

FOIA MARKER

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Folder Title:

PC/DC [Principals Committee/Deputies Committee] Meetings on Bosnia, May 1995 [1]

Staff Office-Individual:

European Affairs-Drew, Nelson/Bremner, Sue

Original OA/ID Number:

696

Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:	Stack:
33	2	6	1	v

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	Nelson Drew to Anthony Lake, re: May 19 Principals' Meeting on Bosnia (3 pages)	05/18/1995	P1/b(1)
001b. paper	Re: Unanswered Policy Questions Relating to OPLAN 40104 (4 pages)	05/00/1995	P1/b(1)
002. agenda	NSC Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia (1 page)	05/16/1995	P1/b(1)
003. email	Donald Kerrick to APNSA Special Assistants, re: Time for Next Bosnia PC/DC (1 page)	05/10/1995	P1/b(1)
004a. memo	Nelson Drew to Anthony Lake, re: May 23 Principals' Meeting on Bosnia (4 pages)	05/22/1995	P1/b(1)
004b. paper	[duplicate of 001b] (4 pages)	05/00/1995	P1/b(1)
004c. paper	Re: Unanswered Policy Questions on NATO Support for UNPROFOR Withdrawal (4 pages)	05/00/1995	P1/b(1)
004d. paper	Re: Roadmap of remaining OPLAN 40104 requirements (2 pages)	05/17/1995	P1/b(1)
004e. cable	Re: Milosevic Discussions - No Deal (4 pages)	05/22/1995	P1/b(1)
005a. memo	[duplicate of 004a] (4 pages)	05/22/1995	P1/b(1)
005b. paper	[duplicate of 001b] (4 pages)	05/00/1995	P1/b(1)
005c. paper	[duplicate of 004c] (4 pages)	05/00/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Drew, Nelson/Bremner, Sue)
OA/Box Number: 696

FOLDER TITLE:

PC/DC [Principals Committee/Deputies Committee] Meetings on Bosnia, May 1995 [1]

2012-0798-F
ke3051

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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005d. paper	[duplicate of 004d] (2 pages)	05/17/1995	P1/b(1)
006. memo	Nelson Drew to Anthony Lake, re: Update for May 23 Principals' Meeting on Bosnia (2 pages)	05/23/1995	P1/b(1)
007. memo	[duplicate of 006] (2 pages)	05/23/1995	P1/b(1)
008. draft	Draft Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee (3 pages)	05/28/1995	P1/b(1)

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DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

MAY27AG

By KDE NARA, Date 4/10/15

2012-0798-F

NSC PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA

DATE: May 28, 1995

LOCATION: White House Situation Room

TIME: 1:00 - 3:00 p.m.

Agenda

- I. NATO Airstrikes: Next Steps
- II. UNPROFOR Options
 - Options for Strengthening or Reconfiguring UNPROFOR
 - Dealing with the Eastern Enclaves
 - Ways to Engage the Russians
- III. Emergency Withdrawal Planning
- IV. Contact Group Options and Strategy

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Declassify on: OADR

TO: LAKE

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

FROM: DREW
VERSHBOW

DOC DATE: 18 MAY 95
SOURCE REF:

By VDE NARA, Date 04/19/15
2012-0798-F

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
PC

CROATIA

net ND

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: BRIEFING MEMO FOR 19 MAY PC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA

ACTION: NOTED BY LAKE

DUE DATE: 22 MAY 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: DREW

LOGREF: 9520653

FILES: IFM

NSCP:

CODES: BOS CRO

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

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DOC 1 OF 1

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RECORD ID: 9520655

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

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White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

By KDE NARA, Date 04/10/15
2010-0198-F

NSC PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA

DATE: May 19, 1995

LOCATION: White House Situation Room

TIME: 2:30 - 4:30 p.m.

Agenda

I. Future of UNPROFOR

A. Options.....JCS/ALL

B. Diplomatic Strategy Leading to a New UNPROFOR.....State

II. OPLAN 40104 In-Progress Review

A. Post-UNPROFOR Withdrawal Strategy.....State

B. Unanswered Policy Questions.....State ✓

C. Alternatives to NATO-Led Withdrawal.....All

D. Roadmap of remaining OPLAN 40104 requirements...JCS/OSD

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BOSNIA: STRATEGIC CHOICES
NSC DISCUSSION PAPER

Introduction:

We are in a critical period for U.S. policy toward Bosnia that could see the withdrawal of UNPROFOR and the introduction of NATO/U.S. ground forces for a mission whose outcome is uncertain. Now is the time to review the fundamental principles guiding our policy and to determine the steps necessary to shape events before strategic choices are completely dictated by the situation on the ground.

Fundamental U.S. policy objectives for Bosnia:

- Obtain a political settlement that satisfies basic Bosnian government requirements and rolls back some Serb aggression
- End or reduce the fighting
- Prevent spread of conflict to other parts of region
- Maintain relief supplies
- Maintain cohesion with Allies
- Avoid American entanglement in fighting on the ground in the Balkans

Key Strategic Choices:

I. Whither UNPROFOR: U.S. support for continued UNPROFOR presence has been based upon an assessment that this course remains the avenue best suited to the majority of our fundamental objectives -- and that, for all of its problems, the alternatives are worse.

- In the current environment, the viability of UNPROFOR is increasingly being called into question.
 - ◆ UNPROFOR is unable to ensure that humanitarian assistance is delivered to UN-protected areas/safe areas.
 - ◆ Fighting among the warring parties is no longer deterred by UNPROFOR presence.
 - ◆ UNPROFOR itself is frequently the subject of attack, and UNPROFOR forces are neither in a position to defend themselves effectively nor to withstand the possible consequences of calling in NATO airpower.
 - ◆ UNPROFOR credibility is thereby undermined with all parties, and NATO credibility in turn eroded as well.

- Under these circumstances, we must ask whether linking U.S. objectives to continued UNPROFOR presence remains valid in the current environment.
 - ◆ There still do not appear to be any alternatives to UNPROFOR that provide better support for U.S. objectives.
 - ◆ Withdrawal followed by unilateral or predominantly U.S. lift (and strike) risks "Americanizing" the Balkan conflict; even multilateral lift risks widening the scope of the conflict as more external parties move to support regional clients.
 - ◆ Replacement of UNPROFOR with another international presence (NATO? WEU? Coalition of the willing?) would either require U.S. participation on the ground or prove equally ineffective -- and require additional political and financial capital to initiate.
 - ◆ U.S. interests are thus best served by finding a way to restore credibility to the UNPROFOR mission in a manner that permits existing troop contributors to sustain their continued presence and the Bosnian government to agree to retain that presence.
- Options other than withdrawal available for UNPROFOR under the present circumstances:
 - ◆ **Muddle through with the status quo:** French have already indicated likely pullout if current conditions remain unchanged -- may be the thread that unravels the whole fabric of UNPROFOR.
 - ◆ **"Restabilization" of existing UNPROFOR mission with more robust enforcement of existing mandate:** UK avoidance of a confrontational approach in B-H must be overcome if this option is to become viable; additional resources needed to enhance military capabilities of existing UNPROFOR forces not likely to be forthcoming.
 - ◆ **"Retrench and reinvigorate" UNPROFOR mission by withdrawing from untenable positions/missions while pursuing more robust enforcement of remaining mandates:** could be seen as a trade of the eastern enclaves for more effective mission performance around Sarajevo -- implications for eastern enclaves could be very serious; however, this option could satisfy both the French and UK; by retrenching, could also alleviate some of the problems associated with resources to enhance capabilities.
 - ◆ **"Retrench and retreat" by withdrawing and pursuing an even less vigorous approach to mandate enforcement:** the least costly approach, this might be used as a bargaining chip to get the Bosnian Serbs to accede to the conditions for French

forces remaining in UNPROFOR; UK likely to support; however, potentially as damaging to UNPROFOR credibility as the status quo, with the additional public image/moral costs of not only "abandoning" the eastern enclaves, but also "capitulating" in cases where UNPROFOR remains; least likely to be acceptable to Bosnians, who could then refuse to allow continued UNPROFOR presence.

Comment: Only realistic choice may be to seek Allied support to "retrench and reinvigorate". Trade U.S. support for retrenchment for allied and UN pledge to pursue more robust enforcement of remaining mandate, including NATO airstrikes. Fall back to "retrench and retreat" only if no other way to prevent withdrawal.

II. **Whither OPLAN 40104**, given U.S. objective of sustaining UNPROFOR and commitment to assist withdrawal if required?

- There are no guarantees that a viable solution to retaining UNPROFOR in theater can be agreed.
- Withdrawal remains a real, and increasingly likely, option if there is no agreement on a more viable UNPROFOR role.
- Nevertheless, several key issues remain to be resolved before a decision to proceed with withdrawal implementation could be taken with confidence:
 - ♦ **What is the end state we want to leave behind following UNPROFOR withdrawal?** What to avoid may be clearer than what to achieve: avoid merely replacing UN with NATO forces and being unable to leave; avoid debacle of U.S./NATO-led withdrawal being depicted as precursor to brutal ethnic cleansing; avoid loss of NATO credibility to the same extent there has been a loss of UN credibility.
 - ♦ **How does NATO deal with unintended consequences of withdrawal operations?** Massive refugee flow; use of NATO forces as shields by civilians or by warring factions; hostage-taking by warring factions; withdrawal of humanitarian aid providers as a result of UNPROFOR withdrawal.
 - ♦ **Under what conditions could withdrawal or partial withdrawal take place without requiring implementation of OPLAN 40104?** If nations determine that they will accomplish *de facto* withdrawal by merely failing to replace units during normal rotation, no NATO assistance may be necessary. If this resulted in enclaves being left unprotected, would the last forces out require NATO assistance, or could the UN accomplish this on its own?

- The way ahead for OPLAN 40104 is also complicated by a dilemma: we must ensure that our actions in preparation for possible UNPROFOR withdrawal do not precipitate the withdrawal itself.
- ◆ Key is not allowing the existence of a "NATO withdrawal force" to prompt either UN troop contributors to seek early withdrawal or Bosnians to act to cause UNPROFOR withdrawal in the hopes that NATO will replace the UN. **A clear "firebreak" is required between completion of NATO preparation for OPLAN 40104 and initiation of OPLAN implementation.** We must be confident that we understand exactly what steps will be required to get from the present state of NATO planning to this firebreak, and what steps take us beyond it.
- ◆ NATO credibility requires that forces must be trained sufficiently to ensure mission success. ACTREQ requested by SACEUR this week will facilitate identification of forces and training shortfalls, and allow SACEUR to initiate action to rectify those shortfalls. Training in place to NATO standards should be an acceptable alternative to assembling in Europe for training, and send a more restrained signal.
- ◆ Training in place would also permit completion of Congressional consultations prior to movement of any US forces. We may need to lay down marker in NATO that assembly of forces in Europe will require a further political decision.

DRAFT

17 May 1995

FUTURE OF UNPROFOR'S MANDATE OPTIONS REVIEW

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**

BACKGROUND

UNSYG Proposed Options. The UNSYG reported to the UNSC on proposals regarding a needed fundamental review of UNPROFOR's mandate. In light of the deteriorating conditions in Bosnia, UNSYG presented four options:

(1) Maintenance of the status quo;

(2) A more aggressive military posture, including sustained use of air power, with the resulting possibility of a more direct UNPROFOR-BSA confrontation;

(3) Withdrawal from Bosnia

(4) Redeployment and reduction in the number of troops, with necessary modifications to the UNPROFOR mandate.

Boutros Ghali has said publicly that he wants UNPROFOR reduced and redeployed (option 4 above), but advanced these four options. They are assessed below from the perspective of USG policy for AMB Albright in New York.

OPTIONS

(1) *Maintenance of Status Quo.* Boutros Ghali's call for a redeployment and reduction shows the UN's frustration with the status quo, both politically and militarily. But changing the mandates is not the answer. The French and British are tired of being involved in a failed mission. But both know triggering a withdrawal could lead to an UNPROFOR exodus. There is no good "end state" after UNPROFOR leaves. This would be the worst case for the US.

The best case would be a political settlement. Making UNPROFOR more effective is an achievable intermediate step that could eventually create conditions more conducive for the warring parties to reach a settlement.

We don't want the situation to unravel in Bosnia. Supporting changes to the UN mandates would only increase the possibility of an UNPROFOR withdrawal. We need to work with the present mandates and regain the initiative.

Indicators of progress from all warring parties will be needed over the next few months: e. g., progress toward cease-fire, discussion on the CG map, freedom of movement, improvement of resupply, reduction of hostilities, improved communication with the UN, BiH self-restraint in using safe areas, pressure on Bosnia, and Pale more involved in discussions. On the ground we need a more effective UNPROFOR, more liberal ROE, and air attacks.

The French want increased efforts to reach a ceasefire, obtain mutual recognition, and make progress on agreement to the Contact Group plan. The USG may have to begin

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reconsidering somewhat tilting its position in helping to stop the fighting and to promote conditions conducive to a negotiated settlement. The UK has said they are not going to propose withdrawal, nor political maneuvers that would lead us to slip into withdrawal. There are no good "end states" after withdrawal. The French realize this.

US troops should not become involved in Bosnia. That is why UNPROFOR must remain. We must support maintaining the political status quo to avoid triggering withdrawal. An even-handed approach may likely be required. If the choice is between UNPROFOR withdrawing and satisfying Bosnian government desires, the US must support UNPROFOR.

(2) **More Aggressive Military Posture.** Sustained use of air power against the Bosnian Serbs would rapidly expand the conflict, with UNPROFOR viewed as a belligerent. This goes far beyond the CHOD initiative and no UNPROFOR contributor would accept. Not a prudent option.

(3) **Withdrawal from Bosnia.** The US opposes. There is no good answer to an "end state" if UNPROFOR withdraws. UNPROFOR must remain in Bosnia.

(4) **Redeployment and Troop Reduction.** This is the UNSYG's real recommendation. The scope of this option is wide. While this option may appear attractive to changing a disintegrating situation in Bosnia, the greatest danger comes from signalling the start of the UNPROFOR withdrawal. Worse case for the US is a Bosnia without UNPROFOR.

The Bosnian government's reaction is likely to be negative to any troop drawdown, especially from the eastern enclaves. When the Dutch replaced the Canadians in Srebrenica, the local population held the Canadians hostage to ensure a one-for-one swap. A related concern for any drawdown is the logistics, movement, and perception problems created during any partial withdrawal. The threat to UN personnel redeploying out of isolated areas could result in the UN requesting a multilateral assisted withdrawal. NATO OPLAN 40104 could come into question.

The risks are too high and the gains too uncertain. The US should support the status quo supporting UNPROFOR under existing mandates. The 19 May CHOD's meeting in The Netherlands will address several options for enhancing UNPROFOR's situation under the existing mandates. The USG should support the outcome of this meeting.

CONCLUSION

The USG should support UNPROFOR under the existing mandates. Maintain the status quo while regaining the initiative. UNPROFOR must pressure both sides in the conflict. This will require US support. We don't want to present the opportunity that could trigger UNPROFOR withdrawal. There is no good "end state" in a post-withdrawal Bosnia. UNPROFOR must remain in Bosnia.

Prepared by: LtCol Tom White, USMC, J-5, EURDIV, X49431, un\unoption.doc

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 18, 1995

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

By KDE NARA, Date 04/10/15

2012-0198-F

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *AV*

FROM: DON KERRICK⁴²/NELSON DREW *DP*

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia and
Croatia, May 19, 1995

Attached at Tab A is the agenda for the Principals meeting on Bosnia to be held May 19, 1995. The memorandum to the agencies is attached at Tab I.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andy Sens to sign the memorandum to the agencies at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the Agencies

Tab A Agenda

Tab B NSC Discussion Paper

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

By KDE NARA, Date 2/11/01

2012-0798-F

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the U.S. to the UN

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for National
Security and International
Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

MR. LEON PANETTA
Chief of Staff to the President

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL T. R. PATRICK
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (S)

There will be a Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia and Croatia on May 19, 1995, 2:30 p.m. - 4:30 p.m., in the White House Situation Room. Attendance will be Principals only. The agenda is attached at Tab A. An NSC Discussion Paper is at Tab B. (S)

Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachments

Tab A Agenda
Tab B NSC Discussion Paper

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White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

20653

By KDE NARA, Date 04/20/15

2012-098-F

NSC PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA

DATE: May 19, 1995

LOCATION: White House Situation Room

TIME: 2:30 - 4:30 p.m.

Agenda

I. Future of UNPROFOR

A. Options.....JCS/ALL

B. Diplomatic Strategy Leading to a New UNPROFOR.....State

II. OPLAN 40104 In-Progress Review

A. Post-UNPROFOR Withdrawal Strategy.....State

B. Unanswered Policy Questions.....State

C. Alternatives to NATO-Led Withdrawal.....All

D. Roadmap of remaining OPLAN 40104 requirements...JCS/OSD

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Declassify on: OADR

May 17, 1995

BOSNIA: STRATEGIC CHOICES
NSC DISCUSSION PAPER

Introduction:

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 - ◆ Fighting among the warring parties is no longer deterred by UNPROFOR presence.
 - ◆ UNPROFOR itself is frequently the subject of attack, and UNPROFOR forces are neither in a position to defend themselves effectively nor to withstand the possible consequences of calling in NATO airpower.
 - ◆ UNPROFOR credibility is thereby undermined with all parties, and NATO credibility in turn eroded as well.

- Under these circumstances, we must ask whether linking U.S. objectives to continued UNPROFOR presence remains valid in the current environment.
 - ◆ There still do not appear to be any alternatives to UNPROFOR that provide better support for U.S. objectives.
 - ◆ Withdrawal followed by unilateral or predominantly U.S. lift (and strike) risks "Americanizing" the Balkan conflict; even multilateral lift risks widening the scope of the conflict as more external parties move to support regional clients.
 - ◆ Replacement of UNPROFOR with another international presence (NATO? WEU? Coalition of the willing?) would either require U.S. participation on the ground or prove equally ineffective -- and require additional political and financial capital to initiate.
 - ◆ U.S. interests are thus best served by finding a way to restore credibility to the UNPROFOR mission in a manner that permits existing troop contributors to sustain their continued presence and the Bosnian government to agree to retain that presence.
- Options other than withdrawal available for UNPROFOR under the present circumstances:
 - ◆ **Muddle through with the status quo:** French have already indicated likely pullout if current conditions remain unchanged -- may be the thread that unravels the whole fabric of UNPROFOR.
 - ◆ **"Restabilization" of existing UNPROFOR mission with more robust enforcement of existing mandate:** UK avoidance of a confrontational approach in B-H must be overcome if this option is to become viable; additional resources needed to enhance military capabilities of existing UNPROFOR forces not likely to be forthcoming.
 - ◆ **"Retrench and reinvigorate" UNPROFOR mission by withdrawing from untenable positions/missions while pursuing more robust enforcement of remaining mandates:** could be seen as a trade of the eastern enclaves for more effective mission performance around Sarajevo -- implications for eastern enclaves could be very serious; however, this option could satisfy both the French and UK; by retrenching, could also alleviate some of the problems associated with resources to enhance capabilities.
 - ◆ **"Retrench and retreat" by withdrawing and pursuing an even less vigorous approach to mandate enforcement:** the least costly approach, this might be used as a bargaining chip to get the Bosnian Serbs to accede to the conditions for French

forces remaining in UNPROFOR; UK likely to support; however, potentially as damaging to UNPROFOR credibility as the status quo, with the additional public image/moral costs of not only "abandoning" the eastern enclaves, but also "capitulating" in cases where UNPROFOR remains; least likely to be acceptable to Bosnians, who could then refuse to allow continued UNPROFOR presence.

Comment: Only realistic choice may be to seek Allied support to "retrench and reinvigorate". Trade U.S. support for retrenchment for allied and UN pledge to pursue more robust enforcement of remaining mandate, including NATO airstrikes. Fall back to "retrench and retreat" only if no other way to prevent withdrawal.

II. Whither OPLAN 40104, given U.S. objective of sustaining UNPROFOR and commitment to assist withdrawal if required?

- There are no guarantees that a viable solution to retaining UNPROFOR in theater can be agreed.
- Withdrawal remains a real, and increasingly likely, option if there is no agreement on a more viable UNPROFOR role.
- Nevertheless, several key issues remain to be resolved before a decision to proceed with withdrawal implementation could be taken with confidence:
 - ♦ **What is the end state we want to leave behind following UNPROFOR withdrawal?** What to avoid may be clearer than what to achieve: avoid merely replacing UN with NATO forces and being unable to leave; avoid debacle of U.S./NATO-led withdrawal being depicted as precursor to brutal ethnic cleansing; avoid loss of NATO credibility to the same extent there has been a loss of UN credibility.
 - ♦ **How does NATO deal with unintended consequences of withdrawal operations?** Massive refugee flow; use of NATO forces as shields by civilians or by warring factions; hostage-taking by warring factions; withdrawal of humanitarian aid providers as a result of UNPROFOR withdrawal.
 - ♦ **Under what conditions could withdrawal or partial withdrawal take place without requiring implementation of OPLAN 40104?** If nations determine that they will accomplish *de facto* withdrawal by merely failing to replace units during normal rotation, no NATO assistance may be necessary. If this resulted in enclaves being left unprotected, would the last forces out require NATO assistance, or could the UN accomplish this on its own?

- The way ahead for OPLAN 40104 is also complicated by a dilemma: we must ensure that our actions in preparation for possible UNPROFOR withdrawal do not precipitate the withdrawal itself.
- ♦ Key is not allowing the existence of a "NATO withdrawal force" to prompt either UN troop contributors to seek early withdrawal or Bosnians to act to cause UNPROFOR withdrawal in the hopes that NATO will replace the UN. **A clear "firebreak" is required between completion of NATO preparation for OPLAN 40104 and initiation of OPLAN implementation.** We must be confident that we understand exactly what steps will be required to get from the present state of NATO planning to this firebreak, and what steps take us beyond it.
- ♦ NATO credibility requires that forces must be trained sufficiently to ensure mission success. ACTREQ requested by SACEUR this week will facilitate identification of forces and training shortfalls, and allow SACEUR to initiate action to rectify those shortfalls. Training in place to NATO standards should be an acceptable alternative to assembling in Europe for training, and send a more restrained signal.
- ♦ Training in place would also permit completion of Congressional consultations prior to movement of any US forces. We may need to lay down marker in NATO that assembly of forces in Europe will require a further political decision.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

White House Guidelines,

May 12, 1995

September 11, 2006

By KOE NARA, Date 5/15/15

2012-0718-F

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW for C

FROM: DON KERRICK D

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia and
Croatia, May 16, 1995

Attached at Tab A is the agenda for the Principals meeting on Bosnia and Croatia to be held May 16, 1995. The memorandum to the agencies is attached at Tab I.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the meeting and authorize Andy Sens to sign the memorandum to the agencies at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the Agencies

Tab A Agenda

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D C 20506

20611

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

By VOE NARA, Date 04/10/15

2012-098-F

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the U.S. to the UN

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for National
Security and International
Affairs

Office of Management and Budget

MR. LEON PANETTA
Chief of Staff to the President

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL T. R. PATRICK
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia (S)

There will be a Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia and Croatia on May 16, 1995, 2:30 p.m. - 3:30 p.m., in the White House Situation Room. Attendance will be Principals only. The agenda is attached at Tab A. (S)

Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Agenda

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. agenda	NSC Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia (1 page)	05/16/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Drew, Nelson/Bremner, Sue)
OA/Box Number: 696

FOLDER TITLE:

PC/DC [Principals Committee/Deputies Committee] Meetings on Bosnia, May 1995 [1]

2012-0798-F
ke3051

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003. email	Donald Kerrick to APNSA Special Assistants, re: Time for Next Bosnia PC/DC (1 page)	05/10/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Drew, Nelson/Bremner, Sue)
OA/Box Number: 696

FOLDER TITLE:

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2012-0798-F
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004a. memo	Nelson Drew to Anthony Lake, re: May 23 Principals' Meeting on Bosnia (4 pages)	05/22/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Drew, Nelson/Bremner, Sue)
OA/Box Number: 696

FOLDER TITLE:

PC/DC [Principals Committee/Deputies Committee] Meetings on Bosnia, May 1995 [1]

2012-0798-F
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DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

20661

By KDE NARA, Date 04/10/15
2012-0728-F

NSC PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA

DATE: May 23, 1995

LOCATION: White House Situation Room

TIME: 2:30 - 4:00 p.m.

Agenda

I. OPLAN 40104 In-Progress Review

- A. Post-UNPROFOR Withdrawal Strategy.....State
- B. Unanswered Policy Questions.....State
- C. Alternatives to NATO-Led Withdrawal.....OSD
- D. Roadmap of remaining OPLAN 40104 requirements.....JCS
- E. Legislative Strategy for OPLAN 40104 Approval.....NSC

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Post-UN Peace Forces Withdrawal Strategy

While U.S. strategy continues to be based on the premise that UN Peace Forces should remain in Bosnia, Croatia, and Macedonia, pressure is mounting for withdrawal before the next winter should attempts to strengthen UN Peace Forces militarily and to reach a political settlement with Milosevic fail. That potential withdrawal could occur in an environment ranging from completely hostile to totally benign. While post-withdrawal strategy would certainly be affected by the environment in which withdrawal were to be conducted, five broad alternatives appear to cover the range of strategic options:

1. U.S. unilateral support for Bosnia;
2. Multilateral support for Bosnia;
3. Support for a follow-on multilateral peacekeeping force;
4. Continued/Enhanced Peace Forces Mission in Macedonia; and
5. Benign neglect.

U.S. Unilateral Support for Bosnia: This is a variation of *lift, train, arm, and/or strike*. The objective would be to protect and preserve the territorial integrity of Bosnia through direct military and political assistance. Interest in lifting the arms embargo would certainly grow following a withdrawal of UN Peace Forces. Training and arming the Bosnian Government forces would constitute a major commitment on the part of the U.S. to level the battlefield and would likely be based on the premise that such a step was a prerequisite to reaching a negotiated settlement. The conflict's fighting would likely intensify in the near-term. Taking the next step--strike--unequivocally Americanizes the war and could easily lead to a significant U.S. combat ground force commitment.

Multilateral Support for Bosnia: Includes efforts on the part of the U.S. to achieve a multilateral lifting of the arms embargo. This course of action would be far less divisive among our NATO allies than the go-it-alone approach above but would be difficult to cobble. Part of that difficulty stems from different evaluations of the warring parties and the strategic and moral interests at stake.. Part is also due to a certain war weariness stemming not only from the current four years of war but also from the Balkans long history of hatred and conflict and the cost in lives and material of continued international involvement in an apparently never-ending struggle.

Support for a Multilateral Peacekeeping Force: This follow-on force to UN Peace Forces could either be a NATO-based force that remained in place after UN Peace Forces withdrawal or it could be an Islamic-dominated force. In either case what is implied is that some of the existing force structures do not depart. In the former, NATO

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elects to remain after effecting or during withdrawal. Such a force would be under NATO command and control and and ROE. Thus, the problems of dual-key would be eliminated. The opportunity for more robust use of international force would increase, provided that NATO could reach consensus for action-a proviso of considerable importance. The latter would imply that some UN Peace Force contributing countries (most likely Islamic countries) elected to remain in place. A force composed principally of Islamic nations would likely not be even-handed in its approach to the conflict.

Continued/Enhanced Peace Forces Mission in Macedonia: Objective is to contain the conflict and prevent its spillover to areas outside Bosnia and Croatia. While it would be difficult to ignore the humanitarian tragedies associated with war in Croatia and/or Bosnia, this course of action would focus attention on the principal strategic interest in the region--containment of the conflict. Mission in Macedonia may or may not suffice to contain the conflict at all its possible flashpoints. Finding the right force mix and sustaining it over time to the benefit of the region's and Macedonia's stability is problematic.

Benign Neglect: This option implies total withdrawal of the international peacekeeping community from the region. Such a walk-away would be difficult given the current level of international involvement. To argue that what was going on did not matter anymore--that it was not worth the cost--would be a tough sell to many domestic markets. Ethnic cleansing, genocide, and cross-border aggression have all been labels used to describe events in the Balkans. To walk-away strategy implies appeasement.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004b. paper	[duplicate of 001b] (4 pages)	05/00/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Drew, Nelson/Bremner, Sue)
OA/Box Number: 696

FOLDER TITLE:

PC/DC [Principals Committee/Deputies Committee] Meetings on Bosnia, May 1995 [1]

2012-0798-F
ke3051

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004c. paper	Re: Unanswered Policy Questions on NATO Support for UNPROFOR Withdrawal (4 pages)	05/00/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Drew, Nelson/Bremner, Sue)
OA/Box Number: 696

FOLDER TITLE:

PC/DC [Principals Committee/Deputies Committee] Meetings on Bosnia, May 1995 [1]

2012-0798-F
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PER E.O. 13526UN FORCES IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA:
ALTERNATIVES TO NATO-LED WITHDRAWAL (S)

ISSUE (S): Given that the preferred option is to have UNPROFOR/UNCRO remain in place and succeed in their mission, what alternatives to a NATO-led withdrawal exist if the forces must be withdrawn?

OPTIONS (S):

- "40104": NATO-led withdrawal, as envisioned in OPLAN 40104
- "Coalition": Non-NATO, coalition-led withdrawal (WEU, UN troop contributors, or other ad hoc coalition)
- "Unilateral": Capable single nation (UK, FR?) withdraws own forces without coordination with allies or UN
- "Backup": UN-led, NATO (or other coalition)-supported, withdrawal
- "Unassisted": Withdrawal en masse, directed and conducted by UN
- "Attrition": Gradual drawdown of UN forces, managed by UN and tied to rotation dates of contributing nations tempered by tactical situation

KEY FACTORS (S):

- Practicality: Are the resources available to do it?
- Safety/security of UN forces during and after withdrawal
- Impact on military/political situation among the warring factions
- Humanitarian concerns
- NATO solidarity, US leadership of the alliance

DISCUSSION (S):

- **Risk of Casualties:** Withdrawal of UN forces without the ability to militarily dominate the warring factions during the withdrawal risks aggression against the forces and potential heavy casualties, especially in the most hotly contested areas (enclaves, pockets, corridors and lines of confrontation). Avoiding UN casualties will require a force perceived by the combatants as willing and capable of protecting the withdrawing forces.
- **UN Limitations:** UN military command structure, rules of engagement, mission, and force capabilities do not admit the robust self-defense needed to withdraw safely. Strengthening the force is likely to remain politically elusive.
- **Lighter Options:** Both SACEUR and CJCS have considered lighter, quicker, on-call options to provide backup support for an unassisted withdrawal. Both have rejected the approach as lacking unity of command, providing insufficient force to deter aggression and lacking responsiveness to protect the withdrawing forces.
- **Longer View:** While we have few US troops at risk, the future of NATO as the alliance of record in Europe and, especially, the US position as the leader of NATO and a central player in European security will be badly damaged if we decline to lead in this instance. If this operation happens without the US or NATO, we lose.

CONCLUSION (S): If UN withdraws, NATO-led "40104" is the least bad approach.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004d. paper	Re: Roadmap of remaining OPLAN 40104 requirements (2 pages)	05/17/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Drew, Nelson/Bremner, Sue)
OA/Box Number: 696

FOLDER TITLE:

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2012-0798-F
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004e. cable	Re: Milosevic Discussions - No Deal (4 pages)	05/22/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Drew, Nelson/Bremner, Sue)
OA/Box Number: 696

FOLDER TITLE:

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2012-0798-F
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005a. memo	[duplicate of 004a] (4 pages)	05/22/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Drew, Nelson/Bremner, Sue)
OA/Box Number: 696

FOLDER TITLE:

PC/DC [Principals Committee/Deputies Committee] Meetings on Bosnia, May 1995 [1]

2012-0798-F
ke3051

RESTRICTION CODES

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White House Guidelines,

20661

September 11, 2006

By VDE NARA, Date 04/10/15
2012-0798-F

NSC PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA

DATE: May 23, 1995

LOCATION: White House Situation Room

TIME: 2:30 - 4:00 p.m.

Agenda

I. OPLAN 40104 In-Progress Review

- A. Post-UNPROFOR Withdrawal Strategy.....State
- B. Unanswered Policy Questions.....State
- C. Alternatives to NATO-Led Withdrawal.....OSD
- D. Roadmap of remaining OPLAN 40104 requirements.....JCS
- E. Legislative Strategy for OPLAN 40104 Approval.....NSC

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Post-UN Peace Forces Withdrawal Strategy

While U.S. strategy continues to be based on the premise that UN Peace Forces should remain in Bosnia, Croatia, and Macedonia, pressure is mounting for withdrawal before the next winter should attempts to strengthen UN Peace Forces militarily and to reach a political settlement with Milosevic fail. That potential withdrawal could occur in an environment ranging from completely hostile to totally benign. While post-withdrawal strategy would certainly be affected by the environment in which withdrawal were to be conducted, five broad alternatives appear to cover the range of strategic options:

1. U.S. unilateral support for Bosnia;
2. Multilateral support for Bosnia;
3. Support for a follow-on multilateral peacekeeping force;
4. Continued/Enhanced Peace Forces Mission in Macedonia; and
5. Benign neglect.

U.S. Unilateral Support for Bosnia: This is a variation of *lift, train, arm, and/or strike*. The objective would be to protect and preserve the territorial integrity of Bosnia through direct military and political assistance. Interest in lifting the arms embargo would certainly grow following a withdrawal of UN Peace Forces. Training and arming the Bosnian Government forces would constitute a major commitment on the part of the U.S. to level the battlefield and would likely be based on the premise that such a step was a prerequisite to reaching a negotiated settlement. The conflict's fighting would likely intensify in the near-term. Taking the next step--strike--unequivocally Americanizes the war and could easily lead to a significant U.S. combat ground force commitment.

Multilateral Support for Bosnia: Includes efforts on the part of the U.S. to achieve a multilateral lifting of the arms embargo. This course of action would be far less divisive among our NATO allies than the go-it-alone approach above but would be difficult to cobble. Part of that difficulty stems from different evaluations of the warring parties and the strategic and moral interests at stake.. Part is also due to a certain war weariness stemming not only from the current four years of war but also from the Balkans long history of hatred and conflict and the cost in lives and material of continued international involvement in an apparently never-ending struggle.

Support for a Multilateral Peacekeeping Force: This follow-on force to UN Peace Forces could either be a NATO-based force that remained in place after UN Peace Forces withdrawal or it could be an Islamic-dominated force. In either case what is implied is that some of the existing force structures do not depart. In the former, NATO

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elects to remain after effecting or during withdrawal. Such a force would be under NATO command and control and and ROE. Thus, the problems of dual-key would be eliminated. The opportunity for more robust use of international force would increase, provided that NATO could reach consensus for action-a proviso of considerable importance. The latter would imply that some UN Peace Force contributing countries (most likely Islamic countries) elected to remain in place. A force composed principally of Islamic nations would likely not be even-handed in its approach to the conflict.

Continued/Enhanced Peace Forces Mission in Macedonia: Objective is to contain the conflict and prevent its spillover to areas outside Bosnia and Croatia. While it would be difficult to ignore the humanitarian tragedies associated with war in Croatia and/or Bosnia, this course of action would focus attention on the principal strategic interest in the region--containment of the conflict. Mission in Macedonia may or may not suffice to contain the conflict at all its possible flashpoints. Finding the right force mix and sustaining it over time to the benefit of the region's and Macedonia's stability is problematic.

Benign Neglect: This option implies total withdrawal of the international peacekeeping community from the region. Such a walk-away would be difficult given the current level of international involvement. To argue that what was going on did not matter anymore--that it was not worth the cost--would be a tough sell to many domestic markets. Ethnic cleansing, genocide, and cross-border aggression have all been labels used to describe events in the Balkans. To walk-away strategy implies appeasement.

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005b. paper	[duplicate of 001b] (4 pages)	05/00/1995	P1/b(1)

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2012-0798-F
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005c. paper	[duplicate of 004c] (4 pages)	05/00/1995	P1/b(1)

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2012-0798-F
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PER E.O. 13526UN FORCES IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA:
ALTERNATIVES TO NATO-LED WITHDRAWAL (S)

ISSUE (S): Given that the preferred option is to have UNPROFOR/UNCRO remain in place and succeed in their mission, what alternatives to a NATO-led withdrawal exist if the forces must be withdrawn?

OPTIONS (S):

- "40104": NATO-led withdrawal, as envisioned in OPLAN 40104
- "Coalition": Non-NATO, coalition-led withdrawal (WEU, UN troop contributors, or other ad hoc coalition)
- "Unilateral": Capable single nation (UK, FR?) withdraws own forces without coordination with allies or UN
- "Backup": UN-led, NATO (or other coalition)-supported, withdrawal
- "Unassisted": Withdrawal en masse, directed and conducted by UN
- "Attrition": Gradual drawdown of UN forces, managed by UN and tied to rotation dates of contributing nations tempered by tactical situation

KEY FACTORS (S):

- Practicality: Are the resources available to do it?
- Safety/security of UN forces during and after withdrawal
- Impact on military/political situation among the warring factions
- Humanitarian concerns
- NATO solidarity, US leadership of the alliance

DISCUSSION (S):

- Risk of Casualties: Withdrawal of UN forces without the ability to militarily dominate the warring factions during the withdrawal risks aggression against the forces and potential heavy casualties, especially in the most hotly contested areas (enclaves, pockets, corridors and lines of confrontation). Avoiding UN casualties will require a force perceived by the combatants as willing and capable of protecting the withdrawing forces.
- UN Limitations: UN military command structure, rules of engagement, mission, and force capabilities do not admit the robust self-defense needed to withdraw safely. Strengthening the force is likely to remain politically elusive.
- Lighter Options: Both SACEUR and CJCS have considered lighter, quicker, on-call options to provide backup support for an unassisted withdrawal. Both have rejected the approach as lacking unity of command, providing insufficient force to deter aggression and lacking responsiveness to protect the withdrawing forces.
- Longer View: While we have few US troops at risk, the future of NATO as the alliance of record in Europe and, especially, the US position as the leader of NATO and a central player in European security will be badly damaged if we decline to lead in this instance. If this operation happens without the US or NATO, we lose.

CONCLUSION (S): If UN withdraws, NATO-led "40104" is the least bad approach.

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005d. paper	[duplicate of 004d] (2 pages)	05/17/1995	P1/b(1)

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006. memo	Nelson Drew to Anthony Lake, re: Update for May 23 Principals' Meeting on Bosnia (2 pages)	05/23/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

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007. memo	[duplicate of 006] (2 pages)	05/23/1995	P1/b(1)

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PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MEETING

May 23, 1995
2:30 - 4:30 p.m.
Situation Room

Chair
Anthony Lake

OVP
Leon Fuerth

State
Secretary Christopher
(Robert Frasure is out of town)

DOD
Secretary Perry

OMB
Gordon Adams

USUN
Madeleine Albright

COS
Leon Panetta

CIA
John Deutch

JCS
Admiral William Owens

White House
Sandy Berger
Nancy Soderberg

NSC
Sandy Vershbow

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
008. draft	Draft Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee (3 pages)	05/28/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Drew, Nelson/Bremner, Sue)
OA/Box Number: 696

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