing board.

That isn't all bad. The twin-reactor deal never made much sense except on the symbolic level – for North Korea. The large reactors are much too big for the small North Korean electric grid. If North Korea needs more electric generators, it hardly needs the most expensive ones that take the longest to put on line and produce plutonium to boot. The new reactors, while harder for the North to see for plutonium production, would produce more plutonium than the small indigenous ones they would replace. In fact, the new reactors, called "proliferation-resistant" by the State Department, are essentially the same as those the State Department labeled a proliferation risk when Russia talked of supplying them to Iran. Most important, under the 1994 deal, North Korea doesn't have to dismantle its plutonium production plants until the second of the two U.S.-supplied reactors is ready. That could be in 10 years – or never – which will leave the United States subject to blackmail indefinitely. It doesn't hurt to have a financial excuse to rethink the deal.

There never was any suggestion about the U.S. taxpayer picking up the tab, or that's out. Or should be. Administration officials swore up and down about this when they defended the original deal before Congress. (It wouldn't hurt to take sure the current South Korean bailout contributions don't contain a hidden pass-through for the nuclear deal.) The United States has already borne the initial burden, paying more than \$ 80 million so far to provide North Korea with

half a million tons of heavy fuel oil per year (doing so until the first reactor is built was part of the very generous deal). The reactors were supposed to be paid for by South Korea – the country whose national security was most immediately endangered, and which will inherit them if the peninsula becomes one. But what if the South can't pay?

President-elect Kim Dae-jung said [news story, Jan. 9] that in the current difficulties "Japan and the United States must contribute more." He cannot afford to be subsidizing North Korean nuclear reactors when he is under IMF pressure to cancel South Korean infrastructure projects that won't produce a short-term return. To add to the problems, the Korea Electric Power Corp., the prime contractor for the North Korean reactor project, is in deep financial trouble and cannot put up any money. The Japanese are not going to pick up the tab, either. They haven't even put money for the reactors into their 1998 budget, as Japanese officials confirmed on Dec. 22, 1997.

Not South Korea, not the United States and not Japan – what then? We should change the deal. If the North needs electric generators, let us find the lowest-cost solution – by putting the project out for bid. This is the way most countries go about building electric plants today. We will undoubtedly get a non-nuclear result that will come in sooner and at a fraction of the current cost – maybe something the South Koreans can still afford. And it wouldn't hurt for North Korea to get firsthand experience with markets and competition.

Getting the project done sooner would mean the North would have to dismantle its own nuclear facilities that much sooner, too. Pyongyang claims it is hanging on to its indigenous nuclear facilities in case it needs to revive them if the new electrical capacity is not installed. Actually, the North is using that option to blackmail the United States.

Of course, the diplomats will argue that North Korea would never agree to modifying the agreement, that we got the best deal possible. Maybe. Time has passed, and the North Koreans may realize shrewdly that if they want electric generators, this may be the only way to get them. If they don't go for an economically advantageous non-nuclear deal, then we know they are up to no good, and we definitely should not trust them with reactors. It's a self-answering proposition.

Victor Gilinsky is an energy consultant and a former U.S. Nuclear Regulatory commissioner. Henry Sokolski is executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center and was deputy for nonproliferation policy in the Pentagon during the Bush administration.

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January 13, 1998, Tuesday, Final Edition

SECTION: A SECTION; Pg. A16

LENGTH: 1173 words

HEADLINE: U.S. Analyzing Potential Fallout From Asia Crisis;
Military, Political Impact Could Be Widespread

BYLINE: Thomas W. Lippman, Washington Post Staff Writer

BODY:

The cascading economic crisis in Asia threatens to generate political and strategic side effects that could undermine U.S. interests from Thailand to Taiwan, according to senior Clinton administration officials and independent analysts.

The administration has spoken little in public about non-economic fallout from the crisis after deciding in July to coordinate its response through the Treasury Department, which is concerned mostly with market stability and bank solvency.

But the State and Defense departments have a long list of concerns about the impact of the financial crisis on Asia's political and military stability, senior officials said, including the potential inability of some countries to modernize their armed forces and the possibility of a Chinese crackdown in Hong Kong.

Some of those issues will be addressed publicly over the next two weeks as Defense Secretary William S. Cohen – accompanied by Stanley Roth, assistant secretary of state for Asian affairs – travels through Asian capitals with a message of reassurance, senior officials said.

Cohen "will try to convey to them our commitment to stand with them during this time of uncertainty," a senior Defense Department official said.

Administration officials acknowledged that the scope of the Asian meltdown caught them by surprise, but they said that since November an interagency team has been analyzing the possible effects. The State Department in particular is sensitive to criticism that Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright has been insufficiently attentive to the potentially wider damage from the economic turmoil.

Albright has said almost nothing in public on the topic since a Nov. 22 speech in Vancouver, when she told Asian economic officials that "in the months ahead, the region's economies must combine the energy of the tiger with the

wisdom of the owl."

But her spokesman, James P. Rubin, and other officials said she has put in more time on this issue than any other for the past few months and has worked closely with Treasury Secretary Robert E. Rubin to craft the U.S. response. One of Albright's aides went so far as to report that she participated in a conference call on the Asian situation while basting her Thanksgiving turkey.

Treasury, however, has been and will remain the lead agency on the U.S. side because Secretary Rubin's voice commands the most authority in world markets and it is Treasury's job to work with the International Monetary Fund. State Department officials and ambassadors in individual countries "have not been as much in charge of policy as they would have been if this were not a technical financial matter," one senior official said.

President Clinton, Secretary Rubin, Albright and other senior officials decided to give priority to fiscal stability and implementation of reforms demanded by the IMF rather than confronting possible political and strategic side effects of the economic crisis. If implementation of those reforms sparks unrest in such countries as Indonesia -- as it has in other parts of the world -- that price must be paid, senior officials said.

"We do recognize that there are major geopolitical ramifications," one senior State Department official said, "but we also agree with Treasury that we have to adhere to the IMF program. This is not one of those situations where we are pressing for less stringent treatment" of Indonesia or other countries out of fear of the political consequences, the official said. "We share the Treasury and White House view that the shortest way to a potential solution is take the IMF medicine. There are no shortcuts."

According to independent analysts and administration officials, some political and strategic side effects are more likely than others, but their lists include these possibilities:

Unrest in Hong Kong could provoke a crackdown by Beijing. Loss of export markets could force China to lay off workers at state-owned industries, with potentially disruptive consequences.

A cash-strapped South Korea could have trouble paying its share of nuclear power reactors to be developed in North Korea, jeopardizing the U.S.-North Korea nuclear agreement.

Political instability in Indonesia could result in violence, potentially disrupting oil markets because Indonesia is a major producer and possibly jeopardizing the security of narrow shipping lanes that carry most of Japan's oil. Hundreds of thousands of expatriate workers in Indonesia and other countries could be laid off, creating another source of instability.

The armed forces of Thailand, South Korea and other allies might curtail military purchases, delaying modernization of their armed forces and trimming sales for U.S. defense contractors. Japan and South Korea may want to renegotiate their share of the cost of keeping U.S. troops stationed there, forcing Washington either to pay more or bring some troops home.

Because of weak currencies, Asian consumers could drastically reduce purchases of U.S. goods, increasing the U.S. trade deficit and making it still more difficult for Clinton to win expanded free trade negotiating authority from Congress. North Korea could "be very tempted to fish in troubled waters" if strikes and demonstrations break out in the South, according to James R. Lilley, former U.S. ambassador to South Korea.

Officials and others are also concerned that in the long run, resentment of a perceived U.S. arrogance in a difficult situation – insisting that Asian nations knuckle under to the IMF no matter the domestic consequences – might disrupt key bilateral relationships in the future.

"I think a lot of Asians are disturbed by the American triumphalism," said Ezra Vogel, a Harvard professor who was the senior East Asia specialist at the CIA in Clinton's first term.

Asians do not like to be told that "the American system of open markets is now proven successful and they will improve by being more like us," Vogel said. "People in the administration who meet with Asians should be a little more prudent in the way they handle this."

"In terms of economic policy, the administration is right to insist on the IMF requirements and not encourage alternative schemes," said Michael Green, an Asia specialist at the Council on Foreign Relations. "But politically, the problem is that this is an extremely sensitive time of transition in all these countries. These next few years are going to test their tolerance for globalism, which means American hegemony. If we are arrogant about it, the response could be intense nationalism."

Administration officials said that while the economic problems are Asia-wide, the affected countries are so different politically and vary so greatly in underlying economic strength that it is difficult for Washington to formulate a broadly applicable response.

"It just doesn't lend itself to grand pronouncements" other than urging countries to stabilize their banks and currencies and get their debt under control, one senior official said.

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