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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. paper	re US Policy in Asia (1 page)	00/00/0000	P1/b(1)
002. paper	re East Asia Initiatives (2 pages)	06/17/1993	P1/b(1)
003. paper	re Balance of Power in Asia (3 pages)	06/00/1993	P1/b(1)
004. paper	re Asian Security (2 pages)	06/00/1993	P1/b(1)
005a. fax	cover, re Asian-Pacific Regional Security (1 page)	06/03/1993	P1/b(1)
005b. memo	Winston Lord to Tony Lake et al re Asia-Pacific Regional Security Themes (3 pages)	06/02/1993	P1/b(1)
005c. memo	Winston Lord to Tony Lake et al re Asia-Pacific Regional Security Themes (page 1 only, duplicate of 005b) (1 page)	06/02/1993	P1/b(1)
005d. memo	Winston Lord to Secretary of State re Multilateral Dialogue (4 pages)	06/01/1993	P1/b(1)
005e. paper	re considerations (6 pages)	05/07/1993	P1/b(1)
005f. statement	Ambassador Lord on Political and Security Issues (6 pages)	05/20/1993	P1/b(1)

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2009-0528-F

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A NEW PACIFIC COMMUNITY TEN GOALS FOR AMERICAN POLICY

Opening Statement at Confirmation Hearings
for Ambassador Winston Lord
Assistant Secretary of State-Designate
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs
March 31, 1993

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee:

President Clinton has honored me with his nomination as Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific. I am grateful for the trust that he and Secretary Christopher have invested in me to help shape America's policy for this critical region.

If I am confirmed, our exchange today will be the first step in a journey charted by thorough consultation and cooperation. This I pledge in the national interest and my own self-interest. There is much to be learned from your perspectives and those of the American people. There is much to be gained when policies are jointly crafted.

Thus, in addition to *ad hoc* exchanges on breaking issues, I will maintain a process of regular meetings, on the Hill and in the Department, with key members of Congress and their staffs. I also intend, as both opportunity and responsibility, to traverse this nation to listen to Americans and clarify our Asian-Pacific policies.

I come to this assignment with a global perspective based on three decades of international experience in the Government and non-profit sector. I am foremost a generalist -- as a Foreign Service officer with varied assignments, a member of the Defense Department's Policy Planning Staff, Special Assistant to the President's National Security Advisor, and Director of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff. Outside government I have served as President of the Council on Foreign Relations, Chairman of the National Endowment for Democracy, Vice Chairman of the International Rescue Committee, and Chairman of the Carnegie National Commission on America and the New World. Throughout I have dealt extensively with Asian issues, including as Ambassador to China and as director and member of many organizations with emphasis on that region.

Above all I come in the spirit of bipartisanship, with a record of service under all but one Administration since Kennedy. I am gratified to have been selected by both Presidents

Reagan and Clinton for positions requiring Senate confirmation. Seasoning has sharpened, not mellowed, my conviction that the greater our unity at home, the greater our success abroad. America has permanent interests. They do not change every four years.

A New Pacific Community

Today no region in the world is more important for the United States than Asia and the Pacific.

Tomorrow, in the twenty-first century, no region will be as important.

In that vast area most of the world's people live. Many of the richest cultures flourish. The most dynamic economies beckon. The major powers intersect.

Asia

America has fought in three wars in Asia during the past half century. We have abiding security interests there. Forty percent of our trade is with the region, its share swelling more rapidly than that of any other, and half again as large as with Western Europe. More and more eager, talented Asian immigrants enrich America's cultural and economic mosaic. Our nation's population and production shift steadily toward our Pacific Coast.

In sum, the firmest guarantees of America's staying power in Asia -- more credible than rhetoric from the rostrum or writs on paper -- are our overriding national interests.

Ever since the Vietnam War we have enjoyed broad bipartisan consensus on the most salient policies in the Asia-Pacific region; this has contributed mightily to our successes. But in recent years, preoccupied by crises in Europe and the Middle East, we have paid insufficient attention to major transformations underway across the Pacific. Our Asian partners have noticed. Some are apprehensive.

Asia has been moving from an arena of confrontations to the premier growth area of the world. Economic, political, and cultural exchanges within this region have mushroomed. Familiar landmarks are shifting. New patterns are taking shape. New generations are taking charge. We risk squandering assets and lagging behind trends.

We have enormous stakes in the Pacific. We need to integrate our economic, political and security policies. We need fresh approaches and structures of cooperation.

It is time to build -- with others -- a New Pacific Community.

A survey of the regional landscape yields both hopes and hazards:

-- It includes the world's fastest-growing economies and most lucrative terrain for American exports and jobs. But we risk losing markets to aggressive competitors, and we are running unacceptable deficits with some of them.

-- The end of the Cold War eased relations among regional powers and deflated regional conflicts. But some of our bilateral ties are frayed or fragile and new security challenges cloud the horizon.

-- Global revolutions in technology, transportation and communications lift the hopes and prospects for countless Asians. But global risks resonate ominously in the area -- the proliferation of dangerous weapons, the burgeoning of populations, the spectre of AIDS, the degradation of the environment, the spawning of refugees, the traffic in drugs.

-- The universal tides of democracy, fanned by information and free markets, flow in the region. But four of the world's last five communist regimes, together with other repressive governments, remain caught in a time warp in Asia.

4 of 5
communist regimes:
China, Vietnam, N. Korea, Laos

How then do we remove the peril and realize the promise?

Foreign policy for the region -- as for the world at large -- begins at home. President Clinton has wisely declared the renewal of America as his supreme goal. This is not only essential for the American people. It is essential for American interests and values abroad. As the Carnegie Commission, which I recently chaired, stated, "First, our foreign policy must be founded on a renewal of our domestic strength; rebuilding our economic base is now our highest priority."

Equally compelling is the need to perfect the American experiment in democracy. We must practice at home what we preach overseas. We can project to troubled countries a multi-ethnic society that reconciles the need for national purpose with the right of groups to be distinctive. As President Eisenhower once said, "Whatever America hopes to bring to pass in the world must first come to pass in the heart of America."

There can be no greater contribution to our Asian policy than fostering domestic economic vigor and social cohesion in America. Our Asian friends recognize this. Progress at home will burnish our leadership credentials. It will make us competitive in the marketplace of goods and credible in the marketplace of values. It will help secure the resources needed for international action. And it will steady popular support without which our foreign policy founders.

Looking forward, we can see ten major goals for American policy in Asia and the Pacific. They are not listed in any order but rather as parameters of progress.

-- Forging a fresh global partnership with Japan that reflects a more mature balance of responsibilities.

-- Erasing the nuclear threat and moving toward peaceful reconciliation on the Korean peninsula.

-- Restoring firm foundations for cooperation with a China where political openness catches up with economic reform.

-- Deepening our ties with ASEAN as it broadens its membership and scope.

-- Obtaining the fullest possible accounting of our missing in action as we normalize our relations with Vietnam.

-- Securing a peaceful, independent and democratic Cambodia.

-- Strengthening APEC as the cornerstone of Asian-Pacific economic cooperation.

-- Developing multilateral forums for security consultations while maintaining the solid foundations of our alliances.

-- Spurring regional cooperation on global challenges like the environment, refugees, health, narcotics, non-proliferation and arms sales.

-- Promoting democracy and human rights where freedom has yet to flower.

Let me briefly elaborate on each one.

Japan

Our fortunes in Asia, indeed the world, will hinge on developing a comprehensive, durable partnership with Japan. This will be my highest priority.

Together Japan and America comprise forty percent of the world's GNP. Our alliance reassures friends, promotes stability, and deters arms races. We are -- or must become -- partners on issues ranging from Korea to Somalia, Cambodia to Russia, technology to foreign aid, the environment to democracy.

We offer our Japanese friends both reassurance about our intentions and a sense of urgency about festering frictions. We will maintain a substantial military presence in Asia.

We will strive energetically to open markets. Japan will have our strong support for a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council; while complex negotiations are underway, we will consult Tokyo systematically on all major issues before the world organization.

In return, equity and reality require more vigorous Japanese performance on economic issues and international responsibilities. An open global economic system is crucial to that country's future. Its current account surplus of 125 billion dollars strains that system; its 49 billion dollar surplus with us creates severe tension. During the past decade our deficits with Japan have totalled almost half a trillion dollars.

We are addressing this imbalance on several fronts -- making the American economy more competitive; urging Japanese macroeconomic measures to stimulate demand and imports; implementing agreements already negotiated; and achieving concrete export and investment results in selected areas.

Globally, Japan has already taken some promising initiatives ranging from peacekeeping to foreign assistance. But Japan's aspirations for a central seat at world councils should be bolstered by contributions worthy of a major political and economic power.

It is time to shape a global partnership with Japan. Together we should thicken webs of consultations and cooperation on three levels. On the global plane, we should collaborate on the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations, the G-7 process, UN peacekeeping missions, and international challenges such as non-proliferation, the environment, refugees, health, human rights and democracy. On the regional plane, we should together nourish economic institutions like APEC and security consultations on a range of issues. On the bilateral plane, we should pursue a structure of economic consultations and deepen our dialogue on our respective policies toward major nations like Korea, Russia, and China.

In this way we can forge a more equitable, positive partnership. America will listen more, lecture less. In turn, Japan should step forward, not in response to American entreaties or pressure, but in a spirit of enlightened self-interest and mutual benefit.

Korea

The Korean Peninsula reflects at once remarkable progress, tenuous openings, and lurking dangers.

The Republic of Korea represents one of Asia's greatest success stories. Its economic growth has been little short of astonishing. Its diplomacy has scored a series of breakthroughs. It is steadily shouldering more of its self-defense. Its continued movement toward democracy -- crowned by the recent inauguration of a President who had spent three decades in opposition -- heartens those living under authoritarian regimes elsewhere in the region.

We applaud these advances even as we work towards greater economic cooperation and reforms on intellectual property rights, financial liberalization, the investment climate and market access.

But the threat from the North remains the most perilous legacy of the Cold War. Prodded by a disastrous economy and estrangement from its major patrons, Pyongyang has toyed with opening toward the outside world. After some promising moves in the past two years, North Korea currently seems to be retreating toward paranoia. In recent weeks it has fueled anxieties in the region by first reneging on commitments to inspection of its nuclear facilities and then declaring its intention to withdraw from the Non-proliferation Treaty. Looming ahead are the profound uncertainties of its political succession.

The policy lines of the United States are clear and consistent. We will maintain significant military forces in South Korea as long as Americans and Koreans believe they are needed for deterrence and regional stability. We will continue to support fully the IAEA and other international bodies to eliminate the North Korean nuclear threat. North Korea's nuclear challenge is to the world community, not just to the United States, as Pyongyang seeks to portray it. This problem is critical to the worldwide campaign to stem proliferation.

The future of the Peninsula must be resolved essentially through direct South-North negotiations; we remain prepared to enhance this process through close consultation with our South Korean ally and multilateral diplomacy. We also stand ready to improve our relations with North Korea if it cooperates on fundamental issues.

China

Ever since participating in the opening to China more than two decades ago, I have worked hard to build Sino-American relations. I will continue to do so, conscious of both American interests and values.

China is an influential member of the international order. More than one of every five humans live there. It possesses nuclear weapons and exports nuclear technology. It

launches satellites and sells missiles. It represents a huge market and one of the world's richest civilizations. It holds a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. It is central to key regional issues like Indochina, Korea, and disputed islands. It abuts the unsettled Central Asia region. It is salient in new challenges that require global action.

In recent years, China has opened up to the world, moved toward a market economy, and enjoyed the fastest growth rate in the world. Together with the greater Chinese communities of Taiwan and Hong Kong it has become one of the most promising areas for investment and trade.

At the same time, its leaders cling to an outdated authoritarian system. Serious abuses persist. While Beijing releases some prominent activists toward the end of their jail sentences, it arrests others for the peaceful expression of political views. The Chinese leaders are gambling that open economics and closed politics will preserve their system of control. It is a gamble that sooner or later will be lost. Economic reform produces -- and requires -- political reform. In today's world, nations cannot prosper for long without opening up their societies. Technology and information, the forces of modernization, and global democratic trends have been eroding communism and totalitarianism across the globe.

All of the Asian models of economic success toward which China looks -- many of them Chinese societies -- have shown that political relaxation, tolerance of opposition, a freer press, the rule of law and other democratic elements are inescapably linked with economic development.

Our policy challenge therefore is to reconcile our need to deal with this important nation with our imperative to promote international values. We will seek cooperation with China on a range of issues. But Americans cannot forget Tiananmen Square.

The United States therefore should conduct a nuanced policy toward Beijing until a more humane system emerges. Shunning China is not an alternative. We need both to condemn repression and preserve links with progressive forces which are the foundations for our longer term ties.

We will continue to be guided by the three Sino-American joint communiques that have provided a flexible framework for our relations. It is up to China and Taiwan to work out their future relationship; we insist only that the process be peaceful. Consistent with our undertakings not to challenge the principle of "one China", we will continue to build upon our unofficial relations with Taiwan based on the Taiwan Relations Act. In our diplomacy and through the 1992 U.S.-Hong Kong Policy Act we should make clear our large humanitarian and commercial stakes in the future of Hong Kong.

Against this backdrop we face a host of serious issues with China: Widespread human rights violations, including in Tibet. Chinese exports of dangerous weapons and technology to volatile areas. Our fastest-growing trade deficit, which is now more than 18 billion dollars, second only to Japan. Collaboration at the United Nations and on regional conflicts. Emerging challenges like the environment and drugs. We should work together where our interests converge and bargain hard over differences.

We will press forward with this agenda in a sober, constructive fashion. Our approach will reflect that China is a great nation. In response to positive movement by the Chinese, we are prepared to address their concerns and strengthen our ties.

The Chinese people hold the same aspirations as others around the globe. We will support those aspirations -- without arrogance -- recognizing that the Chinese people will determine their own destiny, but confident that we are aligning ourselves with the future.

ASEAN

The ASEAN nations, with 330 million people, boast some of the fastest-growing economies and became last year our fourth-largest overseas market. We welcome ASEAN's establishment this January of the world's newest free trade grouping. By the year 2000, ASEAN could become a trillion dollar economic area encompassing eleven countries. We will therefore intensify our efforts to promote U.S. exports and the jobs they create. Last year a successful American tour by our Ambassadors to ASEAN raised awareness of this dynamic region. We will continue such efforts to attract more American firms to this competitive market.

This institution, 25 years young, serves regional stability as well as prosperity. The future admission of the Indochina countries would encourage them in constructive directions. The ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference, which brings together the Ministers of ASEAN and seven other nations, is evolving into an increasingly important forum for regional security consultations. Imaginative diplomacy by Indonesia and others has been crucial in moving the Cambodian peace process forward and exploring peaceful ways to resolve competing claims in the South China Sea.

With the closing of our military facilities in the Philippines, we are gradually developing a diversified pattern of security ties in Southeast Asia. All the ASEAN countries view a continuing U.S. military presence as a stabilizing element during an uncertain period; each in its own way is helping to make it possible. Our commitments to Thailand and the Philippines -- both exemplars of democratic advance -- remain firm. We welcome more cordial relations with Malaysia. We will strengthen those with Singapore and Brunei.

The United States will accord ASEAN and its individual countries the growing attention they merit -- for American trade and investment, for regional security, for the extension of freedom.

Vietnam

We are taking an especially close look at our policy towards Vietnam. Let me emphasize that obtaining the fullest possible accounting for Americans missing from the Vietnam War, including those lost in Laos and Cambodia, will remain a central objective.

I have reviewed the findings of the Senate's Select Committee on POW/MIA, before which I was honored to testify. The Senate's exhaustive examination of this highly-charged issue was a major achievement. I congratulate the Committee, whose findings have served to narrow uncertainties and ease some of the families' pain. Most of the twenty-year record of Hanoi on this issue has been one of callousness and deceit, but we can be encouraged that the Senate Select Committee has confirmed that Vietnamese cooperation with our investigations has substantially improved. While we may never find all the answers, this Administration will make every effort to accelerate the process. We must secure whatever comfort we can for the families of the missing.

I assure you as well that we will vigorously pursue POW/MIA issues with Pyongyang, Moscow and Beijing.

Looking to the future, Vietnam, a rapidly-growing country of 70 million, the fourth largest in East Asia, can play an important political and economic role. If the necessary groundwork is laid we can strengthen regional stability. A key factor will be the political settlement in Cambodia. Vietnam has taken a positive role to date in the UN peace process; we expect its full support for the elections in May and the establishment of a new, independent Cambodian government.

On the economic side, Vietnam has undertaken market reforms, opening up promising vistas for trade and investment. The American business community is eager to take advantage of these opportunities and compete effectively with others.

At the same time, Vietnam continues under a repressive Communist political system. There are scant traces of freedom. As we seek to normalize relations, the intensity and warmth of our ties will depend on progress in this area.

The graduated, reciprocal policy of recent years has successfully induced the Vietnamese to be more cooperative on the POW/MIA and Cambodian issues. South

Vietnamese personnel have been released from re-education camps. Now we need to consider how further steps toward normalization can serve our multiple objectives.

With Vietnam's cooperation we are prepared to heal the wounds of history.

Cambodia

Cambodia continues to be a land of tragedy, torn by two decades of war and ravaged by the brutal policies of the Khmer Rouge.

After arduous diplomacy involving many nations, the fragile outlines of a settlement finally emerged -- ceasefire, demobilization, a large United Nations presence and free elections leading to an independent Cambodian government. Even more is at stake here than the fate of that country and regional security. The UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia -- UNTAC -- is the largest peacekeeping operation in the history of the United Nations. Thus we face a crucial test of multilateral peacekeeping by the international community.

The situation is precarious. The headlines are grim. Yet UNTAC has recorded some impressive achievements. The 20,000 peacekeepers have managed a ceasefire for over a year. UNTAC has registered over 95% of the eligible voters for the elections slated for May. Almost all of the 360,000 Cambodian refugees have been repatriated; the demining and repairing of the country's infrastructure goes forward.

Formidable obstacles remain. The Khmer Rouge refuse to participate in the elections; they seek to disrupt them; they are apparently hunkering down for a long-term struggle to take over the nation. The Cambodian government, installed by Hanoi in 1979, fears repudiation at the polls; it is using violence to intimidate potential voters; it threatens to discredit the election results.

There will be no easy path through this thicket. Working with others, the United States must support the process of free and fair elections and assist the government that emerges. The immediate task for UNTAC is to convince the Cambodian people that their votes will be secret and that their votes will count. The looming policy choices before the world community include the ongoing role of the United Nations, the means to strengthen the future government, and the ways to contain the genocidal Khmer Rouge and others who seek to undermine the settlement.

One of the most complex and central tasks for our Asian policy will be to help provide the Cambodians with a brighter future. No other people deserve peace more.

Economics

In the aftermath of the Cold War, economics is increasingly supplanting military considerations on our foreign policy agenda. More than ever our national security depends on our economic strength. With domestic renewal now America's highest priority, trade and investment are critical. And no region is more central for American economic interests than the world's most dynamic one - Asia.

When I served as Ambassador to China, I devoted more time to promoting American business and economic interests than any other task. I will do so as well in my forthcoming role. I will consult closely with the American business community on their problems and their goals. I will urge our overseas posts to do the same. For the private sector in Asia, as elsewhere around the world, is an increasingly important actor. Helping American businesses to penetrate overseas markets will be key to America's prosperity.

The Asia-Pacific region is the world's largest consumer market and our biggest export market. Last year our exports were worth more than 120 billion dollars and 2.3 million American jobs.

We need to confront our Asian economic challenges and opportunities on several levels. Foreign policy begins at home -- strengthening our competitiveness is a *sine qua non* for an effective policy. The successful completion of the Uruguay Round is the most urgent multilateral task -- this would dramatically increase trade and investment in Asia as in the world, and it would help preserve an open global system against the dangers of protectionism and regional blocs. We welcome the positive role played by Australia and New Zealand as active Cairns Group members. Here, as on other issues, we will consult closely with Canada. Bilaterally we must continue to pry open Asian markets, particularly in those nations running large surpluses with us. We will champion expanding trade but we will insist that others open up to our products and services. As the President has said, we will compete, not retreat.

In addition to these domestic, global, and bilateral policies, greater regional cooperation is required.

The most promising vehicle is APEC, established in 1989 through the efforts of Australia and others. Today this trans-Pacific grouping brings together fifteen Pacific economies representing almost half of the world's GNP. It underscores the new imperatives of interdependence. It can dampen the appeal of exclusionary regional blocs. It can advance regional trade liberalization and integration. It can anchor America in the world's most dynamic region.

As the host for this year's annual Ministerial Conference in November, the United States has the opportunity to strengthen this organization. This will be at the top of our agenda this year. Working with others we can create a true Asian-Pacific economic community.

Security

By virtue of history and geography the United States is the one major power in Asia not viewed as a threat. Virtually every country wants us to maintain our security presence. While balance-of-power considerations have declined in the wake of the Cold War, they remain relevant as Asian-Pacific nations contemplate their fates. Each one harbors apprehensions about one or more of its neighbors. A precipitous American military withdrawal would magnify these concerns. Add the increasing resources available for weapons purchases in the rapidly growing Asian nations and there is a recipe for escalating arms races and future confrontations that could threaten U.S. interests.

American security policy for Asia begins with a reaffirmation of our treaty alliances with Japan, Korea, Australia, Thailand, and the Philippines; our military arrangements under the Compact of Free Association; and the maintenance of a substantial military presence. To be sure, given the end of the Cold War, stronger friends, and budget considerations, there could be prudent modifications after close consultation with our allies. And they can and must assume a growing share of the security burden.

Unlike other regions, crises in Asia do not dominate the headlines, but serious security problems persist. Those left over from the Cold War -- such as the Cambodian conflict and tensions on the Korean Peninsula -- are being addressed by the appropriate groupings of nations. The dispute between Japan -- whom we support -- and Russia over the Northern Territories belongs to bilateral negotiations.

Clearly, however, we must develop new mechanisms to manage or prevent other emerging concerns. We welcome increased security consultations in the framework of the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference. This process can usefully encourage nations to share information, convey intentions, ease tensions, resolve disputes and foster confidence. The United States will fully participate.

For the first time in this century, there are no adversarial fault lines among the great powers in Northeast Asia: the United States, Japan, Russia and China. The post-Cold War period invites dialogue to prevent arms races, the forging of competing alignments, and efforts by one power or group of powers to dominate this strategic region. Our voice will be crucial. In close concert with our Pacific allies, we could engage Russia, China and others inside and outside Northeast Asia.

Asia is not Europe. We do not envisage a formal CSCE-type structure. But it is time to step up regional discussions on future security issues. We are open-minded on the arenas. We will heed the ideas of others, like Japan, Australia, and ASEAN, which have been particularly fertile in this domain. Together we can explore new Asian-Pacific paths toward security.

Global Issues

President Clinton and his Cabinet officers have already moved to restructure the executive branch to meet the new global challenges in our foreign policy. These issues loom large in Asia and the Pacific. They will assume increasing prominence on our regional agenda as we approach the twenty-first century.

A brief checklist illustrates some of these problems:

-- With the end of global superpower rivalry the proliferation of dangerous weapons now poses the greatest threat to our security. In Asia, North Korean programs currently dramatize this challenge.

-- It took until 1830 for the world's population to reach one billion people. Now it increases by that number every decade, with 90% of the growth in developing countries. Asia, East and South, is home to half the world's people. Twenty years from now a billion more people will live there.

-- Many measures of human impact -- from water use to the emissions of trace gases -- show greater change since 1950 than in the previous 10,000 years. The Asian region, with its massive increase in energy consumption, faces severe environmental problems. They range from the plundering of Southeast Asian forests to China's burning of coal to the threat of global warming for some Pacific Island states.

-- There are almost 20 million refugees in the world today. Even more people are uprooted within their own lands. While some recent developments in Asia are promising, poverty, repression and uncertain political succession could unleash major migrations in the future.

-- The traffic in drugs remains a scourge on American society. Although the battle must be won at home by eliminating demand, the supply of narcotics from Burma and neighboring countries exacerbates our calamity.

Surely this is a daunting array of issues. But problems common to all nations can stimulate communities. They can be positive additions to our bilateral and regional dialogues. And if they are not addressed effectively in Asia, they can hardly be addressed by the world.

Increasingly we will inject these global subjects into our relations. We will also encourage new institutions, like APEC, to enhance regional consultations and cooperation.

Democracy and Human Rights

History is on the side of freedom. In recent years hundreds of millions of people have won more open political systems. For the first time ever a majority of the world's nations are governed by some form of democracy.

This spread of liberty not only affirms American values but also serves our interests. Open societies do not attack one another. They make better trading partners. They press for environmental reform. They do not practice terrorism. They do not produce refugees. Thus, as President Clinton has emphasized, promoting democracy must be one of the central pillars of our foreign policy. Moreover, the end of our global rivalry with the Soviet Union reduces the pressure to muffle concerns about unsavory governments for the sake of security.

Naturally this pursuit cannot be our only foreign goal; we must weigh geopolitical, economic and other factors. Nor do we seek to impose an American model; each nation must find its own way in its own cultural and historical contexts. But universal principles of freedom and human rights belong to all, the peoples of Asia no less than others.

Mongolia was the first Asian country to throw off the communist yoke. From Korea to Taiwan to Thailand and the Philippines, we have witnessed encouraging strides toward more democratic and humane societies. This phenomenon is not a product of "Westernization"; rather it is an imperative of "modernization." How can countries attract investment without the rule of law? How can they combat corruption without a free press? How can they shape wise development policies without the unfettered exchange of ideas? In an age of technology and information it is impossible for nations to develop without pluralism and openness. And sooner or later -- accelerated by exposure to television and tourists, fax machines and cellular telephones, cassettes and computers -- economic advance produces political yearnings.

To be sure, areas of Asia lag behind the march of history. First-generation Communist leaders still hold together repressive regimes in several countries. Grave human

rights violations continue from Tibet to Rangoon to East Timor. But it is only a matter of time before the impact of economic reforms, the transmission of international values, and the thrust of human aspirations lead to sunnier climes.

The remainder of this century will be marked by a series of portentous successions in Asia.

Thus, even as we deal pragmatically with authoritarian governments we should press universal principles. Whenever possible we should work with others to expand the frontiers of freedom.

There are many instruments at our disposal -- consistent public positions that eschew double standards; quiet diplomacy; multilateral organizations; selective conditioning of foreign aid; and the efforts of private organizations like the National Endowment for Democracy and the Asia Foundation. The establishment of a Radio Free Asia will be a vital supplement to the Voice of America and will signal our commitment to liberty.

Conclusion

Today a Pacific Community is a vision. Tomorrow it can become a reality.

The initial contours, eased by the end of the Cold War and strengthened by the dynamism of the region, are already emerging. The rapid growth of trade and investment within the area. The increasing integration of economies, technologies, and ecologies. The deepening of ASEAN and its expanding dialogue. The promising evolution of APEC. The beginnings of regional security consultations. The spread of freedom.

These are promising trends. They reflect the foresight of the region's leaders and the energies of its peoples. They also reflect the achievements of a bipartisan American foreign policy that has supported for half a century a huge investment of our national treasure.

It would be a tragic error for America to rest on its oars. That would tempt the forces of adversity, sowing conflict rather than cooperation.

This generation of Americans owes it to the labors of those who came before us, and the hopes of our successors, to help build a new Pacific Community.

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Message:

From: Melinda Altier

The major Canadian contribution, however, was in ground forces. The first to arrive on the line in February 1951 was the Second Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry (PPLI), which was attached to the 27th British Commonwealth Brigade. Later Canada increased its contribution to a peak strength of 6,146 soldiers organized into the three-battalion 25th Infantry Brigade forming part of the First British Commonwealth Division.

Unlike the United States, which followed an individual rotation system, Canadian forces rotated entire units. Thus in the course of the war battalions from three Canadian infantry regiments served in Korea: The First, Second and Third Battalions, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry; the First, Second and Third Battalions of the Royal Canadian Regiment; and the First, Second and Third Battalions of the French-speaking "Van Doo's" (i.e., vingt-deux) of the Royal 22d Regiment. In addition to these infantry units, elements of Lord Strathcona's Horse; the Royal Canadian Engineers; the Second Field Regiment, Royal Canadian Horse Artillery; the First Regiment, Royal Canadian Horse Artillery; and the 81st Field Regiment, Royal Canadian Artillery, as well as a number of service and support units also served in Korea.

During the course of the war 26,791 Canadian servicemen served in Korea: 22,066 in the Royal Canadian Army, 3,621 in the Royal Canadian Navy and 1,104 in the Royal Canadian Air Force. Canadian forces suffered some 1,543 casualties, including 516 killed in action. Thirty-two Canadians were repatriated during the prisoner of war exchanges following the end of the war.

See also BRITISH COMMONWEALTH DIVISION.

Suggestions for further reading: Lieutenant Colonel Herbert Fairlie Wood, *Strange Battlefield: The Operations in Korea and Their Ef-*

fect on the Defense Policy of Canada (Ottawa: Queen's Printers, 1966); John Melady, *Korea: Canada's Forgotten War* (Toronto: Macmillan, 1983); Thor Grimsson and E.C. Russell, *Canadian Naval Operations in Korean Waters 1950-1953* (Ottawa: Queen's Printers, 1965). In addition to the U.S. Army, Navy and Air Force official histories, see also James L. Stokesbury, *A Short History of the Korean War* (New York: Morrow, 1988).

CASUALTIES

Casualty is a broad term encompassing those killed in action (KIA) on the battlefield, those wounded in action (WIA), those who died of their wounds after reaching medical care (DOW), those missing in action (MIA) and those taken prisoner by the enemy (POW). But the term also includes nonbattle casualties who were killed in plane crashes, vehicle mishaps and other such accidents in the war zone that had nothing to do with enemy action; it also includes those who died in Korea from illness or disease.

Thus to get a precise answer to the question, "How many Americans died in the Korean War?" it is necessary to define the term. The answer is "33,629" if you include only those who died in battle. If you include the 20,617 who died of other nonbattle causes, the answer is "54,246."

The answer is more straightforward for those 103,284 wounded in action, but even that figure is spongy because it probably does not include those whose wounds did not require hospitalization. (In the Vietnam War, where statistics were more precisely compiled, there were 153,329 hospitalized for wounds and another 150,375 lightly wounded who were treated by their unit medics or at the local aid station and immediately returned to duty.)

Yet another complicating factor is the very definition of the term *Korean War*. The forego-

Korean War Almanac (1990)



Marines gather their dead for burial at Koto-ri during the Chosin withdrawal, December 1950.

(Courtesy Lyndon Baines Johnson Library & Museum.)

ing statistics are for those who became casualties during the period June 25, 1950–July 27, 1953 (i.e., from when the North Korean invasion began until the day the armistice agreement went into effect). But not everyone uses those dates, and it is not always clear what dates they are using. For example, in awarding Korean service medals, the Defense Department uses the period June 25, 1950 to July 27, 1954, but for determining eligibility for veteran's benefits the Veteran's Administration uses the period June 25, 1950 to January 31, 1955.

When casualty figures for World Wars I and II, Korea and Vietnam are compared (see table), it is noteworthy that not until World War II did battle casualties exceed nonbattle casualties;

until that time illness and disease killed many more soldiers than did enemy action. Because of better preventive medicine (i.e., immunizations and the like) and improved medical care, the ratio in the Korean War increased to three to two; in Vietnam it was almost five to one.

Number of Deaths in Four Wars: World Wars I and II, Korea and Vietnam

	Battle deaths	Other (accidents, disease, etc)
WWI	53,513	63,195
WWII	292,131	115,185
Korea	33,629	20,617
Vietnam	47,244	10,446

Also revealing is the comparison of the cause of battlefield casualties (see table). In World

War II and in Korea *fragments*—i.e., shrapnel from artillery, rockets, mortars and grenades—were the prime cause of death and disablement. In Vietnam the rise in rapid-fire weapons and the closeness of the jungle terrain changed the principal cause of death to small-arms fire.

Percent of Deaths and Wounds in the U.S. Army in Three Wars: World War II, Korea and Vietnam

Agent	Deaths			Wounds		
	World War II	Korea	Vietnam	World War II	Korea	Vietnam
Small arms	32	33	51	20	27	16
Fragments	53	59	36	62	61	65
Booby traps, mines	3	4	11	4	4	15
Punji stakes	—	—	—	—	—	2
Other	12	4	2	14	8	2

¹January 1956–June 1970

Source: *Statistical Data on Army Troops Wounded in Vietnam January 1965–June 1970*, Medical Statistics Agency, Office of the Surgeon General, U.S. Army.

In addition to American casualties, British Commonwealth forces—Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand—lost 1,263 killed in action and another 4,817 wounded in action. Belgium, Colombia, Ethiopia, France, Greece, the Netherlands, the Philippines, South Africa, Thailand and Turkey lost 1,800 killed and 7,000 wounded. The lion's share on the Allied side, however, was suffered by the Republic of Korea (ROK) Armed Forces, which lost an estimated 59,000 killed and 291,000 wounded. The figures for civilian casualties will never be known, but they are estimated to run into the millions.

Enemy casualty figures are likewise impossible to come by. Recent researchers in Beijing,

for example, have found that almost 40 years later the Chinese still guard the totals as state secrets. Although some estimate that as many as one and one-half million Chinese and North Korean soldiers were killed in action, a more reasonable estimate is one-half million killed and another one million wounded in action. See also MIA (MISSING IN ACTION).

Suggestions for further reading: Walter G. Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1966) is the source of official U.S. battle casualties. Max Hastings' *The Korean War* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987) has statistics on Allied and enemy casualties. Spurgeon Neel's *Medical Support of the U.S. Army in Vietnam* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1973) has useful comparisons on wartime casualties and is the source of the two tables shown above.

**CATES, CLIFTON B(LED SOE)
(1893–1970)**

Born August 31, 1893, in Tiptonville, Tennessee, Cates graduated from the University of Tennessee in 1916. A second lieutenant in the Marine Corps Reserve, he was called to active duty in June 1917 and sailed for France the following January. As a young lieutenant with the Sixth Marine Regiment (part of the Army's Second Infantry Division) Cates fought at Belleau Woods, Soissons and in the Argonne, where he was twice wounded in action. For bravery under enemy fire Cates won the Navy Cross, two Army Distinguished Service Crosses, and two Silver Star Medals as well as the French Legion of Honor and the French Croix de Guerre with Gilt Star. During the interwar years he served several tours with the Fourth and Sixth Marine regiments, both in the United States and in China.

Graduating from the Army War College in 1940, during World War II Cates commanded the First Marine Regiment at Guadalcanal and

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

01-Jul-1993 09:20 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Jeremy D. Rosner

(ROSNER)

FROM:

Eric P. Schwartz
(SCHWARTZ)

SUBJECT:

Burma

Jeremy:

The stuff from Human Rights Watch is on the way.

On Burma, here is some background, which you can put into any prose that you like.

In the summer of 1988, there were massive pro-democracy demonstrations that gave the lie to the notion that the people in this autarkic nation had little knowledge or appreciation for democracy. The response by Burma's military leadership was massive killings and jailings of thousands of pro-democracy demonstrators beginning in September 1988. The crackdown would make Tiananmen Square look like a tea party, but, alas, CNN was not on scene.

Opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi, who had captured the imagination of the democracy movement, was detained by the regime in 1989 and still languishes under house arrest. While under house arrest, she was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.

Under pressure from the international community, the regime held elections in May 1990. Even though its leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, was under house arrest, the opposition National League for Democracy overwhelmingly won the election, but the regime did not recognize the results.

In recent months, the regime has released political prisoners and has otherwise attempted to improve its human rights image. But until Aung San Suu Kyi and other political prisoners (no one knows exactly how many remain) are released and Burmese can freely participate in the political life of their country, the U.S. needs to continue to press hard on human rights and democracy.

We ended our aid program and trade preferences to Burma, imposed an arms embargo and have strongly and continually urged other

governments not to transfer arms to Burma. We are also conducting an interagency policy review to try to identify additional ways we might be effective on these issues. (The results of the review are expected in mid-July.) And we have provided humanitarian assistance to displaced Burmese in the region (in Thailand and Bangladesh).

In May, the President met with a group of Nobel Peace Laureates who had travelled to Thailand earlier this year to press the Burma issue (they were not permitted into Burma). After that meeting the President, in a written statement, affirmed his support for their efforts, and expressed strong U.S. support for the release of Aung San Suu Kyi and for the democracy movement.

CC: Records

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001. paper	re US Policy in Asia (1 page)	00/00/0000	P1/b(1)
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COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Jeremy Rosner (Legislative Affairs)
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FOLDER TITLE:

POTUS [President of the United States] Speech Files G-7 Trip Korea, National
Assembly Speech: Korea National Assembly Materials [2]

2009-0528-F
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RESTRICTION CODES

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THE JOINT STAFF
Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate (J-5)
Office of the Director
Washington, D.C. 20318-5101

17 June 1993

MEMO: Summary CINCPAC Security Concepts

- Let me invite your attention to attached summary of our thinking on a Cooperative Engagement strategy in the Pacific.

- Strategy provides a basis for regional discussions.

- We should include elements of CINCPAC strategic concept in our thinking as we proceed.

BARRY R. McCAFFREY
Lieutenant General, US Army

COOPERATIVE ENGAGEMENT

- Cooperative Engagement is USPACOM strategy to:
 - Keep regional/global military power in check
 - Contain proliferation
 - Engage nations diplomatically and integrate them through economics
 - Promote conducive environment for trade
 - Deal with regional disasters and humanitarian assistance needs through in place multilateral arrangements
 - Increase political freedom and fundamental human rights for all with democracy continuing to flourish globally
- Cooperative Engagement encourages a comprehensive security arrangement in Asia-Pacific region.
 - Builds on strong alliances and bilateral arrangements; fosters multilateral approach to solving security challenges.
 - Deters aggression and provides adequate crisis response through adaptive forward presence.
 - Allows integration of USG power--economic, political, social and military.
 - Future-shaping strategy to affordably employ limited means, but exploits all available ways of achieving desired ends.
 - Means - forces, assets, funds, and programs.
 - Ways - Forward presence, maintain strong bilateral relationships and regional alliances, and focus on joint/coalition training, exercising, and positioning of forces for rapid, decisive action.
 - End - Engagement and participation in peace, deterrence and cooperation in crisis, and unilateral or multilateral victory in conflict.

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10/83 11:38 2028477388
Rosner

National Assembly Speech Themes

- o It is a pleasure and an honor to be here with you today and especially to speak to the people of Korea through their elected representatives. I was last in Seoul as governor of Arkansas just before the Olympics. I was struck then, as I am now, by the vibrancy of your society, politics, and economy.
- o Today I would like to talk with you about our efforts to help build an Asia-Pacific community and our views of the deepening ROK-US relationship, across its political, economic, and security dimensions.

REGIONAL SECURITY ISSUES

- o With the end of the Cold War, Asian countries have come into their own as major players on the world stage. For the first time in this century, there are no major fault lines among the great powers in Northeast Asia. Serious security problems remain, but the post-Cold War period invites dialogue to prevent arms races, competing national alignments, and efforts by one power or groups of powers to dominate this strategic region.
- o The future international system will be shaped in part by the new relationships that are emerging in the Asia-Pacific region.
- o Since the end of the Cold War and the closing of our bases in the Philippines, concern has arisen that we might pull out of the region, taking with us the stability that our forward-deployed military presence has provided. I want to assure you that the United States sees itself as part of this region; we will not disengage.
- o The foundation of our security presence in East Asia and the Pacific is, and will continue to be, our strong bilateral mutual defense relationships--especially those with Japan and Korea--and the maintenance of a substantial forward military presence.
- o Now that the Cold War is over, however, we have new opportunities to think about how to best manage the increasingly complex problems of a more dynamic and tightly linked international environment in which there are no clearly defined adversaries as in the past. Thus, we are exploring new mechanisms to promote peace, security, and cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region.

- 2 -

- o There has already been considerable official and unofficial discussion of these problems within the region, and this dialogue has now matured to a point where we need to be engaged. We welcome, for instance, increased security consultations within the framework provided by the ASEAN's Post Ministerial Conference, as well as multilateral dialogue on Northeast Asian security issues.
- o The United States is committed to helping build a new Asia-Pacific community. Our challenge is to ensure that economic, technological, and political change in the region is managed not through more assertive national policies but through greater reliance on dialogue and mechanisms for regional cooperation.
- o We seek a process that will include all the countries of the region and that will reduce tensions and establish a framework for longterm stability and prosperity. As one example, Russia, China, and Vietnam will soon begin to participate in the ASEAN-PMC security consultations.
- o We see particular value in such consultative dialogue in Northeast Asia, where four great world powers come together in the vicinity of the Korean Peninsula. As we consult with other countries in the region on the North Korean nuclear issue, we are laying what may become the foundation for an eventual sub-regional security dialogue in Northeast Asia.
- o We are still in an exploratory phase as we consult with others on security in the Asian-Pacific area. We need to consider how to make the best use of ongoing and new discussions on regional security issues. Institution building will grow from the consensus that eventually emerges from these discussions. Together, we can explore new Asian-Pacific paths to security.
- o The consultations of which I have spoken and our engagement in dialogue are designed to complement, not to replace, our alliances and military presence in Asia and the Pacific. They will anchor us more firmly in the region.

ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY

- o It is becoming increasingly clear, moreover, that security cannot be defined solely in political and military terms but also has a significant economic dimension. For over a century US policy towards Asia has been shaped by the the concept of an "Open Door," and we remain committed today to an open international trading system.
- o In recent years, the economic relationship between the United States and Asia has become increasingly

important; it is crucial to the revitalization of the US economy. Two-way trade totals more than 300 billion dollars annually, and US firms have invested upwards of 62 billion dollars in Asia. Two and a half million American jobs depend on our economic links with the Asia-Pacific region.

- o As economic interdependence grows, so does our common challenge to facilitate regional trade liberalization, to deal with increasingly important economic issues among APEC members, and to promote continued growth and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region. Trade liberalization within APEC is not only consistent with the principles of GATT, but, in fact, provides a powerful and enduring complement to other multilateral efforts at trade liberalization.
- o The United States assumed the chairmanship of APEC in the fall of 1992 and will hold it until the ministerial meeting in Seattle in November 1993. We have three goals for our chairmanship: first, to challenge APEC to undertake far-reaching trade liberalization and promote market oriented solutions to problems associated with regional economic integration; second, to encourage a greater role for the private sector in APEC, which will help achieve these goals; and third, to strengthen APEC as an institution to make it the preeminent economic organization in the Asia-Pacific region.
- o We will continue to work with Korea as a partner in APEC, the ASEAN dialogue, and other multilateral fora and organizations. The ROK already has contributed significantly to building a new Asia-Pacific community by setting in motion in Northeast Asia a process of normalization of relations and reduction of tensions. From the start, the United States has strongly backed your policy of Nordpolitik, which resulted in your establishment of diplomatic ties with Russia in 1990 and with China last August, as well as your dialogue with the North. We also recall with appreciation the important role Korean officials played in establishing APEC, including finding a solution to the "three Chinas" question.
- o Progress in inter-Korean dialogue is important not only for its own sake but also to support and accelerate the building of a new Asian and Pacific Community. The reconciliation agreement and denuclearization declaration that you concluded with the DPRK in December 1991 were milestone events. Much remains to be done, and we will support you in these efforts.
- o More recently, President Kim Young Sam articulated a new "forward-looking diplomacy" towards Japan designed to help resolve the bitter legacy of the past. And just

- 4 -

two months ago, President Kim outlined a "new diplomacy" aimed at promoting "peace, coexistence, and common prosperity" and pledging support for multilateral security consultations on the basis of the ROK-US security alliance.

- o Korea has also been an active participant in supporting international institutions. Your entry, along with the DPRK's, into the United Nations in September 1992 was long overdue. I want to thank this legislature for voting to approve the ROK's contribution to the United Nations' Persian Gulf effort and, just a few months ago, to assist UN peacekeeping operations in Somalia.

ROK-U.S. POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS

- o This is a unique moment in the ROK-US relationship. In both our countries, there is a sense of change. President Kim and I took office within weeks of each other, and I feel a sense of kinship with him in the effort each of us is making to widen political participation and spur economic renewal in our countries.
- o The ROK-US relationship has now developed to a point where we must speed up our efforts to transform a Cold War military alliance into a fuller partnership that addresses the vital political, economic, and security interests our nations share. Our ties have moved to a new basis of full equality and partnership.
- o Last December's election of President Kim Young Sam was the capstone of a remarkable five-year process of democratization initiated by former President Roh Tae Woo. The election is evidence of a new politics in South Korea based on a strengthened electoral system and democratic pluralism. As Korea has moved away from authoritarianism, our security and economic ties have been strengthened.
- o We welcome the plans that President Kim Young Sam announced in March for deregulation, liberalization, and internationalization of the Korean economy, including the areas of finance and trade. ((Update with comment on the Five-year economic reform plan scheduled for release at the end of June.)) These plans for a "New Economy" should help improve the economic environment in Korea and the possibilities for U.S.-Korea economic cooperation.
- o Despite recent economic liberalization measures, many foreign businessmen say it is still too difficult to do business in Korea. Korea still has a long way to go to achieve the status of a truly open market, a status that goes hand in hand with its new importance in the world economy.

- 5 -

- o No nation has gained more from the liberal international trading order than Korea. With success, comes responsibility, and Korea--like other major trading nations--bears a special responsibility for ensuring that the Uruguay Round is concluded successfully, and soon. We are seeking renewal of fast track legislative authority, which would require us to conclude a Uruguay Round agreement by December 15. In the few months before this deadline, Korea and other major trading countries must take action to enable us to reach a comprehensive and balanced resolution acceptable to all nations.

NORTH KOREA AND UNIFICATION ISSUES

- o On July 27, we will mark the fortieth anniversary of the Korean War armistice. When the armistice was signed in Panmunjom, it brought to an end a conflict that killed more than 3 million people. Key to reducing tensions in Northeast Asia and to building a new Pacific community is easing tensions on the Korean peninsula and implementing the agreements you have already reached with Pyongyang.
- o It is only in the last few years that the hostility spawned by that conflict has begun to abate. We welcome the more intense dialogue that has been underway for the past several years.
- o As you know, we have been holding talks with the DPRK on its nuclear program. We welcome the successful outcome of the initial round of talks in New York, which led to the agreement of North Korea to suspend its withdrawal from the Nonproliferation Treaty. This agreement is a first but vital step to ensuring North Korean participation in a strong international nonproliferation regime, a goal that will benefit all nations. Preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons is one of my highest priorities, and we will continue to strongly urge the North Koreans to comply fully with international standards and to move towards the goal of a nuclear-free Korean peninsula. ((This section will almost certainly need updating.))
- o We hope that inter-Korean dialogue will continue to progress. It is up to the two sides to work out the specific arrangements to bring closer together the two halves of your tragically divided country. We will do our utmost to support you in this process. I want to assure you, once again, that the United States fully supports reunification on terms acceptable to the Korean people. It is our sincere hope that what has been divided can be made whole again.

- 6 -

CONCLUSION

- o In conclusion, let me congratulate you on the success of Korea's efforts in democratization. We look forward to the implementation of President Kim Young Sam's plan for a "New Economy," which promises to accelerate the process of deregulation, liberalization, and internationalization of the Korean economy.
- o This is a period of change and opportunity for Asia. In a period of change, it is important to preserve what has proven to be reliable. The United States is a Pacific nation; we will remain engaged in the region. Our existing alliances will continue to be the bedrock of our security policy in Asia and the Pacific.
- o The United States is actively engaged in seeking solutions to the problems which threaten security in Asia. We will maintain our forces in Korea. We will support South-North dialogue as the primary means for resolving the problems of the Korean peninsula. We will continue to support efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation. We are ready to improve our relations with the DPRK if it cooperates in the resolution of fundamental issues.
- o Korea's tragic historical fate has been, it is said, to be a shrimp crushed between whales. Because of that experience, your country has keenly felt the need to work to actively shape a new regional security environment based not on the old calculus of international politics but on new values of cooperation, mutual respect, and common benefit. Through your establishment of diplomatic ties with Russia and China and dialogue with North Korea, you have begun a process of normalization and relaxation of tensions in Northeast Asia. We hope the example of Korea and other like-minded countries have set will spread throughout the region. The United States is committed to actively participating in an enhanced multilateral security dialogue in the Asian-Pacific region, and we look forward to cooperating with you to realize our shared vision.

THEMES FOR SEOUL SPEECH

Sc 4/18

Jeremy--

Based on a discussion in Lake's office and talks with my guys at State and DOD, I think there is general agreement (guidance) the Seoul speech should be a statement of U.S. Asia policy rather than a mere repetition of our commitment to stay engaged in the region (although we do need to reaffirm that commitment). You can weave the Tokyo and Seoul speeches together by playing on the Asia Pacific community theme.

The talking points provided by State and Win Lord's confirmation hearing statement are the substance you should draw on (attached). I've done a rough outline (again drawing from the meeting in Lake's office yesterday).

The purpose of speech is to (1) lay out our vision of a framework for Asian security (economic and political) over the next ten years, (2) identify the challenges to be met in order to achieve the vision, and (3) describe our view of how the U.S. and Asia (together) can meet the challenges, emphasizing specifics of U.S. policy security and economic.

A rough outline might look like:

I. Introduction

- o Some opening related to Korea and democracy, reflecting fact he's at the National Assembly building in the first ever civilian govt in Korea.
- o State the thesis of the speech: vision, challenges, U.S. policies/initiatives

II. Vision

- o End of the cold war changing the balance of power in Asia. Security environment changing with startling speed. Asian countries are coming into their own as major players on the world stage. Future architecture of the region -- security and economic -- will be shaped by the way new relationships are nurtured. What future do we want to paint for ourselves.
- o Four possibilities re alignments among the major powers:
 - Dominance of one power (China, Japan, Russia)--creating a less competitive economic situation and supplanting of U.S. security presence by another
 - Asian bloc--Defines Asia for Asians, creates an inward looking bloc, economically and on security front.
 - Antagonistic polarity--Ongoing military modernization, territorial disputes contribute to arms race and produce a militarily unstable confrontational geopolitical situation with strains on democratization.

--New balance of power emerges among us which is based on regional approaches to security and economic challenges-- will create open dynamic economic policies, stimulate create of new security institutions and spur political liberalization (China, Vietnam, North Korea).

- o Preferred architecture is the fourth--building of new mechanisms and institutions that will generate confidence in one another as members of Asia Pacific community

III. Challenges

- o There are four: nuclear (proliferation points), regional aggression (North Korea), democratic reform (Russia, China) and imperative of seeing economics as national security (the link between stability, peace and healthy economies).
- o Nuclear: state overall proliferation policy, reaffirm goal of non-nuclear peninsula, speak to the status of the No. Korean withdrawal from NPT, China MTCR, export controls.
- o Regional conflict/aggression: ethnic, religious civil wars, need for American forces to be stationed outside the U.S. to reach trouble spots, highlight the No. Korean conventional threat and state unequivocally we will keep ground forces in South Korea as long as the South Korean government wants us. (Jeremy--this is a major point, we haven't said this before).
- o Democracy: Former Soviet Union as the single most important crisis facing us, review reform package from G-7, touch on our support for peaceful reunification. Perhaps mention China/Taiwan/Hong Kong/ASEAN.
- o Economics: National security can't exist without healthy national economies. Support open multilateral trading system, use APEC as a vehicle to spur regional cooperation and integration (Pres. may be able to announce his participation in an APEC event depending on outcome of our decision memo on this point). Would be nice to be able to push the free trade area idea with Asia.

IV. U.S. Policy Stance

- o Sustained military presence--forces on the ground in Korea and throughout the region. Contribution from allies like Korea and Japan make this possible. So. Korea pays \$220 million in 1993 in direct contributions to U.S. forces, a 400% increase over 1989.

Don't mistake adjustments we've made in ground and air forces as lessening of U.S. commitment. Modest reductions of forces in Japan, but have halted withdrawal of 6,500 troops from So. Korea. Will supplement So., Korea's military capability with advance anti-tank, anti-air and anti-missile defense technologies.

- o Supporting a stable Korea--return to U.S. and Korean interests in stable and peaceful Korean peninsula. Preventing nuclear proliferation in Korea is central to

sustaining a nonnuclear future and averting a broader Asian arms race.

- o Involving the key players China, Japan, Russia--look to create new mechanisms for security dialogue. Use ASEAN PMC as a vehicle to address Southeast Asian concerns. Engage in confidence building measures.
- o Promotion of democracy: China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, plus emphasize Clinton-KYS shared values (human rights, empowerment)
- o Market oriented economic reforms: GATT, APEC, U.S.-Korean Dialogue for Economic Cooperation (will be negotiated at the June 24 US-ROK Economic Subcabinet). Cover Framework with Japan and reaffirm support for Taiwan, PRC GATT membership. Suggest explore links between ASEAN FTA and NAFTA.

V. Conclusion

- o Vital to US economic prosperity and security to maintain stability and access to the markets and human resources of Asia.
- o Asia wants the U.S. as a strategic ally, economic power, source of technology.
- o US. is an Asia-Pacific power, intends to remain so.
- o Expression of hope that we are up to the challenge and the US-Korea alliance can be cornerstone of the foundations for a new balance of power.

Please give me a call when you're ready to talk.

Many thanks.

Sandy K.

Seoul--National Assembly Speech Themes

- o It is a pleasure and an honor to be here with you today and especially to speak to the people of Korea through their elected representatives. I was last in Seoul as governor of Arkansas just before the Olympics. I was struck then, as I am now, by the vibrancy of your society, politics, and economy.
- o Today I would like to talk with you about our efforts to help build an Asia-Pacific community and our views of the deepening ROK-US relationship, across its political, economic, and security dimensions.

REGIONAL SECURITY ISSUES

- o With the end of the Cold War, Asian countries have come into their own as major players on the world stage. For the first time in this century, there are no major fault lines among the great powers in Northeast Asia. Serious security problems remain, but the post-Cold War period invites dialogue to prevent arms races, competing national alignments, and efforts by one power or groups of powers to dominate this strategic region.
- o The future international system will be shaped in part by the new relationships that are emerging in the Asia-Pacific region.
- o *milit
engagement* Since the end of the Cold War and the closing of our bases in the Philippines, concern has arisen that we might pull out of the region, taking with us the stability that our forward-deployed military presence has provided. I want to assure you that the United States sees itself as part of this region; we will not disengage.
- o The foundation of our security presence in East Asia and the Pacific is our strong bilateral mutual defense relationships--especially those with Japan and Korea--and the maintenance of a substantial forward military presence.
- o In addition, we enjoy many other bilateral defense relationships with others throughout Asia. We intend to strengthen all these bilateral defense ties in the years ahead.
- o In addition, this administration recognizes the many voices in Asia which are calling for regional security dialogue. In a period of change, we share the view that multilateral security discussions can help ease suspicions, avoid tension, and accelerate cooperation in the region.

- o Now that the Cold War is over, we have new opportunities to think about how to best manage a more dynamic, complex, and tightly linked regional environment in which there are no clearly defined adversaries as in the past. Thus, we are prepared to participate actively in discussions to explore ways of promoting peace, security, and cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region.
- o There has already been considerable official and unofficial discussion of these questions within the region, and this dialogue has now matured to a point where we need to be engaged. We welcome, for instance, increased security consultations within the framework provided by the ASEAN's Post Ministerial Conference, as well as multilateral dialogue on Northeast Asian security issues.
- o The United States is committed to helping build a new Asia-Pacific community. Our challenge is to ensure that economic, technological, and political change in the region is managed not through more assertive national policies but through greater reliance on dialogue and mechanisms for regional cooperation.
- o Democracy and human rights are a component of a broader definition of security. We respect the religious, social, political, and cultural characteristics that make each of our countries unique, but these differences should not be used as justification for denying the universality of human rights. Those of us who live in diverse societies have a special responsibility to foster tolerance, respect for the rights of minorities, and reliance on the rule of law.
- o We seek a process of dialogue to reduce tensions and establish a framework for longterm stability and prosperity that includes all the countries of the Asian-Pacific region.
- 42 1 o We see particular value in such consultative dialogue in Northeast Asia, where four great world powers come together in the vicinity of the Korean Peninsula. As we consult with others on the North Korean nuclear issue, we may lay the foundation for an eventual sub-regional security dialogue in Northeast Asia.
- o We are still in an exploratory phase as we consult with others on security in the Asian-Pacific area. We need to consider how to make the best use of ongoing and new discussions on regional security issues. Institution building will grow from the consensus that eventually emerges from these discussions. Together, we can explore new Asian-Pacific paths to security.

- o The consultations of which I have spoken and our engagement in dialogue are designed to complement, not to replace, our alliances and military presence in Asia and the Pacific. They will anchor us more firmly in the region.

ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY

- o It is becoming increasingly clear, moreover, that security cannot be defined solely in political and military terms but also has a significant economic dimension. For over a century US policy towards Asia has been shaped by the concept of an "Open Door," and we remain committed today to an open international trading system.

- o In recent years, the economic relationship between the United States and Asia has become increasingly important, it is crucial to the revitalization of the US economy. Two-way trade totals more than 300 billion dollars annually, and US firms have invested upwards of 62 billion dollars in Asia. Two and a half million American jobs depend on our economic links with the Asia-Pacific region.

*Even states
2 way trade between
US and Asia?*

- o As economic interdependence grows, so does our common challenge to facilitate regional trade liberalization, to deal with increasingly important economic issues among APEC members, and to promote continued growth and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region. Trade liberalization within APEC is not only consistent with the principles of GATT, but, in fact, provides a powerful and enduring complement to other multilateral efforts at trade liberalization.

APEC

- o The United States assumed the chairmanship of APEC in the fall of 1992 and will hold it until the ministerial meeting in Seattle in November 1993. We have three goals for our chairmanship: first, to challenge APEC to undertake far-reaching trade liberalization and promote market oriented solutions to problems associated with regional economic integration; second, to encourage a greater role for the private sector in APEC, which will help achieve these goals; and third, to strengthen APEC as an institution to make it the preeminent economic organization in the Asia-Pacific region.
- o We will continue to work with Korea as a partner in APEC, the ASEAN dialogue, and other multilateral fora and organizations. The ROK already has contributed significantly to building a new Asia-Pacific community by setting in motion in Northeast Asia a process of

normalization of relations and reduction of tensions. From the start, the United States has strongly backed your policy of Nordpolitik, which resulted in your establishment of diplomatic ties with Russia in 1990 and with China last August, as well as your dialogue with the North. We also recall with appreciation the important role Korean officials played in establishing APEC, including finding a solution to the "three Chinas" question. 7

- o Progress in inter-Korean dialogue is important not only for its own sake but also to support and accelerate the building of a new Asian and Pacific Community. The reconciliation agreement and denuclearization declaration that you concluded with the DPRK in December 1991 were milestone events. Much remains to be done, and we will support you in these efforts.
- o More recently, President Kim Young Sam articulated a new "forward-looking diplomacy" towards Japan designed to help resolve the bitter legacy of the past. And just two months ago, President Kim outlined a "new diplomacy" aimed at promoting "peace, coexistence, and common prosperity" and pledging support for multilateral security consultations on the basis of the ROK-US security alliance.
- o Korea has also been an active participant in supporting international institutions. Your entry, along with the DPRK's, into the United Nations in September 1992 was long overdue. I want to thank this legislature for voting to approve the ROK's contribution to the United Nations' Persian Gulf effort and, just a few months ago, to assist UN peacekeeping operations in Somalia.

ROK-U.S. POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS

- o This is a unique moment in the ROK-US relationship. In both our countries, there is a sense of change. President Kim and I took office within weeks of each other, and I feel a sense of kinship with him in the effort each of us is making to widen political participation and spur economic renewal in our countries.
- o The ROK-US relationship has now developed to a point where we must speed up our efforts to transform a Cold War military alliance into a fuller partnership that addresses the vital political, economic, and security interests our nations share. Our ties have moved to a new basis of full equality and partnership.
- o Last December's election of President Kim Young Sam was the capstone of a remarkable five-year process of

democratization initiated by former President Roh Tae Woo. The election is evidence of a new politics in South Korea based on a strengthened electoral system and democratic pluralism. As Korea has moved away from authoritarianism, our security and economic ties have been strengthened.

- o We welcome the plans that President Kim Young Sam announced in March for deregulation, liberalization, and internationalization of the Korean economy, including the areas of finance and trade. ((Update with comment on the Five-year economic reform plan scheduled for release at the end of June.)) These plans for a "New Economy" should help improve the economic environment in Korea and the possibilities for U.S.-Korea economic cooperation.
- o Despite recent economic liberalization measures, many foreign businessmen say it is still too difficult to do business in Korea. Korea still has a long way to go to achieve the status of a truly open market, a status that goes hand in hand with its new importance in the world economy.
- o Improving the climate for doing business in Korea will allow us to build on our past cooperative initiatives. We hope to strengthen the foundation of our economic partnership through a new "Dialogue for Economic Cooperation." ((Update based on results of subcabinet consultations on June 24.))
- o No nation has gained more from the liberal international trading order than Korea. With success, comes responsibility, and Korea--like other major trading nations--bears a special responsibility for ensuring that the Uruguay Round is concluded successfully, and soon. We are seeking renewal of fast track legislative authority, which would require us to conclude a Uruguay Round agreement by December 15. In the few months before this deadline, Korea and other major trading countries must take action to enable us to reach a comprehensive and balanced resolution acceptable to all nations.

NORTH KOREA AND UNIFICATION ISSUES

- o On July 27, we will mark the fortieth anniversary of the Korean War armistice. When the armistice was signed in Panmunjom, it brought to an end a conflict that killed more than 3 million people. Key to reducing tensions in Northeast Asia and to building a new Pacific community is easing tensions on the Korean peninsula and implementing the agreements you have already reached with Pyongyang.

incl dx
Answers

- o It is only in the last few years that the hostility spawned by that conflict has begun to abate. We welcome the more intense dialogue that has been underway for the past several years.
- o As you know, we have been holding talks with the DPRK on its nuclear program. We welcome the successful outcome of the initial round of talks in New York, which led to the agreement of North Korea to suspend its withdrawal from the Nonproliferation Treaty. This agreement is a first but vital step to ensuring North Korean participation in a strong international nonproliferation regime, a goal that will benefit all nations. Preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons is one of my highest priorities, and we will continue to strongly urge the North Koreans to comply fully with international standards and to move towards the goal of a nuclear-free Korean peninsula. ((This section will almost certainly need updating.))
- re-unification strategy?*
o We hope that inter-Korean dialogue will continue to progress. It is up to the two sides to work out the specific arrangements to bring closer together the two halves of your tragically divided country. We will do our utmost to support you in this process. I want to assure you, once again, that the United States fully supports reunification on terms acceptable to the Korean people. It is our sincere hope that what has been divided can be made whole again.

CONCLUSION

- o In conclusion, let me congratulate you on the success of Korea's efforts in democratization. We look forward to the implementation of President Kim Young Sam's plan for a "New Economy," which promises to accelerate the process of deregulation, liberalization, and internationalization of the Korean economy.
- o This is a period of change and opportunity for Asia. In a period of change, it is important to preserve what has proven to be reliable. The United States is a Pacific nation; we will remain engaged in the region. Our existing alliances will continue to be the bedrock of our security policy in Asia and the Pacific.
- o The United States is actively engaged in seeking solutions to the problems which threaten security in Asia. We will maintain our forces in Korea. We will support South-North dialogue as the primary means for

resolving the problems of the Korean peninsula. We will continue to support efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation. We are ready to improve our relations with the DPRK if it cooperates in the resolution of fundamental issues.

- o Korea's tragic historical fate has been, it is said, to be a shrimp crushed between whales. Because of that experience, your country has keenly felt the need to work to actively shape a new regional security environment based not on the old calculus of international politics but on new values of cooperation, mutual respect, and common benefit. Through your establishment of diplomatic ties with Russia and China and dialogue with North Korea, you have begun a process of normalization and relaxation of tensions in Northeast Asia. We hope the example of Korea and other like-minded countries have set will spread throughout the region. The United States is committed to actively participating in an enhanced multilateral security dialogue in the Asian-Pacific region, and we look forward to cooperating with you to realize our shared vision.

A NEW PACIFIC COMMUNITY TEN GOALS FOR AMERICAN POLICY

Opening Statement at Confirmation Hearings
for Ambassador Winston Lord
Assistant Secretary of State-Designate
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs
March 31, 1993

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee:

President Clinton has honored me with his nomination as Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific. I am grateful for the trust that he and Secretary Christopher have invested in me to help shape America's policy for this critical region.

If I am confirmed, our exchange today will be the first step in a journey charted by thorough consultation and cooperation. This I pledge in the national interest and my own self-interest. There is much to be learned from your perspectives and those of the American people. There is much to be gained when policies are jointly crafted.

Thus, in addition to *ad hoc* exchanges on breaking issues, I will maintain a process of regular meetings, on the Hill and in the Department, with key members of Congress and their staffs. I also intend, as both opportunity and responsibility, to traverse this nation to listen to Americans and clarify our Asian-Pacific policies.

I come to this assignment with a global perspective based on three decades of international experience in the Government and non-profit sector. I am foremost a generalist -- as a Foreign Service officer with varied assignments, a member of the Defense Department's Policy Planning Staff, Special Assistant to the President's National Security Advisor, and Director of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff. Outside government I have served as President of the Council on Foreign Relations, Chairman of the National Endowment for Democracy, Vice Chairman of the International Rescue Committee, and Chairman of the Carnegie National Commission on America and the New World. Throughout I have dealt extensively with Asian issues, including as Ambassador to China and as director and member of many organizations with emphasis on that region.

Above all I come in the spirit of bipartisanship, with a record of service under all but one Administration since Kennedy. I am gratified to have been selected by both Presidents

Reagan and Clinton for positions requiring Senate confirmation. Seasoning has sharpened, not mellowed, my conviction that the greater our unity at home, the greater our success abroad. America has permanent interests. They do not change every four years.

A New Pacific Community

Today no region in the world is more important for the United States than Asia and the Pacific.

Tomorrow, in the twenty-first century, no region will be as important.

In that vast area most of the world's people live. Many of the richest cultures flourish. The most dynamic economies beckon. The major powers intersect.

America has fought in three wars in Asia during the past half century. We have abiding security interests there. Forty percent of our trade is with the region, its share swelling more rapidly than that of any other, and half again as large as with Western Europe. More and more eager, talented Asian immigrants enrich America's cultural and economic mosaic. Our nation's population and production shift steadily toward our Pacific Coast.

In sum, the firmest guarantees of America's staying power in Asia -- more credible than rhetoric from the rostrum or writs on paper -- are our overriding national interests.

Ever since the Vietnam War we have enjoyed broad bipartisan consensus on the most salient policies in the Asia-Pacific region; this has contributed mightily to our successes. But in recent years, preoccupied by crises in Europe and the Middle East, we have paid insufficient attention to major transformations underway across the Pacific. Our Asian partners have noticed. Some are apprehensive.

Asia has been moving from an arena of confrontations to the premier growth area of the world. Economic, political, and cultural exchanges within this region have mushroomed. Familiar landmarks are shifting. New patterns are taking shape. New generations are taking charge. We risk squandering assets and lagging behind trends.

We have enormous stakes in the Pacific. We need to integrate our economic, political and security policies. We need fresh approaches and structures of cooperation.

It is time to build -- with others -- a New Pacific Community.

A survey of the regional landscape yields both hopes and hazards:

-- It includes the world's fastest-growing economies and most lucrative terrain for American exports and jobs. But we risk losing markets to aggressive competitors, and we are running unacceptable deficits with some of them.

-- The end of the Cold War eased relations among regional powers and deflated regional conflicts. But some of our bilateral ties are frayed or fragile and new security challenges cloud the horizon.

-- Global revolutions in technology, transportation and communications lift the hopes and prospects for countless Asians. But global risks resonate ominously in the area -- the proliferation of dangerous weapons, the burgeoning of populations, the spectre of AIDS, the degradation of the environment, the spawning of refugees, the traffic in drugs.

-- The universal tides of democracy, fanned by information and free markets, flow in the region. But four of the world's last five communist regimes, together with other repressive governments, remain caught in a time warp in Asia.

How then do we remove the peril and realize the promise?

4 of 5
Last 5
communist reg.
China, Vietnam, North Korea, Laos

Foreign policy for the region -- as for the world at large -- begins at home. President Clinton has wisely declared the renewal of America as his supreme goal. This is not only essential for the American people. It is essential for American interests and values abroad. As the Carnegie Commission, which I recently chaired, stated, "First, our foreign policy must be founded on a renewal of our domestic strength; rebuilding our economic base is now our highest priority."

Equally compelling is the need to perfect the American experiment in democracy. We must practice at home what we preach overseas. We can project to troubled countries a multi-ethnic society that reconciles the need for national purpose with the right of groups to be distinctive. As President Eisenhower once said, "Whatever America hopes to bring to pass in the world must first come to pass in the heart of America."

There can be no greater contribution to our Asian policy than fostering domestic economic vigor and social cohesion in America. Our Asian friends recognize this. Progress at home will burnish our leadership credentials. It will make us competitive in the marketplace of goods and credible in the marketplace of values. It will help secure the resources needed for international action. And it will steady popular support without which our foreign policy founders.

Looking forward, we can see ten major goals for American policy in Asia and the Pacific. They are not listed in any order but rather as parameters of progress.

-- Forging a fresh global partnership with Japan that reflects a more mature balance of responsibilities.

-- Erasing the nuclear threat and moving toward peaceful reconciliation on the Korean peninsula.

-- Restoring firm foundations for cooperation with a China where political openness catches up with economic reform.

-- Deepening our ties with ASEAN as it broadens its membership and scope.

-- Obtaining the fullest possible accounting of our missing in action as we normalize our relations with Vietnam.

-- Securing a peaceful, independent and democratic Cambodia.

-- Strengthening APEC as the cornerstone of Asian-Pacific economic cooperation.

-- Developing multilateral forums for security consultations while maintaining the solid foundations of our alliances.

-- Spurring regional cooperation on global challenges like the environment, refugees, health, narcotics, non-proliferation and arms sales.

-- Promoting democracy and human rights where freedom has yet to flower.

Let me briefly elaborate on each one.

Japan

Our fortunes in Asia, indeed the world, will hinge on developing a comprehensive, durable partnership with Japan. This will be my highest priority.

Together Japan and America comprise forty percent of the world's GNP. Our alliance reassures friends, promotes stability, and deters arms races. We are -- or must become -- partners on issues ranging from Korea to Somalia, Cambodia to Russia, technology to foreign aid, the environment to democracy.

We offer our Japanese friends both reassurance about our intentions and a sense of urgency about festering frictions. We will maintain a substantial military presence in Asia.

We will strive energetically to open markets. Japan will have our strong support for a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council; while complex negotiations are underway, we will consult Tokyo systematically on all major issues before the world organization.

In return, equity and reality require more vigorous Japanese performance on economic issues and international responsibilities. An open global economic system is crucial to that country's future. Its current account surplus of 125 billion dollars strains that system; its 49 billion dollar surplus with us creates severe tension. During the past decade our deficits with Japan have totalled almost half a trillion dollars.

We are addressing this imbalance on several fronts -- making the American economy more competitive; urging Japanese macroeconomic measures to stimulate demand and imports; implementing agreements already negotiated; and achieving concrete export and investment results in selected areas.

Globally, Japan has already taken some promising initiatives ranging from peacekeeping to foreign assistance. But Japan's aspirations for a central seat at world councils should be bolstered by contributions worthy of a major political and economic power.

It is time to shape a global partnership with Japan. Together we should thicken webs of consultations and cooperation on three levels. On the global plane, we should collaborate on the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations, the G-7 process, UN peacekeeping missions, and international challenges such as non-proliferation, the environment, refugees, health, human rights and democracy. On the regional plane, we should together nourish economic institutions like APEC and security consultations on a range of issues. On the bilateral plane, we should pursue a structure of economic consultations and deepen our dialogue on our respective policies toward major nations like Korea, Russia, and China.

In this way we can forge a more equitable, positive partnership. America will listen more, lecture less. In turn, Japan should step forward, not in response to American entreaties or pressure, but in a spirit of enlightened self-interest and mutual benefit.

Korea

The Korean Peninsula reflects at once remarkable progress, tenuous openings, and lurking dangers.

The Republic of Korea represents one of Asia's greatest success stories. Its economic growth has been little short of astonishing. Its diplomacy has scored a series of breakthroughs. It is steadily shouldering more of its self-defense. Its continued movement toward democracy -- crowned by the recent inauguration of a President who had spent three decades in opposition -- heartens those living under authoritarian regimes elsewhere in the region.

We applaud these advances even as we work towards greater economic cooperation and reforms on intellectual property rights, financial liberalization, the investment climate and market access.

But the threat from the North remains the most perilous legacy of the Cold War. Prodded by a disastrous economy and estrangement from its major patrons, Pyongyang has toyed with opening toward the outside world. After some promising moves in the past two years, North Korea currently seems to be retreating toward paranoia. In recent weeks it has fueled anxieties in the region by first reneging on commitments to inspection of its nuclear facilities and then declaring its intention to withdraw from the Non-proliferation Treaty. Looming ahead are the profound uncertainties of its political succession.

The policy lines of the United States are clear and consistent. We will maintain significant military forces in South Korea as long as Americans and Koreans believe they are needed for deterrence and regional stability. We will continue to support fully the IAEA and other international bodies to eliminate the North Korean nuclear threat. North Korea's nuclear challenge is to the world community, not just to the United States, as Pyongyang seeks to portray it. This problem is critical to the worldwide campaign to stem proliferation.

The future of the Peninsula must be resolved essentially through direct South-North negotiations; we remain prepared to enhance this process through close consultation with our South Korean ally and multilateral diplomacy. We also stand ready to improve our relations with North Korea if it cooperates on fundamental issues.

China

Ever since participating in the opening to China more than two decades ago, I have worked hard to build Sino-American relations. I will continue to do so, conscious of both American interests and values.

China is an influential member of the international order. More than one of every five humans live there. It possesses nuclear weapons and exports nuclear technology. It

launches satellites and sells missiles. It represents a huge market and one of the world's richest civilizations. It holds a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. It is central to key regional issues like Indochina, Korea, and disputed islands. It abuts the unsettled Central Asia region. It is salient in new challenges that require global action.

In recent years, China has opened up to the world, moved toward a market economy, and enjoyed the fastest growth rate in the world. Together with the greater Chinese communities of Taiwan and Hong Kong it has become one of the most promising arcas for investment and trade.

At the same time, its leaders cling to an outdated authoritarian system. Serious abuses persist. While Beijing releases some prominent activists toward the end of their jail sentences, it arrests others for the peaceful expression of political views. The Chinese leaders are gambling that open economics and closed politics will preserve their system of control. It is a gamble that sooner or later will be lost. Economic reform produces -- and requires -- political reform. In today's world, nations cannot prosper for long without opening up their societies. Technology and information, the forces of modernization, and global democratic trends have been eroding communism and totalitarianism across the globe.

All of the Asian models of economic success toward which China looks -- many of them Chinese societies -- have shown that political relaxation, tolerance of opposition, a freer press, the rule of law and other democratic elements are inescapably linked with economic development.

Our policy challenge therefore is to reconcile our need to deal with this important nation with our imperative to promote international values. We will seek cooperation with China on a range of issues. But Americans cannot forget Tiananmen Square.

The United States therefore should conduct a nuanced policy toward Beijing until a more humane system emerges. Shunning China is not an alternative. We need both to condemn repression and preserve links with progressive forces which are the foundations for our longer term ties.

We will continue to be guided by the three Sino-American joint communiques that have provided a flexible framework for our relations. It is up to China and Taiwan to work out their future relationship; we insist only that the process be peaceful. Consistent with our undertakings not to challenge the principle of "one China", we will continue to build upon our unofficial relations with Taiwan based on the Taiwan Relations Act. In our diplomacy and through the 1992 U.S.-Hong Kong Policy Act we should make clear our large humanitarian and commercial stakes in the future of Hong Kong.

Against this backdrop we face a host of serious issues with China: Widespread human rights violations, including in Tibet. Chinese exports of dangerous weapons and technology to volatile areas. Our fastest-growing trade deficit, which is now more than 18 billion dollars, second only to Japan. Collaboration at the United Nations and on regional conflicts. Emerging challenges like the environment and drugs. We should work together where our interests converge and bargain hard over differences.

We will press forward with this agenda in a sober, constructive fashion. Our approach will reflect that China is a great nation. In response to positive movement by the Chinese, we are prepared to address their concerns and strengthen our ties.

The Chinese people hold the same aspirations as others around the globe. We will support those aspirations -- without arrogance -- recognizing that the Chinese people will determine their own destiny, but confident that we are aligning ourselves with the future.

ASEAN

The ASEAN nations, with 330 million people, boast some of the fastest-growing economies and became last year our fourth-largest overseas market. We welcome ASEAN's establishment this January of the world's newest free trade grouping. By the year 2000, ASEAN could become a trillion dollar economic area encompassing eleven countries. We will therefore intensify our efforts to promote U.S. exports and the jobs they create. Last year a successful American tour by our Ambassadors to ASEAN raised awareness of this dynamic region. We will continue such efforts to attract more American firms to this competitive market.

This institution, 25 years young, serves regional stability as well as prosperity. The future admission of the Indochina countries would encourage them in constructive directions. The ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference, which brings together the Ministers of ASEAN and seven other nations, is evolving into an increasingly important forum for regional security consultations. Imaginative diplomacy by Indonesia and others has been crucial in moving the Cambodian peace process forward and exploring peaceful ways to resolve competing claims in the South China Sea.

With the closing of our military facilities in the Philippines, we are gradually developing a diversified pattern of security ties in Southeast Asia. All the ASEAN countries view a continuing U.S. military presence as a stabilizing element during an uncertain period; each in its own way is helping to make it possible. Our commitments to Thailand and the Philippines -- both exemplars of democratic advance -- remain firm. We welcome more cordial relations with Malaysia. We will strengthen those with Singapore and Brunei.

The United States will accord ASEAN and its individual countries the growing attention they merit -- for American trade and investment, for regional security, for the extension of freedom.

Vietnam

We are taking an especially close look at our policy towards Vietnam. Let me emphasize that obtaining the fullest possible accounting for Americans missing from the Vietnam War, including those lost in Laos and Cambodia, will remain a central objective.

I have reviewed the findings of the Senate's Select Committee on POW/MIA, before which I was honored to testify. The Senate's exhaustive examination of this highly-charged issue was a major achievement. I congratulate the Committee, whose findings have served to narrow uncertainties and ease some of the families' pain. Most of the twenty-year record of Hanoi on this issue has been one of callousness and deceit, but we can be encouraged that the Senate Select Committee has confirmed that Vietnamese cooperation with our investigations has substantially improved. While we may never find all the answers, this Administration will make every effort to accelerate the process. We must secure whatever comfort we can for the families of the missing.

I assure you as well that we will vigorously pursue POW/MIA issues with Pyongyang, Moscow and Beijing.

Looking to the future, Vietnam, a rapidly-growing country of 70 million, the fourth largest in East Asia, can play an important political and economic role. If the necessary groundwork is laid we can strengthen regional stability. A key factor will be the political settlement in Cambodia. Vietnam has taken a positive role to date in the UN peace process; we expect its full support for the elections in May and the establishment of a new, independent Cambodian government.

On the economic side, Vietnam has undertaken market reforms, opening up promising vistas for trade and investment. The American business community is eager to take advantage of these opportunities and compete effectively with others.

At the same time, Vietnam continues under a repressive Communist political system. There are scant traces of freedom. As we seek to normalize relations, the intensity and warmth of our ties will depend on progress in this area.

The graduated, reciprocal policy of recent years has successfully induced the Vietnamese to be more cooperative on the POW/MIA and Cambodian issues. South

Vietnamese personnel have been released from re-education camps. Now we need to consider how further steps toward normalization can serve our multiple objectives.

With Vietnam's cooperation we are prepared to heal the wounds of history.

Cambodia

Cambodia continues to be a land of tragedy, torn by two decades of war and ravaged by the brutal policies of the Khmer Rouge.

After arduous diplomacy involving many nations, the fragile outlines of a settlement finally emerged -- ceasefire, demobilization, a large United Nations presence and free elections leading to an independent Cambodian government. Even more is at stake here than the fate of that country and regional security. The UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia -- UNTAC -- is the largest peacekeeping operation in the history of the United Nations. Thus we face a crucial test of multilateral peacekeeping by the international community.

The situation is precarious. The headlines are grim. Yet UNTAC has recorded some impressive achievements. The 20,000 peacekeepers have managed a ceasefire for over a year. UNTAC has registered over 95% of the eligible voters for the elections slated for May. Almost all of the 360,000 Cambodian refugees have been repatriated; the demining and repairing of the country's infrastructure goes forward.

Formidable obstacles remain. The Khmer Rouge refuse to participate in the elections; they seek to disrupt them; they are apparently hunkering down for a long-term struggle to take over the nation. The Cambodian government, installed by Hanoi in 1979, fears repudiation at the polls; it is using violence to intimidate potential voters; it threatens to discredit the election results.

There will be no easy path through this thicket. Working with others, the United States must support the process of free and fair elections and assist the government that emerges. The immediate task for UNTAC is to convince the Cambodian people that their votes will be secret and that their votes will count. The looming policy choices before the world community include the ongoing role of the United Nations, the means to strengthen the future government, and the ways to contain the genocidal Khmer Rouge and others who seek to undermine the settlement.

One of the most complex and central tasks for our Asian policy will be to help provide the Cambodians with a brighter future. No other people deserve peace more.

Economics

In the aftermath of the Cold War, economics is increasingly supplanting military considerations on our foreign policy agenda. More than ever our national security depends on our economic strength. With domestic renewal now America's highest priority, trade and investment are critical. And no region is more central for American economic interests than the world's most dynamic one - Asia.

When I served as Ambassador to China, I devoted more time to promoting American business and economic interests than any other task. I will do so as well in my forthcoming role. I will consult closely with the American business community on their problems and their goals. I will urge our overseas posts to do the same. For the private sector in Asia, as elsewhere around the world, is an increasingly important actor. Helping American businesses to penetrate overseas markets will be key to America's prosperity.

The Asia-Pacific region is the world's largest consumer market and our biggest export market. Last year our exports were worth more than 120 billion dollars and 2.3 million American jobs.

We need to confront our Asian economic challenges and opportunities on several levels. Foreign policy begins at home -- strengthening our competitiveness is a *sine qua non* for an effective policy. The successful completion of the Uruguay Round is the most urgent multilateral task -- this would dramatically increase trade and investment in Asia as in the world, and it would help preserve an open global system against the dangers of protectionism and regional blocs. We welcome the positive role played by Australia and New Zealand as active Cairns Group members. Here, as on other issues, we will consult closely with Canada. Bilaterally we must continue to pry open Asian markets, particularly in those nations running large surpluses with us. We will champion expanding trade but we will insist that others open up to our products and services. As the President has said, we will compete, not retreat.

In addition to these domestic, global, and bilateral policies, greater regional cooperation is required.

The most promising vehicle is APEC, established in 1989 through the efforts of Australia and others. Today this trans-Pacific grouping brings together fifteen Pacific economies representing almost half of the world's GNP. It underscores the new imperatives of interdependence. It can dampen the appeal of exclusionary regional blocs. It can advance regional trade liberalization and integration. It can anchor America in the world's most dynamic region.

As the host for this year's annual Ministerial Conference in November, the United States has the opportunity to strengthen this organization. This will be at the top of our agenda this year. Working with others we can create a true Asian-Pacific economic community.

Security

By virtue of history and geography the United States is the one major power in Asia not viewed as a threat. Virtually every country wants us to maintain our security presence. While balance-of-power considerations have declined in the wake of the Cold War, they remain relevant as Asian-Pacific nations contemplate their fates. Each one harbors apprehensions about one or more of its neighbors. A precipitous American military withdrawal would magnify these concerns. Add the increasing resources available for weapons purchases in the rapidly growing Asian nations and there is a recipe for escalating arms races and future confrontations that could threaten U.S. interests.

American security policy for Asia begins with a reaffirmation of our treaty alliances with Japan, Korea, Australia, Thailand, and the Philippines; our military arrangements under the Compact of Free Association; and the maintenance of a substantial military presence. To be sure, given the end of the Cold War, stronger friends, and budget considerations, there could be prudent modifications after close consultation with our allies. And they can and must assume a growing share of the security burden.

Unlike other regions, crises in Asia do not dominate the headlines, but serious security problems persist. Those left over from the Cold War -- such as the Cambodian conflict and tensions on the Korean Peninsula -- are being addressed by the appropriate groupings of nations. The dispute between Japan -- whom we support -- and Russia over the Northern Territories belongs to bilateral negotiations.

Clearly, however, we must develop new mechanisms to manage or prevent other emerging concerns. We welcome increased security consultations in the framework of the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference. This process can usefully encourage nations to share information, convey intentions, ease tensions, resolve disputes and foster confidence. The United States will fully participate.

For the first time in this century, there are no adversarial fault lines among the great powers in Northeast Asia: the United States, Japan, Russia and China. The post-Cold War period invites dialogue to prevent arms races, the forging of competing alignments, and efforts by one power or group of powers to dominate this strategic region. Our voice will be crucial. In close concert with our Pacific allies, we could engage Russia, China and others inside and outside Northeast Asia.

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Asia is not Europe. We do not envisage a formal CSCE-type structure. But it is time to step up regional discussions on future security issues. We are open-minded on the arenas. We will heed the ideas of others, like Japan, Australia, and ASEAN, which have been particularly fertile in this domain. Together we can explore new Asian-Pacific paths toward security.

Global Issues

President Clinton and his Cabinet officers have already moved to restructure the executive branch to meet the new global challenges in our foreign policy. These issues loom large in Asia and the Pacific. They will assume increasing prominence on our regional agenda as we approach the twenty-first century.

A brief checklist illustrates some of these problems:

-- With the end of global superpower rivalry the proliferation of dangerous weapons now poses the greatest threat to our security. In Asia, North Korean programs currently dramatize this challenge.

-- It took until 1830 for the world's population to reach one billion people. Now it increases by that number every decade, with 90% of the growth in developing countries. Asia, East and South, is home to half the world's people. Twenty years from now a billion more people will live there.

-- Many measures of human impact -- from water use to the emissions of trace gases -- show greater change since 1950 than in the previous 10,000 years. The Asian region, with its massive increase in energy consumption, faces severe environmental problems. They range from the plundering of Southeast Asian forests to China's burning of coal to the threat of global warming for some Pacific Island states.

-- There are almost 20 million refugees in the world today. Even more people are uprooted within their own lands. While some recent developments in Asia are promising, poverty, repression and uncertain political succession could unleash major migrations in the future.

-- The traffic in drugs remains a scourge on American society. Although the battle must be won at home by eliminating demand, the supply of narcotics from Burma and neighboring countries exacerbates our calamity.

Surly this is a daunting array of issues. But problems common to all nations can stimulate communities. They can be positive additions to our bilateral and regional dialogues. And if they are not addressed effectively in Asia, they can hardly be addressed by the world.

Increasingly we will inject these global subjects into our relations. We will also encourage new institutions, like APEC, to enhance regional consultations and cooperation.

Democracy and Human Rights

History is on the side of freedom. In recent years hundreds of millions of people have won more open political systems. For the first time ever a majority of the world's nations are governed by some form of democracy.

This spread of liberty not only affirms American values but also serves our interests. Open societies do not attack one another. They make better trading partners. They press for environmental reform. They do not practice terrorism. They do not produce refugees. Thus, as President Clinton has emphasized, promoting democracy must be one of the central pillars of our foreign policy. Moreover, the end of our global rivalry with the Soviet Union reduces the pressure to muffle concerns about unsavory governments for the sake of security.

Naturally this pursuit cannot be our only foreign goal; we must weigh geopolitical, economic and other factors. Nor do we seek to impose an American model; each nation must find its own way in its own cultural and historical contexts. But universal principles of freedom and human rights belong to all, the peoples of Asia no less than others.

Mongolia was the first Asian country to throw off the communist yoke. From Korea to Taiwan to Thailand and the Philippines, we have witnessed encouraging strides toward more democratic and humane societies. This phenomenon is not a product of "Westernization"; rather it is an imperative of "modernization." How can countries attract investment without the rule of law? How can they combat corruption without a free press? How can they shape wise development policies without the unfettered exchange of ideas? In an age of technology and information it is impossible for nations to develop without pluralism and openness. And sooner or later -- accelerated by exposure to television and tourists, fax machines and cellular telephones, cassettes and computers -- economic advance produces political yearnings.

To be sure, areas of Asia lag behind the march of history. First-generation Communist leaders still hold together repressive regimes in several countries. Grave human

rights violations continue from Tibet to Rangoon to East Timor. But it is only a matter of time before the impact of economic reforms, the transmission of international values, and the thrust of human aspirations lead to sunnier climes.

The remainder of this century will be marked by a series of portentous successions in Asia.

Thus, even as we deal pragmatically with authoritarian governments we should press universal principles. Whenever possible we should work with others to expand the frontiers of freedom.

There are many instruments at our disposal -- consistent public positions that eschew double standards; quiet diplomacy; multilateral organizations; selective conditioning of foreign aid; and the efforts of private organizations like the National Endowment for Democracy and the Asia Foundation. The establishment of a Radio Free Asia will be a vital supplement to the Voice of America and will signal our commitment to liberty.

Conclusion

Today a Pacific Community is a vision. Tomorrow it can become a reality.

The initial contours, eased by the end of the Cold War and strengthened by the dynamism of the region, are already emerging. The rapid growth of trade and investment within the area. The increasing integration of economics, technologists, and ecologies. The deepening of ASEAN and its expanding dialogue. The promising evolution of APEC. The beginnings of regional security consultations. The spread of freedom.

These are promising trends. They reflect the foresight of the region's leaders and the energies of its peoples. They also reflect the achievements of a bipartisan American foreign policy that has supported for half a century a huge investment of our national treasure.

It would be a tragic error for America to rest on its oars. That would tempt the forces of adversity, sowing conflict rather than cooperation.

This generation of Americans owes it to the labors of those who came before us, and the hopes of our successors, to help build a new Pacific Community.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005a. fax	cover, re Asian-Pacific Regional Security (1 page)	06/03/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Jeremy Rosner (Legislative Affairs)
OA/Box Number: 9

FOLDER TITLE:

POTUS [President of the United States] Speech Files G-7 Trip Korea, National
Assembly Speech: Korea National Assembly Materials [2]

2009-0528-F
kc1462

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
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concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005b. memo	Winston Lord to Tony Lake et al re Asia-Pacific Regional Security Themes (3 pages)	06/02/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Jeremy Rosner (Legislative Affairs)
OA/Box Number: 9

FOLDER TITLE:

POTUS [President of the United States] Speech Files G-7 Trip Korea, National Assembly Speech: Korea National Assembly Materials [2]

2009-0528-F
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005c. memo	Winston Lord to Tony Lake et al re Asia-Pacific Regional Security Themes (page 1 only, duplicate of 005b) (1 page)	06/02/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

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POTUS [President of the United States] Speech Files G-7 Trip Korea, National Assembly Speech: Korea National Assembly Materials [2]

2009-0528-F
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RESTRICTION CODES

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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005d. memo	Winston Lord to Secretary of State re Multilateral Dialogue (4 pages)	06/01/1993	P1/b(1)
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FOLDER TITLE:

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Assembly Speech: Korea National Assembly Materials [2]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005e. paper	re considerations (6 pages)	05/07/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Jeremy Rosner (Legislative Affairs)
OA/Box Number: 9

FOLDER TITLE:

POTUS [President of the United States] Speech Files G-7 Trip Korea, National
Assembly Speech: Korea National Assembly Materials [2]

2009-0528-F
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March 31, 1993, excerpts from Ambassador Lord's Opening Statement at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearing on his Nomination to be Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific, pages 12-13.

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SUBJECT: FOLLOWING IS AN UNOFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT OF THE BACKGROUND PRESS BRIEFING BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY WINSTON LORD TO AMERICAN JOURNALISTS AND REPRESENTATIVES OF AMERICAN MEDIA, IN SINGAPORE, MAY 21, 1993. ATTRIBUTION IS TO A "SENIOR AMERICAN OFFICIAL" (SAO). "SECOND AMERICAN OFFICIAL" IS ADMIRAL WILLIAM PENDLEY. PRESENT AT THE BRIEFING WERE DAVID SANGER, THE NEW YORK TIMES (TOKYO BUREAU); STEVEN BUTLER, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT (TOKYO BUREAU); SANDRA BURTON, TIME MAGAZINE (HONG KONG BUREAU); MICHAEL RICHARDSON, INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE (SINGAPORE); PETER BOHAN, REUTERS (SINGAPORE); H. SUBRAMANIAN, ASSOCIATED PRESS (SINGAPORE); MATHEW LEWIS, UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL (SINGAPORE).

(BEGIN TRANSCRIPT)

SAO: MY STRATEGIC PURPOSE FOR COMING OUT HERE ON THE TWO-WEEK TRIP WAS TO UNDERLINE THIS ADMINISTRATION'S INTEREST IN EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC, OUR COMMITMENT TO THE REGION, AND THE FACT THAT WE ARE GOING TO STAY ON. I THINK GENERALLY THE TRENDS ARE POSITIVE IN ASIA; OBVIOUSLY THERE ARE SOME PROBLEMS, BUT COMPARED TO MOST REGIONS IN TERMS OF GENERAL STABILITY ECONOMIC GROWTH DYNAMISM AND ... I THINK YOU ARE FAMILIAR WITH THE REGION.

IT IS IMPORTANT FOR THE ADMINISTRATION FOR STRATEGIC AND POLITICAL REASONS. IT IS IMPORTANT TO THE REVITALIZATION OF THE AMERICAN ECONOMY. PRESIDENT CLINTON HAS MADE DOMESTIC RENEWAL OUR HIGHEST PRIORITY

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AND THEREFORE OBVIOUSLY THE MOST DYNAMIC AND FASTEST GROWING ECONOMIES OFFER THE BEST OPPORTUNITIES FOR U.S. EXPORTS AND JOBS. *WE ARE GOING TO TRY TO MOVE FORWARD IN ASIA NOT ONLY REASSERTING OUR COMMITMENT AND OUR PRESENCE AND SO ON BUT ALSO TO TRY TO ADDRESS SOME BILATERAL ISSUES. I THINK IT IS OF NOTE THAT WHEN YOU TRY TO HIT SOME OF THOSE HEAD ON AND TRY TO MAKE PROGRESS, YOU ARE GOING TO GET SOME PROBLEMS IN THE EARLY STAGES. I THINK THAT JUST SHOWS THE ADJUSTMENTS YOU ARE MAKING, THAT YOU ARE REALLY TRYING TO GET AT THESE ISSUES, AS WELL AS STRENGTHENING SOME MULTILATERAL FRAMEWORKS WHICH WE THINK REINFORCE BOTH STABILITY AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS.

LET ME SAY AT THE OUTSET I THINK THERE ARE CONCRETE SIGNS OF OUR INTEREST IN ASIA ALREADY IF YOU JUST LOOK AT THE NUMBER OF EVENTS AND AMERICAN OFFICIALS THAT ARE COMING OUT HERE IN THE FIRST SIX MONTHS OF THE ADMINISTRATION. SECRETARIES CHRISTOPHER AND BENSON WENT TO TOKYO TO MOVE THE G-7 PROCESS ALONG SEVERAL WEEKS AGO. UNDERSECRETARY TARNOCK WAS OUT HERE ON A SWING THROUGH PART OF THE REGION A FEW WEEKS AGO. DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE PERRY HAS BEEN OUT TO JAPAN AND KOREA. YOU HAD MY TWO-WEEK TRIP TO A LARGE PART OF THE REGION. THIS IS NOT YET CONFIRMED BUT I THINK THERE IS A GOOD CHANCE THAT DEPUTY SECRETARY WHARTON WILL BE HEADING OUT TO SOUTHEAST ASIA WITHIN A FEW WEEKS. THEN YOU'VE GOT IN EARLY JULY THE TOKYO SUMMIT, THE G-7 ASPECT AS WELL AS THE BILATERAL ASPECT BETWEEN THE U.S. AND JAPAN. AND THERE IS EVERY INDICATION THE PRESIDENT WILL GO ON TO KOREA AS WELL. I DON'T KNOW IF THAT HAS BEEN ANNOUNCED PUBLICLY OR NOT, BUT ...

IT HAS NOT BEEN
ANNOUNCED NOR
CONFIRMED BY THE
WHITE HOUSE

THE PRESS: IT WAS.

"BEING LOOKED AT"

SAO: IF IT HAS BEEN ANNOUNCED PUBLICLY THAT'S CONFIRMED, OF COURSE. AND THEN SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER WILL BE BACK HERE IN LATE JULY FOR THE ANNUAL ASEAN POST-MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE MEETING. THE U.S. WILL HOST THE APEC MEETING IN SEATTLE IN NOVEMBER. SO THAT SEEMS TO US A CLEAR, CONCRETE DEMONSTRATION OF THE AMERICAN INTEREST IN THIS REGION, JUST BY VIRTUE OF THE ... NOT TO MENTION THE PEOPLE COMING IN THE OTHER DIRECTION TO THE UNITED STATES FROM ASIA, WHICH ALREADY HAS BEEN HAPPENING AND WILL CONTINUE TO HAPPEN OVER THE COMING MONTHS. SO, YOU KNOW, BOSNIA AND THE MIDDLE EAST MAY GET A LOT OF THE HEADLINES, BUT IF YOU JUST LOOK AT THE TRAVELS AND THE EVENTS I THINK THERE IS A

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CLEAR THEM HERE OF OUR STRATEGIC INTEREST IN THIS REGION.

THERE IS A GREAT DEAL OF CONTINUITY AND CONSISTENCY IN OUR POLICY BECAUSE AMERICAN INTERESTS DO NOT CHANGE EVERY FOUR YEARS. AND THERE ARE SOME NEW ELEMENTS. AMONG THE CONSISTENT ELEMENTS ARE -- BESIDES THE FACT THAT WE ARE GOING TO REMAIN AN ASIAN-PACIFIC POWER, IN OUR OWN SELF INTEREST, NOT JUST BECAUSE EVERYONE WISHES US TO STAY ON OUT HERE. WE ARE GOING TO MAINTAIN OUR VARIOUS ALLIANCES; I HAVE BEEN STRESSING THROUGHOUT THAT THIS WILL BE ONE OF THE FOUNDATIONS OF OUR SECURITY POLICY. AND WE'LL MAINTAIN A SUBSTANTIAL FORWARD AMERICAN MILITARY PRESENCE, ANOTHER FOUNDATION OF OUR SECURITY POLICY. IT ALSO HELPS WITH OUR ECONOMIC INTERESTS. WE ARE GOING TO SEEK, EVERYWHERE WE CAN, TO OPEN UP ASIAN MARKETS AND HAVE ACCESS TO ASIAN RESOURCES, CAPITAL; THESE ARE ALL ESSENTIAL TO UPHOLD THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC SYSTEM. WE SUPPORT THE OPENING UP OF ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL SYSTEMS AND SOCIETIES. WE UPHOLD INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS WITH RESPECT TO HUMAN RIGHTS. SO ALL OF THESE WILL MAKE FAIRLY CONSISTENT GOALS AND POLICIES AND WE WILL CONTINUE TO UNDERLINE IT.

I'D SAY THE NEW ELEMENTS ARE SOMEWHAT MORE EMPHASIS ON REGIONAL FRAMEWORKS AND INSTRUMENTS AS WELL. I WANT TO STRESS THIS IS ON THE FOUNDATION OF OUR BILATERAL ALLIANCES AND FORWARD MILITARY PRESENCE. BUT AGAINST THAT BACKDROP IN THE ECONOMIC AREA WE ARE GOING TO GIVE VERY HEAVY EMPHASIS TO APEC AND, AS I SAID, WE ARE GOING TO BE HOSTING THAT IN SEATTLE. SO THAT, WE THINK, IS THE MOST PROMISING REGIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION.

ANOTHER PROMISING REGIONAL ORGANIZATION IS, OF COURSE, ASEAN, IN TERMS OF THE ECONOMIC CONNECTIONS WITH US. WHEN I WAS IN BRUNEI FOR THE U.S.-ASEAN DIALOGUE, THERE WAS PRIMARILY A DISCUSSION OF ECONOMIC ISSUES, BUT SOME DISCUSSION OF SECURITY ISSUES AS WELL. THEN THERE IS THIS INNOVATION OF SENIOR OFFICIALS PARTICIPATING IN REGIONAL SECURITY CONSULTATIONS IN THE ASEAN POST MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE FRAMEWORK. SO WE'VE INDICATED FROM THE BEGINNING THAT IN ADDITION TO THE CONTINUITIES THAT I'VE SUGGESTED THAT WE ARE WILLING TO TAKE A POSITIVE ATTITUDE TOWARDS REGIONAL SECURITY CONSULTATIONS.

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AND THAT LEADS ME INTO THE SECOND PART OF MY OPENING REMARKS AND THAT IS THE MEETING WE JUST HAD HERE WHICH FOLLOWS ON QUITE LOGICALLY FROM THE DIALOGUE WE HAD IN BURNEI. THIS WAS PROPOSED BY ASEAN, THAT THE SENIOR OFFICIALS AT THIS LEVEL DISCUSS SECURITY ISSUES AND WE READILY ACCEPTED THAT AND I THINK OTHERS WHO ATTENDED HERE ALL EAGERLY ACCEPTED IT. THE FACT IS THAT IN ADDITION TO OUR ALLIANCES AND OUR FORWARD MILITARY PRESENCE THERE ARE SOME CONFLICTS WHICH ARE BEING HANDLED IN APPROPRIATE GROUPINGS OF NATIONS, WHETHER IT IS KOREA OR CAMBODIA, WITH JAPAN AND RUSSIA HANDLING THEIR ISSUE BILATERALLY.

BUT AS YOU LOOK AHEAD AT THE POST-COLD WAR ENVIRONMENT, WITH COUNTRIES HAVING CERTAIN CONCERNS AS THEY LOOK TO THE FUTURE, AND EVERYONE OUT HERE WORRIED ABOUT SOMEONE ELSE, THE U.S., BY VIRTUE OF HISTORY AND GEOGRAPHY, I THINK, IS SEEN AS A BENIGN AND STABILIZING POWER. IT'S CLEAR EVERYONE WANTS US TO STAY ON OUT HERE AND WE WANT TO STAY ON IN OUR OWN SELF INTEREST AS WELL AS TO HELP PROVIDE THIS SENSE OF SECURITY AND STABILITY. WE THINK THESE REGIONAL CONSULTATIONS WILL BE INCREMENTAL. WE ARE NOT TALKING OF IMMEDIATE STRUCTURES OR GOING INTO FORMAL ARRANGEMENTS; WE ARE TALKING ABOUT DIALOGUE, CONSULTATIONS AND, TOGETHER WITH OUR FRIENDS, WHOM WE WILL BE LISTENING TO VERY CLOSELY, WE WILL TRY TO MOVE AHEAD TO INTENSIFY REGIONAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS.

I DID COME IN A LISTENING MODE AS WELL AS BEING A POSITIVE PARTICIPANT. WE HAD NO AMERICAN BLUEPRINTS. TOGETHER WITH OTHERS WE ARE SEARCHING WAYS TO TALK ABOUT THE FUTURE, TO HAVE COUNTRIES IN THIS REGION CONVEY THEIR INTENTIONS, EASE MISPERCEPTIONS, LOWER TENSIONS, PERHAPS DETERMINE ARMS RACES OR NEW ALIGNMENTS. SO IT'S AN INCREMENTAL PROCESS AND THERE'S NO SET STRUCTURES ENVISAGED RIGHT NOW. WE COULD DEVELOP STRUCTURES OVER TIME BUT THE EMPHASIS NOW IS ON CONSULTATIONS AND DIALOGUE.

I THINK OUR WILLINGNESS TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS HAS BEEN VERY MUCH APPRECIATED OUT HERE; CERTAINLY THAT WAS THE IMPRESSION WE HAD FROM THE VERY BEGINNING WHEN WE SIGNALLED THIS A FEW MONTHS AGO AND I WAS ACCORDED A WARM WELCOME. IT WAS, IN FACT, A WARM WELCOME THAT WE HAD IN THESE MEETINGS. I WANT TO STRESS AGAIN THAT THIS MULTILATERAL SECURITY DIALOGUE IS A COMPLEMENT TO, NOT A REPLACEMENT FOR, ALLIANCES AND OUR OTHER DEFENSE RELATIONSHIPS WE HAVE WORKED OUT, PARTICULARLY WITH

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SOME OF THE ASEAN COUNTRIES AFTER THE CLOSURE OF THE PHILIPPINE BASES.

AS FAR AT THIS PARTICULAR MEETING, I THINK YOU ALL HAVE THE CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENT. EVERYONE ALWAYS SAYS THE DISCUSSIONS ARE GREAT, IT WAS A TERRIFIC MEETING, AND SO ON. YOU WOULDN'T EXPECT ANYTHING ELSE FROM ME. BUT IN THIS CASE I CAN GENUINELY SAY I THOUGHT THEY WERE VERY GOOD DISCUSSIONS. THEY WERE INFORMAL. THERE WAS A LOT OF CONSENSUS. THERE WERE SOME DISAGREEMENTS BUT I REALLY DO THINK IT WAS APPROACHED, ON THE ONE HAND, CANDIDLY BUT ON THE OTHER HAND IT REALLY WAS, I THINK, RATHER CORDIAL WITH A SENSE THAT THERE WAS MUTUAL RESPECT EVEN WHERE THERE WERE SOME DIFFERENCES. BUT, AS I SAID, A LOT OF CONSENSUS AS WELL. AND I THINK IT DID DEMONSTRATE THE POTENTIAL OF THESE REGIONAL SECURITY DISCUSSIONS.

YOU CAN TALK TO THE ASEAN AND THE OTHER ASIAN PARTICIPANTS HERE. I THINK IT IS FAIR TO SAY WITHOUT SOUNDING TOO SELF-SERVING THAT THEY APPRECIATED THE U.S. POSTURE AND STYLE IN TERMS OF ACTIVELY PARTICIPATING ON THE ONE HAND BUT CLEARLY WILLING TO LISTEN ON THE OTHER HAND. SO WE'VE GOT FEEDBACK THAT THE APPROACH, I THINK, OF THE AMERICAN DELEGATION WAS APPRECIATED.

IF YOU LOOK AT THE CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENT -- AGAIN IT IS HIS STATEMENT; IT IS NOT TRYING TO BE A CONSENSUS DOCUMENT, SO I WANT TO MAKE THAT CLEAR -- BUT WE'RE FRANKLY VERY PLEASED WITH SEVERAL THINGS IN IT, REFLECTING THE DISCUSSIONS IN THE MEETING THAT WE THINK ARE VERY POSITIVE. THERE'S AN EXPRESSION OF EVERYONE WANTING THE U.S. PRESENCE TO REMAIN OUT HERE. THERE'S A GOOD STATEMENT ON THE KOREA SITUATION, EVEN THOUGH SOME COUNTRIES ... I THINK EVERYONE'S CONCERNED ABOUT NORTH KOREAN PROLIFERATION; WHETHER EVERYONE WANTED TO PUT EVERYTHING IN A STATEMENT AT ONE TIME IS NOT ENTIRELY CLEAR. BUT I THINK THERE WAS ENOUGH CONSENSUS THAT YOU HAVE A VERY, VERY GOOD STATEMENT ON KOREA. A GOOD STATEMENT ON CAMBODIA RESPECTING THE ELECTIONS AND THE NEED TO ADDRESS THE POST-ELECTION SITUATION. AND A CLEAR REFERENCE TO THE RELEVANCE OF DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS TO SECURITY. SO WE THINK THERE ARE A LOT OF POSITIVE ELEMENTS THERE.

ALSO THERE IS A SENSE IN THE DOCUMENT THAT IT'S IMPORTANT TO INCLUDE, AS WE LOOK TO THE FUTURE, OTHER

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KEY ACTORS IN THE REGION IN THIS DIALOGUE, AND HOW THAT WOULD BE DONE AND WHAT WAYS STILL ARE TO BE WORKED OUT. BUT IT IS OBVIOUS WE ARE TALKING ABOUT COUNTRIES TALKING TOGETHER ABOUT THEIR CONCERNS AND EASING TENSIONS. THIS GROUPING IS NOT DIRECTED AGAINST ANY COUNTRY; IT IS THE DESIGN TO HAVE THE VARIOUS PARTIES OUT HERE TALK TO EACH OTHER AND TRY TO PROVIDE A MORE STABLE FUTURE.

I SHOULD COMMEND SINGAPORE, BY THE WAY. THEY REALLY DID A SUPERB JOB, BOTH GENERALLY HOSTING THIS AND THE SINGAPORE CHAIRMAN, PETER CHAN, WAS EXTREMELY SKILLFUL. SO I WOULD JUST END UP ON THE NOTE THAT IT WAS CLEAR IN MY DISCUSSIONS ALL THROUGH ASIA, AND THEN AT THIS PARTICULAR CONFERENCE, THAT EVERYONE WANTS US TO STAY OUT HERE AND I HAVE CARRIED THE MESSAGE THAT WE WILL STAY OUT HERE. AT THE SAME TIME THE ASIANS ARE PICKING UP MORE OF THE BURDENS AND ARE SUPPORTING OUR PRESENCE; IT HAS TO BE A TWO-WAY STREET. BUT WE'RE DETERMINED TO STAY HERE BECAUSE IT IS IN OUR SELF INTEREST AND I THINK THIS STRATEGIC MESSAGE THAT I MENTIONED AT THE VERY OUTSET GOT ACROSS QUITE EFFECTIVELY AND WAS WELL RECEIVED THROUGHOUT THE REGION AND AT THIS MEETING HERE IN SINGAPORE.

SO WHY DON'T WE LEAVE IT AT THAT AND GO TO YOUR QUESTIONS.

Q: (AP) EARLIER ON DOWNSTAIRS YOU SAID THAT IN REFERENCE TO CHINA AND RUSSIA, TAKING PART IN THESE DISCUSSIONS AND THAT YOU SAID YOU'LL GO ALONG WITH GENERAL CONSENSUS. COULD YOU ELABORATE ON THAT?

SAO: WELL, AGAIN ITS NOT APPROPRIATE TO GET OUT FURTHER THAN THE CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENT BECAUSE THIS IS A COLLECTIVE OF DECISION. BUT WE DO BELEIVE THAT WE ARE VERY COMFORTABLE WITH THE IDEA OF INTEGRATING, AS I SAY IN WAYS STILL TO BE DETERMINED, KEY PLAYERS LIKE CHINA AND RUSSIA IN THIS DIALOGUE. SO IT'S MADE CLEAR THAT THIS IS NOT A GROUPING DIRECTED AT ANY COUNTRY. INDEED, IT'S TO BE INCLUSIVE OVER TIME SO THAT PEOPLE CAN TALK TO EACH OTHER DIRECTLY AND ALLAY MISPERCEPTIONS AND CREATE A GREATER SENSE OF STABILITY AND SECURITY. SO WE FAVOR THAT PROCESS.

Q: (US NEWS) DID YOU DISCUSS THE MODES BY WHICH THAT WILL TAKE PLACE?

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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005f. statement	Ambassador Lord on Political and Security Issues (6 pages)	05/20/1993	P1/b(1)
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COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
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FOLDER TITLE:

POTUS [President of the United States] Speech Files G-7 Trip Korea, National
Assembly Speech: Korea National Assembly Materials [2]

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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
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May 27, 1993

SEJPOL 11519

America and the New Pacific Community

Overall Themes:

East Asia is the most economically dynamic region in the world. We and the East Asians can benefit greatly through increased, mutually beneficial economic and political ties. We must remain engaged in the region if we are to maintain our prosperity and security.

A community of common economic, political, and strategic interests is emerging in the East Asia-Pacific region. There is a growing convergence of values and principles on such issues as the need for stability, market economies, political pluralism, and human rights.

The U.S. has played a key role in the Pacific since the 19th century. Our stake in the region is greater than ever and will increase. America recognizes the vital importance of the region and will continue to strengthen its membership in the emerging community.

What is the New Pacific Community?

- o Many people have chosen to characterize the countries surrounding the Pacific Rim as the Pacific Community. The initial outlines of such a community are already visible. They are the outlines of the emerging bonds of interdependence and mutual interest that have grown among us.
- o There remains a great diversity in cultures, religions, and histories among America and the East Asian and Pacific countries. We cherish these differences, the diversity of which is reflected in our own culture, and seek to learn from them.
- o But more and more, we are bound together by a tight web of shared economic, political, and strategic interests. More and more, the fortunes of one of us are lashed tightly to those of all the others.
- o These deeply shared interests include a strong desire for sustained economic growth, freer markets at home, and open markets abroad.
- o As time passes, more of us share an interest in the development of more democratic institutions. We recognize that political systems must be open and fair if all people are to share in the rewards of prosperity.
- o We also understand that prosperity only comes with peace and stability, and that greater political cooperation and a continued American military presence are essential for maintaining these.

- o There are also strong human connections. Asian-Americans are among America's fastest growing ethnic groups and American universities host thousands of Asian exchange students.

Why is it Important for America?

- o For the past several years, the media have focussed on Europe, Russia, and the Middle East to such a degree that some Americans have lost sight of the great transformation taking place in East Asia and the Pacific.
- o In fact, recent developments in East Asia may alter the face of global economic and political relations as much as those taking place elsewhere in the world. In the past thirty years, East Asian and Pacific countries have undergone a revolution in economic and technological capabilities.
- o The East Asia-Pacific region has become the most economically dynamic region in the world. Japan's emergence as an economic superpower goes without saying. It has overshadowed the more recent but no less remarkable productive surges by South Korea, Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia, China, and Taiwan.
- o Our own peace and prosperity are inextricably linked to East Asian and Pacific peace and prosperity. We are becoming increasingly interdependent with our Asian friends and allies in economic, political, and security affairs.
- o How we respond to the challenges posed by this transformation will determine our global economic and political standing in the next century. We must continue to be a leader in this community. We must continue to remain engaged in this region in every way.
- o America must recognize and engage across-the-board with East Asia's vital economic, political, and strategic importance. Our destiny as a great power is tied to this vibrant, dynamic region.
- o We want to help create a Pacific Community based on competitive but free and fair trade. We want to tap into East Asia's economic dynamism so that it can help keep our own economy growing. We want more open East Asian markets and more American exports and investment in the region.
- o We want to maintain and increase the openness of our economy so that we may share in the bounty of East Asian markets.
- o We want to encourage the great, historical trend toward democracy and support for human rights knowing that a democratic East Asia will be a more peaceful and harmonious region.

- o We also want to help keep the peace, to guard our own security and to ensure that political or military conflict does not divert us from our common goals.
- o Finally, we want the community to expand. We see promise in a Russia that, as it reforms its political and economic system, can share in the responsibilities and the benefits of full membership in this community. We believe that China can as well.
- o The more strongly we are engaged in East Asia and the Pacific, the more strongly will we build the ties that bind us into a true community of peaceful, prosperous, and mutually beneficial relations.

The Pacific Community is Economically Interdependent

- o The U.S and East Asian economies are increasingly integrated. Both sides benefit from this, and America must remain economically engaged in the region in order to be competitive worldwide. We must compete, not retreat.
- o We rely more than ever on international trade. In the 1960's, less than 10% of our GNP was involved in world trade. Now over 30% is engaged in trade.
- o In a world where trade is more important, East Asia is our most important trading partner. The region is the one of the world's largest consumer market and our biggest export market. Last year, our exports were worth more than \$120 billion and 2.3 million American jobs.
- o I have pointed out in the past that for all the adventure and opportunity in the new global economy, an American cannot approach it without mixed feelings. We remember a simpler time when America dominated the world economy and we didn't have to worry about overseas competition, exporting more goods and services, or losing jobs and factories to lower wage countries.
- o Yet the truth is that open and competitive commerce, particularly with our East Asian partners, will enrich us as a nation. It spurs us to innovate and connects us with our customers. It promotes the growth without which no rich country can hope to prosper further.
- o In a February speech at the American University in Washington, I outlined steps the U.S. can take to set a new economic direction at home and to help create a new direction for the world.

- o These steps included:
 - getting the American economic house in order;
 - making trade policy an element of American security;
 - exercising leadership among the major financial powers to improve our coordination on behalf of global economic growth, and;
 - promoting steady growth in the developing world.
- o East Asians tell us all the time that the best thing for their own economic prospects is a strong and healthy American economy. This is one indication of how closely we all are tied together.
- o We are doing our part for a stronger Pacific Community by getting the American economy back into competitive trim. We are here in Tokyo with our G-7 partners to discuss in detail the coordination of macroeconomic policies to get the industrialized economies back on the track to economic growth.
- o For their part, East Asian and Pacific countries can contribute to the successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round of the GATT negotiations.
- o The Round has dragged on for too long. But it still holds the potential, if everyone does their share, to boost American wages and living standards significantly and to do the same for other nations around the world.
- o At the same time we work to make the Uruguay Round a success, we can further build cooperative ties and further liberalize cross-Pacific trade by strengthening the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC).
- o To emphasize the importance of the endeavor, I plan to attend the APEC Ministerial to be held in Seattle in November.
- o Regional arrangements like this one provide opportunities to explore new kinds of trade concerns, such as how trade relates to the environment.
- o The East Asian countries should also further open their markets to American goods and services. We continue to welcome East Asian products and services into our markets, but we insist that our products and services enter theirs on equal terms.

- o We continue to welcome foreign investment knowing that with it come new jobs, new ideas, new capital. But we insist that our investors are equally welcome in East Asian countries.
- o Open markets will take us only part of the way in balancing our trade. Our business people must get out there and sell. Any good sales person can tell you that you have to go where the money is. East Asia and the Pacific is where the money is and we need to stay and grow in this market.
- o The U.S. Government and those of our trading partners can only do so much to increase our trade prospects in this vital region. American business must also take up the challenge by increasing its presence.

The Pacific Community Shares Vital Political and Security Concerns

- o America and its East Asian friends and allies share vital political interests in the peaceful resolution of conflicts that continue to trouble the region, in the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and in the spread of democracy and human rights.
 - o While we may take a different approach, Americans and many East Asians share an abiding interest in the development of democratic institutions.
 - o Rapid economic growth paved the way for the rise of new middle classes and the evolution of more pluralistic political patterns in Japan just after WWII, then in South Korea and Taiwan. We have no doubt that the region as a whole will follow their lead.
 - o We also share with many members of the Pacific community an abiding interest in the resolution of conflicts affecting the region's peace and security.
- We relied heavily on East Asian financial support in our fight against Saddam Hussein and on other East Asian countries for logistical support.
 - We have worked closely with South Korea, Japan, Russia, and China in trying to stem the threat of nuclear proliferation in North Korea.
 - Japan, the ASEAN countries, and China have played an essential role in the Cambodian peace process and Japanese and American contributions will be essential for Cambodian reconstruction.

- We have coordinated closely with the six members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) on Cambodia and other areas of security concern in the region.
- o Identifying and pursuing our shared interests in these and other areas will increasingly require closer communication and cooperation among the U.S., our allies, and our friends throughout the region.
 - o At the same time that we bolster these cooperative efforts, we should remember that American military presence in the region has helped maintain the peace and stability on which its economic success is based.
 - o We fought three wars over the past fifty years in order to protect interests which we considered vital. Our interests in the region are strengthening, not diminishing, and our continued military presence will be necessary to secure our interests.
 - o We have sought and obtained greater host nation support for our military presence from our allies throughout the region. By 1995, Japan, for example, will pay over 70% of the cost of stationing U.S. troops there and South Korea will pay one third of all local costs.
 - o We should nevertheless recall that our forces are stationed in East Asia because they guard our security as well as those of our allies.
 - o Our military presence in the region is not large. Only a tiny fraction of the American defense dollar goes to support our forces in East Asia. Yet this small investment pays us back handsomely in our own security and in the peace and prosperity throughout a region that covers a large percentage of the globe.
 - o In fact, ours is the only country in the region capable of guaranteeing region-wide stability and of blunting the effects of regional conflict and lingering historical animosities.
 - o Most East Asian countries recognize this and wholeheartedly welcome a continued American commitment to the region's security.
 - o We must therefore continue to foster our close alliance relations with Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand.

- o At the same time we do so, we will seek to complement our military guarantee with an open minded search for new consultations to manage or prevent the emergence of new conflicts.

-- The U.S. welcomes increased regional interest in multilateral regional security dialogue. We are participating fully in the discussions organized within the framework of the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference. This process can usefully encourage nations to share information, ease tensions, and foster mutual confidence.

Working Together to Solve Global Problems

- o East Asia and the Pacific is a source of both concerns for and solutions to the global issues facing into the next century.
- o The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction threaten East Asian peace as it does that of other regions, particularly on the Korean Peninsula, where North Korea poses the danger of nuclear and missile proliferation.
- o The region faces severe environmental problems with overpopulation, deforestation, industrial pollution, and habitat degradation.
- o While recent developments in Indochina have reduced the flow of refugees, poverty, repression, and unstable political successions could unleash major migrations.
- o American and East Asian societies remain threatened with drug abuse, and the flow of deadly narcotics from the Golden Triangle in Southeast Asia must be stopped.
- o These problems know no international borders, and their solution cannot rely on uncoordinated efforts of individual states.
- o We must work more closely with members of the emerging Pacific Community to address these issues, and we will seek to inject these into our bilateral discussions as well as in multilateral fora such as APEC.

Conclusion

- o Working to build a stronger Pacific Community offers a great challenge to the American people. We will have to work harder, save and invest more, and keep the doors to foreign trade open.
- o It also offers tremendous benefits. We will profit greatly from the ties that strengthen our economic competitiveness, bolster our technological base, help us improve our human capital, and increase the possibilities for peace and democracy. The reward will be a more peaceful and prosperous world for our children.

PRESS RELEASE



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EXCERPTS FROM

**Remarks by
William Perry
U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense
at the Asia Society Conference
Tokyo, Japan
Thursday, May 13, 1993**

(as delivered)

Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen:

Today I would like to share with you the Clinton Administration's view of America's security role in Asia now that the Cold War is over.

I believe that there was one clear winner in the Cold War — democracy. One hundred years ago, Victor Hugo said, "More powerful than the tread of mighty armies is an idea whose time has come." Democracy is an idea whose time has come, and has proven to be more powerful than mighty armies. The benefits of democracy will be shared by everyone who believes in peace and freedom. But to secure these benefits, we need to recognize that the collapse of Soviet Communism has not meant an end to all of the threats to our security. We need now to pursue security policies that will be successful as the policies we pursued at the end of the Second World War.

Since 1945, America's objectives have been to secure peace, provide a basis for stability, and to promote prosperity in Asia. And as I look around this room today, I believe it can be

asserted that we have succeeded. In fact, there is no better example of what we might hope for in the former Soviet bloc than that they could evolve to the democracy and prosperity achieved here in Japan.

The United States puts a top priority on continuing to participate in Asia's phenomenal economic success. Our country remains committed to Asian security. We recognize our own role in providing for Asian stability, and will continue to seek the enhancement of democratic and economic institutions throughout this region.

I know that there is some concern in this room that the new U.S. Administration is focused on other parts of the world and that American interest in Asia is waning. Nothing could be farther from the truth. Seven million Asian-Americans keep our ties to Asia strong, but they are not the only Americans involved with Asia. Trade between the United States and Asian nations amounts to more than 300 billion dollars a year; almost three million American jobs depend on it. U.S. firms have invested

more than 60 billion dollars in Asia. Trade with this region dwarfs U.S. trade with Europe, and the increase in trade has been dramatic -- more than 230 percent increase in the decade from 1978 to 1988. We have a major stake in peace and stability in Asia.

But the past few years have been a period of overwhelming revolutionary change, unprecedented in their sweeping scope and relatively peaceful character. The geopolitical certainties of half a century were overthrown with breathtaking speed. And now, together, we must form new political policies and economic institutions to deal with the new world in which we live. Four hundred years ago, Shakespeare said, "There is a tide in the affairs of men which, taken at the flood, leads on to fortune." On such a full sea we are now afloat, and we must take the current when it serves or lose our venture. On such a full sea, we are now afloat, and we must take the current when it serves. In taking this new current, we ask ourselves several very fundamental questions: In this new world, what dangers threaten our interests? What should be our strategy to cope with these dangers? And what mix of initiatives and programs and institutions can we form to protect and defend our interests? For the United States, the challenge of dealing with these changed circumstances falls to a leader -- President Clinton -- who was himself elected with a mandate for change.

From the Clinton Administration's perspective, the old world of bipolar rigidity has been replaced by a new world of fluid complexity. We see dangers in this new security environment in four broad areas: nuclear, regional, democratic and economic. Let me describe each of these in turn.

The first of these is the nuclear threat or, more generally, the danger of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In a sense, this threat is more dangerous than ever, given the crises which affect our world after the Cold War, and given the ease with which nuclear technology can be spread.

There are still some 30,000 nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union whose security could be lessened with the removal of the old mechanisms of control. And there are

institutions there and people with great knowledge and skill in making nuclear weapons, and these people have lost their economic livelihood as a result of the cutbacks in weapons production. The temptation to sell this knowledge and skill will be great. It will take innovative programs to prevent the proliferation of this nuclear know-how.

But the former Soviet Union does not present the only problem. We know that there are nations hostile to freedom and democracy who are determined to acquire nuclear weapons. Of special concern is North Korea's potential development of nuclear weapons -- now, in my opinion, the primary threat to security in Northeast Asia. North Korea's noncompliance with its International Atomic Energy Agency safeguard obligations, and its announced decision to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty potentially pose a grave danger. The prospect of North Korea with nuclear weapons, particularly with missile delivery systems, is both dangerous and destabilizing. And North Korea's history adds to our concern over its potential possession of nuclear weapons.

For more than twenty years we have joined other countries in a variety of efforts aimed at counterproliferation, including arms control treaties that restrict international trade in sensitive equipment and materials. But now the time is right for new and intensified efforts.

The United States is in the process of rationalizing its own export controls with special emphasis on impeding the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We hope that governments around the world will join us in this and that they will target their export controls against known proliferators.

The second broad area of danger with which we are concerned is the danger from conflicts and crises that threaten regional peace and stability. This includes the actions of regional aggressors like Iraq; ethnic and religious civil wars that could spread across borders, as in former Yugoslavia; and the breakdown in civil order, as in Somalia. To respond to these crises, we must keep fully capable military

forces stationed outside the United States where they will be able to reach trouble spots quickly, to deter and, if necessary, to defeat aggression. We recognize that the forward presence of U.S. military forces in a region demonstrates American commitment and can serve as the foundation for regional stability and security.

There are several particular issues in the Asia-Pacific region today that merit inclusion under the category of regional dangers.

- In addition to the nuclear threat mentioned above, there still persists a conventional military threat to South Korea from the North Korean million-man army, two-thirds of which is deployed within 30 miles of the DMZ. Given the uncertainties surrounding the ongoing political transition in Pyongyang, the U.S. and South Korea must be prepared for anything from internal collapse to desperate aggression – contingencies that would have impact not only on the future of the Korean Peninsula but on the security of the entire region.

- In Cambodia, an agreement is now in place to bring peace to that nation. The United States shares the world's hopes that the upcoming elections will bring stability and progress to this troubled spot of the world. But the Khmer Rouge continue to create problems, and the outcome is still uncertain.

- There are contested territorial claims in many parts of this region. The Spratlys are a potential source for regional conflict that could engage many of the region's nations and threaten passage through the critical sea lines that traverse the South China Sea.

We believe that U.S. military forces must be able to deal with regional threats in concert with our allies and friends. The ability to operate with ad hoc coalitions that was demonstrated during the Gulf War will be required in the future as well. That war showed that well-trained forces positioned in the Pacific, with access throughout Southeast Asia, can respond quickly and effectively to protect international peace in remote areas of the globe. That is a capability that we plan to keep.

And there's another capability which we want to develop and strengthen, and that is the capability for peacekeeping. Peacekeeping will

become an increasingly important mission for all of our forces. The United States is requesting 300 million dollars in next year's defense budget for peacekeeping operations. But peacekeeping is not only about restoring order by military means, it also entails the normal functions of government: police, infrastructure, health, education, economics. I would suggest that no armed force in the world today has yet been adequately trained for these missions. We want to work together with our Asian friends and allies to develop this capability.

The third danger arises from the failure of democratic reform, particularly in the former Soviet Union. The great theologian, Reinhold Niebuhr, said: "Man's capacity for good makes democracy possible. His capacity for evil makes it indispensable." Because of the importance of democratic reform, and because of the fragility of the new democratic regimes, our policies are designed to prevent the reversal of reform in the countries that have newly formed democratic governments. That's why President Clinton announced major initiatives at Vancouver with President Yeltsin. These efforts are aimed at assisting the Russians in their economic restructuring as well as providing help to Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan in dismantling their nuclear arsenals.

Our Department of Defense has an important role to play in promoting democracy. The U.S. military can help spread understanding of the principles – and benefits – of civilian control of the military. To that end, we are sponsoring military-to-military contacts with the armed forces of the former Soviet Union.

All of Asia would benefit from a democratic Russia, as it would benefit from democracy in other countries – such as in Cambodia, where Thailand, Australia, and Japan have borne so much of the burden of trying to build a stable nation.

The countries of Asia know the tremendous advantages of democratic progress. The Republic of Korea is a particularly impressive example of democratic institution-building, but it is not alone in the region. The world trend is toward the open and free expression of ideas, and our security policies should support that trend.

The fourth danger which we see is a failure to see national security interests in a way that includes economic interests. Economic well-being is vital to any nation's security.

This Administration has put a sharp focus on putting our domestic economic house in order, but we don't want to do that at the expense of our trading partners. On the contrary, a healthy U.S. economy will benefit all trading nations.

And the most important thing we can do for U.S. security is to strengthen the U.S. economy. In the short run, our defense depends on strong, effective military forces capable of meeting any threats to our security. And we have such forces.

But in the long run, U.S. national security depends upon our economic strength. We cannot staff, train, and equip an effective military force without a strong economy.

Our long-term well-being is in jeopardy in the United States today because of two decades of low productivity growth, lack of investment, and rising budget deficits. The improved security environment brought about by an end to the Cold War allows us to reduce our defense budget to help cut the deficit and to provide funds for investment in economic growth. We have already begun the transition of our defense industries, workers, and military personnel toward a post-Cold War economy.

There are some who have asked whether the United States can, in its current economic circumstances, afford to maintain troops in Asia; they should be asking, instead, whether we can afford not to. Today, across the United States, Americans benefit, in employment, investment, and consumer goods, from the strength of our relations with Asia.

One reason why we can afford our forward presence in Asia is that alliances reinforce stronger economic and trade relationships, and our Asian allies -- Japan and Korea -- contribute to mutual efforts and to the cost of our presence. The substantial share of costs that Japan pays toward the stationing of U.S. forces here makes our presence cost-effective, and serves as a clear indication of the value that Japan places on our joint security relationship.

The safer environment resulting from the end of the Cold War does mean that we have been able to reduce troop strength without endangering national security. But there remains a significant role for U.S. forward military presence, consisting of permanently stationed forces in Korea and Japan, and a carrier presence. Neither our adversaries nor our friends should mistake the adjustments in our ground and air forces as a diminishment of U.S. commitment to the region.

Since 1990, the Department of Defense has pursued what we call the East Asia Strategy Initiative -- a careful, phased approach to adjustments in America's force posture in East Asia. The first phase saw planned reductions of about 12 percent in our regional military strength and a similar additional reduction with the withdrawal from the Philippines. In the current second phase, modest reductions will be made in Japan. We were also planning modest withdrawal of troops from South Korea but that withdrawal has been halted because of the threat posed by the North Korean nuclear weapons program. As we approach the third phase which begins in 1996 and goes on to the end of the century, we will evaluate the security environment and consult with our friends and allies before we make any further changes. We want to make sure that we have the military strength that is needed to guarantee regional stability and protect our mutual interests into the Twenty-first Century. In Korea, we want to continue the process of the Republic of Korea moving to take the leading role in its own defense.

We would hope that the security situation, especially surrounding the North Korean nuclear program, will have improved to the point that we can proceed with additional adjustments of our military forces there. But we are not going to cut military strength in Korea unless the security situation permits it.

In sum then, in Asia, we are shifting from a large permanent U.S. military presence to a more widely dispersed regional posture. This posture consists of regional access arrangements -- some formal, such as the one concluded with Singapore in 1990, and some informal, such as the arrangements for commercial use and repairs

that we have made throughout the region. Joint training arrangements, information exchanges, periodic ship visits, and professional military education programs are important elements that serve to underscore America's continuing security interest in Asia.

Seven mutual defense pacts and over forty bilateral arrangements provide the framework for regional security that has met the needs of Asia as well as the needs of the United States. Our strong bilateral relationship with Japan is a uniquely important component of our Asia policy. It helps deter North Korea, provides for the defense of our Asian allies, serves to reassure regional friends, and satisfies Japanese domestic concerns. But the time has come for Japanese leadership in world affairs and a maturing relationship between the U.S. and Japan. Japan's leadership role in Cambodia peacekeeping is a constructive step in that direction. Along similar lines, we welcome Australia's efforts to promote defense and security cooperation with Southeast Asian nations, and the efforts of many ASEAN nations to develop defense ties among themselves.

Our bilateral alliances do indeed continue to contribute to regional stability, but, in this more secure international environment, there will be enhanced opportunities to address political, economic, environmental, social, and security issues through new or revitalized international organizations, and through regional security arrangements. The Clinton Administration strongly supports and encourages regional security dialogues.

In Asia, we have seen ad hoc multilateral initiatives work in bringing about a diplomatic settlement of the conflict in Cambodia. Indonesia has taken the initiative to invite parties with claims in the Spratly Islands to workshops aimed at addressing this security problem. The ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference, which brings together the ministers of the ASEAN and seven other nations, is evolving into an increasingly important forum for regional security considerations.

We see friends and allies in the region coming to grips with real security issues in a practical way. And this is the very definition of a security dialogue -- seeking real solutions for

real problems. Initiatives of this practical, problem-solving bent can clearly enhance specific regional stability and security issues.

In the end, we believe that building more mature security relationships among our Asian allies and friends will better sustain our mutual objectives over time. The growing influence and strength of our friends and allies will make it possible for them to assume greater responsibilities for our mutual security interests, and we will work with them towards that end.

We do believe that the U.S. presence in Asia has been a check against potential adventurism and aggression and has created a climate of stability permitting the evolution of democratic and economic progress. Throughout this vast Asian Pacific region, economies have prospered and democratic institutions have taken root along with an ever-increasing commitment to human rights. Americans will remain engaged in East Asia and the Pacific. By doing so, we promote our own hopes for democracy, human rights, and economic opportunity.

These are particularly exciting times. The challenges and the difficulties are great, but the opportunity to create a more peaceful, stable and prosperous world is even greater. We are driven in our work by the sense that, if we do our jobs well, we can help lay the foundation for a Twenty-first Century for which democracy, peace and prosperity will be as characteristic as totalitarianism, war and destruction were for so much of the Twentieth Century.

I'd like to close with a quote from the novelist Graham Greene, who said, "There always comes a moment in time when a door opens and lets the future in." For more than four decades, our strategy and programs have been based on dealing with the Cold War. The end of the Cold War has opened a door, and the future is waiting to come in. All of us have a stake in that future. And by our actions, by the plans and programs we develop, we can shape that future, instead of merely being shaped by it.

Thank you.

Begin Q & A portion:

Q: U.S. troop presence in Korea is significant for preventing power from North