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Folder Title:

POTUS [President of the United States]-Travel (Venezuela, Brazil, Argentina, October 13-18, 1997) [4]

Staff Office-Individual:

Inter-American Affairs

Original OA/ID Number:

1361

Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:	Stack:
37	5	9	3	V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	Samuel Berger and Mack McLarty to the President, re: Proposed Communications Plan For Your Trip to South American Trip (8 pages)	ca. 09/1997	P1/b(1)
002. memo	Peter Allgeier to Jim Dobbins and Lael Brainard, re: Possible Mercosur Meeting during POTUS Trip (1 page)	08/08/1997	P1/b(1)
003. memo	Antony Blinken and David Leavy to Samuel Berger, Mack McLarty, Jim Steinberg, and Anne Lewis, re: Preliminary Communications Plan for the President's Trip to South America (8 pages)	08/13/1997	P1/b(1)
004. memo	James Dobbins to Samuel Berger, re: Planning for the October Trip to South America (2 pages)	07/11/1997	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Inter-American Affairs
OA/Box Number: 1361

FOLDER TITLE:

POTUS [President of the United States]-Travel (Venezuela, Brazil, Argentina, October 13-18, 1997) [4]

2009-1155-F
ke2443

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DEC ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

5699
redc

By KDE NARA, Date 05/09/14

September 5, 1997

2009-1155-F

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER/MACK MCLARTY

FROM:

ANTONY BLINKEN ^{AB} & DAVE LEAVY ^{DL}

SUBJECT:

Preliminary Communications Plan for POTUS Trip to
South America

On August 19 we submitted to you the original version of this document. The memo to the President at Tab I has been revised to reflect your edits and comments.

Concurrence by:

James Dobbins, Bob Kyle

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I.

Attachment

Tab I Communications Plan for POTUS Trip to South America

CONFIDENTIAL

Classified by: Antony Blinken

Reason: 1.5 (d)

Declassify On: 9/5/2007

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

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UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9706489
RECEIVED: 24 SEP 97 18

TO: BERGER



FROM: NAPLAN
BLINKEN

DOC DATE: 25 SEP 97
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: ARGENTINA
VENEZUELA
PUBLIC STATEMENTS

BRAZIL
ANSA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: BACKGROUND INFO FOR BERGER BREAKFAST W/ SOUTH AMER INFLUENTIALS 29
SEP

ACTION: NOTED BY BERGER

DUE DATE: 30 SEP 97 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: NAPLAN

LOGREF: 9706494

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BLINKEN
DESOUZA
DOBBINS
NAPLAN
NSC CHRON

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSTSM

CLOSED BY: NSSWD

DOC 1 OF 1

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9706489

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 BERGER
001

Z 97092620 FOR INFORMATION
X 97092915 NOTED BY BERGER

UNCLASSIFIED

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 6489
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS
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	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Cosgriff	<u>1</u>	<u>14/9/26</u>	
Rice			
Davies			
Kerrick			
Steinberg	<u>2</u>	<u>Natl Sec Adv...</u>	
Berger	<u>3</u>		
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	<u>TMA 9-29</u>	<u>N</u>
Records Mgt.	<u>5</u>		

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

197 SEP 26 PM 3:58

Exec Sec Office has diskette uo

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

6489

September 25, 1997

INFORMATION

Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: ANTONY J. BLINKEN **ATB**
FROM: STEVEN J. NAPLAN
SUBJECT: South America Influentials Breakfast

NOTED

On Monday, September 29 you will be meeting with 10 South America experts for a conversation in anticipation of the President's trip to Venezuela, Brazil, and Argentina next month.

This breakfast is, in part, an opportunity for you to deliver the Administration's South America and Fast Track message to these influentials, and to answer their questions about specific policy matters. Additionally, the breakfast provides you with an opportunity to probe the views of these outside experts and to benefit from their varying perspectives on the region.

Attachment

Tab A Guest List
Tab B InterAm Meeting Outline and Suggested Questions
Tab C Fast Track Talking Points
Tab D Materials Authored by Attending Guests

9/29/97 South America Influentials Breakfast:

Al Fishlow

Paul A. Volker Senior Fellow for International Economics, Council on Foreign Relations. Served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs 1975-76. Recent publications include "Future Sustainable Latin American Growth" summer, 1996. Met last month with Chilean President Frei and visited Brazil. Fishlow has been studying social security reform in South America and considering the prospects for implementing the Chilean model elsewhere in the region. Favors Administration's approach on Fast Track and would like to see USG take a leadership role in promoting education reform and higher ed in the region. *(Recent Fishlow speech on U.S.-Latin America relations attached).*

Michael May

Director, MERCOSUR-South America Project at CSIS. Director of CSIS U.S.-Argentine Caucus. Long time consultant to American businesses with interests in the region (including Upjohn) and manager of Latin American Affairs at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. May argues that it is imperative that the USG regain a leadership role in the region, with an awareness that Brazilian self-interest will inevitably lead to conflict with the U.S. and that Argentina can serve as a moderating influence on Brazil. Concerned that South America has felt forgotten by the Administration and is thrilled that POTUS is 'finally getting focused' on the region. *(Recently submitted op/ed to Brazilian publication re POTUS visit to Brazil attached).*

Richard Feinberg

Professor of International Relations and Special Assistant to the Chancellor for Pacific Rim Affairs, University of California, San Diego. Former Senior Director Inter-American Affairs, NSC. His book, Summitry in the Americas: A Progress Report, was released last April by the Institute for International Economics. Feinberg reports that while the Brazilian Ambassador to the U.S. objected to his book's characterization of Brazil's foreign policy, that the Mexican and Argentinean governments were pleased with the book's conclusions. (Argentina's Foreign Minister penned the preface to the Spanish-language edition of the book.) Feinberg traveled to Argentina, Chile and Uruguay this summer as a participant in the World Bank's annual conference on Latin American economies. After the breakfast, Feinberg will remain in Washington to co-host an OAS conference on implementing the Summit of the Americas. *(5/4/97 San Diego Union Tribune Op/Ed "An Historic Opportunity for Clinton" attached).*

Sue Schwab

Dean, School of Public Affairs, University of Maryland. Served as an executive for corporate strategy at Motorola, 1993-95. Served as Assistant Secretary of Commerce and Director General of the U.S. and Foreign Commercial Service in the Bush Administration. Served as former Sen. Danforth's chief international trade aide. Schwab is predominantly an authority on trade and has insights on the approaching congressional debate over Fast Track.

Jose Miguel Vivanco

Executive Director, Human Rights Watch/Americas. Served as legal advisor for the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of the OAS. Vivanco met recently with President Cardoso and is pleased with his national human rights plan for Brazil. Would like to see POTUS promote Cardoso's plan. Beyond his extensive interest in human rights, Vivanco is also focused on the increasing levels of criminality (common violence, gang-related and organized crime) in the region and public frustration with the lack of effective judicial systems. Has twice raised concerns over police brutality and prison conditions in Venezuela with President Caldera. Offers very high praise for the accuracy of State's annual human rights report. Would like to see American ambassadors in the region adopt the more "aggressive" stances of their EU counterparts re human rights. Vivanco is a Chilean national.

Thomas Quigley

Policy Adviser on Latin America and Caribbean Affairs, Office of International Justice and Peace of the U.S. Catholic Conference. Visited Peru recently to meet with the Bishops Council on Human Rights and visited Colombia last year re drugs. Favors Clinton Administration's approach toward the region over past Administration efforts. Presently focused as much on regional economic issues as on human rights. Quigley is personally ambivalent on Fast Track (the U.S. Catholic Conference "straddles" on NAFTA and free trade matters) and he is strongly opposed to the lifting of the weapons sales ban. Quigley opposes F-16 sales to Chile.

(Remarks to Latin American Conference on the Pastoral Work for Human Rights, delivered in Lima, Peru attached).

Peter Hakim (Inter-American Dialogue)

President, Inter-American Dialogue. Member of External Advisory Committee of the Latin America Program of the World Bank. Hakim recently met with President Cardoso in Brazil and with most of the Brazilian cabinet. Hakim is basically supportive of the general direction of Administration policy towards the region, but believes USG efforts need to be "reenergized." He is a strong proponent of Fast Track, would like to see a more multilateral approach on counternarcotics and Cuba and believes that the Summit of the Americas can serve as the pinnacle of hemispheric cooperation.

(9/14/97 Oxford Analytica essay "U.S.-Latin America Relations" attached).

Bernard Aronson

Chairman, ACON Investments. Served as International Advisor to Goldman, Sachs for Latin America. Former Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs. Has argued in the past that the U.S. generally ignores Latin America except during times of crisis.
(12/12/96 *Washington Post Op/Ed "Strengthen Democracies, Not Armies"* attached).

Robert Weiner

Senior Coordinator, Latin America and Caribbean Program, Lawyers Committee for Human Rights. Has made recent trips to Colombia, Paraguay, Peru and Bolivia. Visited Venezuela last year. Focused on World Bank, IDB and DoJ efforts to promote rule of law and good governance reforms in the region. Believes World Bank efforts are too narrow in scope, and not reflective of the consensus among the NGO and legal communities in the region. Weiner considers institutional reform a greater priority than trade, but also recognizes that the two issues can complement each other. He is concerned about prosecutorial "overeagerness" in the region, (particularly regarding the drug war) and the damage that he believes aggressive prosecutors have done to due process and human rights.
(8/17/97 *Washington Post Op/Ed "Colombia Emerges as the Bosnia of South America"* attached).

Joe Tulchin

Director, Latin American Program, The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Tulchin attended the Williamsburg Defense Ministerials of the Americas, and served as an official observer at the OAS Conference on Confidence Building Measures. Tulchin is particularly focused on civil-military relations in the region and he offers that expansion of investment in the region is an even greater priority than trade.
(7/11/97 *"Memo to Mack"* attached).

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D C. 20504

6494

September 26, 1997

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: JAMES F. DOBBINS

FROM: PATRICK J. DESOUZA *PD*

SUBJECT: Your Meeting With Latin American Influentials,
Monday, September 29, 1997 at 8am.

I. Purpose

Your meeting with these influentials provides an opportunity to discuss the Administration's Latin America policy on the eve of POTUS's trip. This second leg of three trips to the hemisphere within a year comes against the backdrop of congressional attention to sensitive issues such as fast track, arms sales, climate change and counternarcotics. These influentials may be helpful in providing feedback of how the themes and deliverables of the trip will affect the debate at home and abroad on these sensitive issues.

II. Background

Our communications strategy must now make the transition from successfully dealing with difficult issues facing our nearest neighbors and ourselves - drugs and immigration - to taking advantage of the opportunities for cooperation with important emerging markets in our hemisphere.

We will be highlighting a region that is embracing democracy, free markets and international cooperation and that can be the cornerstone for our own security and prosperity in the 21st century. We will also be underscoring the mutuality of interests in the hemisphere.

Shifting towards this positive message now will also be important for setting-up the broader message of the Santiago Summit: the emergence of a "new" hemisphere in which democratically-elected leaders are working hard to prepare our peoples for the 21st century. In fact, the principal deliverables on this trip map the main baskets of hemispheric

initiatives for Santiago: education, democracy, economic integration and poverty alleviation.

III. Key Issues

There are two central issues that you should discuss with the group. First, how can the positive areas of cooperation during the trip be reinforced over the long-run to change the negative images of Latin America in the United States and to advance a forward-looking development strategy. Second, how are these efforts likely to shape the current debates on fast track, arms sales, climate change and counternarcotics at home.

A. Areas of Cooperation and a Forward-Looking Development Strategy. At each stop, we will highlight certain areas of cooperation to advance mutual interests: energy and counter-narcotics in Venezuela, education and information technology in Brazil and security cooperation for international peacekeeping in Argentina. Each of these areas show how there are important opportunities to further long-run U.S. interests: reliable energy supply, open markets for our shared prosperity and security cooperation in the post-Cold War world.

Against this backdrop of cooperation, it will also be useful to discuss how to make the environment a long-run area of cooperation like these others.

B. Shaping the Debate At Home. There will be an interplay between the messages communicated on the trip and the actions currently before Congress and the American people.

Fast track authorization is critical, not only for a free trade agreement with Chile but also for the success of the Santiago Summit. The hemisphere has agreed to launch FTAA negotiations at the Summit. The energy and education/technology messages should make it clear for the fast track debate that there are business opportunities that we will lose to others, such as the EU, if we do not act. Education reform may help with concerns in the U.S. regarding labor exploitation in Latin America.

Sales of advanced armaments may also cause some concern among certain members of the U.S. Congress. The issue will be discussed against the backdrop of the MNNA designation for Argentina and the timing of our announcement on UN Security Council reform. Given President Frei's concerns regarding how the arms sales question will be managed in the U.S. Congress, it will be important to our credibility that we are able to

effectively communicate back home the distinctions between international peacekeeping designations such as MNNA and issues of modernization.

Finally, the public debate in the U.S. on Latin environmental regulation and increasing supplies of narcotics needs to be shaped. The counter-drug alliance announced in Venezuela will be helpful. On the other hand, basic disagreements with developing countries over climate change may adversely affect the prospects for Kyoto and may complicate the fast track debate.

IV. The Meeting

You may wish to open with short remarks to frame the main questions you would like addressed, and then begin the discussion with an initial question.

Opening Remarks

- This is the second leg of the President's three trips to the hemisphere within a year and will illustrate for the American people that a mutuality of interest in cooperation throughout the hemisphere exists.
- In Venezuela, Brazil and Argentina, the President will be presenting a 21st century agenda for the hemisphere: strengthening democracy, balancing energy production with environmental sensitivity, preparing citizens for the global economy through education and technology and enhancing security through multilateral approaches to counternarcotics and international peacekeeping.
- This leg will show the diversity of our hemisphere. Different than our nearest neighbors that pose challenges in terms of issues such as drugs and immigration, these nations represent examples of the historic opportunities that we have for cooperation in enhancing regional security and taking advantage of emerging markets.
- I would welcome your ideas about how to reinforce our long-run commitment to cooperation in this part of our hemisphere. These nations are fast growing markets and may offer a bulwark for prosperity and security.

- It is a challenge to communicate this sense of opportunity to Americans. Currently in front of Congress we have issues such as fast track, arms sales, climate change and counternarcotics. The politics of these policy issues will be affected by our efforts to promote cooperation throughout the hemisphere.

You might at this point in the meeting draw on some of the questions below:

[] contains name of influential you may ask question of if you choose

- How should we engage the American public and Congress in these opportunities for cooperation? [Schwab]
 - on an energy security initiative where Venezuela is our largest supplier of oil; [Aronson]
 - on a multilateral alliance against narcotics production and trafficking which we will initiate in Venezuela;
 - on an education and information technology initiative in Brazil which will illustrate how we must prepare our citizens for the global economy; [Fishlow, Feinberg]
 - on security cooperation with Argentina and others for the post-Cold War world; [Tulchin]
- How do we get at areas such as the environment and corruption in which cooperation is more difficult?
- How do we reinforce the progress that we are making with these emerging economies over the long-run? [Hakim]
- The Summit of the Americas next April will illustrate some of the major themes of this trip: education, democracy, economic integration and poverty alleviation. How do we make a successful transition from this trip to Santiago and beyond?

Concurrences by: Steve Naplan *PD for*

FAST TRACK FACT SHEET

FAST TRACK: IN AMERICA'S NATIONAL INTEREST

FAST TRACK MEANS: **IMPROVING OUR STANDARD OF LIVING**

- Keeping the Economy on the Fast Track. The President will use Fast Track authority to continue breaking down trade barriers and creating new jobs -- keeping America's economic expansion on the global fast track.
- The Economy Is Strong. The President's 3-part economic strategy of cutting the deficit, investing in education and training, and opening markets abroad is working. America has enjoyed the longest period of sustained growth in a generation— one-third from overseas trade. The result: Nearly 13 million new jobs, unemployment below 5%, inflation the lowest in a generation.
- Our Future Prosperity Depends on Trade. More than 95% of the world's consumers live outside the US. Many emerging economies in Asia and Latin America will grow at three times the rate of the US economy. America needs fast track to negotiate fair new trade agreements that will keep us competitive, expand our exports, create more jobs, and raise our standard of living.

FAST TRACK MEANS: **CREATING MORE JOBS**

- Breaking Down Barriers. The President, in consultation with Congress, will keep breaking down barriers to our products and services. That strategy is paying off for companies and workers. America is once again the world's largest total exporter, the largest producer of semiconductors, the largest producer of automobiles. Exports support over 11 million American jobs, including one in five manufacturing jobs and over the last four years have created 1.7 million new jobs.
- Sectoral Agreements. The President needs the flexibility to negotiate agreements and increase exports in sectors where the United States is most competitive: such as agriculture, medical equipment, telecommunications, and environmental technology.
- Regional Free Trade Agreements. America will also benefit from opening markets in Asia, Latin America, and Africa to US goods and services.
- Free and Fair Trade. The President supports raising labor standards, protecting the environment and expanding worker retraining and educational opportunities to ensure that no American is left out of the global economy.

FAST TRACK MEANS: **MAINTAINING AMERICA'S GLOBAL LEADERSHIP**

- Compete or Retreat. As the American people prepare to meet the challenges of the 21st century, we face a critical choice: Shape the global economy to America's advantage, or turn back and fail to compete for new business, new contracts, and new jobs.
- Credibility. Fast track gives the US credibility to negotiate tough trade deals. It preserves for Congress the ultimate decision to vote an agreement up or down, but without reopening it provision-by-provision and causing gridlock. That puts America in a strong position to negotiate trade agreements and maintains a partnership between the President and Congress that has worked for over 20 years.
- Continued Bipartisanship. Every President since 1974--Republican and Democratic--has had fast track authority. Congress has consistently recognized that the President must have the authority to break down foreign trade barriers, and a bipartisan majority of the United States Congress has consistently supported American leadership in opening markets and creating jobs.

FAST TRACK FACT SHEET

BASIC FACTS ABOUT FAST TRACK NEGOTIATING AUTHORITY

What is Fast Track?

- Expedited Procedure: Fast track is an expedited procedure for Congressional consideration of trade agreements. The three essential features of any fast track authority are: (1) extensive consultations and coordination with Congress throughout the process; (2) a vote on implementing legislation within a fixed period of time, and (2) an up or down vote, with no amendments. Congress is ensured a central role before, during and after negotiations.
- Credibility to Negotiate Tough Trade Deals: Fast Track gives the President credibility to negotiate tough trade deals. Congress is required to vote on an agreement without reopening any of its provisions, while retaining the ultimate power of voting it up or down. Fast Track puts America in a strong position to negotiate major trade agreements while maintaining a partnership between the President and Congress that has worked for over 20 years.

How will the President Use Fast Track?

The President has identified three main areas in which new trade agreements would greatly benefit the United States.

- The WTO Agenda: The “built-in” agenda of the World Trade Organization calls for negotiations on government procurement in 1997; intellectual property in 1998; agriculture in 1999; and trade in services in 2000. In each of these areas, the United States is the most competitive nation in the world and stands to benefit the most from writing the rules of trade.
- Key Sectors of the Future: The President also wants to build on the success of the Information Technology Agreement (ITA). This \$5 billion tariff cut on products for which the United States is the world’s leading producer was achieved by the use of residual tariff cutting authority. The Administration has identified 8 additional sectors for future negotiations: ITA II, chemicals, automotive, oilseeds, energy equipment and services, environmental technology and services, medical equipment and services, and wood and paper products. Other APEC members have submitted their “wish lists” and there is overlapping support for many of the US suggestions. Without fast track, it is very unlikely that this process will go forward.
- Emerging Economies: The President hopes to move forward in the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC) toward the goal of open trade by the year 2010 and with a Free Trade Agreement for the Americas (FTAA) by the year 2005. In both regions, economic growth rates are among the highest in the world and barriers to US exports remain high. Tariff reductions and greater market access will have a very positive effect on our exports. Without the active participation of the United States, both of these processes will slow considerably.

ALBERT FISHLOW

It is a great pleasure to be here today. I thank you sincerely for the invitation to attend and to address this distinguished group. By now you have discovered one of my fundamental defects: my prior and long experience with Brazil unfortunately condemns me to an imperfect Portanol. I would hope that is the only negative reaction to my presentation. But the question of US relations with Latin America usually has a way of provoking wide response. I welcome your reactions and questions. And I emphasize that my views are entirely my own private reactions.

I wish to speak about a play in three acts: past, present and future. The relationship with the United States enters importantly into all three. And that includes Chile. Whether one speaks of the nineteenth century and substantial Chilean exports of wheat to California; or of the failed promise of the Alliance for Progress; or of potential benefits from expanded trade and investment from a Free Trade Area of the Americas and a new engagement with the United States, one inevitably links the two halves of this hemisphere.

I do not wish to focus extensively on the past. History, on the whole, has not dealt kindly with Latin America. The United States evolved from colonial status to stable independence and an extraordinary rate of material advance that placed its income per capita higher than other countries by the beginning of the twentieth century. Latin American independence, gained in the early 19th century, unfortunately produced no such immediate and happy result. Instead of rapid advance and insertion into the new technology of the Industrial Revolution, there was initially decline in trade and material advance for most countries in the first half century after political autonomy had been achieved. And then thereafter, the differences became so large -and static comparative advantage so compelling- that it became almost impossible to catch up.

The tragedy of this unfortunate beginning lingers on even now virtually at the beginning of the 21st century. Look at the average level of income in the region and the high degree of inequality in the income distributions found throughout the area. Recall the debt crisis of the 1980s, and the negative effects broadcast widely throughout the region. Income per capita in Latin America did not grow for something like 15 years, the longest period of stagnation since the early part of the nineteenth century.

But now there is also the case of the "Asian Miracle." Following in the wake of Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore exhibited spectacular expansion from the 1960s on, and have achieved higher levels of income and much greater income equality than the Latin American countries. And there are still others in the sequence. Despite the currency problems of Thailand and its Asean neighbors -and the consequent adjustment that is necessary- it does not mean the end of Asian growth and emergence.

This obviously quickly brings me to the present and to the second act of my play. It has had a much better beginning. The impressive results are visible already.

In the last decade, Latin America has profoundly changed. Economically, it has discovered the virtues of consistent and continuous macroeconomic policy. That has translated into monetary and fiscal policies that have supported low rates of inflation in the region. In many of these countries, costs have been limited. For virtually the first time in the last 50 years, countries throughout the area have increases in prices at the one digit level. And it has moved away from protectionist strategies that sought to limit imports, but whose most profound and negative effects were to be found in constrained exports and regular balance of payments crises. Politically, it has seen the restoration of democratic principles and commitment to real popular participation virtually throughout the hemisphere. Militaries have retreated to the barracks, and has been replaced by capable civilian leaders committed to respect for constitutional guarantees. New individuals have come forward to participate in the political process, and that novelty has lead to new political groupings. And socially, there is now beginning in many countries the necessary attention to profound inequality of opportunity that has severely hampered past generations within the region. But this time, there is the shared understanding that improvements in equity and higher rates of aggregate expansion can be compatible.

These changes are beginning to lead to new and higher rates of growth in the hemisphere. Chile deserves special mention. Under Presidents Alwyn and Frei, income per capita has gone up more consistently and rapidly than elsewhere in the region. Other countries are beginning to achieve parallel results.

This new climate sees economic development emerging not from great national plans nor exceptional inflow of foreign resources, but from a rise in domestic savings. This is essential. Virtually all countries, except Chile, have yet to make this transition; they remain at a ratio of something like 20 percent of GDP. But at a minimum, in order to accomplish a growth rate of around 6 percent a year- which realistically should be the goal given the number of unemployed and underemployed- they require 25 percent investment. Foreign investment can regularly and dependably satisfy only 2 or 3 percent of the total. Mexico in 1994 and the recent events in Southeast Asia eloquently testify to that conclusion. The rest must come internally.

One place where savings can productively originate is the public sector. This turns former Latin American governmental priorities on their head. The key public-sector issue formerly was the application of resources through publicly owned and managed facilities. Now it must be acquiring resources to dispense to the private sector to enable them to invest productively. Inequality in the region is so great that acquiring savings only from those individuals that can afford it would likely lead to more inequality in the future; that is more the case with the high internal rates found in much of the region. What of a revised Social Security system, as in Chile, as origin of those public resources? I confess to remaining skeptical. Let me give only two reasons. First, the observed Chilean increase in domestic savings came long after the new pension system started in 1980; indeed, it is part of the process of expansion associated with a return to civilian rule, and is associated with increased business accumulation. Second, there appears to be

a negative relationship between private savings and more recent increases in pension assets.

Further research on the savings function will undoubtedly yield high results. But, meanwhile, generating positive public accumulation is clearly a strategy that has worked, and worked here where surpluses have been characteristic of the last decade. A casual look at the successful Asian experience, cited earlier, likewise confirms the relevance of government savings as a principal instrument. This places great weight on the new governments. They have to be in a position not merely to raise taxes, but even more importantly, to reduce bloated current expenses and to decentralize needed government outlays to states and municipalities.

These changes in Latin America have proceeded almost wholly from an internal set of priorities. That is what makes them both fundamental and enduring. The United States government did play a role in three dimensions. First, it contributed through the Brady bonds to an eventual end to the debt crisis. That write-off of liabilities assisted in the recovery phase that followed. Second, it intervened decisively in the Mexican case in early 1995 when a large package of assistance was necessary. And thirdly, it held out to all countries of the region except Cuba, at the Miami Summit in December 1994, an opportunity for closer association through a Free Trade Area of the Americas. That summit is about to be repeated to define the future direction of the free trade initiative; and the meeting will occur here in Santiago in April, 1998.

Free trade in the hemisphere from Alaska to Patagonia is clearly a central- but not exclusive- part of United States' policy. It has evolved over the last decade from agreement with Canada to ratification of NAFTA, including Mexico, in 1993 to the Miami meeting the following year. A whole process of joint activities and meetings has gone along with this process since it took root in 1994. The IDB and ECLA, in addition to the more than 30 countries that agreed to move ahead, have been actively engaged in committees dealing with all aspects of potential regional trade. Indeed, the degree of continuous travel involved in this work has made at least some ministerial assistants -who end up going- grateful.

On this subject I appreciate that I am now speaking to a partially frustrated audience. Chile was initially promised a position in NAFTA back in 1994. It is now 1997 and nothing has apparently happened. Or to put the case more accurately, there has not yet been introduced legislation to obtain the needed "fast-track" authority from Congress; without that provision, any trade agreement would be subject to impossibly complicating amendment.

But a great deal has happened here. Chile has reached agreement with Mercosur to become an active associate member of that pact. Chile has concluded agreement independently with Canada to establish free trade with that country, while it had already done so with Mexico. Chile has become a member of APEC. Chile is engaged in negotiation with the European Union to examine what relationship may occur with those

countries in the future. And Chilean barriers to trade, already low, are likely to move lower in the future.

And in addition, I am, of course, aware of more recent events detracting from the bilateral relationship. There is the lingering grapes episode from 1989. There is the California court ruling in June barring, on sanitary grounds, imports of chips and logs from Chile, New Zealand and Siberia. That led, erroneously, to banning of an import of processed timber, a move which was shortly reversed. In reality, something like 97% of export permits are still valid. Then, more recently, US salmon producers filed a complaint against alleged 'dumping' by eight Chilean salmon exporters. Since United States imports account for more than half of Chilean exports of salmon and trout, this is the more serious case. And on the other side, there are barriers to import of US wheat that have created a bit of a fuss.

I do not want to get into any of these specific issues. I do not know enough about them to say anything that might be useful. I simply want to note that these kinds of problems have become virtually a daily affair. With the European Community and Japan there is an immense range of issues that constantly arise: note the recent question of the merger of Boeing and McDonnell Douglas that almost led to severe difficulties involving the US and Europe. In a world of expanded trade -and trade has been growing at a rate of twice that of world gross product- such conflicts are inevitable where private interests have the democratic right to assert an opportunity to present their view. That does not mean that the private view is correct or ultimately prevails. But there is no alternative to giving it a voice.

On the question of "fast-track" and the Free Trade Area of the Americas, the Clinton Administration has just made a commitment to introduce the needed legislation on September 8. The next months should thus see a broad public debate on this issue in the United States. I hazard the guess that the Administration will get what it needs in order to move the process of freer trade in the hemisphere along. To come to Santiago without such authorization is virtually a default to a Brazilian initiative in favor of a South American Free Trade Area as a prelude to ultimate and eventual negotiation with NAFTA. To come to Santiago with that authority is to give the United States an opportunity to provide new leadership and sustained commitment to a broad and effective Free Trade Area of the Americas that will take shape in future years.

But it is essential to note that regardless of the initial route taken, the ultimate destination must be the same. The United States is too large and too important to ignore. A rapidly growing and developing Latin America needs both the commercial opportunity as well as the political alliance as an important source of support to the new development direction the region is taking. Even if the United States cannot directly provide resources to bail out Argentina, or Brazil, or Chile from financial problems, as it did Mexico, it can be of great assistance nonetheless in making markets aware of the changes occurring in the area.

What is important about an eventual regional group is not the static gain to be achieved from reduction in the levels of protection. Tariff levels have already fallen substantially throughout the area. The major benefit is the stimulus to new and expanded trade. Note that exchange with Mexico proceeded at much higher annual rates of growth subsequent to NAFTA than before. And the correlate of more rapid increase of trade and greater foreign investment will reinforce domestic factors making this a period of return to the developmental advance of past decades.

Therefore I diverge from those who argue that the most appropriate direction for Latin America in the future is the multilateral route through the WTO rather than the regional route with subsequent reduction of limitations to all trade. The United States is important as market as well as source of imports, foreign investment and technological change. For the countries of the region, newly committed to the importance of international trade, there is advantage to a proximate and committed neighbor. By next April, at Santiago, there will be an opportunity to judge whether the United States qualifies.

But the story of Latin American development will not end, even with the ultimate success of the Free Trade Area. History continues after 2005 and much more will be needed. The third and future act deals with the most important social problem facing the region, the highly unequal distribution of income found there.

Because the countries of the region have now consciously moved to a more market oriented strategy -as have the former Communist countries- this does not remove the state obligation for assuring access to education, health, adequate housing, etc. Populism is not the way to accomplish these objectives. Countries of the region have had adequate experiment to learn that higher minimum wages, price controls, rationing, and even highly differentiated tax rates, do not really work. Their first positive effects are replaced by subsequent negative ones as rules are avoided and evaded.

Improvement in education yields real social returns. The World Bank finds rates in excess of 25 percent for primary education, 15 to 18 percent for secondary and 13 to 16 percent for tertiary. East Asia stands as the classic case, with a higher increase in gross product for additional investment than is found in other regions. In good measure that reflects the advantage of assuring universal access. In Latin America, in many countries, this is the rule, but not the practice. Grade repetition, lack of completion even of primary school, and poor quality are the realities.

Education is also the factor that shows up repeatedly as the most important one in explaining differences in income levels, holding all other factors such as age, sector of work, occupation, etc. constant. One recent study shows Latin Americans with no schooling having a 56 percent probability of being in the lowest fifth of the income distribution, while those with university training had only a 4 percent chance. The proportions reverse at the top end. Undoubtedly education is partially serving as a proxy for other factors such as school quality and family characteristics. But its repetitive

importance makes abundantly clear that hopes for bettering the income distribution start with this factor.

More active participation by government is necessary, particularly at the local level, where efforts must be undertaken to promote attendance and to maintain school quality. Curricular reform is urgently required in many countries. Beyond this, there is real need to confront the misallocation of resources inherent in extensive state subsidization of higher education that is repeatedly found in the region. The pattern of private secondary training to enable students to pass entrance examinations to free public universities is characteristic of the region. Those who can afford to pay at the earlier stage are those who benefit later from access to expensive -but unpaid- training.

What is true for education also is characteristic of a whole range of ancillary activities with similar effects in improving the quality of labor: improved nutrition, better health and other social investments. Indeed, for some lower income countries, the effect of such outlays may be greater than for education itself.

The great problem of such a strategy is that its effects are delayed by a generation, and governments seem always pressed by more immediate priorities. Chile merits credit for being an exception to this rule. But the lag in effect is real and must be compensated for. Those of the previous generation will not benefit. For them, the principal hope remains rapid economic advance, with provision for greater social services for those with inadequate incomes.

In such a third act, the focus is inherently domestic. The United States can help in a variety of ways, such as providing access to the new technology of the internet that is expanding at an enormous rate. The resources of the World Bank and IDB will also supplement. But the real political support necessarily must emerge locally and continuously. Without such a change, in another twenty five years, the same problems and deficiencies will remain - as has been true of the last twenty five.

But the mood of the region is shifting. There is now a new realism everywhere. That is a cause for a new optimism. Perhaps the beginning of the 21st century will later be known as the Latin American "miracle."

Submission to Brazilian Publication "Amanha"

President Clinton's Visit to Brazil: a Prelude to Cooperation or Strife

by Michael May and Sidney Weintraub

Questions have arisen in Brazil regarding U.S. policy in the Americas, especially the effect that the passage of fast-track negotiating authority will have on American involvement in the region. Once formally requested by the president, the U.S. Congress will need to approve the proposal. Fast-track negotiating authority is crucial in that it would allow the president to negotiate trade agreements that would be voted on by the Congress without amendments. Fast-track gives U.S. trade negotiators credibility in that potential partners in a free-trade negotiations would know that the accord reached with the U.S. executive branch would not be substantially changed by the Congress, although the agreement need not necessarily be approved. In fact, there is a growing feeling in the region that the lack of fast-track authority has diminished the posture of the U.S. abroad.

Despite scepticism that exists in some Brazilian circles, the granting of fast-track is preferably before the hemispheric negotiations start but surely before they are concluded, the necessary requirement that would permit the United States to fulfill the 1994 commitment that it undertook, along with 33 other nations present at the Miami Summit, to reach a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) by 2005. Brazil affirmed this agreement and continues the support its concept. Although there may be disagreement as to the timing, approach and scope of the FTAA, most of the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean support U.S. involvement in the region and would be disappointed if President Clinton arrived at the Santiago Summit in April 1998 without fast-track negotiating authority in hand.

The President Clinton's October, 1997 visits to Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela will provide an important opportunity to cement relations between the United States and these countries and serve as a prelude to the Santiago Summit by providing a benchmark of U.S. intentions in the area. A successful Clinton journey could mirror the accomplishments resulting from the earlier fruitful visit of President Cardoso to Washington. The stopover in Brazil will clearly be the make or break element of the trip. This is particularly true in the area of trade. Both countries need a catalyst that will encourage greater hemispheric cooperation. U.S. relations with Argentina are the warmest they have been in years, particularly because virtually all of the seriously contentious bilateral trade problems have been resolved. U.S. trade relations with Venezuela are relatively noncontentious. This is less true for Brazil-U.S. trade relations.

President Clinton must show the Brazilian government and population that he recognizes Brazil's stature in the region and the world. He must also support the many dynamic reforms undertaken by President Cardoso. However, there are differences as to how free trade in the Americas should be accomplished. Without fast-track, when the Santiago summit takes place, Clinton would be seen by informed Latin Americans as coming with half empty hands. Conversely, with fast-track approved, Clinton would be perceived as ready to engage the United

States in serious trade bargaining. Future hemisphere integration and economic growth will depend, to a large degree, on Brazil and the U.S. jointly adopting a mature position of mutual cooperation. Inflexibility and short-sightedness on the part of either Brasilia or Washington would be harmful to both countries and the hemisphere as a whole.

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BODY:

In this week's state visit to Mexico, President Clinton has an historic opportunity to bridge the enormous chasm now existing between the U.S. and Mexican governments, and the increasingly poisonous atmosphere surrounding public debate in both countries. On this first official trip to Latin America, he also has a chance to demonstrate U.S. concern about the region as a whole.

Presidents Bill Clinton and Ernesto Zedillo have forged a friendship in the crucible of crises. Zedillo owes a huge debt to Clinton for his unflinching support for the North American Free Trade Agreement and for helping Mexico stabilize the peso, for his refusal to engage in Mexico-bashing over immigration during the 1996 presidential campaign and for his recent certification that Mexico is "fully cooperating" in counter-narcotics efforts. For his part, Clinton considers that Zedillo and his key advisers have acted with bravery and intelligence in the face of very tough problems largely not of their own making.

The mutual respect between the two heads of state is shared among top officials. Cabinet diplomacy between the two nations is broad and deep. A myriad of issues, ranging from border crossings to capital market regulations to agricultural trade to border environmental protection, makes up the most complex agenda existing between an industrialized and a developing economy. While progress is more rapid in some areas than in others, the overall direction of change is toward greater cooperation and understanding in official bilateral relations.

Yet this progress is now threatened by tumultuous popular debates over drugs and migration. The U.S. public increasingly views Mexico with suspicion and disdain, denouncing its government as riddled with narcotics-enriched corruption, prone to stonewalling U.S. officials and defrauding its own citizens. In reaction to these negative images, many Mexicans view the United States as arrogant, hypocritical and threatening. These perceptions tend to be reinforced by U.S. media silence on such issues as arms smuggling into Mexico, drug-related corruption in the United States and contribution of migrant workers



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to the U.S. economy.

President Clinton can begin to alter these public perceptions by addressing -- frankly and respectfully -- the key issues that bind the two neighbors: democracy, economic prosperity, effective governance and inter-American cooperation.

Clinton can fortify Mexico's progress toward democracy by meeting with leaders from all three major political parties and by repeating assurances that the U.S. government will work with whichever parties win open, transparent elections. He should also meet with leaders from the private sector and civil society, thereby signaling that democratization begins at the ballot box but must also encompass a broad array of social forces. By these actions, Clinton would demonstrate to the U.S. public that Mexico has traveled further down the democratic path than many realize, while satisfying Mexican citizens that the United States truly supports their quest for genuine democracy.

Clinton and Zedillo can rightfully congratulate each other on the courage they demonstrated during the 1994-95 peso crisis and praise NAFTA for attenuating some of the harshest effects of that crisis. They can compare their priority programs to deliver better education to more people, programs which are the centerpieces of their poverty alleviation efforts. Their economic message will be clear: the NAFTA partners are working together to safeguard economic stability and social progress throughout what is becoming the world's largest single market.

The two leaders also need to lay out a plan for extending the vision of the NAFTA southward, to negotiate the Free Trade Area of the Americas as endorsed at the 1994 Summit of the Americas in Miami. Most important, both countries have deep interests in constructing a strategic alliance -- centered on trade but extending to a panoply of common concerns -- throughout the Western Hemisphere.

Effective governance remains the most difficult current challenge in bilateral relations. President Zedillo recognizes the U.S. demand that Mexico must do better in law enforcement, especially in regard to drugs. For his part, President Clinton should acknowledge -- openly and publicly -- the fact that international drug trafficking responds to the power and presence of demand in the United States, the world's largest consumer market for illicit substances. He should credit Zedillo and his team for their recent efforts. Privately, perhaps, he might also acknowledge the problems posed for Mexico by the contentious and controversial process of U.S. certification.

On an issue of special importance to Mexico, he should pledge increased efforts to halt the flow of illegal arms into that country from the United States. And, more broadly, the President should lay the groundwork for a unilateral anti-drug campaign designed to reduce consumer demand, punish money laundering and strengthen law enforcement throughout the hemisphere.

If Clinton can show that the United States is not the problem, but rather is part of the solution, he can convince the Mexican public that the United States is indeed a valued partner. If he can persuade citizens back home that most Mexicans indeed want to work with the United States, he can begin to build a broad public constituency in favor of deeper bilateral cooperation. This would be a major step toward unifying perceptions among governing elite and common citizens on both sides of our long, shared border.

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By improving our relationship with Mexico, Clinton can also strengthen our ties with Latin America. These same basic issues -- democracy, prosperity, effective governance -- will frame the agenda for the hemispheric summit scheduled for Santiago, Chile, in March 1998. The president's visit to Mexico provides an exceptional opportunity for the United States and Mexico to develop common approaches toward key concerns, improve understanding, and thus enhance the prospects for inter-American cooperation.

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TOM QUIGLEY

II Latin American Conference on the Pastoral Work for Human Rights Lima-Perú, August 27-31, 1997

Presentation from the United States

INTRODUCTION

I would like, in the first place, to express my appreciation and gratitude to the organizers of this II Encuentro for inviting me to participate in this very rich and important event. I want especially to thank Fr. Leonidas and Laura Vargas, tireless workers for the defense and promotion of the fundamental rights of every person, especially the most needy.

The theme of this meeting, education in human rights, offers an opportunity to reflect on the various and different ways in which the defense and protection of human rights forms an almost invisible backdrop to so much of the activity of the Church, even when--or especially when--the concept of human rights as such is not adverted to. That is, a great deal of what goes on in our programs of human promotion, community organizing, political advocacy and the like--what we usually speak of as our Christian responsibility in and to the world, the constant search to apply the principles of Catholic social teaching and Gospel values to our everyday lives--is actually a participation in the pastoral action for human rights.

EVANGELIZATION INCLUDES HUMAN RIGHTS PROMOTION

"The pastoral of human rights," as CELAM's Social Pastoral Department has stated, "is the evangelizing mission that the Church, through its communities and institutions carries out in the area of the defense and promotion of human life and dignity, as the extension of the liberating mission of Jesus of Nazareth and with the participation of men and women of good will."

In their brilliant presentations at the I Encuentro three years ago, both Bishop Irizar and Fr. Leonidas explored the rich tapestry of Catholic teaching on human rights from the Sacred Scriptures to the early Fathers to the latest encyclical of Pope John Paul II. While the term "human rights" has come into vogue mainly in this century, the promotion of the dignity and fundamental rights of the human person, *imago Dei*, has been our teaching and (with the well known unfortunate exceptions) our practice since the very beginning.

HUMAN RIGHTS PASTORAL IN THE U.S.

Let me speak about the experience of the Church in the United States. While there has been a presence of the Church in parts of what is today the United States since the 16th century, the relevant timeframe for our discussion is the last century and a half, from roughly the 1840s to the present. It is in this period that the Catholic community grew from being a small and somewhat marginal part of the new republic to being today the largest religious community in the country. During that time, there have been successive waves of immigrants, mostly poor, fleeing famine, discrimination, even outright persecution, all seeking a better life. Many of the immigrants were Catholics--first the Irish and Germans, then the Italians and Poles, later the Cubans and Mexicans and Haitians, the Central and South Americans from many countries of our hemisphere, as well as from Vietnam and the Philippines and from numerous

other countries.

LABOR RIGHTS

In each period, the Church has been a source of assistance and welcome for the in-coming poor and needy. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Catholic social teaching on the dignity and rights of workers, and the personal engagement of many "labor priests" and the Jesuit-directed Labor Schools in several cities, offered outstanding examples of the pastoral of human rights, understood primarily under the rubric of labor rights.

CIVIL RIGHTS

In the great moral drama of the last century, the struggle to end the evil of slavery and racial discrimination, the Catholic community was not a particularly significant actor. But the teachings of the Church on racial equality and the firm commitment of today's Catholics to inter-racial harmony and justice for all peoples represent another and very important arena of the pastoral of human rights. The term "civil rights" has been more often used, speaking to the rights that many citizens of our country, because of their color, had been denied.

PRO-LIFE SEAMLESS GARMENT

The Church's emphasis, especially in recent years, on the inviolable right to life of every human being, from the moment of conception to natural death, has put the Catholic Church and its teachings in the forefront of parts of the human rights movement, most notably in the very contentious debate in our country over the issues of abortion, of so-called "assisted suicide," and of capital punishment. The "seamless garment" approach advocated most notably by the late Cardinal Bernardin of Chicago makes the Church the outstanding organized defender of human rights in the U.S., despite the denunciation and vilification of the Church by many others who also claim the title of human rights advocates--namely, that of the so-called "right" to abortion.

The child in the womb, the mentally and physically handicapped, the aged sick and the condemned criminal have no stronger protectors in the U.S. than the leadership of the Church and the great numbers of active Catholics who march, demonstrate, write letters to elected officials--and pray--that the basic human rights of these most vulnerable of our society be respected and protected.

IMMIGRANT RIGHTS

Similarly with today's new waves of immigrants. Just as the Church defended the rights of the famine-driven Irish a century and a half ago, it today seeks to change both the political decisions recently enacted by state and federal governments that discriminate harshly against undocumented immigrants, and--just as important as trying to reverse the laws--it seeks to persuade, to move the hearts of people, to educate, so that the stranger will be welcomed, given a little help, given a chance to become valued and productive members of the society. As with the pro-life movement, the Church is the surest and strongest defender of immigrant rights in the U.S.

EDUCATION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

How does the Church in the U.S. teach about human rights? How does it educate for human rights? With regard to the human rights issues I have mentioned above--the rights of the pre-born, the handicapped, workers and migrants, ethnic and racial minorities, etc.--the Church sponsors a variety of national and local offices focused on the specific issue. There is a National Catholic Office for the Deaf, a National Catholic Office for Persons with Disabilities; the National Catholic Conference for Interracial Justice, and so on.

Among groups with a conscious program of advocacy and education for human rights in more general terms, one would have to cite especially the national conferences of religious men and women, the Conference of Major Superiors of Men and the Leadership Conference of Women Religious, both of which do excellent work both of informing and encouraging their members in their own human rights work, and of engaging in direct programs of advocacy and action. Individual religious congregations, the Jesuits, Franciscans, Maryknoll and the Columbans, among others, have their own centers with programs of education and advocacy on human rights issues. The publications of some of these groups are outstanding, as is their outreach to specific segments of the population.

CARITAS AGENCIES

In the U.S., there are two affiliates of Caritas Internationalis, Catholic Charities-USA and Catholic Relief Services. Catholic Charities, organized on a diocesan basis, is by far the largest private sector provider of essential services to the poor in our country and engages in political advocacy on welfare rights and other human rights issues. Catholic Relief Services, which operates exclusively in other countries, is also the largest private U.S. voluntary agency engaged in programs of emergency and disaster relief, international economic development, and human rights advocacy.

Both Catholic Charities and CRS emphasize human rights, in the funding they provide for local groups, whether in the U.S. or abroad, and in the educational materials they produce for their support base at home. A few years ago, CRS began funding a local, diocesan human rights agency, the office for human rights of the Archdiocese of Guatemala (OSSAG). Since then, they have provided necessary start-up funding for other local human rights agencies of the Church in Latin America, in Africa and in Asia. Increasingly, CRS has come to define its mission in terms of advancing the cause of justice and peace in whatever country they work in. Thus, pastoral action for human rights has become a central focus of the work of CRS.

THE EPISCOPAL CONFERENCE

Possibly the most direct and relevant aspect of the U.S. Church's education on human rights is the work of the U.S. Catholic Conference. Let me say a bit about that. Just as there are two Caritas agencies within the U.S. Church, one domestic, the other international in scope, so there are two sides to the social policy and political advocacy offices of the U.S. Bishops' Conference. Both offices, Domestic Social Development and International Justice and Peace, form one Department of Social Development and World Peace.

SDWP

It is this department that staffs the bishops' committees that have issued numerous statements on human rights, both at home and abroad. Major letters, such as the pastoral on Catholic Social Teaching and the U.S. economy, "Economic Justice for All," as well as the pastoral on modern war, "The Challenge of Peace: God's Promise and Our Response," and the statement on "Relieving Third World Debt," all staffed by that department, are expressions of the Church's social teachings, applied to specific situations. Thus, human rights documents.

Similarly, a number of other statements and practical resources for use in local parish study groups have come from the department: "Communities of Salt and Light," a manual on the social mission of the parish, another document commemorating the tenth anniversary of the peace pastoral, "The Harvest of Justice is Sown in Peace," another anniversary reflection, "A Decade after Economic Justice for All," a pastoral reflection on the environment and a call to ecological justice, "Renewing the Earth," several documents and parish resources on health care reform, welfare reform, global food policy, and other issues.

One of the most widely used teaching documents is one that addresses a range of domestic and international justice issues. Every four years, in the year preceding our national elections, the Conference publishes a booklet called "Political Responsibility" which lays out the positions of the bishops on some two dozen issues, from abortion to welfare reform, all of which are in some way a part of the political debate in the country. Its purpose is to educate the public on the moral implications of the votes they will cast the following November.

OTHER INFORMATION/ADVOCACY OFFICES

In addition to the public education and advocacy work of this Department, many other offices of the Conference are engaged in education on specific aspects of human rights issues: the offices of Education, Pro-Life Affairs, Migration and Refugee Services, Hispanic Affairs, African American Catholics, Ecumenical and Interreligious Affairs, Communications and Media Relations, and the Campaign for Human Development, a major domestic program funding community organizing programs among the poor, all involved in education on some aspects of human rights.

THE US CHURCH AND LATIN AMERICA

For many years, the Conference has addressed the human rights implications of U.S. foreign policy. Especially during the 1970s and 1980s, when U.S. foreign policy was so deeply involved with the various crises in this hemisphere, the USCC carried on an extensive program of what we could call "education on human rights." In those years, the Conference issued literally dozens of policy statements, expressions of solidarity with the suffering Church in various parts of Latin America, congressional testimonies dealing with Argentina, Brazil or Chile, with El Salvador, Nicaragua or Guatemala, Mexico, Cuba or Haiti and other countries where the policy of the U.S. government was heavily engaged. A number of official delegations of bishops and staff to most of these and other countries added additional moral weight and authority to the policy recommendations and gave visible expression to the

ecclesial unity and solidarity between the local churches.

RELIGIOUS LIBERTY ISSUES

In recent years, new attention has been directed to the religious freedom aspect of the human rights picture. Much of it is focused on the few remaining communist regimes that either directly persecute or severely limit expression of religious faith, especially the People's Republic of China and Vietnam, as well as a number of largely Muslim countries with particularly harsh restrictions on Christian life and practice, such as Sudan, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan. The Conference has also addressed these concerns more explicitly in recent times, while noting that the great bulk of our activity on human rights in the past, the Latin American issues, clearly involved the issues of religious liberty. Bishops, priests, religious, and many hundreds of catechists and other committed lay people suffered attacks of every kind, from verbal abuse to arrest, imprisonment, torture, exile and even death at the hands government officials and para-military bands. Religious freedom and the rights of believers were just as seriously violated then as anything that is happening today in other parts of the world.

THE HUMAN RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN THE U.S.

Which brings me to my last point. The human rights movement globally, but especially in the United States, owes a great debt to you, the pioneers in the field of the human rights pastoral. It was precisely the violations of human rights in this part of the world, and the response of the churches here, that gave birth to the human rights movement in the U.S.

The human rights policies of the Carter administration, the creation of new human rights groups, the new vigor given to the Inter-American and United Nations commissions for human rights, the enactment of legislation in our Congress prohibiting military aid to countries with consistent patterns of gross violation of human rights, the outpouring of articles and books on human rights—all of this was framed by the stories of torture coming out of Brazil, beginning in the mid-1960s, then of other military coups and subsequent repressive policies in Bolivia, Uruguay, Paraguay, Chile and Argentina in the '70s, followed by the Central American crises in the later '70s and the '80s. The picture was framed by these issues, and was given flesh and blood by the heroic and dedicated response of Christians in each of these countries to the violence and abuse of their fundamental rights. Today's global human rights movement owes far more than is generally known to the pioneer work of the pastoral engagement of the Church in Latin America in its defense of the rights and dignity of the human person.

US-Latin American Relations

As President Clinton prepares for his second trip to Latin America this year--a week long visit to Brazil, Argentina, and Venezuela, beginning October 12--US policy in the region badly needs to be re-energized. US-Latin American relations, for the most part, remain cordial, but the opportunities for building a genuinely cooperative and integrated hemisphere seem to be slipping away. US policy and action in Latin America has been sharply constrained by domestic political imperatives--no matter whether Washington is dealing with the major issues of trade and economic integration, with the politics of appointing ambassadors to countries like Mexico and Argentina, with controversial themes like drugs and immigration, or with troublesome countries like Cuba and Haiti. Within the region, the United States is more and more perceived as a less than fully reliable partner, insensitive to Latin American concerns, and preoccupied with its own short-term interests.

The question is whether and how President Clinton and his advisors can reinvigorate US policy in the coming months, in time for a successful meeting of Western Hemisphere leaders at the second Summit of the Americas in mid-April in Santiago, Chile.

As it has been from the outset of Clinton's second term, the most critical uncertainty is whether the Administration will secure fast track negotiating authority from Congress this year. For most of Latin America, this is the acid test of the US commitment to building hemispheric free trade arrangements and stronger economic cooperation overall. Without fast track, the United States cannot make good on its promise to have Chile become part of NAFTA, nor will it have much credibility to engage the other nations of the hemisphere in free trade discussions. It will still be possible to launch negotiations for the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) at the Santiago Summit, but the exercise will generate little enthusiasm in Latin America.

The prospects are still good that the White House will secure fast track this year--but they are dimming as time passes. They suffered a major blow last week when the Administration, once again, failed to present fast track legislation to Congress--after publicly assuring everyone that it would definitely do so. The Administration's problem is not a new one. It has still not found an acceptable formula for dealing with labor and environmental standards in the fast track request.

The only solution that will get Congressional approval is for the Administration to accept the Republican demand for a "clean" fast track bill (i.e., with very weak or no labor and environmental conditions), and then use of the full weight of the presidency to press hard for the 60 to 70 Democratic votes needed for passage. Last week's delay hurt the prospect of fast track approval in several ways: It revealed that the White House remains divided on the issue and thereby further galvanized the opposition, and it reduced by another week the already short time frame for gaining approval. Yet, if Clinton gives fast track his top priority and throws himself personally into the campaign, he will probably win. He has got to do so within the next week or two, however.

US trade problems with Latin America do not end with fast track. Largely because of the influence of the US textile industry, Central American and Caribbean countries have been denied

NAFTA parity legislation--which would establish an interim trade arrangement to help protect these nations' economies by stemming the NAFTA-induced diversion of trade and investment toward Mexico. And the United States has not been willing to give a hearing to the Central American governments' request for a full free trade pact with the region.

The United States and major Latin American countries (most prominently, Brazil) are at odds over how the nations of the hemisphere should proceed toward the FTAA. There is broad consensus that FTAA negotiations should be formally launched at the Santiago Summit--but fundamental differences have emerged over the pace of the negotiations; whether efforts should be made to reach and implement partial agreements prior to the 2005 target date; and the role that subregional trading blocs like NAFTA and Mercosur should play in the negotiations once the FTAA is in place. Compounding the frictions over multilateral trade issues are a range of bilateral trade conflicts between the United States and most of its partners in Latin America and the Caribbean. Intellectual property rights remains a contentious issue, as does the range of US non-tariff barriers--anti-dumping actions, countervailing duties, and health and sanitary restrictions, for example.

U.S.-Latin American relations are suffering from more than frustrations over trade issues. This past month, the Clinton Administration announced plans for two security-related initiatives in Latin America, both meant to underscore growing US confidence in the region's governments. Washington lifted its twenty-year old ban on the transfer of high tech weapons to Latin America, and proposed a special security relationship for Argentina, to designate that country a major non-NATO ally (a category heretofore reserved for a handful of countries like Israel, Jordan, and Korea that are close US partners in actively hostile situations). The reaction in Latin America--particularly among the countries most affected--has been almost the opposite of what was intended. Instead of good will, the announcements provoked suspicions about US aims and rekindled some of the historic anxieties among Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. The United States needs to stop taking important decisions about Latin America in an ad-hoc fashion. In concert with other governments, Washington needs to shape a coherent policy on security issues to guide future decisions, and help to explain them. It should focus on promoting regional transparency on all military initiatives, developing arms restraint regimes, resolving border conflicts, and enhancing civilian control of the military.

Within the next week, the Administration is required to present a report to Congress, giving an updated review of US-Mexican cooperation against drug trafficking. (The report was mandated by Congress as a condition for agreeing, earlier this year, to certify Mexico as a reliable US ally in the war against drugs.) The findings are not likely to present a very positive assessment of Mexico's antidrug efforts--just the opposite, in fact. Coincidental with the initiation of the fast track debate, the report could well open a new round of anti-Mexican and anti-NAFTA criticism in the United States, and new calls for the decertification of Mexico (although these will be resisted by the Administration).

US drug policy will remain a constant source of friction in US relations in the hemisphere as long as Washington insists on unilaterally judging the counter-narcotics efforts of other

countries and penalizing those that do not meet its standards. Meanwhile, the one country that has been decertified by the United States--Colombia--continues its downward spiral of political and economic deterioration, mounting violence and human rights abuses, and loss of territorial control to drug criminals, guerillas, and paramilitary forces. Most of this cannot be blamed on decertification, although US policy has certainly not helped Colombia deal with any of its problems.

Another issue increasingly dividing the United States and Latin America is immigration. Although they mainly affect Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean, the harsh US immigration laws that took effect this year--and the record number of deportations they have produced--are seen throughout the region as demeaning to Latin America. The fact they were approved without concern about (or even consideration of) their effects on other countries reinforces the Latin American view that the region is a low priority for the United States.

US policy toward a number of specific countries will also importantly influence the broader US-Latin American relationship. Washington's Cuba policy, a source of continuing friction with Latin America, will most probably become more intransigent in the coming period. A constructive change in US policy would be welcomed throughout the region, but unless there is a deep crisis in Cuba--resulting in another mass outflow of people and/or internal violence--that is not in the cards. The Administration's efforts to stay usefully engaged in Haiti, manage a graceful exit from Panama by the treaty date of 2000, and restore normal relations with Colombia are being closely watched in the region.

Interestingly, only trade--of all these contentious issues in US-Latin American relations--is now scheduled to be on the agenda for the Santiago Summit discussions of the hemisphere's presidents and prime ministers next April. More than anything, that suggests that the other issues--security and arms control, narcotrafficking, immigration, Cuba, and Haiti--are either too difficult or too conflictive for the heads of state to deal with them productively. The good news is that, if agreements can be reached on the trade front and the stage can be set for real progress toward hemispheric economic integration, these other problems will become relatively less important and probably easier to address. The bad news is that, if the trade discussions do not produce satisfactory results, US-Latin American relations could take a turn for the worse--as more antagonistic issues come to dominate the inter-American agenda. Nothing, in short, would do more to revitalize US policy toward Latin America than an energetic White House campaign for fast track legislation and its prompt approval by Congress.

Peter Hakim, for Oxford Analytica
September 14, 1997

Washington Post, 12 December 1996

Bernard Aronson

Strengthen Democracies, Not Armies

With democracy ascendant in our hemisphere, Latin America has a historic opportunity to redefine the role of its military, traditionally the greatest obstacle to democratic stability. Unfortunately, that opportunity will be endangered if the Clinton administration goes ahead with its plans to end a two-decade-old ban and resume sales of sophisticated U.S. weaponry to Latin American militaries.

Until recently, the military in Latin America traditionally viewed itself as the self-appointed guardian of the nation's order and sovereignty, separate from, and ultimately, above the state. But the military dictatorships of right and left that ruled through the 1970s and '80s left a legacy of violence and economic mismanagement, and there is no popular nostalgia for their return. The guerrilla insurgencies which, during the Cold War, provided a national security rationale for military dominance have in most cases ended. And burgeoning intra-regional trade has begun to erode the border rivalries that once justified large defense establishments.

These historic changes, coupled with the pressures of shrinking public resources on military budgets, have offered Latin Americans a unique opportunity to transform the military into a normal, civilian-dominated branch of government.

The administration's impending arms sales presuppose that this important transformation has already taken place. In reality, the delicate balance between civilian and military power in Latin America has only barely begun to tilt toward the civilian side, and the administration's decision risks tilting it back in the other direction.

While elected presidents hold office in every Latin American nation except Cuba, not one exercises the authority over the military that every Western democratic leader assumes automatically upon taking office. In most Latin nations there is still no real civilian-military dialogue, and at best only rudimentary oversight by elected legislatures.

The threat of military coup d'états has diminished, especially since foreign ministers of the Organization of American States agreed in 1991 to confront them collectively. Yet twice in 1992, rebel Venezuelan military forces nearly overthrew the civilian president, and this past April, a Paraguayan general almost toppled that nation's first democratic government. Though border tensions have lessened, Colombia and Venezuela periodically rattle sabers over disputed island territories, and last year Peru and Ecuador fought a bloody border battle.

Apparently, the administration believes that resuming U.S. arms sales will strengthen democracy—and implicitly civilian rule—by recognizing and rewarding those Latin militaries that have accepted democratic governance, as well as those that have supported recent negotiated settlements of disputed boundaries. Militaries still threatening hostilities, such as Peru and Ecuador, would continue to be excluded, the administration stresses.

This view would be more credible if civilian presidents and populations in Latin America were asking for new weaponry, but the opposite is true. Throughout the hemisphere, civilian leaders are struggling to reduce bloated state budgets and payrolls as part of far-reaching structural economic reforms designed to restrain inflation and attract foreign investment. Civilian populations—whose real wages still have not recovered from the lost decade of the 1980s—are pressing new democratic governments for safe drinking water, sanitation, health services, basic education and housing.

To feed the appetites of Latin American militaries for sophisticated weapons they do not need at a cost no Latin nation can afford—and to do so against the private wishes of democratic leaders—would undermine civilian authority and heighten regional tensions.

Chile, for example, faces no discernible military threat. Yet no Latin military is pressing more aggressively for sophisticated armaments, including advanced fighter aircraft. The commander of the Chilean army, Gen. Augusto Pinochet, holds that position not because the elected Chilean president appointed him but because Pinochet installed himself through the year 1998 by constitutional amendments he imposed as a condition of relinquishing power over the government. Under other provisions imposed by the military, the elected president cannot remove an armed service chief, and the Chilean armed forces have an automatic claim on 10 percent of the nation's copper export revenues. This is hardly a model of civilian control worthy of reward.

If Chile upgrades its military capabilities, the military in neighboring Argentina, Chile's historic rival, will demand new armaments to counter the perceived threat. Extreme Argentine nationalists—no friends of democracy—will press the civilian government to buy them. Argentina is just now emerging from a deep self-imposed recession, engineered to stave off capital flight following Mexico's peso crisis; unemployment stands at 17 percent. The sale of jets to Chile, warns Jorge Domínguez, Argentina's civilian defense minister, "is neither suitable nor necessary for the needs of the region."

The U.S. administration argues that if this country did not sell the high-tech weapons to Latin America, France, Russia or others would fill the vacuum. The weapons, then, would still flow, while the United States would lose influence, revenues and jobs—and would exercise less control over the end use and transfer of the arms.

Instead of acquiescing in this false choice between foreign and U.S. arms sales, the administration should exercise real leadership in the hemisphere by endorsing and vigorously supporting the growing civilian call for regional arms control. The hemisphere is ripe for negotiations on agreed regional balances of conventional weapons, limits on acquisitions of destabilizing new weaponry and confidence-building measures among Latin militaries.

To succeed, a new Latin American conventional arms control regime must not appear to be imposed by Washington. But with presidential leadership, the United States could be far more energetic and creative, through the OAS and other regional groupings, in support of an arms control agenda emerging from Latin America. At Latin request, for example, NATO and the Warsaw Pact could share their experience with conventional arms control in Europe. The United States should support, also, a long-standing Argentine proposal to establish a regional center under U.N. auspices where Latin militaries could train with Western militaries for international peacekeeping duties.

With arms control agreements in place and Latin militaries engaged in international peacekeeping missions, the United States could respond legitimately to reasonable requests to upgrade Latin military forces, so long as those requests were initiated by civilian leaders, sanctioned by regional agreements and consistent with acceptable human rights practices. Such a policy would be far more worthy of U.S. leadership in the Americas and far more supportive of democracy.

The writer was assistant secretary of state for Inter-American Affairs from June 1989 to July 1993.

LEVEL 1 - 1 OF 1 STORY

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SECTION: OUTLOOK; Pg. C05

LENGTH: 1734 words

HEADLINE: As Its Civil War Intensifies, **Colombia** Emerges as the Bosnia of South America

BYLINE: Ana Carrigan; Robert O. Weiner

BODY:

"Your time has come . . . we have come to clean up this region just as we are doing in other provinces, and we will start with you. We know your movements very well. We are following step by step"

This threat was not issued by Serbs engaged in ethnic cleansing in Bosnia. It came from paramilitaries in **Colombia** who slaughter civilians in that country's growing civil war. The reality it reflects should cause Americans to recast the common image of **Colombia**: the cocaine republic whose civilian "democracy" has been corrupted, but whose military, committed to the rule of law, remains a steadfast partner with Washington in the war on drugs and leftist guerrillas.

Colombia, in reality, is something different: a failing state where murderous warlords, with the tacit cooperation of the military and narco-trafficking organizations, have pushed the country toward de facto partition. In the process they have marginalized many of **Colombia's** democratic institutions. Though Washington's drug warriors have been slow to notice, the spread of this "dirty war" -- not the country's drug cartels -- is the greatest threat to **Colombia**, its neighbors and the interests of the United States.

Late last month, the Colombian government reluctantly agreed to the Clinton administration's conditions for more than \$ 100 million in police and military aid. After months of resistance, the country's security forces agreed not to put weapons and equipment into the hands of those implicated in serious human rights violations. But it remains to be seen whether this agreement will have any real effect in the face of opposition from military hard-liners who say the conditions violate the Colombian constitution and U.S. congressional critics who believe the administration is hindering the drug war.

Meanwhile, **Colombia** is tearing itself apart. It is fast becoming a Bosnia, or the closest thing to it in this hemisphere. There are three parties to **Colombia's** struggle:

Private paramilitary armies: Sponsored by wealthy landholders and protected by the regular Colombian army, they now operate with murderous impunity across half of the national territory.

Left-wing guerrilla organizations: Long the de facto authority wherever the



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state failed to establish its presence, they have expanded their reach to more than half the nation's rural municipalities. They kidnap wealthy foes, extort "war taxes" to fund their activities and mete out their own brand of justice.

The government: Increasingly irrelevant, it is struggling to regain its authority over the military and its ability to protect the people.

As in Bosnia's ethnic cleansing, civilians are the main target in this struggle, with the paramilitaries inflicting some 60 percent of the casualties. Col. Carlos Alfonso Velasquez, the former number-two commander in northern Colombia, was cashiered by the high command last December for reporting on official failure to address the savagery of the paramilitaries. Velasquez says the military has adopted a logic that regards civilians in contested zones as part of the guerrillas' political structure. The paramilitaries massacre these civilians, fulfilling the military's desire for high body counts and enabling their sponsors to consolidate and expand their land holdings. There were an estimated 3,000 political killings in 1996 in Colombia and the number is expected to rise this year.

Recent fighting around the village of Mapiripan in a guerrilla-controlled area of southeast Colombia was typical. Three weeks ago, a uniformed column of paramilitaries kidnapped and executed 30 civilians over the course of five days, according to the mayor and other survivors from the village. Five decapitated bodies were recovered. A week later, leftist rebels took credit for killing 26 uniformed men whom they said were regular army soldiers disguised as a paramilitaries who had carried out the first massacre. The government denies its soldiers took part in the attack.

Such violence reflect both madness and method. The paramilitaries, armed with sophisticated weapons, target people -- a schoolteacher, a shopkeeper, a bus driver -- who, they say, put ideas into the heads of future guerrillas, food in their stomachs and wheels under their feet. At least one group also openly totes an electric saw for dismembering its victims.

The guerrillas have perfected kidnapping as a means of raising revenue and many also profit by providing armed protection for coca growers. A State Department report estimates that the rebels are also responsible for a third of political killings in 1996.

Along the fault line between guerrilla and paramilitary territory, the violence has displaced families on a scale never seen before south of the Panama Canal. UNICEF reported earlier this year that 1 million Colombians -- about one out of every 40 citizens -- have been forced from their homes.

Emerging from the war zones of rural Colombia are virtual rump republics accountable only to paramilitary leaders such as cocaine millionaire and landowner Carlos Castano. Described by Newsweek as "Latin America's most notorious death squad leader" and by the State Department as a "known drug trafficker," Castano is the most powerful of a dozen or so paramilitary chieftains who operate autonomously yet increasingly see the benefits of working together to maximize their political clout.

Castano has murdered his way to control of a neo-feudal empire stretching across half of Colombia. He has also overseen a perverse, personal version of land reform. In addition to paying the 2,000 soldiers in his personal uniformed



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army a reported \$ 400 monthly salary, he has donated thousands of acres to them and their relatives -- land which he told one Colombian magazine he had "liberated" from its previous occupants.

Castano's criminal career encapsulates Colombia's institutional collapse. Colombian prosecutors say that he was a star pupil in the 1980s at hit-squad training schools that were sponsored by the Colombian army, funded by the Medellin cartel and run by Israeli and British mercenaries. Along with other graduates of this mercenary school, the Castano brothers delivered protection for the drug barons' properties and provided the army with cover for "dirty war" practices.

In 1993, Castano switched allegiance to the Cali cartel. As The Washington Post's Doug Farah reported last year, the Cali kingpins were collaborating with the government to bring down their chief rival, fugitive Medellin drug boss Pablo Escobar. Castano organized a terrorist force that liquidated Escobar's organization and helped Colombian police hunt Escobar down and kill him.

Castano, despite several arrest warrants for murder, enjoys a spotless criminal record. He has never been arrested. Last winter, when Minister of Defense Juan Carlos Esguerra (currently Colombia's ambassador to Washington) bowed to pressure from the U.S. embassy and offered a \$ 1 million reward to anyone who arranged for Castano's capture, most Colombians regarded the offer as a bad joke. Castano's whereabouts, after all, are not exactly unknown to the authorities. When reporters from the New York Times and Newsweek arranged to visit and interview Castano this spring, he noted that the local army base was "just over the hill" from his headquarters. To the chagrin of prosecutors, Colombian law enforcement officials insist they do not know where he is.

Faced with all this, U.S. policymakers have long seemed alternately divorced from reality and at war with themselves. Tethered to a military approach to the drug problem, the Reagan, Bush and the first Clinton administrations gave the Colombian armed forces largely uncritical support, enabling them to flout civilian authority and legal prosecution.

At the same time, the State Department has produced increasingly detailed human rights reports on the paramilitaries' role. Washington has also supported endangered Colombian anti-corruption fighters and human rights defenders like former prosecutor general Alfonso Valdivieso, now running for president.

Now that the State Department, under the direction of Secretary Albright, has made human rights central to Colombia policy, the Clinton administration faces two challenges. In Washington it will have to fend off a vocal faction in Congress that vigorously opposes such limitations on military anti-narcotics aid. In Colombia it will have to enforce the agreement that U.S. support not go to units commanded by known human rights abusers.

U.S. policy also is going to be challenged by Colombian politics. Last month, Colombian President Ernesto Samper, facing domestic pressure for peace and international scrutiny on human rights, fired the chief of the armed forces, Gen. Harold Bedoya. A booster of the paramilitary, Bedoya had resisted government overtures to the guerrillas and generally disdained civilian authority. Now he is running for president in 1998. With Valdivieso and other leading hopefuls talking about peace negotiations, Bedoya will be the leading proponent of military solutions to the problems of narcotics and insurgency.



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Colombia's electoral choices next year will be stark: cultivating slender chances for peace or pursuing a war of annihilation against the guerrillas. The United States must confront a hard reality: The twin Colombian catastrophes -- the drug trade and crisis in human rights -- are interconnected. Both are promoted by the anarchic dynamics of the "dirty" internal war. Drugs, like guerrillas and paramilitaries, flourish in the absence of democratic politics. The United States has to give effective support to those civilians and military officers who believe in moving toward, not away from, the rule of law.

The Clinton administration should know by now that it cannot continue this effort alone. U.S. pressure is inevitably exploited by Colombian demagogues. A collaborative strategy among a group of friendly nations is needed. This will inevitably involve compromises with Latin and European allies who do not share all of Washington's views about the drug war.

Ana Carrigan is a freelance writer and the author of "The Palace of Justice: A Colombian Tragedy" (Four Walls Eight Windows). Robert Weiner coordinates the Latin America and the Caribbean Program of the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights.

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from J. S. Tulchin

July 11, 1997

MEMO TO MACK

The key to engagement in Latin America is a loud, clear message. The message should be repeated often by a highly visible representative of the President and it should be linked closely to the President's visits to the region, to the upcoming summit - and to future ministerials - and be marked by specific concrete accomplishments.

As to substance, engagement in Latin America should focus on two subjects for action - increasing economic exchange and consolidating democracy - and two subjects for hemispheric goodwill - human capital formation and poverty alleviation. Each of these should be the focus of discussion during the President's trip and during the summit.

1) Economic exchange: THIS IS MORE THAN TRADE.

The nations of Latin America are focused on fast track, but their economic growth depends more on expanding investment and savings than on trade. Therefore, it is important to understand that Argentina, Chile, Brazil and the others want US investment as much as or more than access to US markets. Both are important.

ACTION: Fast track. This should be the President's #1 priority in the Fall. With the expansion of NAFTA will come all the other advantages that pave the way for investment. Pushing for fast track will be the clearest signal that the President cares about the region. Everything else is just talk.

ACTION: Hemispheric talks to fix rules for private sector exchange This might include stock market transactions, the protection of intellectual property, the adjudication of commercial disputes, and the reduction of money laundering.

2) Consolidating Democracy: EXERCISING LEADERSHIP

Democracy in Latin America is still precarious in many countries. In none are there strong institutions capable of withstanding powerful shocks. This is an area in which the US enjoys a massive comparative advantage, an area in which all of Latin America looks to the US with genuine admiration and respect. The stronger the democracies in the region, the stronger we are. Therefore, we should act to encourage the nations in the region to consolidate their democracies. We should speak often and loudly on issues such as judicial reform, police reform, political party organization, congressional procedures, freedom of the press, reducing corruption.

ACTION: support regional standards of democratic reform. This can be done by encouraging reliance on OAS conventions, by giving backbone to relevant IDB conditionalities, and by initiating other regional efforts to strengthen democracy.

ACTION: declare unequivocal US support for democracy in the region.

3) Human Capital Formation: PROVIDING ENCOURAGEMENT**4) Poverty Alleviation: SETTING THE RIGHT MORAL STANDARDS**

These are critical subjects for the leaders of Latin America. However, it is not possible for any president of the US to intervene to good effect in these areas except as moral support.

ACTION: provide moral support. The President should support his colleagues in the region and encourage them to devote their political energies and the economic resources of their governments to these issues. The principal problem in Latin America is the legacy of centuries of social injustice and the alarming lack of any sense of community solidarity.

ACTION: give visibility to Latin America. The President needs a high-level official to speak on behalf of his administration about Latin America and he needs Latin American expertise in the White House.

from J. S. Tulchin

July 11, 1997

from J. S. Tulchin

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Addendum

Since drafting the memo to Mr. McLarty, several issues have come into higher relief and should be taken into consideration as plans are drawn for the president's trip to Latin America in October. These issues affect the countries he is to visit and are currently at the top of their lists of priorities. As a consequence, if the president is not prepared to deal with these issues in his conversations, his ability to deal with the issues which are, in my opinion more significant and have longer term implications will be undermined.

- Mercosul/Merosur versus NAFTA/FTAA
- Brazil's aspirations to join the Security Council
this is tied in with the recent announcement of Argentina's special status and the impending sale of military high technology to Chile
- the Pentagon's announcement of a change in US policy on the sale of arms to Latin America

from J. S. Tulchin

July 11, 1997

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Riordan Roett
Sarita and Don Johnston Professor and
Director, Latin American Studies Program

September 26, 1997

**The Honorable Samuel R. Berger
Special Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D. C.**

Dear Mr. Berger:

I regret that my teaching schedule will preclude my attendance at your breakfast on Monday, September 29. I thought I would forward a few ideas to you regarding the President's trip to South America. Mack McLarty and I have discussed some of these themes on other occasions.

The issues in Venezuela I believe are few and rather clear. Petroleum is a very high priority for the USA and the President will want to use that as a framework for discussions in Caracas. Macro-economic reform continues to be the principal need in Venezuela - Teodoro Petkoff, the Planning Minister, has made important strides but much remains to be done. A strong endorsement of what has been accomplished, and a statement supporting continued reform, would be appropriate. Venezuela is in a pre-election mood; a strong endorsement of the democratic "tradition" in Venezuela would be welcome by those concerned over possible social unrest - and even military discontent - in the immediate future.

The President's trip to Brazil and Argentina is far more complicated. Mack McLarty and I have discussed the US-Brazil relationship frequently. There is no doubt that Brazil is the key player in South America and, barring a serious economic crisis, will continue to be so well into the 21st century. The US should recognize that fact. The day-to-day irritations with Brasilia are normal, I think, at this point in the links between a super power and a rapidly rising regional leader. The US needs to take a benign attitude towards Brazil. With regard to Mercosur, Brazil is and will be its principal protagonist. The US should endorse Mercosur - as Mack did at our Mercosur Economic Summit in Sao Paulo recently - and "de-link" it from the FTAA process.

I had suggested earlier to Mack, that the President might consider asking Cardoso/Menem to invite the presidents of Mercosur to a joint meeting while he is in the region. That would provide a strong, positive endorsement of "open regionalism" and recognize the importance of the region not just in terms of trade and investment. The political/security dimension of Mercosur is too little recognized in Washington, D. C.

Brazil, too, has entered an electoral year. While the US does not endorse candidates, a strong statement praising the continued consolidation of democracy in Brazil would be very welcome. And a statement with regard to social justice and equity would be tricky but useful given recent progress in reducing poverty with the *Real* stabilization plan. But much remains to be done and Brazil faces a long road in addressing decades of neglect in the social area. The President will face questions regarding Argentina and NATO status as well as a permanent seat on the Security Council but I am sure that you have worked out appropriate positions on those issues!

In Buenos Aires, I think it would be appropriate not to dwell on any privileged position that the Argentine government may feel in occupies with the US. That would serve current, short-term political interests in the Menem administration but be of far less use in crafting an American position in the Southern Cone in general. A statement by the President regarding the need for a strong and independent media/press is very important as is a reference to the well known spread of corruption. These are themes that can be woven into a general statement that supports the impressive economic recovery of Argentina since Menem was first elected in 1989 but also provides support for those groups in civil society struggling to deepen the democratic commitment of the regime.,

See
also
note for
Sidney
Rob

The trip provides an important opportunity to recognize the dramatic economic recovery in both countries but the visit should not overlook what yet remains to be accomplished in the social and political fields. To appear to downplay Mercosur would be a mistake. The trade and investment numbers in Brazil and the Southern Cone indicate a renewed interest on the part of the European Union (which will hold a Summit with the Mercosur presidents in 1999) and the Presidents visit allows the US to reaffirm its interest in the region and its importance to the US in the next century.

Sincerely,



Riordan Roett

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 15, 1997

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR: Jim Steinberg
Jim Dobbins
Jeff Davidow
Dan Tarullo
Robert Kyle
Don Carrick
Don Baer

FROM: Mack McLarty *MM*

SUBJECT: Presidential Travel to the Hemisphere

Given my new responsibilities as the President's Special Envoy for the Americas, Sandy Berger has suggested that I coordinate the planning process for upcoming Presidential travel to the hemisphere. In keeping with my discussions with Jim Steinberg, we both believe an initial, smaller group should be convened as soon as possible to begin lining out the trips to Mexico and the rest of the hemisphere, and, more broadly, to discuss the issues and policies which will affect the success of the President's proposed travel.

While there has already been discussion about scheduling and possible structure of the visits, we want to ensure that scheduling does not drive policy but rather that policy drives the schedule. Therefore, we need to begin to put together what we hope the President's travel will accomplish and how we intend to get it done.


We need to begin the process now. We face an active period in hemispheric affairs; the President is committed to the Summit process and to creating a new partnership in the Americas.

My scheduler Molly Varney will be calling your office shortly to find a mutually convenient time to meet among the eight of us Wednesday or Thursday. I look forward to working closely with each of you in the weeks and months ahead.

cc: S. Berger

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

Office of National Drug Control Policy
Washington, DC 20503



xx

J
T
K
P

FACSIMILE MESSAGE

TO: Ambassador Dobbins

FAX: 69130

DATE: 7/16 TIME: 9:15 PAGES: 2 + Cover

FROM: Janet Crist

FAX NUMBER: 202/395-6708

OFFICE NO: 202/395-6732

COMMENTS:



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY
Washington, D. C. 20503

July 16, 1997

The Honorable Christopher J. Dodd
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-0702

Dear Senator Dodd:

Wanted to confirm that the Administration supports the Dodd-McCain legislation on international drug cooperation. Believe your thinking supports U.S. drug policy by recommending a mechanism that would allow us to make fundamental improvements in the way we cooperate with major drug producing and transit countries. At a minimum, your bill promises to remove a major cause of foreign policy friction, especially with Latin American and Caribbean countries. Timing for consideration of new ideas is fortunate because of the upcoming Summit of the Americas and heightened interest in multilateral counter-drug cooperation following the President's travel to Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean.

ONDCP is prepared to lead an interagency task force to develop a new strategy. We must build on our *National Drug Control Strategy*. We can accomplish the requirement to build a more effective concept for multi-national cooperation in the two years provided by your bill.

Although we would want to explore a number of options, elements of a new strategy might involve increased use of multilateral mechanisms and international organizations such as the OAS. We might also consider expansion of ad hoc arrangements for in-depth bilateral counter-drug cooperation with countries of particular interest such as Mexico. The Department of State and ONDCP are already formulating plans for a fall conference to develop new thinking along the lines of your proposal.

Thanks for your continued leadership on the drug issue.

Respectfully,

Barry R. McCaffrey
Director



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY

Washington, D.C. 20503

July 16, 1997

The Honorable John McCain
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-0303

Dear Senator McCain:

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Respectfully,

Barry R. McCaffrey
Director

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL


July 18, 1997

Jim/Ted -

Please find attached a draft agenda for the Monday meeting. (The first lady's office has been invited to attend.)

I have also included a draft schedule from Aviva Steinberg. Scheduling feels strongly about going to Venezuela on the front end if it is important to be there on a week day.

Please call on Monday if there are issues not on the agenda that should be. Thank you

Nicole 

cc: Glyn

PRESIDENT'S TRAVEL TO SOUTH AMERICA
TRIP PLANNING MEETING

DRAFT

JULY 21, 1997

- I. Travel Itinerary
 - Countries, in order
 - Major events and cities/destinations (e.g. MERCOSUR event, Peru/Ecuador mtg, Speeches to Parliaments, crowd events)
- II. First Lady Itinerary
 - Panama meeting of First Ladies
 - Other recommended stops
- III. Dates of Travel
- IV. Update on Deliverables
 - Brazil/education
- V. Communications Strategy
 - Presidential involvement, including speeches and what venues
 - Press plan
- VI. Miscellaneous
 - Congressional/Cabinet involvement
 - Argentina elections
 - McLarty and advance team travel
- VII. Taskings

DRAFT

PROPOSED SCHEDULE FOR THE PRESIDENT'S TRIP TO VENEZUELA, BRAZIL AND ARGENTINA

October 12 - 19, 1997

NOTE: None of the events listed below have received sign-off by the White House. These events are the requests of the host government.

Sunday, October 12

TBD DEPART Washington, DC en route Caracas, Venezuela
[flight time: 4 hours and 15 minutes]

Arrival Ceremony

RON Caracas, Venezuela

Monday, October 13

Message Event/Speech

Bi-lat w. Caldera

Wreath Laying at El Panteon (Simon Bolivar's tomb)

State Reception/Lunch

Embassy Event

4:00 pm WHEELS UP en route Brasilia, Brazil
[flight time: 4 hours and 30 minutes]
[time change: +1]

9:30 pm ARRIVE in Brasilia, Brazil

RON Brasilia, Brazil

OPTION #1**Tuesday, October 14**

Arrival Ceremony

Speech to Brazilian Congress/
Speech to Public

Bi-lat w/ Cardoso

OTR Time

Embassy Event

State Dinner/Reception

RON Brasilia, Brazil**Wednesday, October, 15**

10:00 am Depart en route Sao Paulo

Speech/Business Event

AmCham event

RON Sao Paulo, Brazil**Thursday, October 16**10:00 am DEPART (Sao Paulo or Rio de Janero) en route Iguacu Falls
[flight time: ?]

TBD Visit the Iguacu Falls

4:00 pm DEPART en route Buenos Aires. Argentina

OPTION #2**Tuesday, October 14**

Arrival Ceremony

Speech to Brazilian Congress/
Speech to Public

Bi-lat w/ Cardoso

State Lunch

Embassy Event

DEPART en route Sao Paulo

RON Sao Paulo, Brazil**Wednesday, October, 15**

Speech/Business Event

AmCham event

Depart en route Rio de Janero, Brazil

Helo sightseeing tour

OTR crowd/OTR event

RON Rio de Janero, Brazil

Arrival Ceremony

RON Buenos Aires, Argentina

Friday, October 17

Speech to Congress/Public Event

Bi-lat with Menem

Press Conference with Menem

Wreath Laying at Plaza San Martin

Possible visit to Jewish Community Center

Embassy Event

State Dinner

RON Buenos Aires, Argentina

Saturday, October 18

9:00 am DEPART en route to Bariloche, Argentina
[flight time: 2 hours]

11:00 am ARRIVE Bariloche

DOWN TIME

RON Bariloche, Argentina

Sunday, October 19

DOWN TIME

TBD Depart en route Washington, DC

Berger
COS
Copped

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
8-4-97

Summary
FYI - 

Sandy
FYI

8/5
→ Jim D / Eric's
Can we address this?
②

TP/K/H
Can we perhaps
deal with this → possible
the content of a brief
trip. Took to assist
Sandy, and see if we can
come up with it
AUG = 5 1997 

The Terrorist Question

What do the suicide bombers in Jerusalem and New York City tell us? Something we already knew: There are Palestinian extremist groups that are nourished by terrorism against Jews — and it doesn't matter who's in power in Israel, how active the U.S. is, or whether peace talks are moving or stalled.

The question is how to deal with them. One option is permanent war between the Israeli and Palestinian peoples. But both the Israeli and Palestinian majorities know this is futile. The architects of the Oslo peace had another idea: Build a peace between Israelis and Palestinians that will satisfy the center of each community. You do this not because it will eradicate all terrorism. That's impossible. There will be Palestinian and Israeli extremists who will never reconcile. No, you do this because it creates a better way to diminish terrorism — having the Israeli and Palestinian moderates fighting together against the Israeli and Palestinian extremists.

We were in the process of testing this strategy when Yitzhak Rabin was gunned down by an Israeli fanatic. Ever since then, the Oslo experiment has been slowly eroding, and if this isn't reversed, we are heading back to a war of the Palestinian middle against the Israeli middle — only it will be much worse because now Palestinians have guns. We are heading for Bosnia or the Jordan.

The two men with the most power to halt this slide are Yasir Arafat and Benjamin Netanyahu, and what is really depressing is that neither seems up to the task. Mr. Arafat's leadership has been foolhardy and self-defeating. He has learned nothing from dealing with Israelis. Look at the Hebron deal last year. Mr. Netanyahu, a lifelong advocate of keeping Hebron under Israeli control, relinquished most of it as part of the Oslo deal. Why? Because 75 percent of Israelis wanted Oslo to proceed. And they believed then that Mr. Arafat was making a real security effort. In other words, a weak Mr. Arafat was able to triumph over Likud ideology because he had the leverage of the Israeli public on his side of the table.

So what happens? Immediately after Hebron, Mr. Netanyahu, to restore his right-wing credentials, starts a provocative building project at Har Homa in Jerusalem, and Mr. Arafat, instead of finding other ways to express his disgust, tries to hurt Mr. Netanyahu by turning Palestinian security cooperation on and off. Natural-

ly, the Israeli public sides with Mr. Netanyahu. Mr. Arafat loses all his leverage; peace talks halt. Even though it was Arafat men who helped Israel uncover the Hamas Belt Sahur suicide bomb factory, he opens himself to charges of not doing enough on security because of how he has turned it on and off. He is, and should be, paying a price for his little games.

As for Mr. Netanyahu, his leadership has been incompetent. Yes, he has floated the idea of a Palestinian

The answer's in the middle.

mini-state in the West Bank and Gaza. But while Mr. Netanyahu has leaked those ideas to the Israeli press, he has never shared them with the Palestinians or developed any realistic strategy for working with Palestinians to achieve his ends. So Palestinians assume his ideas are just a fraud, meant for CNN, and that they are supposed to provide Israel security while Mr. Netanyahu diddles them, or tosses them a concession only when it is politically cost free for him. When the Americans asked Mr. Netanyahu to temporarily freeze building at Har Homa so peace talks could be resumed, he offered to do so over a four-day holiday when there would be no construction anyway — an idea deemed too ridiculous to even pass to the Palestinians.

When Mr. Netanyahu wants to lead, he can. He showed that in Hebron, and just last week he blocked a new provocative building project in Jerusalem. But he usually debases what he has done by placating the ideologues in his party with acts that drive the Palestinians to despair. So the Americans, Palestinians and his coalition partners have all concluded that he is a man with no core and that the person who puts the latest greatest pressure on him gets the most.

It's so revealing that, even with the peace process frozen, the latest Gallup Poll in Israel showed 80 percent of Israelis favoring a demilitarized Palestinian state, and even some sharing of Jerusalem. The Israeli people have a core — they know there is no military solution, and that without the two centers finding a way to cooperate, there's only a future full of yesterdays. It's a shame they have no leaders to show them the way.

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
9-4-97

At Home Abroad

ANTHONY LEWIS

The Price Of Truth

GUATEMALA
The American press has its problems. Juries award outlandish damages in libel and other legal actions. Government denies us information that should be available. The public does not love us.

True. But how minor those burdens seem — how petty — in a world where working as a journalist risks death. That, among other places, is Latin America.

Over the last 10 years, 173 Latin reporters, photographers, columnists and editors have been murdered. They were not covering wars or something else that might be considered hazardous duty. They were just doing their ordinary job: trying to publish the truth.

The chilling thing about those murders is that almost none of them have been solved. Official corruption, indifference and threats have prevented serious investigations.

That grim record was the subject of an extraordinary conference put on here last week by the Inter-American Press Association. Hundreds of journalists, lawyers, political figures and others met to call for an end to unpunished crimes against journalists.

What made the conference remarkable was testimony about the victims. Widows, colleagues and others told about their lives and deaths.

Jorge Carpio Nicolle, a leading Guatemalan editor, died when 30 hooded men ambushed his car on a remote country road on July 3, 1993.

"They asked if he was Jorge Carpio," his widow, Marta Arrivillaga de Carpio, said. "Then they shot him. My husband fell in my arms."

Mrs. Carpio, who has taken over as editor of the newspaper *El Gráfico*, said those who ordered the killing remain unknown. The police official in charge of the investigation was murdered, evidence destroyed — and all this at a time when Jorge Carpio's cousin was President of Guatemala.

Violeta Chamorro, the former President of Nicaragua, spoke of the 1978 murder of her husband, Pedro Joaquín Chamorro, an editor who opposed the Somoza dictatorship. He and the others who died, she said, "could have had a safe life style. But they had a commitment to truth."

Many in the conference hall suffered experiences that were painful even to hear described. An Argentine editor's 7-year-old son was kidnapped during that country's civil war, and never found. Irma Flaquer Jordán, a Guatemalan newspaper columnist, was kidnapped in 1984. Her sister, Anabella Flaquer, told how the family had been warned to investigate her disappearance, but "investigation had disappeared, have been condemned," she said, "the torment of not knowing how it died."

The focus was on cases from Mexico, Guatemala and Colombia. I others were mentioned, not only Latin America but in Russia, Africa, India and elsewhere.

In most cases the suspicion is that government officials or military elements were behind the murders: victims had often spoken out against official crimes and abuses. In Colombia drug lords targeted the press and drug traffickers working with corrupt officials seem to be doing the same in Mexico. A Mexican editor, Benjamin Flores González, was kidnapped and shot to death just two weeks ago.

It is murder with impunity. To

Unpunished crimes against Latin journalists

but is to understand that more is at stake than the lives of journalists. Plagiarism killing that goes unpunished rots a society, destroying people's faith in law.

The purpose of the murders is to send a message — to the press and all citizens. The message is: Do not disagree with the powerful; do not speak out against evil. Unchallenged the result would be a silent society and that is a terrible price to pay. Rosalinda Torres Velázquez, a Mayan member of the Guatemalan Congress, said: "A people without education is a dead people."


The spread of democracy in Latin America has not ended the phenomenon of crimes against the press without punishment. Intolerance (free expression remains despite fall of authoritarian regimes, and do corrupt or ineffective police systems).

But there is courage, too — courage that means those coping for the safety of the United States. Latin journalists are prepared to challenge the culture of silence, and their matters to more than freedom of press. Marta Carpio, whose husband died for speaking out, said: "The conference is to bring back truth."


The New York Times

MONDAY, AUGUST 4, 1997

US trade with Brazil and Argentina (\$ billion)



US trade with Brazil and Argentina (\$ billion)



↓
MERCOSUR
form

↓
MERCOSUR
common
external
tariff
goes into
effect

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

August 8, 1997


NOTE FOR JIM STEINBERG

Jim:

I just received the attached memo from Allgeier conveying what purports to be formal USTR opposition to a Mercosur meeting. Nowhere does it state, however, that Charlene agrees, nor does it explain the inconsistency between this position and Charlene's comments to Sandy.

This issue clearly requires further sorting out before anything is sent to the President. Given that Allgeier, Brainard and Barshefsky were all positive about this idea when first approached, I suspect that resistance to it has originated with Tarullo and spread out.

How do you want to proceed?


Jim Dobbins

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. memo	Peter Allgeier to Jim Dobbins and Lael Brainard, re: Possible Mercosur Meeting during POTUS Trip (1 page)	08/08/1997	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Inter-American Affairs
OA/Box Number: 1361

FOLDER TITLE:

POTUS [President of the United States]-Travel (Venezuela, Brazil, Argentina, October
13-18, 1997) [4]

2009-1155-F
ke2443

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]


C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]



FACSIMILE

Office of the United States Trade Representative
Executive Office of the President
Washington, DC
20508

Date: August 8, 1997
Page 1 of 2

Office of the Western Hemisphere

To:	<u>Name</u>	<u>Organization</u>	<u>Telephone</u>	<u>Fax</u>
	Jim Dobbins	NSC	6-9131	6-9130
	Lael Brainard	NEC	5-5104	6-2223
cc:	Nelson Cunningham	McClarty's Office	6-2000	6-2464
	Bryan Samuel	State/ARA	647-6754	647-0791

FROM: Peter Allgeier, (202) 395-6135, FAX (202) 395-9675
(Incomplete or problem faxes, call (202) 395-5190)

SUBJECT: USTR View on Mercosur Meeting during POTUS Trip

Please see attached.

URGENT

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003. memo	Antony Blinken and David Leavy to Samuel Berger, Mack McLarty, Jim Steinberg, and Anne Lewis, re: Preliminary Communications Plan for the President's Trip to South America (8 pages)	08/13/1997	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Inter-American Affairs
OA/Box Number: 1361

FOLDER TITLE:

POTUS [President of the United States]-Travel (Venezuela, Brazil, Argentina, October 13-18, 1997) [4]

2009-1155-F
ke2443

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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Washington, DC 20585

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

August 25, 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR CHRIS BALDERSTON

FROM: ELGIE HOLSTEIN *EH*
RE: **Presidential Trip to Latin America**

I would like to recommend that Secretary Peña accompany President Clinton on his trip to Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela on October 12-17. This recommendation is based on the central role that energy will play in Venezuela, and the major role that climate change and clean energy will play in Brazil and Argentina. As we move toward the climate change conference in Kyoto and the 1998 Summit of the Americas in Santiago, our successful advancement of these issues will be critical to meeting our economic, investment, and environmental goals in the region.

Specifically, we are working with the White House and State Department on the following messages and events:

Venezuela:

- Presidents Clinton and Caldera will join industry representatives (mainly energy companies) to sign the Bilateral Investment and/or Bilateral Tax Treaties;

Both Presidents deliver speeches, with President Clinton delivering a major energy address focusing on energy cooperation in the Americas, energy security and sustainable development. The Presidents can also announce that the Hemisphere's energy ministers will gather in Caracas in January to further our progress on these issues;

The Presidents witness the signing, by Secretary Peña and his counterpart, Minister Arrieta, of the U.S.-Venezuela energy agreement. This agreement builds on successful petroleum R&D cooperation to date by expanding it to include renewable energy, energy efficiency, and data/information exchange; and

Finally, the Presidents participate in a photo opportunity with Venezuelan students about to begin a Fulbright energy study program in the United States.

*Not
will thing
don't that
cloud be
unusual?*

AUG 25 1997

*It's this
continued for the
visit or something
we have
proving*

Brazil:

- Presidents Clinton and Cardoso witness the signing by Secretary Peña and his counterpart, Minister de Brito, of the U.S.-Brazil clean energy agreement, including cooperation on energy efficiency, renewable energy, and advanced power systems. This agreement includes the participation of the U.S. Agency for International Development. While Brazil has been reluctant to move toward any agreement on addressing climate change, this agreement will provide concrete actions we can take jointly, on a win-win basis;
- The agreement can also be a hook for the President's climate change discussions with President Cardoso; and
- The energy secretaries can witness a private sector signing by a U.S. company selling clean energy generated by fuel cell technology developed with DOE support.

Argentina:

- Presidents Clinton and Menem witness the signing by Secretary Peña and his counterpart, Secretary Mirkin, of a bilateral Statement of Intent on Activities Implemented Jointly, a mechanism under the climate change treaty. The Statement of Intent will promote U.S. industry investments in Argentine clean energy projects that reduce greenhouse gases;
- This is followed by Secretaries Peña and Mirkin presiding over a U.S.-Argentina (perhaps Southern Cone--i.e., Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay) Business Roundtable, where our private sectors recommend governmental steps to promote clean energy opportunities in the vast Southern Cone market; and
- The energy secretaries can witness a private sector signing of a clean energy fuel cell project agreement.

I hope that you will agree with me that Secretary Peña's participation will help further these issues by offering concrete actions and resources, and by working with his counterparts on the ground during the visit. I look forward to working with you as we work toward finalizing arrangements for the October trip.

cc: Andrew Friendly, Office of the Special Envoy for the Americas
Ted Piccone, NSC/Latin America
David Sandalow, CEQ

FAX COVER SHEET TO CHRIS BALDERSTON, 456-2525

FROM: ELGIE HOLSTEIN

RE: PRESIDENTIAL TRIP TO LATIN AMERICA

CC: ANDREW FRIENDLY, 456-2464
TED PICCONE, 456-9130
DAVID SANDALOW, 456-2710

Please call Aimée Christensen, 586-4576 with any questions.

after trip
144

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9704754
RECEIVED: 10 JUL 97 12

TO: .BERGER

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

FROM: DOBBINS

By KDE NARA, Date 05/09/14
2009-1155-F

DOC DATE: 10 JUL 97
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: LATIN AMERICA

PRESIDENTIAL TRAVEL

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: PLANNING FOR OCT TRIP TO LATIN AMER

ACTION: NOTED BY BERGER W/ COMMENT

DUE DATE: 16 JUL 97 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: DOBBINS

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

DAVIES
DOBBINS
ELKON
KERRICK
NSC CHRON
STEINBERG

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSTMH

CLOSED BY: NSDRS

DOC 1 OF 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9704754

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 BERGER
001

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 97071414 FOR DECISION
X 97082516 NOTED BY BERGER W/ COMMENT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____

LOG #

4754

URGENT/NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM

RES

NSC

INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG

TMA

NO

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Cosgriff			
Haines	1	mark 7/12	
Rice			
Davies			
Kerrick	2/5	7/12	see ROE
Steinberg	3		
Berger	4		
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	6		N
Records Mgt.			

A - Action

I - Information

D - Disposition

R - Review

S - Study

A - Action

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has discussed

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004. memo	James Dobbins to Samuel Berger, re: Planning for the October Trip to South America (2 pages)	07/11/1997	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Inter-American Affairs
OA/Box Number: 1361

FOLDER TITLE:

POTUS [President of the United States]-Travel (Venezuela, Brazil, Argentina, October 13-18, 1997) [4]

2009-1155-F
ke2443

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]