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Folder Title:

PC/DC [Principals Committee/Deputies Committee] Meetings on Bosnia, April 1995 [4]

Staff Office-Individual:

European Affairs-Drew, Nelson/Bremner, Sue

Original OA/ID Number:

696

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33	2	6	1	v

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. fax	Fax Coversheet [partial] (1 page)	04/00/1995	b(7)(C)
002a. memo	Alexander Vershbow to Anthony Lake, re: Carter Redux (1 page)	04/06/1995	P1/b(1)
002b. memo	Robert Frasure to the Secretary of State, re: A Conversation with Carter on Bosnia (2 pages)	04/05/1995	P1/b(1)
003a. memo	Don Kerrick to Anthony Lake, re: Issue Sheet: Extending Sanctions Relief for FRY (4 pages)	04/14/1995	P1/b(1)
003b. report	Re: Inter-Serbian Sanctions: Assessment #6 [partial] (11 pages)	04/13/1995	P1/b(1)
003c. paper	Re: The End of the Second Hundred Days: Strategy and Options (4 pages)	04/00/1995	P1/b(1)
004a. memo	Alexander Vershbow to Anthony Lake, re: Contact Group's Final Offer to Milosevic (2 pages)	04/04/1995	P1/b(1)
004b. paper	Re: Contact Group Proposals (2 pages)	04/00/1995	P1/b(1)
004c. fax	Fax Coversheet [partial] (1 page)		P3/b(3)
005. memo	Richard Clarke to the Peacekeeping Core Group, re: 14 April Meeting Conclusions (2 pages)	04/14/1995	P1/b(1)
006. fax	Fax Coversheet [partial] (1 page)	04/00/1995	b(7)(C)
007. note	Handwritten notes from Principals Committee meeting (15 pages)	04/14/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Drew, Nelson/Bremner, Sue)
OA/Box Number: 696

FOLDER TITLE:

PC/DC [Principals Committee/Deputies Committee] Meetings on Bosnia, April 1995 [4]

2012-0798-F

ke3050

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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RECORD ID: 9520423
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TO: AGENCIES

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White House Guidelines,

FROM: SENS

September 11, 2006

DOC DATE: 06 APR 95

SOURCE REF:

By KDE NARA, Date 2/12/11
2012-0708-F

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
PC

CROATIA
AGENDA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA OF 14 APR PC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA

ACTION: DOHSE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DUE DATE: 07 APR 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK

LOGREF:

FILES: IFG

NSCP:

CODES: BOS CRO

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BERGER
JOSHI
KERRICK
KRECKO
LAKE
NSC CHRON
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VERSHBOW
WOLIN

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DOC 2 OF 2

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 LAKE
001
002

Z 95040419 FOR DECISION
X 95040610 LAKE APPROVED RECOM
X 95040610 DOHSE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

002 950406 FUERTH, L
002 950406 BRILL, K
002 950406 ADAMS, G
002 950406 PANETTA, L
002 950406 MCALEER, R
002 950406 INDERFURTH, K
002 950406 GARTHOFF, D
002 950406 PATRICK, T

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OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS

Initials: YDE Date: 04/08/15

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

2012-098-F

LOG 9520423
DATE 06 APR 95

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA OF 14 APR PC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA LARRY BRANSCUM ROOM 290, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>1</u> _____
MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>1</u> _____
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>1</u> _____
MR. LEON E. PANETTA WHITE HOUSE 1ST FLOOR, WEST WING WASHINGTON, DC 20500	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>1</u> _____

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC SECRETARIAT, ROOM 379 OEOB
PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

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001. fax	Fax Coversheet [partial] (1 page)	04/00/1995	b(7)(C)

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2012-0798-F
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TIME OF TRANSMISSION

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Initials: VDE Date: 0410915

2012-0718-F

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☐ IMMEDIATE
☐ PRIORITY
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RELEASER: _____

DATE/TIME: _____

MESSAGE #: _____

Log # 20423

FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: Notice of Meeting PAGES: 3

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
<u>USUN New York</u>	<u>Mr. Rick Inderfurth</u>	<u>212-415-4016</u>	<u>(b)(7)c</u>

[001]

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

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SITUATION ROOM**

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(PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Notification & Agenda For PC MTG ON
BOSNIA & Croatia NSC LOG # 20423

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

rec'd 4/5 2:38pm
National Security Council
The White House

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LOG # 20423

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SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

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Dohse			
Sens			
Soderberg	copy		
Berger	2	mk	
rtu Lake	3	Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	5		D
NSC Secretariat			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: _____

COMMENTS:

14
Apr 17 PC mtg on
Bosnia + Croatia

Exec Sec Office has diskette _____

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

20423

WASHINGTON, D C. 20506

April 6, 1995

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

By VDE NARA, Date 04/09/15
2012-0798-F

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for National
Security & International
Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the U.S. to the UN


MR. LEON PANETTA
Chief of Staff to the
President

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. T. R. PATRICK
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia ~~(S)~~

There will be a Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia and Croatia on Friday, April 14, 1995, 2:30 - 4:00 p.m., in the White House Situation Room. Attendance will be Principals only. The agenda is attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~


Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Agenda

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

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20423

Meeting of NSC Principals Committee
on Bosnia and Croatia
Friday, April 14, 1995
2:30-4:00 p.m.

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

White House Situation Room

By KDE NARA, Date 04/09/11

2012-0708-F

AGENDA

I. Diplomatic Strategy

- A. Contact Group Status/Next Steps.....State
- B. Next Steps following Passage of UNSC
Resolutions on UNPROFOR.....State*

II. OPLAN 40104 Approval Process

- A. Next Steps on NATO Prepositioning - Step Two JCS
(Mini/Maxi Options) and Beyond.....~~State~~*
- B. NATO/U.S. Decision Timeline for OPLAN 40104.....JCS*
-- Strategy for Briefing President and Gaining
Congressional Authorization for
Appropriation.....OSD*/JCS

III. Preventing or Containing Renewed Fighting in Bosnia

- A. Diplomatic Strategy.....State*
- B. Strategy/Options for Strengthening
UNPROFOR.....JCS*/OSD/State

* Paper Due 12:00 Noon April 13.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20423

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

April 4, 1995

By KDE NARA, Date 04/09/15
2012-0798-F

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *W*

FROM: DON KERRICK *(D)*

SUBJECT: Principals Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia,
~~April 7, 1995~~ April 14, 1995

Attached at Tab A is the agenda for the Principals' meeting on Bosnia and Croatia to be held ~~April 7, 1995~~. The memorandum to the agencies is attached at Tab I. April 14, 1995

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the meeting and authorize Andy Sens to sign the memorandum to the agencies at Tab I.

Approve *W* Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the Agencies
Tab A Agenda

~~SECRET~~

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002a. memo	Alexander Vershbow to Anthony Lake, re: Carter Redux (1 page)	04/06/1995	P1/b(1)

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002b. memo	Robert Frasure to the Secretary of State, re: A Conversation with Carter on Bosnia (2 pages)	04/05/1995	P1/b(1)

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JIMMY CARTER

April 4, 1995

To President Alija Izetbegovic

I have of course been following closely the developments in Bosnia-Herzegovina since my visit there in December, which concluded with my phone call to you from Sarajevo airport. I was heartened by the rapidity with which a cease-fire and then a cessation of hostilities agreement were reached by the beginning of the new year.

Nonetheless, I had hoped more headway could have been made by now in resuming negotiations along the lines suggested by the Contact Group. As you know, Ambassadors Marion Creakmore and Harry Barnes have been in touch periodically with Vice President Ganic to stay informed about your government's views, and of course we have also been talking with the U.S. government, the UN and Dr. Karadzic. We have also followed the discussions with President Milosevic regarding recognition of Bosnia and Croatia. I realize that the developments in Croatia have complicated the situation for the UN and that there is still much to do before that matter is worked out. With regard to the recognition of Bosnia, I understand President Milosevic has not been very forthcoming.

It is increasingly doubtful that the efforts of the Contact Group to orchestrate direct and good faith peace talks at this stage will be successful.

I have been particularly disheartened by the increase in fighting during the last few weeks in Bosnia--even while the cessation of hostilities agreement is still in effect. Without going into details on specifics here, I had hoped that both sides would have been able to show still more restraint.

I have not given up hope that peace can come to Bosnia. Hence I was reassured by some statements in your speech of March 27 on the current situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Page 2

I have in mind especially your renewed commitment to democracy and your stress on the need not to miss any chance for peace, because you believe that the war must not last a single day longer than is necessary.


That encourages me to believe that The Carter Center may again be able to be of some use in finding ways to restart meaningful negotiations. At the beginning of your speech, you stated that a future federal organization is possible and desirable. That being the case, I believe that a fruitful path might now be to focus on the basic principles of such an organization. I understand that the Contact Group had provided you with a paper last spring on "Some Possible Elements for a Constitution for Bosnia and Herzegovina" which might be a possible subject for discussion.

What I have in mind are quiet and private meetings with you, and also with Dr. Karadzic. This would permit us to explore, without any public statements, a range of new approaches that might prevent a return to bloody hostilities and lead to a permanent resolution of the existing differences and the creation of a federal structure acceptable to all groups within Bosnia-Herzegovina. Any beneficial ideas that are developed would then be shared with the U.S. and other governments represented in the Contact Group, as a basis for further peace efforts.

I would be glad to return to Bosnia-Herzegovina for these visits, again representing The Carter Center. I would do so only with the knowledge and approval of American officials.

I have asked Ambassador Harry Barnes to ascertain your response to this suggestion. I am sending a similar letter and request to Dr. Karadzic. I fervently hope that the two of you will accept my proposal. I would also hope that both of you will take the necessary steps to ensure that the cessation of hostilities agreement is observed for the rest of the month.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter



JIMMY CARTER

April 4, 1995

To Dr. Radovan Karadzic

As you know, I have been following closely the developments in Bosnia-Herzegovina since my visit there in December at your invitation. I was heartened by the rapidity with which a cease-fire and then a cessation of hostilities agreement were reached by the beginning of the new year.

Nonetheless, as you know from our phone conversation in late January, I had hoped more headway could have been made by now in resuming negotiations along the lines suggested by the Contact Group. Then somewhat later I had sent you the draft of a message I would have been prepared to send you more formally. My conviction has always been that it is critically important to get the peace talks started. In the ensuing weeks, Ambassadors Creekmore and Barnes and their colleagues have stayed in touch regularly with Dr. Djordjevic and Mr. Hanley. We have of course kept in close contact with the U.S. government, the UN, and with Professor Ganic. In addition, we have followed the discussions with President Milosevic regarding recognition of Bosnia and Croatia. I realize that the developments in Croatia have complicated the situation for the UN and that there is still much to do before that matter is worked out.

I have been particularly disheartened by the increase in fighting during the last few weeks in Bosnia itself--even while the cessation of hostilities agreement is still in effect. Without going into details on specifics here, I had hoped that both sides would have been able to show still more restraint.

It is increasingly doubtful that the efforts of the Contact Group to orchestrate direct and good faith peace talks at this stage will be successful.

Page 2

You had written me most recently on March 9 and encouraged me to resume my mission. As was indicated to you at the time through Dr. Djordjevic, I was reluctant to reply until I had a much clearer sense of what the Contact Group was prepared to do next, and particularly of course the U.S. government. I now think I have a reasonable understanding of those factors.

First of all, you should know that I have not given up hope that peace can come to Bosnia. It was that hope that led me to accept your invitation to come to Pale. Hence I was reassured by some statements in your letter. I have in mind especially your renewed assertion that you wish to resolve the conflict by peaceful means and not by violence, and that you are ready to negotiate on the basis of equitable and balanced arrangements. I understand from Dr. Djordjevic that you have sought to limit the military actions on your side.

These factors encourage me to believe that The Carter Center may again be able to be of some use in finding ways to restart meaningful negotiations. On several occasions during our talks in Pale, you stated that you were in agreement with the idea of a future organizational arrangement made up of two entities. That being the case, I believe that a possible path might now be to focus on the principles of such an organization. I understand that you have seen a paper prepared last spring on "Some Possible Elements for a Constitution for Bosnia and Herzegovina" which might be a possible subject for discussion.


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I have asked Ambassador Harry Barnes to ascertain your response to this suggestion. I am sending a similar letter and request to President Izetbegovic. I fervently hope that the two of you will accept my proposal. I would also hope that both of you will take the necessary steps to ensure that the cessation of hostilities agreement is observed for the rest of the month.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Jimmy Carter". The signature is written in dark ink on a white background. The first name "Jimmy" is written in a large, flowing cursive, and the last name "Carter" is written in a slightly smaller, more compact cursive. The signature is positioned below the word "Sincerely,".

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003b. report	Re: Inter-Serbian Sanctions: Assessment #6 [partial] (11 pages)	04/13/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Drew, Nelson/Bremner, Sue)
OA/Box Number: 696

FOLDER TITLE:

PC/DC [Principals Committee/Deputies Committee] Meetings on Bosnia, April 1995 [4]

2012-0798-F
ke3050

RESTRICTION CODES

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Intelligence Report

DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force

13 April 1995

Inter-Serbian Sanctions: Assessment #6

Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic continues to support sanctions against the Bosnian Serbs in hopes of isolating Bosnian Serb President Radovan Karadzic and of getting sanctions on Serbia and Montenegro (FRY) lifted. Milosevic apparently is allowing limited resupply to the Bosnian Serb Army (BSA) so the BSA is not prevented from holding its own against the Bosnian Army.

Activity since mid-January at internationally monitored border crossings suggests that the embargo and winter weather have held shipments across the Serbia-Bosnia border to below pre-August levels, when the embargo was imposed. Since mid-February enforcement overall has deteriorated from the levels noted in late December, which suggests that the Bosnian Serbs are increasingly obtaining embargoed goods and that the VJ is supplying the BSA. In addition to those crossing the Serbia-Bosnia border, other goods are reaching the Bosnian Serbs through Croatia, a large potential loophole that probably is the largest conduit for fuel to the Bosnian Serbs.

Because the embargo has reduced the amount of goods crossing the Serbia-Bosnia border, it has imposed some pain on Pale's civilian economy, particularly its financial and industrial sectors. There are no indications that the embargo has had a serious impact on the BSA's capabilities, even with some spot shortages reported. The BSA seems largely self-sufficient in logistics capability, except for fuel and some munitions. [redacted] the Bosnian Serb network to acquire critical munitions is still in operation, and Pale probably has used the current cease-fire to resupply its forces.

~~Top Secret~~

Milosevic Keeping Pressure on Karadzic With Sanctions

Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic continues to support sanctions against the Bosnian Serbs. He probably has determined that he has few other means for pressuring and isolating Bosnian Serb President Radovan Karadzic. Milosevic also hopes that the West will respond by dropping sanctions on Serbia and Montenegro (FRY). Another former source of political pressure, the dissident group of Bosnian Serb assembly members who are aligned with Milosevic, apparently has lost its impetus to pressure Karadzic, [redacted] So far, Milosevic has not forced Karadzic to accept a peace plan Belgrade likes, nor has he significantly weakened him with sanctions. Nevertheless, Karadzic may now be feeling some pressure after eight months of sanctions. [redacted] Milosevic's pressure will continue to grow as will internal pressure from the constant shortage of essentials. [redacted]

Milosevic probably does not intend for the embargo to prevent the Bosnian Serb Army (BSA) from holding its own against the Bosnian Army. Moreover, his allowing some assistance to the BSA appeases the leadership of the Yugoslav Army, which generally opposes Milosevic's blockade of the Bosnian Serbs. As a consequence, he is apparently allowing limited resupply to the BSA so long as it serves Serbian political aims and the activity can be plausibly denied.

This memorandum was prepared by analysts of the DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force. The report was requested by Leon Fuerth, Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs, to provide information on Serbia's sanctions against the Bosnian Serbs. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force [redacted]

~~Top Secret~~

Shipments Across FRY-Bosnia Border Remain Restricted

[redacted] suggests that Belgrade's embargo and winter weather have held shipments across the Serbia-Bosnia border to levels below those observed before the embargo was imposed in August. *The presence of the monitors from the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY) at most of the border crossings capable of handling large quantities of goods has inhibited major violations of the embargo.* In particular, [redacted] only one large-scale fuel shipment attempted since 30 December, suggesting that Belgrade has largely shut off such shipments across the Bosnian border. [redacted]

In response to ICFY requests since January, FRY officials implemented measures that have helped restrict shipments. *As it did in late December 1994, Belgrade recently addressed major problems with an eye toward the United Nations review on lifting sanctions on the FRY scheduled for April.*

- Customs officers increased the number and thoroughness of bus inspections at many of the major border crossings, but implementation has been inconsistent. [redacted] As a result of their auto and bus inspections, Yugoslav officials at the border have regularly confiscated or turned back unauthorized shipments of fuel, construction materials, agricultural supplies, clothing, and livestock. [redacted] During February, for example, officials confiscated 26 tons of fuel and 19 tons of fertilizer, but [redacted] suggests that similar amounts of fuel were turned back from the border but not confiscated. In March, a patrol reportedly confiscated about 80 tons of fuel from four trucks using hidden tanks.
- Yugoslav officials have taken steps to reduce the use of some minor crossings and havens discovered by ICFY monitors. [redacted]
[redacted]
- On 13 March, ICFY protested to FRY officials about buses loaded with soldiers transiting the border. [redacted] Belgrade promised to take immediate action, and there have been no subsequent confirmed transits of troops.
- ICFY [redacted] stopped 24-hour monitoring at the Jamena ferry crossing after the FRY had erected barricades in response to ICFY's request.

~~Top Secret~~

- Serbia also has cooperated with ICFY at Priboj and Uzice in inspecting and sealing Yugoslav trains that transit Bosnia, including freight cars on passenger trains.
- In March, Serbian postal officials were checking packages for prohibited goods, [redacted]
- On 27 March, Customs Director Kertes agreed to improve controls on loading Yugoslav Red Cross (YRC) trucks to ensure that only approved goods were included in the shipments. [redacted] unidentified FRY officials were pressuring them to allow YRC vehicles to be used to move unauthorized goods into Bosnia. [redacted]

Belgrade also has imposed more penalties on smugglers. Yugoslav customs initiated action in 215 cases of sanctions violations in February and imposed fines of 127,000 dinars. [redacted] this was a marked improvement over the August 1994 to January 1995 period when 138 cases were initiated and 341,450 dinars in fines were meted out. [redacted]

Widespread Problems at the Border Indicate Enforcement Deteriorating

Although Belgrade has addressed some ICFY concerns and no large shipments have been observed, the nature and frequency of enforcement shortcomings since mid-February indicate enforcement overall has deteriorated from the levels noted in late December. The deteriorating enforcement suggests that the Bosnian Serbs are increasingly obtaining embargoed goods and that the VJ is supplying the BSA across the Bosnia border. [redacted]

[redacted] *we cannot determine if the enforcement deficiencies have allowed enough shipments to compensate for quantities lost from the cutoff in August 1994 of large trucks.* [redacted]

[redacted]

~~Top Secret~~

~~Top Secret~~

[REDACTED]

Moreover, [REDACTED] Belgrade is shipping large quantities of fuel and other goods to the Bosnian Serbs through Croatia via the Belgrade-Zagreb highway. *Large-scale use of this route could have permitted Belgrade to shift cargo trucks away from the inter-Serb border, accounting for the apparent cessation of transits at those crossings. In addition, the information on the detected cross-border helicopter flights is insufficient to confirm that any have been used to resupply the BSA* [REDACTED]

Deteriorating Enforcement Against "Ant Trade"

ICFY has had few indications of transits by large cargo trucks or tankers across the border, but the flow of truck, bus, automobile, farm tractor, and pedestrian traffic, which composes the "ant trade," appears to have been relatively steady through March at ICFY-manned crossings. Monitors have noted significant enforcement deficiencies by FRY officials against this traffic since mid-February. In particular, ICFY patrols in March detected an increasing number unauthorized truck transits. [REDACTED]

Yugoslav officials have not responded to monitors' requests to improve enforcement procedures, have not halted repeated violations, and have attempted to circumvent ICFY controls. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

~~Top Secret~~

Gaps in ICFY Coverage Leave Loopholes

Smuggling activity [redacted] *suggests that goods are crossing the border where international monitoring is irregular or nonexistent. As of 31 March, ICFY is monitoring 19 border crossings--down from 21 around the clock-- and is deploying fewer patrols. The remainder of the approximately 130 Serbia-Bosnia border crossings are monitored solely by the VJ, FRY customs, or police.* [redacted]

[redacted] *funding constraints have forced personnel reductions, which in turn has reduced the number of crossings monitored full time and the number of patrols. [redacted] detailed several incidents in March touching on monitor security, which could lead the monitors to be more cautious in patrolling away from the manned posts and less inclined to press Serbian officials to improve enforcement.* [redacted]

[redacted] inadequate coverage by FRY patrols, inadequate personnel and facilities to support inspections, and insufficient guidance on enforcement regulations also have hampered enforcement. [redacted]

Pressure on FRY officials from Serbs living and trading along the border also may contribute to lax enforcement [redacted]

[redacted] A confrontation on 14 March between police and Bosnian Serb civilians at Arstac escalated into an exchange of gunfire and grenades. At the Nudo Valley checkpoint [redacted] [redacted] on 10 March that a customs officer was reluctant to inspect most of the vehicles because he claimed that the local people knew him. [redacted]

Unauthorized Helicopter Activity Continuing

Since January, there have been several incidents reported of helicopters apparently crossing between Serbia and Bosnia. Since January, [] 50 cross-border violations of the No-Fly Zone. Most flights detected originate in Bosnia and cross into Serbia because the flights entering Bosnia probably fit the profile of clandestine arms supply flights flown singly and primarily at night. []

The largest suspected cross-border violation occurred on 3 February when [] around the eastern enclave of Srebrenica reported 15 helicopters flying approximately 10 kilometers north of the enclave traveling in a westerly direction. Because of the flight direction and proximity to the border, [] reported that the aircraft were crossing the border into Bosnia. At the same time, UN observers stationed at the Surcin radar facility, which is used to monitor the border for illegal cross-border flight activity, were denied access to the facility. In response to UN inquiries, Belgrade claimed that no helicopters crossed the border. The United Nations subsequently dropped its investigation for lack of evidence. The UN observers have been allowed to reenter the Surcin radar facility and have continued to monitor the radar for cross-border flight activity. []

Military-Related Activity Increasing Along the Border

Since late January, reports of military vehicles, aircraft, and troops crossing the border have increased. *The reports reinforce []*
Belgrade is providing some support to the BSA despite the embargo. []

Belgrade Using Croatian "Back Door" to Get Around Embargo

In addition to goods transiting the Serbia-Bosnia border because of deteriorating enforcement, fuel and other products from the FRY are reaching the Bosnian Serbs through Croatia. Insufficient information is available to determine how long this route has been used to evade the blockade, the volume of the shipments, and Belgrade's involvement, but the traffic appears to be increasing. This represents a large potential loophole in the embargo and probably already is the largest conduit for fuel shipments to the Bosnian Serbs.

[redacted] in early March that tanker trucks were supplying fuel to Serb-controlled areas of Bosnia via the Zagreb-Belgrade Highway. [redacted]

[redacted] the flow of goods from Serbia to Bosnia through Croatia has steadily increased since the highway was reopened in December 1994.

[redacted] lumber, consumer goods, and food destined for Bosnia also have crossed into Croatia at Lipovac, with 50-60 trucks believed transiting the border in each direction during each eight-hour period when monitors are present. From 7 February to 23 March, [redacted] 1,109 trucks may have transited west while monitors were at Lipovac. [redacted] Russian battalion soldiers and Croatian police do not stop vehicles from entering Croatia when they are not present.

[redacted] the shipments travel the highway west to Okucani and turn south to deliver to Banja Luka and elsewhere in Bosnia. [redacted]

More Impact on Civilian Than Military Sector

Because the embargo apparently has reduced goods transiting the Serbia-Bosnia border, it has imposed some pain on Pale's civilian economy. There is insufficient data available to distinguish the extent of the embargo's impact from that caused by the fighting

and the spillover from UN sanctions against the FRY. *The limited data suggests, however, that the greatest damage from all the external factors, including Belgrade's embargo, has been to Pale's financial and industrial sectors.*

- Bosnian Serb banks have been cut off from the Serbian financial system, with no electronic funds transfers operating. Trade transactions take place on a cash basis, either in German marks or with the few Serbian dinars Pale acquired while part of the Serbian monetary union in 1994. Due to its lack of hard currency, Pale has tried with little success to provide liquidity by using various types of fiat money, including commodity coupons and checks, but the German mark remains the principal medium of exchange.
- The non-military industrial sector reportedly is operating at 10 to 15 percent of capacity, with the timber industry the only significant export sector, [redacted] for example, reported that 457 trucks containing Bosnian lumber were detected bound for Serbia during a 45-day period, and [redacted] lumber trucks have crossed the Serbia-Bosnia border. [redacted]

The blockade also appears to have caused additional shortages of fuel, electricity, and basic foodstuffs, such as meat and cooking oil. [redacted] all goods are rationed in Bosnian Serb areas, with fuel two to five times more expensive than in Serbia. As a consequence, farming has shifted from mechanized to labor intensive methods, possibly employing locally conscripted labor. Even the BSA faces constant spot shortages of food, clothing, and fuel, which could result from internal distribution delays.

Despite the spot shortages for the BSA, there are no indications the embargo has had a serious impact on its capabilities. Reporting on recent fighting indicates Bosnian Serb forces have been able to counter Bosnian Government attacks in the Majevisa Mountains and Travnik area. Similarly, Bosnian Serb forces conducted a successful counteroffensive last November to regain territory in northwest Bosnia, south of Bihac [redacted]

The BSA remains largely self-sufficient in logistic capability, except for fuel and certain munitions. Available reporting indicates the Bosnian Serb network to acquire critical munitions inside Serbia is still in operation:

- [redacted] A press report on 27 March identified four of these supply links and revealed two additional FRY firms, the

Sloboda and Milan Blagovevic Factories, that are associated with Bosnian Serb ammunition suppliers.

• [redacted] the BSA had no problems receiving military supplies from factories inside Serbia, suggesting Pale is confident it can continue receiving supplies from Serbia.

In addition, Bosnian Serb officials continue to attempt to acquire military supplies and other goods through Cyprus. *Bosnian Serbs probably have used the current cease-fire to resupply their forces.* [redacted]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003c. paper	Re: The End of the Second Hundred Days: Strategy and Options (4 pages)	04/00/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Drew, Nelson/Bremner, Sue)
OA/Box Number: 696

FOLDER TITLE:

PC/DC [Principals Committee/Deputies Committee] Meetings on Bosnia, April 1995 [4]

2012-0798-F
ke3050

RESTRICTION CODES

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9502669
RECEIVED: 05 APR 95 19

TO: LAKE

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

FROM: VERSHBOW

September 11, 2006

By KDE NARA, Date 04/09/15
2012-0728-F

DOC DATE: 04 APR 95
SOURCE REF:

DK

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
SERBIA
UN

CROATIA
RUSSIA
PEACEKEEPING

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: CONTACT GRP FINAL OFFER TO MILOSEVIC

ACTION: LAKE APPROVED RECOM

DUE DATE: 08 APR 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: VERSHBOW

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON
VERSHBOW

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMBN

CLOSED BY: NSMEC

DOC 1 OF 1

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 LAKE
001

Z 95040520 FOR DECISION
X 95040618 LAKE APPROVED RECOM

National Security Council
The White House

Rec'd 4/6
6:45 PM

PROOFED BY: _____

LOG # 2669

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG APR 6 A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Reed	<u>1</u>	<u>JWR</u>	_____
Dohse	_____	_____	_____
Sens	_____	_____	_____
Soderberg	<u>2</u>	<u>COPY</u>	_____
Berger	<u>3</u>	_____	_____
Lake	<u>4</u>	Natl Sec Advisor has seen	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>5</u>	<u>JWR 4/6</u>	<u>N</u>
NSC Secretariat	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

CC ARV JWR 4/6

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette _____

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004a. memo	Alexander Vershbow to Anthony Lake, re: Contact Group's Final Offer to Milosevic (2 pages)	04/04/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Drew, Nelson/Bremner, Sue)
OA/Box Number: 696

FOLDER TITLE:

PC/DC [Principals Committee/Deputies Committee] Meetings on Bosnia, April 1995 [4]

2012-0798-F
ke3050

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004b. paper	Re: Contact Group Proposals (2 pages)	04/00/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Drew, Nelson/Bremner, Sue)
OA/Box Number: 696

FOLDER TITLE:

PC/DC [Principals Committee/Deputies Committee] Meetings on Bosnia, April 1995 [4]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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004c. fax	Fax Coversheet [partial] (1 page)		P3/b(3)
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COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Drew, Nelson/Bremner, Sue)
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TIME OF TRANSMISSION:

TIME OF RECEIPT:

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: KDE Date: 04/09/15

2012-0728-F

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE:

X

IMMEDIATE

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

RELEASER:

DTG:

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MESSAGE NO: _____ CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PAGES: 2
(Including Cover)
FROM: Richard A. Clarke (202) 456-9351 Rm. 302 - OEOB
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Summary of Conclusions from Peacekeeping Core Group Meeting -

April 14, 1995

<u>TO (AGENCY)</u>	<u>DELIVER TO</u>	<u>DEPT/ROOM NO.</u>	<u>PHONE NUMBER</u>
<u>USUN</u>	<u>William Woodward</u>	_____	<u>736-7555</u>
<u>CIA</u>	<u>Enid Schoettle</u>	_____	(b)(3) [0040]
<u>OMB</u>	<u>Gordon Adams (HAND CARRIED)</u>	_____	_____
<u>NSC</u>	<u>Don Kerrick (HAND CARRIED)</u>	_____	_____
<u>NSC</u>	<u>Susan Rice (HAND CARRIED)</u>	_____	_____
<u>NSC</u>	<u>David Satterfield (HAND CARRIED)</u>	_____	_____
<u>NSC</u>	<u>Steven Simon (HAND CARRIED)</u>	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

REMARKS:

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005. memo	Richard Clarke to the Peacekeeping Core Group, re: 14 April Meeting Conclusions (2 pages)	04/14/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Drew, Nelson/Bremner, Sue)
OA/Box Number: 696

FOLDER TITLE:

PC/DC [Principals Committee/Deputies Committee] Meetings on Bosnia, April 1995 [4]

2012-0798-F
kc3050

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 24, 1995

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *nv*
FROM: DON KERRICK *(K)*
SUBJECT: 505 Agreement for Federation

After a struggle, JCS and OSD have agreed to narrow 505 agreement for Federation which is limited to IMET (FY 95: \$70K for orientation trip for Bosniac and Croat Officers and English language training for six officers; \$200K requested for FY 96).

State is drafting cable to inform Allies and implement the agreement.

Attachment
Tab A 505 Summary Sheet

cc: Alan Kreczko
Steve Simon
Rick Saunders

SUMMARY SHEET ON THE 505 AGREEMENT FOR BOSNIA

What does the 505 agreement include?

The 505 agreement with the Republic of Bosnia will be limited to IMET. For FY 95, \$70,000 has been allocated for a high level orientation trip for Bosniac and Croat officers, and English language training for six officers. For FY 96, our \$200,000 request may also include staff training for a number of officers.

How does the 505 agreement fit into current U.S. policy?

The 505 agreement cannot be viewed in isolation but must be seen as part of a comprehensive effort by the U.S. to support and promote the building of multi-ethnic democracy in Bosnia Herzegovina.

The narrow 505 agreement is first and foremost about assisting the Bosnian Federation not about aiding the Bosnian war effort.

Training provided under the 505 agreement will be specifically targetted towards programs that integrate Bosniac and Croat forces for the purpose of building a joint staff and reinforcing the cease-fire between the Bosniacs and Croats.

How will the 505 help build the Federation?

The 505 agreement will support the Bosniac-Croat cease fire which put an end to fighting in Central Bosnia. Our assistance on all fronts is directed at building bridges between the two communities. The IMET program, by training Bosniacs and Croats together, will help build this trust within an integrated command. The 505 agreement is a vehicle for providing assistance in building a Federation military establishment that is compatible with the practices of modern democratic societies.

Why is it important to do the 505 agreement now? Why not wait until the fighting dies down?

The Washington Accords are an ambitious endeavor. Building a functioning democratic Federation government is a long-term project requiring U.S. assistance during war-time conditions. Day to day events on the battlefield should not deflect us from our longer term effort to build a multi-ethnic democratic Federation.

The 505 agreement will symbolize our strong support for the Federation. It should be noted that a 505 agreement does not commit the U.S. to providing military assistance either in general or in a specific form.

-2-

Does the 505 threaten to elicit a dangerous response from the Bosnian Serbs?

The 505 agreement will not send a new message to the Bosnian Serbs. It transmits the same clear and unambiguous message that is the basis of our policy: "the U.S. supports the building of a Federation government that is democratic, respects human rights, and represents all groups."

The 505 agreement is consistent with the key U.S. role in building a democratic Federation. The U.S. was directly involved in negotiating the Washington Accords. We have appropriated \$20 million and requested another \$70 million in economic assistance to the Federation. We have a Special Envoy for the Federation, a Coordinator of assistance to the Federation, and a retired Major General who will continue the work of General Galvin in assisting Bosniacs and Croats in implementing the military aspects of the Federation agreements. At the request of the Federation, we have appointed a U.S. arbitrator to help resolve issues impeding progress on implementation of the Accords.

We see no evidence that the appointment of General Sewall has evoked a strong response from the Pale serbs. Furthermore, similiar 505 agreements with Croatia, Slovenia and FYROM have not prompted a noticeable Serb response.

Will the IMET agreement violate the arms embargo?

We have determined that, as was the case with Croatia, Slovenia and FYROM where we have similiar agreements, the 505 agreement would not violate UNSCR 713, the arms embargo resolution.

In fact, IMET programs have already begun in Slovenia and FYROM and should be off the ground in Croatia shortly. Defense bilateral working groups have visited all three countries.

How will we inform the allies?

We will inform the allies, the NAC, the EU, the UN and the contact group prior to signing the agreement. We will explain carefully the limited scope of the agreement, its relationship to implementation of the Washington accords, and the importance of its role in helping prevent a breakdown of the cease fire between Bosniacs and Croats in Bosnia.

-3-

How will we announce the 505 agreement?

We will announce the agreement in the same way we announced the appointment of retired MG Sewall as Military advisor to the Secretary of State on Military issues related to the Federation. The announcement would be a low-key factual presentation at the noon press brief with an explanation of the limited scope of the agreement and the objective of supporting the Federation -- not the Bosnian war effort.

TO: AGENCIES

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

FROM: SENS

By VDX NARA, Date 04109115
2012-0798-F

DOC DATE: 19 APR 95

SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
PC

CROATIA
SOC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSION FOR PC MTG RE BOSNIA & CROATIA 14 APR

ACTION: SENS SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DUE DATE: 20 APR 95

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK

LOGREF:

FILES: IFM

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BERGER

JOSHI

KERRICK

KRECZKO

NSC CHRON

SODERBERG

VERSHBOW

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY MBN DATE 4/19 BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSASK

CLOSED BY: NSMBN

DOC 2 OF 2

~~SECRET~~

RECORD ID: 9520487

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 LAKE
001
002

Z 95041817 FOR DECISION
X 95041918 LAKE APPROVED RECOM
X 95041918 SENS SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

002 950419 FUERTH, L
002 950419 BRILL, K
002 950419 ADAMS, G
002 950419 MCALEER, R
002 950419 INDERFURTH, K
002 950419 GARTHOFF, D
002 950419 PATRICK, T

~~SECRET~~

National Security Council
The White House

Red 4/18
7 PM

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 20487
URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT
BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG PR A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Reed	_____	_____	_____
Dohse	<u>1</u>	_____	_____
Sens	_____	_____	_____
Soderberg	<u>copy</u>	_____	_____
Berger	<u>2</u>	<u>OK</u>	_____
Lake	_____	Deputy Natl Sec Advisor	_____
Dohse	<u>3</u>	<u>W</u> has seen	<u>Tab I</u>
Situation Room	<u>4</u>	<u>MON 4/19</u>	<u>ID</u>
West Wing Desk	_____	_____	<u>D</u>
NSC Secretariat	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

CC: _____

COMMENTS:

18 APR 93 12:30 PM

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

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OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

Initials: YDE Date: 24/09/15

2012-098-F

LOG 9520487
DATE 19 APR 95

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSION FOR PC MTG RE BOSNIA & CROATIA 14 APR
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA LARRY BRANSCUM ROOM 290, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>1</u>
MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>1</u>
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>1</u>
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>VIA FAX</u>
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>VIA FAX</u>
MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>VIA FAX</u>

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC SECRETARIAT, ROOM 379 OEOB

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9520487
DATE 19 APR 95

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSION FOR PC MTG RE BOSNIA & CROATIA 14 APR
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

DATE

TIME

SIGNATURE

COL. T. R. PATRICK
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
ROOM 2E865
PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20318-0001

PRINT LAST NAME: _____

COPY: VIA FAX

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC SECRETARIAT, ROOM 379 OEOB

PAGE 02 OF 02 PAGES

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006. fax	Fax Coversheet [partial] (1 page)	04/00/1995	b(7)(C)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Drew, Nelson/Bremner, Sue)
OA/Box Number: 696

FOLDER TITLE:

PC/DC [Principals Committee/Deputies Committee] Meetings on Bosnia, April 1995 [4]

2012-0798-F
ke3050

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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~~SECRET~~

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

WHSR CONTROL
TIME OF RECEIPT

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS

Initials: VDE Date: 04109115

2012-0928-F

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE

- ☐ FLASH
☐ IMMEDIATE
☐ PRIORITY
☐ ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DATE/TIME: _____

MESSAGE #: _____

FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR
SUBJECT: Summary
Notice of Meeting PC 14 Apr Re Bosnia PAGES: 6

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
<u>USUN New York</u>	<u>Mr. Rick Inderfurth</u>	<u>212-415-4016</u>	<u>(b)(7)c</u>

[006]

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

~~SECRET~~

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: VDE Date: 04/08/15
2012-0798-F

RELEASER: _____

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO.: _____ CLASSIFICATION: **SECRET** TOTAL: 6
(PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (202) 456-9425 WH SITROOM
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: SOC of PC Re Bosnia & Croatia 14 Apr
NSC LOG # 9520487

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

20487

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

April 19, 1995

By YDE NARA, Date 01109115
2012-0728-F
MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

AMBASSADOR RICK INDEFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the U.S. to the United
Nations

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency


COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

COL. T.R. PATRICK
Executive Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

DR. GORDON ADAMS
Associate Director for
National Security &
International Affairs
Office of Management and
Budget

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Principals Committee Meeting on
Bosnia and Croatia, April 14, 1995 ~~(S)~~

Please pass to the Principals the Summary of Conclusions attached
at Tab A. ~~(S)~~


Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee

DATE: April 14, 1995

LOCATION: White House Situation Room

TIME: 2:30 - 3:45 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting
on Bosnia and Croatia ~~(S)~~

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair
Anthony Lake

OVP
Leon Fuerth

State
Strobe Talbott
Robert Frasure

DOD
William Perry

OMB
Gordon Adams

USUN
Madeleine Albright

Chief of Staff
No Representative

CIA
Admiral William Studeman

JCS
General John Shalikashvili

White House
Samuel Berger

NSC
Alexander Vershbow
Brigadier General Don Kerrick

Summary of Conclusions

Sanctions

1. Principals discussed whether and under what conditions to support extension of limited sanctions relief for the FRY beyond the second 100-day period that ends on April 22. Principals agreed that while the border closure has proven less effective than desired, other variables, including the situation on the ground and views of Allies and the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina, must be taken into account. ~~(S)~~

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

Duration of Sanctions Relief

2. Principals agreed to support a conditioned extension of sanctions relief for less than 100 days, with the exact timeframe to be determined after consultations with the Bosnian Government. Principals agreed that State should seek definitive views from the Bosnian Government **(Action: State)** and that Ambassador Albright should incorporate those views in negotiations with Allies on the length of additional sanctions relief. **(Action: USUN)** ~~(S)~~

Conditions for Sanctions Relief

3. Principals agreed that additional conditions must be included in any new extension of sanctions relief. Those conditions could include, but are not limited to, an end to all cross-border helicopter flights, the termination of telecommunication links between Serbia-Montenegro and Serb-controlled areas of Bosnia, an end to exports from Serbia-Montenegro to Serb-controlled areas of Bosnia under the auspices of the Yugoslav Red Cross and an end to bus transit of Serb soldiers across the border. The U.S. will also pursue measures aimed at closing the "back door," the transshipment of FRY goods through Croatia to Bosnian Serb territory. Principals authorized Ambassador Albright to discuss conditions that should be applied to sanctions relief extension. **(Action: USUN)** ~~(S)~~

Tactics

4. Principals discussed the difficulties that will be encountered in crafting an acceptable resolution extending sanctions relief and authorized Ambassador Albright to negotiate with Allies and the Government of Bosnia in the drafting of the resolution. They also agreed that Ambassador Albright should use the threat of a veto in order to ensure the resolution meets U.S. conditions. ~~(S)~~

Sanctions Tightening Measures

5. Principals deferred discussion of additional sanctions issues and remanded to the Deputies Committee approval of measures to close the "back door" and reduce the transshipment of oil to Serbia-Montenegro through Albania. Principals also asked Deputies to continue efforts to resolve ICFY related funding issues that are hindering ICFY operations. **(Action: OVP/State)**

Contact Group Status and Prospects

6. Principals reviewed the lack of progress in the Contact Group's latest efforts to gain Milosevic's recognition of Bosnia and the other former Yugoslav Republics in exchange for additional sanctions relief. They agreed that the Contact Group was nearing its useful end as a negotiating body but that we would continue to support the Contact Group plan as the basis for a negotiated settlement, noting that Bosnian Serb continued rejection of the plan remains the primary obstacle to peace. Principals authorized Ambassador Frasure to discuss with the Bosnians the importance of reducing the level of violence in any renewed fighting in order to keep UNPROFOR in Bosnia.

(Action: State) ~~(S)~~

OPLAN 40104 Approval Process

OPLAN 40104

7. Principals reviewed the status of OPLAN 40104 that covers NATO participation in UNPROFOR's withdrawal from Bosnia. Noting that unanswered policy questions remain, they directed the IWG to develop a list of unanswered policy questions and answers relating to the plan for Deputies' review before briefing the plan to the President and Congress. (Action: NSC with input from State/OSD/JCS) Principals agreed that Congressional consultations should be completed before voting to approve the plan in the NAC or identifying specific U.S. units that will participate in the operation. ~~(S)~~

Command and Control

8. Principals reaffirmed that U.S. participation in UNPROFOR withdrawal is possible only if the operation is under full NATO command and control. They agreed that Ambassador Albright should remind the UNSYG of the requirement for NATO command and control. (Action: USUN) Principals further directed that clear guidance be provided to our representatives at NATO concerning the approval process within the USG. (Action: State/JCS) ~~(S)~~

NATO Prepositioning

9. Principals reviewed the progress of NATO prepositioning efforts, noting that the SACEUR had been given the authority by the North Atlantic Council to deploy the Step Two mini-prepositioning force (80 personnel, including 20 U.S.). Deployment is expected in late April or early May. Principals agreed that because the NATO operation has not begun, the deploying mini-prepositioning forces will be under national command, NATO operational control and UN tactical control. These

command arrangements are similar to those in place for the other U.S. military personnel already serving in Croatia. Principals agreed that concerned Congressional Staff and members should be briefed on these arrangements before the deployment begins.

(Action: JCS) Subsequent decisions will be required before deploying the maxi-prepositioning force to Croatia and regarding the appropriate command and control arrangements at that stage.

~~(S)~~

Options for Strengthening UNPROFOR

10. Principals briefly reviewed the progress of ongoing efforts with the British and the French to strengthen UNPROFOR. Noting that Allies remain very reluctant to undertake meaningful strengthening measures, Principals agreed that the CJCS would report on further progress following his meetings with his counterparts during the week of April 24 in Brussels.

(Action: JCS) ~~(S)~~

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

20487

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

April 17, 1995

By KDE NARA, Date 04/09/15

2012-0798-f

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *N*

FROM: DON KERRICK *(K)*

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Principals
Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia,
April 14, 1995

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Principals is the Summary of Conclusions from the Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia and Croatia held April 14, 1995.

Concurrence by: Leon Fuerth *LF*

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andrew Sens to sign the memo to agencies at Tab I.

Approve *AK* Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memo to the Agencies

Tab A Summary of Conclusions

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007. note	Handwritten notes from Principals Committee meeting (15 pages)	04/14/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Drew, Nelson/Bremner, Sue)
OA/Box Number: 696

FOLDER TITLE:

PC/DC [Principals Committee/Deputies Committee] Meetings on Bosnia, April 1995 [4]

2012-0798-F
ke3050

RESTRICTION CODES

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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~~SECRET~~

20558

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

By WOL NARA, Date 24/09/15 April 29, 1995
2012-0798-F

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *AV*

SUBJECT: Memorandum to the President on April 28
Principals' Committee Discussion of Bosnia

Attached is a memorandum to the President reviewing the issues discussed at Friday's PC: ongoing Contact Group efforts; measures to deal with Sarajevo airport; and NATO OPLAN 40104. I have also included a paragraph on the Jonathan Knapp situation.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached memorandum to the President.

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum to the President

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526 THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Principals' Review of Bosnia, April 28, 1995

Principals met on Friday to review three aspects of our Bosnia policy: (1) ongoing Contact Group efforts to gain Milosevic's recognition of Bosnia, isolate the Bosnian Serbs, and extend the cessation of hostilities; (2) measures to deal with Serb attempts to control access to Sarajevo airport; and (3) NATO contingency planning for a possible UNPROFOR withdrawal from Bosnia.

Contact Group: Principals agreed that we should offer to suspend some additional sanctions if Milosevic unambiguously recognizes Bosnia within its internationally-recognized borders. They agreed, however, that this offer should be contingent on a commitment by our Contact Group partners to tighten the closure of the Serbian-Bosnian border and to take similar measures to seal Croatia's border with Bosnian Serb areas -- the "back door" through which significant circumvention has occurred. This approach is strongly backed by the Bosnians; indeed, they have said they will extend the cessation of hostilities if there is progress on recognition and sealing of the border. At Friday's Contact Group meeting, our partners reacted positively on closure of the border but, as usual, argued for a more generous package of sanctions relief than we and the Bosnians consider prudent.

In any event, the chances of securing genuine Serbian recognition of Bosnia are low, since Milosevic continues to demand a lifting of all the sanctions (which the Contact Group has conditioned on recognition of all the former Yugoslav states). Nevertheless, if allies make good on sealing the border, it can -- over time -- increase the economic squeeze on the Bosnian Serbs and pressure them to accept the Contact Group plan. The Croatians, for their part, seem prepared to cooperate in closing the "back door."

Sarajevo Airport: Principals agreed on the unacceptability of recent Serb actions to assert control over Sarajevo airport and to prohibit the use of UN flights by our Ambassador and Contact Group representative. They were deeply concerned at signs that the UN is prepared to accede to Serb dictates, which would destroy what little UN credibility remains. Principals agreed that, while there is no immediate humanitarian crisis in the

Bosnian capital, the Serbs' actions amount to an attempt at the "strangulation" of Sarajevo, which NATO and the UN have pledged to prevent. Therefore, Principals asked the Interagency Working Group to develop options for NATO action to reopen Sarajevo airport, together with a diplomatic strategy for gaining Allied and UN support. Chris stressed that, if we decide to pursue NATO action, we will need to ask you to go to John Major and the new French President to overcome their objections. Bill Perry noted the need to consider how to respond if the Serbs retaliate in other areas, such as by attacking the eastern enclaves. We will, of course, seek your approval before going down this road.

UNPROFOR Withdrawal Planning: Shali briefed Principals on the NATO OPLAN for UNPROFOR withdrawal. The plan involves roughly 70,000 NATO troops, including 25,000 from the U.S., and will cost between \$1.5 and \$2 billion dollars (for the U.S., an additional \$600 million beyond the cost of ongoing operations). Under the plan, in the first two weeks UK- and French-led units would secure the routes from the Adriatic to Sarajevo, opening the way for U.S. troops to push through to Tuzla and on to the eastern enclaves. The withdrawal of UNPROFOR troops would then unfold over the subsequent 2-3 months. Because of the length of the operation and the eight-week lead-time involved, the OPLAN also includes rapid response capabilities to extract individual UNPROFOR units in emergency situations.

Principals agreed that, in purely military terms, the OPLAN was sound and should receive continued U.S. support at NATO. They agreed that Shali should identify the U.S. forces that would be involved, while making clear that the actual commitment of those forces will require a further decision by you and consultations with the Congress. At the same time, Principals felt that there were many sensitive political questions to be answered before seeking your approval of the plan, including: Is our post-withdrawal policy still to lift the arms embargo and, if so, how will that affect NATO's posture during withdrawal? How to deal with Serb attacks on the eastern enclaves during and after the operation? Will NATO enforce the exclusion zones? How to deal with civilians seeking NATO protection or evacuation and with refugees? What is NATO's role in delivering humanitarian aid?

Principals agreed that, as we grapple with these questions within the Administration, we should pose them to members of Congress in consultations on Bosnia in the coming weeks. The scale of the withdrawal operation and the policy dilemmas involved should help dampen support for unilateral lift and build support for our efforts to contain the fighting and keep UNPROFOR in place. Let me know if you have any problems with this approach to the OPLAN and whether you would like to receive an early briefing on it.

U.S. Hostage: Principals briefly discussed the situation of Jonathan Knapp, the American relief worker captured two months ago along with four French colleagues by the Bosnian Serbs. At Knapp's request, we have been working through the French and the UN to secure his release. His family is becoming more anxious as the Serbs threaten to put Knapp on trial, and they may soon abandon quiet diplomacy in favor of a media campaign. Chris will consider the possibility of a direct message to Bosnian Serb leader Karadzic from a middle-level USG official, based on indications that this may be the face-saver the Serbs are looking for to release Knapp.