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Folder Title:

PC/DC [Principals Committee/Deputies Committee] Meetings on Bosnia, May 1995 [2]

Staff Office-Individual:

European Affairs-Drew, Nelson/Bremner, Sue

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	Nelson Drew to Anthony Lake, re: May 19 Principals' Committee Meeting on Bosnia (3 pages)	05/18/1995	P1/b(1)
001b. memo	Nelson Drew to Anthony Lake, re: May 23 Principals' Meeting on Bosnia (4 pages)	05/22/1995	P1/b(1)
003a. memo	Nelson Drew to Anthony Lake, re: Update for May 23 Principals' Meeting on Bosnia (2 pages)	05/23/1995	P1/b(1)
003b. draft	Draft paper, re: Bosnia: Formulating A Post-UNPROFOR Withdrawal Strategy (4 pages)	05/00/1995	P1/b(1)
004a. memo	[duplicate of 003a] (2 pages)	05/23/1995	P1/b(1)
004b. paper	Re: Roadmap of remaining OPLAN 40104 requirements (2 pages)	05/17/1995	P1/b(1)
005. paper	Re: Unanswered Policy Questions Relating to OPLAN 40104 (4 pages)	05/00/1995	P1/b(1)
006. cable	Re: Milosevic Discussions - No Deal (5 pages)	05/22/1995	P1/b(1)
007. fax	Fax Coversheet [partial] (1 page)	05/00/1995	b(7)(C)
008a. memo	[duplicate of 001a] (3 pages)	05/18/1995	P1/b(1)
008b. paper	[duplicate of 005] (4 pages)	05/00/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Drew, Nelson/Bremner, Sue)
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FOLDER TITLE:

PC/DC [Principals Committee/Deputies Committee] Meetings on Bosnia, May 1995 [2]

2010-0798-F

ke3052

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]

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DRAFT

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee

DATE: May 19, 1995

LOCATION: White House Situation Room

TIME: 2:30 - 4:30 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting
on Bosnia ~~(S)~~

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair

Anthony Lake

USUN

Madeleine Albright

OVP

Leon Fuerth

CIA

John Deutch

State

Warren Christopher

Richard Holbrooke

JCS

Admiral William Owens

DOD

Walter Slocombe

NSC

Alexander Vershbow

OMB

Alice Rivlin

Colonel Nelson Drew

Summary of Conclusions

Negotiations with Milosevic

1. Principals discussed progress made to date in ongoing negotiations between Ambassador Frasure and Milosevic regarding the recognition/sanctions relief package. They agreed on the contents of an instruction cable to Frasure outlining key problem areas in Milosevic's counterproposal and authorizing further negotiations to close the gap **(Action: State)**. The cable will provide goals but retain flexibility for Frasure in the negotiations. ~~(S)~~

2. Principals agreed the following guidance on the most sensitive issues:

- Successor State Status: Principals agreed to maintain an existing position that Serbia/Montenegro could be treated as "a" successor state but not "the" successor state to Yugoslavia. ~~(S)~~
- Timing of Serbian Admission to OSCE: Principals agreed that Serbia's admission to OSCE should be simultaneous with restoration of the long duration missions to Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina. ~~(S)~~
- Sanctions Relief: Principals agreed on the need to avoid "front-end loading" of sanctions relief or lifting. Milosevic's proposed automatic mechanism for continuing extension of sanctions suspension without a UNSC vote was unacceptable. Principals agreed to counter his oil relief proposal of 500,000 MT per month with an offer of 125,000 MT, and to try to limit imports through a single point of entry. OVP provided an outline chart linking specific sanctions relief actions to specific progress toward a political settlement involving Pale; Principals agreed that this should be provided to Frasure as a guide rather than as detailed negotiating instructions. They agreed that some lifting of sanctions should be tied to recognition of Croatia. They reaffirmed that any lifting of the "outer wall" of sanctions (access to IFIs, full participation in international organizations) should be tied to cooperation with War Crimes Tribunals and progress toward a broader regional settlement, including restoration of autonomy to Kosovo. ~~(S)~~

Future Options for UNPROFOR

3. Principals reaffirmed that retention of UNPROFOR in Bosnia was critical to U.S. interests, and agreed to support the conclusions of the CHODs meeting with UNPROFOR Commanders calling for enhancement of UNPROFOR's ability to fulfill its existing mandate. The CHODs' proposal included agreement that the UNPROFOR Ground Commanders would develop an enhanced air supply plan for eastern enclaves on an urgent basis, and that unhindered use of Sarajevo airport was imperative. Other options considered but rejected by the CHODs included continuation of the existing situation, retrenchment and reduced UN presence, UNPROFOR withdrawal, and military intervention. CJCS will be instructed to take this window of opportunity to press allies for as robust an enhancement of UNPROFOR as possible (**Action: JCS**) and USUN will work to ensure that options presented for agreement in New York reflect the CHODs' decisions (**Action: USUN**). ~~(S)~~

4. Principals agreed that there was little likelihood that the CHODs' proposals would lead to more robust use of force by UNPROFOR in pursuit of fulfilling its mandate, or increased willingness to employ NATO airpower under the dual key approach. If an opportunity arose to support rotation of the UNSYG Special Representative to someone more likely to support UN requests for the use of NATO airstrikes, the U.S. would be supportive, but not initiate such an effort. (Action: USUN). ~~(S)~~

5. At the same time, Principals agreed that if the French found enhancing UNPROFOR in its existing areas and mandates acceptable, and the UK was willing to let this go forward, the U.S. should not press for UNPROFOR retrenchment at this time. Principals also noted that success in the Frasure-Milosevic negotiations could help satisfy French requirements for progress toward a political settlement. ~~(S)~~

OPLAN 40104

6. Principals noted that briefings to the SFRC earlier in the day had flagged serious concerns regarding preparing the Congress for U.S. participation in a possible withdrawal operation, lack of clarity about a post-withdrawal strategy, and funding. Principals agreed that a strong effort would be needed to secure Congressional approval. ~~(S)~~

7. Principals agreed to meet again on Tuesday, 23 May, to address (1) post-withdrawal strategy; (2) remaining unanswered questions associated with OPLAN 40104 implementation; (3) the remaining steps associated with OPLAN 40104; and (4) a legislative strategy. ~~(S)~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

20655

By KDE NARA, Date 04/10/15
2012-0798-F

NSC PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA

DATE: May 19, 1995

LOCATION: White House Situation Room

TIME: 2:30 - 4:30 p.m.

Agenda

I. Future of UNPROFOR

A. Options.....JCS/ALL

B. Diplomatic Strategy Leading to a New UNPROFOR.....State

II. OPLAN 40104 In-Progress Review

A. Post-UNPROFOR Withdrawal Strategy.....State

B. Unanswered Policy Questions.....State

C. Alternatives to NATO-Led Withdrawal.....All

D. Roadmap of remaining OPLAN 40104 requirements...JCS/OSD

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Declassify on: OADR

BOSNIA: STRATEGIC CHOICES
NSC DISCUSSION PAPERIntroduction:

We are in a critical period for U.S. policy toward Bosnia that could see the withdrawal of UNPROFOR and the introduction of NATO/U.S. ground forces for a mission whose outcome is uncertain. Now is the time to review the fundamental principles guiding our policy and to determine the steps necessary to shape events before strategic choices are completely dictated by the situation on the ground.

Fundamental U.S. policy objectives for Bosnia:

- Obtain a political settlement that satisfies basic Bosnian government requirements and rolls back some Serb aggression
- End or reduce the fighting
- Prevent spread of conflict to other parts of region
- Maintain relief supplies
- Maintain cohesion with Allies
- Avoid American entanglement in fighting on the ground in the Balkans

Key Strategic Choices:

I. **Whither UNPROFOR:** U.S. support for continued UNPROFOR presence has been based upon an assessment that this course remains the avenue best suited to the majority of our fundamental objectives -- and that, for all of its problems, the alternatives are worse.

- In the current environment, the viability of UNPROFOR is increasingly being called into question.
 - ◆ UNPROFOR is unable to ensure that humanitarian assistance is delivered to UN-protected areas/safe areas.
 - ◆ Fighting among the warring parties is no longer deterred by UNPROFOR presence.
 - ◆ UNPROFOR itself is frequently the subject of attack, and UNPROFOR forces are neither in a position to defend themselves effectively nor to withstand the possible consequences of calling in NATO airpower.
 - ◆ UNPROFOR credibility is thereby undermined with all parties, and NATO credibility in turn eroded as well.

- Under these circumstances, we must ask whether linking U.S. objectives to continued UNPROFOR presence remains valid in the current environment.
 - ♦ There still do not appear to be any alternatives to UNPROFOR that provide better support for U.S. objectives.
 - ♦ Withdrawal followed by unilateral or predominantly U.S. lift (and strike) risks "Americanizing" the Balkan conflict; even multilateral lift risks widening the scope of the conflict as more external parties move to support regional clients.
 - ♦ Replacement of UNPROFOR with another international presence (NATO? WEU? Coalition of the willing?) would either require U.S. participation on the ground or prove equally ineffective -- and require additional political and financial capital to initiate.
 - ♦ U.S. interests are thus best served by finding a way to restore credibility to the UNPROFOR mission in a manner that permits existing troop contributors to sustain their continued presence and the Bosnian government to agree to retain that presence.
- Options other than withdrawal available for UNPROFOR under the present circumstances:
 - ♦ **Muddle through with the status quo:** French have already indicated likely pullout if current conditions remain unchanged -- may be the thread that unravels the whole fabric of UNPROFOR.
 - ♦ **"Restabilization" of existing UNPROFOR mission with more robust enforcement of existing mandate:** UK avoidance of a confrontational approach in B-H must be overcome if this option is to become viable; additional resources needed to enhance military capabilities of existing UNPROFOR forces not likely to be forthcoming.
 - ♦ **"Retrench and reinvigorate" UNPROFOR mission by withdrawing from untenable positions/missions while pursuing more robust enforcement of remaining mandates:** could be seen as a trade of the eastern enclaves for more effective mission performance around Sarajevo -- implications for eastern enclaves could be very serious; however, this option could satisfy both the French and UK; by retrenching, could also alleviate some of the problems associated with resources to enhance capabilities.
 - ♦ **"Retrench and retreat" by withdrawing and pursuing an even less vigorous approach to mandate enforcement:** the least costly approach, this might be used as a bargaining chip to get the Bosnian Serbs to accede to the conditions for French

forces remaining in UNPROFOR; UK likely to support; however, potentially as damaging to UNPROFOR credibility as the status quo, with the additional public image/moral costs of not only "abandoning" the eastern enclaves, but also "capitulating" in cases where UNPROFOR remains; least likely to be acceptable to Bosnians, who could then refuse to allow continued UNPROFOR presence.

Comment: Only realistic choice may be to seek Allied support to "retrench and reinvigorate". Trade U.S. support for retrenchment for allied and UN pledge to pursue more robust enforcement of remaining mandate, including NATO airstrikes. Fall back to "retrench and retreat" only if no other way to prevent withdrawal.

II. Whither OPLAN 40104, given U.S. objective of sustaining UNPROFOR and commitment to assist withdrawal if required?

- There are no guarantees that a viable solution to retaining UNPROFOR in theater can be agreed.
- Withdrawal remains a real, and increasingly likely, option if there is no agreement on a more viable UNPROFOR role.
- Nevertheless, several key issues remain to be resolved before a decision to proceed with withdrawal implementation could be taken with confidence:
 - ♦ **What is the end state we want to leave behind following UNPROFOR withdrawal?** What to avoid may be clearer than what to achieve: avoid merely replacing UN with NATO forces and being unable to leave; avoid debacle of U.S./NATO-led withdrawal being depicted as precursor to brutal ethnic cleansing; avoid loss of NATO credibility to the same extent there has been a loss of UN credibility.
 - ♦ **How does NATO deal with unintended consequences of withdrawal operations?** Massive refugee flow; use of NATO forces as shields by civilians or by warring factions; hostage-taking by warring factions; withdrawal of humanitarian aid providers as a result of UNPROFOR withdrawal.
 - ♦ **Under what conditions could withdrawal or partial withdrawal take place without requiring implementation of OPLAN 40104?** If nations determine that they will accomplish *de facto* withdrawal by merely failing to replace units during normal rotation, no NATO assistance may be necessary. If this resulted in enclaves being left unprotected, would the last forces out require NATO assistance, or could the UN accomplish this on its own?

- The way ahead for OPLAN 40104 is also complicated by a dilemma: we must ensure that our actions in preparation for possible UNPROFOR withdrawal do not precipitate the withdrawal itself.
- ◆ Key is not allowing the existence of a "NATO withdrawal force" to prompt either UN troop contributors to seek early withdrawal or Bosnians to act to cause UNPROFOR withdrawal in the hopes that NATO will replace the UN. **A clear "firebreak" is required between completion of NATO preparation for OPLAN 40104 and initiation of OPLAN implementation.** We must be confident that we understand exactly what steps will be required to get from the present state of NATO planning to this firebreak, and what steps take us beyond it.
- ◆ NATO credibility requires that forces must be trained sufficiently to ensure mission success. ACTREQ requested by SACEUR this week will facilitate identification of forces and training shortfalls, and allow SACEUR to initiate action to rectify those shortfalls. Training in place to NATO standards should be an acceptable alternative to assembling in Europe for training, and send a more restrained signal.
- ◆ Training in place would also permit completion of Congressional consultations prior to movement of any US forces. We may need to lay down marker in NATO that assembly of forces in Europe will require a further political decision.

~~SECRET~~**DRAFT**

17 May 1995

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**FUTURE OF UNPROFOR'S MANDATE
OPTIONS REVIEW****BACKGROUND**

UNSYG Proposed Options. The UNSYG reported to the UNSC on proposals regarding a needed fundamental review of UNPROFOR's mandate. In light of the deteriorating conditions in Bosnia, UNSYG presented four options:

(1) Maintenance of the status quo;

(2) A more aggressive military posture, including sustained use of air power, with the resulting possibility of a more direct UNPROFOR-BSA confrontation;

(3) Withdrawal from Bosnia

(4) Redeployment and reduction in the number of troops, with necessary modifications to the UNPROFOR mandate.

Boutros Ghali has said publicly that he wants UNPROFOR reduced and redeployed (option 4 above), but advanced these four options. They are assessed below from the perspective of USG policy for AMB Albright in New York.

OPTIONS

(1) *Maintenance of Status Quo.* Boutros Ghali's call for a redeployment and reduction shows the UN's frustration with the status quo, both politically and militarily. But changing the mandates is not the answer. The French and British are tired of being involved in a failed mission. But both know triggering a withdrawal could lead to an UNPROFOR exodus. There is no good "end state" after UNPROFOR leaves. This would be the worst case for the US.

The best case would be a political settlement. Making UNPROFOR more effective is an achievable intermediate step that could eventually create conditions more conducive for the warring parties to reach a settlement.

We don't want the situation to unravel in Bosnia. Supporting changes to the UN mandates would only increase the possibility of an UNPROFOR withdrawal. We need to work with the present mandates and regain the initiative.

Indicators of progress from all warring parties will be needed over the next few months: e. g., progress toward cease-fire, discussion on the CG map, freedom of movement, improvement of resupply, reduction of hostilities, improved communication with the UN, BiH self-restraint in using safe areas, pressure on Bosnia, and Pale more involved in discussions. On the ground we need a more effective UNPROFOR, more liberal ROE, and air attacks.

The French want increased efforts to reach a ceasefire, obtain mutual recognition, and make progress on agreement to the Contact Group plan. The USG may have to begin

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reconsidering somewhat tilting its position in helping to stop the fighting and to promote conditions conducive to a negotiated settlement. The UK has said they are not going to propose withdrawal, nor political maneuvers that would lead us to slip into withdrawal. There are no good "end states" after withdrawal. The French realize this.

US troops should not become involved in Bosnia. That is why UNPROFOR must remain. We must support maintaining the political status quo to avoid triggering withdrawal. An even-handed approach may likely be required. If the choice is between UNPROFOR withdrawing and satisfying Bosnian government desires, the US must support UNPROFOR.

(2) **More Aggressive Military Posture.** Sustained use of air power against the Bosnian Serbs would rapidly expand the conflict, with UNPROFOR viewed as a belligerent. This goes far beyond the CHOD initiative and no UNPROFOR contributor would accept. Not a prudent option.

(3) **Withdrawal from Bosnia.** The US opposes. There is no good answer to an "end state" if UNPROFOR withdraws. UNPROFOR must remain in Bosnia.

(4) **Redeployment and Troop Reduction.** This is the UNSYG's real recommendation. The scope of this option is wide. While this option may appear attractive to changing a disintegrating situation in Bosnia, the greatest danger comes from signalling the start of the UNPROFOR withdrawal. Worse case for the US is a Bosnia without UNPROFOR.

The Bosnian government's reaction is likely to be negative to any troop drawdown, especially from the eastern enclaves. When the Dutch replaced the Canadians in Srebrenica, the local population held the Canadians hostage to ensure a one-for-one swap. A related concern for any drawdown is the logistics, movement, and perception problems created during any partial withdrawal. The threat to UN personnel redeploying out of isolated areas could result in the UN requesting a multilateral assisted withdrawal. NATO OPLAN 40104 could come into question.

The risks are too high and the gains too uncertain. The US should support the status quo supporting UNPROFOR under existing mandates. The 19 May CHOD's meeting in The Netherlands will address several options for enhancing UNPROFOR's situation under the existing mandates. The USG should support the outcome of this meeting.

CONCLUSION

The USG should support UNPROFOR under the existing mandates. Maintain the status quo while regaining the initiative. UNPROFOR must pressure both sides in the conflict. This will require US support. We don't want to present the opportunity that could trigger UNPROFOR withdrawal. There is no good "end state" in a post-withdrawal Bosnia. UNPROFOR must remain in Bosnia.

Prepared by: LtCol Tom White, USMC, J-5, EURDIV, X49431, un\unoption.doc

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(2) Edward G. Kelly
(3)

TO BE PROVIDED

40104 Timeline/
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20661

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 19, 1995

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

By VDE NARA, Date 04/10/13

2012-0798-F

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *AV*

FROM: NELSON DREW *ND*

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, May 23, 1995

Attached at Tab A is the agenda for the Principals meeting on Bosnia to be held May 23, 1995. The memorandum to the agencies is attached at Tab I.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the meeting and authorize Andy Sens to sign the memorandum to the agencies at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the Agencies

Tab A Agenda

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Declassify on: OADR

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20661

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By KDE NARA, Date 04/10/15

2012-0798-F

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the U.S. to the UN

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for National
Security and International
Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

MR. LEON PANETTA
Chief of Staff to the President

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL F. C. WILSON
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia ~~(S)~~

There will be a Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia and Croatia on May 23, 1995, 2:30 p.m. - 4:00 p.m., in the White House Situation Room. Attendance will be Principals only. The agenda is attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Agenda

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Declassify on: OADR

TAB A

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DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

20661

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

By KDE NARA, Date 2/11/05
2012-0718-F

NSC PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA

DATE: May 23, 1995

LOCATION: White House Situation Room

TIME: 2:30 - 4:00 p.m.

Agenda

- I. OPLAN 40104 In-Progress Review
 - A. Post-UNPROFOR Withdrawal Strategy.....State
 - B. Unanswered Policy Questions.....State
 - C. Alternatives to NATO-Led Withdrawal.....OSD
 - D. Roadmap of remaining OPLAN 40104 requirements.....JCS
 - E. Legislative Strategy for OPLAN 40104 Approval.....NSC

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Declassify on: OADR

DRAFT

Post-UN Peace Forces Withdrawal Strategy

While U.S. strategy continues to be based on the premise that UN Peace Forces should remain in Bosnia, Croatia, and Macedonia, pressure is mounting for withdrawal before the next winter should attempts to strengthen UN Peace Forces militarily and to reach a political settlement with Milosevic fail. That potential withdrawal could occur in an environment ranging from completely hostile to totally benign. While post-withdrawal strategy would certainly be affected by the environment in which withdrawal were to be conducted, five broad alternatives appear to cover the range of strategic options:

1. U.S. unilateral support for Bosnia;
2. Multilateral support for Bosnia;
3. Support for a follow-on multilateral peacekeeping force;
4. Continued/Enhanced Peace Forces Mission in Macedonia; and
5. Benign neglect.

U.S. Unilateral Support for Bosnia: This is a variation of *lift, train, arm, and/or strike*. The objective would be to protect and preserve the territorial integrity of Bosnia through direct military and political assistance. Interest in lifting the arms embargo would certainly grow following a withdrawal of UN Peace Forces. Training and arming the Bosnian Government forces would constitute a major commitment on the part of the U.S. to level the battlefield and would likely be based on the premise that such a step was a prerequisite to reaching a negotiated settlement. The conflict's fighting would likely intensify in the near-term. Taking the next step--strike--unequivocally Americanizes the war and could easily lead to a significant U.S. combat ground force commitment.

Multilateral Support for Bosnia: Includes efforts on the part of the U.S. to achieve a multilateral lifting of the arms embargo. This course of action would be far less divisive among our NATO allies than the go-it-alone approach above but would be difficult to cobble. Part of that difficulty stems from different evaluations of the warring parties and the strategic and moral interests at stake.. Part is also due to a certain war weariness stemming not only from the current four years of war but also from the Balkans long history of hatred and conflict and the cost in lives and material of continued international involvement in an apparently never-ending struggle.

Support for a Multilateral Peacekeeping Force: This follow-on force to UN Peace Forces could either be a NATO-based force that remained in place after UN Peace Forces withdrawal or it could be an Islamic-dominated force. In either case what is implied is that some of the existing force structures do not depart. In the former, NATO

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elects to remain after effecting or during withdrawal. Such a force would be under NATO command and control and and ROE. Thus, the problems of dual-key would be eliminated. The opportunity for more robust use of international force would increase, provided that NATO could reach consensus for action-a proviso of considerable importance. The latter would imply that some UN Peace Force contributing countries (most likely Islamic countries) elected to remain in place. A force composed principally of Islamic nations would likely not be even-handed in its approach to the conflict.

Continued/Enhanced Peace Forces Mission in Macedonia: Objective is to contain the conflict and prevent its spillover to areas outside Bosnia and Croatia. While it would be difficult to ignore the humanitarian tragedies associated with war in Croatia and/or Bosnia, this course of action would focus attention on the principal strategic interest in the region--containment of the conflict. Mission in Macedonia may or may not suffice to contain the conflict at all its possible flashpoints. Finding the right force mix and sustaining it over time to the benefit of the region's and Macedonia's stability is problematic.

Benign Neglect: This option implies total withdrawal of the international peacekeeping community from the region. Such a walk-away would be difficult given the current level of international involvement. To argue that what was going on did not matter anymore--that it was not worth the cost--would be a tough sell to many domestic markets. Ethnic cleansing, genocide, and cross-border aggression have all been labels used to describe events in the Balkans. To walk-away strategy implies appeasement.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003a. memo	Nelson Drew to Anthony Lake, re: Update for May 23 Principals' Meeting on Bosnia (2 pages)	05/23/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Drew, Nelson/Bremner, Sue)
OA/Box Number: 696

FOLDER TITLE:

PC/DC [Principals Committee/Deputies Committee] Meetings on Bosnia, May 1995 [2]

2010-0798-F
ke3052

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003b. draft	Draft paper, re: Bosnia: Formulating A Post-UNPROFOR Withdrawal Strategy (4 pages)	05/00/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Drew, Nelson/Bremner, Sue)
OA/Box Number: 696

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2010-0798-F
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LEGISLATIVE STRATEGY

Background

Hill briefings on the OPLAN for UNPROFOR withdrawal have begun. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee was briefed on May 19. The Senate Armed Services Committee is scheduled to be briefed on May 25. Their counterpart committees in the House have asked to defer briefings until the week of June 6 because of floor action on the State/Foreign Assistance Authorization Bill and Committee mark up of the Defense Authorization Bill. Both Intelligence Committees have declined briefings.

Discussion

Although it is unlikely that we will see a unilateral lift amendment (Chris Smith has indicated that he will not offer a lift amendment to the Gilman Bill that is on the House floor this week) we need to continue to press to schedule the OPLAN briefings to lay the groundwork for bringing this issue into sharper focus on the Hill. The main message coming from the SFRC briefing, especially from Lugar and Kassebaum was that The Administration should be working to inform the public and gaining their support if we expect the Senate to provide additional funding. We also need to consult a few key Congressional leaders to get their counsel on ways to build Hill support.

Recommendations

- Continue to push hard for presenting the OPLAN briefings to HIRC, House National Security Committee, and the corresponding Appropriations subcommittees. Week of June 6. (DOD and State)
- Revisit briefings with the Intelligence Committees after recess. Week of June 6. (NSC)
- Principal level discussions with key members, seeking their support and advice as follows:
 - Perry/Shalikashvili discussion with Sen. Nunn, and based on Nunn's recommendations and suggestions, a possible follow on discussion with Sen. Warner.
 - Lake conversation with Speaker Gingrich (his staff has appeared receptive)
 - Senior level follow on conversations as indicated by above consultations.

- Task development of a public affairs strategy to gain public support for U.S. participation in NATO OPLAN. (State/DOD)

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004a. memo	[duplicate of 003a] (2 pages)	05/23/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

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OA/Box Number: 696

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2010-0798-F
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EDECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526UN FORCES IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA:
ALTERNATIVES TO NATO-LED WITHDRAWAL (C)

ISSUE (S): Given that the preferred option is to have UNPROFOR/UNCRO remain in place and succeed in their mission, what alternatives to a NATO-led withdrawal exist if the forces must be withdrawn?

OPTIONS (S):

- "40104": NATO-led withdrawal, as envisioned in OPLAN 40104
- "Coalition": Non-NATO, coalition-led withdrawal (WEU, UN troop contributors, or other ad hoc coalition)
- "Unilateral": Capable single nation (UK, FR?) withdraws own forces without coordination with allies or UN
- "Backup": UN-led, NATO (or other coalition)-supported, withdrawal
- "Unassisted": Withdrawal en masse, directed and conducted by UN
- "Attrition": Gradual drawdown of UN forces, managed by UN and tied to rotation dates of contributing nations tempered by tactical situation

KEY FACTORS (S):

- Practicality: Are the resources available to do it?
- Safety/security of UN forces during and after withdrawal
- Impact on military/political situation among the warring factions
- Humanitarian concerns
- NATO solidarity, US leadership of the alliance

DISCUSSION (S):

- **Risk of Casualties:** Withdrawal of UN forces without the ability to militarily dominate the warring factions during the withdrawal risks aggression against the forces and potential heavy casualties, especially in the most hotly contested areas (enclaves, pockets, corridors and lines of confrontation). Avoiding UN casualties will require a force perceived by the combatants as willing and capable of protecting the withdrawing forces.
- **UN Limitations:** UN military command structure, rules of engagement, mission, and force capabilities do not admit the robust self-defense needed to withdraw safely. Strengthening the force is likely to remain politically elusive.
- **Lighter Options:** Both SACEUR and CJCS have considered lighter, quicker, on-call options to provide backup support for an unassisted withdrawal. Both have rejected the approach as lacking unity of command, providing insufficient force to deter aggression and lacking responsiveness to protect the withdrawing forces.
- **Longer View:** While we have few US troops at risk, the future of NATO as the alliance of record in Europe and, especially, the US position as the leader of NATO and a central player in European security will be badly damaged if we decline to lead in this instance. If this operation happens without the US or NATO, we lose.

CONCLUSION (S): If UN withdraws, NATO-led "40104" is the least bad approach.

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004b. paper	Re: Roadmap of remaining OPLAN 40104 requirements (2 pages)	05/17/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
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European Affairs (Drew, Nelson/Bremner, Sue)
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12 May 1995

**PROPOSED US POLICY PRINCIPLES
DURING NATO-LED UNPROFOR WITHDRAWAL**

- **NATO Mission.** NATO's (and the US) mission is to conduct withdrawal operations and depart. There will be no follow-on missions. To the extent it can without adversely impacting the withdrawal effort, NATO forces will continue to conduct NATO-authorized operations, including SHARP GUARD, DENY FLIGHT, CAS, TEZ, and protection of safe areas.
- **Neutrality.** NATO forces will remain completely neutral and impartial during the withdrawal, and will not support Bosnian government or Croatian military forces. NATO will not turn over weapons or hand off territory to any warring party.
- **Use of Force.** NATO will be authorized to take necessary self-defense measures, including lethal force if required, to protect themselves and UN personnel from any faction, including civilians, regardless of location. NATO will use all necessary measures required to accomplish their mission.
- **Withdrawal priority.** The withdrawal priority will be to remove UN personnel (civilian and military) first, then UN forces' weapons, and then UN equipment. UN weapons and equipment not withdrawn will be disabled or destroyed whenever possible. To the extent it can without adversely impacting the withdrawal effort, NATO forces will be authorized to destroy warring faction weapons/equipment previously confiscated by UNPROFOR.
- **Command and Control.** NATO will continue to support UNPROFOR operations under existing UN mandates. Once the UN asks for NATO help in withdrawal anywhere in the theater and, prior to the withdrawal actually commencing, NATO will assume command and control of all current UNPROFOR units throughout FRY to conduct emergency, partial, or total withdrawal operations. NATO will delegate local authority to UN commanders in areas not being withdrawn.
 - ⇒ *** Dual-key.** After TOA, NATO Theater Command is in effect and dual key arrangements will not apply to NATO forces in areas or countries in the theater in which NATO-led withdrawal operations are authorized, nor in areas within the theater from which attacks on NATO-led withdrawal operations are launched from which hostile intent is demonstrated. Except as provided above, dual-key arrangements will remain in place for areas from which

UNPF is not being withdrawn as delimited by the NATO Theater Commander, in agreement with the TC UNPF.

- **Civilians.** NATO forces will not attempt to defend Bosnian Muslim, Croat, or Serb civilian populations and will not undertake to evacuate civilians from the enclaves (or elsewhere). However, to the extent it can, without adversely impacting the withdrawal effort, NATO forces will be authorized to:

⇒ Respond to attacks on civilian populations in area where NATO forces are operating.

⇒ Support humanitarian assistance (aid delivery, refugee relocation, etc.) efforts of UNHCR and NGOs.

Notes:

* Dual-key statement should not be considered as the final USG policy position until agreed upon at the NAC.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005. paper	Re: Unanswered Policy Questions Relating to OPLAN 40104 (4 pages)	05/00/1995	P1/b(1)

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006. cable	Re: Milosevic Discussions - No Deal (5 pages)	05/22/1995	P1/b(1)

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Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
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OA/Box Number: 696

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White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

FROM: SENS

By KDE NARA, Date 04/01/15
2012-0728-F

DOC DATE: 24 MAY 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
PC

CROATIA
SOC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS OF PC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA 19 MAY

ACTION: SENS SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DUE DATE: 25 MAY 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: DREW

LOGREF:

FILES: IFM

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007. fax	Fax Coversheet [partial] (1 page)	05/00/1995	b(7)(C)

COLLECTION:

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National Security Council
European Affairs (Drew, Nelson/Bremner, Sue)
OA/Box Number: 696

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PC/DC [Principals Committee/Deputies Committee] Meetings on Bosnia, May 1995 [2]

2010-0798-F
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
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b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

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2012-0728-F

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RELEASER: _____

DATE/TIME: _____

MESSAGE #: _____

NSC # 20662

FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: Notice of Meeting SOC FC MTO BOSNIA/COGATE PAGES: 9

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
<u>USUN New York</u>	<u>Mr. Rick Inderfurth</u>	<u>212-415-4016</u>	<u>(b)(7)c</u>

[007]

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

~~SECRET~~

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

National Security Council
The White House

REC'd 5/22
6.15pm

PROOFED BY: _____

LOG # 20662

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

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	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon	<u>4</u>	<u>SA</u>	
Dohse	<u>1</u>	<u>h</u>	
Sens			
Soderberg	<u>copy</u>	<u>✓</u>	
Berger	<u>2</u>	<u>OK</u>	
Lake	<u>3</u>	Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>5</u>	<u>OK 5/24</u>	<u>D</u>
Records Mgt.			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

~~SECRET~~

20662

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

May 24, 1995

By YDE NARA, Date 04110115
2012-0798-F
MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

AMBASSADOR RICK INDEFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the U.S. to the United
Nations

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency


COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

COL. F. C. WILSON
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

DR. GORDON ADAMS
Associate Director for
National Security &
International Affairs
Office of Management and
Budget

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Principals Committee Meeting on
Bosnia and Croatia, May 19, 1995 ~~(S)~~

Please pass to the Principals the Summary of Conclusions attached
at Tab A. ~~(S)~~


Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee

DATE: May 19, 1995

LOCATION: White House Situation Room

TIME: 2:30 - 4:30 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting
on Bosnia (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair

Anthony Lake

USUN

Madeleine Albright

OVP

Leon Fuerth

CIA

John Deutch

State

Warren Christopher

Richard Holbrooke

JCS

Admiral William Owens

DOD

Walter Slocombe

NSC

Alexander Vershbow

Colonel Nelson Drew

OMB

Alice Rivlin

Summary of Conclusions

Negotiations with Milosevic

1. Principals discussed progress made to date in ongoing negotiations between Ambassador Frasure and Milosevic regarding the recognition/sanctions relief package. They agreed on the contents of an instruction cable to Frasure outlining key problem areas in Milosevic's counterproposal and authorizing further negotiations to close the gap (**Action: State**). The cable will provide goals but retain flexibility for Frasure in the negotiations. (S)

2. Principals agreed on the following guidance on the most sensitive issues:

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

- Successor State Status: Principals agreed to maintain our existing position that Serbia/Montenegro could be treated as "a" successor state but not "the" successor state to Yugoslavia. ~~(S)~~
- Timing of Serbian Admission to OSCE: Principals agreed that Serbia's admission to OSCE should be simultaneous with restoration of the long-duration missions to Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina. ~~(S)~~
- Sanctions Relief: Principals agreed on the need to avoid "front-end loading" of sanctions relief or lifting. Milosevic's proposed automatic mechanism for continuing extension of sanctions suspension without a UNSC vote was unacceptable. Principals agreed to counter his oil relief proposal of 500,000 MT per month with an offer of 125,000 MT, and to try to limit imports through a single point of entry. OVP provided an outline chart linking specific sanctions relief actions to specific progress toward a political settlement involving Pale (attached); Principals agreed that this should be provided to Frasure as a guide rather than as detailed negotiating instructions. They agreed that some lifting of sanctions should be tied to recognition of Croatia. They reaffirmed that any lifting of the "outer wall" of sanctions (access to IFIs, full participation in international organizations) should be tied to cooperation with the War Crimes Tribunal and progress toward a broader regional settlement, including restoration of autonomy to Kosovo. ~~(S)~~

Future Options for UNPROFOR

3. Principals reaffirmed that retention of UNPROFOR in Bosnia was critical to U.S. interests and agreed to support the conclusions of the CHODs meeting with UNPROFOR Commanders calling for enhancement of UNPROFOR's ability to fulfill its existing mandate. The CHODs' proposal included agreement that the UNPROFOR Ground Commanders would develop an enhanced air supply plan for the eastern enclaves on an urgent basis and that unhindered use of Sarajevo airport was imperative. (Other options considered but rejected by the CHODs included continuation of the existing situation, retrenchment and reduced UN presence, UNPROFOR withdrawal and military intervention.) CJCS will be instructed to take this window of opportunity to press allies for as robust an enhancement of UNPROFOR as possible (Action: JCS) and USUN will work to ensure that options presented for agreement in New York reflect the CHODs' decisions (Action: USUN). ~~(S)~~

4. Principals agreed that there was little likelihood that the CHODs' proposals would lead to more robust use of force by UNPROFOR in pursuit of fulfilling its mandate or increased willingness to employ NATO airpower under the dual key approach. If an opportunity arose to support rotation of the UNSYG Special Representative to someone more likely to support UN requests for the use of NATO airstrikes, the U.S. would be supportive but not initiate such an effort. (Action: USUN). (S)

5. At the same time, Principals agreed that if the French found enhancing UNPROFOR in its existing areas and mandates acceptable, and the UK was willing to let this go forward, the U.S. should not press for UNPROFOR retrenchment at this time. Principals also noted that success in the Frasure-Milosevic negotiations could help satisfy French requirements for progress toward a political settlement. (S)

OPLAN 40104

6. Principals noted that briefings to the SFRC earlier in the day had flagged serious concerns regarding preparing the Congress and the public for U.S. participation in a possible withdrawal operation, lack of clarity about a post-withdrawal strategy and funding. Principals agreed that a strong effort would be needed to secure Congressional approval. (C)

7. Principals agreed to meet again on Tuesday, May 23, to address (1) post-withdrawal strategy (Action: State); (2) remaining unanswered questions associated with OPLAN 40104 implementation (Action: State, OSD); (3) the remaining steps associated with OPLAN 40104 (Action: JCS, OSD); and (4) a legislative strategy (Action: All). (C)

Attachment

May 12 Contact Group Agreement
(The plan offered to Milosevic on May 18)

If the FRY:

- Recognizes Bosnia
- Tightens closure of the inter-Serb border, allows transfer of border mission to OSCE and OSCE monitors to Kosovo

FRY gets in return:

- Suspension of sanctions on non-strategic trade (notes 1 and 2)
- Suspension of financial sanctions (notes 1 and 3)
- OSCE membership

If Pale then:

- Accepts the CG package.

FRY gets in return:

- Lift of all Phase 1 sanctions

And if Pale then:

- Fully implements Contact Group plan

FRY and Pale get in return:

- "Lift of remaining sanctions (plus release of frozen assets) calibrated to implementation in a way to be developed later."

NOTES:

1. All "suspensions" are for a six-month period and can be renewed only by positive vote by the Security Council.
2. The agreed definition of "strategic goods" includes oil, petroleum products, coal, iron, steel, and other metals *plus energy-related equipment and petro-chemicals*.
3. All financial sanctions are suspended, including credits. Frozen assets are not released. The resolution relaxing sanctions is to contain prohibitions against using frozen assets to secure or otherwise support loans and credits.

Milosevic's May 18 Counter Offer

If the FRY:

- Recognizes Bosnia
- Allows reinforcement of the inter-Serb border-monitoring mission

FRY gets in return:

- Suspension of sanctions on non-strategic trade (UN definition)
- Import of 500,000 MT of oil a month
- Suspension of all financial sanctions
- Lift of sports sanctions
- Entry into OSCE

If Pale then:

- Accepts the CG plan as a starting point for negotiations

FRY gets in return:

- Lift of phase 1 sanctions (air and ferry service).

Then:

- When a cessation of hostilities is in place, and
- The Bosnian parties have begun negotiations on implementation of the CG plan

FRY gets in return:

- Lift of non-strategic trade and financial sanctions
- Suspension of strategic trade sanctions (oil import quota remains in place)

When

- The CG plan is fully implemented on the ground
- Respective forces have withdrawn to the agreed territorial limits

FRY gets in return:

- Lift of remaining sanctions (presumably including release of frozen assets)

NOTES:

1. All "suspensions" are for an indefinite time period. The Security Council would "review" the situation in the former Yugoslavia, to include the sanctions suspension arrangements.
2. UNSC Resolutions define strategic goods as including crude oil, petroleum products, coal, energy-related equipment, iron, steel, other metals, chemicals, rubber, tires, vehicles, aircraft, and motors of all types.

Countering Milosevic's Counter Offer

~~DRAFT~~

If the FRY:

- Recognizes Bosnia
- Allows reinforcement of the inter-Serb border-monitoring mission
- Ends support for Pale and Knin

FRY gets in return:

- Suspension of sanctions on non-strategic trade (UN definition)
- Import of up to 100,000 MT of oil a month
- Suspension of all financial sanctions
- Entry into OSCE

If Pale then:

- Accepts the CG plan as a starting point for negotiations and begins negotiations

FRY gets in return:

- Partial lift of phase 1 sanctions
- CG agreement to change terms of sanctions relief extension (eg: longer than six month periods, revise extension conditionality, etc.)

Then when:

- The Bosnian parties have reached agreement, and
- They have begun implementation of the CG plan (to include starting withdrawals)

FRY gets in return:

- Lift of non-strategic trade and financial sanctions
- Suspension of strategic trade sanctions (oil import quota remains in place)

And when

- The CG plan is fully implemented on the ground, and
- Respective forces have withdrawn to the agreed territorial limits
- (And if the FRY has recognized Croatia, Slovenia, and Macedonia)

FRY gets in return:

- Lift of remaining sanctions (presumably including release of frozen assets)
- End of oil quota system

NOTES:

1. Initial suspensions are for six months. The Security Council would have to vote to to extend sanctions relief.
2. UNSC Resolutions define strategic goods as including crude oil, petroleum products, coal, energy-related equipment, iron, steel, other metals, chemicals, rubber, tires, vehicles, aircraft, and motors of all types.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

20662

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

May 22, 1995

By LDL NARA, Date 04/10/15

2012-078-F

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *N*

FROM: NELSON DREW *D*

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Principals
Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia,
May 19, 1995

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Principals is the Summary
of Conclusions from the Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia
and Croatia held May 19, 1995.

Concurrence by: Leon Fuerth *LF*

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andrew Sens to sign the memo to agencies at
Tab I.

Approve *AS* Disapprove

Attachments

Tab I Memo to the Agencies

Tab A Summary of Conclusions

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

TO: LAKE

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

FROM: DREW
VERSHBOW

By VDE NARA, Date 5/11/05

DOC DATE: 18 MAY 95
SOURCE REF:

2012-0798-F

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
PC

CROATIA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: BRIEFING MEMO FOR 19 MAY PC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA

ACTION: NOTED BY LAKE

DUE DATE: 22 MAY 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: DREW

LOGREF: 9520653

FILES: IFM

NSCP:

CODES: BOS CRO

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

DREW
JOSHI
KRECZKO
NSC CHRON
SODERBERG
VERSHBOW

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDRS

CLOSED BY: NSKDB

DOC 1 OF 1

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RECORD ID: 9520655

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 LAKE

Z 95051821 FOR INFORMATION

001

X 95052318 NOTED BY LAKE

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
008a. memo	[duplicate of 001a] (3 pages)	05/18/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Drew, Nelson/Bremner, Sue)
OA/Box Number: 696

FOLDER TITLE:

PC/DC [Principals Committee/Deputies Committee] Meetings on Bosnia, May 1995 [2]

2010-0798-F
ke3052

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

20655

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

By VDE NARA, Date 04/10/15

200-098-F

NSC PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA

DATE: May 19, 1995

LOCATION: White House Situation Room

TIME: 2:30 - 4:30 p.m.

Agenda

I. Future of UNPROFOR

A. Options.....JCS/ALL

B. Diplomatic Strategy Leading to a New UNPROFOR.....State

II. OPLAN 40104 In-Progress Review

A. Post-UNPROFOR Withdrawal Strategy.....State

B. Unanswered Policy Questions.....State <

C. Alternatives to NATO-Led Withdrawal.....All

D. Roadmap of remaining OPLAN 40104 requirements...JCS/OSD

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Declassify on: OADR

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PER E.O. 13526

BOSNIA: STRATEGIC CHOICES
NSC DISCUSSION PAPER

Introduction:

We are in a critical period for U.S. policy toward Bosnia that could see the withdrawal of UNPROFOR and the introduction of NATO/U.S. ground forces for a mission whose outcome is uncertain. Now is the time to review the fundamental principles guiding our policy and to determine the steps necessary to shape events before strategic choices are completely dictated by the situation on the ground.

Fundamental U.S. policy objectives for Bosnia:

- Obtain a political settlement that satisfies basic Bosnian government requirements and rolls back some Serb aggression
- End or reduce the fighting
- Prevent spread of conflict to other parts of region
- Maintain relief supplies
- Maintain cohesion with Allies
- Avoid American entanglement in fighting on the ground in the Balkans

Key Strategic Choices:

I. **Whither UNPROFOR:** U.S. support for continued UNPROFOR presence has been based upon an assessment that this course remains the avenue best suited to the majority of our fundamental objectives -- and that, for all of its problems, the alternatives are worse.

- In the current environment, the viability of UNPROFOR is increasingly being called into question.
 - ◆ UNPROFOR is unable to ensure that humanitarian assistance is delivered to UN-protected areas/safe areas.
 - ◆ Fighting among the warring parties is no longer deterred by UNPROFOR presence.
 - ◆ UNPROFOR itself is frequently the subject of attack, and UNPROFOR forces are neither in a position to defend themselves effectively nor to withstand the possible consequences of calling in NATO airpower.
 - ◆ UNPROFOR credibility is thereby undermined with all parties, and NATO credibility in turn eroded as well.

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Declassify on: OADR

- Under these circumstances, we must ask whether linking U.S. objectives to continued UNPROFOR presence remains valid in the current environment.
 - ◆ There still do not appear to be any alternatives to UNPROFOR that provide better support for U.S. objectives.
 - ◆ Withdrawal followed by unilateral or predominantly U.S. lift (and strike) risks "Americanizing" the Balkan conflict; even multilateral lift risks widening the scope of the conflict as more external parties move to support regional clients.
 - ◆ Replacement of UNPROFOR with another international presence (NATO? WEU? Coalition of the willing?) would either require U.S. participation on the ground or prove equally ineffective -- and require additional political and financial capital to initiate.
 - ◆ U.S. interests are thus best served by finding a way to restore credibility to the UNPROFOR mission in a manner that permits existing troop contributors to sustain their continued presence and the Bosnian government to agree to retain that presence.
- Options other than withdrawal available for UNPROFOR under the present circumstances:
 - ◆ **Muddle through with the status quo:** French have already indicated likely pullout if current conditions remain unchanged -- may be the thread that unravels the whole fabric of UNPROFOR.
 - ◆ **"Restabilization" of existing UNPROFOR mission with more robust enforcement of existing mandate:** UK avoidance of a confrontational approach in B-H must be overcome if this option is to become viable; additional resources needed to enhance military capabilities of existing UNPROFOR forces not likely to be forthcoming.
 - ◆ **"Retrench and reinvigorate" UNPROFOR mission by withdrawing from untenable positions/missions while pursuing more robust enforcement of remaining mandates:** could be seen as a trade of the eastern enclaves for more effective mission performance around Sarajevo -- implications for eastern enclaves could be very serious; however, this option could satisfy both the French and UK; by retrenching, could also alleviate some of the problems associated with resources to enhance capabilities.
 - ◆ **"Retrench and retreat" by withdrawing and pursuing an even less vigorous approach to mandate enforcement:** the least costly approach, this might be used as a bargaining chip to get the Bosnian Serbs to accede to the conditions for French

forces remaining in UNPROFOR; UK likely to support; however, potentially as damaging to UNPROFOR credibility as the status quo, with the additional public image/moral costs of not only "abandoning" the eastern enclaves, but also "capitulating" in cases where UNPROFOR remains; least likely to be acceptable to Bosnians, who could then refuse to allow continued UNPROFOR presence.

Comment: Only realistic choice may be to seek Allied support to "retrench and reinvigorate". Trade U.S. support for retrenchment for allied and UN pledge to pursue more robust enforcement of remaining mandate, including NATO airstrikes. Fall back to "retrench and retreat" only if no other way to prevent withdrawal.

II. **Whither OPLAN 40104**, given U.S. objective of sustaining UNPROFOR and commitment to assist withdrawal if required?

- There are no guarantees that a viable solution to retaining UNPROFOR in theater can be agreed.
- Withdrawal remains a real, and increasingly likely, option if there is no agreement on a more viable UNPROFOR role.
- Nevertheless, several key issues remain to be resolved before a decision to proceed with withdrawal implementation could be taken with confidence:
 - ♦ **What is the end state we want to leave behind following UNPROFOR withdrawal?** What to avoid may be clearer than what to achieve: avoid merely replacing UN with NATO forces and being unable to leave; avoid debacle of U.S./NATO-led withdrawal being depicted as precursor to brutal ethnic cleansing; avoid loss of NATO credibility to the same extent there has been a loss of UN credibility.
 - ♦ **How does NATO deal with unintended consequences of withdrawal operations?** Massive refugee flow; use of NATO forces as shields by civilians or by warring factions; hostage-taking by warring factions; withdrawal of humanitarian aid providers as a result of UNPROFOR withdrawal.
 - ♦ **Under what conditions could withdrawal or partial withdrawal take place without requiring implementation of OPLAN 40104?** If nations determine that they will accomplish *de facto* withdrawal by merely failing to replace units during normal rotation, no NATO assistance may be necessary. If this resulted in enclaves being left unprotected, would the last forces out require NATO assistance, or could the UN accomplish this on its own?

- The way ahead for OPLAN 40104 is also complicated by a dilemma: we must ensure that our actions in preparation for possible UNPROFOR withdrawal do not precipitate the withdrawal itself.
- ◆ Key is not allowing the existence of a "NATO withdrawal force" to prompt either UN troop contributors to seek early withdrawal or Bosnians to act to cause UNPROFOR withdrawal in the hopes that NATO will replace the UN. **A clear "firebreak" is required between completion of NATO preparation for OPLAN 40104 and initiation of OPLAN implementation.** We must be confident that we understand exactly what steps will be required to get from the present state of NATO planning to this firebreak, and what steps take us beyond it.
- ◆ NATO credibility requires that forces must be trained sufficiently to ensure mission success. ACTREQ requested by SACEUR this week will facilitate identification of forces and training shortfalls, and allow SACEUR to initiate action to rectify those shortfalls. Training in place to NATO standards should be an acceptable alternative to assembling in Europe for training, and send a more restrained signal.
- ◆ Training in place would also permit completion of Congressional consultations prior to movement of any US forces. We may need to lay down marker in NATO that assembly of forces in Europe will require a further political decision.

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17 May 1995

FUTURE OF UNPROFOR'S MANDATE OPTIONS REVIEW

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

BACKGROUND

UNSYG Proposed Options. The UNSYG reported to the UNSC on proposals regarding a needed fundamental review of UNPROFOR's mandate. In light of the deteriorating conditions in Bosnia, UNSYG presented four options:

(1) Maintenance of the status quo;

(2) A more aggressive military posture, including sustained use of air power, with the resulting possibility of a more direct UNPROFOR-BSA confrontation;

(3) Withdrawal from Bosnia

(4) Redeployment and reduction in the number of troops, with necessary modifications to the UNPROFOR mandate.

Boutros Ghali has said publicly that he wants UNPROFOR reduced and redeployed (option 4 above), but advanced these four options. They are assessed below from the perspective of USG policy for AMB Albright in New York.

OPTIONS

(1) *Maintenance of Status Quo.* Boutros Ghali's call for a redeployment and reduction shows the UN's frustration with the status quo, both politically and militarily. But changing the mandates is not the answer. The French and British are tired of being involved in a failed mission. But both know triggering a withdrawal could lead to an UNPROFOR exodus. There is no good "end state" after UNPROFOR leaves. This would be the worst case for the US.

The best case would be a political settlement. Making UNPROFOR more effective is an achievable intermediate step that could eventually create conditions more conducive for the warring parties to reach a settlement.

We don't want the situation to unravel in Bosnia. Supporting changes to the UN mandates would only increase the possibility of an UNPROFOR withdrawal. We need to work with the present mandates and regain the initiative.

Indicators of progress from all warring parties will be needed over the next few months: e. g., progress toward cease-fire, discussion on the CG map, freedom of movement, improvement of resupply, reduction of hostilities, improved communication with the UN, BiH self-restraint in using safe areas, pressure on Bosnia, and Pale more involved in discussions. On the ground we need a more effective UNPROFOR, more liberal ROE, and air attacks.

The French want increased efforts to reach a ceasefire, obtain mutual recognition, and make progress on agreement to the Contact Group plan. The USG may have to begin

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DRAFT

reconsidering somewhat tilting its position in helping to stop the fighting and to promote conditions conducive to a negotiated settlement. The UK has said they are not going to propose withdrawal, nor political maneuvers that would lead us to slip into withdrawal. There are no good "end states" after withdrawal. The French realize this.

US troops should not become involved in Bosnia. That is why UNPROFOR must remain. We must support maintaining the political status quo to avoid triggering withdrawal. An even-handed approach may likely be required. If the choice is between UNPROFOR withdrawing and satisfying Bosnian government desires, the US must support UNPROFOR.

(2) **More Aggressive Military Posture.** Sustained use of air power against the Bosnian Serbs would rapidly expand the conflict, with UNPROFOR viewed as a belligerent. This goes far beyond the CHOD initiative and no UNPROFOR contributor would accept. Not a prudent option.

(3) **Withdrawal from Bosnia.** The US opposes. There is no good answer to an "end state" if UNPROFOR withdraws. UNPROFOR must remain in Bosnia.

(4) **Redeployment and Troop Reduction.** This is the UNSYG's real recommendation. The scope of this option is wide. While this option may appear attractive to changing a disintegrating situation in Bosnia, the greatest danger comes from signalling the start of the UNPROFOR withdrawal. Worse case for the US is a Bosnia without UNPROFOR.

The Bosnian government's reaction is likely to be negative to any troop drawdown, especially from the eastern enclaves. When the Dutch replaced the Canadians in Srebrenica, the local population held the Canadians hostage to ensure a one-for-one swap. A related concern for any drawdown is the logistics, movement, and perception problems created during any partial withdrawal. The threat to UN personnel redeploying out of isolated areas could result in the UN requesting a multilateral assisted withdrawal. NATO OPLAN 40104 could come into question.

The risks are too high and the gains too uncertain. The US should support the status quo supporting UNPROFOR under existing mandates. The 19 May CHOD's meeting in The Netherlands will address several options for enhancing UNPROFOR's situation under the existing mandates. The USG should support the outcome of this meeting.

CONCLUSION

The USG should support UNPROFOR under the existing mandates. Maintain the status quo while regaining the initiative. UNPROFOR must pressure both sides in the conflict. This will require US support. We don't want to present the opportunity that could trigger UNPROFOR withdrawal. There is no good "end state" in a post-withdrawal Bosnia. UNPROFOR must remain in Bosnia.

Prepared by: LtCol Tom White, USMC, J-5, EURDIV, X49431, un\unoption.doc

DRAFT

TO BE PROVIDED

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
008b. paper	[duplicate of 005] (4 pages)	05/00/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Drew, Nelson/Bremner, Sue)
OA/Box Number: 696

FOLDER TITLE:

PC/DC [Principals Committee/Deputies Committee] Meetings on Bosnia, May 1995 [2]

2010-0798-F
ke3052

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

TO BE PROVIDED

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