

FOIA MARKER

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Folder Title:

North Korea/South Korea [1]

Staff Office-Individual:

Legislative Affairs-Davis, William

Original OA/ID Number:

959

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. paper	re Korean Peninsula Discussion (6 pages)	07/00/1997	P1/b(1)
002a. fax	cover sheet, NSC to USUN re Notice of Meeting (1 page)	07/31/1997	P1/b(1)
002b. paper	re Korean Peninsula Discussion [duplicate of 001] (6 pages)	07/00/1997	P1/b(1)
003a. paper	re attachment to memoranda of justification (1 page)	03/00/1997	P1/b(1)
003b. note	Todd Stern to POTUS re attached memo (1 page)	03/18/1997	P1/b(1)
003c. memo	Samuel Berger and John Hilley to POTUS re US Contribution to KEDO (3 pages)	03/12/1997	P1/b(1)
003d. memo	Gary Samore to Jim Steinberg re KEDO (2 pages)	03/10/1996	P1/b(1)
003e. memo	action, Gary Samore to Samuel Berger re Releasing US Funding to KEDO (1 page)	03/04/1997	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
William Davis (Legislative Affairs)
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FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea/South Korea [1]

2009-0528-F

kc1453

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Beuter
Callahan

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

PHOTOCOPY
PRESERVATION

Davis, William K.

From: Ragan, Richard F.
Sent: Friday, October 03, 1997 11:16 AM
To: @NSA - Natl Security Advisor
Cc: @DEMOCRACY - Dem/Human Affairs; @ASIA - Asian Affairs; @LEGISLAT - Legislative Affairs
Subject: Tony Hall Phone Call Talking Points [UNCLASSIFIED]

ROB PLEASE PASS TO SRB

Background For Congressman Tony Hall Phone Call

Congressman Tony Hall (D-OH) is planning his third trip to North Korea to assess the food situation there. He will be accompanied by National Prayer Breakfast Organizer Doug Coe; Medal of Honor recipient and Korean War veteran General Raymond Davis; a Washington Post correspondent; and an agronomist from Mecry Corps International (an NGO). In a letter to DPRK/UN Ambassador Li Gun, Hall explained that the purpose of his trip is to build humanitarian support among U.S. faith-based groups and to show General Davis the food shortages first-hand. Davis would also discuss with DPRK officials the possibility of future visits by other U.S. veterans. Hall requested a meeting with Kim Jong-Il, but we would be very surprised if the Dear Leader agreed to such a meeting.

Hall's first stop is at Yokota AFB, Toyko, on Oct. 13, where he plans to spend the night and receive a briefing from the military. On Oct. 14, they will arrive in Pyongyang, four days after Kim Jong-Il's accession. On Oct. 15, the group will take a World Food Program (WFP) helicopter to Hanhung and then drive toward the Chosin Reservoir for unannounced village stops. The group then plans to chopper to Chongjin on Oct. 16 for visits to hospitals, nurseries and private homes. On Oct. 17, Hall plans to leave Pyongyang and we believe, return to the U.S. through South Korea.

Congressman Hall will likely seek three things from you:

1. DoD Logistical Support -- OSD is aware of his request and is working to support it on a reimbursable (by Congress) basis. They plan to fly Hall's delegation via commercial air to Japan, MilAir in and out of the DPRK, and commercial on the return to the U.S. Because private citizens are part of Hall's delegation, Secretary Cohen has to write a letter requesting the use of a military plane for the trip (usually the Speaker provides the letter). We have no objection to DoD's proposed course of action on this.

2. To Offer Himself as an Administration Interlocutor -- We have explained to Hall's staff that, in light of our effort to separate food aid from the other issues with which we are dealing, such a role for Hall would not be appropriate -- we don't want them to play the food issue against other issues. We would, however, like him to deliver a tough message on food assistance. To date, the DPRK has severely limited the number of monitors, threatened not to extend their visas, and restricted access to areas in the North (where some believe the famine may be the worst). In fact we are currently considering withholding delivery of the last 25,000 ton shipment, which is scheduled to arrive Oct. 15, if our monitor visas aren't extended. Congressman Hall's message should be that we expect better cooperation all around: on the number of monitors, on the their mobility, and on their access to remote areas. He should explain that if they aren't able to ensure that our food assistance is getting to the most needy and not being diverted to the military, making the case for any additional assistance becomes increasingly difficult. Hall should be clear that if the WFP and U.S. monitors don't receive better cooperation, we might have to reconsider our policy of supporting future appeals.

3. A contribution to UNICEF -- AID has been considering a \$5 million contribution to a UNICEF appeal, which Hall expressed an interest in being able to announce on his trip. The South Koreans are also interested in the UNICEF appeal and have asked to announce first so we are waiting before making a final decision on our contribution.

Talking Points

- Hear you are planning to go back to North Korea this month.
- I understand you are working with my staff and DoD to arrange military transportation for your trip. I'm told that everything is in on track but I'll be happy to do what I can if you run into any snags.
- Always appreciate your insight into the food crisis. As you know, the U.S. has been very generous in our support for international appeals to North Korea. However, we believe the real solution to the North Korea food crisis lies in addressing its structural problems, which will be much easier to begin addressing in the context of the Four-Party Talks.
- On food issues in particular, believe you know the North Koreans have been uncooperative. They've threatened us on several fronts; not to extend the visas for our U.S. NGOs currently in country monitoring our last food

donation....limited the number of WFP and U.S. monitors....restricted their access to remote areas....and unwilling thus far to accept native Korean speakers.

- The message you should deliver should be tough one. Explain this type action is unacceptable and if better cooperation is not provided the U.S. may not be in a position to support future appeals.
- If the U.S. monitors who are currently in-country don't have their visas extended, we intend to divert our last shipment of 25,000 tons.
- Would be interested in you observations when you return.

IF ASKED

- Know you were interested in being able to announce \$5 million UNICEF contribution but think a tough message is better this trip. We will likely support the UNICEF appeal but still have not come to a final decision.

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9704406
RECEIVED: 24 JUN 97 17

TO: HAMILTON, LEE H
ET AL

FROM: PRESIDENT

DOC DATE: 31 JUL 97
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOREA NORTH
CO

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE
FOOD

B

PERSONS:

WMD

SUBJECT: LTRS TO REP HAMILTON ET AL RE NORTH KOREA FOOD ASSISTANCE

ACTION: FOR DISPATCH

DUE DATE: 05 JUL 97 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PRITCHARD

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

WH STRIPPING DESK


FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

DANVERS
KRISTOFF
NSC CHRON
PRITCHARD
RAGAN

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY



DATE

7/31

BY HAND

W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSTSM

CLOSED BY: NSTSM

DOC 5 OF 5

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9704406

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 PRITCHARD	Z 97062417 PREPARE MEMO FOR BERGER
002 BERGER	Z 97071612 FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR SIGNATURE
002 PRITCHARD	Z 97071612 FOR FURTHER ACTION
002 BERGER	Z 97071622 FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR SIGNATURE
002 PRITCHARD	Z 97071811 FOR FURTHER ACTION
003 BERGER	Z 97071818 FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR SIGNATURE
004 PRESIDENT	Z 97073021 FOR SIGNATURE
005	X 97073121 PRESIDENT SGD LTR
005 WH STRIPPING DESK	X 97073121 FOR DISPATCH

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

004 970730	VICE PRESIDENT
004 970730	WH CHIEF OF STAFF
005 970731 WH STRIPPING DESK	CIA
005 970731 HAMILTON, LEE H	STATE
005 970731 BEREUTER, DOUGLAS K	DEFENSE
005 970731 GILMAN, BENJAMIN A	

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9704406
RECEIVED: 24 JUN 97 17

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: GILMAN, BENJAMIN A
HAMILTON, LEE H
BEREUTER, DOUGLAS K

DOC DATE: 20 JUN 97
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOREA NORTH
CO

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NORTH KOREA FOOD ASSISTANCE

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR BERGER

DUE DATE: 05 JUL 97 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: PRITCHARD

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION
PRITCHARD

FOR CONCURRENCE
DANVERS
KRISTOFF
RAGAN
SIMON

FOR INFO
BEERS
BOUCHARD
CARAVELLI
CLARKE
JONES, K
SAMORE
SCHWARTZ

COMMENTS: IF FINAL REPLY CANNOT BE PREPARED BY DUE DATE, AN INTERIM RESPONSE
MUST BE PREPARED FOR BILL DANVERS' SIGNATURE.

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND MATCH

OPENED BY: NSTSM

CLOSED BY:

DOC 1 OF 1

UNCLASSIFIED

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 4406

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG QPS A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Cosgriff	<u>1</u>		<u>A</u>
Rice			
Davies			
Kerrick			
Steinberg			
Berger			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>1</u>	<u>QPS 7/31</u>	<u>D</u>
Records Mgt.	<u>2</u>	<u>QPS 7/31</u>	<u>D</u>

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

Date July 31, 1997?

17 JUL 31 PM 4:30

Exec Sec Office has diskette _____

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 4406

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Cosgriff			
Rice			
Davies			
Kerrick			
Steinberg			
Berger			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>1</u>	<u>QPS 7/30</u>	<u>D</u> <u>Stev</u>
Records Mgt.			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette _____

National Security Council
The White House

8000
7/21
1159
1244

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 4406
URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS
BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O 7/26
10am

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Cosgriff	<u>1</u>	<u>KPC 7/18</u>	<u>Done</u>
Rice			
Davies	<u>2</u>	<u>G 7/21</u>	
Kerrick			
Steinberg	<u>3</u>	<u>J</u>	<u>Redo 7/26/97</u>
Berger			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk			<u>Walker 7/26</u>
Records Mgt.			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS: Further edits done 7/26/97
0 Tabs I + A.

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

National Security Council
The White House

8000 7/17
8AM
RED

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 4406
URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS
BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG PR A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Cosgriff			
Rice	<u>1</u>	<u>D 7/16 Edit</u>	
Davies			
Kerrick			
Steinberg	<u>2</u>		<u>Return to Pritchard</u>
Berger	<u>3</u>		
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>		
Records Mgt.			
	<u>Pritchard</u>	<u>5</u>	

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 4406
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG TMA A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Cosgriff	_____	_____	_____
Rice	_____	_____	_____
Davies	_____	_____	_____
Kerrick	_____	_____	_____
Steinberg	_____	_____	_____
Berger	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>1</u>	<u>TMA 7-16</u>	<u>D</u>
Records Mgt.	_____	_____	_____
<u>Pritchard</u>	<u>2</u>	_____	<u>FFA.</u>

A = Action I = Information D = Dispat. R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS: ① Needs Davies concurrence
 ② Need to John Hilley to the
 '97 JUL 15 PM 8:29 Memo ~~from~~ ^{to} the POTUS

Exec Sec Office has diskette _____

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 31, 1997

Dear Lee:

Thank you for your letter regarding the deteriorating food situation in North Korea. By all estimates, the reports you refer to are accurate in their expectations that North Korea will not have enough food to feed its people properly, even after the fall harvest. Given the severity of this situation, effective implementation of any aid deliveries is essential.

As you point out, well-run monitoring programs will ensure that those most in need receive aid quickly. To date, we have relied mainly on the World Food Program to monitor the distribution of food. Although WFP has done a good job, we agree with you that the extent of the current food crisis in North Korea suggests that the number of monitors should be increased. We have earmarked more than one-half of our latest contribution for distribution under the supervision of American Private Voluntary Organizations.

I am confident that the American monitors we have selected will work to distribute food quickly and efficiently. I appreciate your research and will keep in mind your suggestion that CARE and Catholic Relief Services are also available and capable of providing additional monitors.

Unfortunately, no matter how well delivered, the short-term emergency aid we provide will not solve the North's chronic food shortages. I hope the four-party peace talks can provide long-term structural reform that will eliminate these kinds of humanitarian crises. I look forward to your support in this effort.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Bill", written in a cursive, slightly slanted style.

The Honorable Lee H. Hamilton
Ranking Member
Committee on International Relations
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 31, 1997

Dear Representative Bereuter:

Thank you for your letter regarding the deteriorating food situation in North Korea. By all estimates, the reports you refer to are accurate in their expectations that North Korea will not have enough food to feed its people properly, even after the fall harvest. Given the severity of this situation, effective implementation of any aid deliveries is essential.

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Unfortunately, no matter how well delivered, the short-term emergency aid we provide will not solve the North's chronic food shortages. I hope the four-party peace talks can provide long-term structural reform that will eliminate these kinds of humanitarian crises. I look forward to your support in this effort.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Bill Clinton". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

The Honorable Douglas Bereuter
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 31, 1997

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for your letter regarding the deteriorating food situation in North Korea. By all estimates, the reports you refer to are accurate in their expectations that North Korea will not have enough food to feed its people properly, even after the fall harvest. Given the severity of this situation, effective implementation of any aid deliveries is essential.

As you point out, well-run monitoring programs will ensure that those most in need receive aid quickly. To date, we have relied mainly on the World Food Program to monitor the distribution of food. Although WFP has done a good job, we agree with you that the extent of the current food crisis in North Korea suggests that the number of monitors should be increased. We have earmarked more than one-half of our latest contribution for distribution under the supervision of American Private Voluntary Organizations.

I am confident that the American monitors we have selected will work to distribute food quickly and efficiently. I appreciate your research and will keep in mind your suggestion that CARE and Catholic Relief Services are also available and capable of providing additional monitors.

Unfortunately, no matter how well delivered, the short-term emergency aid we provide will not solve the North's chronic food shortages. I hope the four-party peace talks can provide long-term structural reform that will eliminate these kinds of humanitarian crises. I look forward to your support in this effort.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Bill Clinton". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a long horizontal stroke extending to the right.

The Honorable Benjamin A. Gilman
Chairman
Committee on International Relations
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ID 9704406

REFERRAL

DATE: 31 JUL 97

MEMORANDUM FOR: WH STRIPPING DESK

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:

TO: HAMILTON, LEE H

SOURCE: PRESIDENT

DATE: 31 JUL 97

SUBJ: LTRS TO REP HAMILTON ET AL RE NORTH KOREA FOOD ASSISTANCE

REQUIRED ACTION: FOR DISPATCH

DUE DATE: 01 AUG 97

COMMENT:


FOR JOHN W. FICKLIN

NSC RECORDS MANAGEMENT OFFICE

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9704406
DATE 31 JUL 97

SUBJECT: LTRS TO REP HAMILTON ET AL RE NORTH KOREA FOOD ASSISTANCE
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

DATE

TIME

SIGNATURE

WH STRIPPING DESK

PRINT LAST NAME: _____

COPY: ORIGINALS

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOB

PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 30, 1997

ACTION

signed 7-31-97

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

SAMUEL BERGER
JOHN HILLEY

SUBJECT:

Response to Gilman, Hamilton and Bereuter on
North Korean Food AssistancePurpose

Representatives Gilman, Hamilton and Bereuter wrote you urging that the Administration not support any new expanded food assistance programs in North Korea unless an effective monitoring program is put in place. The Congressmen suggest food aid programs coupled with monitoring services similar to what CARE and Catholic Relief Services are capable of providing. The proposed letter responding to Gilman et al. indicates our concurrence with their concerns regarding monitoring and explains that, as a result, we have earmarked more than half of our latest contribution for distribution under the supervision of American Private Voluntary Organizations.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letters at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Proposed Letter to Gilman, Hamilton and Bereuter.
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

4406

July 18, 1997

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: SANDRA J. KRISTOFF *P.K.*

FROM: JACK PRITCHARD *P*

SUBJECT: Response to Gilman et. al. on North Korea Food Assistance

Representatives Gilman, Hamilton and Bereuter wrote the President urging the Administration not to support any new expanded food assistance program in North Korea unless an effective monitoring program is put in place, similar to what CARE and Catholic Relief Services are capable of providing. The proposed letter responding to Gilman et. al. indicates we also believe the number of monitors should be increased and have earmarked more than half of our latest contribution for distribution under the supervision of American Private Voluntary Organizations.

Concurrences by: *P.K.* Richard Ragan, *P.K.* Bill Danvers

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Letter to Gilman et. al.
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, NEW YORK
CHAIRMAN

WILLIAM F. GOODLING, PENNSYLVANIA
JAMES A. LEACH, IOWA
HENRY J. HYDE, ILLINOIS
DOUG BEREUTER, NEBRASKA
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, NEW JERSEY
DAN BURTON, INDIANA
ELTON GALLEGLY, CALIFORNIA
ILEANA ROSS-LEHTINEN, FLORIDA
CASS BALLINGER, NORTH CAROLINA
DANA ROHRBACH, CALIFORNIA
DONALD A. MANZULLO, ILLINOIS
EDWARD R. ROYCE, CALIFORNIA
PETER T. KING, NEW YORK
JAY KIM, CALIFORNIA
STEVEN J. CHABOT, OHIO
MARSHALL "MARK" SANFORD, SOUTH CAROLINA
MATT SALMON, ARIZONA
AMRO HOUGHTON, NEW YORK
TOM CAMPBELL, CALIFORNIA
JOHN FOX, PENNSYLVANIA
JOHN M. McHUGH, NEW YORK
LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, SOUTH CAROLINA
ROY BLUNT, MISSOURI
JERRY MORAN, KANSAS
KEVIN BRADY, TEXAS

RICHARD J. GARON
CHIEF OF STAFF

ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WASHINGTON, DC 20515

TELEPHONE: (202) 225-5021

FACSIMILE: (202) 225-2035

4900
LEE H. HAMILTON, INDIANA
RANKING DEMOCRATIC MEMBER

SAM GEJDESEN, CONNECTICUT
TOM LANTOS, CALIFORNIA
HOWARD L. BERMAN, CALIFORNIA
GARY L. ACKERMAN, NEW YORK
ENI F. H. FALEOMAEVEGA, AMERICAN SAMOA
MATTHEW G. MARTINEZ, CALIFORNIA
DONALD M. PAYNE, NEW JERSEY
ROBERT E. ANDREWS, NEW JERSEY
ROBERT MENENDEZ, NEW JERSEY
SHERROD BROWN, OHIO
CYNTHIA A. MCKINNEY, GEORGIA
ALCEE L. HASTINGS, FLORIDA
PAT DANNER, MISSOURI
EARL F. HILLARD, ALABAMA
WALTER H. CAPPS, CALIFORNIA
BRAD SHERMAN, CALIFORNIA
ROBERT WEXLER, FLORIDA
STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, NEW JERSEY
BOB CLEMENT, TENNESSEE
BILL LUTHER, MINNESOTA
JIM DAVIS, FLORIDA

MICHAEL H. VAN DUSEN
DEMOCRATIC CHIEF OF STAFF

June 20, 1997

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500

NSC

Re: North Korea Food Assistance

Dear Mr. President:

We are concerned about the response to the food crisis in North Korea, whose government is certified by the State Department as a state sponsor of terrorism. Because news reports indicate that the current harvest and donations of food assistance may not cover the unmet need for food that will develop in North Korea before its fall harvest, there may be further efforts this year to provide additional food assistance.

Last year, we did not oppose deliveries of food aid for North Korea for victims of floods, as long as certain conditions were met. In our letter to Secretary of State Christopher of February 6, 1996, we outlined four major conditions:

1. Our South Korean allies do not oppose the delivery of this assistance;
2. Previous food aid and official concessional food deliveries have not been diverted to military needs;
3. North Korean military stocks have been tapped to respond to North Korea's unmet food need; and
4. The United Nations World Food Program ("WFP") will be able to ensure that all upcoming food aid deliveries will not be diverted from intended recipients.

On February 13, 1996, the Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs, Wendy Sherman, replied with assurances that these conditions were met. Subsequently, the WFP initiated a food aid program in flood damaged areas of North Korea with three international monitors.

After our exchange of letters, the WFP, with U.S. support, expanded its food assistance program beyond targeted relief for flood victims to a nationwide program for all children under the age of six. We understand that WFP also expanded its corps of international monitors from three to almost twenty to ensure the integrity of this nationwide program.

Given the estimated unmet need for food, we expect that the WFP may issue an appeal for a national feeding program for many or all civilians in North Korea. In consultation with WFP, we understand that such an operation would require a much larger number of food aid monitors than are currently deployed.

Recently, we approached the two largest providers of food aid and monitoring services, CARE and Catholic Relief Services ("CRS"), about the requirements for effectively monitoring a national feeding program in North Korea. Specifically, we requested their estimate of the time, size, and cost of such a monitoring effort. They responded to our request with the attached proposal. In sum, CARE and CRS would be able to provide an adequate monitoring effort that would total 50 food aid monitors for North Korea within two weeks for six months at a cost of \$2.8 million.

We urge the Administration not to support any new expanded national feeding program in North Korea unless an effective monitoring program, perhaps along the lines of the program proposed by CARE and CRS, is put in place.

We look forward to hearing your thoughts on these matters.


Sincerely,



BENJAMIN A. GILMAN
Chairman
Committee on International Relations



LEE H. HAMILTON
Ranking Democratic Member
Committee on International Relations



DOUG BEREUTER
Chairman
Subcommittee on Asia & the Pacific

Attachment

CARE AND CRS
NORTH KOREA EMERGENCY PROGRAM

Submitted by:	CARE and CRS
Contacts:	Dan O'Brien CARE AE/RMU George Ropes CRS
Date:	22 May 1997

PROBLEM STATEMENT

North Korea is facing a food crisis; two United Nations agencies estimate the deficit of food at 2.4 million tons. This is larger than the food shortage which precipitated the 1985 famine in Ethiopia. The present crisis, mostly the result of structural problems related to the country's economic and political system, has been exacerbated by severe floods in 1995 and 1996.

It is likely that WFP will issue an increased appeal to respond to the deteriorating food crisis in North Korea. This appeal will cover an expanded area of the country, and include a substantial number of beneficiaries. In anticipation of this, the House International Relations Committee has requested that CARE and CRS develop a joint proposal which will address the concerns in Congress regarding potential diversion of emergency food assistance to the DPRK military. This proposal has been developed for this purpose.

OBJECTIVES

The final goal of this proposal is to provide short-term humanitarian assistance to vulnerable groups in North Korea, directly in response to the severe food shortage. Objectives will be to ensure that the US emergency food assistance reaches only the most vulnerable targeted groups in the areas of intervention, and that there will be timely distribution of food and adequate monitoring and reporting of the US emergency food assistance.

STRATEGY

CARE AND Catholic Relief Services [CRS], two of America's oldest, largest and most respected Private Voluntary Organizations, are among the most experienced in monitoring and managing emergency feeding programs. Both organizations have responded to every recent famine and emergency worldwide, including Ethiopia, Somalia, Iraq and Rwanda. To complement UN humanitarian relief activities in North Korea, CARE and CRS could pool their extensive experience and resources to address the humanitarian disaster developing in North Korea. Working collaboratively, we could ensure that humanitarian food assistance given by the U.S. to the DPRK reaches hungry civilians.

PROPOSED INTERVENTION

CARE and CRS propose to monitor the distribution of donated food assistance to targeted food-insecure populations in the country. We would suggest the following distribution of labor:

WFP should coordinate and/or implement the movement of food to North Korean ports or other designated delivery points in country; CARE and CRS would then monitor delivery of this food assistance to targeted beneficiaries in separate geographical areas of North Korea. We would anticipate that some food would be channeled through the Public Distribution System, some distributed to institutions such as hospitals and orphanages, and the rest distributed directly to targeted vulnerable groups in need. In the latter channel, CARE and CRS would implement and monitor these general distributions.

STAFFING

In order to monitor American humanitarian assistance effectively, CARE and CRS propose to each field teams of 20-25 experienced food monitors and managers. The first of these 40-50 trained staff could be in the DPRK within 2 weeks of authorization. Depending upon approval of our proposal, all could be in place by July 1. This large number of staff should suffice to both manage and monitor food distributions effectively; however, more food or unanticipated conditions could result in the need for additional monitors. Both CARE and CRS have depth in experienced staff who have experience in food emergency situations, and it is from this human resource pool that the monitors assigned to work in North Korea would be drawn.

BUDGET

A very rough budget which assumes assigning 50 monitors to the DPRK for a period of six months (from 1 July through 31 December, 1997) appears below. A more detailed and accurate budget will be prepared once the various details of any intervention have been determined. We see the job needing approximately:

Estimated Commodity Tonnage	300,000 MT
Monitors:	
Salaries/Benefits/Lodging	\$1,704,000
Travel to/from DPRK	200,000
Internal Travel: Vehicle Rental & Fuel	600,000
Office Management/Running Costs/Overhead	334,880
TOTAL:	\$2,838,880

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Successful implementation of this undertaking rests on several assumptions, including:

- signed agreements between the DPRK and both CARE and CRS
- expedited entry for all staff to the DPRK
- full access to all distribution locations and recipients
- sufficient fuel for full mobility (local or imported)
- unhindered use of radios and/or telephones for internal and external communications
- guaranteed security of aid workers

REHABILITATION PROGRAM

CARE and CRS realize that this emergency may not end in six months. Therefore, even though this proposal is for an initial emergency program of six months, CARE and CRS recognize that additional emergency programming may be necessary, as will long-term aid to restore the self-sufficiency of the North Korean people. We suggest that Relief and Development activities be programmed for an additional three years. During that time our agencies could provide seeds, set up agricultural extension programs, and undertake land reclamation projects. A full-scale proposal and budget would be developed in due course.

APPENDIX

ACTIVITIES AND EXPECTED RESULTS

Primary activities to be accomplished by CARE and CRS to implement the proposed objectives include:

- Identification of target areas, beneficiary populations and ration sizes for CARE/CRS distributions based on DPRK, UN and other assessments
- Recruitment and deployment of expatriate staff for distribution and monitoring activities, program administration and food logistics management
- Establishment of Headquarters and, as permitted, on-site distribution locations
- Establishment of procedures for on-site food distribution, beneficiary registration and general reporting
- Establishment of administrative systems, including personnel management, communications, telecommunications, vehicle management, financial management, and procurement.

For the activities identified above, CARE and CRS would follow established organization guidelines and standards on managing food resources and overall administration of start-up emergency programs. The anticipated results of the activities are:

- Assurance that the appropriate target populations and ration levels have been determined
- Capable and experienced staff in place to prepare for and monitor food distributions
- Existence of standard procedures and systems to support the monitoring activities

IMPLEMENTATION PLAN

Assuming a six-month intervention, the following general timeline would apply:

Month 1:

- initial assessment start-up team with key staff deployed to North Korea to establish presence
- formalization of operating agreements with the Government of the DPRK and WFP
- recruitment of monitors and initiation of deployment to North Korea
- initiation of procurement, rental arrangements, etc. for project materials and supplies
- planning in coordination with WFP and the DPRK regarding commodity arrivals and in-country movement, distribution sites, ration levels, and target beneficiaries

Month 2:

- deployment of monitors to achieve full staff levels in-country
- initiation of data collection, as well as formal monitoring and reporting procedures

Months 3-5:

- continued monitoring and reporting of commodity flows and distribution
- continued assessment and monitoring of general food security situation

Month 6:

- evaluation of project activities and achievements
- final project reports
- assessment of future programming needs

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, NEW YORK
CHAIRMAN

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VICTOR O. FRAZER, VIRGIN ISLANDS (IND.)
MICHAEL H. VAN DUSEN
DEMOCRATIC CHIEF OF STAFF

One Hundred Fourth Congress
Congress of the United States
Committee on International Relations
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

February 6, 1996

Hon. Warren Christopher
Secretary of State
Department of State
2201 C Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20520

Re: Food Aid for North Korea

Dear Mr. Secretary:

We are writing regarding the World Food Program's ("WFP's") appeal for food aid donations to help relieve the starvation caused by recent flooding in North Korea.

From the briefings recently provided by the State Department, we understand that the WFP issued a call for food aid to help relieve the large unmet need for food aid in North Korea. That appeal received only a limited response from the donor community. We understand that following recent flooding, the WFP reissued its appeal, but only for food aid donations to relieve starvation in specific areas affected by recent flooding. This smaller WFP appeal totals \$8 million, of which \$2 million would come from the United States as the lead donor.

The State Department informally notified us that the Administration plans to respond to this appeal by providing \$2 million in cash to the WFP, paid from Fiscal Year 1996 funds available to the Agency for International Development's International Disaster Assistance account.


We are skeptical of any assistance to North Korea. As you know, the North Korean government threatens our troops stationed in South Korea, supports international terrorism, and frustrates our efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and the missiles to carry them.

Nevertheless, we recognize the view of the Administration that the victims of the recent flooding should not pay with their lives for the misguided policies of the North Korean government if we can ensure that our assistance actually meets their critical needs. Therefore, we will not seek to block this assistance program as currently described, if the Administration notifies the Congress in writing of the following that:


1. Our South Korean allies do not oppose the delivery of this assistance;
2. Previous food aid and official concessional food deliveries have not been diverted to military needs;
3. North Korean military stocks have been tapped to respond to North Korea's unmet food aid needs; and
4. The WFP will be able to ensure that all upcoming food aid deliveries will not be diverted from intended recipients.

We would ask that you respond to this letter, in classified or unclassified form, before obligating funds to support the WFP's appeal. We look forward to working with you on this issue.


Sincerely,



BENJAMIN A. GILMAN
Chairman
International Relations Committee



LEE H. HAMILTON
Ranking Democratic Member
International Relations Committee



PAT ROBERTS
Chairman
Agriculture Committee



DOUG BEREUTER
Chairman
Subcommittee on Asia
and the Pacific



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

FEB 13 1996

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The Secretary has asked me to thank you for your letter dated February 5, on the decision to extend \$2 million in humanitarian assistance to the World Food Program (WFP) for flood relief in North Korea. You raised specific questions about the program and asked for an Administration response prior to obligation of funds.

The U.S. decided to extend this assistance in order to respond to a real humanitarian need, to keep the World Food Program engaged in North Korea, and to demonstrate to North Korea the benefits of its unprecedented decision to permit international organizations to operate there. This move is also consistent with USG policy of several Administrations that aims to promote North Korean behavior that would allow its greater integration with the international community. We appreciate your understanding of our desire to avoid having flood victims pay for the public policies of North Korea. We share your concern that any USG assistance reach those most needy.

I would like to respond to the specific questions you pose in your letter.

The South Korean Government has indicated its understanding of our modest assistance to the WFP. Our decision was taken only after close consultations with the ROK and after taking into account the concerns expressed by the ROK in those consultations. ROK Foreign Minister Gong Ro Myung made clear even before our decision that his government would not object to modest humanitarian donations to international organizations for use in North Korea. Following our announcement, Foreign Ministry spokesman Chang Chul-kyun said, "We have no reason to raise an objection to such humanitarian assistance on a small scale."

The earlier U.S. Government assistance of \$225,000 for flood related assistance was given through UNICEF for 1) medical supplies and 2) a supplemental feeding program for children under the age of 5. Let me assure you that UNICEF and other related U.N. agencies have staff in North Korea, coordinating and overseeing the distribution of contributions]*

The Honorable

Benjamin A. Gilman, Chairman,

Subcommittee on International Operations
and Human Rights,

Committee on International Relations,
House of Representatives.

4406

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 24, 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR GLYN DAVIES
NSC Executive Secretariat

FROM: SUSAN BROPHY 
Legislative Affairs

SUBJECT: Presidential Correspondence

Attached are copies of letters sent to the President by various Members of Congress. Since these letters address national security issues, we would appreciate your assistance in drafting a response.

Thank you very much for your assistance. If you have any questions, please feel free to call Chris Walker at x67500.

The following is a brief description of the letter:

- 1) Rep. Benjamin Gilman (R-NY) and others, concerning food aid to North Korea.

Enclosures

JUN 24 14:15

NEWS RELEASE

Delaware's

Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.

<http://www.senate.gov/~biden>

Washington, D.C. 20510
(202) 224-5042

Contact:
Chris Madison, (202) 224-0264

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE: August 1, 1997

STATEMENT BY JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR. ON NORTH KOREA'S FOOD CRISIS

A great human tragedy is silently unfolding in North Korea and there is an urgent need for the United States to respond. The North is experiencing a severe famine and has asked the world for help. Pyongyang has gratefully acknowledged our past assistance. It is in our interest to respond generously to their plight.

According to experts from the World Food Program (WFP) who recently returned from extensive travels in North Korea, tens of thousands of people are on the brink of starvation. Hundreds of thousands more are suffering from severe malnutrition, the result of several years of scarcity.

The public food distribution system on which 78% of the North's population depends has effectively ceased to function in most parts of the country. In those few rural areas where the public distribution system still is operating, rations have fallen to below 100 grams per day, the equivalent of a small handful of rice or corn for each person.

The evidence of famine is pervasive and undeniable. Children are among the hardest hit, their hair tinged red from malnutrition, their growth stunted, their eyes sunken and listless.

The United States has a long tradition of responding generously to peoples in need. By sharing our bounty we have saved millions in Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Angola. To date, however, our response to North Korea's famine has been cautious and inadequate.

Over the past 12 months, the United States has provided a total of about \$60 million in food aid, including the recent announcement of \$27.4 million for 100,000 metric tons of grain.

The world, following our restrained lead, has been slow to meet the genuine emergency needs of the North Korean people. According to the World Food Program, the North began 1997 roughly 2 million tons of grain short of what it would need to avoid famine. But as of July 1, the North had received a total of only about 423,000 tons of food aid. It had managed to purchase or barter another 330,000 tons, leaving a shortfall of more than 1 million tons for the remainder of the calendar year.

The United States has never linked politics with emergency food assistance, and we should not do so now. We can do more. And we should do more to avert mass starvation and the incumbent risk of political and military instability on the Korean Peninsula.

North Korean authorities attribute the shortages to a string of bad weather, including serious flooding in 1995 and 1996. Truth be told, however, the famine is largely the result of wrong-headed, discredited communist economic policies and the devotion of vast resources to the North Korean Armed Forces.

But this does not make the North Korean people less deserving of emergency relief. It is not ethically permissible to use starvation as a weapon to force the North Korean dictatorship to undertake essential economic reforms.

Some observers worry that the North might divert our food aid from those who are truly hungry to the military or party elite. But international relief agencies are able to send their monitors throughout the famine-stricken areas where supplies are being delivered. The World Food Program has even chartered a helicopter to facilitate oversight.

United States private voluntary organizations will soon begin directly supervising the distribution of American assistance, opening another window into life inside this secretive country. We can have a high degree of confidence that the vast majority of any assistance we provide will reach the intended targets.

Opponents of emergency famine relief for North Korea wonder aloud whether the famine might not be the perfect mechanism to bring down one of the most repressive regimes on the planet. But this view is not only immoral, it displays a total disregard for the potentially explosive results of such a policy of "strangulation."

Famines are profoundly destabilizing events. No one can predict with confidence how North Korea might respond. But it is obvious to me that we do not want the North--which may possess one or two nuclear weapons--to experience panic, massive population migrations, and instability.

In testimony earlier this month before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Andrew Natsios, director of foreign disaster assistance during the Bush Administration and now vice-president of World Vision, a nongovernmental relief organization operating in North Korea, warned that the North's famine could soon reach the irreversible stage.

He added that by the time the world sees CNN broadcasts of emaciated North Korean children too weak to lift themselves off their cots, it will be too late to save them.

On August 5, representatives of North Korea, South Korea, China, and the United States are scheduled to convene talks aimed at replacing the tattered 1953 Armistice with a peace treaty. These negotiations are likely to be difficult and protracted.

But while the diplomats talk famished innocent North Koreans move closer to death. It is time for the United States to lead a comprehensive, humane response to the North's famine. Not because the North has agreed to peace talks, frozen its nuclear program and accepted International Atomic Energy Agency monitoring of its Yongbyon nuclear facility. Not because the North is cooperating for the first time in 50 years in the search for the remains of America's 8,000 missing servicemen from the Korean War.

We should respond because it is the right thing to do and the smart thing to do. It is an expression of all that is best about America and it will resonate in the hearts of the North Korean people.

###

TO: AGENCIES

CHRON FILE

FROM: DAVIES

DOC DATE: 30 JUL 97
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOREA SOUTH
DC

KOREA NORTH
AGENDA

DAVIES

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION / AGENDA & DISCUSSION PAPER FOR 31 JUL DC MTG ON KOREA

ACTION: DAVIES SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DUE DATE: 01 AUG 97

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PRITCHARD

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FILES: IFM

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FOR ACTION

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White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By WA NARA, Date 03/25/15
2009-0528-F

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DOC 2 OF 2

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002 970730 STARR, B

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National Security Council
The White House

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Steinberg	3	<u>7/30</u>	_____
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cc:

COMMENTS: *nom + agenda for
DC on Korea*

97 JUL 30 AM 10:32

7/31

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

July 30, 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MR. DANIEL K. TARULLO
Assistant to the President
for International Economic
Policy

MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. RICK E. YANNUZZI
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

MR. J. BENJAMIN NYE
Executive Secretary
Department of the Treasury

COL. M. MANNING, USMC
Secretary, Joint Staff

COL. JAMES N. MATTIS
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MS. BARBARA STARR
Executive Secretary
Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency

MS. MONA SUTPHEN
Executive Assistant to the
Representative of the U.S.
to the United Nations

SUBJECT: Korea Deputies Committee Meeting, July 31, 1997

There will be a Deputies Committee Meeting on Thursday, July 31, 1997 from 2:30-3:30 p.m. in the Situation Room. An agenda is attached at Tab A and background paper to help frame the discussion is attached at Tab B.



Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachments

Tab A Agenda
Tab B Discussion Paper

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By  NARA, Date 03/25/15
2009-0528-F

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: After Korean Unification

DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING
ON KOREA

DATE: JULY 31, 1997
LOCATION: WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
TIME: 2:30 - 3:30 P.M.

AGENDA

- I. Update of Political/Economic Situation CIA
- II. Status of Four Party Preparatory Talks State
- III. Discussion/Decisions Needed
 - Terms of Reference State
 - Special Negotiator State
 - Role of China. State
 - U.S.-ROK Forces As Agenda Items. JCS
 - Sequence for Lifting Sanctions State
 - Venue for Plenary Talks. State
- IV. Items for Review
 - Threat Briefing for Principals JCS
 - General Officer Talks. JCS
- V. Conclusions and Next Steps NSC

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White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By W NARA, Date 03/25/15
2009-0528-F

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Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
William Davis (Legislative Affairs)
OA/Box Number: 959

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea/South Korea [1]

2009-0528-F
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P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
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b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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DATE 30 JUL 97

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MR. J. BENJAMIN NYE ROOM 3408, MAIN TREASURY BLDG 1500 PENNSYLVANIA AVE, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20220 DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>VIA FAX</u>
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MS. MONA SUTPHEN USUN/W ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET, NW WASHINGTON D.C. 20520-6319 U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>VIA FAX</u>
MR. DANIEL TARULLO ROOM 231 OLD EXECUTIVE OFC BLDG NATL ECONOMIC COUNCIL	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>1</u>

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PAGE 01 OF 02 PAGES

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COL. M. MANNING ROOM 2E865 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20318-0001 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF	_____	_____	_____
		PRINT LAST NAME:	_____
		COPY: <u>VIA FAX</u>	
MS. BARBARA STARR ROOM 5933, DEPT OF STATE 2201 C STREET, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20451 ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT AGENCY	_____	_____	_____
		PRINT LAST NAME:	_____
		COPY: <u>VIA FAX</u>	

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOB

PAGE 02 OF 02 PAGES

TIME OF TRANSMISSION:

TIME OF RECEIPT:

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: ✓

IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO: _____

CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~PAGES: 9

(Including Cover)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK ²⁸⁸

(202) 456-9425

WH SITUATION ROOM

(NAME)

(PHONE NUMBER)

(ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION:

Notification / Agenda & Discussion Paper
for 31 Jul DC Mtg on Korea NSC LOG # 20560

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
<u>State</u>	<u>Executive Secretary</u>	_____	_____
<u>Treasury</u>	<u>Executive Secretary</u>	_____	_____
<u>DOD</u>	<u>Executive Secretary</u>	_____	_____
<u>USUN</u>	<u>Exec. Asst. to the U.S. Rep. (Wash g.c.)</u>	_____	_____
<u>CIA</u>	<u>Executive Secretary</u>	_____	_____
<u>JCS</u>	<u>Secretary, Joint Staff</u>	_____	_____
<u>ACDA</u>	<u>Executive Secretary</u>	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

REMARKS:

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: W Date: 03/25/15

2009-0528-F

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002a. fax	cover sheet, NSC to USUN re Notice of Meeting (1 page)	07/31/1997	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
William Davis (Legislative Affairs)
OA/Box Number: 959

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea/South Korea [1]

2009-0528-F
kc1453

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

20560

July 30, 1997

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES B. STEINBERG

FROM:

JACK PRITCHARD *JP*

SUBJECT:

Deputies Committee Meeting on Korea, July 31,
1997

Attached at Tab A is the agenda and at Tab B the discussion paper for the Deputies Committee meeting on Korea to be held on July 31, 1997. The memorandum to the agencies is attached at Tab I.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize the NSC Executive Secretary to sign the memorandum to the agencies at Tab I.

Approve *JP*

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the Agencies

Tab A Agenda

Tab B Discussion Paper

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

By *@* NARA, Date *03/25/15*

2009-0528-F

CONFIDENTIAL

Reason: 1.5 (d)

Declassify On: After Korean Unification

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

20560

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MR. DANIEL K. TARULLO
Assistant to the President
for International Economic
Policy

MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. RICK E. YANNUZZI
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

MR. J. BENJAMIN NYE
Executive Secretary
Department of the Treasury

M. Manning
COL. F. C. WILSON, USMC
Secretary, Joint Staff

COL. JAMES N. MATTIS
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MS. BARBARA STARR
Executive Secretary
Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency

MS. MONA SUTPHEN
Executive Assistant to the
Representative of the U.S.
to the United Nations

SUBJECT: Korea Deputies Committee *Manning* 1997

There will be a Deputies Committee Meeting
1997 from 2:30-3:30 p.m. in the Situation Room
attached at Tab A and background paper
discussion is attached at Tab B.

July 31,
a is

Glyn T. Davies
Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachments
Tab A Agenda
Tab B Discussion Paper

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: After Korean Unification

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By *(U)* NARA, Date *03/25/15*
2009-0528-F

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

20560

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. JAMES N. MATTIS
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MS. MONA SUTPHEN
Executive Assistant to the
Representative of the U.S.
to the United Nations

MR. RICK E. YANNUZZI
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. F. C. WILSON, USMC
Secretary, Joint Staff

MS. BARBARA STARR
Executive Secretary
Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency

SUBJECT: Korea Deputies Committee Meeting, July 31, 1997

There will be a Deputies Committee Meeting on Thursday, July 31, 1997 from 2:30-3:30 p.m. in the Situation Room. An agenda is attached at Tab A and background paper to help frame the discussion is attached at Tab B.

Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachments

Tab A Agenda
Tab B Discussion Paper

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By AM NARA, Date 03/25/19
2009-0528-F

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: After Korean Unification

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

20560

DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING

C.D. KOREA

Date: JULY 31, 1997

2:30 - 3:30 P.M.

Location: WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

AGENDA

I. Update of Political/Economic Situation

~~CIA~~ Lead

II. Status of Four Party Preparatory Talks

State Lead

III. Discussion/Decisions Needed

Terms of Reference - ~~State~~ Lead

Special Negotiator - ~~State~~ Lead

Role of China - ~~State~~ Lead

U.S.-ROK Forces As Agenda Items - ~~JCS~~ Lead

Sequence for Lifting Sanctions - ~~State~~ lead

Venue for Plenary Talks - ~~State~~ Lead

IV. Items for Review

Threat Briefing for Principals - ~~JCS~~ Lead

General Officer Talks - ~~JCS~~ Lead

V. Conclusions and Next Steps

NSC Summary

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

By W NARA, Date 03/25/15

2009-0528-F

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002b. paper	re Korean Peninsula Discussion [duplicate of 001] (6 pages)	07/00/1997	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
William Davis (Legislative Affairs)
OA/Box Number: 959

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea/South Korea [1]

2009-0528-F
kc1453

RESTRICTION CODES

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- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9702549
RECEIVED: 14 APR 97 16

TO: ALBRIGHT, M

FROM: PRESIDENT

DOC DATE: 24 APR 97
SOURCE REF: 97-21

KEYWORDS: NON PROLIFERATION
LEGAL ISSUES
PD

TERRORISM
BUDGET

WAD

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: PD 97-21 RE USE OF NONPROLIFERATION ANTITERRORISM DEMINING & RELATED
PROGRAMS ACCOUNT FUNDS FOR US CONTRIBUTION TO KEDO

ACTION: PRESIDENT SGD PD 97-21

DUE DATE: 19 APR 97 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: SAMORE

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BAKER
DANVERS
KRISTOFF
NSC CHRON
SAMORE

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY *RE* _____ DATE *4/24* BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSGP

CLOSED BY: NSTSM

DOC 4 OF 4

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9702549

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 SAMORE
002 BERGER
003 PRESIDENT
004

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 97041416 PREPARE MEMO FOR BERGER
Z 97041710 FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR SIG
Z 97042407 FOR SIGNATURE
X 97042416 PRESIDENT SGD PD 97-21

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

003 970423
003 970423
004 970424 ALBRIGHT, M
004 970424
004 970424
004 970424

DISPATCH FOR INFO

VICE PRESIDENT
WH CHIEF OF STAFF
BURNS, W
CONROY, R
DUSAULT, P
SAUNDERS, T

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9702549
RECEIVED: 14 APR 97 16

TO: DAVIES

FROM: BURNS, W

DOC DATE: 11 APR 97
SOURCE REF: 9706743

KEYWORDS: NON PROLIFERATION
LEGAL ISSUES
PD

TERRORISM
BUDGET

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: PRES ACTION REQUIRED TO MAKE US CONTRIBUTION TO KOREAN PENINSULA
ENERGY DEVELOPMENT ORGAN

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR BERGER

DUE DATE: 19 APR 97 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: SAMORE

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION
SAMORE

FOR CONCURRENCE
CARAVELLI
CLARKE
KRECZKO
LINDSAY
SIMON
WALSH

FOR INFO
BEERS
JONES, K
LEE
PIFER
SCHWARTZ

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSGP

CLOSED BY:

DOC 1 OF 1

UNCLASSIFIED

National Security Council
The White House

Rec'd
4/17/97
6:17pm

PROOFED BY: _____

LOG # 2549

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG (12) A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
<i>clm</i> Harmon	<u>1</u>	<u>JA</u>	_____
Dohse	_____	_____	_____
Davies	_____	_____	_____
Kerrick	<u>Copied</u>	_____	_____
Steinberg	<u>2</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	_____
Berger	_____	<u>[Signature]</u>	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>3</u>	<u>re 4/21</u>	<u>D</u> <u>WAKEN</u>
Records Mgt.	<u>4</u>	<u>Tmb 4-23</u>	<u>D</u> <u>Stern</u>
	<u>5</u>	<u>Tmb 4-24</u>	<u>D</u>
	<u>6</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	<u>D</u>

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette Yes

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 24, 1997

Presidential Determination
No. 97-21

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: Use of Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining
and Related Programs Account Funds for the U.S.
Contribution to the Korean Peninsula Energy
Development Organization (KEDO)

Pursuant to the authority vested in me by section 614(a)(1) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, 22 U.S.C. 2364(a)(1), I hereby determine that it is important to the security interests of the United States to furnish up to \$25 million in funds made available under heading "Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs" in title II of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1997 (as enacted in Public Law 104-208) for the United States contribution to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization without regard to any provision of law within the scope of section 614(a)(1). I hereby authorize this contribution.

You are hereby authorized and directed to transmit this determination to the Congress and to arrange for its publication in the Federal Register.

William J. Clinton

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9702549
DATE 24 APR 97

SUBJECT: PD 97-21 RE USE OF NONPROLIFERATION ANTITERRORISM DEMINING & RELATED
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MS. MADELEINE ALBRIGHT 7TH FLOOR 2201 C STREET, NW WASHINGTON, DC DEPARTMENT OF STATE	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>ORIG + 1</u>
MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520 DEPARTMENT OF STATE	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>2</u>
MS. RYAN CONROY ROOM 5945, NEW STATE 2201 C STREET, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20523 AGENCY FOR INTL DEVELOPMENT	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>2</u>
MR. PHILIP DUSAULT INTL SECURITY AFFAIRS ROOM 10002 NEOB OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>2</u>
MR. TIM SAUNDERS ROOM 5 OEOB WH EXECUTIVE CLERK	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>2</u>

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT. ROOM 379 OEOB

PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

April 23, 1997

President sgd per WH
Executive Clerk
T.M.A. 4-24-97

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THROUGH: THE EXECUTIVE CLERK

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
JOHN HILLEY

SUBJECT: Presidential Determination on U.S. Assistance to
the Korean Peninsula Energy Development
Organization (KEDO)

Purpose

To invoke Presidential waiver authority under Section 614 of the Foreign Assistance Act in order to provide the FY97 U.S. contribution to KEDO.

Background

On March 18, 1997, you made three certifications required by the 1997 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act to provide U.S. funds to KEDO, and you authorized the Department of State to notify Congress and conduct consultations with the appropriate committees regarding the use of Presidential waiver authority under Section 614 of the Foreign Assistance Act to provide the 1997 U.S. contribution to KEDO of \$25 million.

On April 11, 1997, the Department of State notified the NSC that these Congressional consultations have been completed and that the consultations have identified no opposition to use of the Section 614 waiver for this purpose (Tab B). By signing the attached Presidential Determination at Tab A, you will invoke Section 614 waiver authority and authorize release of the FY97 U.S. contribution to KEDO. KEDO will use these funds to repay outstanding loans it incurred to purchase heavy fuel oil for North Korea. Since KEDO's overall financial situation remains uncertain, we are continuing international efforts to raise funds.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the Presidential Determination at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Presidential 614 Determination
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff



United States Department of State

*Washington, D.C. 20520*UNCLASSIFIED

April 11, 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR GLYN T. DAVIES
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SUBJECT: Presidential Action Required to Make the U.S.
Contribution to the Korean Peninsula Energy
Development Organization

This memorandum requests that the President sign the Presidential determination required to make available the FY 1997 U.S. contribution of \$25 million to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO).

The President signed Presidential Determination 97-20 on March 18, 1997, pertaining to the U.S. contribution to KEDO, as required under the heading "Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs" in Title II of the Foreign Operations, Export, Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1997. Furthermore, the President authorized the Department of State to consult with and provide a written justification to the appropriate committees of Congress prior to making his decision whether to exercise his authority under section 614(a)(1) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, to permit the U.S. contribution to KEDO.


The State Department has concluded the formal consultations with Congress that are required under section 614 prior to the President making a determination. Specifically, we have consulted with majority and minority staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the House International Relations Committee, and the House and Senate Foreign Operations Subcommittees. We also presented briefings to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the House International Relations Committee, and the House Foreign Operations Subcommittee. The Senate Foreign Operations Committee indicated that it was satisfied with the written reports and certifications that we had provided earlier and did not require a briefing. Our consultations have identified no opposition to the President's proposed determination under section 614.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

-2-

With the completion of the consultations, the President may make a determination that the furnishing of assistance under this authority "is important to the security interests of the United States." We therefore recommend that the President sign the Presidential determination exercising his authority under section 614 to permit the U.S. contribution to KEDO.


William Burns
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

Draft Presidential determination under section 614

UNCLASSIFIED

DRAFT PRESIDENTIAL DETERMINATION UNDER SECTION 614(a)(1) OF THE
FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT

The White House
Washington, D.C.
Presidential Determination
No. _____

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: Use of Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining
 and Related Programs Account Funds for the U.S.
 Contribution to KEDO

Pursuant to the authority vested in me by section 614(a)(1) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, 22 U.S.C. 2364(a)(1), I hereby determine that it is important to the security interests of the United States to furnish up to \$25 million in funds made available under the heading "Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs" in Title II of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriation Act, 1997 (as enacted in P.L. 104-208) for the United States contribution to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization without regard to any provision of law within the scope of section 614(a)(1). I hereby authorize this contribution.

You are hereby authorized and directed to transmit this determination to the Congress and to arrange for its publication in the Federal Register.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D C. 20504

2549

April 16, 1997

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

FROM: GARY SAMORE ^{6S}

SUBJECT: Presidential 614 Determination on U.S. Assistance
to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development
Organization (KEDO)

We have fulfilled all the statutory and political requirements to free up the FY97 U.S. contribution to KEDO. The attached memorandum to the President recommends that he take the final legal step of invoking his waiver authority under Section 614 of the Foreign Assistance Act to provide the 1997 U.S. contribution to KEDO of \$25 million.

KEDO will use the U.S. contribution to repay loans it took out to purchase past heavy fuel oil shipments to North Korea. Even with the expected EU contribution this year of nearly \$30 million, KEDO will still be short nearly \$20 million for oil purchases this year. To offset this shortfall, we are planning to increase our international fund raising campaign, including a possible Presidential effort at the Vancouver APEC meeting.

All policy agencies and OMB concur in recommending that the President use his 614 waiver authority to provide the U.S. contribution to KEDO.

Concurrences by: (Bill Danvers, Jamie Baker, Sandy Kristoff) ^{6S} ~~60~~

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the attached memorandum to the President.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for the President
Tab A Presidential 614 Determination
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THROUGH: THE EXECUTIVE CLERK

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
JOHN HILLEYSUBJECT: Presidential Determination on U.S. Assistance to
the Korean Peninsula Energy Development
Organization (KEDO)Purpose

To invoke Presidential waiver authority under Section 614 of the Foreign Assistance Act in order to provide the FY97 U.S. contribution to KEDO.

Background

On March 18, 1997, you made three certifications required by the 1997 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act to provide U.S. funds to KEDO, and you authorized the Department of State to notify Congress and conduct consultations with the appropriate committees regarding the use of Presidential waiver authority under Section 614 of the Foreign Assistance Act to provide the 1997 U.S. contribution to KEDO of \$25 million.

On April 11, 1997, the Department of State notified the NSC that these Congressional consultations have been completed and that the consultations have identified no opposition to use of the 614 waiver for this purpose (Tab B). By signing the attached Presidential Determination at Tab A, you will invoke 614 waiver authority and authorize release of the FY97 U.S. ~~million~~ contribution to KEDO. KEDO will use these funds to repay outstanding loans it incurred to purchase heavy fuel oil for North Korea. Since KEDO's overall financial situation remains uncertain, we are continuing international efforts to raise funds.

Section

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the Presidential Determination at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Presidential 614 Determination
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

Davis, William K.

From: Bendick, Gordon L.
To: Kristoff, Sandra J.
Cc: /R, Record at A1; @ASIA - Asian Affairs; @LEGISLAT-Legislative Affairs
Subject: RE: Senator Stevens [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Tuesday, April 08, 1997 8:43PM

Sandy

I talked to Syd Ashworth today. She went with Stevens and told me that Stevens told the North Koreans that if they come to the 4 Party talks in NY and participate in serious and meaningful dialogue with the others, they can expect the US to be more supportive of their desire for financial assistance. Syd told me that Stevens did not tell the NK's that they could expect any financial help, but we'd certainly consider something if their behavior warranted it.

Stevens met with MKA and Richardson before the trip and used these visits as the basis for his remarks to the NK's. Syd also recommends that you get a copy of Stevens' remarks in Yakota, as they most correctly illuminate his words to the NK's. I'm sorry, Sandy, I just didn't have time to track them down for you today. I'll see if I can't track them down tomorrow.

In short, Stevens doesn't think the NK's deserve any help right now, and the idea of a "checking account" would not be warmly received by him at this juncture. However, Syd told me that she would talk to Stevens about starting a dialogue with SRB regarding this and other issues, as Stevens is willing to listen to reason. Also, it would be good for us to have SRB and the Senate Approps Chair having a routine form of discourse. Therefore, we are pursuing a SRB-Stevens Meeting. We are using the NK Trip as the hook for what we hope will be an on-going dialogue between them.

Hopefully, this will help you shut down the checkbook idea for the time being while we work with Stevens to seek some solutions to the NK issue. Will get you more tomorrow.

Again, sorry it took me most of the day to get back to you.

From: Kristoff, Sandra J.
To: Danvers, William C.
CC: /N, NonRecord at A1; Bass, Peter E.; Helweg, M. Diana; @LEGISLAT-Legislative Affairs
Subject: Senator Stevens [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Tuesday, April 08, 1997 07:18 PM

Bill--State wants to recommend the Secretary send a letter to Stevens requesting he lead the charge in Senate Appropriations Committee to set up a "checking account" of roughly \$25 million for SecState to use at her own discretion with North Korea. I do not like this idea and would argue against it with SRB and JBS. Have put a hold on sending State's memo up to Albright, but this will not last for long as the letter would need to be on the Hill NLT April 11. Any word from Steve Cortese??? Any guess as to whether a SecState request would result in more dollars in the supplemental? I would hate to cede North Korea issues to Mark Minton because of dollars SecState has access to. Did SRB ever talk to Stevens or should I now move into memo gear? SJK

From: Danvers, William C.
To: Kristoff, Sandra J.
CC: /N, NonRecord at A1; /R, Record at A1; Suettinger, Robert L.; @LEGISLAT-Legislative Affairs
Subject: RE: Need a Number [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Monday, April 07, 1997 01:19 PM

We are still trying to get the meeting set up with Newt's office. We will get you a read out of Stevens' comments and get back to you. Thanks.

From: Kristoff, Sandra J.
To: Danvers, William C.
CC: /N, NonRecord at A1; Suettinger, Robert L.
Subject: RE: Need a Number [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Monday, April 07, 1997 12:50 PM

bill- i want to find out what stevens said in pyongyang about the food situation and about setting up a congressionally funded account for state to draw on to use for food aid to dprk. this came up in conversation i had with srb late friday and i told him i'd check.

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CC: /N, NonRecord at A1
Subject: Need a Number [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Monday, April 07, 1997 12:09 PM

Chris---Could I get a name and number for Sen. Ted Stevens foreign policy person? thanks. sandy K.

Davis, William K.

From: Bass, Peter E.
To: Danvers, William C.; Kristoff, Sandra J.
Cc: /N, NonRecord at A1; /R, Record at A1; Helweg, M. Diana; @LEGISLAT-Legislative Affairs
Subject: RE: Senator Stevens [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Tuesday, April 08, 1997 7:52PM

He did not make a call to Stevens, as far as our records show.

From: Kristoff, Sandra J.
To: Danvers, William C.
CC: /N, NonRecord at A1; Bass, Peter E.; Helweg, M. Diana; @LEGISLAT-Legislative Affairs
Subject: Senator Stevens [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Tuesday, April 08, 1997 07:18 PM

Bill---State wants to recommend the Secretary send a letter to Stevens requesting he lead the charge in Senate Appropriations Committee to set up a "checking account" of roughly \$25 million for SecState to use at her own discretion with North Korea. I do not like this idea and would argue against it with SRB and JBS. Have put a hold on sending State's memo up to Albright, but this will not last for long as the letter would need to be on the Hill NLT April 11. Any word from Steve Cortese??? Any guess as to whether a SecState request would result in more dollars in the supplemental? I would hate to cede North Korea issues to Mark Minton because of dollars SecState has access to. Did SRB ever talk to Stevens or should I now move into memo gear? SJK

From: Danvers, William C.
To: Kristoff, Sandra J.
CC: /N, NonRecord at A1; /R, Record at A1; Suettinger, Robert L.; @LEGISLAT-Legislative Affairs
Subject: RE: Need a Number [UNCLASSIFIED]
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~~SECRET~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9701234
RECEIVED: 25 FEB 97 19

TO: ALBRIGHT, M

FROM: PRESIDENT

DOC DATE: 18 MAR 97
SOURCE REF: 97-20

KEYWORDS: NUCLEAR ENERGY
LEGAL ISSUES
PD

KOREA
CONGRESSIONAL

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: PD 97-20 RE US CONTRIBUTION TO KEDO

ACTION: PRESIDENT SGD PD 97-20

DUE DATE: 28 FEB 97 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: SAMORE

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BAKER
DANVERS
NSC CHRON
PRITCHARD
SAMORE

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

By (W) NARA, Date 03/25/15
2009-0528-F

COMMENTS: DRAFT MEMO FOR LARKIN & JUSTIFICATION DISPATCHED PER SAMORE

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDRS

CLOSED BY: NSTSM

DOC 5 OF 5

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

RECORD ID: 9701234

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001	SAMORE	Z	97022519	PREPARE MEMO FOR BERGER
002	SAMORE	Z	97030312	ADD-ON / APPROPRIATE ACTION
003	BERGER	Z	97030410	FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR SIG
004		Z	97031912	FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR SIG
005		X	97031913	PRESIDENT SGD PD 97-20

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

<u>DOC</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>DISPATCH FOR ACTION</u>	<u>DISPATCH FOR INFO</u>
001	970225	OMB	
004	970312		VICE PRESIDENT
004	970312		WH CHIEF OF STAFF
005	970318	ALBRIGHT, M	BURNS, W
005	970318		CONROY, R
005	970318		DUSAULT, P
005	970318		SAUNDERS, T

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9701234

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~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9701234
RECEIVED: 25 FEB 97 19

TO: HARMON

FROM: BURNS, W

DOC DATE: 25 FEB 97
SOURCE REF: 9703119

KEYWORDS: NUCLEAR ENERGY
LEGAL ISSUES
PD

KOREA
CONGRESSIONAL

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: DRAFT PD REQUIRED TO MAKE US CONTRIBUTION TO KOREAN PENINSULA
ENERGY DEVELOPMENT ORGAN / KEDO

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR BERGER

DUE DATE: 28 FEB 97 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: SAMORE

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION
SAMORE

FOR CONCURRENCE
ANDREASEN
DANVERS
KRECZKO
KRISTOFF
OMB

FOR INFO
BELL
CARAVELLI
CLARKE
FICKLIN
PRITCHARD

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY OPS (OMB) DATE 2/25/97 BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDRS

CLOSED BY:

DOC 1 OF 1

UNCLASSIFIED

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____

LOG # 1234

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG cc A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon			
~~Brown~~ Donse	<u>1/3</u>	<u>13/4</u>	
Kerrick	<u>2/4</u>	<u>(1)</u>	
Steinberg	<u>3/1</u>	<u>(2)</u>	
Berger		<u>(3)</u>	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>3</u>	<u>(12) 3/10</u>	<u>check</u>
Records Mgt.	<u>4</u>	<u>(12) 5/12</u>	<u>5/12</u>

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: SRB, REP, JS, DK, GRD, JAH, Sam

COMMENTS:

LA 3/18

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 18, 1997

Presidential Determination
No. 97-20

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: U.S. Contribution to KEDO: Certification Under the Heading "Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs" in Title II of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1997 (as enacted in Public Law 104-208)

Pursuant to the requirements set forth under the heading "Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs" in title II of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1997 (as enacted in Public Law 104-208), I certify that:

(1) (A) the United States is taking steps to assure that progress is made on the implementation of the January 1, 1992, Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the implementation of the North-South dialogue, and (B) North Korea is complying with the other provisions of the Agreed Framework between North Korea and the United States and with the Confidential Minute;

(2) North Korea is cooperating fully in the canning and safe storage of all spent fuel from its graphite-moderated nuclear reactors and that such canning and safe storage is scheduled to be completed by the end of fiscal year 1997; and

(3) North Korea has not significantly diverted assistance provided by the United States for purposes for which it was not intended.

You are authorized and directed to report this determination to the Congress and to publish it in the Federal Register.

William J. Clinton

Draft

To be sent to Chairs of Appropriations and Foreign Relations Committees following receipt of Presidential determination:

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Pursuant to the requirements under the heading "Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs" in Title II of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1997 (as enacted in P.L. 104-208) ("FY 1997 Appropriations Act"), this letter is to provide notification that, on _____, 1997, the President signed Presidential Determination No. _____ regarding the U.S. contribution to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization ("KEDO"). Specifically, the President certified that:

(1)(A) the United States is taking steps to assure that progress is made on the implementation of the January 1, 1992, Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the implementation of the North-South dialogue, and (B) North Korea is complying with the other provisions of the Agreed Framework and with the Confidential Minute;

(2) North Korea is cooperating fully in the canning and safe storage of all spent fuel from its graphite-moderated nuclear reactors and that such canning and safe storage is scheduled to be completed by the end of fiscal year 1997; and

(3) North Korea has not significantly diverted assistance provided by the United States for purposes for which it was not intended.

A copy of this determination and the justification for it are enclosed. Also enclosed is the report required under the same heading of the FY 1997 Appropriations Act prior to the obligation of any funds.

The Honorable

_____, Chairman,
Committee on _____

In addition, we wish to inform you that the President proposes to exercise his authority under section 614(a)(1) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (the "Act"), to authorize the furnishing of up to \$25 million in FY 1997 Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs funds for a U.S. contribution to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), without regard to provisions of law within the scope of that section. This funding level is the same as specified in the Administration's congressional presentation documents for FY 1997.

The U.S. contribution will be used to help pay the FY 1997 administrative and heavy fuel oil expenses of KEDO, an international organization established to implement the Agreed Framework between the United States and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), signed October 21, 1994. Under the Agreed Framework, the U.S. agreed to organize under its leadership an international consortium to finance and supply two light-water reactors (LWR) to the DPRK. The U.S. also agreed to make arrangements for the provision to the DPRK of annual shipments of heavy fuel oil. For its part, North Korea agreed to "freeze" and eventually dismantle its potentially dangerous graphite nuclear reactor program. It also agreed to allow implementation of full-scope safeguards by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on its nuclear facilities in accordance with the timetable specified in the Agreed Framework.

Over the past year, there has been significant progress in implementing the Agreed Framework. Building on the 1995 KEDO-DPRK agreement for the provision of the two light-water reactors specified under the Agreed Framework, the two sides have agreed on five additional implementing protocols. As of December 31, 1996, much of the preliminary work has been completed prior to turning over the reactor site to KEDO for site preparation. KEDO has also been making regular shipments of heavy fuel oil to the DPRK in accordance with its obligations under the Agreed Framework. In the meantime, North Korea continues to maintain the freeze on its nuclear facilities and that freeze is being monitored by international inspectors from the IAEA.

The United States, Japan and South Korea have played and will continue to play a leading role in KEDO through the organization's Executive Board, its main decision-making body. The Republic of Korea will play the central role in financing and constructing KEDO's reactor project and has already contributed an additional \$4.5 million for KEDO administrative costs. Japan will play a significant role in financing the reactor project and has already contributed \$3 million for the initial reactor site survey and \$6.5 million for initial KEDO

administrative costs and heavy fuel oil shipments, as well as advancing \$19 million to provide liquidity as needed to support the financing of heavy fuel oil and KEDO expenses. We expect further financial contributions from both countries to KEDO's administrative costs and its projects in 1997.

Progress has been made in securing additional members and contributions for KEDO and its activities, although much work remains to be done. Since KEDO's establishment in March 1995, the three Executive Board members have approached more than thirty-five countries from Europe, Asia, Latin America and the Middle East to ask their support for the organization. As of December 31, 1996, we now have seven additional members: Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Finland, Argentina, Indonesia, Chile. Three other countries -- France, Brazil, and Switzerland -- have informed us of their intention to join. KEDO and the European Union have essentially reached agreement on the terms and conditions for EU membership in KEDO and its participation on the KEDO Executive Board. Additionally, the EU will contribute, annually, \$20 million for at least five years. A number of other countries -- Brunei, Germany, Greece, Malaysia, the Netherlands, Norway, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand -- have made contributions in support of the organization as non-members. We look forward to additional pledges to join KEDO and to contribute to the organization over the coming year.

As described in more detail in the enclosed Memorandum of Justification pursuant to section 614 of the Act, we believe that the use of these funds in the manner described is essential to carrying out the terms and conditions of the Agreed Framework and in achieving our high-priority nuclear nonproliferation objectives.

Please do not hesitate to contact us if you believe we may be of further assistance.

Sincerely,

Barbara Larkin
Assistant Secretary
Legislative Affairs

Enclosures:

- (1) Presidential Determination under FY 1997 Appropriations Act
- (2) Memorandum of Justification for Presidential Determination under FY 1997 Appropriations Act
- (3) Report under FY 1997 Appropriations Act
- (4) Memorandum of Justification under Section 614 of FAA

The White House
Washington, D.C.
Presidential Determination
No. _____

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: U.S. Contribution to KEDO: Certification Under the
Heading "Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining
and Related Programs" in Title II of the Foreign
Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs
Appropriations Act, 1997 (as enacted in P.L. 104-208)

Pursuant to the requirements set forth under the heading
"Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related
Programs" in Title II of the Foreign Operations, Export
Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1997 (as
enacted in P.L. 104-208), I certify that:

(1)(A) the United States is taking steps to assure
that progress is made on the implementation of the January
1, 1992, Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the
Korean Peninsula and the implementation of the North-South
dialogue, and (B) North Korea is complying with the other
provisions of the Agreed Framework between North Korea and
the United States and with the Confidential Minute;

(2) North Korea is cooperating fully in the canning
and safe storage of all spent fuel from its
graphite-moderated nuclear reactors and that such canning
and safe storage is scheduled to be completed by the end of
fiscal year 1997; and

(3) North Korea has not significantly diverted
assistance provided by the United States for purposes for
which it was not intended.

You are authorized and directed to report this to the
Congress and to publish them in the Federal Register.

MEMORANDUM OF JUSTIFICATION
FOR PRESIDENTIAL DETERMINATION UNDER THE HEADING
"NONPROLIFERATION, ANTI-TERRORISM, DEMINING AND
RELATED PROGRAMS" IN TITLE II OF
THE FOREIGN OPERATIONS APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 1997
IN CONNECTION WITH THE U.S. CONTRIBUTION TO
THE KOREAN PENINSULA ENERGY DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATION

Pursuant to the requirements set forth under the heading "Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs" in Title II of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1997 (P.L. 104-208) ("FY 1997 Appropriations Act"), the President determined and certified that:

(1)(A) the United States is taking steps to assure that progress is made on the implementation of the January 1, 1992, Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the implementation of the North-South dialogue, and (B) North Korea is complying with the other provisions of the Agreed Framework between North Korea and the United States and with the Confidential Minute;

(2) North Korea is cooperating fully in the canning and safe storage of all spent fuel from its graphite-moderated nuclear reactors and that such canning and safe storage is scheduled to be completed by the end of fiscal year 1997; and

(3) North Korea has not significantly diverted assistance provided by the United States for purposes for which it was not intended.

The justification for the Presidential determination is set forth below.

(1)(A) Implementation of Joint Denuclearization Declaration

On January 1, 1992, the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea issued the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. The provisions of the Joint Declaration state that the North and South:

- shall not test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons;
- shall use nuclear energy solely for peaceful purposes;
- shall not possess nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities, and;

- in order to verify the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, shall conduct inspections of the objects selected by the other side and agreed upon between the two sides, in accordance with procedures and methods to be determined by the North-South Nuclear Control Commission which shall be established within one month of the effectuation of this joint declaration.

The DPRK and the ROK held a series of North-South Joint Nuclear Control Commission meetings in early 1992 as specified in the Joint Declaration, but these were discontinued as relations between the two Korean states worsened and the DPRK threatened to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and refused to cooperate with the IAEA. As a result, the absence of sustained governmental talks between the ROK and DPRK has delayed further implementation of the Denuclearization Declaration.

The United States has, however, taken steps to encourage DPRK compliance with the Joint Declaration by encouraging North-South dialogue and ensuring DPRK implementation of the Agreed Framework. The Agreed Framework itself explicitly provides that the DPRK will take steps to implement the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. In addition, the Agreed Framework, as a step towards full implementation of the Denuclearization Declaration, has succeeded in eliciting positive DPRK movement on key provisions of the Declaration. Specifically, North Korea's willingness to immediately freeze and eventually dismantle its graphite-moderated nuclear reactors and related facilities has halted activities that, had they not been stopped, would have given the DPRK a nuclear weapons capability. Such a capability would have been a threat to peace and security on the Korean Peninsula as well as to Northeast Asia. The DPRK agreement to forego reprocessing under the Agreed Framework and to replace its existing nuclear reactors with proliferation-resistant LWRs represents a major step toward assuring the DPRK will not test, manufacture, produce, store, deploy or possess nuclear weapons. All these steps, aside from advancing the goals of the Joint Declaration, go beyond the NPT's requirements.

(1)(A) Implementation of North-South Dialogue

The U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework provides that "the DPRK will engage in North-South dialogue." In pursuit of this objective, the U.S. has taken diplomatic steps with both North and South Korea to encourage DPRK compliance with its commitments to engage in dialogue and to support South Korean initiatives toward the North. The U.S. has also encouraged China, over the course of implementing the Agreed Framework, to use its influence to encourage the DPRK, among other things, to participate more fully in dialogue with the South. While the

North Korean response to our efforts has not been as forthcoming as we would like, the U.S. continues to firmly pursue the objective of increased North-South dialogue.

It is the firm position of the United States that North-South contacts are the key to resolving the most important issues on the peninsula. We have used every available opportunity to press the DPRK to resume North-South dialogue, as it is committed to do under the terms of the Agreed Framework. The U.S. has consistently made clear in bilateral contacts with the DPRK, that improvement in North-South relations is key to peace and security on the Korean Peninsula and a requirement of improved U.S.-DPRK bilateral relations. Prior to the signing of the Agreed Framework, Ambassador Robert L. Gallucci, during his tenure as Chairman of the Senior Steering Committee on Korea, frequently raised the issue of North-South dialogue in his correspondence with his North Korean counterpart, First Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Kang Sok Ju. North Korean acceptance of direct dialogue with the ROK was an essential element of the U.S. negotiating strategy with the DPRK and was successfully obtained in concluding the Agreed Framework. As of October 1995, contact and correspondence with DPRK Vice Minister Kang has been maintained by Ambassador Winston Lord, Assistant Secretary of State, who continues to raise the same issues.

During the first year of implementation of the Agreed Framework, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Hubbard raised North-South issues repeatedly with the DPRK in Kuala Lumpur over the course of negotiating the Light Water Reactor (LWR) Supply Agreement. Mr. Hubbard continued to address this issue with North Korean Ambassador-at-Large Ho Jong in December 1995. In addition, these points were made at all three rounds of U.S.-DPRK negotiations on the opening of liaison offices. More recently, U.S. officials at the Director-level continue to stress to their North Korean counterparts, both in New York and in Washington, the importance of improving DPRK relations with the ROK.

Implementation of the Agreed Framework has created and continues to create many occasions for direct North-South contact. The Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), established by the U.S., ROK, and Japan to oversee implementation of various components of the Agreed Framework, has proven to be an effective vehicle for this purpose. KEDO has engaged in extensive negotiations with the DPRK on the LWR supply agreement and related protocols. ROK Government officials and technical experts have participated in the formulation of KEDO's negotiating strategy; have directly engaged in negotiations with the DPRK; and have held numerous consultations with DPRK experts on technical-related issues. South Koreans also comprise the majority of technical experts on KEDO site survey teams dispatched to the DPRK to survey the proposed reactor site.

In support of ROK initiatives, we have conveyed South Korean positions -- and U.S. support for those positions -- to the DPRK and others, sometimes with positive results. In 1995, North and South Korea held a series of bilateral meetings in Beijing that produced an agreement whereby the South provided 150,000 tons of rice to the North as a grant. In December of that same year, the DPRK, at U.S. urging, released the crew of a South Korean fishing vessel which had strayed into North Korean waters, a step which the ROK had been urging the DPRK to take for some time. In 1996, the U.S., ROK, and Japan consulted on a consolidated appeal from various United Nations' agencies including World Food Program (WFP) for use in flood-related relief in North Korea. It was agreed that to address this humanitarian crisis and to support stability on the Peninsula, the U.S., ROK and Japan would each donate humanitarian assistance to North Korea.

It is against this backdrop that President Clinton and President Kim Young Sam of the Republic of Korea on April 16, 1996 issued a joint proposal for Four Party Talks (U.S., ROK, DPRK, China) to discuss peace on the Korean Peninsula. In announcing this initiative, the two Presidents confirmed the fundamental principle that the establishment of a stable, permanent peace on the Korean peninsula was an important goal of the Korean people and that South and North Korea should take the lead in a renewed search for peace. In addition, the Four Party proposal can begin a process that will lead to tension reduction, greater economic cooperation and eventually the creation of a new, permanent peace mechanism. In support of this important initiative, the U.S. has agreed to play an active role and has raised the importance of encouraging North-South dialogue and North Korean participation in the four-party talks with other countries, notably China, Japan, and Russia. Assistant Secretary Lord, briefing the press following President Clinton's meeting with Chinese President Jiang Zemin at the Asian Pacific Economic Conference (APEC) meetings in Manila in November 1996, noted that the Chinese not only supported the idea of North-South dialogue as a basic principle but had confirmed PRC participation in the four party process.

In U.S.-DPRK talks in December 1996, the DPRK committed itself to attend a joint U.S.-ROK briefing on the Four Party peace proposal. It was agreed that the briefing would take place on January 29. Although the DPRK reserved a decision on participating in the Four Party talks per se, its expressed willingness to attend the joint briefing involving the ROK was encouraging. Subsequently, however, the DPRK informed us that it would be unable to attend the joint briefing as previously agreed. The DPRK explained that, although it remained

committed to attending the joint briefing, it was giving first priority to the procurement of grain to address a major food shortfall. The Four Party proposal remains on the table, and we hope that the DPRK will agree that it represents the best means for securing lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula. In mid-February, the DPRK requested that the joint briefing be rescheduled for March 5, 1997.

(1)(B) DPRK Compliance with Agreed Framework

Described below are the relevant commitments undertaken by the DPRK in the Agreed Framework and the Confidential Minute:

The freeze on the DPRK's graphite moderated reactors and related facilities will be fully implemented within one month of the date of this document.

The DPRK agreed to implement the freeze on its nuclear facilities within one month after signing the Agreed Framework. Since November 1994, all of North Korea's graphite-moderated nuclear facilities have been frozen. Specifically, this means no refueling or operation of the 5 MW research reactor, no construction on the 50 and 200 MW reactors, no reprocessing and sealing of the reprocessing facility, no operation of the fuel fabrication plant; and no construction of new graphite-moderated reactors or related facilities.

During the one-month period, and throughout the freeze, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will be allowed to monitor this freeze, and the DPRK will provide full cooperation to the IAEA for this purpose.

The IAEA has maintained a continuous presence at the Nyongbyon nuclear facility and has continued with inspection activities related to verifying and monitoring the freeze in the DPRK according to the terms of the Agreed Framework. These activities have allowed it to determine that North Korea is complying with the freeze provisions of the Agreed Framework. In addition to IAEA monitoring activities, the United States has its own National Technical Means which give us further confidence that the DPRK is complying with these provisions of the agreement.

While the IAEA has been monitoring the nuclear freeze, it has also conducted bilateral discussions with the DPRK to resolve a number of issues, some related to technical aspects of freeze monitoring. North Korean and IAEA officials met in January, June, and September of 1996, and the two sides resolved a number of these issues related to spent fuel canning and safeguarding the nuclear materials which are being safely stored.

Other issues discussed relate to the preservation of historical data that the IAEA will find useful in determining the amount of plutonium the DPRK produced in the past. Under the terms of the Agreed Framework, "when a significant portion of the LWR project is completed, but before delivery of key nuclear components," the DPRK will come into full compliance with its safeguards agreement with the IAEA, including taking all steps that may be deemed necessary by the IAEA, following consultations with the Agency with regard to verifying the accuracy and completeness of the DPRK's initial report on all nuclear material in the DPRK. Current IAEA-DPRK discussions are the beginning of that process. In the June 1996 meeting, the North presented a paper concerning the preservation of historical data at Nyongbyon. Differences between the two sides still remain, as reflected in recent statements by IAEA Director General Hans Blix. This issue was discussed in September and will be the topic for further negotiation between the DPRK and IAEA.

Dismantlement of the DPRK's graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities will be completed when the LWR project is completed.

At present, North Korea is not required by the Agreed Framework to take immediate steps to comply with this requirement of the agreement.

The U.S. and the DPRK will cooperate in finding a method to store safely the spent fuel from the 5 MW(e) experimental reactor during the construction of the LWR project, and to dispose of the fuel in a safe manner that does not involve reprocessing in the DPRK.

This topic is addressed in a separate certification.

The DPRK will remain a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and will allow implementation of its safeguards agreement under the Treaty.

As specified in the Agreed Framework, the DPRK has remained a party to the NPT. Paragraph IV, subparagraph 2 of the Agreed Framework specifies that "upon conclusion of the supply contract for the provision of the LWR project, ad hoc and routine inspections will resume under the DPRK's safeguards agreement with the IAEA with respect to facilities not subject to the freeze." With the successful conclusion of the agreement on the supply of light-water reactors (LWRs) to the DPRK, signed between the DPRK and KEDO in New York City on December 15, 1995, the DPRK agreed to allow the IAEA to resume such inspections.

While this is a first step towards the DPRK's adherence to its safeguards agreement, additional actions are not immediately required. As mentioned above, the IAEA and DPRK have begun discussions relating to the preservation of historical data which will prove useful in eventually bringing the DPRK into full compliance with its safeguards agreement. Full compliance, however, is not required by the Agreed Framework until "a significant portion of the LWR project is completed, but before delivery of key nuclear components." That will not be reached for some years.

Within three months of the date of this document, both sides will reduce barriers to trade and investment, including restrictions on telecommunications services and financial transactions.

In January 1995, the DPRK announced that it was lifting all existing restrictions against trade with the United States.

Each side will open a liaison office in the other's capital following resolution of consular and other technical issues through expert-level discussions.

The United States and the DPRK have held two rounds of expert-level discussion on opening liaison offices and other exchanges in diplomatic channels. Technical issues still remain to be resolved before those offices can be established.

As progress is made on issues of concern to each side, the U.S. and the DPRK will upgrade bilateral relations to the Ambassadorial level.

Issues of concern for the United States cover a number of areas such as DPRK missile proliferation, accounting of U.S. servicemen who are missing in action (MIA) as a result of the Korean War and concerns about North Korea's role in international terrorism. (See separate reports required by Congress for more details on some of these issues.) At our request, North Korea has engaged the United States on these topics, either through specific negotiations or through diplomatic channels. The United States cannot even begin considering an upgrade in bilateral relations until liaison offices have been opened. Such an upgrade will not occur until the United States is fully satisfied with the progress on these issues of concern.

The justification regarding North Korean compliance with the Confidential Minute is provided in a classified attachment.

(2) Spent Fuel Canning and Storage

U.S. and DPRK workers have been cooperating successfully since November 1994 with respect to the canning and storage of spent fuel from North Korea's 5MW(e) reactor at Nyongbyon. In January 1995, the U.S. and DPRK agreed on the method for safely storing the spent fuel as an interim step toward its ultimate transfer out of North Korea. The agreed-upon method consists of the treatment of the water in the spent fuel basin, the placement of spent fuel rods in specially-designed stainless steel canisters, and the storage of the canisters in racks stationed in the basin. All of these activities have been carried out in the presence of IAEA inspectors and the appropriate seals are to be applied.

A U.S.-supplied water treatment system, including a chiller to lower the temperature of the water, filters, and an ion exchange system, was jointly installed in September 1995. This system was designed to regulate pH and biological levels, ionic chloride and sulfate concentrations, gamma radionuclide concentrations, and water temperature in order to minimize radiation and clouding in the basin and slow additional corrosion of the spent fuel rods. DPRK personnel, having been fully trained by U.S. personnel at the spent fuel site, have been operating the system since the Fall of 1995.

A sludge vacuuming system was also installed in the Fall of 1995 to remove the buildup of magnesium hydroxide sludge caused by the deterioration of the fuel cladding and to prepare the area for canning operations. Beginning in mid-November 1995, the issuance of visas to U.S. personnel was delayed by the DPRK, during a difficult stage in the negotiations on the KEDO-DPRK reactor supply agreement. Visas were again issued in mid-December 1995 after the U.S. protested against the delay.

Actual canning of the 8,000 spent fuel rods began on April 27, 1996. U.S. and DPRK personnel have been working to safely store the spent fuel since that time. Four canning stations have been established, three operated by DPRK personnel and one operated by U.S. personnel, with a regular work schedule in place. Each station is responsible for removing individual spent fuel rods from baskets contained in the spent fuel basin and proceeding with the cleaning, conditioning, and placement of these rods in the stainless steel storage canisters. A lid is then placed on each canister, the canister is pressurized with a mixture of argon and oxygen to remove the water, and the same gas mixture is used to condition and inert the fuel for long-term storage. Following this procedure, each canister is transferred from the canning station to storage racks in the spent fuel basin. The storage racks are then to be sealed by the IAEA and placed under international safeguards. As of December 31, 1996, 4204 of the 8000 fuel rods (over 50%) have been placed in canisters.

For most of the canning project, cooperation and consultation among DPRK and U.S. technical experts has been close. DPRK personnel have met their commitments to assist the canning effort by facilitating the entry of U.S. personnel and equipment into the DPRK; unloading, installing, and maintaining equipment; providing necessary utilities; and disposing of wastes from the project. From the beginning of actual canning in April 1996 through August 1996, there were occasional delays for technical and other reasons, as would be expected in a technically complex project carried out in an unfamiliar environment (the DPRK).

In August, the DPRK indicated that it might have to suspend spent fuel canning due to the failure of the U.S. to ease economic sanctions, as called for in the Agreed Framework. In late September, the DPRK unilaterally reduced the work schedule for its teams from 72 hours per week to 40 hours per week, citing concern for worker safety due to excessive exposure to radiation at the spent fuel basin. However, the DPRK also indicated that this change was a result of the U.S. failure to implement fully its obligations under the Agreed Framework, specifically with regard to easing trade sanctions against the DPRK. The U.S., having previously agreed upon an approach to lower cesium levels in the basin with the DPRK, dispatched equipment and additional technical experts to address this issue. By October, radiation levels were reduced satisfactorily, however, a resumption of the original work schedule did not occur.

U.S. efforts to safely store the DPRK's spent nuclear fuel experienced further deleterious affects as a result of the political fallout from the North Korean submarine incursion into the coastal waters of the Republic of Korea. From November 4-January 7, the DPRK intentionally interrupted canning operations in retaliation against the ROK's announcement of a "freeze" on light-water reactor construction activities. However, the freeze on the DPRK nuclear reactors and related facilities remained in place. The U.S. immediately engaged the DPRK in discussions and pressed not only for the resumption of canning operations but also for the DPRK to take the necessary steps to put the submarine incident behind us. U.S.-DPRK agreement was reached in late December, which resulted in the resumption of full DPRK cooperation in spent fuel canning operations on January 8, 1997, including the restoration of the original work schedule.

With canning operations underway and over fifty percent of the spent fuel having been canned and placed under IAEA safeguards, completion of the canning operation is scheduled to be completed by the end of fiscal year 1997. Until that time, we will continue to evaluate DPRK actions to ensure that the DPRK continues its full cooperation with spent fuel canning activities.

(3) Diversion of U.S. Provided Assistance

Heavy Fuel Oil

The United States has provided heavy fuel oil (HFO) to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) in accordance with the U.S./DPRK Agreed Framework and has also provided humanitarian assistance in the form of food aid. The Agreed Framework provides for the phased provision of heavy fuel oil (HFO) to the DPRK in an amount equivalent to the foregone output of its three graphite-moderated nuclear reactors (the 5 MW, 50 MW and 200 MW reactors). The Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) provides for the delivery of 500,000 metric tons of HFO annually. This heavy fuel oil is to be used for purposes specified in the Confidential Minute.

In Summer 1995, KEDO finalized with the DPRK a record of conversation that limited the use of HFO to five specific sites, Sonbong, the Chongjin Power Plant, the Pyongyang Power Plant, the Pukchang Power Plant and the boiler at Nyongbyon. KEDO, with North Korean cooperation, has since installed fuel flow meters at the power plant facilities in Sonbong, Chongjin, Pyongyang and Pukchang to ensure that shipments are not being diverted. In a meeting held in July 1996, KEDO included the power plants at Sunchon and East Pyongyang in the consumption loop, while the DPRK agreed to provide more frequent flow meter readings and additional information on HFO disposal.

KEDO's monitoring arrangements, along with other means, give us confidence that the HFO supplied by KEDO has largely been used in the manner prescribed by the Agreed Framework. In the months since KEDO oil deliveries began, there has been some evidence that the DPRK was using small amounts of the oil for purposes contrary to those specified in the Confidential Minute. These amounts do not, however, constitute a significant diversion of the half-million metric tons of HFO being delivered. We take any evidence of North Korean violations seriously and have continuously worked with DPRK authorities to tighten compliance arrangements.

We are prepared to provide a classified briefing on this subject upon Congressional request.

Humanitarian Assistance

The U.S. has made contributions to the UN Consolidated Appeal for North Korea four times for a total of \$8.425 million since the summer of 1995. The first two tranches of humanitarian assistance were grants from the OFDA (Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance) and were given to UNICEF to provide medicine for flood-affected children. The USG made a \$2 million grant to the World Food Program (WFP) in February

1996 through OFDA, which was used to provide rice to flood-affected victims. The most recent donation of \$6.2 million was made under the PL 480 Title II emergency program for some 13 thousand tons of rice, corn soy blend and corn meal destined for flood-affected victims.

The WFP and UNICEF have been responsible for monitoring the distribution of the U.S. contribution and neither agency reports any significant diversion of humanitarian goods. The U.S. funded a visit of an OFDA contract observer and two USAID observers to North Korea to observe WFP operations. USAID has also funded food monitors through the WFP. Both the U.S. and international observers agree that the DPRK is making an unprecedented effort to cooperate with the international humanitarian relief effort. They report that while the government continues to extensively supervise foreigners' movements, the WFP has been able to monitor relatively closely, even in areas previously closed to foreigners, the distribution of U.S. Government-supplied food aid.

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Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

REPORT UNDER THE HEADING "NONPROLIFERATION,
ANTI-TERRORISM, DEMINING AND RELATED PROGRAMS"
IN TITLE II OF
THE FOREIGN OPERATIONS APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 1997
IN CONNECTION WITH THE U.S. CONTRIBUTION TO
THE KOREAN PENINSULA ENERGY DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATION

This report is submitted pursuant to the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1997 (P.L. 104-208) ("FY 1997 Appropriations Act"), under the heading "Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs," with respect to --

- (1) the cooperation of North Korea in the process of returning to the United States the remains of United States military personnel who are listed as missing in action as a result of the Korean conflict (including conducting joint field activities with the United States);
- (2) violations of the military armistice agreement of 1953;
- (3) the actions which the United States is taking to assure that North Korea is consistently taking steps to implement the Joint Declaration on Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and engage in North-South dialogue; and
- (4) all instances of non-compliance with the Agreed Framework between North Korea and the United States and the Confidential Minute, including diversion of heavy fuel oil.

(1) DPRK Cooperation on the Recovery of Remains

Building on the work of the United Nations Command, the U.S. initiated a series of direct, bilateral talks with North Korea in January 1996. Because of conflicts over schedule and venue, the next meeting did not take place until early May in New York. On May 9, 1996, the U.S. and DPRK reached an agreement that opened the way for the joint recovery of remains of U.S. servicemen from the Korean War. The agreement provided for \$2 million to resolve all DPRK outstanding compensation claims. It further provided that technical talks would be held in June 1996 to determine specifics for joint recovery operations. At the technical talks June 10-14 in Pyongyang, the U.S. and DPRK reached agreement on the dates, location, and logistical issues for the first two joint recovery operations. Specifically, the DPRK agreed to accommodate the first joint recovery operation on July 10, 1996 at an aircraft site in Unsan County, and the second joint recovery operation in September 1996 at an aircraft crash site in Ryonggang County, Nampo City. DPRK willingness to cooperate on these two initial joint recovery operations, in support of the May 1996 agreement, represented an important step forward on this humanitarian issue.

A ten-member U.S. team, nine Army personnel and one State Department officer, spent most of July 1996 in the DPRK working with the Korean People's Army and Ministry of Foreign Affairs to locate and retrieve the remains of U.S. personnel. This led to the repatriation on July 30, 1996 of the remains of U.S. Army Corporal Lawrence LeBoeuf, who had been missing in action since November 1950. Operationally, despite initial tensions and logistical difficulties, the two sides developed an effective working environment that helped to reduce tensions and facilitate quick resolution of disagreements which ultimately led to the successful outcome of this mission.

The success of the first joint recovery operation was the culmination of consistent and determined efforts by the U.S. Government to account for its missing from the Korean War. The North Korean military personnel assigned to work with the U.S. team acted professionally and effectively with their American counterparts. U.S. and North Korean team leaders were able to resolve technical problems with minimal disruption to the operation. When the joint team failed to find remains at the primary site, the North Koreans suggested an alternate site where Corporal LeBoeuf's remains were recovered.

Because of heightened tensions on the Korean Peninsula caused by the submarine infiltration of DPRK military personnel into the ROK, the second joint recovery operation, originally scheduled for September 1996, was delayed. Efforts are underway to reschedule this operation for early 1997, once the spring thaw makes recovery efforts possible.

We are prepared to provide a more thorough history from 1985-1996 on this subject upon Congressional request.

(2) Violations of the Military Armistice Agreement

The Military Armistice Agreement of 1953 (AA) created a Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) four kilometers wide, stretching 151 miles across the Korean peninsula. A Military Demarcation Line (MDL) was established down the center of the DMZ, two kilometers from each side of the DMZ. Under the terms of the AA, each side was permitted access to its two-kilometer portion of the DMZ but was expressly prohibited from crossing the MDL into the other side's portion of the DMZ.

Since 1953 there have been approximately 1,600 armed incidents involving attacks, intrusions or the exchange of fire in or near the DMZ. The majority of these incidents occurred in the late 1960s and early 1970s, with a peak occurring in 1968 when a total of 573 such incidents were recorded.

Since 1990, incidents in the DMZ have generally been limited to provocative posturing by members of the (North)

Korean People's Army (KPA). Notable exceptions to this pattern were armed infiltrations by North Korean soldiers in 1992 and 1995 and the shooting down of a U.S. Army helicopter in 1994 on the northern side of the DMZ. However, armed infiltrations by KPA soldiers continue, most recently on September 18, 1996, when a North Korean submarine was found aground on the east coast of the Republic of Korea (ROK) south of the DMZ.

The AA of 1953 also created a joint Military Armistice Commission (MAC) with membership representing both the United Nations Command (UNC) and the KPA/Chinese People's Volunteers (CPV). The MAC's functions are to supervise the implementation of the AA, settle violations through negotiations, and act as an intermediary between the commanders of the opposing sides. On April 28, 1994, the KPA recalled its members from the MAC and has since systematically tried to dismantle the MAC and to begin direct negotiations with the U.S. officers of the UNC with the objective of trying to create an interim bilateral peace mechanism to replace the AA. KPA efforts to nullify the AA and to replace it with a new peace arrangement continue.

The most serious incidents to have occurred in the year since October 1, 1995, are:

On October 3, 1995, the KPA permitted two civilians to cross the MDL, a major violation. When the UNC attempted to protest this violation, the KPA unilaterally adopted the position of refusing to receive UNC protests of KPA Armistice violations.

On October 17, 1995, ROK Army personnel killed an armed infiltrator along the Imjin River southwest of the DMZ. The infiltrator was later determined to have come from the DPRK. The KPA subsequently refused to accept the UNC protest.

On April 4, 1996, in a meeting with UNC officers at Panmunjom, KPA officers read a statement that the KPA had given up "its duty concerning maintenance and administration of the MDL and DMZ assumed by the Military Armistice Agreement."

For three consecutive nights from April 5 through 7, 1996, approximately 120 armed KPA soldiers entered the neutral Joint Security Area at Panmunjom carrying mortars and recoilless rifles, occupied field fortifications, and remained until late in the evening.

On April 11, 1996, three KPA soldiers crossed the MDL and moved approximately 200 meters into the UNC portion of the eastern zone of the DMZ, where they remained for approximately three hours before the approach of UNC DMZ police caused them to move back to the KPA side.

On May 19, 1996, five KPA soldiers crossed the MDL and moved approximately 20 meters into the UNC portion of the DMZ before returning to the KPA side.

On September 18, 1996, a submarine with an estimated complement of 26 persons became disabled off the east coast of the ROK. Its occupants put ashore on the territory of the ROK. An investigation determined that the vessel originated in the DPRK. During subsequent ROK operations, 11 KPA personnel were found dead, one was captured, and 11 were killed. One individual remains unaccounted for. A UNC protest of the Armistice violation was refused by the KPA. On December 30 the DPRK expressed its regret for the incident and indicated that it would work to see that such an incident does not recur.

(3) Implementation of the Joint Denuclearization Declaration and North-South Dialogue

Implementation of Joint Denuclearization Declaration

On January 1, 1992, the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea issued the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. The provisions of the Joint Declaration state that the North and South:

- shall not test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons;
- shall use nuclear energy solely for peaceful purposes;
- shall not possess nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities, and;
- in order to verify the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, shall conduct inspections of the objects selected by the other side and agreed upon between the two sides, in accordance with procedures and methods to be determined by the North-South Nuclear Control Commission which shall be established within one month of the effectuation of this joint declaration.

The DPRK and the ROK held a series of North-South Joint Nuclear Control Commission meetings in early 1992 as specified in the Joint Declaration, but these were discontinued as relations between the two Korean states worsened and the DPRK threatened to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and refused to cooperate with the IAEA. As a result, the absence of sustained governmental talks between the ROK and DPRK has delayed further implementation of the Denuclearization Declaration.

The United States has, however, taken steps to encourage DPRK compliance with the Joint Declaration by encouraging North-South dialogue and ensuring DPRK implementation of the Agreed Framework. The Agreed Framework itself explicitly provides that the DPRK will take steps to implement the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. In addition, the Agreed Framework, as a step towards full implementation of the Denuclearization Declaration, has succeeded in eliciting positive DPRK movement on key provisions of the Declaration. Specifically, North Korea's willingness to immediately freeze and eventually dismantle its graphite-moderated nuclear reactors and related facilities has halted activities that, had they not been stopped, would have given the DPRK a nuclear weapons capability. Such a capability would have been a threat to peace and security on the Korean Peninsula as well as to Northeast Asia. The DPRK agreement to forego reprocessing under the Agreed Framework and to replace its existing nuclear reactors with proliferation-resistant LWRs represents a major step toward assuring the DPRK will not test, manufacture, produce, store, deploy or possess nuclear weapons. All these steps, aside from advancing the goals of the Joint Declaration, go beyond the NPT's requirements.

Implementation of North-South Dialogue

The U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework provides that "the DPRK will engage in North-South dialogue." In pursuit of this objective, the U.S. has taken diplomatic steps with both North and South Korea to encourage DPRK compliance with its commitments to engage in dialogue and to support South Korean initiatives toward the North. The U.S. has also encouraged China, over the course of implementing the Agreed Framework, to use its influence to encourage the DPRK, among other things, to participate more fully in dialogue with the South. While the North Korean response to our efforts has not been as forthcoming as we would like, the U.S. continues to firmly pursue the objective of increased North-South dialogue.

It is the firm position of the United States that North-South contacts are the key to resolving the most important issues on the peninsula. We have used every available opportunity to press the DPRK to resume North-South dialogue, as it is committed to do under the terms of the Agreed Framework. The U.S. has consistently made clear in bilateral contacts with the DPRK, that improvement in North-South relations is key to peace and security on the Korean Peninsula and a requirement of improved U.S.-DPRK bilateral relations. Prior to the signing of the Agreed Framework, Ambassador Robert L. Gallucci, during his tenure as Chairman of the Senior Steering Committee on Korea, frequently raised the issue of North-South dialogue in his correspondence with his North Korean counterpart, First Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Kang Sok Ju. North Korean acceptance of direct

dialogue with the ROK was an essential element of the U.S. negotiating strategy with the DPRK and was successfully obtained in concluding the Agreed Framework. As of October 1995, contact and correspondence with DPRK Vice Minister Kang has been maintained by Ambassador Winston Lord, Assistant Secretary of State, who continues to raise the same issues.

During the first year of implementation of the Agreed Framework, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Hubbard raised North-South issues repeatedly with the DPRK in Kuala Lumpur over the course of negotiating the Light Water Reactor (LWR) Supply Agreement. Mr. Hubbard continued to address this issue with North Korean Ambassador-at-Large Ho Jong in December 1995. In addition, these points were made at all three rounds of U.S.-DPRK negotiations on the opening of liaison offices. More recently, U.S. officials at the Director-level continue to stress to their North Korean counterparts, both in New York and in Washington, the importance of improving DPRK relations with the ROK.

Implementation of the Agreed Framework has created and continues to create many occasions for direct North-South contact. The Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), established by the U.S., ROK, and Japan to oversee implementation of various components of the Agreed Framework, has proven to be an effective vehicle for this purpose. KEDO has engaged in extensive negotiations with the DPRK on the LWR supply agreement and related protocols. ROK Government officials and technical experts have participated in the formulation of KEDO's negotiating strategy; have directly engaged in negotiations with the DPRK; and have held numerous consultations with DPRK experts on technical-related issues. South Koreans also comprise the majority of technical experts on KEDO site survey teams dispatched to the DPRK to survey the proposed reactor site.

In support of ROK initiatives, we have conveyed South Korean positions -- and U.S. support for those positions -- to the DPRK and others, sometimes with positive results. In 1995, North and South Korea held a series of bilateral meetings in Beijing that produced an agreement whereby the South provided 150,000 tons of rice to the North as a grant. In December of that same year, the DPRK, at U.S. urging, released the crew of a South Korean fishing vessel which had strayed into North Korean waters, a step which the ROK had been urging the DPRK to take for some time. In 1996, the U.S., ROK, and Japan consulted on a consolidated appeal from various United Nations' agencies including World Food Program (WFP) for use in flood-related relief in North Korea. It was agreed that to address this humanitarian crisis and to support stability on the Peninsula, the U.S., ROK and Japan would each donate humanitarian assistance to North Korea.

It is against this backdrop that President Clinton and President Kim Young Sam of the Republic of Korea on April 16, 1996, issued a joint proposal for Four Party Talks (U.S., ROK, DPRK, China) to discuss peace on the Korean Peninsula. In announcing this initiative, the two Presidents confirmed the fundamental principle that the establishment of a stable, permanent peace on the Korean peninsula was an important goal of the Korean people and that South and North Korea should take the lead in a renewed search for peace. In addition, the Four Party proposal can begin a process that will lead to tension reduction, greater economic cooperation and eventually the creation of a new, permanent peace mechanism. In support of this important initiative, the U.S. has agreed to play an active role and has raised the importance of encouraging North-South dialogue and North Korean participation in the four-party talks with other countries, notably China, Japan, and Russia. Assistant Secretary Lord, briefing the press following President Clinton's meeting with Chinese President Jiang Zemin at the Asian Pacific Economic Conference (APEC) meetings in Manila in November 1996, noted that the Chinese not only supported the idea of North-South dialogue as a basic principle but had confirmed PRC participation the four-party process.

In U.S.-DPRK talks in December 1996, the DPRK committed itself to attend a joint U.S.-ROK briefing on the Four Party peace proposal. It was agreed that the briefing would take place on January 29. Although the DPRK reserved a decision on participating in the Four Party talks per se, its expressed willingness to attend the joint briefing involving the ROK was encouraging. Subsequently, however, the DPRK informed us that it would be unable to attend the joint briefing as previously agreed. The DPRK explained that, although it remained committed to attending the joint briefing, it was giving first priority to the procurement of grain to address a major food shortfall. The Four Party proposal remains on the table, and we hope that the DPRK will agree that it represents the best means for securing lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula. In mid-February, the DPRK requested that the joint briefing be rescheduled for March 5, 1997.

4) North Korean Compliance with the Agreed Framework

Described below are the relevant commitments undertaken by the DPRK in the Agreed Framework and the Confidential Minute:

The freeze on the DPRK's graphite moderated reactors and related facilities will be fully implemented within one month of the date of this document.

The DPRK agreed to implement the freeze on its nuclear facilities within one month after signing the Agreed Framework. Since November 1994, all of North Korea's graphite-moderated nuclear facilities have been frozen.

Specifically, this means no refueling or operation of the 5 MW research reactor; no construction on the 50 and 200 MW reactors; no reprocessing and sealing of the reprocessing facility; no operation of the fuel fabrication plant; and no construction of new graphite-moderated reactors or related facilities.

During the one month period, and throughout the freeze, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will be allowed to monitor this freeze, and the DPRK will provide full cooperation to the IAEA for this purpose.

The IAEA has maintained a continuous presence at the Nyongbyon nuclear facility and has continued with inspection activities related to verifying and monitoring the freeze in the DPRK according to the terms of the Agreed Framework. These activities have allowed it to determine that North Korea is complying with the freeze provisions of the Agreed Framework. In addition to IAEA monitoring activities, the United States has its own National Technical Means which give us further confidence that the DPRK is complying with these provisions of the agreement.

While the IAEA has been monitoring the nuclear freeze, it has also conducted bilateral discussions with the DPRK to resolve a number of issues, some related to technical aspects of freeze monitoring. North Korean and IAEA officials met in January, June, and September of 1996, and the two sides resolved a number of these issues related to spent fuel canning and safeguarding the nuclear materials which are being safely stored.

Other issues discussed relate to the preservation of historical data that the IAEA will find useful in determining the amount of plutonium the DPRK produced in the past. Under the terms of the Agreed Framework, "when a significant portion of the LWR project is completed, but before delivery of key nuclear components," the DPRK will come into full compliance with its safeguards agreement with the IAEA, including taking all steps that may be deemed necessary by the IAEA, following consultations with the Agency with regard to verifying the accuracy and completeness of the DPRK's initial report on all nuclear material in the DPRK. Current IAEA-DPRK discussions are the beginning of that process. In the June 1996 meeting, the North presented a paper concerning the preservation of historical data at Nyongbyon. Differences between the two sides still remain, as reflected in recent statements by IAEA Director General Hans Blix. This issue was discussed in September and will be the topic for further negotiation between the DPRK and IAEA.

Dismantlement of the DPRK's graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities will be completed when the LWR project is completed.

At present, North Korea is not required by the Agreed Framework to take immediate steps to comply with this requirement of the agreement.

The U.S. and the DPRK will cooperate in finding a method to store safely the spent fuel from the 5 MW(e) experimental reactor during the construction of the LWR project, and to dispose of the fuel in a safe manner that does not involve reprocessing in the DPRK.

This topic is addressed in a separate certification.

The DPRK will remain a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and will allow implementation of its safeguards agreement under the Treaty.

As specified in the Agreed Framework, the DPRK has remained a party to the NPT. Paragraph IV, subparagraph 2 of the Agreed Framework specifies that "upon conclusion of the supply contract for the provision of the LWR project, ad hoc and routine inspections will resume under the DPRK's safeguards agreement with the IAEA with respect to facilities not subject to the freeze." With the successful conclusion of the agreement on the supply of light-water reactors (LWRs) to the DPRK, signed between the DPRK and KEDO in New York City on December 15, 1995, the DPRK agreed to allow the IAEA to resume such inspections.

While this is a first step towards the DPRK's adherence to its safeguards agreement, additional actions are not immediately required. As mentioned above, the IAEA and DPRK have begun discussions relating to the preservation of historical data which will prove useful in eventually bringing the DPRK into full compliance with its safeguards agreement. But full compliance is not required by the Agreed Framework until "a significant portion of the LWR project is completed, but before delivery of key nuclear components." That will not be reached for some years.

Within three months of the date of this document, both sides will reduce barriers to trade and investment, including restrictions on telecommunications services and financial transactions.

In January 1995, the DPRK announced that it was lifting all existing restrictions against trade with the United States.

MEMORANDUM OF JUSTIFICATION
UNDER SECTION 614 OF THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT
TO PROVIDE A U.S. CONTRIBUTION TO
THE KOREAN PENINSULA ENERGY DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATION

The Administration proposes that up to \$25.0 million in FY 1997 Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs funds be used for a U.S. contribution to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), an international organization established to implement portions of the Agreed Framework signed between the United States and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) on October 21, 1994. This funding level for U.S. contributions to KEDO was specified in the Administration's congressional presentation documents for FY 1997 and was appropriated by Congress for this purpose. KEDO would be permitted to use the U.S. contribution to help cover its FY 1997 administrative and heavy fuel oil shipment expenses.

In order to make available the funds appropriated for this contribution, the President intends to exercise his authority under section 614(a)(1) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, to authorize the voluntary contribution to KEDO without regard to applicable statutory restrictions within the scope of this section.

The Agreed Framework addresses U.S. and international concerns about the DPRK's nuclear weapons program and, if fully implemented, will lead ultimately to the complete dismantlement of North Korea's current nuclear program. Under the U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework, the U.S. represented that it would "organize under its leadership an international consortium to finance and supply the light-water reactor (LWR) project to be provided to the DPRK." In order to meet this pledge, the U.S., South Korea (ROK) and Japan agreed on the creation of an international organization, KEDO, to implement the reactor project, the annual delivery of 500,000 metric tons of heavy fuel oil to North Korea and other possible projects called for in the Agreed Framework (e.g., the transfer of spent fuel out of the DPRK for ultimate disposition). The U.S., ROK and Japan have played and will continue to play leading roles in KEDO.

KEDO's purpose is to coordinate cooperation among interested parties in the international community and to facilitate the financing and execution of projects needed to implement the Agreed Framework. KEDO members have agreed to

cooperate in taking the steps necessary to implement the Agreed Framework consistent with the Charter of the United Nations, the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the North-South Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Moreover, KEDO will obtain assurances that nuclear materials, equipment, or technology transferred to the DPRK in connection with projects undertaken by KEDO will be used exclusively for such projects, only for peaceful purposes, and in a manner that ensures the safe use of nuclear energy. The continued funding of KEDO is critical to the success of the specific objectives of the Agreed Framework, the general goals of international nuclear nonproliferation, and the aim of maintaining peace and security on the Korean Peninsula.

KEDO is located in New York and is directed by an Executive Board consisting of representatives of the original member countries-- the U.S., Japan, and the ROK. Other members may participate in its activities by serving on advisory committees covering the organization's projects, attending the KEDO General Conference, participating in ad hoc technical meetings relating to KEDO projects and, in some cases, sending technical experts to serve in the KEDO secretariat. The day-to-day operations of KEDO are directed by Executive Director Stephen Bosworth, former U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines, assisted by two Deputy Executive Directors (one from Japan and one from the ROK). KEDO has contracted with private firms for the bulk of the legal, technical, and financial expertise required to oversee the LWR project and other projects. It has a secretariat consisting of approximately 30 people to carry out its functions, many on detail from member countries.

The U.S. contribution to KEDO will help fund: 1) KEDO's FY 1997 costs for office space, office supplies, communications, consulting costs and legal services, and employee remuneration for a staff of about thirty people, including the Executive Director, the two Deputy Directors, and support personnel; and 2) a portion of the estimated \$60 million worth of heavy fuel oil due to be shipped in FY 1997. These funds are essential to KEDO's ability to meet the terms of the U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework regarding the provision of heavy fuel oil. Should KEDO fail to meet these deliveries, the DPRK might renege on its Agreed Framework obligations, including possibly breaking the freeze on its nuclear program. Hence, early transfer of these funds is essential to meeting our nonproliferation objectives in the DPRK.

For these reasons, it is important to the security interests of the United States to make a U.S. contribution of up to \$25 million to KEDO notwithstanding any provision of law within the scope of section 614(a)(1).



February 25, 1997

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MEMORANDUM FOR JOYCE A. HARMON
ACTING EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SUBJECT: Presidential Action Required to Make the U.S.
Contribution to the Korean Peninsula Energy
Development Organization (KEDO)

This memorandum requests that the President sign the attached Presidential determination and authorize submission of the report required under the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1997 (as enacted in P.L. 104-208) ("FY 1997 Appropriations Act"). In addition, it recommends that the President authorize the Department of State to consult with, and provide the attached written policy justification to, relevant committees of the Congress concerning the proposed waiver of legal provisions restricting the U.S. contribution to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization ("KEDO").

In its congressional presentation documents, the Administration requested \$25 million for the U.S. contribution to KEDO. In the FY 1997 Appropriations Act, Congress capped the amount we could make available to KEDO at this level. However, Congress authorized such funds only for KEDO's administrative and heavy fuel oil expenses, thereby precluding FY 1997 funds being used for KEDO's light-water reactor project.

In addition, Congress created (or left in place) a number of obstacles to the U.S. contribution to KEDO. First, it refused to include language that would permit the obligation of funds without the President exercising his authority under section 614(a)(1) of the Foreign Assistance Act ("FAA") to find that it is "important to the security interests of the United States" to make the contribution without regard to provisions of law within the scope of that section. (Potential legal restrictions on direct or indirect assistance to the DPRK include sections 307, 620A, and 620(f), of the FAA, section 530 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995, and sections 507, 516, 523, and 527 of the FY 1997 Appropriations Act.) Second, it required specific Presidential certifications and a Presidential report prior to the obligation of funds. Third, it required that

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"regular notification procedures" must be followed prior to the obligation of funds even though such procedures would not ordinarily apply in this case. The first two items, discussed in detail below, require Presidential action. The third item does not require Presidential action but is also discussed briefly below.

FY 1997 Certifications and Report

The FY 1997 Appropriations Act provides that funds may not be obligated for KEDO until the President certifies and reports to Congress that --

(1)(A) the U.S. is taking steps to assure that progress is made on the implementation of the January 1, 1992, Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the implementation of the North-South dialogue, and (B) North Korea is complying with the other provisions of the Agreed Framework between North Korea and the United States and with the Confidential Minute;

(2) North Korea is cooperating fully in the canning and safe storage of all spent fuel from its graphite-moderated nuclear reactors and that such canning and safe storage is scheduled to be completed by the end of fiscal year 1997; and

(3) North Korea has not significantly diverted assistance provided by the United States for purposes for which it was not intended.

As set forth more fully in the attached memorandum of justification, we believe the facts justify certifying each of these criteria. We recommend that the President sign the determination containing these certifications (attachment 4) prior to our consultations with Congress pursuant to section 614. These certifications are similar to those required in connection with the FY 1996 contribution to KEDO. Some in Congress may criticize or question the certification that the DPRK is "cooperating fully" with spent fuel canning due to the DPRK's two-month suspension of canning operations and the short time that we have had since canning resumed on January 8 to judge the DPRK's renewed commitment to the canning project. In response, we should emphasize that the FY 1997 Appropriations Act requires a certification that the DPRK is "cooperating fully" in the spent fuel canning operation, and note that DPRK teams are now working 72 hours per week as originally agreed. Indeed, the certification requirement enabled us to put substantial pressure on the DPRK to resume full cooperation in the canning operation, given the DPRK's reliance on heavy fuel oil shipments provided by KEDO and funded by the U.S. contribution to KEDO. In short, we believe this certification

is justified and that any Congressional criticism can be effectively countered.

In addition, before funds can be obligated for the U.S. contribution to KEDO under this legislation, the President must report to the Congress on --

(1) the cooperation of North Korea in the process of returning to the United States the remains of United States military personnel who are listed as missing in action as a result of the Korean conflict (including conducting joint field activities with the United States);

(2) violations of the military armistice agreement of 1953;

(3) the actions which the United States is taking to assure that North Korea is consistently taking steps to implement the Joint Declaration on Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and engage in North-South dialogue; and

(4) all instances of non-compliance with the Agreed Framework between North Korea and the United States and the Confidential Minute, including diversion of heavy fuel oil.

The report at Attachment 3 provides this information. We recommend that the President authorize State to submit this report prior to our section 614 consultations with Congress.

Having the Presidential certifications and report in hand will significantly assist the section 614 consultation process and deprive Congress of a grounds for delay. At the same time, we note that the first two elements of the Presidential report -- cooperation concerning MIA remains and compliance with the armistice agreement -- raise the issue of the North Korean submarine running aground on the east coast of South Korea. The North-South tensions resulting from this incident have delayed the second joint U.S.-DPRK operation for the recovery of MIA remains, previously scheduled for September 1996. This delay and other repercussions of the submarine incident could prompt Members of Congress or staffers to seek to delay the President's section 614 determination or to put a "hold" on the obligation of funds in response to our notification (see below).

Section 614 Determination

As with all previous contributions to KEDO, we must use section 614 of the FAA to waive the various prohibitions against assistance to the DPRK, which are based on factors such as North Korea's communist regime and its support for terrorism. State requests authority to initiate the section 614 process by consulting with the appropriate congressional committees (the House and Senate Appropriations Committees, the

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Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and the House International Relations Committee). Following consultations, the President may make a determination, and notify in writing the Speaker of the House and the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, that the furnishing of assistance under this authority "is important to the security interests of the United States."

With respect to both the FY 1996 and FY 1997 appropriations acts, State requested that Congress include language that would permit the contribution to KEDO notwithstanding the provisions of law prohibiting direct or indirect assistance to the DPRK. Such language would have obviated the need for the President to exercise his authority under section 614 every year to allow the U.S. contribution to KEDO, yet Congress has not included such language. However, Congress fully expects the President to use section 614 for this contribution, so the use of section 614 per se should not be controversial (as it has been in some other cases).

(NOTE: Attachment 1 is a draft Presidential determination pursuant to section 614 provided for review purposes only. It should not be signed by the President until after State's consultations with Congress have been completed. Only the Presidential determination pursuant to the FY 1997 Appropriations Act (attachment 4) should be signed by the President at this time.)

Notification Procedures

The FY 1997 Appropriations Act requires that the "regular notification procedures" apply to the obligation of these funds. Under this provision we will need to provide an appropriate notification to Congress 15 days before making funds available. Although we are not legally required to honor any "hold" that the relevant committees might place on the notification, we have consistently waited for the lifting of such holds before obligating funds.


This year's U.S. contribution to KEDO will be used to pay for administrative and heavy fuel oil ("HFO") expenses. KEDO is facing a financial crisis unless the U.S. can provide these funds rapidly. Under the terms of the Agreed Framework, KEDO is expected to ship 500,000 metric tons of heavy fuel oil annually to North Korea at an estimated yearly cost of \$60 million. KEDO needs the 1997 U.S. contribution in order to fund heavy fuel oil shipments to the DPRK in 1997 as specified in the U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework. In addition, KEDO currently has no funding for further oil shipments. KEDO has been gathering increasing international support, most notably the

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recent decision by European Union foreign ministers to join KEDO and provide approximately \$20 million annually over the next five years. However, the U.S. contribution for FY 1997 is still critical to KEDO's program.

Accordingly, in the event of a congressional "hold" on the U.S. contribution to KEDO, State and/or other senior government officials may have to call the chairs or key Members of the committees of jurisdiction to have the "hold" removed.

In conclusion, we recommend that the President authorize the State Department to initiate consultations with, and provide a written justification to, the appropriate committees of Congress in preparation for the President exercising his authority under section 614 to permit the U.S. contribution to KEDO. We further recommend that the President sign the Presidential Determination at attachment 4 and authorize the State Department to submit to the appropriate committees both this determination and the report required under the FY 1997 Appropriations Act.



William J. Burns
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

- (1) Draft Presidential determination under Section 614
- (2) Letters of Notification re: Section 614 and transmittal of Presidential determination and report under FY 1997 Appropriations Act
- (3) Memorandum of Justification re: Section 614
- (4) Draft Presidential determination under FY 1997 Appropriations Act
- (5) Memorandum of Justification re: Presidential determination under FY 1997 Appropriations Act
- (6) Report under FY 1997 Appropriations Act

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003b. note	Todd Stern to POTUS re attached memo (1 page)	03/18/1997	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
William Davis (Legislative Affairs)
OA/Box Number: 959

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea/South Korea [1]

2009-0528-F
kc1453

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003c. memo	Samuel Berger and John Hilley to POTUS re US Contribution to KEDO (3 pages)	03/12/1997	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

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National Security Council
William Davis (Legislative Affairs)
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Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003d. memo	Gary Samore to Jim Steinberg re KEDO (2 pages)	03/10/1996	P1/b(1)

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003e. memo	action, Gary Samore to Samuel Berger re Releasing US Funding to KEDO (1 page)	03/04/1997	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
William Davis (Legislative Affairs)
OA/Box Number: 959

FOLDER TITLE:

North Korea/South Korea [1]

2009-0528-F
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