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Folder Title:

PC/DC [Principals Committee/Deputies Committee] Meetings on Bosnia, March 1995 [7]

Staff Office-Individual:

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696

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33	2	6	1	v

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	BG Don Kerrick to Samuel Berger, re: March 2 Deputies Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia (4 pages)	03/01/1995	P1/b(1)
001b. paper	Re: Draft Discussion Paper (5 pages)	03/00/1995	P1/b(1)
001c. paper	Re: Croatia Discussion Paper: Possible Incentives & Disincentives (3 pages)	03/00/1995	P1/b(1)
001d. paper	Re: Decision Paper (2 pages)	03/01/1995	P1/b(1)
001e. report	Re: The Balkans: The Next Three Months (6 pages)	02/24/1995	P1/b(1)
001f. list	Re: Balkan Policy Review Issues/Decisions (2 pages)	02/00/1995	P1/b(1)
002a. fax	Fax Coversheet [partial] (1 page)	03/00/1995	b(7)(C)
002b. note	Handwritten notes from Deputies Committee Meeting (7 pages)	02/28/1995	P1/b(1)
003. note	Handwritten notes from Deputies Committee Meeting (10 pages)	03/02/1995	P1/b(1)

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Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Drew, Nelson/Bremner, Sue)
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FOLDER TITLE:

PC/DC [Principals Committee/Deputies Committee] Meetings on Bosnia, March 1995
[7]

2012-0798-F
ke3045

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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TAB A



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DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

20256

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

By KDE NARA, Date 04/07/15

2012-0798-F

DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA AND CROATIA

DATE: March 2, 1995

LOCATION: White House Situation Room

TIME: TBD

Agenda

- I. Near-Term Croatia Strategy.....State
- II. NATO Prepositioning - Step Two.....JCS
- III. Former Yugoslavia Policy Review.....NSC/All

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Declassify on: OADR

TAB 3

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001b. paper	Re: Draft Discussion Paper (5 pages)	03/00/1995	P1/b(1)

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TAB C

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001d. paper	Re: Decision Paper (2 pages)	03/01/1995	P1/b(1)

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TAB D

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DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

February 27, 1995

FORMER YUGOSLAVIA POLICY REVIEW

Introduction

As we approach a potentially critical period in the Balkans over the next three months, now is the time to review the fundamental principles guiding our policy. U.S. policy has, in fact, had some success over the past two years in containing the spread of the war, reducing the level of violence, keeping relief supplies flowing to most areas, and maintaining cohesion with Allies and Russia. What we have been unable to produce is a political settlement in Bosnia or Croatia that rolls back Serb gains sufficiently to be acceptable to the Bosnians and Croats, and to be perceived as "fair" (much less "just") in moral terms.

The fundamental problem has been a lack of leverage: sanctions and political pressure have been insufficient to sway the Serbs, and our efforts to bring NATO air power to bear have come to naught. In Bosnia, after almost a year of effort, the Contact Group is becoming a spent force, with its unity increasingly strained. In Croatia, the Z-4 plan for a political solution is, for all intents and purposes, stillborn, and Tudjman's decision to eject UNPROFOR threatens to destroy even the limited economic confidence-building measures developed over the past year.

As the CIA paper makes clear, there is no "peace faction" among any of the parties, and Milosevic's willingness to pressure his Serb cousins is limited. If we stay on our present course, the prospects are for an escalation of the war in Bosnia and a new war in Croatia, with the potential unraveling of our limited achievements to date, and increased pressures for U.S. involvement. The differences between the optimistic and pessimistic scenarios are largely ones of timing and degree. And as the risk of war increases in Bosnia and Croatia, the dangers of spillover to other areas grow as well.

If the war escalates, the withdrawal of UNPROFOR from Croatia, Bosnia or both will become increasingly likely -- creating the prospect of U.S. troops on the ground in former Yugoslavia in a hostile environment, the outcome we have most sought to avoid. As international efforts founder, the Bosnians will be able to make an increasingly convincing case for lifting the arms embargo; yet the odds of bringing our Allies and, especially, the Russians along will remain low. Moreover, lifting the arms embargo, to be effective, entails the United States taking other actions that increase our involvement and responsibility.

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Interests and Objectives

Throughout the conflict, we have sought to protect several core U.S. interests: maintaining our strategic relationship with key Allies and protecting the credibility of NATO; avoiding a conflict with Russia that could undermine our efforts to promote reform and international cooperation; preventing the spread of the Bosnian conflict into a wider Balkan war that could destabilize southeastern Europe and draw in U.S. allies; and ensuring that the use of force to change borders and acts of genocide do not become legitimate forms of behavior in post-Cold War Europe.

Along with these core interests, we have pursued a range of more specific objectives, but have never set clear priorities among them:

- To stop or limit the fighting.
- To maintain relief supplies and reduce human suffering.
- To prevent the establishment by force of a Greater Serbia.
- To achieve a negotiated settlement acceptable to all parties that reverses at least some Serb territorial conquests and preserves the territorial integrity and international identity of Bosnia, Croatia and other ex-Yugoslav states.
- To prevent the spread of conflict to Kosovo, Macedonia, Albania and beyond.
- To keep U.S. ground forces out except in the context of implementing a political settlement.

The tools we have applied have varied over time in response to events, and as our priorities have shifted: Until the end of 1994, we sought to use NATO military power to enforce UNSC resolutions and to put pressure on the Bosnian Serbs to settle on terms that provided a better deal for the Bosnian Government ("air power in the service of diplomacy"). After Bihac, however, we consciously shifted the emphasis to maintaining NATO cohesion, recognizing that this would erode U.S. and Alliance credibility and reduce further our negotiating leverage. Yet we did not scale back our political objectives to match our reduced leverage -- leading to the present diplomatic impasse.

The result has been charges of fecklessness and an erosion of confidence in U.S. leadership on other issues. Therefore, we now need to step back and confront these inherent contradictions:

- On the one hand, our own principles, as well as public and Congressional pressures, make it difficult to disengage and effectively abandon the Bosnians.

- On the other hand, we do not presently have the means to attain the political goal we have set -- negotiated settlements that deprive the Serbs of some of their ill-gotten gains -- and we have not been prepared to commit those means. Moreover, there is limited public support in the U.S. or in Europe for doing so.

Basic Strategic Choices

Many of our decisions over the next 2-3 months will be driven by events on the ground. But some of our choices will depend on where we want to go in the longer term. Therefore, before considering specific options, Principals need to decide our overall strategic direction and whether the course chosen is politically sustainable. This, in turn, requires deciding what are our priority interests and sticking with that decision in terms of committing the resources needed to attain our goals. The following, in broad terms, are basic approaches to be considered:

1. Continue our present policy; muddle through while supporting the Bosnians: Maintain the Contact Group and continue to seek a political solution that provides a better deal for the Bosnians, but not commit to increased military pressure on their behalf; rely for leverage on sanctions and efforts to isolate the Bosnian and Krajina Serbs (recognizing that these will be inadequate to the task). Seek to contain the fighting and humanitarian suffering to the extent possible, while maintaining Alliance cohesion. Keep UNPROFOR in place in essentially its present form (improve its effectiveness, but don't press it to take a more confrontational stance against the Serbs). Seek to postpone any lifting of the arms embargo and don't push for use of NATO air power, since this would precipitate UNPROFOR's withdrawal. Continue to sustain the Federation. Take additional measures in the front-line states to contain spillover of the conflict, such as beefing up UNPROFOR/Macedonia.
 - This would maintain European and Russian support, reduce the risks of deeper U.S. military involvement, and recognize that, absent such involvement, political settlements are not achievable in the foreseeable future.
 - The gap between our goal of a "fair" settlement and our unwillingness to provide the means to that end, however, would leave us vulnerable to charges of diplomatic fecklessness. It would be difficult to persuade the public and pro-Bosnian elements in the Congress that, over time, the maintenance of sanctions, a continued stalemate on the ground, and the solidity of the Federation will bring the Bosnian Serbs to accept a settlement along the lines of the

Contact Group plan, and the Krajina Serbs to accept autonomy within Croatia.

- The main weakness of this approach, however, is that the Bosnians and the Croats are not prepared to play along: Both are ready to pursue the military option with renewed vigor over the coming months, putting UNPROFOR's presence in doubt. And the Bosnians will campaign for lift when the ceasefire ends. Our continued rhetorical support for their cause would make it difficult for us to oppose.

2. Adopt a policy of neutrality toward the terms of a settlement and focus on active containment of the conflict: Openly acknowledge that achieving a better solution for the Bosnians is not possible without U.S. actions that it is not in our interest to take. Apart from this shift in approach to the diplomatic track, take essentially the same actions as under the previous approach. Make clear we do not believe multilateral lift is politically attainable and strongly oppose Congressional pressures to lift unilaterally. Abandon Contact Group or suspend its activities, making clear that it is up to the parties, not the international community, to find a mutually acceptable solution. Promote periodic ceasefire agreements. Advise the Bosnians of the need to be realistic about the facts on the ground and agree to terms that acknowledge Serb preeminence (accept territorial outcomes short of 51:49, Serb Confederation with Belgrade; seek protection through links to Croatia, etc.).

- This course would also maintain good relations with the Europeans, avoid a confrontation with Russia, and reduce the potential for U.S. military involvement. We would concentrate our efforts in areas where we have been able to achieve some success: reducing the violence, delivering humanitarian relief, maintaining the Muslim-Croat ceasefire and the Federation, and preventing the spread of the conflict outside of Bosnia and possibly Croatia. By distancing ourselves from the Bosnians' political agenda, we might have greater success in keeping UNPROFOR in place.
- We would suffer harsh criticism from some quarters in the Congress and the public for abandoning the Bosnians and performing another flip-flop. We would need to make the case that it is not in U.S. interests to intervene unilaterally to ensure Bosnian victory, that we cannot gain European or Russian support for firmer measures to help the Bosnians, and that lift alone would probably make things worse for them in any case. We would want to appeal to the significant number of Congressmen whose support for lift is soft, and who are not keen on the deeper military involvement that a credible lift-and-strike policy would require.

- Assuming we can ride out the initial storm, this approach would lower expectations and adjust public opinion to the reality of a continued conflict for which there may be no immediate solution. It would put the onus on the parties to negotiate directly with one another, rather than forcing us to explain repeated failed diplomatic initiatives backed by empty threats. It would force the Bosnians to accept the reality of defeat and the fact that they are destined to live surrounded by Serbs. It might even lead to a de facto indefinite cessation of serious hostilities, reducing both human suffering and public pressures for action.
- The problem with this approach, like the first, is that we may not be able to ride out the storm: the Bosnians may succeed in getting Congress to lift unilaterally, possibly with sufficient votes to override a Presidential veto. Moreover, we would, effectively, be acquiescing in Serb aggression, setting a dangerous precedent for the future.

3. Containment of Conflict and Long-Term Quarantine of Greater Serbia: Abandon efforts to negotiate a political settlement and reimpose full sanctions against Serbia for the long haul. Make clear we will refuse to recognize Serb conquests in Bosnia and Croatia and we will continue to treat Serbia as a pariah state until Serbs accept settlements that restore territorial integrity of Bosnia and Croatia. Refrain from military intervention, take laissez-faire approach to continued fighting among the parties. Concentrate on humanitarian aid, bolstering the Federation politically and economically, and containing spillover to other parts of the region. If UNPROFOR were to withdraw, this could be combined with a lift-and-leave strategy.

- This approach would be analogous to our approach to Soviet domination of Central and Eastern Europe during the Cold War, in which we were prepared to wait for decades for a just outcome -- isolating one party while promoting free-market development in the other. It would be based, again, on a recognition that there is no available political solution, and avoid perpetuating false expectations that the international community can impose a settlement. But in contrast to the previous approach, it would be based as well on a judgment that Milosevic remains the problem rather than the solution, despite his recent attempts to play the peacemaker -- distinguishing the victim from the victimizer.
- It is doubtful Russia would agree if we reimposed the sanctions noose around Serbia, however. We might agree with the Russians to disagree about Serbia, perhaps lifting or suspending some or all multilateral sanctions against the FRY -- but maintaining U.S. sanctions -- in exchange for agreement on continued, tightened sanctions against the Pale

and Knin Serbs (but recognizing that Milosevic will try to undermine these to the extent he can get away with it).

- The front-line states' enforcement of sanctions would be difficult to sustain absent substantial financial compensation. Without such compensation, long-term continuation of the sanctions could actually have a destabilizing effect on the region overall. Moreover, this long-term approach could result in further Serb territorial expansion and prolong the humanitarian and refugee crisis for years to come.
- As with approaches 1 and 2, it is not clear we could sustain this course in the face of pressure from the Congress and the Bosnians.

4. Increased U.S. commitment in support of Bosnians, apply military pressure to compel Serb acceptance of a settlement: In theory, this could involve either: (a) returning to our 1994 approach: press for a more robust UNPROFOR that is prepared to use force against Serbs and make active use of NATO close air support; resume NATO enforcement of exclusion zones, and possibly establish additional exclusion zones; if these measures prove insufficient, withdraw UNPROFOR and implement a multilateral lift-and-strike strategy; or (b) proceeding directly to lift and strike, after helping UNPROFOR to withdraw. In practice, only (b) is feasible, since Allies will not agree to robust military actions while their vulnerable UNPROFOR forces remain in place.

- This would align our policy with Congressional rhetoric and provide the means to back up our declared goals of helping the Bosnians and thwarting Serb ambitions. It would lead to increased fighting, at least in the short term, but might in time give the Bosnians the capability to recover territory and, by altering the situation on the battlefield, convince the Serbs to agree to an equitable political settlement.
- It would, however, create significant strains in our relations with our Allies and the Russians. Our readiness to participate in NATO extraction of UNPROFOR could provide the leverage to win Allied support in the UNSC for multilateral lift. But preventing a Russian veto would be more difficult. It would, at a minimum, require lifting sanctions against Serbia at the same time (although this may be necessary in any event to encourage Milosevic not to resume military support to his Serb cousins).
- Moreover, withdrawing UNPROFOR and explicitly committing to produce a Bosnian success would hasten the onset of the situation we have sought most to avoid, the deployment of U.S. ground forces, leaving us with the responsibility for organizing relief supplies and protecting the enclaves. And

lift - whether unilateral or multilateral -- would commit us to arming and training the Bosnians for an indefinite period, as well as providing air cover, even if we tried to set a time limit on our support. In short, it could Americanize the war, with little likelihood of hastening a political settlement.

Near-Term Decisions

The foregoing choices pertain mainly to the decisions we will need to take in the coming months on Bosnia. In Croatia, the situation may be more urgent, and our goal more straightforward: to prevent a new war over the Krajina. To this end, we need to be clear at the outset that we do not support Croatian military action to reassert control over the Krajina Serbs, and increase pressure on Tudjman to retain at least some portion of UNPROFOR interposed between the warring parties in the separation zone. We cannot go too far in imposing punitive measures on Tudjman, however, given the importance of Tudjman's support for the Federation and our need to use Croatian territory to support any UN/NATO/U.S. operation in Bosnia. We must above all avoid driving Tudjman into an unholy alliance with Milosevic to carve up Bosnia.

Finally, to the extent that we decide to focus more on containment of spillover, beefing up or replacing UNPROFOR in Macedonia would take on greater urgency alongside the decisions that we will need to make with respect to Bosnia and Croatia.

With these considerations in mind, the following is a sketch of the options on which decisions will be needed over the next three months.

Options: Croatia

Near Term:

- Make renewed push (in tandem with Germans and other Allies) within next 10 days to convince Tudjman to extend UNPROFOR with reduced mandate (UNPROFOR Lite).
- Fallback: Press for one-time extension of March 31/June 30 deadlines to allow more time for negotiations.

Issue: Whether to threaten limited punitive actions at this stage? Or should we offer Tudjman a carrot?

If these initial efforts fail:

- Begin Step Two prepositioning for UNPROFOR withdrawal from Bosnia or Croatia no later than March 8 (will require Congressional consultations and decisions on funding).
- Offer new, high-level international negotiator to negotiate Croatian settlement, in tandem with final push for acceptance of UNPROFOR Lite.
- Agree in principle to Croatian proposal for international task force (ITF) to replace UNPROFOR that would monitor Croatian-Bosnian border *on condition that* Tudjman agrees to extend ceasefire, agrees the force will also police the separation zone, and agrees to negotiate with Krajina Serbs on basis of principles in Z-4 plan.

Issues: Is ITF feasible? (Border force would be highly vulnerable to attack or hostage-taking by Bosnian and Krajina Serb forces, who have traditionally viewed such a force as threat to their survival, and whose acceptance would be a *sine qua non*. Allies would look to U.S. to join the force. But some token presence on the border may be the fig leaf Tudjman needs to back down on ejection of UNPROFOR; Krajina Serbs may accept if it is only way to keep international forces in separation zone.)

Who would comprise the force? (Unarmed civilian monitors? Joint international-Croatian-Krajina Serb police force? NATO? WEU, backed by U.S. air support -- but recognizing that effectiveness would be limited without TACPs?)

Medium Term:

- Withdraw UNPROFOR from Croatia

Issues: Nature of U.S. participation?

How to discourage Tudjman from using NATO forces as cover for early offensive (sanctions or other punitive steps? carrots?).

How to deter Krajina Serbs from seizing vacated UNPROFOR positions or threatening NATO forces (air strike threat?)

- Introduce civilian monitors to replace UNPROFOR (e.g. OSCE)

Long Term (post-UNPROFOR withdrawal):

- Contain fighting: Establish no-fly zone in Croatia? Other measures?

- Decide whether to let Tudjman fend for himself (allowing possible Serb victory) or to provide limited support, despite our warnings that he will be on his own.

Options: BosniaNear Term:

- Keep Plan B on the table.

Issues: If so, for how long? Possible modifications/extensions that aren't sweeteners -- e.g. put forward detailed proposal on constitutional arrangements for future Bosnian Union?)

- Consider staged or scaled-back Plan B -- i.e. ask Milosevic to identify the steps he would take in "partial recognition" of Bosnia and Croatia, determine whether they could be linked to limited sanctions relief.

Issues: What could Milosevic do beyond tightening border closure to justify sanctions relief? (We could not justify additional relief for tightening a border that should be sealed already. Possibilities: close the "back door" to Croatia; cooperate with the War Crimes Tribunal; recognize Bosnia's border and territorial integrity but not the Sarajevo Government.)

Should we take parallel steps in support of Bosnians to reduce Bosnian/Congressional criticism -- e.g. IMET, other training for Bosnians?

- Continue efforts to isolate Pale irrespective of Plan B: increase border monitors; close Krajina back door.
- Consider whether to reduce or end the activity of the Contact Group as such, in order to emphasize the need for the parties themselves to undertake territorial and constitutional discussions. (This would permit private or individual mediators to operate.) Or agree to French international conference without prior agreement on mutual recognition?
- Explore efforts to increase international support for the Federation: material assistance and political support (envoys to and from, participation in international conferences, agreements such as our proposed 505 agreement, etc.)
- Approach the UN to reconsider its decision not to expand UNPROFOR with the troops already offered (i.e. urge UN to increase UNPROFOR numerically to enable it to deliver humanitarian assistance more effectively, especially along the Blue Route, as opposed to changing its ROE).

Medium Term:

Decision depends on the choice of overall strategic approach as described above:

- Muddle through, continue to support Bosnians rhetorically, continue diplomatic efforts, but focus on containment.
- Shift to policy of neutrality toward terms of settlement and active containment of conflict; end or suspend Contact Group activities, acknowledge we cannot produce better deal for Bosnians.
- Containment of conflict and long-term quarantine of Greater Serbia.
- Renewed push for military measures in support of Bosnians: withdraw UNPROFOR, multilateral lift and strike

Long Term:

- Maintain support for Federation to forestall Muslim-Croat splits. Intensify isolation of Pale and Knin Serbs.
- Maintain support for War Crimes Tribunal.
- Withdraw UNPROFOR, lift the arms embargo, with lift possibly implemented in stages (beginning with defensive weapons) and tied to "final offer" to accept Contact Group plan.

Issue: Are we prepared to lift unilaterally if Allies support us in UNSC but Russians veto? Alternatives to lift?

- Abandon support for lift, take tough line with Congress and Bosnians, stick with one of the containment options.

Options: Containing Spillover

- Beef up or replace UNPROFOR/Macedonia

Issues: When and how? (Enlarge existing force under UN command? Replace with NATO division?)

- Continue efforts to defuse Greece/FYROM dispute.
- Shore up outer wall of sanctions against Serbia.
- Expand bilateral aid/infrastructure programs in south Balkans.
- Expand bilateral military cooperation and economic cooperation with Albania, Bulgaria, Macedonia.
- High-level visits to front-line states.

Decision Timeline

See chart

Attachments:

CIA paper - The Balkans: The Next Three Months
Decision Timeline

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001e. report	Re: The Balkans: The Next Three Months (6 pages)	02/24/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Drew, Nelson/Bremner, Sue)
OA/Box Number: 696

FOLDER TITLE:

PC/DC [Principals Committee/Deputies Committee] Meetings on Bosnia, March 1995
[7]

2012-0798-F
ke3045

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]


C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]



Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001f. list	Re: Balkan Policy Review Issues/Decisions (2 pages)	02/00/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Drew, Nelson/Bremner, Sue)
OA/Box Number: 696

FOLDER TITLE:

PC/DC [Principals Committee/Deputies Committee] Meetings on Bosnia, March 1995
[7]

2012-0798-F
ke3045

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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TAB F

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

DRAFT
~~SECRET~~

The International Military Presence in Macedonia: Regional Stability and Containment

Purpose

This paper provides a strategy to retain international military forces in Macedonia and surrounding countries to contain the further spread of war in the Balkans should UNPROFOR withdraw from Croatia and Bosnia and fighting increase there. This military strategy is designed to support the long-term stabilization of Macedonia as an area critical to spread of war further into the southern tier of Europe.

Background

The Principals' Committee meeting on February 7, 1995, directed more comprehensive planning on options to contain the conflict in Bosnia and Croatia. Pressure is growing for the withdrawal of UNPROFOR from the former Yugoslavia, and the prospects for renewed fighting in both Croatia and Bosnia are high in the Spring. Given Macedonia's importance to stability in Southern Europe, the Principals directed that special attention be given to strengthening forces in Macedonia to provide stability through deterrence of military threats to Macedonia.

National Interests

Preventing the spread of war in the Balkans is a vital national security interest of the United States, and Macedonia is the center of gravity to containing conflict in Southern Europe. Regional war would threaten the overall stability of Europe and could trigger a conflict between Greece and Turkey, thereby further straining NATO in an increasingly volatile area. The US commitment to stability in Macedonia is well-established. This Administration has reaffirmed the Bush Administration's announcement in December 1992 that the US would employ military force against the Serbians in Kosovo and Serbia proper in the event of conflict in Kosovo caused by Serbian action. While the threat of Serbian caused violence is low, the consequence of a large refugee flow into Macedonia is grave for the entire region.

The Threat: Why Focus on Macedonia?

The sizable ethnic Albania minority in Macedonia makes it likely that should Macedonia be destabilized, the Albanians will move to merge those ethnically Albanian dominated areas within Macedonia with Albania. An upheaval in Kosovo, which is 90% ethnic Albanian, would result in massive refugee flows that would present Macedonia with insupportable economic, political, and security problems. This is the greatest threat to the region in general for it is the most likely condition to destabilize Macedonia and lead to a land grab of at least parts of Macedonia with the potential to draw in NATO allies Greece and Turkey on opposite sides, Russia, Serbia, and Bulgaria.

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The greatest threat to Macedonian stability is its internal condition undermined by external factors. The combined effects of enforcing the UN-mandated economic sanctions on Macedonia's major trading partner, Serbia, and the closure of the border with Greece, have led to deteriorating and grave economic difficulties--30% unemployment, per capita income at 1964 levels, and industrial output operating at 40% efficiency. These problems only exacerbate ethnic tensions. At the same time, Macedonian nationalists have become more militant. It is conceivable that the fragile democracy that Gligorov has built cannot survive these pressures.

In sum, Macedonia is the most politically, economically, and militarily vulnerable of the states in the region, and its political and military collapse would trigger a preventable wider Balkan war.

Options.

Four options are available to support an international military presence in Macedonia. These include:

1. A NATO deployment;
2. A U.S. led, multinational deployment,
3. A U.S. unilateral deployment,
4. Retain UNPROFOR.

The disadvantages and dangers inherent in any unilateral U.S. action would likely aggravate regional tensions. Such action would risk NATO, PFP, and our emerging partnership with Russia. Moreover, the American people would likely be particularly hesitant to support any U.S. involvement of ground combat forces without a similar commitment from our NATO allies. Finally, it would be logistically difficult if not impossible to get so involved without the direct support of our NATO allies.

A U.S.-led multinational (but not NATO) suffers from many of the disadvantages of a unilateral U.S. action, and does not enjoy the existing infrastructure advantages of a NATO-run operation.

A NATO-run containment strategy has intrinsic merit. Containment of the conflict is a European problem first and foremost, and NATO has the existing political and military infrastructure to support such activities. An exclusively NATO-led operation would not be plagued by the dual-key, chain-of-command difficulties that have characterized UN-NATO command relationships in Bosnia to date. Even so, such an enhanced NATO-controlled operation also risks heightening regional tensions. Without the economic assistance and political stabilization package, such a strategy would not address internally-based stability concerns.

The status quo option is based on the premise that the current UNPROFOR mission and force structure not only is adequate to respond to the current threat environment, but also that any increase in the in the size of the forces would be counterproductive in the long-term--that it would be destabilizing by provoking internal unrest.

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Proposed Concept

Given the withdrawal of UNPROFOR from the former Yugoslavia and the potential for conflict among Serbia, Croatia, and the warring parties in Bosnia, the deployment of a more capable NATO force to Macedonia and associated sites in the southern Balkans is designed to deter a wider Balkan war. It should be equipped and have the ROE to carry out its assigned mission. This deployment is expected to be of indefinite duration. It should be under NATO command and control (C2), operating under a UN mandate. It is intended to send a strong international and internal signal regarding its commitment to preserve internal and regional stability in Southern Europe, thereby containing the present conflict to the former Yugoslavia.

Mandate

The principal focus of this strategy is not the areas of conflict themselves but rather the areas of potential conflict in the countries surrounding Bosnia. Authority for the operations will emanate from a UN mandate, but under NATO C2.

General Mission

An appropriately sized NATO ground force, with significant U.S. participation and with appropriate air and naval support in the region, will deploy to Macedonia. This force will deter threats to Macedonia and preserve the inviolability of Macedonia's internationally recognized borders, thereby enhancing internal and regional stability and prevent the spread of war throughout the Balkans.

Forces and Operations

- Deploy an appropriately sized NATO force to Macedonia;
- NATO force is under exclusive NATO command and control;
- Consider increasing NATO naval presence in the Adriatic;
- Consider increasing NATO air forces deployed to the region; consider basing in Albania.

Assumptions

- NATO will concentrate on containment of the conflict vice active ground involvement in the former Yugoslavia.
- Macedonia will accept the NATO deployment and permit the full use of its military infrastructure.
- UN sanctions against Serbia will not be part of the NATO mission.
- Russia, Turkey, and Greece cannot prevent this deployment.
- UNPROFOR has withdrawn from Bosnia and Croatia.
- Deployment will be under permissive conditions--logistics hubs, overflight and transit rights, and SOFAs will be available.
- Funding arrangements will be acceptable to the U.S.

~~SECRET~~

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20282 REDO

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

March 6, 1995

By WDC NARA, Date 04/07/15

2012-0798-F

ACTION

Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

SIGNED

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *W*

FROM: BG DON KERRICK *(P)*

SUBJECT: Memorandum to the President on U.S. Support for
Step Two of NATO Prepositioning

Attached at Tab A is a memorandum to the President seeking his approval to support Step Two Prepositioning at NATO. Have reworked per Sandy Berger's request.

Concurrences by: *(P)* Alan Kreczko, Bill Danvers *(P)*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab A.

Attachment

Tab A Memorandum to the President

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON
March 9, 1995

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

3/11/95

✓
MR. PRESIDENT

Attached is a decision memo from Tony Lake on U.S. participation in NATO's "Step Two" prepositioning of communications systems for use in possible withdrawal of UNPROFOR troops from Croatia. Step Two would involve agreement to deploy some 450 U.S. military personnel in Europe, 320 of them in Croatia -- though actual deployment would be subject to a further decision of the NAC.

Pros: Our participation would send the right signal about U.S. leadership in NATO. Our allies' forces on the ground are in danger and we must not be seen obstructing NATO military planning needed to protect them. Cons: prepositioning could embolden Tudjman to keep refusing any UNPROFOR successor force, moving us toward commitment of a large-scale ground force to help extract UNPROFOR, and in turn leading to a wider war.

Our allies would prefer to keep UNPROFOR in place and are reluctant to proceed with Step Two deployment at this time, fearing this could hasten UNPROFOR's departure and open the way for air strikes and lifting the arms embargo. But deployment may become unavoidable.

While recognizing the real risks, NSC Principals recommend approval of U.S. participation in Step Two. Leon and George concur, though George is concerned that this might trigger a War Powers debate. We have forwarded a copy of the memo to the Vice President. If you approve, State and Defense will consult with Congress next week before informing NATO of our decision.]

John Podesta *JP*
Todd Stern *TS*

Tony

I want to review
when the VP returns
for trip - visit w/ Tudjman

BC

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 6, 1995

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**

95 MAR 6 P9:26

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE ✓

SUBJECT: U.S. Participation in Step Two of NATO
Prepositioning for UNPROFOR Withdrawal

Purpose

To obtain your agreement for U.S. forces' participation in Step Two of NATO prepositioning for UNPROFOR withdrawal.

Background

Principals met Friday to discuss U.S. participation in Step Two of NATO's ongoing efforts to prepare to support a possible UNPROFOR withdrawal from Bosnia or Croatia. We are seeking your approval to inform NATO that the United States agrees to support Step Two of NATO's efforts to preposition communications systems and operators in Croatia. Step Two includes deployment of approximately 450 U.S. military personnel within Europe, including 320 to government-controlled areas of Croatia, although the timing of the actual deployment of the prepositioning force will be subject to a subsequent NAC decision.

NATO and UNPROFOR military planning for UNPROFOR's possible withdrawal from Bosnia has been underway for several months. With UNPROFOR withdrawal a possibility this spring, NATO began to take action in February by executing Step One, which initiated the process of establishing an enhanced theater communications system. No U.S. forces were involved. With Step One well underway, NATO is seeking approval to execute Step Two, which will deploy military personnel to set up and operate the communications system.

Prepositioning is a necessary step to support a large operation. Nearly 1800 personnel are involved, including the 450 Americans. The total NATO cost for prepositioning is estimated at \$11.3M and comes from existing NATO funds (the U.S. pays 25 percent), although we will pay our own transportation and sustainment costs. An orderly withdrawal of UNPROFOR cannot begin until

eight weeks after the prepositioning occurs; thus Shali argues that delaying a decision will put Allied forces at risk.

This decision would carry significant risks, even though it would send the right signal about U.S. leadership in NATO, support our military leaders and maximize military preparedness. In the worst case, it could set in motion a series of events leading to UNPROFOR's withdrawal and renewed fighting, with NATO and U.S. forces left on the ground to deal with the aftermath. Tudjman might welcome the NATO deployment as a stepping stone to a larger NATO and U.S. ground role as UNPROFOR's replacement. Emboldened by NATO and U.S. forces in Croatia, Tudjman could become even more intransigent on accepting an UNPROFOR successor force. This could move us closer to an actual commitment of ground forces for a large-scale operation to extract UNPROFOR, the exact dimensions of which will remain unknown until the plan is completed in about two weeks. With NATO on the ground, or positioned to extract UNPROFOR, the decision to withdraw UNPROFOR will be easier for the UN and troop contributors to make. If they withdraw, renewed fighting is a certainty and the wider war we feared will have been facilitated by NATO's deployment into Croatia. While we anticipate a subsequent NAC decision will be taken to deploy the forces into Croatia, with each incremental step, it becomes more unlikely that our decision will be reversible. In fact, if NATO decides to conduct the operation, large-scale U.S. participation is inevitable.


Not all Allies support prepositioning, so our decision may prove academic for the time being. The French have been the most adamant, calling for a delay on the grounds that putting NATO personnel on the ground in Croatia would undermine efforts to change Tudjman's mind. Other Allies have voiced similar concerns and fear that NATO prepositioning will set in train the steps described above, leading to UNPROFOR's withdrawal and the wider war that diplomatic efforts aim to prevent. They also see UNPROFOR's departure as the opening to lifting the arms embargo and accompanying air strikes. Allies prefer to keep UNPROFOR in place and muddle through.

After balancing the risks against the military requirements, Principals decided that, because of the danger to our Allies who have forces on the ground and to sustain our leadership of the Alliance, we should make the commitment to support Step Two. This will permit the personnel to be organized and trained, with their actual deployment subject to a further decision by the NAC. Principals agreed that we will not press those Allies who are reluctant to execute Step Two but that it is important that the U.S. not be seen as obstructing NATO military planning needed to reduce the risks to Allied forces.

Principals also concluded that, in view of the Congressional interest that the deployment of 320 U.S. military personnel to Croatia will generate, consultations must be completed before informing NATO of our decision. We would seek to cast this as a limited, precautionary move that is being taken without prejudice to a possible future decision to help in a NATO-led withdrawal of UNPROFOR. We would make clear that we intend to consult closely with the Congress on the latter (more formidable) undertaking and seek prior Congressional approval of the necessary funding. If you agree, State and Defense will brief leadership and key committee chairs early next week.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize U.S. representatives at NATO to support Step Two prepositioning, subject to consultations with Congress, and with the actual deployment of U.S. personnel to Croatia subject to a subsequent NAC and Principals' decision.

Approve  discuss

Disapprove _____

~~SECRET~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9520282
RECEIVED: 03 MAR 95 18

TO: PRESIDENT

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

FROM: LAKE

September 11, 2006

DOC DATE: 06 MAR 95
SOURCE REF:

By KOE NARA, Date CH107115
2012-0728-F

KEYWORDS: NATO
UN

PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: FOLLOW UP TO 3 MAR PC MTG ON NATO EXPANSION - US PARTICIPATION IN
STEP II OF NATO PREPOSITIONING FOR UNPROFOR WITHDRAWAL

ACTION: PRES APPROVED W/ COMMENT

DUE DATE: 07 MAR 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK

LOGREF:

FILES: IFM

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

DANVERS
KERRICK
KRECZKO
NSC CHRON
VERSHBOW

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSGP

CLOSED BY: NSKDB

DOC 3 OF 3

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~~SECRET~~

RECORD ID: 9520282

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 LAKE	Z 95030319 FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR DECISION
001 KERRICK	Z 95030412 FOR REDO
002 LAKE	Z 95030616 FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR DECISION
003 PRESIDENT	Z 95030621 FOR DECISION
003	X 95031117 PRES APPROVED W/ COMMENT

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

003	950306	VICE PRESIDENT
003	950306	WH CHIEF OF STAFF

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

~~SECRET~~
THE WHITE HOUSE

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

3/11/95

WASHINGTON
March 9, 1995

✓
MR. PRESIDENT

Attached is a decision memo from Tony Lake on U.S. participation in NATO's "Step Two" prepositioning of communications systems for use in possible withdrawal of UNPROFOR troops from Croatia. Step Two would involve agreement to deploy some 450 U.S. military personnel in Europe, 320 of them in Croatia -- though actual deployment would be subject to a further decision of the NAC.

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John Podesta *JP*
Todd Stern *TS*

Tony

I want to revisit
when the VP returns
for trip - visit of Tudjman

BC

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 6, 1995

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**

65 MAR 6 09:26

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE ✓

SUBJECT: U.S. Participation in Step Two of NATO
Prepositioning for UNPROFOR Withdrawal

Purpose

To obtain your agreement for U.S. forces' participation in Step Two of NATO prepositioning for UNPROFOR withdrawal.

Background

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eight weeks after the prepositioning occurs; thus Shali argues that delaying a decision will put Allied forces at risk.

This decision would carry significant risks, even though it would send the right signal about U.S. leadership in NATO, support our military leaders and maximize military preparedness. In the worst case, it could set in motion a series of events leading to UNPROFOR's withdrawal and renewed fighting, with NATO and U.S. forces left on the ground to deal with the aftermath. Tudjman might welcome the NATO deployment as a stepping stone to a larger NATO and U.S. ground role as UNPROFOR's replacement. Emboldened by NATO and U.S. forces in Croatia, Tudjman could become even more intransigent on accepting an UNPROFOR successor force. This could move us closer to an actual commitment of ground forces for a large-scale operation to extract UNPROFOR, the exact dimensions of which will remain unknown until the plan is completed in about two weeks. With NATO on the ground, or positioned to extract UNPROFOR, the decision to withdraw UNPROFOR will be easier for the UN and troop contributors to make. If they withdraw, renewed fighting is a certainty and the wider war we feared will have been facilitated by NATO's deployment into Croatia. While we anticipate a subsequent NAC decision will be taken to deploy the forces into Croatia, with each incremental step, it becomes more unlikely that our decision will be reversible. In fact, if NATO decides to conduct the operation, large-scale U.S. participation is inevitable.

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
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Principals also concluded that, in view of the Congressional interest that the deployment of 320 U.S. military personnel to Croatia will generate, consultations must be completed before informing NATO of our decision. We would seek to cast this as a limited, precautionary move that is being taken without prejudice to a possible future decision to help in a NATO-led withdrawal of UNPROFOR. We would make clear that we intend to consult closely with the Congress on the latter (more formidable) undertaking and seek prior Congressional approval of the necessary funding. If you agree, State and Defense will brief leadership and key committee chairs early next week.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize U.S. representatives at NATO to support Step Two prepositioning, subject to consultations with Congress, and with the actual deployment of U.S. personnel to Croatia subject to a subsequent NAC and Principals' decision.

Approve

A handwritten signature, possibly "D. A. ...", is written over a horizontal line. A large checkmark is drawn over the signature.

Disapprove

~~SECRET~~

20282 REDO

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D C 20506

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

March 6, 1995

By VDE NARA, Date 04101115

2000-0798-F

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *W*

FROM: BG DON KERRICK *(C)*

SUBJECT: Memorandum to the President on U.S. Support for
Step Two of NATO Prepositioning

Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

SIGNED

Attached at Tab A is a memorandum to the President seeking his approval to support Step Two Prepositioning at NATO. Have reworked per Sandy Berger's request.

Concurrences by: Alan Kreczko, Bill Danvers

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab A.

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum to the President

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

20282

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

March 3, 1995

By KDE NARA, Date 04/07/15

2012-048-F

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *AV*

FROM: BG DON KERRICK *(D)*

SUBJECT: Memorandum to the President on U.S. Support for
Step Two of NATO Prepositioning.

Attached at Tab A is a memorandum to the President seeking his
approval to support Step Two Prepositioning at NATO.

Concurrences by: *(D)* Alan Kreczko, Bill Danvers

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab A.

*Have memorandum
per State Dept
signed.*

Attachment

Tab A Memorandum to the President

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

TO: AGENCIES

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

FROM: SENS

By YDE NARA, Date 04/04/15
2012-0728-1

DOC DATE: 01 MAR 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
DC

CROATIA
SOC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 28 FEB DC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA

ACTION: REED SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DUE DATE: 04 MAR 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK

LOGREF:

FILES: IFM

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BAKER JANE
KERRICK
KRECZKO
NSC CHRON
SODERBERG
VERSHBOW

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY AB

DATE 3/1

BY HAND

W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJDA

CLOSED BY: NSKDB

DOC 2 OF 2

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS

Initials: KDE Date: 04/07/95

2012-0798-F

Y COUNCIL
EIP

LOG 9520255
DATE 01 MAR 95

LOG 9520255
ATE 01 MAR 95

OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 28 FEB DC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA
ICATION: ~~SECRET~~

ATIA

UTION:

DATE

TIME

SIGNATURE

TURE

CK

STAFF

PRINT LAST NAME: _____

0318-0001

COPY: VIA FAX

1

: 1

: VIA FAX

: 1

: VIA FAX

Y: VIA FAX

THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC SECRETARIAT, ROOM 379 OEGB

PAGE 02 OF 02 PAGES

OM 379 OEGB

1 OF 02 PAGES

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: VDT Date: 0410715

RELEASER: _____

DTG: _____

2012-0798-F

MESSAGE NO.: _____ CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 4
(PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (202) 456-9425 WH SITROOM
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 28 FEB DC MTG ON BOSNIA

NSC LOG # 20255

<u>TO (AGENCY)</u>	<u>DELIVER TO</u>	<u>DEPT/ROOM NO.</u>	<u>PHONE NUMBE</u>
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002a. fax	Fax Coversheet [partial] (1 page)	03/00/1995	b(7)(C)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Drew, Nelson/Bremner, Sue)
OA/Box Number: 696

FOLDER TITLE:

PC/DC [Principals Committee/Deputies Committee] Meetings on Bosnia, March 1995
[7]

2012-0798-F
ke3045

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~SECRET~~

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

WHSR CONTROL
TIME OF RECEIPT

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS

Initials: KDE Date: 04/07/15

2012-0798-F

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE

- ☐ FLASH
☐ IMMEDIATE
☐ PRIORITY
☐ ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DATE/TIME: _____

MESSAGE #: _____

NSC LOG # 20255

FROM: National Security Council ^(K) PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: Notice of Meeting SOC OF 28 FEB DC MTG PAGES: 4

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	
<u>USUN New York</u>	<u>Mr. Rick Inderfurth</u>	<u>212-415-4016</u>	<u>(b)(7)c</u>

002a]

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

~~SECRET~~

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

~~SECRET~~

20255

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 1, 1995

By VDC NARA, Date 04/01/15

2012-008-F

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the U.S. to the United
Nations

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency


COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

COL. T.R. PATRICK
Executive Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for
National Security &
International Affairs
Office of Management and
Budget

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee Meeting on
Bosnia and Croatia, February 28, 1995 ~~(S)~~

Please pass to the Deputies the Summary of Conclusions attached
at Tab A. ~~(S)~~


for Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

T
A
B

A.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee
DATE: February 28, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 4:45 - 6:00pm

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on
Bosnia and Croatia ~~(S)~~

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair:
Samuel R. Berger

USUN:
James O'Brien

OVP:
Leon Fuerth
Rick Saunders

CIA:
Douglas MacEachin
Ray Converse

State:
Peter Tarnoff
Richard Holbrooke
Robert Frasure

JCS:
LTG Wesley Clark
MG Jared Bates

DOD:
John Deutch
Walter Slocombe

NSC:
Alexander Vershbow
BG Donald L. Kerrick

OMB:
Gordon Adams
Kevin Beckell

Summary of Conclusions

1. Deputies met to discuss our strategy for dealing with Croatia in the run-up to the March 31 UNPROFOR mandate expiration date. They requested that the State strategy paper be expanded to include a list of incentives and disincentives designed to obtain a positive decision from President Tudjman on retaining UNPROFOR or a similar force. The paper should include options and recommended alternatives to UNPROFOR that we would subsequently propose to Tudjman, in addition to the five-point mandate presented to the Croats in January. Additionally, Deputies asked that the disincentives include specific areas of U.S. and European assistance that we might threaten to suspend if

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

Tudjman refuses to retain UNPROFOR in the separation zone, as well as possible carrots to induce his cooperation. The paper should be circulated NLT OOB Thursday, March 2, for consideration by the Deputies that afternoon. (Action: State with JCS input) (S)

2. Deputies discussed the issue of prepositioning NATO communications assets to support a NATO-led operation to withdraw UNPROFOR from Bosnia and/or Croatia. Deputies agreed that the issue should be presented to the Principals this week with two options. Option One would authorize U.S. support for prepositioning now as a precautionary move without prejudice to possible future decisions regarding UNPROFOR withdrawal, U.S. participation, and the funding for such actions. Option Two would defer a decision on prepositioning until the military operational plan is reviewed and Congressional authorization and funding have been obtained. Deputies directed that an options paper be circulated NLT OOB Thursday, March 2, for Deputies' review that afternoon and Principals' review Friday, March 3. (Action: JCS/NSC) (S)

3. Deputies deferred discussion on the NSC-staff paper "Former Yugoslavia Policy Review" until their next meeting on March 2. For those discussions, they requested a supporting paper outlining options for beefing-up Macedonia should UNPROFOR withdrawal from Bosnia or renewed fighting threaten to expand the conflict. The paper, to include alternative agency views, should be circulated NLT OOB Thursday, March 2. (Action: OSD) (S)

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20255

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

March 1, 1995

By KDE NARA, Date 04/07/15

2000-0798-F
ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER
THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *N*
FROM: BG DON KERRICK *(K)*
SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions ^{From} ~~for~~ the Deputies
Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia,
February 28, 1995

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Deputies is the Summary of
Conclusions from the Deputies Committee meeting on Bosnia and
Croatia held February 28, 1995.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andrew Sens to sign the memo to agencies at
Tab I.

Approve *(Signature)* Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memo to the Agencies
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002b. note	Handwritten notes from Deputies Committee Meeting (7 pages)	02/28/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Drew, Nelson/Bremner, Sue)
OA/Box Number: 696

FOLDER TITLE:

PC/DC [Principals Committee/Deputies Committee] Meetings on Bosnia, March 1995
[7]

2012-0798-F
ke3045

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~SECRET~~

20278

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

March 3, 1995

By KDE NARA, Date 04/07/15

2012-0908-F

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *AV*

FROM: BG DON KERRICK *(K)*

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Deputies
Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia,
March 2, 1995

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Deputies is the Summary of
Conclusions from the Deputies Committee meeting on Bosnia and
Croatia held March 2, 1995.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andrew Sens to sign the memo to agencies at
Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memo to the Agencies

Tab A Summary of Conclusions

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

20278

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

WASHINGTON D C 20506

White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By KDE NARA, Date 04/07/15
2012-098-F
MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

AMBASSADOR RICK INDEFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the U.S. to the United
Nations

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

COL. T.R. PATRICK
Executive Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for
National Security &
International Affairs
Office of Management and
Budget

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee Meeting on
Bosnia and Croatia, March 2, 1995 ~~(S)~~

Please pass to the Deputies the Summary of Conclusions attached
at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: March 2, 1995

LOCATION: White House Situation Room

TIME: 6:00pm - 7:00pm

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on
Bosnia and Croatia ~~(S)~~

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair:

Samuel R. Berger

USUN:

James O'Brien

David Scheffer

OVP:

Leon Fuerth

Rick Saunders

CIA:

Douglas MacEachin

Ray Converse

State:

Strobe Talbott

Peter Tarnoff

Richard Holbrooke

JCS:

LTG Wesley Clark

COL. Walter Buchanan

DOD:

John Deutch

Walter Slocombe

WHITE HOUSE

Nancy Soderberg

OMB:

Gordon Adams

Keith Beckell

NSC:

Alexander Vershbow

BG Donald L. Kerrick

Summary of Conclusions

1. Deputies met to discuss the strategy for Ambassador Holbrooke to pursue in a final push with President Tudjman aimed at reversing his decision to terminate the UNPROFOR mandate in Croatia on March 31. They agreed retention of interpositional forces along the confrontation line is vital to prevent renewed fighting between the Croatian and Krajina Serb forces. The price for retention of the interpositional force may be agreeing to Tudjman's demand for forces along Croatia's border with Bosnia, but it is not clear we can support a border force. If Tudjman is willing to agree to the interpositional force, Deputies agreed that Ambassador Holbrooke should only offer to discuss a possible

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

border force with Allies. Deputies asked State to prepare a paper for Principals' consideration on Friday, March 3, illustrating the approach Ambassador Holbrooke will use in his meeting with President Tudjman next week. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~

2. Deputies discussed the issue of Step Two prepositioning of NATO communications assets to support a NATO-led operation to withdraw UNPROFOR from Bosnia and/or Croatia. They agreed that the issue should be presented to the Principals Friday for decision. They requested that the decision paper be modified to reflect the Deputies' discussion. (Action: NSC) ~~(S)~~

3. Deputies agreed to meet in informal session Saturday, March 4, to discuss the NSC-staff paper "Former Yugoslavia Policy Review." ~~(S)~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003. note	Handwritten notes from Deputies Committee Meeting (10 pages)	03/02/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Drew, Nelson/Bremner, Sue)
OA/Box Number: 696

FOLDER TITLE:

PC/DC [Principals Committee/Deputies Committee] Meetings on Bosnia, March 1995
[7]

2012-0798-F
ke3045

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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