

FOIA MARKER

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Folder Title:

PC/DC [Principals Committee/Deputies Committee] Meetings on Bosnia, May 1995 [5]

Staff Office-Individual:

European Affairs-Drew, Nelson/Bremner, Sue

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696

Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:	Stack:
33	2	6	1	V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. paper	Re: May 28 Principals' Meeting on Bosnia: Issues for Discussion (9 pages)	05/27/1995	P1/b(1)
001b. cable	Re: [Balkan Crisis] (3 pages)	05/27/1995	P1/b(1)
001c. cable	Re: Letter from Secretary on Contact Group Ministerial (3 pages)	05/27/1995	P1/b(1)
001d. cable	Re: [Balkan Crisis] (3 pages)	05/00/1995	P1/b(1)
002. fax	Fax Coversheet [partial] (1 page)	05/00/1995	b(7)(C)
003a. memo	Don Kerrick to Samuel Berger, re: May 9 Deputies Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia (5 pages)	05/08/1995	P1/b(1)
003b. cable	Re: Meeting with Milosevic - Still Demands Sanctions Lift (5 pages)	05/07/1995	P1/b(1)
003c. cable	Re: Holbrooke Meeting with President Tudjman: May 7, London (4 pages)	05/07/1995	P1/b(1)
003d. cable	Re: Sarajevo Airport (2 pages)	05/04/1995	P1/b(1)
003e. paper	Re: Unanswered Policy Questions Relating to OPLAN 40104 (12 pages)	05/00/1995	P1/b(1)
003f. talking points	Re: Talking Points for Congressional OPLAN 40104 (4 pages)	05/00/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Drew, Nelson/Bremner, Sue)
OA/Box Number: 696

FOLDER TITLE:

PC/DC [Principals Committee/Deputies Committee] Meetings on Bosnia, May 1995 [5]

2012-0798-F
ke3055

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

TIME OF RECEIPT:

2012-098-F

**WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM**

PRECEDENCE: X

**IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE**

RELEASER: _____

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO: _____ CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ PAGES: 11
(Including Cover)
FROM: NSC - ALEXANDER VERSHBOW 456-9151 368 OEOB
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Agenda and Discussion Paper for Sunday's PC Meeting on Bosnia

<u>TO (AGENCY)</u>	<u>DELIVER TO</u>	<u>DEPT/ROOM NO.</u>	<u>PHONE NUMBER</u>
<u>STATE</u>	<u>Secretary Christopher/Amb. Albright</u>	<u></u>	<u></u>
<u></u>	<u>John Kornblum/Bob Frasure</u>	<u></u>	<u></u>
<u>DOD</u>	<u>Secretary Perry/Walter Slocombe</u>	<u></u>	<u></u>
<u>JCS</u>	<u>General Shalikashvili/LTG Christman/</u>	<u></u>	<u></u>
<u></u>	<u>LTG Clark</u>	<u></u>	<u></u>
<u>CIA</u>	<u>John Deutch</u>	<u></u>	<u></u>
<u>OVP</u>	<u>Leon Fuerth</u>	<u></u>	<u></u>

REMARKS:

Attached is a draft, not yet vetted with Sandy Berger. We will try to circulate a revision in the morning, but thought it would be useful to provide this advance copy.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

MAY27AG

By KDE NARA, Date 04/13/15
2012-0798 F

NSC PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA

DATE: May 28, 1995

LOCATION: White House Situation Room

TIME: 1:00 - 3:00 p.m.

Agenda

I. NATO Airstrikes: Next Steps

II. UNPROFOR Options

-- Options for Strengthening or Reconfiguring UNPROFOR

-- Dealing with the Eastern Enclaves

-- Ways to Engage the Russians

III. Emergency Withdrawal Planning

IV. Contact Group Options and Strategy

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

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UN TROOP LOCATIONS IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
AS OF MAY 1995

There are a total of 39,579 troops, military observers and civilian police in Bosnia, Croatia and Macedonia, including a headquarters staff in Zagreb of 322 made of personnel from each country.

The list below gives the main troop locations.

BOSNIA: (about 22,470 -- Each country is also represented by military observers in Sarajevo, the capital.)

- Bangladesh - 1,239 (Bihac)
- Belgium - 96 (roving support units)
- Britain - 3,565 (mainly southwest)
- Canada - 831 (southwest)
- Denmark - 254 (northeast)
- Egypt - 430 (Sarajevo)
- France - 3,835 (mainly Sarajevo)
- Jordan - 100 (northeast)
- Malaysia - 1,534 (southwest)
- Netherlands - 1,523 (northeast)
- New Zealand - 253 (southwest)
- Norway - 712 (northeast)
- Pakistan - 2,978 (northeast)
- Russia - 507 (Sarajevo)
- Spain - 1,464 (southwest)
- Sweden - 1,015 (southwest)
- Turkey - 1,474 (southwest)
- Ukraine - 609 (Sarajevo)

CROATIA: (about 14,300)

- Argentina - 860
- Belgium - 763
- Canada - 1,163
- Czech Rep - 890
- Denmark - 809
- Estonia - 33
- France - 787
- Indonesia - 233
- Jordan - 3,400
- Kenya - 962
- Lithuania - 33

Nepal - 894
Netherlands - 111
Norway - 101
Poland - 1,042
Russia - 809
Slovak Rep - 586
Sweden - 110
Ukraine - 498
USA - 339 (medical)

MACEDONIA (1,090)

USA - 526
Denmark - 45
Finland - 433
Sweden - 40

INTERNATIONAL

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DIST: BELL, CLARKER, DREW, KERRICK, NODIST, SAUNDERS, SCHMIDT, SESTAK, SHEEHAN, STEPHENS, VERSHBOW

PREC: RUSH CLASS: INTERNATIONAL DTG:

FM: FBIS

TO:

F7087

FBIS S 087MAY27

UNCLAS 7I

FRANCE: France To Send Naval Force to Bosnia LD2705163295 Paris
LCI Television in French 1600 GMT 27 May 95

[FBIS Translated Text] France has just decided to send the naval air group of the aircraft carrier Foch to the coast off Bosnia in order to reinforce the French UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR] contingent. This has just been announced by Admiral Lanxade, chief of staff of the French Armed Forces.

We have decided to adopt the firmest possible attitude, Admiral Lanxade said in a news briefing which has just ended. The Foch, accompanied by two transport ships with landing craft, the Ouragan and the Foudre, will leave Toulon on Sunday the admiral said. The aircraft carrier will take fighters and fighter helicopters and troops. Further details have not been released.

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em N

FBIS 05/27/95 12:35:00

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INTERNATIONAL

INTERNATIONAL

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DIST: CLARKER, DREW, KERRICK, NODIST, SAUNDERS, STEPHENS, VERSHBOW

PREC: RUSH CLASS: INTERNATIONAL DTG:

FM: Reuters

TO:

a0556

^BC-YUGOSLAVIA-FRANCE 2NDLD (SCHEDULED, PICTURE)

^France's Chirac sets diplomatic blitz on Bosnia

(Adds Chirac call to Milosevic)

By Irwin Arief

PARIS, May 27 (Reuter) - President Jacques Chirac launched a diplomatic blitz on Saturday to gain better protection for French peacekeepers in ex-Yugoslavia after Bosnian Serbs took more than a hundred of them hostage and killed two others.

Chirac, barely in his second week as head of state, telephoned Serbia President Slobodan Milosevic to express his indignation over the taking of peacekeepers as hostages and urged him to use his influence to obtain their release.

He also requested emergency sessions of the United Nations Security Council and NATO's policy-making Council of Ambassadors, threatening to withdraw French soldiers unless the council approved a new mandate to better protect them.

"This situation cannot go on, and France will not allow it to go on. Take it or leave it," Foreign Minister Herve de Charette said on Europe 1 radio.

Chirac began a day of intense diplomatic activity by calling senior advisers and cabinet members to the Elysee presidential palace to confer on Bosnia.

Attending the two-hour meeting were Prime Minister Alain Juppe, Defence Minister Charles Millon, armed forces chief of staff Jacques Lanxade and de Charette.

Afterward, Chirac paid homage to the slain peacekeepers and blamed their deaths on "the ambiguity that surrounds the peacekeepers' mandate, the unsuitability of their means and the international community's lack of determination," the palace said in a statement.

"To avoid the worst, France intends to urge its partners to redefine the mission of the United Nations forces and to provide these forces with the necessary means to accomplish their task in the service of peace," the statement said.

The U.N. should also reinforce its peacekeeping forces and concentrate them in larger units rather than disperse them in small groups, de Charette said in the radio interview.

Chirac asked Milosevic to "use all means available to him to put pressure on (the Bosnian Serb capital) Pale so that these

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soldiers can regain their freedom and fulfill their mission," Chirac spokeswoman Catherine Colonna said.

U.N. spokesman Lieutenant-Colonel Gerard Dubois told France-Info radio from Sarajevo that 199 peacekeepers -- including French and Ukrainian soldiers -- either were being held hostage or confined to their base by Bosnian Serb soldiers.

The Serbs took them hostage to ward off more NATO airstrikes on their positions like those mounted on Thursday and Friday.

All those being held hostage have been disarmed, Dubois told France-Info radio from Sarajevo.

``Some of them have been moved away, and we don't know where all of them are located at this time," he said. ``The situation is serious and very tense."

The two peacekeepers' deaths brought to five the number of French soldiers killed in fighting in and around Sarajevo in the past two months.

France has about 3,800 soldiers in the 22,000-strong U.N. force in Bosnia, the largest national contingent, according to U.N. figures
RB-- 05/27/95 11:09:00

FROM:
SITREPT

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001b. cable	Re: [Balkan Crisis] (3 pages)	05/27/1995	P1/b(1)

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Unclassified



*Bureau of International Organization Affairs
Office of Peacekeeping
and Humanitarian Operations
(IO/PHO)*

Date Sent 5/27/95 Time 11:05 Pages 5 Plus Cover

To: CON NELSON Drew Office: NSC

Fax Number: 456-9150 Phone Number: 456-9157

From: WILLIAM M. BARTLETT, Dep. Dir. Office: IO/PHO

Fax: 202-647-4006

Phone: 736-7732/38

Comments:

NOT COMPREHENSIVE

Unclassified

May 27, 95 10:55

P.01

OUTGOING FAX

UNITED STATES MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS

IF RECEIVED INCOMPLETE CALL (212) 415-4444

799 UNITED NATIONS PLAZA
NEW YORK, N. Y. 10017u/c
CLASSIFICATION

DATE: 5/27/95
443103

FROM: William Wood

TO: 1) <u>Bill Bartlett</u>	(NAME)	(OFFICE/TEL #)	74006 (FAX # ONLY)
2) _____	(NAME)	(OFFICE/TEL #)	(FAX # ONLY)
3) _____	(NAME)	(OFFICE/TEL #)	(FAX # ONLY)
4) _____	(NAME)	(OFFICE/TEL #)	(FAX # ONLY)

SUBJECT: _____

HANDLE AS:

____ ROUTINE _____ PRIORITY X URGENTREMARKS: As promised. This is as of 1130
local and probably NOT
Comprehensible.

(COM/CENTER USE ONLY - DO NOT WRITE BELOW)

DACOM (CLASS) _____ DEX (UNCLAS) ✓ NO. UNNPAGE NO. 1 OF 5 PAGES

TOR IN TEL/UNIT

EOT IN TEL/UNIT

MAY-27-95 SAT 10:12

P.03

MAY 27.95 10.56

P 02

MAY-27-95 08.58 FROM: SITUATION CENTRE NEW YORK 10.212 553 2501

PAGE 1/4

ACTION:
MSC
COPIES!
AMBS.
HUNG
WOOD
S. SELDOWITZ
FROM: JTH

PAGE 1 OF 3

OUTGOING FACSIMILE

**IMMEDIATE
UNCLASSIFIED**

OUTGOING FAX NO:	DTG: 0655 NYT 27 May 95
TO: UNPF TROOP CONTRIBUTING COUNTRIES	FROM: UN HQ - DPKO SITUATION CENTRE
FAX NO: DISTRIBUTION	FAX NO: (212)-963-9053
SUBJECT: UPDATED LIST OF DETAINED UNMOS	
ATT: MILITARY ADVISER	DRAFTER: MAJ ERIKSSON SIGN: <i>[Signature]</i>
INFO: REF NO:	
TOTAL NUMBER OF TRANSMITTED PAGES INCLUDING THIS PAGE: 3	

MESSAGE

PLEASE FIND ENCLOSED A UPDATED LIST OF DETAINED UNMOS BY BSA FORCES
AS OF 27 MAY 1130 HRS LOCAL TIME.

May 27, 95 10:56

P.03

MAY-27-95 08:00 FROM: SITUATION CENTRE NEW YORK ID: 212 863 2581

PAGE 2/4

0645

UNMO HQ ZAGREB
TO: UN HQ NEW YORK

27/05/95

PAGE 1/1

SUBJECT: UPDATE LIST OF DETAINED UNMO'S BY BSA FORCES AT FIGURES
27130 Z MAY 95.TEAM 7L - PALE LO TEAM (LOCATION: PALE)

-01	CAPT RECHNER, PATRICK	000675	CAN
-02	CAPT ZIDLIK, OLDRICH	000456	CZE
-03	CAPT TETREVSKY, PAVEL	000205	RUS

REMARK: THEY WERE TRANSPORTED TO JAHORINSKI POTOK THE PLACE
WHERE UN CONDUCTED AIRSTRIKE, TIMING AT 0945Z MAY 95.TEAM SE-1 (LOCATION PALE)

-04	MAJ KALBARCZYK, JANUSZ	001204	POL
-05	CAPT ROMERO HUELIN, JOSE	001125	SPA
-06	CAPT BATINSHENKO, DMITRI	001221	RUS
-07	SQUADR EVANS, GRIFFITHS	001069	GHA
-08	MAJ KOZUSNEK, ZLATEK	000893	CZE

REMARK: AS ABOVE BUT TIMING FOR TRANSPORTATION WAS 261148Z MAY
95.TEAM SN-1 (LOCATION VOGOSCA - NORTH OF SARAJEVO)

-09	MAJ VIDTANIN, UTEA	001201	BIN
-10	CAPT LAPALM, RYAN	000501	CAN
-11	CAPT GADGAARD, GERT	001146	DAN
-12	MAJ MAHAT, BALDEN	001206	NEP

REMARK: DETAINED BY ARMED BSA GUARDS IN ACCOMMODATION, NOT
ALLOWED TO USE COMMS.TEAM SS-1 (LOCATION KASINDO - SOUTH EAST OF SARAJEVO)

-13	MAJ BELLO, ABDUL RAZAK	001016	NIG
-14	MAJ KRATKY, KARL	000928	CZE
-15	CAPT AHMAD, MANZOOR	000821	PAK
-16	CAPT HELGERS, MARK	001232	NED
-17	MAJ WOLTASIAK, WIESLAW	000950	POL
-18	MAJ WESTLUND, GUNNAR	001154	SWE

REMARK: SAME AS TEAM SN-1

May 27,95 10:57

P.04

MAY-27-95 00:00 FROM SITUATION CENTRE NEW YORK 10:21:00 000 2501

PAGE 3/4

TEAM L (LOCATION LUKAVICA BSA MILITARY BARRACKS SOUTH OF SARAJEVO)

-19	MAJ CALMHEDE MICHAEL	000788	SWE
-20	LT CDR JORGENSEN JACK BRANDT	001084	DEN

REMARK: AT 261740Z MAY BOTH UNMO WERE ORDERED BY ARMED BSA SOLDIERS TO LEAVE THEIR ACCOMMODATION TO AN UNKNOWN LOCATION.

TEAM SG-1 (LOCATION GRABAVICA - BSA CONTROLLED AREA IN THE CENTER OF SARAJEVO)

-31	CAPT ALVES HARLEY	000721	BRA
-32	MAJ GELISSEN JOS	001229	NET
-23	MAJ GOLUBEV SERGEY	001218	RUS

REMARK: 10 BSA SOLDIERS CAME INTO THE ACCOMMODATION AND TWO OF THE THREE ABOVE MENTIONED UNMO'S WERE TAKEN TO AN UNKNOWN LOCATION. THE THIRD MEMBER OF THE SG-1 TEAM MAJ GOLUBEV SERGEY WITH RUSSIAN NATIONALITY WAS ORDERED TO GO TO THE RUSBAT LOCATION WHERE HE REMAINS AT THIS TIME.

TEAM SW-1 (BLAZUY - WEST OF SARAJEVO)

-24	CAPT MROWICKI OLIVIER	001001	FRA
-25	CAPT AL LAWWAMA MAHD	000736	JOR
-26	CAPT LAINE JARMO	001158	FIN
-27	MAJ ROUBTSOV VALERY	000832	RUS
-28	CAPT LBO NEL	001277	BRA
-29	LT COL NIAGI JOTHAM	001009	KEN
-30	COMD SCHANDELER GUY	000611	BEL
-31	FLT LT HALL ANDREW	001145	UK
-32	MAJ MAHAT HALDEV	001206	NEP

REMARK: THIS TEAM WAS TOLD BY THE BSA THAT THEY WERE NOT ALLOWED TO LEAVE THEIR ACCOMMODATION. THIS TEAM IS AT THE TIME BEING NOT GUARDED BY BSA AND CAN STILL USE THEIR COMMS.

TEAM BANJA LUKA (AIRFIELD MONITORS AT BANJA LUKA.)

-33	KARATNIQOV VAESLI	000535	RUS
-34	RAMAKERS WILHELMUS	001236	NET
-35	CORTES MENDEZ MANUEL	001129	SPA

REMARK: THE RUS AND NET UNMO HAVE BEEN TRANSPORTED TO AN UNKNOWN LOCATION. THE SPA UNMO REMAINS AT THE MAHOVLJANI AIRBASE NEAR BANJA LUKA.

MAY-27-95 SAT 10:14

P. 06

May 27, 95 10:58

P. 05

MAY-27-95 08:22 FROM: SITUATION CENTRE NEW YORK ID: 212 963 2581

PAGE 4/4

LATEST UPDATE: AT 270635Z MAY, THE TEAM LEADER OF UNMO TEAM L7 (LO TEAM PALE) COULD CONTACT BY RADIO UNMO HQ UNPROFOR SARAJEVO AND STATED THE FOLLOWING:

QUOTE- UNMO'S ARE UNHARMED. THE KASINDO TEAM SS-1 IS CONFIRMED TO BE AT THE BSA SAHORINA RADAR STATION. TEAM SG-1 WAS TOGETHER WITH L7 AND EC-1. NO NEWS OF LELA AND SN 1 TEAM (VOGOSCA TEAM).

INTERNATIONAL

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DIST: CLARKER, DREW, KERRICK, NODIST, SAUNDERS, STEPHENS, VERSHBOW

PREC: RUSH CLASS: INTERNATIONAL DTG:

FM: Reuters

TO:

a0229

^BC-YUGOSLAVIA-BOSNIA-HOSTAGES

^Bosnia Serbs hold 93 UN soldiers as human shields

SARAJEVO, May 27 (Reuter) - Bosnian Serbs are holding 93 U.N. soldiers as human shields against NATO airstrikes and a further 127 peacekeepers and unarmed military observers have been blockaded or taken hostage, mission spokesmen said on Saturday.

The men at risk include 154 French troops, 33 Ukrainians and 33 U.N. military observers from countries around the world.

Major Guy Vinet said 187 French and Ukrainian troops were being held at weapons collection points (WCPs) around Sarajevo or at observation posts near the city.

Here are the locations involved:

-- Poljine WCP where 21 French peacekeepers have been disarmed and separated into three groups. One group remains at the WCP, another has been taken to the local Bosnian Serb Army (BSA) brigade headquarters. Another has been taken to the local BSA battalion HQ as protection against air strikes and any kind of rescue.

-- Lukavica WCP where 40 French peacekeepers have been divided into two groups. Nineteen are being held in the main WCP warehouse and 21 at the BSA HQ in Lukavica. The French surrendered yesterday after being surrounded by the BSA, who fired small arms into the barracks area and used two rocket propelled grenades to destroy a U.N. APC and another vehicle.

-- Krivoglavci WCP where 11 Ukrainians are surrounded by BSA soldiers with small arms and anti-tank weapons.

In addition to these three WCPs, 21 French peacekeepers have been taken by the BSA at Rajlovac observation post and divided into two groups. One group is held at the post and the other has been taken to Vogosca, north of the capital.

Vinet said all 93 of these peacekeepers are considered as having been taken as human shields.

In addition, peacekeepers have been blocked inside three other WCPs by BSA soldiers with small arms and anti-tank weapons. These include 21 French blocked at Osiek, 22 French blocked at Bare and 22 Ukrainians blocked at Ilidza. Two anti aircraft guns and one APC have been taken outside the Ilidza WCP and made ready for firing.

INTERNATIONAL

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In addition three French observation posts are blocked by the BSA. These include 10 French at Krupac, 14 French at Ilidza and five French at Kasindolska.

The roads around the Poljine and Ilidza WCP's have been mined by the BSA and the road between the Sierra Four checkpoint and the airport has been mined as well, Captian Myriam Souchaki said.

Souchaki said 33 UN military observers (UNMOs) are either blocked in their positions by the BSA or being used as human shields.

Six are being used as human shields in Pale ``in areas considered by the Bosnian Serbs to be possible NATO targets."

Two were seen chained to a bridge outside Pale. Six are being held at the Jahorina radio station.

Nine are confined by BSA to quarters in various locations. One Russian UNMO is confined to the Russian battalion.

Nine are ``unaccounted for and assumed to be in BSA hands," Souchaki said.

^REUTE

RB-- 05/27/95 05:38:00

FROM:
SITREPRT

INTERNATIONAL

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P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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001d. cable	Re: [Balkan Crisis] (3 pages)	05/00/1995	P1/b(1)
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COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Drew, Nelson/Bremner, Sue)
OA/Box Number: 696

FOLDER TITLE:

PC/DC [Principals Committee/Deputies Committee] Meetings on Bosnia, May 1995 [5]

2012-0798-F
ke3055

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DIST: BASS, BERGER, DOHSE, FUERTH, HARMON, LAKE, SENS, SIT, SODERBERG, BEYRLER, CLARKER, DREW, HARMON, KERRICK, LAKEA, SAUNDERS, STEPHENS, SUM, SUM2, VERSHBOW, WHSR_SPECIAL

PREC: IMMEDIATE CLASS: ~~SECRET~~ DTG: 271451Z MAY 95

FM: AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO

TO:
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0253

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**

////

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 SARAJEVO 000204

NODIS

DEPT ONLY FOR THE SECRETARY AND EUR RFRASURE

E.O. 12356: DECLAS: OADR

TAGS: AMGT

SUBJECT: "I'VE BROKEN THE MACHINE"

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. GENERAL SMITH AFFIRMED THE VIEW THAT THE UNPROFOR MISSION IS DRAWING TO A CLOSE. THE "ONE THOUSAND DOLLAR QUESTION IS ARE WE TO GO ON THROUGH THE PAIN BARRIER? ... YOU ARE PREPARED TO FIGHT OR YOU ARE NOT." ACCORDING TO SMITH "THIS IS THE ONLY QUESTION WHICH MATTERS."

IF YES:

3. IF THE ANSWER IS YES (WE ARE PREPARED TO CROSS THE BARRIER) IT MEANS BEING PREPARED FOR

--BODIES,

--A LONG TERM COMMITMENT

--RESOURCES, "MONEY,"

--AND A WILLINGNESS TO ESCALATE.

4. FURTHER, FOR SMITH, THERE MUST BE "A CLEAR PLAN BEHIND ME AS TO WHERE WE'RE GOING." THERE MUST BE "A BIGGER AIM THAN FOUR WEAPONS GETTING BACK INTO COLLECTION POINTS." THIS WAS ESSENTIAL ALSO FOR THE "MORALE" OF THOSE HOSTAGES WHO MAY BE SACRIFICED: THERE MUST BE A LARGER REASON, "A GOOD, SOLID OBJECTIVE." DO WE "FIGHT A WAR?"

5. IF WE CROSS THE PAIN BARRIER, UNPROFOR, DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS, AND OTHERS TRAPPED IN SARAJEVO BECOME PART OF

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

THE PROBLEM AS POTENTIAL HOSTAGES. SMITH FEELS STRONGLY THAT THE PAIN BARRIER DECISION MUST NOT BE A QUESTION FOR THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL, BUT RATHER A MATTER FOR THE SECURITY COUNCIL, BECAUSE OF ITS POLITICAL CONTENT.

IF NO:

6. IF WE ARE NOT PREPARED TO CROSS THE PAIN BARRIER, SMITH SAID "DON'T TALK TO ME ABOUT AIR STRIKES, WEAPONS COLLECTION POINTS, EXCLUSION ZONES, OR SAFE AREAS." IN THIS CASE AS WELL, SMITH SAID "I'M PART OF THE PROBLEM: WE CAN'T DO WHAT WE WERE DOING." THE UNPROFOR MISSION WOULD HAVE TO WITHDRAW, "LEAVING UNHCR" BEHIND.

7. IN EITHER CASE, SMITH SAYS, "I'VE BROKEN THE MACHINE, AND IT CAN'T BE PUT TOGETHER." THE UN MISSION IS IRREPARABLY HARMED IN EITHER CASE. THE OLD CONDITIONS CANNOT BE RECREATED, AND THE UN CANNOT PRETEND THAT IT CAN OPERATE UNDER THE EXISTING MANDATES. THERE "MUST BE A DEFINITION OF THE OBJECT OF ACTIVITY" FOR THE UN. SMITH SAYS "I HAVE DEMONSTRABLY FAILED TO REESTABLISH THE TEZ." HE POINTED OUT "WE HAVE NO WEAPONS COLLECTIONS POINTS IN OUR CONTROL." (COMMENT: WE POINTED OUT THAT THEY STILL CONTROL THE BOSNIAN GOVERNMENT WCP'S. END COMMENT.) IF THE SYG SAYS TO ESCALATE, SMITH "WILL NOT TURN THE KEY" UNTIL THERE IS A PLAN IN PLACE, OUTLINING WHO FILLS IN BEHIND THE UNPROFOR MISSION.

WHAT NEXT?

8. SMITH IS ABLE TO HOLD ON FOR A TIME. HE HAS CREATED BATTLE GROUP NEAR VITEZ. (COMMENT: VICE PRESIDENT GANIC CALLED US IN TO REASSURE HIM THAT THE BRITISH WERE NOT WITHDRAWING IN THIS AREA--THE LOCAL POPULACE HAD TRIED TO BLOCK SOME ELEMENTS FROM CONSOLIDATING WITH THIS FEAR IN MIND. END COMMENT.) THE GROUP WILL CONSIST OF PRIMARILY BRITISH ELEMENTS

--3 WARRIOR RIFLE COMPANIES

--A RECCE SQUADRON

--AN ENGINEER SQUADRON

--ONE OR MORE FIRE SUPPORT COMPANIES WITH ANTI-TANK MISSILES AND MORTARS (SMITH IS REQUESTING CANADIAN AND SPANISH PARTICIPATION)

--HELICOPTERS FOR CASUALTY EVACUATION

--ARMED LYNX HELICOPTERS

9. SMITH EMPHASIZES THAT "AIR POWER WILL NOT SOLVE THIS PROBLEM." RATHER, "WE'RE COMING DOWN TO THE GROUND." IT IS ESSENTIAL, ESPECIALLY IN THE CASE OF AN UNPROFOR EXTRACTION, TO DETERMINE WHO "FILLS IN BEHIND UNPROFOR."

10. THIS MORNING AT THE VRBANJA BRIDGE CONFRONTATION, THE FRENCH CAPTURED SIX SERB PRISONERS AND ONE BODY. AT THE TIME OF OUR CONVERSATION THE FRENCH STILL HAD TEN SERBS "UNDER THE GUNS" BUT THERE WERE TWO FRENCH SOLDIERS AMONG

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

THEM. ACCORDING TO SMITH, THE SERBS WERE TERRIBLY ANXIOUS TO NEGOTIATE FOR THE PRISONERS, BUT SMITH REFUSED TO DISCUSS THE MATTER EXCEPT WITH MLADIC PERSONALLY.

11. THE REASON FOR THE SERB ANXIETY IS TWO-FOLD. FIRST, THEY ARE AFRAID THAT THE PRISONERS MIGHT BE TURNED OVER TO ?THE BOSNIANS (WITH UNPREDICTABLE RESULTS), AND, SECOND, SMITH BELIEVES THE SERBS MAY BE FROM THE FRY, NOT BOSNIA. REPORTEDLY THEY SPOKE FRENCH AND WERE DRESSED EXACTLY LIKE THE FRENCH: IN THIS WAY, "WE ARE OUTSIDE THE GENEVA CONVENTION." (COMMENT: GANIC ALSO RAISED THE ISSUE OF PRISONERS WITH US, SAYING THAT THE BOSNIANS WOULD WANT TO
~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 SARAJEVO 000204

NODIS

DEPT ONLY FOR THE SECRETARY AND EUR RFRASURE

E.O. 12356: DECLAS: OADR

TAGS: AMGT

SUBJECT: "I'VE BROKEN THE MACHINE"

SEIZE THEM FROM THE FRENCH DURING TRANSFER TO THE PTT BUILDING. WE URGED, EMPHATICALLY, THAT THE BOSNIANS LEAVE THEM WITH SMITH, WITHOUT PROVIDING ANY DETAILS. GANIC SAID HE WOULD, IN FACT, PROVIDE A POLICE ESCORT TO ASSURE THAT THEY ARRIVE SAFE AND IN SMITH'S HANDS. END COMMENT.)

12. SMITH IS PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE FOR THE RETURN OF THE BODY IN THE EVENT THAT THE FRENCH NEED A HERCULES FOR A MEDEVAC OF ONE OR MORE OF THEIR WOUNDED.

13. COMMENT: SMITH REAFFIRMED OUR VIEW THAT THE UNPROFOR MISSION IS DRAWING TO AN END, REGARDLESS OF THE RESUMPTION OF ROBUST ACTION. UNPROFOR CANNOT GO BACK TO THE STATUS QUO ANTE, AND YET IF IT FAILS TO ESCALATE, AND MUST ACCEPT INSTEAD A NEGOTIATED, FACE-SAVING SOLUTION, IT WILL BE UNABLE TO ENFORCE ANY ELEMENT OF ITS MANDATE: THE SAFE AREAS, TEZ, AND PREVIOUS REGIME WILL BE LOST COMPLETELY AND CANNOT BE REPLACED BY THIS UN MISSION. IF THE UN DETERMINES TO CONTINUE WITH AN ENFORCEMENT OPERATION, THE MISSION WILL END: UNPROFOR WILL REQUIRE A NATO EXTRACTION. WE BELIEVE THAT WE ARE APPROACHING PERHAPS THE FINAL CRISIS OF THE UNPROFOR MISSION IN BOSNIA. END COMMENT. MENZIES

BT

#0204

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NNNN

<^SECT> SECTION: 01 OF 02

<^SSN> 0204

<^TOR> 950527120720 M1689681

<^SECT> SECTION: 02 OF 02

<^SSN> 0204

<^TOR> 950527120721 M1689682

FROM:

SITREPT

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9520653
RECEIVED: 18 MAY 95 08

TO: AGENCIES

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

FROM: SENS

September 11, 2006

DOC DATE: 18 MAY 95

SOURCE REF:

By KDE NARA, Date 04/13/15
2012-0728-T

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
PC

CROATIA
AGENDA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION / AGENDA & BRIEFING PAPER FOR 19 MAY PC MTG ON
BOSNIA & CROAITA

ACTION: DOHSE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DUE DATE: 22 MAY 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: DREW

LOGREF:

FILES: IFM

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BASS
BERGER
DREW
JOSHI
KERRICK
KRECKO
LAKE
NSC CHRON
VERSHBOW

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY OPS DATE 5-18-95 BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJDA

CLOSED BY: NSDRS

DOC 2 OF 2

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RECORD ID: 9520653

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 LAKE	Z 95051815 FOR DECISION
001	X 95051819 LAKE APPROVED RECOM
002	X 95051819 DOHSE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

<u>DOC</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>DISPATCH FOR ACTION</u>	<u>DISPATCH FOR INFO</u>
002	950518	FUERTH, L	
002	950518	BRILL, K	
002	950518	MCALEER, R	
002	950518	INDERFURTH, K	
002	950518	ADAMS, G	
002	950518	PANETTA, L	
002	950518	GARTHOFF, D	
002	950518	PATRICK, T	

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REC'D 5/13 4:30pm

National Security Council
The White House

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LOG # 20653

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG OKS A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon	<u>1</u>	<u>5/13</u>	
Dohse	<u>1/3</u>	<u>5/13</u>	
Sens			
Soderberg			
Berger			
Lake	<u>2</u>		Natl Sec Advisor has seen
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	<u>OKS 5/13</u>	<u>D</u>
Records Mgt.			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

Bosnia PC mtg ~~Prep~~
NOM + Agenda + Discussion
Papers

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

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Initials: KDE Date: 04/13/15

RELEASER: _____

DTG: _____

2012-07-28-F

MESSAGE NO.: _____

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~TOTAL: 7
(PAGES INCLUDING COVER)FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK
(NAME)(202) 456-9425
(PHONE NUMBER)WE SITROOM
(ROOM NO.)MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Notification / Agenda & Discussion paper for 19May PC Meeting on Bosnia NSC LOG # 20653

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
<u>State</u>	<u>Executive Secretary</u>	_____	_____
<u>DoD</u>	<u>Executive Secretary</u>	_____	_____
<u>USUN</u>	<u>Off. of the Rep. of the U.S.</u>	_____	_____
<u>CIA</u>	<u>Executive Secretary</u>	_____	_____
<u>JCS</u>	<u>Secretary, Joint Staff</u>	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
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REMARKS:

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. fax	Fax Coversheet [partial] (1 page)	05/00/1995	b(7)(C)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Drew, Nelson/Bremner, Sue)
OA/Box Number: 696

FOLDER TITLE:

PC/DC [Principals Committee/Deputies Committee] Meetings on Bosnia, May 1995 [5]

2012-0798-F
ke3055

RESTRICTION CODES

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TIME OF TRANSMISSION

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

WHSR CONTROL
TIME OF RECEIPT

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Initials: WDC Date: 04/13/15

2012-09-18

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE

- ☐ FLASH
☒ IMMEDIATE
☐ PRIORITY
☐ ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DATE/TIME: _____

MESSAGE #: _____

FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR
SUBJECT: Notice of Meeting: 19 May PC on Bosnia PAGES: Cover + 6

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
<u>USUN New York</u>	<u>Mr. Rick Inderfurth</u>	<u>212-415-4016</u>	<u>(b)(7)c</u>

[002]

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

~~SECRET~~

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

~~SECRET~~

20653

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

May 18, 1995

By KDE NARA, Date 04/13/15
2012-0108-F

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the U.S. to the UN

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for National
Security and International
Affairs
Office of Management and Budget


MR. LEON PANETTA
Chief of Staff to the President

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. T. R. PATRICK
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (S)

There will be a Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia and Croatia on May 19, 1995, 2:30 p.m. - 4:30 p.m., in the White House Situation Room. Attendance will be Principals only. The agenda is attached at Tab A. An NSC Discussion Paper is at Tab B. (S)


Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachments

Tab A Agenda
Tab B NSC Discussion Paper

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

20653

By KDE NARA, Date 04/13/15
2012-0798-F

NSC PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA

DATE: May 19, 1995

LOCATION: White House Situation Room

TIME: 2:30 - 4:30 p.m.

Agenda

I. Future of UNPROFOR

A. Options.....JCS/ALL

B. Diplomatic Strategy Leading to a New UNPROFOR.....State

II. OPLAN 40104 In-Progress Review

A. Post-UNPROFOR Withdrawal Strategy.....State

B. Unanswered Policy Questions.....State

C. Alternatives to NATO-Led Withdrawal.....All

D. Roadmap of remaining OPLAN 40104 requirements...JCS/OSD

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

May 17, 1995

BOSNIA: STRATEGIC CHOICESNSC DISCUSSION PAPERIntroduction:

We are in a critical period for U.S. policy toward Bosnia that could see the withdrawal of UNPROFOR and the introduction of NATO/U.S. ground forces for a mission whose outcome is uncertain. Now is the time to review the fundamental principles guiding our policy and to determine the steps necessary to shape events before strategic choices are completely dictated by the situation on the ground.

Fundamental U.S. policy objectives for Bosnia:

- Obtain a political settlement that satisfies basic Bosnian government requirements and rolls back some Serb aggression
- End or reduce the fighting
- Prevent spread of conflict to other parts of region
- Maintain relief supplies
- Maintain cohesion with Allies
- Avoid American entanglement in fighting on the ground in the Balkans

Key Strategic Choices:

I. **Whither UNPROFOR:** U.S. support for continued UNPROFOR presence has been based upon an assessment that this course remains the avenue best suited to the majority of our fundamental objectives -- and that, for all of its problems, the alternatives are worse.

- In the current environment, the viability of UNPROFOR is increasingly being called into question.
 - ◆ UNPROFOR is unable to ensure that humanitarian assistance is delivered to UN-protected areas/safe areas.
 - ◆ Fighting among the warring parties is no longer deterred by UNPROFOR presence.
 - ◆ UNPROFOR itself is frequently the subject of attack, and UNPROFOR forces are neither in a position to defend themselves effectively nor to withstand the possible consequences of calling in NATO airpower.
 - ◆ UNPROFOR credibility is thereby undermined with all parties, and NATO credibility in turn eroded as well.

- Under these circumstances, we must ask whether linking U.S. objectives to continued UNPROFOR presence remains valid in the current environment.
 - ◆ There still do not appear to be any alternatives to UNPROFOR that provide better support for U.S. objectives.
 - ◆ Withdrawal followed by unilateral or predominantly U.S. lift (and strike) risks "Americanizing" the Balkan conflict; even multilateral lift risks widening the scope of the conflict as more external parties move to support regional clients.
 - ◆ Replacement of UNPROFOR with another international presence (NATO? WEU? Coalition of the willing?) would either require U.S. participation on the ground or prove equally ineffective -- and require additional political and financial capital to initiate.
 - ◆ U.S. interests are thus best served by finding a way to restore credibility to the UNPROFOR mission in a manner that permits existing troop contributors to sustain their continued presence and the Bosnian government to agree to retain that presence.
- Options other than withdrawal available for UNPROFOR under the present circumstances:
 - ◆ **Muddle through with the status quo:** French have already indicated likely pullout if current conditions remain unchanged -- may be the thread that unravels the whole fabric of UNPROFOR.
 - ◆ **"Restabilization" of existing UNPROFOR mission with more robust enforcement of existing mandate:** UK avoidance of a confrontational approach in B-H must be overcome if this option is to become viable; additional resources needed to enhance military capabilities of existing UNPROFOR forces not likely to be forthcoming.
 - ◆ **"Retrench and reinvigorate" UNPROFOR mission by withdrawing from untenable positions/missions while pursuing more robust enforcement of remaining mandates:** could be seen as a trade of the eastern enclaves for more effective mission performance around Sarajevo -- implications for eastern enclaves could be very serious; however, this option could satisfy both the French and UK; by retrenching, could also alleviate some of the problems associated with resources to enhance capabilities.
 - ◆ **"Retrench and retreat" by withdrawing and pursuing an even less vigorous approach to mandate enforcement:** the least costly approach, this might be used as a bargaining chip to get the Bosnian Serbs to accede to the conditions for French

forces remaining in UNPROFOR; UK likely to support; however, potentially as damaging to UNPROFOR credibility as the status quo, with the additional public image/moral costs of not only "abandoning" the eastern enclaves, but also "capitulating" in cases where UNPROFOR remains; least likely to be acceptable to Bosnians, who could then refuse to allow continued UNPROFOR presence.

Comment: Only realistic choice may be to seek Allied support to "retrench and reinvigorate." Trade U.S. support for retrenchment for allied and UN pledge to pursue more robust enforcement of remaining mandate, including NATO airstrikes. Fall back to "retrench and retreat" only if no other way to prevent withdrawal.

II. Whither OPLAN 40104, given U.S. objective of sustaining UNPROFOR and commitment to assist withdrawal if required?

- There are no guarantees that a viable solution to retaining UNPROFOR in theater can be agreed.
- Withdrawal remains a real, and increasingly likely, option if there is no agreement on a more viable UNPROFOR role.
- Nevertheless, several key issues remain to be resolved before a decision to proceed with withdrawal implementation could be taken with confidence:
 - ♦ What is the end state we want to leave behind following UNPROFOR withdrawal? What to avoid may be clearer than what to achieve: avoid merely replacing UN with NATO forces and being unable to leave; avoid debacle of U.S./NATO-led withdrawal being depicted as precursor to brutal ethnic cleansing; avoid loss of NATO credibility to the same extent there has been a loss of UN credibility.
 - ♦ How does NATO deal with unintended consequences of withdrawal operations? Massive refugee flow; use of NATO forces as shields by civilians or by warring factions; hostage-taking by warring factions; withdrawal of humanitarian aid providers as a result of UNPROFOR withdrawal.
 - ♦ Under what conditions could withdrawal or partial withdrawal take place without requiring implementation of OPLAN 40104? If nations determine that they will accomplish *de facto* withdrawal by merely failing to replace units during normal rotation, no NATO assistance may be necessary. If this resulted in enclaves being left unprotected, would the last forces out require NATO assistance, or could the UN accomplish this on its own?

- The way ahead for OPLAN 40104 is also complicated by a dilemma: we must ensure that our actions in preparation for possible UNPROFOR withdrawal do not precipitate the withdrawal itself.
- ♦ Key is not allowing the existence of a "NATO withdrawal force" to prompt either UN troop contributors to seek early withdrawal or Bosnians to act to cause UNPROFOR withdrawal in the hopes that NATO will replace the UN. **A clear "firebreak" is required between completion of NATO preparation for OPLAN 40104 and initiation of OPLAN implementation.** We must be confident that we understand exactly what steps will be required to get from the present state of NATO planning to this firebreak, and what steps take us beyond it.
- ♦ NATO credibility requires that forces must be trained sufficiently to ensure mission success. ACTREQ requested by SACEUR this week will facilitate identification of forces and training shortfalls, and allow SACEUR to initiate action to rectify those shortfalls. Training in place to NATO standards should be an acceptable alternative to assembling in Europe for training, and send a more restrained signal.
- ♦ Training in place would also permit completion of Congressional consultations prior to movement of any US forces. We may need to lay down marker in NATO that assembly of forces in Europe will require a further political decision.

~~SECRET~~

20653

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 18, 1995

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

By VDE NARA, Date 04/13/15

2012-0984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW AV

FROM: DON KERRICK⁴²/NELSON DREW D

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia and
Croatia, May 19, 1995

Attached at Tab A is the agenda for the Principals meeting on Bosnia to be held May 19, 1995. The memorandum to the agencies is attached at Tab I.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andy Sens to sign the memorandum to the agencies at Tab I.

Approve  Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the Agencies

Tab A Agenda

Tab B NSC Discussion Paper

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Initials: KDE Date: 04/13/15

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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DATE 18 MAY 95

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FROM: KERRICK
VERSHBOW

September 11, 2006

DOC DATE: 08 MAY 95

SOURCE REF:

By VDE NARA, Date 04/18/15

2012-098-F

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
DC

CROATIA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: INFO MEMO FOR 9 MAY DC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA

ACTION: NOTED BY BERGER

DUE DATE: 11 MAY 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK

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FOR INFO

KERRICK
KRECKO
NSC CHRON
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DOC 1 OF 1

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

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National Security Council
The White House

7:00m

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Berger	<u>2</u>	Deputy Natl Sec Advisor	
Lake		has seen	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>3</u>		<u>N</u>
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Berger mtg package
Bosnia Croatia
DC mtg May 9

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003a. memo	Don Kerrick to Samuel Berger, re: May 9 Deputies Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia (5 pages)	05/08/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
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European Affairs (Drew, Nelson/Bremner, Sue)
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FOLDER TITLE:

PC/DC [Principals Committee/Deputies Committee] Meetings on Bosnia, May 1995 [5]

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White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

By KDE NARA, Date 04/13/15

2012-0918-E

NSC DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA AND CROATIA

DATE: May 9, 1995

LOCATION: White House Situation Room

TIME: 1:00-2:30pm

Agenda

I. Near-Term Diplomatic Strategy

A. Contact Group Prospects/Next Steps.....State

B. Croatia: Situation Review/Next Steps.....State

II. Strategy for Dealing with the Situation in Sarajevo

A. Intelligence Assessment.....CIA

B. Diplomatic Strategy.....State

C. Existing Mandates.....State

D. Military Options.....JCS

III. OPLAN 40104: Unanswered Policy Questions

A. Post-UNPROFOR Withdrawal Strategy.....State

B. Unanswered Policy Questions: Dealing with Civilians;
Delivery of Humanitarian Aid; Dealing with Warring
Parties; Violations of Safe Areas and Exclusion Zones;
Resolving Territorial and Equipment Disputes; Command
and Control; Mission of the NATO Force.....State

IV. OPLAN 40104 Congressional Briefings.....JCS

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003b. cable	Re: Meeting with Milosevic - Still Demands Sanctions Lift (5 pages)	05/07/1995	P1/b(1)
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003c. cable	Re: Holbrooke Meeting with President Tudjman: May 7, London (4 pages)	05/07/1995	P1/b(1)

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Bosnia Diplomatic Strategy: Sarajevo Airport

The Problem

After their successful challenge to the French at the illegal Sierra-4 checkpoint and their even more humiliating treatment of Contact Group representatives at Sarajevo airport, the Bosnian Serbs know they can keep bullying the United Nations and get whatever they want. The UN has no fall-back position for its talks with Karadzic; it long-ago ruled out the option of enforcing its control of the airport and the environs of Sarajevo. In his initial report on the situation, the Secretary General made it clear that the airport could be kept open only with the parties' agreement.

Referring to nonexistent precedents and claiming that the airport is Serb territory merely managed by the UN, Karadzic and his minions have threatened to fire on UN aircraft carrying anything but UNPROFOR military personnel. On April 27, the Serb commander overseeing the airport turned back a plane with civilians aboard and Karadzic announced that he will never allow foreign diplomats to land at Sarajevo, "especially diplomats from hostile nations, like Iran and the United States."

Prognosis: Humiliation and Strangulation

In the end, the UN may be able to maintain the airport as a logistical base for its own severely limited activities, but unless the UN can persuade the Bosnian Serbs otherwise, Sarajevo will lose its air link to the outside world. The GOBH will be isolated and the city will be strangled by closure of land routes.

And the Serbs may go further. In recent weeks, the Bosnian Serb Army has made obvious preparations for a massive attack on Sarajevo -- digging tank emplacements, replacing wooden and sandbag revetments encircling the city with reinforced concrete, etc. General Smith has said he expects the Serbs to "pick off the enclaves one-by-one" and then go for "the real prize enclave -- Sarajevo itself."

In response to these moves, the GOBH is certain to take into its own hands the future of its capital city. The B-H Army has already engaged in probing actions north and south of the city -- possibly setting the stage for an all-out offensive to punch one or two corridors into Sarajevo from nearby government-controlled territory. As Bosnian Vice President Ganic has stated, "We want UNPROFOR to stay in Bosnia and do its job while the Serbs want UNPROFOR to stay in Bosnia and not do its job." In the case of Sarajevo, the Bosnians will not long accept an UNPROFOR that is powerless to counter the Serbs.

Our Limited Options

The key to keeping UNPROFOR on the ground and to avoiding the deployment of U.S. ground troops in Bosnia is to take aggressive and decisive measures to keep Sarajevo Airport open for all traffic. The legal authority exists to do so and military options are being prepared.* But if we are truly serious, we must begin immediately to build a consensus among our allies and at the UN, threatening realistic consequences for inaction.

Among our options are the following:

- Using existing authority to permit NATO air activity of the following sorts:
 - 1) Close air support in defense of UNPROFOR troops at the airport, who have in recent days been shelled by the Bosnian Serbs;
 - 2) Air strikes based on the fact that Sarajevo is being strangled;
 - 3) Air strikes based on the fact that the exclusion zone is being violated.

Diplomatically, we could begin with the following steps:

- Consulting immediately with allies bilaterally, at NATO and at the UN on Serb non-compliance with relevant UNSC resolutions, which call for unhindered delivery of humanitarian assistance including "safe and secure access" to Sarajevo Airport, and provide for the use of force to protect the Sarajevo safe area. The UN Security Council is to act Wednesday to issue a Presidential Statement on the airport that will call for its re-opening in accordance with the 1992 Airport Agreement.
- Convening a meeting of the NAC to discuss military measures to ensure compliance with relevant UNSC resolutions.
- Arranging calls by the Secretary to Hurd, Juppe and Kozyrev, letting them know that a failure to open the airport on acceptable terms will make a Ministerial impossible.
- Raising the issue at the May 5 Contact Group meeting in Paris.

*See accompanying papers

EXISTING AUTHORITY FOR NATO AIR ACTIVITY AROUND SARAJEVO AIRPORT

Within limitations, the UN and NATO have the authority to use air power in response to restrictions placed on the use of Sarajevo Airport, based on the following:

CLOSE AIR SUPPORT (CAS)

NATO Authority: Based on paragraph 1.1 of the Athens Ministerial Decision Sheet (June 10, 1993), which reads in part:

"Ministers decided ... to offer NATO's protective air power in case of attack against UNPROFOR"

NATO may respond to a UN request for NATO air power, without further action, to support UNPROFOR.

UN Authority: UNSC 836 Res. (June 4, 1993), reaffirmed by UNSC Res. 844 (June 18, 1993) provides that:

"... member states, acting ... through regional organizations, ... may take all necessary measures, through the use of air power, ... in and around safe areas, ... to support UNPROFOR in the performance of [certain aspects of] its mandate ..."

That mandate includes deterring attacks on the safe areas, and replying to obstruction of movement of UNPROFOR or humanitarian convoys throughout Bosnia. In addition, under UNSC Res. 770, the UN may request NATO to use force to facilitate delivery of humanitarian assistance to Sarajevo. These resolutions require that actions by member states and regional organizations be taken in "close cooperation" or in "coordination" with the UN, respectively.

AIR STRIKES IN RESPONSE TO STRANGULATION

NATO Authority: Based on NAC decisions of August 2 and 9, 1993, which read in part:

"...that the Alliance will make immediate preparations for undertaking, in the event of strangulation of Sarajevo and other areas ..., measures including air strikes ..."

NATO may conduct air strikes in response to the "strangulation" of safe areas.

The NAC decision also makes clear that "the first use of air power shall be authorized by the UN Secretary General." This has been termed the "dual key" arrangement.

UN Authority: As with CAS, implementing UN resolutions are 770, 836 and 844.

AIR STRIKES IN RESPONSE TO VIOLATIONS OF THE SARAJEVO
EXCLUSION ZONE

NATO Authority: Based on the NAC decision of February 9, 1994, which reads in part that NATO:

"... accepts ... the request of the UN Secretary General to launch air strikes, ... at the request of the United Nations, against artillery or mortar positions in or around Sarajevo ... which are determined by UNPROFOR to be responsible for attacks against civilians, ... and ... in response to artillery or mortar attacks on Sarajevo, ... and ... in response to the identification of any heavy weapons [inside] the exclusion zone [and not under UNPROFOR control] ..."

NATO may conduct air strikes, at the UN's request, if the Sarajevo exclusion zone is violated.

UN Authority: As with CAS, implementing UN resolutions are 770, 836 and 844.

In addition to the UN/NATO authorities, collective self-defense would authorize states to use air power at the request of the Bosnian Government. Such use of air power could be restricted by UN Security Council resolutions -- e.g., by the establishment of the no-fly zone over Bosnia.

NOTE: UN and NATO authority to use air power, as noted above, does NOT apply to restrictions on the use of Sarajevo Airport by diplomats or official delegations.

INFORMATION PAPER

Subject: Military Options for Reopening Sarajevo Airport (U)

1. (U) Purpose. To provide options to reopen Sarajevo airport for the delivery of humanitarian aid.
2. (U) Background. Sarajevo air operations have been periodically interrupted by the Bosnian Serbs since the beginning of the conflict. Bosnian Serb forces control the area surrounding the airport and the major land routes into Sarajevo. The Bosnian Serbs have the capability to attack aircraft in flight and while unloading on the airfield. Aircraft are threatened by both antiaircraft weapons and conventional direct and indirect ground systems. The Bosnian Muslims also have the capability, though to a lesser extent, to interdict air operations. UNPROFOR has documented numerous occasions of BiH fire.
3. (S) Discussion. The following options are available for consideration for the delivery of humanitarian aid into Sarajevo:

Assumptions:

- New UNSCR(s) required to implement a military option will be adopted by the Security Council.
- A parallel diplomatic effort to secure the opening of Sarajevo will be undertaken.

OPTION 1: Secure Sarajevo Airport - forcibly secure and maintain a DMZ around Sarajevo. Create a demilitarized zone (8-10km) around Sarajevo airfield which denies the Bosnian Serbs from employing weapons against aircraft that are in flight or on the ground. This option could require up to a division sized force to secure the airfield and remove the Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Muslim presence from the immediate area.

UNPROFOR Action:

- UNPROFOR seize (if necessary) and establish administrative control over the Sarajevo airport
- Secure airfield perimeter and approaches using a combination of troops equipped with means of acquisition for various types of attack. May include night vision devices, GPS, artillery acquisition battery.
- Take direct action to secure high terrain and buildings from belligerents. Move civilians outside of airport safe zone (2-3km). Combatants excluded inside 8-10km zone.

- Roving security patrols along approaches to the airport. Requires mounted and dismounted patrols monitoring out to 10 km from the airport.
- NATO Airborne AC-130 and helicopter response capability to attack sniper/mortar/artillery positions. Consider use of a ground quick reaction force.

Belligerent Reaction:

- "Administrative" harassment by Serbian officials at the airport.
- Threats from Bosnian Serb government in Pale, e.g., refusing to guarantee the safety of UN flights.
- Employ random sniping incidents due to the particular vulnerability of aircraft
- Small arms fire directed either at aircraft or ground personnel. Will be disruptive even if not directed at airport operations per se.
- Random or continuous mortar and artillery attacks designed to damage the airfield, aircraft or simply to disrupt operations.
- Employment of man portable IR surface to air missiles/AAA designed to directly attack aircraft.
- Employment of longer range systems (heavy artillery, SA-2s from ranges of 30-50kms).
- Horizontal escalation elsewhere in B-H; hostage taking, attacks on ground convoys, attacks on UN personnel, disruption of utilities into Sarajevo and other enclaves.
- BiH may target UNPROFOR attempting to blame the BSA in order to encourage a NATO response against the BSA.

Counteraction:

- Difficult if not impossible to counteract Bosnian Serb horizontal escalation/asymmetric responses.

Recommended Force Enhancements:

- Counterbattery radar, NODs, GPS, and other long range acquisition devices linked to means of reaction.
- Up to a brigade dedicated to airport security with heavy quick reaction force, up to a brigade sized force to remove combatants from the Sarajevo airport area.
- AC-130, CAS, and helicopter support
- Air assault capability (company sized)

Pol-Mil Considerations:

- UNPROFOR/Allies unlikely to support "offensive" operation to open airport.
- Additional troop contributions to support new mission unlikely.
- Allies could call for large US troop and equipment contribution.
- Bosnian Serbs could advertise DMZ as form of ethnic cleansing.

Risk Assessment:

- Irrespective of any of the military measures taken, the absolute safety of transport/civilian aircraft cannot be guaranteed given the threat environment.
- Difficulty maintaining sophisticated equipment with limited logistics base.
- Cannot guarantee the survivability of aircraft (especially helicopters, transport, and AC-130s) in a semi-integrated air defense network.
- UNPROFOR would be required to redeploy forces to support this option which could create increased risk in other areas. Only French, UK, Dutch, Canadian forces capable of accomplishing tasks associated with this option.
- Without significant force enhancements, UNPROFOR forces outmatched by Bosnian Serb forces.
- Increased probability of UNPROFOR ground force casualties.
- Airport sits astride confrontation line; will be difficult to establish which party is responsible for firing.

OPTION 2: Use CAS and air strike packages to support delivery of humanitarian aid flights. Marshall significant NATO air package to suppress immediate threats around Sarajevo airport as aid is flown into and unloaded at the airfield. Package could include integration of target acquisition systems to assist in locating indirect firing systems. Given the nature of the threat surrounding the airfield, target acquisition (riflemen, AA gun, mortar) would be extremely difficult. As a consequence, the ability to deliver effective suppressive fire against these type targets would be extremely difficult.

UNPROFOR Action:

- Deploy target acquisition system to Sarajevo airfield. Deploy TACPs to Sarajevo area.
- Package aid deliveries so that CAS/air strike packages support specified high density delivery periods.
- Clearly state intent to use NATO air support for protecting aid deliveries into Sarajevo.
- Specify target categories (high value, artillery pieces, headquarters in Sarajevo vicinity) that NATO may strike in response to Serb attack on humanitarian aid flights.

Belligerent Reaction:

- Continued "administrative" harassment by Serbian officials at the airport. Blocking aid outside airport.
- Threats from Bosnian Serb government refusing safety of flights.
- Hostage taking - placing hostages at weapons sites.
- Direct attack against humanitarian flights.
- BiH may manipulate NATO's intent to use air power to their advantage.

Counteraction:

- Direct attack against targets engaging aircraft.
- Direct attack against Bosnian Serb high value targets.

Recommended Force Enhancements:

- AC-130 aircraft.
- EW CAP (EA-6B, EF-111s).

Pol-Mil Considerations:

- Troop contributing nations unlikely to support air option due to concern for safety of deployed troops.
- "Dual key" arrangement remains key factor in control of air strikes.
- Could require significant US contribution in terms of air assets.
- Bosnian Serbs likely to use collateral damage as media weapon against US/NATO. Given this scenario, attempts to suppress sniper/mortar fires in an urban environment have a high potential for collateral damage.

Risk Assessment:

- Air power alone insufficient to protect humanitarian aid flights and keep airfield open. Threat/target difficult to identify and acquire (snipers, mortars, urban environment, mountainous topography).
- Support aircraft (AC-130) at high risk in semi-integrated air defense network.
- Bosnian Serbs can react in ways (hostage taking, utility shut-down) which limit the effectiveness of air power options.
- High probability of collateral damage and fratricide.

OPTION 3: Open and maintain a road corridor from the Adriatic coast to Sarajevo (15km through Bosnian Serb held territory).

UNPROFOR Action:

- Enhance convoy ability to protect themselves by employing a graduated range of security responses from self protection through heavy force (armor/Infantry Fighting Vehicle) security escorts.
- UNPROFOR can create and employ a "Quick Reaction Force" consisting of heavy ground maneuver units, assault forces, and possibly helicopters.
- To counter interdiction efforts UNPROFOR can obtain and employ combat engineer units/assets moving with convoys or reacting to specific points.
- Provide each convoy with TACPs and continuous overhead air escort (helo/fixed wing).

Belligerent Reaction:

- Incidents of civil disobedience on the part of the population, e.g. crowds blocking roads.
- Halt and delay convoys with intent to delay aid delivery or steal ("tax") contents of the convoys.
- Sniping or other acts of random violence to intimidate and disrupt or stop convoys.
- Attacks on convoys to prevent delivery of aid or as a punitive measure in response to UNPROFOR (or opposing) belligerent actions.
- Belligerents may stop/delay aid by interdicting LOC.
 - Barricade roadway Mine road segments
 - Destroy bridges Block tunnels

Counteraction:

- Difficult to counteract Bosnian Serb indirect responses - mining roads, destroying bridges (72 choke points on the Ploce - Sarajevo route).

Recommended Force Enhancements.

- Up to a brigade for route security (approx 15 km).
- Quick Reaction Force (mech and air assault).
- 1-2 engineer battalions.
- AC-130, CAS, and helicopter support.
- MP units.

Pol-Mil Considerations:

- Additional troop contributions to support new mission unlikely.
- UNPROFOR/NATO allies could call for significant US contribution.
- UNPROFOR unlikely to accept full enforcement of mandate.

Risk Assessment:

- Bosnian Serb indirect/asymmetrical responses can halt aid delivery.
- Current UNPROFOR forces not capable of providing robust ground escort package. Without enhancements, UNPROFOR forces would be outmatched by Bosnian Serb forces.
- Difficulty maintaining sophisticated equipment with limited logistics base.
- Cannot guarantee the survivability of aircraft (especially helicopters, AC-130s) in a semi-integrated air defense network.
- Increased probability of UNPROFOR ground force casualties.
- Routes parallel numerous hot spots near the active confrontation line. Convoys may encounter indirect fire from the fighting.

NOTE: These options were developed based on the assigned mission - reopen Sarajevo airport. The options are intentionally robust based on the threat capabilities and areas required to be secured. An air strike only package directed against high value targets throughout Bosnia was not considered. This approach could be perceived as purely offensive and unrelated to the

direct opening of the airport at Sarajevo. The danger to relief operations and UNPROFOR troops could rise dramatically given this approach to reopening Sarajevo.

5. (S) Recommendation. The military options are high risk, high cost operations. Unless the US is willing to employ ground forces to support the securing of Sarajevo airfield and/or the coastal route to Sarajevo, it is unlikely that UNPROFOR or NATO will support a military option. At this time, the Joint Staff recommends against executing a military option.

Prepared by Balkans Working Group, J-5, EURDIV
X49435

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003d. cable	Re: Sarajevo Airport (2 pages)	05/04/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Drew, Nelson/Bremner, Sue)
OA/Box Number: 696

FOLDER TITLE:

PC/DC [Principals Committee/Deputies Committee] Meetings on Bosnia, May 1995 [5]

2012-0798-F
ke3055

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

***TO BE
PROVIDED***

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003e. paper	Re: Unanswered Policy Questions Relating to OPLAN 40104 (12 pages)	05/00/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Drew, Nelson/Bremner, Sue)
OA/Box Number: 696

FOLDER TITLE:

PC/DC [Principals Committee/Deputies Committee] Meetings on Bosnia, May 1995 [5]

2012-0798-F
ke3055

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003f. talking points	Re: Talking Points for Congressional OPLAN 40104 (4 pages)	05/00/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Drew, Nelson/Bremner, Sue)
OA/Box Number: 696

FOLDER TITLE:

PC/DC [Principals Committee/Deputies Committee] Meetings on Bosnia, May 1995 [5]

2012-0798-F
ke3055

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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