

FOIA MARKER

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Folder Title:

PC/DC [Principals Committee/Deputies Committee] Meetings on Bosnia, April 1995 [2]

Staff Office-Individual:

European Affairs-Drew, Nelson/Bremner, Sue

Original OA/ID Number:

696

Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:	Stack:
33	2	6	1	V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. fax	Fax coversheet [partial] (1 page)	04/00/1995	b(7)(C)
001b. note	Handwritten notes from Deputies Committee Meeting (9 pages)	04/27/1995	P1/b(1)
002a. memo	BG Don Kerrick to Anthony Lake, re: April 14 Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia (6 pages)	04/13/1995	P1/b(1)
002b. cable	Re: Contact Group Meeting with President Tudjman (2 pages)	04/12/1995	P1/b(1)
002c. chart	Re: OPLAN 40104 - UNPROFOR Withdrawal (1 page)	04/00/1995	P1/b(1)
002d. paper	Re: Information Paper [To provide information on the status of decisions concerning the OPLAN 40104...] (1 page)	04/13/1995	P1/b(1)
003a. memo	Don Kerrick to Anthony Lake, re: April 28 Principals Meeting on Bosnia (4 pages)	04/27/1995	P1/b(1)
003b. cable	Re: Milosevic's April 26 Meeting with UK Charge [partial] (2 pages)	04/26/1995	P1/b(1)
003c. cable	Re: Milosevic's Response to Contact Group Paper on Recognition (4 pages)	04/17/1995	P1/b(1)
003d. chart	Re: UK-FR Proposal (1 page)	04/00/1995	P1/b(1)
003e. paper	Re: Unanswered Policy Questions on NATO Support for UNPROFOR Withdrawal (4 pages)	04/00/1995	P1/b(1)
004. fax	Fax coversheet [partial] (1 page)	04/00/1995	b(7)(C)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Drew, Nelson/Bremner, Sue)
OA/Box Number: 696

FOLDER TITLE:

PC/DC [Principals Committee/Deputies Committee] Meetings on Bosnia, April 1995 [2]

2012-0798-F

ke3048

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9503062
RECEIVED: 24 APR 95 08

TO: LAKE

FROM: KERRICK
VERSHBOW

DOC DATE: 24 APR 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
IMET

CROATIA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: 505 AGREEMENT FOR FEDERATION

ACTION: NOTED BY LAKE

DUE DATE: 27 APR 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

KERRICK
KRECZKO
NSC CHRON
SIMON
VERSHBOW

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSVJD

CLOSED BY: NSMEC

DOC 1 OF 1

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9503062

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 LAKE
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Z 95042414 FOR INFORMATION
X 95051517 NOTED BY LAKE

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National Security Council
The White House

rec'd 4124
415PM

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LOG #

3062

A/O _____

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AB

SYSTEM:

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	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL /DATE	DISPOSITION
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Dohse	_____	_____	_____
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Soderberg	_____	_____	_____
Berger	2	ml	_____
Lake	3	AD	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	4	_____	N
NSC/Rm	_____	_____	_____
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A = Action

I = Information

D = Dispatch

R = Retain

N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

Special Dispatch Instructions:

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 24, 1995

Nat'l Sec. Advisor
her name

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *h*
FROM: DON KERRICK *(C)*
SUBJECT: 505 Agreement for Federation

After a struggle, JCS and OSD have agreed to narrow 505 agreement for Federation which is limited to IMET (FY 95: \$70K for orientation trip for Bosniac and Croat Officers and English language training for six officers; \$200K requested for FY 96).

State is drafting cable to inform Allies and implement the agreement.

Attachment
Tab A 505 Summary Sheet

cc: Alan Kreczko
Steve Simon
Rick Saunders

SUMMARY SHEET ON THE 505 AGREEMENT FOR BOSNIA

What does the 505 agreement include?

The 505 agreement with the Republic of Bosnia will be limited to IMET. For FY 95, \$70,000 has been allocated for a high level orientation trip for Bosniac and Croat officers, and English language training for six officers. For FY 96, our \$200,000 request may also include staff training for a number of officers.

How does the 505 agreement fit into current U.S. policy?

The 505 agreement cannot be viewed in isolation but must be seen as part of a comprehensive effort by the U.S. to support and promote the building of multi-ethnic democracy in Bosnia Herzegovina.

The narrow 505 agreement is first and foremost about assisting the Bosnian Federation not about aiding the Bosnian war effort.

Training provided under the 505 agreement will be specifically targetted towards programs that integrate Bosniac and Croat forces for the purpose of building a joint staff and reinforcing the cease-fire between the Bosniacs and Croats.

How will the 505 help build the Federation?

The 505 agreement will support the Bosniac-Croat cease fire which put an end to fighting in Central Bosnia. Our assistance on all fronts is directed at building bridges between the two communities. The IMET program, by training Bosniacs and Croats together, will help build this trust within an integrated command. The 505 agreement is a vehicle for providing assistance in building a Federation military establishment that is compatible with the practices of modern democratic societies.

Why is it important to do the 505 agreement now? Why not wait until the fighting dies down?

The Washington Accords are an ambitious endeavor. Building a functioning democratic Federation government is a long-term project requiring U.S. assistance during war-time conditions. Day to day events on the battlefield should not deflect us from our longer term effort to build a multi-ethnic democratic Federation.

The 505 agreement will symbolize our strong support for the Federation. It should be noted that a 505 agreement does not commit the U.S. to providing military assistance either in general or in a specific form.

-2-

Does the 505 threaten to elicit a dangerous response from the Bosnian Serbs?

The 505 agreement will not send a new message to the Bosnian Serbs. It transmits the same clear and unambiguous message that is the basis of our policy: "the U.S. supports the building of a Federation government that is democratic, respects human rights, and represents all groups."

The 505 agreement is consistent with the key U.S. role in building a democratic Federation. The U.S. was directly involved in negotiating the Washington Accords. We have appropriated \$20 million and requested another \$70 million in economic assistance to the Federation. We have a Special Envoy for the Federation, a Coordinator of assistance to the Federation, and a retired Major General who will continue the work of General Galvin in assisting Bosniacs and Croats in implementing the military aspects of the Federation agreements. At the request of the Federation, we have appointed a U.S. arbitrator to help resolve issues impeding progress on implementation of the Accords.

We see no evidence that the appointment of General Sewall has evoked a strong response from the Pale serbs. Furthermore, similiar 505 agreements with Croatia, Slovenia and FYROM have not prompted a noticeable Serb response.

Will the IMET agreement violate the arms embargo?

We have determined that, as was the case with Croatia, Slovenia and FYROM where we have similiar agreements, the 505 agreement would not violate UNSCR 713, the arms embargo resolution.

In fact, IMET programs have already begun in Slovenia and FYROM and should be off the ground in Croatia shortly. Defense bilateral working groups have visited all three countries.

How will we inform the allies?

We will inform the allies, the NAC, the EU, the UN and the contact group prior to signing the agreement. We will explain carefully the limited scope of the agreement, its relationship to implementation of the Washington accords, and the importance of its role in helping prevent a breakdown of the cease fire between Bosniacs and Croats in Bosnia.

-3-

How will we announce the 505 agreement?

We will announce the agreement in the same way we announced the appointment of retired MG Sewall as Military advisor to the Secretary of State on Military issues related to the Federation. The announcement would be a low-key factual presentation at the noon press brief with an explanation of the limited scope of the agreement and the objective of supporting the Federation -- not the Bosnian war effort.

TO: AGENCIES

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 02 MAY 95
SOURCE REF:

By KDE NARA, Date 2410/95
2012-0718-F

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
SOC

DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR BOSNIA DC MTG ON 27 APR

ACTION: DOHSE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DUE DATE: 02 MAY 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK

LOGREF:

FILES: IFM

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BASS
BERGER
KERRICK
KRECZKO
LAKE
NSC CHRON
SODERBERG
VERSHBOW

COMMENTS: _____

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DOC 2 OF 2

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RECORD ID: 9520554

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 BERGER
001
002

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 95050117 FOR DECISION
X 95050212 SODERBERG APPROVED RECOM
X 95050212 DOHSE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

002 950502 FUERTH, L
002 950502 BRILL, K
002 950502 ADAMS, G
002 950502 NYE, J
002 950502 MCALEER, R
002 950502 INDERFURTH, K
002 950502 GARTHOFF, D
002 950502 PATRICK, T

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Initials: YDE Date: CH/0816

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

2012-0728-F

LOG 9520554
DATE 02 MAY 95

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR BOSNIA DC MTG ON 27 APR
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

DATE

TIME

SIGNATURE

MR. LEON FUERTH
OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
VIA LARRY BRANSCUM
ROOM 290, OEOB
WASHINGTON, DC 20506

PRINT LAST NAME: _____

COPY: 1

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
2201 C STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

PRINT LAST NAME: _____

COPY: 1

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET
ROOM 238
OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG
WASHINGTON, DC 20503

PRINT LAST NAME: _____

COPY: 1

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC SECRETARIAT, ROOM 379 OEOB

PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

**National Security Council
The White House**

Exec Sec Office has diskette: yes

LOG # 20554 A/O _____

DOCLOG mae

SYSTEM: PRS NSC INT _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL /DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon			
Dohse	<u>1/3</u>	<u>5/5</u>	<u>Sign TB</u>
Sens			
Soderberg	<u>copy</u>		
Berger	<u>2</u>	<u>AW</u>	
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	<u>JAL 5/2</u>	<u>J</u>
NSC/Rm			

A = Action

I = Information

D = Dispatch

R = Retain

N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

Special Dispatch Instructions:

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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001a. fax	Fax coversheet [partial] (1 page)	04/00/1995	b(7)(C)

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National Security Council
European Affairs (Drew, Nelson/Bremner, Sue)
OA/Box Number: 696

FOLDER TITLE:

PC/DC [Principals Committee/Deputies Committee] Meetings on Bosnia, April 1995 [2]

2012-0798-F
ke3048

RESTRICTION CODES

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TIME OF TRANSMISSION

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

WHSR CONTROL
TIME OF RECEIPT

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OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: VDE Date: 04/08/15

2012-0798-F

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE

- ☐ FLASH
☐ IMMEDIATE
☐ PRIORITY
☐ ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DATE/TIME: _____

MESSAGE #: _____

FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: Sec
Summary of Meeting on April 27 Bosnia DMTB PAGES: 5

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURITY
<u>USUN New York</u>	<u>Mr. Rick Inderfurth</u>	<u>212-415-4016</u>	<u>(b)(7)c</u>

[001a]

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

~~SECRET~~

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

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OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: YDE Date: 04/08/15
2012-0798-F

RELEASER: _____

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO.: _____ CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 5
(PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Summary of Conclusions for DC MTG
ON Bosnia on 27 April NSC LOG # 20554

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
<u>Treasury</u>	<u>Executive Secretary</u>		

REMARKS:

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

20554

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 2, 1995

By VDE NARA, Date 0410815
2012-028-F
MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the U.S. to the United
Nations

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for National
Security & International
Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

MR. J. BENJAMIN NYE
Executive Secretary
Department of the Treasury


MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

COL. T. R. PATRICK
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee Meeting on
Bosnia, April 27, 1995 (S)

Please pass to the Deputies the Summary of Conclusions attached
at Tab A. (S)


Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20554

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: April 27, 1995

LOCATION: White House Situation Room

TIME: 3:30 - 4:30 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on
Bosnia ~~(S)~~

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair:
Samuel R. Berger

OMB:
Gordon Adams
Keith Beckell

OVP:
Leon Fuerth
Rick Saunders

USUN:
David Scheffer
James O'Brien

State:
Peter Tarnoff
Richard Holbrooke
Robert Frasure

CIA:
Douglas MacEachin
Ray Converse

Treasury:
J. Benjamin Nye

JCS:
LTG Wesley Clark
RADM Charles Moore

DOD:
Walter Slocombe
Joseph Kruzell

NSC:
Alexander Vershbow
BG Donald L. Kerrick

Summary of Conclusions

1. Deputies met to discuss next steps in the Contact Group, including what sanctions relief package we would be willing to offer Milosevic in return for genuine recognition of Bosnia, and the accompanying strategy for Ambassador Frasure to pursue in the next Contact Group meeting and in a follow-on private meeting with Milosevic. Deputies agreed that we should continue to pursue a strategy to isolate Karadzic and the Pale Serbs by further tightening the inter-Serb border and by moving to close the "back door" so that prohibited goods do not reach the Bosnian Serbs through Croatia. ~~(S)~~

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

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
2. Deputies agreed that any further suspension of sanctions will require genuine recognition by Milosevic of Bosnia's internationally-recognized borders and a real sealing of the Bosnian Serbs' border. Deputies agreed that no lifting of any sanctions would be appropriate at this time and that suspension of certain sanctions for finite periods of time was the most we could accept. They authorized Ambassador Frasure to propose option "a" from the OVP's sanctions relief chart (Tab A). Noting that other Contact Group partners would likely seek broader sanctions relief, Deputies agreed that Ambassador Frasure could inform Contact Group partners that he would need to seek Washington's approval to move even part of the way toward option "b" from the OVP sanctions chart. (Action: State) (S)

3. Deputies approved measures to close the "back door" as outlined in the OVP memorandum previously circulated to Deputies. They directed OVP and Treasury to work together to resolve the issue concerning the use of U.S. Customs Agents as sanctions monitors. (Action: OVP) (S)

4. Deputies discussed the situation in Sarajevo, where the Bosnian Serbs have reneged on the 1992 agreement regarding the unrestricted use of Sarajevo airport. They agreed that we should continue efforts to strengthen UNPROFOR to make it more effective when dealing with the Bosnian Serbs. Deputies asked that the Bosnian Government be contacted to learn more about their proposal to create a demilitarized zone in and around Sarajevo which would be one means of restoring full UN control over the airport. (Action: State) Deputies deferred further discussion on measures to strengthen UNPROFOR pending a report from the CJCS on his meetings with counterparts in Brussels. (Action: JCS) (S)

5. Deputies discussed the status of efforts to develop answers to the policy questions concerning OPLAN 40104 for a NATO-led withdrawal of UNPROFOR from Bosnia. They agreed to defer further discussion until the Principals receive the JCS briefing on the OPLAN on April 28. At that time, the NSC will determine the process that will be used to finalize answers to the questions as a basis for review by Deputies and Principals. (Action: NSC) (S)

Sanctions Relief in Return for Tighter Border Closure and Bosnian Recognition



¹ All suspensions are for successive, limited periods. UNSC action required to extend suspensions. Continuation of suspensions to depend on continued progress toward negotiated settlement of the conflicts.

² Strategic goods include crude oil, petroleum products, coal, energy-related equipment, iron, steel, other metals, chemicals, rubber, tires, vehicles, aircraft, and motors of all types.

~~SECRET~~

20554

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

White House Guidelines,

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 11, 2006

By VDE NARA, Date 04105/15
2012-0918-F
ACTION

May 1, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *AV*

FROM: BG DON KERRICK *DK*

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia, April 27, 1995

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Deputies is the Summary of Conclusions from the Deputies Committee meeting on Bosnia held April 27, 1995.

Concurrence by: Rick Saunders *RS/m*

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andrew Sens to sign the memo to agencies at Tab I.

Approve *mlr* Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memo to the Agencies

Tab A Summary of Conclusions w/attachment

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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European Affairs (Drew, Nelson/Bremner, Sue)
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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Meeting of NSC Principals Committee
on Bosnia and Croatia

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

Friday, April 14, 1995

2:30-4:00p.m.

White House Situation Room

By VDE NARA, Date 01/08/15

2012-0798-F

AGENDA

I. Diplomatic Strategy

- A. Contact Group Status/Next Steps.....State
- B. Next Steps following Passage of UNSC
Resolutions on UNPROFOR.....State*

II. OPLAN 40104 Approval Process

- A. Next Steps on NATO Prepositioning - Step Two
(Mini/Maxi Options) and Beyond.....JCS*
- B. NATO/U.S. Decision Timeline for OPLAN 40104.....JCS*
 - Strategy for Briefing President and Gaining
Congressional Authorization for
Appropriation.....State*/OSD*/JCS

III. Preventing or Containing Renewed Fighting in Bosnia

- A. Diplomatic Strategy.....State*
- B. Strategy/Options for Strengthening
UNPROFOR.....JCS*/OSD/State

* Paper Due 12 Noon April 13.

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DIST: BERGER, DOHSE, FUERTH, LAKE, REED, SENS, SIT, SODERBERG, WOLIN, CLARKER,
CRESSEY, KERRICK, LAKEA, SAUNDERS, STEPHENS, SUM, SUM2, VERSHBOW, WHSR_SPECIAL

PREC: IMMEDIATE CLASS: ~~SECRET~~ DTG: 121236Z APR 95

FM: AMEMBASSY BELGRADE

TO:
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5483

////

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 BELGRADE 001773

NODIS

EUR FOR FRASURE AND EUR/SCE
NSC FOR VERSHBOW

FROM CHRIS HILL

E.O. 12356:DECL
TAGS:
SUBJECT: MILOSEVIC ON BOSNIA RECOGNITION: NO

REF: STATE 86669

1. ~~SECRET~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT

2. SUMMARY. MILOSEVIC REPLIED TO THE CONTACT GROUP PROPOSAL ON RECOGNIZING BOSNIA (REFTEL) WITH A CLEAR NO, AN ASSESSMENT SHARED BY ALL MEMBERS OF THE CONTACT GROUP AFTER AN APRIL 11 FIVE-HOUR MEETING/DINNER WHICH STARTED AT 6:00 P.M. HE EXPLAINED THAT TO RECOGNIZE THE CURRENT STATE OF BOSNIA (AS OPPOSED TO THE FUTURE UNION OF BOSNIA) WOULD BE TANTAMOUNT TO RECOGNITION OF THE IZETBEGOVIC GOVERNMENT, A MOVE WHICH WOULD BE "COUNTERPRODUCTIVE" AS IT WOULD DRIVE THE BOSNIAN SERBS INTO A WAR FEVER FED BY A SENSE OF ABANDONMENT AND BETRAYAL.

3. MILOSEVIC INSISTED THAT THE ONLY WAY TO CONVINCE THE BOSNIAN SERBS THAT THEY ARE ON THE WRONG TRACK IS TO OFFER BELGRADE "FULL SANCTIONS RELIEF IMMEDIATELY." MILOSEVIC DID NOT SHARE THE SENSE OF URGENCY ABOUT THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND IN BOSNIA. ALL SIDES HE BELIEVES -- INCLUDING IZETBEGOVIC -- ARE INTERESTED IN EXTENDING THE CEASE-FIRE. THE ONLY GLIMMER OF HOPE FOR THE RECOGNITION PACKAGE WAS WHEN AFTER FIVE HOURS,

~~SECRET~~

MILOSEVIC LOOKED DOWN AT THE TWO PAGE PROPOSAL LYING FACE DOWN ON THE TABLE IN FRONT OF HIM, AND SAID: "OKAY, I'LL READ IT." FOLLOWING THE MILOSEVIC MEETING, THE CG MET BRIEFLY AT THE FRENCH EMBASSY TO COMPARE NOTES AND TO CHASTISE RUSSIAN REP ZOTOV FOR HIS REFUSAL TO ENDORSE THE PROPOSAL IN FRONT OF MILOSEVIC AND FOR HIS COMMENTS TO THE PRESS CALLING FOR FULL SANCTIONS RELIEF. END SUMMARY.

4. BRITISH UK REP EHRMAN OPENED THE MARATHON MEETING WITH A 15 MINUTE POINT BY POINT DESCRIPTION OF THE CONTACT GROUP PROPOSAL EXPLAINING ALONG THE WAY THAT THE CONTACT GROUP WAS INCREASINGLY CONCERNED BY THE DETERIORATION OF THE CEASEFIRE AND THE POTENTIAL FOR ALL OUT WAR. MILOSEVIC STARED AT EHRMAN WITH A LOOK OF RAPT FASCINATION AND AT THE CONCLUSION ASKED: "IS THAT IT? THAT'S ALL?"

5. VISIBLY ANNOYED, MILOSEVIC SAID THAT HE HAD HEARD MOST OF THE ELEMENTS BEFORE, THAT THERE WAS NOTHING NEW. HE THEN SAID: "ON THE BASIS OF MY COUNTRY'S EARNEST EFFORTS ON BEHALF OF PEACE I EXPECT THAT YOU, THE CONTACT GROUP MEMBERS, WILL RECOMMEND UNANIMOUSLY THAT THE SANCTIONS AGAINST THE FRY BE LIFTED. WE HAVE, I BELIEVE, SERVED OUR PROBATIONARY PERIOD WITH FULL COOPERATION. NOW IS THE TIME FOR YOU TO RESPOND ACCORDINGLY." HE LOOKED OVER TO HIS SECRETARY, ASKED IF HE HAD GOTTEN IT ALL DOWN AND TOLD HIM TO TYPE IT UP AND DISTRIBUTE IT TO THE CONTACT GROUP. "THAT'S MY REPLY," HE EXPLAINED.

6. ASKED TO ELABORATE, MILOSEVIC SAID THAT HE HAS DISCUSSED THESE ISSUES "ENDLESSLY" WITH ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE CONTACT GROUP IN THE PAST. THE BOSNIAN SERBS ARE BECOMING MORE DIFFICULT TO REASON WITH. THIS IS DUE TO THE FAILURE OF THE CONTACT GROUP TO LIFT SANCTIONS AND HELP HIS POSITION AGAINST THE BOSNIAN SERBS WHO STUBBORNLY BELIEVE THAT THE CONTACT GROUP MUST BE ANTI-SERB. HE ADMONISHED HIS INTERLOCUTORS FOR "NOT SEEING THE SITUATION CLEARLY" AND FOR PAYING EXCESSIVE ATTENTION TO "MARGINAL GUYS" SUCH AS IZETBEGOVIC AND KARADZIC.

7. MILOSEVIC GLANCED AT THE PROPOSAL, ALLOWED THAT IT MIGHT BE AN EXPRESSION OF GOOD WILL BUT THAT IT MISSED THE POINT. "YOU KNOW WE HAVE NOTHING TO DO WITH THAT WAR" HE DECLARED. "IF YOU WANT TO SUPPORT PEACE IT IS LOGICAL TO SUPPORT THE ONLY RELIABLE FACTOR FIGHTING FOR PEACE, SERBIA." MILOSEVIC ADMITTED THAT HIS EFFORTS WITH THE PALE ASSEMBLY HAD GONE VERY SLOWLY, BUT EXPLAINED THAT THEY WOULD HAVE BORNE FRUIT HAD SERBIA BEEN GRANTED MORE SANCTIONS RELIEF WHEN HE MADE THE IMPORTANT DECISION TO SUPPORT THE CONTACT GROUP PLAN.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

8. MILOSEVIC PROFESSED DISBELIEF AT THE FAILURE OF THE CONTACT GROUP TO SEE HIS SIDE OF THINGS. "MAYBE YOU WANT TO KEEP THE WAR ON" HE THEORIZED. MILOSEVIC RACED THROUGH SOME RECENT HISTORY OF THE PEACE PROCESS, STARTING WITH THE VANCE-OWEN PLAN AND INSISTED THAT NOTHING SHORT OF FULL SANCTIONS RELIEF IS APPROPRIATE. "PARTIAL SUSPENSION MEANS NOTHING FOR US." GERMAN REP STEINER TRIED TO EXPLAIN THE ORIGINS OF PLAN "A" AND PLAN "B" BUT MILOSEVIC WAVED HIM OFF DECLARING: "WE HAVE PASSED
~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 BELGRADE 001773

NODIS

EUR FOR FRASURE AJD EUR/SCE
NSC FOR VERSHBOW

FROM CHRIS HILL

E.O. 12356:DECL

TAGS:

SUBJECT: MILOSEVIC ON BOSNIA RECOGNITION: NO

THE PROBATIONARY PERIOD: FIRST TWO MONTHS THEN 100 DAYS THEN ANOTHER 100 DAYS." SUSPENSION, HE EXPLAINED, IS A HUMILIATION, AND HE CITED THE CONTACT GROUP'S PROMISE TO GET NATURAL GAS INTO SERBIA, A DELIVERY WHICH NEVER CAME AND WHICH IN MILOSEVIC'S VIEW SHOWED " AN ABSENCE OF STYLE." HE ALSO MENTIONED THE HELICOPTER FLIGHTS AS A FIGMENT OF SOMEONE'S IMAGINATION. "THEY ARE PROBABLY MUSLIM OR TURKISH. BESIDES, THEY WERE HEARD GOING FROM BOSNIA INTO SERBIA. WHAT WOULD THEY BE CARRYING? WOOD AND POTATOES?"

9. MILOSEVIC INSISTED THAT HIS WILLINGNESS TO RECOGNIZE THE "BOSNIAN UNION" WAS A FAIR OFFER, BASED ENTIRELY ON THE CONTACT GROUP PLAN. US REP TOLD HIM WE WERE NOT INTERESTED IN A PROMISSORY NOTE. TO BE MEANINGFUL, RECOGNITION MUST BE OF THE EXISTING STATE OF BOSNIA. MILOSEVIC INSISTED THAT HIS WILLINGNESS TO RECOGNIZE THE FUTURE UNION WAS FIRM, AND SHOULD BE SEEN AS "RECOGNITION NOW" OF A FUTURE UNION. MILOSEVIC INSISTED THAT RECOGNITION OF THE UNION WOULD "BYPASS" KARADZIC AND PUT ALL THE PRESSURE NEEDED ON HIM, WITHOUT BEING COUNTERPRODUCTIVE. MILOSEVIC INSISTED THAT BOSNIA TODAY IS NOT A STATE, "IT'S A BATTLEFIELD." NONE OF THE CONTACT GROUP MEMBERS SHOWED ANY INTEREST IN PURSUING OTHER RECOGNITION CONCEPTS. THE FRENCH REP ALONE TRIED TO BE HELPFUL BY ADDING: "YOU CAN SAY YOU ONLY RECOGNIZE BOSNIA, NOT THE IZETBEGOVIC GOVERNMENT."

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

10. NOR DID ANY OF THE CONTACT GROUP ENGAGE MILOSEVIC WHEN HE TURNED TO THE SUBJECT OF THE FRY AS A SUCCESSOR STATE. NONE OF THE OTHER REPUBLICS OF THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA DISPUTE THE FRY'S STATUS AS SUCH, HE ARGUED. STEINER AND HILL TOLD HIM THEY WERE NOT INTERESTED IN PURSUING THIS ISSUE AT THIS TIME AND MILOSEVIC DROPPED IT.

11. MILOSEVIC SAID THAT THE WEST WILL EVENTUALLY HAVE NO CHOICE BUT TO DROP SANCTIONS. "YOU CANNOT KEEP SOMETHING IN PLACE WHICH IS HARMING 150 MILLION PEOPLE." IF RUSSIA WANTS TO LIFT THE SANCTIONS THAT WILL BE ENOUGH FOR SERBIA, HE ARGUED.

12. MILOSEVIC IS CONVINCED THAT CARTER WILL COME AND THAT KARADZIC WILL WELCOME HIM, AS THE FORMER PRESIDENT IS HIS TICKET TO RESPECTABILITY. "KARADZIC WILL LIE AGAIN TO CARTER. HE WILL NOT FOLLOW THROUGH ON ANY COMMITMENTS." HE WAS DERISIVE ABOUT THE BOSNIAN SERB LEADERSHIP, CALLING THEM ALL "LIARS". "KOLJEVIC IS DRUNK EVERY DAY BY 10:00 AM." AS FOR KARADZIC, "HE'S NOT A PSYCHIATRIST, HE'S A PATIENT!" MILOSEVIC SEES SOME POSSIBILITY THAT MLADIC WILL BREAK WITH HIS CIVILIAN LEADERSHIP. THE BOSNIAN SERB LEADERS, MILOSEVIC BELIEVES, ARE OBSESSED BY THE IDEA THAT IF THEY ACCEPT THE CONTACT GROUP PLAN WITH ITS MAP, THEY MAY BE STUCK WITH IT IF THEY ARE UNABLE TO WORK OUT THE SWAPS THAT THEY FEEL HAVE TO BE MADE, SUCH AS A 16 KM BRCZKO CORRIDOR. MILOSEVIC BELIEVES THE CONTACT GROUP MAY WANT TO HAVE CONTACTS WITH THE BANJA LUKA LEADERSHIP WHICH HE CLAIMS IS MUCH MORE ENLIGHTENED THAN THE CROWD FROM PALE. "BUT FIRST I'LL HAVE TO CHECK THIS OUT."

13. AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE EVENING, MILOSEVIC LOOKED DOWN AT THE CONTACT GROUP PROPOSAL AND SAID HE WOULD READ IT AND GET BACK TO THE GROUP WITH HIS COMMENTS. HE ACKNOWLEDGED, HOWEVER, THAT HIS DIFFERENCES ARE FUNDAMENTAL: HE WILL NOT RECOGNIZE THE EXISTING STATE OF BOSNIA, AND HE WILL ACCEPT NO LESS THAN FULL SANCTIONS RELIEF.

14. COMMENT: THE CONTACT GROUP MET BRIEFLY AT MIDNIGHT AT THE FRENCH EMBASSY TO COMPARE NOTES. EVERYONE AGREED THAT DESPITE HIS WILLINGNESS TO STUDY THE PROPOSAL, MILOSEVIC HAD GIVEN THE GROUP A FIRM NO. THE MEMBERS AGREED THAT HE ACTED AS THOUGH HE WAS UNDER LITTLE PRESSURE, AND DID NOT EVEN SHARE THE VIEW THAT THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND IN BOSNIA WAS GETTING OUT OF HAND.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

15. AT THE END OF THE POST-MORTEM, THE GROUP PUT ZOTOV IN THE HOT SEAT FOR HIS COMMENTS TO THE BELGRADE PRESS EARLIER IN THE DAY TO THE EFFECT THAT MOSCOW SUPPORTS FULL SANCTIONS RELIEF. STEINER, LOOKING INTENTLY OVER HIS WIRE RIMMED ~~SECRET~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 BELGRADE 001773

NODIS

EUR FOR FRASURE AND EUR/SCE
NSC FOR VERSHBOW

FROM CHRIS HILL

E.O. 12356:DECL

TAGS:

SUBJECT: MILOSEVIC ON BOSNIA RECOGNITION: NO

GLASSES, HELD UP THE CG PROPOSAL IN HIS HAND AND ASKED ZOTOV WHETHER HIS GOVERNMENT SUPPORTED IT. ZOTOV, VISIBLY PERSPIRING AND TUGGING AT HIS COLLAR, EXPLAINED THAT HE CONSIDERED IT NOT AS A CONTACT GROUP PROPOSAL, BUT RATHER AS SOMETHING "WORKED OUT IN THE CONTACT GROUP." ZOTOV PLEADED: "IT WAS THE BEST I COULD DO." PERINA
BT
#1773

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<^SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 03

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<^TOR>950412085003 M1615531

<^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 03

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<^TOR>950412085004 M1615532

<^SECT>SECTION: 03 OF 03

<^SSN>1773

<^TOR>950412085006 M1615533

FROM:
SITREPT

~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002b. cable	Re: Contact Group Meeting with President Tudjman (2 pages)	04/12/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Drew, Nelson/Bremner, Sue)
OA/Box Number: 696

FOLDER TITLE:

PC/DC [Principals Committee/Deputies Committee] Meetings on Bosnia, April 1995 [2]

2012-0798-F
ke3048

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

CROATIA

UN efforts to develop operational plans for UNCRO are lagging, and the situation on the ground in Croatia remains uncertain and tense. This presents two dangers for limiting the Balkan conflict to a small war in Bosnia. First, hostilities could result as both sides flex their muscle with clashes, cease-fire violations, exercises, and other provocations. The most serious of these has been the Croatian advance west from Bosnia toward Croatian Serb headquarters in Knin.

The second danger is that international energy will be consumed by getting UNCRO deployed, instead of using the limited time UNCRO buys us to push for settlement talks. Without progress toward reintegration and reconciliation in Croatia, we will have a much harder time keeping Zagreb on the path of peaceful means in dealing with the Serbs.

The parties remain far apart on what they will agree to publicly regarding UNCRO's presence and operations. The UN Secretariat therefore plans to propose a general, "implementable" plan for UNCRO next week and ask the UNSC to approve it irrespective of whether the parties embrace it entirely. This approach reflects the reality that important details of UNCRO's operations will only be defined in day-to-day operations on the ground. Ambassador Albright emphasized to UN representatives Akashi and Stoltenberg Wednesday that time is limited and the plan they present to the UNSC must be in line with the Gore-Tudjman Copenhagen announcement.

We must try to meet minimum Croatian expectations that Zagreb gets something out of all the recent fuss besides a name change. GOC anxiety that Tudjman will be seen at home as having sold out is real. This is reflected in Croatia's latest letter to Boutros Ghali, which is tough in putting demands on UNCRO that are not entirely reasonable. From our viewpoint, UN redeployment out of the UNPA's and onto their periphery, i.e. the separation zone and the international border, is important. What the border force actually does is less important, provided it at least puts more soldiers at checkpoints that UNPROFOR did.

At the same time, we should try to launch direct talks between Knin and Zagreb. We would start by approaching the other Z-4 members (EU, Russia, UN) and encouraging them to support such an effort. While pushing for political talks in order to start people on both sides thinking about the prospect of serious negotiations, we could at first focus on the economic confidence-building measures, implementation of which has bogged down in some cases.

~~SECRET~~

DRAFT

DRAFT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

13/4/95 19:22

INFORMATION PAPER

1. (U) Purpose. To provide the interagency information on the status of the OPLAN 40104 NATO/US decision timeline approval process.

2. ~~(S)~~ Key Points

- While the NATO alliance fully supports a diplomatic solution to the crisis, the fact remains a withdrawal from Bosnia is still a real possibility.
- On 29 March SACEUR updated the NAC on the status of OPLAN 40104 and the flexibility of the OPLAN to respond to an emergency withdrawal. In response to SACEUR request, the Military Committee forwarded a memorandum recommending directing/authorizing SACEUR the following:
 - be prepared to execute on order from NAC, OPLAN 40104 in full for a withdrawal of UNPROFOR from either B-H or Croatia or both.
 - be prepared to execute on order from NAC, limited operations either in B-H or Croatia or both based on OPLAN 40104
 - * to request the assembly and training, and the deployment of forces in respect of Step 2 Minimum Measures.
 - * to request national identification of remaining Step 2 forces
 - * to request national identification of Military-Civilian Relations, Maritime and Air Forces
 - * to request identification of Main forces
- * French broke silence; but finally agreed to deployment of Minimum Step 2.
- France's decision will delay the next step of 40104 by approximately three weeks. An informal MC will meet weekly, to consider national comments to 40104.
- Once NAC approves OPLAN, for emergency withdrawal SACEUR will need:
 - authority to request assembly and training of remaining Step 2 forces
 - authority to request identification, assembly and training for MCR, Maritime and Air Forces
 - authority to request identification, assembly and training for Main forces

Prepared by: John E. Roberti, LCDR, USN, EURDIV, 49435
N:\EUR\EUCENEA\NATO\OPLAN 40104\4104UPD2.ISS

DRAFT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DRAFT

Classified By: Multiple Sources
Declassify On: OADR

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002c. chart	Re: OPLAN 40104 - UNPROFOR Withdrawal (1 page)	04/00/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Drew, Nelson/Bremner, Sue)
OA/Box Number: 696

FOLDER TITLE:

PC/DC [Principals Committee/Deputies Committee] Meetings on Bosnia, April 1995 [2]

2012-0798-F
kc3048

RESTRICTION CODES

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002d. paper	Re: Information Paper [To provide information on the status of decisions concerning the OPLAN 40104...] (1 page)	04/13/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Drew, Nelson/Bremner, Sue)
OA/Box Number: 696

FOLDER TITLE:

PC/DC [Principals Committee/Deputies Committee] Meetings on Bosnia, April 1995 [2]

2012-0798-F
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NOTIONAL LEGISLATIVE STRATEGY
'LIFT AND EXTRACT'

Key Dates

April 14: Principals Committee Meeting
April 21: UN vote on extension of limited sanctions relief
April 24: Senate resumes
April 30: Cessation of Hostilities ends
May 1: House Resumes
May 9: Moscow Summit

Already planned or scheduled events

April 19: SecState lunch with Rep. Livingston
April 29: SecDef breakfast with Gingrich
May 2/3: House: Consultative Group (SecState, SecDef, CJCS, NSA, USUNAmb) Possible Senate (Tentative) also.

Individual Contacts:

Senate

Republicans

Sen. Stevens
Sen. Bond
Sen. Coverdell
Sen. Coats
Sen. Burns
Sen. Hutchison

Democrats

Sen. Boxer
Sen. Bryan
Sen. Kerry
Sen. Levin
Sen. Moseley-Braun
Sen. Robb
Sen. Simon
Sen. Wellstone
Sen. Lieberman
Sen. Bradley

House

Rep. Gingrich
Rep. Armev (voted against lift last year)
Rep. DeLay (")
Rep. Hyde

Potential group briefings:

Senate Freshmen (Senators Snowe, Santorum, Grams, Kyl, Thomas and Inhofe supported unilateral lift in the House)
Sen. Lugar (SFRC Subcommittee on Europe)
Sen. Warner (Armed Services Subcommittee on AirLand Forces)
Sen. Hatfield (Appropriations Committee)
Sen. Thurmond (Armed Services) (voted for lift)
Sen. Daschle (DPC)
Key Senate opponents of lift (Sens. Nunn, Lugar, Sarbanes, Kerry, Kerrey)

Rep. Livingston (Appropriations) (voted for lift)
Rep. Spence (National Security)
Rep. Hamilton (HIRC Democrats)
Rep. Combest (HPSCI)
Democratic Freshmen and Sophomores
Reps. Peterson, Reed, and Spratt (House Democratic Task Force on National Security)

Schedule:

Week of April 17: Staff calls to interested Members re sanctions vote (Leadership, DOD Big Eight, State Big Twelve plus Levin, Biden, Lugar, Lieberman)

Week of April 24:

--Individual briefings for Senators on lift and ops plan.

--Possible briefing for key Members of Armed Services at Pentagon

--Perry meeting with Gingrich

--Placement of lift and extract op eds

Week of May 1:

--Formal presentation of ops plan to funding and authorizing committees; Group briefing team plus budgeteers

--Consultative Group for House leadership (possibly also Senate)

--Individual and Group briefings for House Members (can slip depending on planned House consideration of Gilman bill)

Week of May 8:

--Continuation of and follow up on previous week activities.

Briefing Teams*:

Group briefings: Tarnoff, Slocombe, Clark

Individual briefings: Holbrooke, Kruzel, JCS rep

*Should include Budget people (S/RPP, DoD Comptroller) as appropriate for Appropriations committees.

BOSNIA: GOING FOR A SMALL WAR

Milosevic's firm and final "no" to the Contact Group on April 11 leaves international diplomatic efforts on Bosnia at a dead-end. Meanwhile, the Bosnian Government is understandably distrustful of a Carter mission and we expect nothing to come from the initiative. Senior Carter Center officials say the former President is unlikely to re-enter the fray without both sides' concurrence. These developments have ended any realistic chance that Izetbegovic's conditions for extending the cease-fire -- Milosevic's recognition of Bosnia or Karadzic's acceptance of the Contact Group plan -- will be met.

For purposes of Allied solidarity and in the hope that it can be revived at a later date, we should keep the Contact Group in mothballs, ready to be used should events on the ground merit. Representatives can and should continue to meet, as they will next Wednesday in Vienna. At the same time, we should not portray the Group as alive and well -- and working on ideas to bring the conflict to an end. This would only damage our credibility, both in the region and with our public and press.

With the diplomatic track exhausted, we must now focus on keeping the fighting to the lowest possible levels. This means convincing an extremely reluctant Bosnian Government that this is in its interest. Bob Frasure will travel to Sarajevo next week to sound out Bosnian leaders. He will press for private assurances that the stakes will not be raised in the fighting to come, particularly in and around Sarajevo. The Bosnians, however, feeling they have no choice, may decide that a dramatic gesture -- either an attempt to open a corridor to Sarajevo or asking for UNPROFOR withdrawal -- is their only hope for creating movement towards a settlement. We should therefore be prepared to offer incentives for keeping the fighting to a minimum.

With diplomacy at a dead-end, there are two possible incentives for use in approaching the Bosnians: 1) working for a robust UNPROFOR and 2) introducing a UN resolution that blesses the Contact Group map.

General Joulwan believes that UNPROFOR Commander Rupert Smith views the latest Serb outrages in Sarajevo and Gorazde as tests of his mettle. While we do not necessarily share General Joulwan's optimism, a more robust UNPROFOR (as opposed to a beefed up UNPROFOR) is one of the few remaining carrots to offer the Bosnians in return for moderation on the battlefield. In addition, a robust UNPROFOR, which in essence means an UNPROFOR ready to enforce the exclusion zones, would help deflate pressure on the Hill for lifting the arms embargo. If the political will exists on our side, we should continue pressuring the British and French to accept this point. If not, the option holds little prospect for success.

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-2-

Another point of leverage worth exploring is a UN resolution that blesses the Contact Group plan and map, something Silajdzic has sought for several months. The idea is to tie a UNSC resolution to continuation of the cease-fire or a private commitment to limit fighting. Bosnian doubts about Allied and Russian resolve in sticking to the map might lead them to pursue such a trade-off. However, whether this is enough to convince the Bosnians to delay action on a matter of supreme national interest is highly questionable.

Any other options we may have -- e.g., further isolating Karadzic, reimposing sanctions on Milosevic -- are long-term strategies with little chance for putting off new fighting. In fact, in the short-term more pressure on the Serbs is likely to exacerbate fighting.

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13-Apr-95 13:01

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

INFORMATION PAPER

1. (U) Purpose. To provide options, and a strategy, to strengthen UNPROFOR.
2. (U) Background. The Principals Committee met 28 March 1995 and agreed the US should immediately approach the British and French to explore measures to strengthen UNPROFOR in Bosnia.
3. (S) Assessment. At the 11 April Troop Contributors Meeting (TCM), Mr. Akashi and GEN Janvier recounted UNPROFOR's successes, most of which they feel are not recognized. Additionally, they indicated the equipment and manpower previously offered by nations, and subsequently accepted by the UN, is all that is needed. This is a clear indication of UNPROFOR priorities and the likelihood that they would not accept any new initiatives.
CJCS's lengthy discussion with the British CHOD indicated great reluctance on the part of the British. However, the CJCS and his British and French counterparts have agreed to discuss these options at a flag officer/staff level meeting next week. The British, French, and the UN will likely resist all efforts to move UNPROFOR beyond a current Chapter VI impartial posture. Our major leverage is their concern in preventing US Congressional action on unilateral lift. We should use this leverage to encourage UNPROFOR to act with a stronger hand to enforce the current mandate.
4. (S) Options. There are specific options that may strengthen UNPROFOR ability to perform within its mandate. These include:

- **Securing Sarajevo and Tuzla Airports.** The focal points of international interest in the conflict. Measures would include securing the perimeter, approaches, high terrain, and buildings. Establish a safe zone with increased armored patrols, and airborne immediate response capability.
- **Establishing a ground corridor between Konjic and Sarajevo.** Would ensure the free flow of aid into Sarajevo. This would require forces trained in crowd control, armored self-protection of convoys, combat engineers, TACPs moving with convoys, and a "quick reaction force."
- **Establish ground corridors between Sarajevo and eastern enclaves.** Same as above, would ensure free flow of aid to enclaves.
- **Create cease fire lines.** UNPROFOR, without use of force, can not physically separate the warring factions. This initiative must be one fought

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Declassify On: OADR

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on the political front, and decided among the warring parties. A cessation of hostilities or peace agreement is required to define cease fire lines.

- **Increase the number of, and consolidate UNPROFOR into, safe areas and exclusion zones.** Protects the civilian population and ensures access for aid. Not compatible with the use of the safe areas for military activities. Enforcing demilitarization requires increases in UNPROFOR's capability. Need to provide ground and air mobility assets, and a "quick reaction force" securing the safe areas. Will require secure lines of communication to safe areas to ensure delivery of aid.
- **Enhance capabilities within UNPROFOR.** Provide heavy lift helicopters, engineer battalions, UNMOs, civilian police, TACPs, counter battery radars, and mobility assets.

5. (C) Execution Strategy. To execute this initiative the following steps are necessary:

- CJCS contact British and French CHODs proposing new initiative. (Complete)
- Expand US proposals (shown above), study options for effectiveness and risk. Provide to British and French on 18 April.
- Convene a tri-lateral flag/staff working group 19-20 April in Washington. (Scheduled)
- Brief tri-lateral proposal to CHODs (possibly off line at the MC/CS) and refer to capitals by end of April.
- Brief to President 1 May. Consult with Congress, if necessary, on 2-5 May.
- Introduce initiative to UNSYG, SRSG, UNPROFOR Commanders by 8 May.

6. (C) Summary. Proactive actions to deliver humanitarian aid and permit freedom of movement for UNPROFOR must be carefully weighed against the associated risks and benefits. Strict enforcement of these measures may place UNPROFOR at odds with both the GOBH and the SRBH. Impartiality and the delivery of humanitarian assistance are UNPROFOR's first priorities.

Prepared by: John Roberti, LCDR, USN

European Division, J-5, Ext 49431.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003a. memo	Don Kerrick to Anthony Lake, re: April 28 Principals Meeting on Bosnia (4 pages)	04/27/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Drew, Nelson/Bremner, Sue)
OA/Box Number: 696

FOLDER TITLE:

PC/DC [Principals Committee/Deputies Committee] Meetings on Bosnia, April 1995 [2]

2012-0798-F
ke3048

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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20525

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

By YDE NARA, Date 04/08/15

2012-0148-F

PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA AND CROATIA

DATE: April 28, 1995

LOCATION: White House Situation Room

TIME: 4:30-6:00pm

Agenda

- I. Near-Term Diplomatic Strategy
 - A. Contact Group Prospects/Response to the Milosevic Proposal.....State**
 - B. Sanctions Options for Recognition.....OVP**
- II. OPLAN 40104 Briefing.....JCS

** - Paper Due 9:00am April 27.

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DIST: SIT, CLARKER, CRESSEY, KERRICK, SAUNDERS, STEPHENS, SUM, SUM2, VERSHBOW,
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PREC: IMMEDIATE CLASS: ~~SECRET~~ DTG:261652Z APR 95

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NODIS

OP CENTER PLS PASS EUR A/S HOLBROOKE AND DAS FRASURE
NSC FOR VERSHBOW

E.O. 12356: DECL

TAGS: PREL, SR

SUBJECT: MILOSEVIC'S APRIL 26 MEETING WITH UK CHARGE

REF: BELGRADE 1868 → *follows this cable* →

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. UK CHARGE ROBERTS HAS GIVEN US A BRIEF READ-OUT OF
HIS APRIL 26 MEETING WITH MILOSEVIC, AT WHICH ROBERTS
WAS INSTRUCTED BY LONDON TO SEEK CONFIRMATION OF
MILOSEVIC'S INTERPRETATION OF THE PAPER RECEIVED ON
APRIL 17 (REFTEL).

3. ROBERTS SAID THAT HE WROTE OUT HIS SPEAKING NOTES
(AND PASSED THE PAPER TO MILOSEVIC) SO THAT THERE WOULD
BE NO MISUNDERSTANDING BY MILOSEVIC OF WHAT THE UK WAS
ASKING. THE FULL TEXT OF THESE SPEAKING NOTES IS
TRANSMITTED IN PARA 7 BELOW.

4. ACCORDING TO ROBERTS, MILOSEVIC READ THE PAPER
CAREFULLY AND THEN RESPONDED THAT HE WAS PUZZLED BY THIS
NEED FOR CLARIFICATION, SINCE THE PAPER WAS FULLY
CONSISTENT WITH HIS OWN PROPOSAL OF APRIL 17. IN THE
DISCUSSION OF MODALITIES, MILOSEVIC SAID HE DID NOT
UNDERSTAND WHY EVERYTHING COULD NOT BE HANDLED BY ONE
PAPER, BUT DID NOT SEE THIS ISSUE AS A LARGE PROBLEM.

5. THE CONTENTIOUS DISCUSSION CENTERED AROUND HOW MUCH
SANCTIONS RELIEF WOULD BE PROVIDED BY THE CONTACT GROUP,
WITH MILOSEVIC CONTINUING TO INSIST ON "LIFTING" OF ALL
SANCTIONS. ROBERTS REPORTEDLY ARGUED THAT THIS WAS NOT

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003b. cable	Re: Milosevic's April 26 Meeting with UK Charge [partial] (2 pages)	04/26/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Drew, Nelson/Bremner, Sue)
OA/Box Number: 696

FOLDER TITLE:

PC/DC [Principals Committee/Deputies Committee] Meetings on Bosnia, April 1995 [2]

2012-0798-F
kc3048

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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POSSIBLE, AS HE HAD ALREADY EXPLAINED LAST TIME, BUT
THAT SANCTIONS RELIEF COULD BE "SUBSTANTIAL." [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
(b)(1)

[003b]

[REDACTED] MILOSEVIC DID
NOT RESPOND POSITIVELY BUT INSTEAD ARGUED THAT OIL AND
FUEL WERE IN HIS VIEW NON-STRATEGIC, AND THAT SUSPENSION
RATHER THAN LIFT WAS IN ANY CASE HUMILIATING AND SUBJECT
TO REVERSAL THROUGH FABRICATIONS SUCH AS THE HELICOPTER
CHARGES. HE STRONGLY COMPLAINED IN THIS CONTEXT ABOUT
UNSCR 988 AND HOW IT AGAIN SHOWED THE UNWILLINGNESS OF
THE CONTACT GROUP COUNTRIES TO WORK WITH HIM
CONSTRUCTIVELY.

6. IN SUMMING UP THE DISCUSSION, ROBERTS SAID THAT
MILOSEVIC CONFIRMED ALL ASPECTS OF THE PROPOSAL AS
OUTLINED ON APRIL 17 BUT MADE CLEAR THAT THE DEGREE OF
SANCTIONS RELIEF REMAINED AN UNRESOLVED ISSUE, WITH
TOUGH NEGOTIATIONS AHEAD TO FIND COMMON GROUND.

7. BEGIN TEXT OF UK SPEAKING NOTES:

[REDACTED]
(b)(1)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(b)(1)

PERINA

FROM:
SITREPT

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003c. cable	Re: Milosevic's Response to Contact Group Paper on Recognition (4 pages)	04/17/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Drew, Nelson/Bremner, Sue)
OA/Box Number: 696

FOLDER TITLE:

PC/DC [Principals Committee/Deputies Committee] Meetings on Bosnia, April 1995 [2]

2012-0798-F
ke3048

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003d. chart	Re: UK-FR Proposal (1 page)	04/00/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

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National Security Council
European Affairs (Drew, Nelson/Bremner, Sue)
OA/Box Number: 696

FOLDER TITLE:

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2012-0798-F
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
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

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Sanctions Relief in Return for Tighter Border Closure and Bosnian Recognition



¹ All suspensions are for successive, limited periods. UNSC action required to extend suspensions.

Continuation of suspensions to depend on continued progress toward negotiated settlement of the conflicts.

² Strategic goods include crude oil, petroleum products, coal, energy-related equipment, iron, steel, other metals, chemicals, rubber, tires, vehicles, aircraft, and motors of all types.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003e. paper	Re: Unanswered Policy Questions on NATO Support for UNPROFOR Withdrawal (4 pages)	04/00/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Drew, Nelson/Bremner, Sue)
OA/Box Number: 696

FOLDER TITLE:

PC/DC [Principals Committee/Deputies Committee] Meetings on Bosnia, April 1995 [2]

2012-0798-F
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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

TO: AGENCIES

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White House Guidelines,

FROM: SENS

September 11, 2006

DOC DATE: 25 APR 95

SOURCE REF:

by KDE NARA, Date 04/08/15
2012-0798-F

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
AGENDA

CROATIA
PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION OF PC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA 28 APR

ACTION: SENS SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DUE DATE: 28 APR 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK

LOGREF:

FILES: IFM

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BERGER
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DOC 2 OF 2

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RECORD ID: 9520525

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 LAKE
002

Z 95042514 FOR DECISION
X 95042607 SENS SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

<u>DOC</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>DISPATCH FOR ACTION</u>	<u>DISPATCH FOR INFO</u>
002	950425	FUERTH, L	
002	950425	BRILL, K	
002	950425	MCALKEER, R	
002	950425	INDERFURTH, K	
002	950425	ADAMS, G	
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Initials: YDE Date: 04/08/95

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DATE 25 APR 95

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DATE 25 APR 95

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PAGE 02 OF 02 PAGES

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(NAME)(202) 456-9425
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(ROOM NO.)MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Notification & Agenda for 28 Apr PC
Meeting on Bosnia & Croatia NSC LOG # 20525

<u>TO (AGENCY)</u>	<u>DELIVER TO</u>	<u>DEPT/ROOM NO.</u>	<u>PHONE NUMBE</u>
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<u>State</u>	<u>Executive Secretary</u>	_____	_____
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<u>USUN</u>	<u>Ofc. of the Rep. of the U.S.</u>	_____	_____
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<u>CIA</u>	<u>Executive Secretary</u>	_____	_____
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<u>JCS</u>	<u>Secretary, Joint Staff</u>	_____	_____
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REMARKS:

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004. fax	Fax coversheet [partial] (1 page)	04/00/1995	b(7)(C)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Drew, Nelson/Bremner, Sue)
OA/Box Number: 696

FOLDER TITLE:

PC/DC [Principals Committee/Deputies Committee] Meetings on Bosnia, April 1995 [2]

2012-0798-F
ke3048

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~SECRET~~

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

WHSR CONTROL
TIME OF RECEIPT

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: VDE Date: 04/08/15

2012-0798-F

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE

- ☐ FLASH
☒ IMMEDIATE
☐ PRIORITY
☐ ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DATE/TIME: _____

MESSAGE #: _____

FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR
SUBJECT: Notice of Meeting: 29 Apr PC on Bosnia PAGES: Cover + 2

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

NSC 20525

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
<u>USUN New York</u>	<u>Mr. Rick Inderfurth</u>	<u>212-415-4016</u>	<u>(b)(7)c</u>

[004]

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

~~SECRET~~

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Exec Sec Office has diskette UG

LOG # 20525 A/O

DOCLOG ARS

SYSTEM: PRS NSC INT

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL /DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon			
Dohse	<u>1</u>	<u>D</u>	
Sens	<u>4</u>	<u>AOR</u>	
Soderberg	<u>copy</u>		
Berger	<u>2</u>	<u>AW</u>	
Lake	<u>3</u>	<u>Nat'l Sec Advisor</u>	
Situation Room		<u>has seen</u>	
West Wing Desk	<u>5</u>	<u>McC 4/25</u>	<u>D</u>
NSC/Rm	<u>6</u>		<u>N</u>

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

CC:

COMMENTS:

Apr 28 PC mtg NDM + Agents

APR 28 1975

Special Dispatch Instructions:

~~SECRET~~

20525

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

April 25, 1995

By VDC NARA, Date 04/08/15

2012-098-F

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the U.S. to the UN

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for National
Security & International
Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

MR. LEON PANETTA
Chief of Staff to the President

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. T. R. PATRICK
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia (S)

There will be a Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia and Croatia on April 28, 1995, 4:30-6:00 p.m., in the White House Situation Room. Attendance will be principals only. The agenda is attached at Tab A. Papers should be circulated by the designated Agency by 9:00 a.m., April 27. (S)



Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Agenda

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

20525

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

By YDE NARA, Date 04/08/15
2012-098-F

PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA AND CROATIA

DATE: April 28, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 4:30-6:00 p.m.

Agenda

- I. Near-Term Diplomatic Strategy
 - A. Contact Group Prospects/Response to the Milosevic Proposal.....State**
 - B. Sanctions Options for Recognition.....OVP**
- II. OPLAN 40104 Briefing.....JCS

** - Paper Due 9:00 a.m., April 27.

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

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20525

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

April 25, 1995

By VDE NARA, Date 04/08/15

2012-0798-F

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *AV*

FROM: DON KERRICK *(K)*

SUBJECT: Principals Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia,
April 28, 1995

Attached at Tab A is the agenda for the Principals' Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia to be held April 28, 1995. The memorandum to the agencies is attached at Tab I.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andy Sens to sign the memorandum to the agencies at Tab I.

Approve *AK* Disapprove

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the Agencies

Tab A Agenda

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

TO: AGENCIES

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

FROM: SENS

September 11, 2006

DOC DATE: 20 APR 95
SOURCE REF:

By KDE NARA, Date 04/08/15
2012-0798-F

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA

PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: PC TASKING ON SARAJEVO SITUATION

ACTION: SENS SGD MEMO

DUE DATE: 03 MAY 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK

LOGREF:

FILES: IFM

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BASS

BERGER

KERRICK

LAKE

NSC CHRON

SODERBERG

VERSHBOW

COMMENTS:

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DATE

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DOC

2 OF

2

~~SECRET~~

RECORD ID: 9520557

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 LAKE
002

Z 95050107 FOR DECISION
X 95050107 SENS SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

002 950420 FUERTH, L
002 950420 BRILL, K
002 950420 ADAMS, G
002 950420 MCALEER, R
002 950420 INDERFURTH, K
002 950420 GARTHOFF, D
002 950420 PATRICK, T

~~SECRET~~

National Security Council
The White House

Exec Sec Office has diskette YD LOG # 20557 A/O _____
DOCLOG MBN SYSTEM: PRS NSC INT

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL /DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon			
Dohse	<u>1</u>	<u>D</u>	
Sens			
Soderberg	<u>copy</u> ✓		
Berger	<u>copy</u>		
Lake	<u>2</u>		
Situation Room		<u>Kbw</u>	<u>signed and sent out</u>
West Wing Desk		<u>[Signature]</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>
NSC/Rm			

A = Active

CC:

COMME

20557
Approved by
Lake

N = No Further Action

Per Dohse, signed
by SDO for Sens
and sent out
to addressees.

Special I

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Initials: KDE Date: 0410815

2012-098-F

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9520557
DATE 20 APR 95

SUBJECT: PC TASKING ON SARAJEVO SITUATION
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA LARRY BRANSCUM ROOM 290, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1 _____
MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1 _____
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1 _____

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC SECRETARIAT, ROOM 379 OEOB
PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

WHITE HOUSE
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1995 APR 30 PM 4:12

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TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

CIA

APR 30
23 PM '95

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OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

Initials: VDE Date: 04/08/15
2012-0708-F

RELEASER: Kevin B. Wooten
DTG: _____

** Corrected Copy **

MESSAGE NO.: 0911 CLASSIFICATION: SECRET TOTAL: 3
(PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: WHSR (NAME) _____ (PHONE NUMBER) _____ (ROOM NO.) _____

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: PRINCIPAL TASKING ON SARATEVO
SITUATION (S)

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
3 STATE	Kenneth Brill	Exec Sec	
1 DoD	Col Robert McAleen	Exec Sec	
CIA	Douglas F. Ganthoff	Exec Sec	
JCS	Col T.R. Patrick	Secretary, Joint Staff	
USUN	Ambassador Rick Underfuth		

REMARKS:

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 30, 1995

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the U.S. to the UN

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for National
Security & International
Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. T. R. PATRICK
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Principals Tasking on Sarajevo Situation ~~(S)~~

Principals met Friday, April 28, 1995 and directed the Bosnia Interagency Working Group to immediately conduct a review of the current situation in Sarajevo -- where violations of the exclusion zone have increased and where the Bosnian Serbs have closed the Sarajevo airport to diplomatic and humanitarian relief flights in violation of the 1992 agreement. Accordingly, the following taskings are assigned:

Intelligence Assessment of Situation: Assessment should include, but need not be limited to, the current situation within the Sarajevo Exclusion Zone, Bosnian Serb intentions and goals; humanitarian relief situation; threats and anticipated reaction to efforts to fly into Sarajevo without Serb authorization; Serb response to a NATO ultimatum threatening airstrikes if Sarajevo airport is not reopened under the terms of the 1992 agreement; and Bosnian Government and other views and reactions. (Action: CIA, Suspense: COB May 1) ~~(S)~~

Review of Existing UN and NATO Mandates: Assessment of existing UN and NATO mandates that would permit the use of military force to reopen Sarajevo Airport, end the strangulation of Sarajevo, or escort flights into Sarajevo. (Action: State, with OSD/JCS input, Suspense: COB May 2) (S)

Military Options: Options to reopen Sarajevo airport; options to escort flights into Sarajevo; options to deter interference with airfield operations; options to deter or counter horizontal escalation in response to forced flights into Sarajevo or to punitive air strikes under NATO's August 1993 decision. (Action: JCS with OSD input, Suspense: COB May 2) (S)

Diplomatic Strategy: Political and diplomatic strategy to reopen Sarajevo airport under provisions of 1992 agreement; steps to gain Allied and UN support for tougher measures including forced entry should it become necessary or issuance of a NATO ultimatum under the August 1993 air strikes decision. (Action: State with OSD/JCS input, Suspense: COB May 2) (S)

Kevin B. Wooten
for Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

~~SECRET~~

20557

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D C 20506

By KDE NARA, Date 04/08/15 April 29, 1995
2012-0718-F
ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *h*
FROM: DON KERRICK *(D)*
SUBJECT: Principals Tasking on Sarajevo Situation

In response to Principals tasking, the Bosnia IWG has begun to review the situation in Sarajevo. Agencies have been informally tasked. Goal is to complete review by Wednesday. Attached memorandum formalizes tasking. Request release by OOB Monday.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andrew Sens to sign the memorandum to the agencies at Tab I.

Approve *DK* Disapprove

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to Agency Counterparts

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR