

FOIA MARKER

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Folder Title:

PC/DC [Principals Committee/Deputies Committee] Meetings on Bosnia, May 1995 [4]

Staff Office-Individual:

European Affairs-Drew, Nelson/Bremner, Sue

Original OA/ID Number:

696

Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:	Stack:
33	2	6	1	v

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. fax	Fax Coversheet [partial] (1 page)	05/00/1995	b(7)(C)
001b. agenda	NSC Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia (1 page)	05/16/1995	P1/b(1)
002. fax	Fax Coversheet [partial] (1 page)	05/00/1995	b(7)(C)
003a. paper	Re: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (1 page)	05/00/1995	P1/b(1)
003b. paper	Re: Unanswered Policy Questions to OPLAN 40104 (5 pages)	05/00/1995	P1/b(1)
004a. memo	Don Kerrick to Anthony Lake, re: May 16 Principals Meeting on Bosnia (6 pages)	05/15/1995	P1/b(1)
004b. agenda	[duplicate of 001b] (1 page)	05/16/1995	P1/b(1)
004c. chart	Re: OPLAN 40104 (3 pages)	05/00/1995	P1/b(1)
004d. paper	Re: Position Paper: SACEUR request for Activation Request (ACTREQ) authority (2 pages)	05/12/1995	P1/b(1)
004e. paper	Re: Implications of Activation Request (ACTREQ) (1 page)	05/00/1995	P1/b(1)
004f. paper	Re: Position Paper: OPLAN 40104 Approval Process - Congressional Briefings (2 pages)	05/15/1995	P1/b(1)
004g. paper	[duplicate of 003a] (1 page)	05/00/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Drew, Nelson/Bremner, Sue)
OA/Box Number: 696

FOLDER TITLE:

PC/DC [Principals Committee/Deputies Committee] Meetings on Bosnia, May 1995 [4]

2012-0798-F
ke3054

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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004h. paper	[duplicate of 003b] (5 pages)	05/00/1995	P1/b(1)

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European Affairs (Drew, Nelson/Bremner, Sue)
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TO: AGENCIES

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 12 MAY 95
SOURCE REF:

By KDE NARA, Date 04/10/15
2012-0798-F

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
AGENDA

CROATIA
PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 16 MAY PC MTG RE BOSNIA & CROATIA

ACTION: DOHSE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DUE DATE: 15 MAY 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK

LOGREF:

FILES: IFM

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BASS
BERGER
JOSHI
KERRICK
KRECZKO
LAKE
NSC CHRON
SODERBERG
VERSHBOW

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY MBN DATE 5/12 BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMBN

CLOSED BY: NSMBN

DOC 2 OF 2

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICERCAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 LAKE	Z 95051216 FOR DECISION
001	X 95051216 BERGER APPROVED RECOM
002	X 95051216 DOHSE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTIONDISPATCH FOR INFO

002	950512	FUERTH, L
002	950512	BRILL, K
002	950512	ADAMS, G
002	950512	PANETTA, L
002	950512	MCALDER, R
002	950512	INDERFURTH, K
002	950512	GARTHOFF, D
002	950512	PATRICK, T

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS

Initials: KDE Date: 04/10/15

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

2012-0798-F

LOG 9520611
DATE 12 MAY 95

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 19 MAY PC MTG RE BOSNIA & CROATIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA LARRY BRANSCUM ROOM 290, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>1</u>
MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>1</u>
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>1</u>
MR. LEON E. PANETTA WHITE HOUSE 1ST FLOOR, WEST WING WASHINGTON, DC 20500	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>1</u>
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>VIA FAX</u>
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>VIA FAX</u>

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PAGE 01 OF 02 PAGES

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DATE 12 MAY 95

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 19 MAY PC MTG RE BOSNIA & CROATIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

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DATE

TIME

SIGNATURE

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS
WASHINGTON, DC 20505

PRINT LAST NAME: _____

COPY: VIA FAX

COL. T. R. PATRICK
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
ROOM 2E865
PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20318-0001

PRINT LAST NAME: _____

COPY: VIA FAX

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PAGE 02 OF 02 PAGES

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
TIME OF TRANSMISSION
12 JUL 12 PM 5:34

TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: VDE Date: 01/10/15
2012-0798-F

RELEASES: 17:37
BB-4

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO.: 1021

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

TOTAL: 3
(PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK
(NAME)

(202) 456-9425
(PHONE NUMBER)

WH SITROOM
(ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: 16 May PC Mtg Re Bosnia & Croatia

NSC LOG # 20611

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOMMay 12 1996
TIME OF RECEIPTWHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

(A)

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINEUNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTSInitials: KDE Date: 240/15

2012-0198-F

RELEASER: BS-4

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO.: 1021

CLASSIFICATION:

SECRETTOTAL: 3

(PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK
(NAME)(202) 456-9425
(PHONE NUMBER)WH SITROOM
(ROOM NO.)MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: 16 May PC Mtg Re Bosnia & CroatiaNSC LOG # 20511

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

STATE

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

USUN/STATE

OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR

DOD

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

JCS

SECRETARY

CIA

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

REMARKS:

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

MAY 12 PM 5:34

TIME OF RECEIPT

MAY 12 PM 5:41

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOMPRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINEUNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: KDE Date: 04/12/15

2012-0787

RELEASER: *BB-4*

DTG:

MESSAGE NO.: 1021

CLASSIFICATION:

~~SECRET~~

TOTAL: 3

(PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK

(202) 456-9425

WH SITROOM

(NAME)

(PHONE NUMBER)

(ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION:

16 May PC Mtg Re Bosnia & Croatia

NSC LOG # 20511

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
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STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
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USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
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DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
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JCS	SECRETARY		
-----	-----------	--	--

CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
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REMARKS:

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

WASHFAX

DELTA

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

12 MAY 95 17 38 TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

NMCC/JCS

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: VCE Date: 04/10/95
2012-0718-F

RELEASER: *BH-4*

DTG:

MESSAGE NO.: 1021

CLASSIFICATION:

SECRET

TOTAL: 3
(PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK
(NAME)

(202) 456-9425
(PHONE NUMBER)

WH SITROOM
(ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: 16 May PC Mtg Re Bosnia & Croatia

NSC LOG # 20511

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

STATE

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

USUN/STATE

OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR

DOD

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

JCS

SECRETARY

CIA

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

REMARKS:

B
B
N
D
A

Rec'd 5/12 3:12 pm

National Security Council
The White House

Exec Sec Office has diskette WSD LOG # 20611 AO _____
DOCLOG WSD SYSTEM: PRS NSC INT _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL /DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon			
Dohse	<u>1</u>	<u>D</u>	
Sens			
Soderberg			
Berger	<u>2</u>	<u>ab</u>	
Lake			
Dohse	<u>3</u>	<u>has seen</u>	<u>Tab I</u>
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>		
NSC/Rm			

Deputy Natl Sec Advisor

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

NOM + Agenda for D
+ Croatia P

Special Dispatch Instructions:

May
OMB
attended?
yes -
Principals only

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

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OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: KDE Date: 24110115

RELEASER: _____

DTG: _____

2012-0908-F

MESSAGE NO.: _____

CLASSIFICATION: **SECRET**TOTAL: 3

(PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK

(202) 456-9425

WH SITROOM

(NAME)

(PHONE NUMBER)

(ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: 16 May PC Mtg Re Bosnia & CroatiaNSC LOG # 20611

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

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National Security Council
European Affairs (Drew, Nelson/Bremner, Sue)
OA/Box Number: 696

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2012-0798-F
ke3054

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TIME OF TRANSMISSION

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

WHSR CONTROL
TIME OF RECEIPT

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Initials: YDE Date: 04/10/15

2012-0798-F

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE

- ☐ FLASH
☐ IMMEDIATE
☐ PRIORITY
☐ ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DATE/TIME: _____

MESSAGE #: 20611

FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR
SUBJECT: Notice of Meeting PC Mtg Re Bosnia PAGES: 3

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
<u>USUN New York</u>	<u>Mr. Rick Inderfurth</u>	<u>212-415-4016</u>	<u>(b)(7)c</u>

[001a]

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

~~SECRET~~

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

20611

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

May 12, 1995

By KDE NARA, Date 04/10/13

2012-0798-F

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the U.S. to the UN

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for National
Security and International
Affairs

Office of Management and Budget

MR. LEON PANETTA
Chief of Staff to the President

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. T. R. PATRICK
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia (S)

There will be a Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia and Croatia on May 16, 1995, 2:30 p.m. - 3:30 p.m., in the White House Situation Room. Attendance will be Principals only. The agenda is attached at Tab A. (S)


Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Agenda

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001b. agenda	NSC Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia (1 page)	05/16/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

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European Affairs (Drew, Nelson/Bremner, Sue)
OA/Box Number: 696

FOLDER TITLE:

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2012-0798-F
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20611

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 12, 1995

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

By VDR NARA, Date 04/10/15

2012-028-F

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH:

ALEXANDER VERSHBOW For C

FROM:

DON KERRICK D

SUBJECT:

Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia and
Croatia, May 16, 1995

Attached at Tab A is the agenda for the Principals meeting on
Bosnia and Croatia to be held May 16, 1995. The memorandum to
the agencies is attached at Tab I.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the meeting and authorize Andy Sens to sign the
memorandum to the agencies at Tab I.

Approve AK Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the Agencies

Tab A Agenda

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9520653
RECEIVED: 18 MAY 95 08

TO: AGENCIES

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 18 MAY 95
SOURCE REF:

By KDE NARA, Date 04/12/15
2012-07-18-F

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
PC

CROATIA
AGENDA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION / AGENDA & BRIEFING PAPER FOR 19 MAY PC MTG ON
BOSNIA & CROAITA

ACTION: DOHSE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DUE DATE: 22 MAY 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: DREW

LOGREF:

FILES: IFM

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BASS
BERGER
DREW
JOSHI
KERRICK
KRECZKO
LAKE
NSC CHRON
VERSHBOW

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY OPS DATE 5-18-95 BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJDA

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DOC 2 OF 2

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~~SECRET~~

RECORD ID: 9520653

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 LAKE	Z 95051815 FOR DECISION
001	X 95051819 LAKE APPROVED RECOM
002	X 95051819 DOHSE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

<u>DOC</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>DISPATCH FOR ACTION</u>	<u>DISPATCH FOR INFO</u>
002	950518	FUERTH, L	
002	950518	BRILL, K	
002	950518	MCALEER, R	
002	950518	INDERFURTH, K	
002	950518	ADAMS, G	
002	950518	PANETTA, L	
002	950518	GARTHOFF, D	
002	950518	PATRICK, T	

~~SECRET~~

-ECI 5/18 4:30pm

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____

LOG # 20653

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SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

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	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon	<u>1</u>	<u>5/18</u>	
Dohse	<u>1/3</u>	<u>5/18</u>	
Sens			
Soderberg			
Berger			
Lake	<u>2</u>		Nat Sec Advisor has seen
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	<u>OKS 5/18</u>	<u>D</u>
Records Mgt.			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

*Bosnia PC mtg ~~Packag~~
NOM + Agenda + Discussion
Paper*

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

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FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK
(NAME)

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WH SITROOM
(ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Notification / Agenda & Discussion paper for 19

May PC Meeting on Bosnia NSC LOG # 20653

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
<u>State</u>	<u>Executive Secretary</u>	_____	_____
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<u>CIA</u>	<u>Executive Secretary</u>	_____	_____
<u>JCS</u>	<u>Secretary Joint Staff</u>	_____	_____
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REMARKS:

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. fax	Fax Coversheet [partial] (1 page)	05/00/1995	b(7)(C)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Drew, Nelson/Bremner, Sue)
OA/Box Number: 696

FOLDER TITLE:

PC/DC [Principals Committee/Deputies Committee] Meetings on Bosnia, May 1995 [4]

2012-0798-F
ke3054

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR
SUBJECT: Notice of Meeting: 19 May, PC on Bosnia PAGES: Cover + 6

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
<u>USUN New York</u>	<u>Mr. Rick Inderfurth</u>	<u>212-415-4016</u>	<u>(b)(7)c</u>

[002]

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20653

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

May 18, 1995

By VDE NARA, Date 04/10/15

2012-0798-F

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the U.S. to the UN

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for National
Security and International
Affairs
Office of Management and Budget


MR. LEON PANETTA
Chief of Staff to the President

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. T. R. PATRICK
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (S)

There will be a Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia and Croatia on May 19, 1995, 2:30 p.m. - 4:30 p.m., in the White House Situation Room. Attendance will be Principals only. The agenda is attached at Tab A. An NSC Discussion Paper is at Tab B. (S)


Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachments

Tab A Agenda
Tab B NSC Discussion Paper

~~SECRET~~

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White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

20653

By KDE NARA, Date 04/10/15
2012-0798-F

NSC PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA

DATE: May 19, 1995

LOCATION: White House Situation Room

TIME: 2:30 - 4:30 p.m.

Agenda

I. Future of UNPROFOR

A. Options.....JCS/ALL

B. Diplomatic Strategy Leading to a New UNPROFOR.....State

II. OPLAN 40104 In-Progress Review

A. Post-UNPROFOR Withdrawal Strategy.....State

B. Unanswered Policy Questions.....State

C. Alternatives to NATO-Led Withdrawal.....All

D. Roadmap of remaining OPLAN 40104 requirements...JCS/OSD

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BOSNIA: STRATEGIC CHOICESNSC DISCUSSION PAPERIntroduction:

We are in a critical period for U.S. policy toward Bosnia that could see the withdrawal of UNPROFOR and the introduction of NATO/U.S. ground forces for a mission whose outcome is uncertain. Now is the time to review the fundamental principles guiding our policy and to determine the steps necessary to shape events before strategic choices are completely dictated by the situation on the ground.

Fundamental U.S. policy objectives for Bosnia:

- Obtain a political settlement that satisfies basic Bosnian government requirements and rolls back some Serb aggression
- End or reduce the fighting
- Prevent spread of conflict to other parts of region
- Maintain relief supplies
- Maintain cohesion with Allies
- Avoid American entanglement in fighting on the ground in the Balkans

Key Strategic Choices:

I. **Whither UNPROFOR:** U.S. support for continued UNPROFOR presence has been based upon an assessment that this course remains the avenue best suited to the majority of our fundamental objectives -- and that, for all of its problems, the alternatives are worse.

- In the current environment, the viability of UNPROFOR is increasingly being called into question.
 - ◆ UNPROFOR is unable to ensure that humanitarian assistance is delivered to UN-protected areas/safe areas.
 - ◆ Fighting among the warring parties is no longer deterred by UNPROFOR presence.
 - ◆ UNPROFOR itself is frequently the subject of attack, and UNPROFOR forces are neither in a position to defend themselves effectively nor to withstand the possible consequences of calling in NATO airpower.
 - ◆ UNPROFOR credibility is thereby undermined with all parties, and NATO credibility in turn eroded as well.

- Under these circumstances, we must ask whether linking U.S. objectives to continued UNPROFOR presence remains valid in the current environment.
 - ◆ There still do not appear to be any alternatives to UNPROFOR that provide better support for U.S. objectives.
 - ◆ Withdrawal followed by unilateral or predominantly U.S. lift (and strike) risks "Americanizing" the Balkan conflict; even multilateral lift risks widening the scope of the conflict as more external parties move to support regional clients.
 - ◆ Replacement of UNPROFOR with another international presence (NATO? WEU? Coalition of the willing?) would either require U.S. participation on the ground or prove equally ineffective -- and require additional political and financial capital to initiate.
 - ◆ U.S. interests are thus best served by finding a way to restore credibility to the UNPROFOR mission in a manner that permits existing troop contributors to sustain their continued presence and the Bosnian government to agree to retain that presence.
- Options other than withdrawal available for UNPROFOR under the present circumstances:
 - ◆ **Muddle through with the status quo:** French have already indicated likely pullout if current conditions remain unchanged -- may be the thread that unravels the whole fabric of UNPROFOR.
 - ◆ **"Restabilization" of existing UNPROFOR mission with more robust enforcement of existing mandate:** UK avoidance of a confrontational approach in B-H must be overcome if this option is to become viable; additional resources needed to enhance military capabilities of existing UNPROFOR forces not likely to be forthcoming.
 - ◆ **"Retrench and reinvigorate" UNPROFOR mission** by withdrawing from untenable positions/missions while pursuing more robust enforcement of remaining mandates: could be seen as a trade of the eastern enclaves for more effective mission performance around Sarajevo -- implications for eastern enclaves could be very serious; however, this option could satisfy both the French and UK; by retrenching, could also alleviate some of the problems associated with resources to enhance capabilities.
 - ◆ **"Retrench and retreat" by withdrawing and pursuing an even less vigorous approach to mandate enforcement:** the least costly approach, this might be used as a bargaining chip to get the Bosnian Serbs to accede to the conditions for French

forces remaining in UNPROFOR; UK likely to support; however, potentially as damaging to UNPROFOR credibility as the status quo, with the additional public image/moral costs of not only "abandoning" the eastern enclaves, but also "capitulating" in cases where UNPROFOR remains; least likely to be acceptable to Bosnians, who could then refuse to allow continued UNPROFOR presence.

Comment: Only realistic choice may be to seek Allied support to "retrench and reinvigorate." Trade U.S. support for retrenchment for allied and UN pledge to pursue more robust enforcement of remaining mandate, including NATO airstrikes. Fall back to "retrench and retreat" only if no other way to prevent withdrawal.

II. Whither OPLAN 40104, given U.S. objective of sustaining UNPROFOR and commitment to assist withdrawal if required?

- There are no guarantees that a viable solution to retaining UNPROFOR in theater can be agreed.
- Withdrawal remains a real, and increasingly likely, option if there is no agreement on a more viable UNPROFOR role.
- Nevertheless, several key issues remain to be resolved before a decision to proceed with withdrawal implementation could be taken with confidence:
 - ♦ **What is the end state we want to leave behind following UNPROFOR withdrawal?** What to avoid may be clearer than what to achieve: avoid merely replacing UN with NATO forces and being unable to leave; avoid debacle of U.S./NATO-led withdrawal being depicted as precursor to brutal ethnic cleansing; avoid loss of NATO credibility to the same extent there has been a loss of UN credibility.
 - ♦ **How does NATO deal with unintended consequences of withdrawal operations?** Massive refugee flow; use of NATO forces as shields by civilians or by warring factions; hostage-taking by warring factions; withdrawal of humanitarian aid providers as a result of UNPROFOR withdrawal.
 - ♦ **Under what conditions could withdrawal or partial withdrawal take place without requiring implementation of OPLAN 40104?** If nations determine that they will accomplish *de facto* withdrawal by merely failing to replace units during normal rotation, no NATO assistance may be necessary. If this resulted in enclaves being left unprotected, would the last forces out require NATO assistance, or could the UN accomplish this on its own?

- The way ahead for OPLAN 40104 is also complicated by a dilemma: we must ensure that our actions in preparation for possible UNPROFOR withdrawal do not precipitate the withdrawal itself.
- ♦ Key is not allowing the existence of a "NATO withdrawal force" to prompt either UN troop contributors to seek early withdrawal or Bosnians to act to cause UNPROFOR withdrawal in the hopes that NATO will replace the UN. **A clear "firebreak" is required between completion of NATO preparation for OPLAN 40104 and initiation of OPLAN implementation.** We must be confident that we understand exactly what steps will be required to get from the present state of NATO planning to this firebreak, and what steps take us beyond it.
- ♦ NATO credibility requires that forces must be trained sufficiently to ensure mission success. ACTREQ requested by SACEUR this week will facilitate identification of forces and training shortfalls, and allow SACEUR to initiate action to rectify those shortfalls. Training in place to NATO standards should be an acceptable alternative to assembling in Europe for training, and send a more restrained signal.
- ♦ Training in place would also permit completion of Congressional consultations prior to movement of any US forces. We may need to lay down marker in NATO that assembly of forces in Europe will require a further political decision.

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20653

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 18, 1995

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White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

By KDE NARA, Date 04/10/15

2012-098-E

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW AV

FROM: DON KERRICK/NELSON DREW D

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia and
Croatia, May 19, 1995

Attached at Tab A is the agenda for the Principals meeting on Bosnia to be held May 19, 1995. The memorandum to the agencies is attached at Tab I.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andy Sens to sign the memorandum to the agencies at Tab I.

Approve  Disapprove

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the Agencies

Tab A Agenda

Tab B NSC Discussion Paper

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COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>VIA FAX</u>
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>VIA FAX</u>
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COL. T. R. PATRICK
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PAGE 02 OF 02 PAGES

TO: LAKE

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White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

FROM: KERRICK
BERGER

DOC DATE: 12 MAY 95
SOURCE REF:

By KOE NARA, Date 04/10/15

2012-098-F

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
PC

UN
DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: OPLAN 40104 UNANSWERED POLICY ISSUES FOR PC MTG

ACTION: OBE PER APNSA OFFICE

DUE DATE: 16 MAY 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK

LOGREF:

FILES: IFM

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

~~KERRICK~~
NSC CHRON

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Soderberg			
Berger	<u>2</u>	<u>DBE</u>	
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk			
NSC/Rm			

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

May 12, 1995

By KDE NARA, Date 24110115

2012-098-F
INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: SAMUEL BERGER

FROM: DON KERRICK 

SUBJECT: OPLAN 40104 Unanswered Policy Issues

State, as lead agency, has circulated another draft version (Tab A) of the unanswered policy questions. This version captures Walt Slocombe and Wes Clark comments. Agencies are now circulating for Deputy/Principal review in run-up to Tuesday PC. If additional comments are received, State will circulate a final version on Monday.

State is re-drafting a post-UNPROFOR withdrawal strategy, but their efforts lag behind the development of answers to questions.

Attachment

Tab A State Draft Memo on Unanswered Policy Issues

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003a. paper	Re: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (1 page)	05/00/1995	P1/b(1)
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COLLECTION:

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2012-0798-F
ke3054

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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003b. paper	Re: Unanswered Policy Questions to OPLAN 40104 (5 pages)	05/00/1995	P1/b(1)

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004a. memo	Don Kerrick to Anthony Lake, re: May 16 Principals Meeting on Bosnia (6 pages)	05/15/1995	P1/b(1)

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TAB A

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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TAB B



DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

United States Department of State

Washington, D. C. 20520

May 12, 1995

INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

S/S

~~SECRET~~ NODIS
~~DECL:OADR~~

TO: The Secretary

THROUGH: Acting Secretary Tarnoff

FROM: EUR - Robert C. Frasure *RCF*

SUBJECT: Contact Group Consensus in Frankfurt -
Next Stop is Belgrade

The Contact Group reached a full consensus in Frankfurt on May 12 on a Bosnia recognition/border/sanctions suspension package that should be fielded with Milosevic in Belgrade next week and with the Bosnians.

On sanctions suspension, the following points were agreed:

- There would be a six-month suspension of designated sanctions with a positive UNSC renewal mechanism.
- There will be no actual lift until Pale accepts the CG package. At that point, Phase One sanctions -- airport, sports, and culture which are now suspended -- would be lifted. Other than that agreed point, it was felt that additional lift must be calibrated to implementation of the plan. This framework can be developed later.
- Financial transactions will be freed up, as the Europeans wanted. However, assets will remain frozen and the UNSC resolution will specifically state that credits cannot be provided against frozen assets. (The Bundesbank believes no banks will do so, in that event.)
- The difference was split between the UN and EU lists on strategic trade definitions. To the EU list were added equipment for energy production and petrochemicals. The EU list plus these items will not be suspended. Oil is the key item that remains forbidden. (The traffic jams in Belgrade don't provide much confidence that this is effective.)

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There was considerable interest in the OSCE package that I had suggested to Milosevic. It was agreed that we should actively pursue it in the following manner:

- The FRY and FYROM (a new element, they are now only observers) should get OSCE seats. This would step over the FRY successor state issue and also do something for Gligorov. It will also help us on our small-package diplomacy with the FYROM.
- OSCE takes over the enhanced ICFY border monitoring mission. (The Germans have now matched our pledge for fifty monitors.) In the meantime -- until the OSCE elements are in place -- the ICFY role will continue with certification by the head of mission to be passed directly through Owen to the UN Secretary General.
- The OSCE Long Duration Mission will return to Kosovo, Sandzak, and the Vojvodina.

It should be noted that the Frankfurt meeting was functionally a Quad. Zotov couldn't get there from Moscow. The Germans are to brief the Russians in Bonn this afternoon. We think the Russians will be sufficiently on board with this approach that they will not cause trouble.

It was agreed that I should go to Belgrade early next week on behalf of the CG and explore the packages with Milosevic. My visit would not be publicly announced and the substance of the packages should be closely held.

On the Bosnian side, Sacirbey was in Frankfurt and will be in touch with Izetbegovic. Sacirbey was especially enthusiastic about the OSCE aspect. German CG rep Steiner will go to Mostar for a Federation meeting and will brief Ganic on the packages.

There was great concern about the rapidly deteriorating situation inside Bosnia, especially in Sarajevo. (We always need to be aware of the possibility that we are playing diplomatic word games with ourselves while the war spins out of control.) All sides agree that something must be done about the airport, and air strikes might be necessary. It was agreed that we should warn both the Bosnians and Mladic (via Milosevic) to pull back from the precipice.

We all recognize that this is all a long shot venture. But with the Frankfurt meeting, we seem to be off to a good start.

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TAB C

May 12 Contact Group AgreementIf the FRY:

- Recognizes Bosnia
- Tightens closure of the inter-Serb border, allows transfer of border mission to OSCE and OSCE monitors to Kosovo

FRY gets in return:

- Suspension of sanctions on non-strategic trade (notes 1 and 2)
- Suspension of financial sanctions (notes 1 and 3)
- OSCE membership

If Pale then:

- Accepts the CG package.

FRY gets in return:

- Lift of all Phase 1 sanctions

And if Pale then:

- Fully implements Contact Group plan

FRY and Pale get in return:

- "Lift of remaining sanctions (plus release of frozen assets) calibrated to implementation in a way to be developed later."

NOTES:

1. All "suspensions" are for a six-month period and can be renewed only by positive vote by the Security Council.
2. The agreed definition of "strategic goods" includes oil, petroleum products, coal, iron, steel, and other metals *plus energy-related equipment and petro-chemicals*.
3. All financial sanctions are suspended, including credits. Frozen assets are not released. The resolution relaxing sanctions is to contain prohibitions against using frozen assets to secure or otherwise support loans and credits.

TAB D

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004c. chart	Re: OPLAN 40104 (3 pages)	05/00/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Drew, Nelson/Bremner, Sue)
OA/Box Number: 696

FOLDER TITLE:

PC/DC [Principals Committee/Deputies Committee] Meetings on Bosnia, May 1995 [4]

2012-0798-F
ke3054

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004d. paper	Re: Position Paper: SACEUR request for Activation Request (ACTREQ) authority (2 pages)	05/12/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Drew, Nelson/Bremner, Sue)
OA/Box Number: 696

FOLDER TITLE:

PC/DC [Principals Committee/Deputies Committee] Meetings on Bosnia, May 1995 [4]

2012-0798-F
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TAB F

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004e. paper	Re: Implications of Activation Request (ACTREQ) (1 page)	05/00/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Drew, Nelson/Bremner, Sue)
OA/Box Number: 696

FOLDER TITLE:

PC/DC [Principals Committee/Deputies Committee] Meetings on Bosnia, May 1995 [4]

2012-0798-F
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TAB G

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004f. paper	Re: Position Paper: OPLAN 40104 Approval Process - Congressional Briefings (2 pages)	05/15/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Drew, Nelson/Bremner, Sue)
OA/Box Number: 696

FOLDER TITLE:

PC/DC [Principals Committee/Deputies Committee] Meetings on Bosnia, May 1995 [4]

2012-0798-F
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TAB H

TO BE PROVIDED

TAB I

~~SECRET~~DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

1 May 1995

INFORMATION PAPER

Subject: Military Options for Reopening Sarajevo Airport (U)

1. (U) Purpose. To provide options to reopen Sarajevo airport for the delivery of humanitarian aid.
2. (U) Background. Sarajevo air operations have been periodically interrupted by the Bosnian Serbs since the beginning of the conflict. Bosnian Serb forces control the area surrounding the airport and the major land routes into Sarajevo. The Bosnian Serbs have the capability to attack aircraft in flight and while unloading on the airfield. Aircraft are threatened by both antiaircraft weapons and conventional direct and indirect ground systems. The Bosnian Muslims also have the capability, though to a lesser extent, to interdict air operations. UNPROFOR has documented numerous occasions of BiH fire.
3. ~~(S)~~ Discussion. The following options are available for consideration for the delivery of humanitarian aid into Sarajevo:

Assumptions:

- New UNSCR(s) required to implement a military option will be adopted by the Security Council.
- A parallel diplomatic effort to secure the opening of Sarajevo will be undertaken.

OPTION 1: Secure Sarajevo Airport - forcibly secure and maintain a DMZ around Sarajevo. Create a demilitarized zone (8-10km) around Sarajevo airfield which denies the Bosnian Serbs from employing weapons against aircraft that are in flight or on the ground. This option could require up to a division sized force to secure the airfield and remove the Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Muslim presence from the immediate area.

UNPROFOR Action:

- UNPROFOR seize (if necessary) and establish administrative control over the Sarajevo airport
- Secure airfield perimeter and approaches using a combination of troops equipped with means of acquisition for various types of attack. May include night vision devices, GPS, artillery acquisition battery.
- Take direct action to secure high terrain and buildings from belligerents. Move civilians outside of airport safe zone (2-3km). Combatants excluded inside 8-10km zone.

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Declassify on OADR

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- Roving security patrols along approaches to the airport. Requires mounted and dismounted patrols monitoring out to 10 km from the airport.
- NATO Airborne AC-130 and helicopter response capability to attack sniper/mortar/artillery positions. Consider use of a ground quick reaction force.

Belligerent Reaction:

- "Administrative" harassment by Serbian officials at the airport.
- Threats from Bosnian Serb government in Pale, e.g., refusing to guarantee the safety of UN flights.
- Employ random sniping incidents due to the particular vulnerability of aircraft
- Small arms fire directed either at aircraft or ground personnel. Will be disruptive even if not directed at airport operations per se.
- Random or continuous mortar and artillery attacks designed to damage the airfield, aircraft or simply to disrupt operations.
- Employment of man portable IR surface to air missiles/AAA designed to directly attack aircraft.
- Employment of longer range systems (heavy artillery, SA-2s from ranges of 30-50kms).
- Horizontal escalation elsewhere in B-H; hostage taking, attacks on ground convoys, attacks on UN personnel, disruption of utilities into Sarajevo and other enclaves.
- BiH may target UNPROFOR attempting to blame the BSA in order to encourage a NATO response against the BSA.

Counteraction:

- Difficult if not impossible to counteract Bosnian Serb horizontal escalation/asymmetric responses.

Recommended Force Enhancements:

- Counterbattery radar, NODs, GPS, and other long range acquisition devices linked to means of reaction.
- Up to a brigade dedicated to airport security with heavy quick reaction force, up to a brigade sized force to remove combatants from the Sarajevo airport area.
- AC-130, CAS, and helicopter support
- Air assault capability (company sized)

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Pol-Mil Considerations:

- UNPROFOR/Allies unlikely to support "offensive" operation to open airport.
- Additional troop contributions to support new mission unlikely.
- Allies could call for large US troop and equipment contribution.
- Bosnian Serbs could advertise DMZ as form of ethnic cleansing.

Risk Assessment:

- Irrespective of any of the military measures taken, the absolute safety of transport/civilian aircraft cannot be guaranteed given the threat environment.
- Difficulty maintaining sophisticated equipment with limited logistics base.
- Cannot guarantee the survivability of aircraft (especially helicopters, transport, and AC-130s) in a semi-integrated air defense network.
- UNPROFOR would be required to redeploy forces to support this option which could create increased risk in other areas. Only French, UK, Dutch, Canadian forces capable of accomplishing tasks associated with this option.
- Without significant force enhancements, UNPROFOR forces outmatched by Bosnian Serb forces.
- Increased probability of UNPROFOR ground force casualties.
- Airport sits astride confrontation line; will be difficult to establish which party is responsible for firing.

OPTION 2: Use CAS and air strike packages to support delivery of humanitarian aid flights. Marshall significant NATO air package to suppress immediate threats around Sarajevo airport as aid is flown into and unloaded at the airfield. Package could include integration of target acquisition systems to assist in locating indirect firing systems. Given the nature of the threat surrounding the airfield, target acquisition (riflemen, AA gun, mortar) would be extremely difficult. As a consequence, the ability to deliver effective suppressive fire against these type targets would be extremely difficult.

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~~SECRET~~**UNPROFOR Action:**

- Deploy target acquisition system to Sarajevo airfield. Deploy TACPs to Sarajevo area.
- Package aid deliveries so that CAS/air strike packages support specified high density delivery periods.
- Clearly state intent to use NATO air support for protecting aid deliveries into Sarajevo.
- Specify target categories (high value, artillery pieces, headquarters in Sarajevo vicinity) that NATO may strike in response to Serb attack on humanitarian aid flights.

Belligerent Reaction:

- Continued "administrative" harassment by Serbian officials at the airport. Blocking aid outside airport.
- Threats from Bosnian Serb government refusing safety of flights.
- Hostage taking - placing hostages at weapons sites.
- Direct attack against humanitarian flights.
- BiH may manipulate NATO's intent to use air power to their advantage.

Counteraction:

- Direct attack against targets engaging aircraft.
- Direct attack against Bosnian Serb high value targets.

Recommended Force Enhancements:

- AC-130 aircraft.
- EW CAP (EA-6B, EF-111s).

Pol-Mil Considerations:

- Troop contributing nations unlikely to support air option due to concern for safety of deployed troops.
- "Dual key" arrangement remains key factor in control of air strikes.
- Could require significant US contribution in terms of air assets.
- Bosnian Serbs likely to use collateral damage as media weapon against US/NATO. Given this scenario, attempts to suppress sniper/mortar fires in an urban environment have a high potential for collateral damage.

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~~SECRET~~**Risk Assessment:**

- Air power alone insufficient to protect humanitarian aid flights and keep airfield open. Threat/target difficult to identify and acquire (snipers, mortars, urban environment, mountainous topography).
- Support aircraft (AC-130) at high risk in semi-integrated air defense network.
- Bosnian Serbs can react in ways (hostage taking, utility shut-down) which limit the effectiveness of air power options.
- High probability of collateral damage and fratricide.

OPTION 3: Open and maintain a road corridor from the Adriatic coast to Sarajevo (15km through Bosnian Serb held territory).

UNPROFOR Action:

- Enhance convoy ability to protect themselves by employing a graduated range of security responses from self protection through heavy force (armor/Infantry Fighting Vehicle) security escorts.
- UNPROFOR can create and employ a "Quick Reaction Force" consisting of heavy ground maneuver units, assault forces, and possibly helicopters.
- To counter interdiction efforts UNPROFOR can obtain and employ combat engineer units/assets moving with convoys or reacting to specific points.
- Provide each convoy with TACPs and continuous overhead air escort (helo/fixed wing).

Belligerent Reaction:

- Incidents of civil disobedience on the part of the population, e.g. crowds blocking roads.
- Halt and delay convoys with intent to delay aid delivery or steal ("tax") contents of the convoys.
- Sniping or other acts of random violence to intimidate and disrupt or stop convoys.
- Attacks on convoys to prevent delivery of aid or as a punitive measure in response to UNPROFOR (or opposing) belligerent actions.
- Belligerents may stop/delay aid by interdicting LOC.
 - Barricade roadway Mine road segments
 - Destroy bridges Block tunnels

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~~SECRET~~**Counteraction:**

- Difficult to counteract Bosnian Serb indirect responses - mining roads, destroying bridges (72 choke points on the Ploce - Sarajevo route).

Recommended Force Enhancements.

- Up to a brigade for route security (approx 15 km).
- Quick Reaction Force (mech and air assault).
- 1-2 engineer battalions.
- AC-130, CAS, and helicopter support.
- MP units.

Pol-Mil Considerations:

- Additional troop contributions to support new mission unlikely.
- UNPROFOR/NATO allies could call for significant US contribution.
- UNPROFOR unlikely to accept full enforcement of mandate.

Risk Assessment:

- Bosnian Serb indirect/asymmetrical responses can halt aid delivery.
- Current UNPROFOR forces not capable of providing robust ground escort package. Without enhancements, UNPROFOR forces would be outmatched by Bosnian Serb forces.
- Difficulty maintaining sophisticated equipment with limited logistics base.
- Cannot guarantee the survivability of aircraft (especially helicopters, AC-130s) in a semi-integrated air defense network.
- Increased probability of UNPROFOR ground force casualties.
- Routes parallel numerous hot spots near the active confrontation line. Convoys may encounter indirect fire from the fighting.

NOTE: These options were developed based on the assigned mission - reopen Sarajevo airport. The options are intentionally robust based on the threat capabilities and areas required to be secured. An air strike only package directed against high value targets throughout Bosnia was not considered. This approach could be perceived as purely offensive and unrelated to the

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direct opening of the airport at Sarajevo. The danger to relief operations and UNPROFOR troops could rise dramatically given this approach to reopening Sarajevo.

5. ~~(S)~~ Recommendation. The military options are high risk, high cost operations. Unless the US is willing to employ ground forces to support the securing of Sarajevo airfield and/or the coastal route to Sarajevo, it is unlikely that UNPROFOR or NATO will support a military option. At this time, the Joint Staff recommends against executing a military option.

Prepared by Balkans Working Group, J-5, EURDIV
X49435
(eur/eurcenea/bosnia/dosom/sarajevo)

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DRAFT

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PER E.O. 13526

BOSNIA: FORMULATING A POST-UNPROFOR WITHDRAWAL STRATEGY

In carrying out planning for UNPROFOR withdrawal, NATO has worked on the very narrow assumption that it will enter Bosnia, extract UNPROFOR, and leave. Even if this turns out to be the case, we cannot state with any degree of certainty what Bosnia will look like after UNPROFOR departs. Will the UN retain a residual presence, continuing to provide assistance to the eastern enclaves and Sarajevo? If not, who will? Will we push NATO to be ready to take a more assertive role in the conflict, particularly in and around a strangled Sarajevo? If multilateralism fails, will the U.S. be ready to provide air support, humanitarian supplies and arms? These are the questions that must be examined in formulating a post-withdrawal strategy.

Humanitarian Assistance

If UNPROFOR withdrawal is carried out in a relatively permissive environment, UNHCR and other NGO's may be able to stay on the ground, continuing to provide relief supplies to the five most vulnerable areas of the country: the three eastern enclaves, Bihac and Sarajevo. Many areas of the Federation, however, would have to begin the process of distributing relief on their own.

At the moment, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is the UN's coordinating agency for the delivery of humanitarian assistance in the former Yugoslavia. The World Food program (WFP), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the World Health Organization (WHO), and the United Nations Education, Science and Culture Organization (UNESCO) operate in conjunction with UNHCR in both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia; the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) and United Nations Volunteers operate in Bosnia-Herzegovina. UNHCR's position -- and thus that of its implementing partners -- remains what it has always been: It will continue operations as long as the security situation permits.

One of the most important NGOs, the International Committee of the Red Cross, has said it will remain in Bosnia as long as possible. In addition, there are over 100 NGOs in the former Yugoslavia, many of them implementing partners of the UN or of bilateral donors such as the U.S., or operating on their own. The EC has several projects, among them the EU Administration of Mostar project, as well as its monitors, and these functions would presumably continue after UNPROFOR withdrawal.

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NATO's Role

DRAFT

OPLAN 40104 makes no provision for a NATO mission in Bosnia, such as support for humanitarian relief efforts, after UNPROFOR withdraws. Any determination of NATO's post-UNPROFOR role would therefore require a policy decision and would need to take into account several factors:

-- Conditions of withdrawal. Bosnian Serb opposition to withdrawal could lead to direct military confrontation with U.S. and NATO forces. Under such a scenario, international support might be more forthcoming for lifting the arms embargo and taking broader military actions. Such support would be less likely if the withdrawal is not contested.

-- Allied support of lift and strike. In the face of Russian opposition to lift, but possible support from key Allies, we could press for a unilateral NATO commitment to the Bosnian government to assist it obtain arms and to provide air power. If key Allies are not prepared to support us, we would have to consider building a coalition of the willing.

-- Continuation of legal mandates. Without new UN resolutions, the authorization for NATO close air support and the protection of safe areas and exclusion zones may lapse with UNPROFOR's withdrawal. The legal framework for enforcement of the No-fly zone and Sharp Guard, in contrast, would probably continue, although for the former, NATO would need new technical arrangements.

The U.S. Role

UNPROFOR's withdrawal from Bosnia will increase pressure on the U.S. to become more involved in Bosnia, diplomatically and militarily. If withdrawal is precipitated by passage in the U.S. Congress of a unilateral lift bill, the U.S. will be under great pressure to help arm and train Bosnian troops. While Congress wants to lift the arms embargo, it might try to tie our hands in using military force, seriously complicating our ability to help. If the withdrawal is the result of British and/or French exhaustion, we will still be under great pressure to support the Bosnian Government by lifting the arms embargo.

In the event of withdrawal, the U.S. will in short order be faced with the following decisions:

-- Whether to Lift the Embargo: The U.S. will be under great pressure after withdrawal to revisit the lift issue in the Security Council (assuming the withdrawal is not precipitated by unilateral lift). Since the Russians are

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unlikely to go along with multilateral lift, we might consider the alternative of "great power lift", i.e., lift by the U.S., France and Britain (while this option would be preferable to unilateral action, it is not clear that Allies would go along, even after withdrawal). Our remaining options would be unilateral lift or doing nothing.

-- Whether to Plan for and Provide Humanitarian Aid: If U.N. relief agencies retreat with UNPROFOR, we will have to make quick decisions on humanitarian issues, i.e., opening a relief corridor to Sarajevo or the enclaves, perhaps using air power to break the strangulation of the city.

-- Whether to Strike: Once the UN is removed, the U.S., as the strongest advocate of air action, will be under great pressure to retaliate for Serb violations, either through NATO or unilaterally.

-- Whether to Arm and Train: If the arms embargo is lifted, unilaterally or multilaterally, we will have to decide how to arm the Bosnians and train them in the use of weapons. This might include training in weapons left behind by departing UNPROFOR troops.

TAB K

Proposed US Policy Principles
(During Withdrawal)

- Mission. NATO (and the US) will limit its mission to the withdrawal operation, and depart when that operation is finished.
- Neutrality. NATO will remain impartial and neutral during the withdrawal, and will not support Bosnian (or Croatian) military forces, or turn over territory or weapons to them.
- Use of force. NATO forces will be authorized to take the necessary measures (including lethal force) consistent with the laws of war against any threat (from any faction and including nominal civilians) to protect themselves and UN personnel (including hostage rescue) and to protect the accomplishment of the operation.
- Withdrawal priority. The withdrawal priority will be to remove UN personnel (civilian and military) first, then UN forces' weapons, and finally UN equipment. Weapons and equipment not withdrawn will be disabled or destroyed whenever possible.
- Command and control. [Once the UN asks for NATO help in a withdrawal anywhere in the theater, NATO will assume command of all current UNPROFOR units throughout FRY, subject to delegation of local authority to UN commanders in areas not being withdrawn. OSD/JCS] or [NATO will have flexibility to fully support a partial or complete withdrawal if it must, but also to remain in a supporting role if not asked and not needed by UNPROFOR.]
- No dual key. After TOA to NATO, no dual key arrangements will apply to any air operation judged by the NATO commander to be needed to support the withdrawal operation. Dual key arrangements will remain in place for areas and functions from which UN forces are not being withdrawn. The SRSG would continue to direct and be responsible for any remaining civil UN operations.
- Non defense/evacuation of civilians. NATO forces will not attempt to defend the Bosnian (or Serb, or Croatian) populations and will not undertake to evacuate civilians from the enclaves (or elsewhere).

• Authorized secondary, not-to-interfere activities.

However, to the extent it can without adversely impacting the withdrawal effort, NATO forces will be authorized to

-- support humanitarian assistance (aid delivery, refugee relocation, etc.) efforts of UNHCR and NGOs;

[-- assist in the evacuation of civilians from enclaves and other exposed areas, but not take over responsibility for their shelter or safety after arrival]

-- respond to attacks on civilian populations in areas where NATO forces are operating;

-- continue to conduct current NATO-authorized operations, including SHARP GUARD, DENY FLIGHT, CAS, TEZ, protection of safe areas;

-- destroy warring faction weapons/equipment previously confiscated by UNPROFOR.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004g. paper	[duplicate of 003a] (1 page)	05/00/1995	P1/b(1)

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FOLDER TITLE:

PC/DC [Principals Committee/Deputies Committee] Meetings on Bosnia, May 1995 [4]

2012-0798-F
ke3054

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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004h. paper	[duplicate of 003b] (5 pages)	05/00/1995	P1/b(1)

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