

FOIA MARKER

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Folder Title:

PC/DC [Principals Committee/Deputies Committee] Meetings on Bosnia, March 1995 [1]

Staff Office-Individual:

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33	2	6	1	V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	Don Kerrick to Alexander Vershbow, re: March 28 Principals Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia (5 pages)	03/27/1995	P1/b(1)
001b. cable	Re: [New Peacekeeping Force] (4 pages)	03/28/1995	P1/b(1)
001c. cable	Re: Contact Group Plus Italy Informally Circulates Text of Three Resolutions (10 pages)	03/25/1995	P1/b(1)
001d. letter	Dr. Mate Granic to UN Secretary General (3 pages)	03/27/1995	P1/b(1)
001e. cable	Re: Contact Group Meeting - A Final Effort to Head off a Bosnia War (4 pages)	03/27/1995	P1/b(1)
001f. cable	Re: Meeting with Milosevic -- Assurances on Croatia, Different Game Plans on Bosnia (6 pages)	03/24/1995	P1/b(1)
001g. paper	Re: Conversations with Milosevic (14 pages)	03/24/1995	P1/b(1)
001h. letter	Alija Izetbegovic to UN Secretary General (1 page)	03/22/1995	P1/b(1)
001i. paper	Re: Options for Bosnia - Fighting Escalates in the Spring (3 pages)	03/00/1995	P1/b(1)
001j. paper	Re: A Possible Strategy to Extend the Cease-fire (2 pages)	03/00/1995	P1/b(1)
002. fax	Fax coversheet [partial] (1 page)	03/00/1995	b(7)(C)

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FOLDER TITLE:

PC/DC [Principals Committee/Deputies Committee] Meetings on Bosnia, March 1995
[1]

2012-0798-F

ke3039

RESTRICTION CODES

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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TAB A

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A
20393

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

Meeting of NSC Principals Committee
on Bosnia and Croatia
Tuesday, March 28, 1995
3:15-4:45 p.m.
White House SVTS Conference Room

By KDE NARA, Date 04/06/15

2012-0987

AGENDA

- I. Croatia: Mandate for New UN Peacekeeping Force...State/USUN
- II. Diplomatic Strategy
 - A. Contact Group Status/Next Steps.....State
 - B. Sanctions Options.....OVP
- III. Preventing or containing renewed fighting in Bosnia
 - A. Options for Tougher UN/NATO Action...,.....OSD
 - B. Diplomatic Strategy.....State

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Declassify on: OADR

TAB B

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001b. cable	Re: [New Peacekeeping Force] (4 pages)	03/28/1995	P1/b(1)

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001d. letter	Dr. Mate Granic to UN Secretary General (3 pages)	03/27/1995	P1/b(1)

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001e. cable	Re: Contact Group Meeting - A Final Effort to Head off a Bosnia War (4 pages)	03/27/1995	P1/b(1)

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001f. cable	Re: Meeting with Milosevic -- Assurances on Croatia, Different Game Plans on Bosnia (6 pages)	03/24/1995	P1/b(1)

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001g. paper	Re: Conversations with Milosevic (14 pages)	03/24/1995	P1/b(1)

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**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**

March 27, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR MEMBERS OF THE PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE

FROM: LEON FUERTH
SUBJECT: Sanctions Policy

Sanctions enforcement is gradually degenerating. It is possible to combat this trend, but to do so requires commitment of assets. The attached paper provides a rundown of areas of slippage and proposed countermeasures.

More effective enforcement of sanctions within existing authorities can further isolate Pale and Knin and may help convince Milosevic that sanctions will continue to bite unless he can help bring about negotiated settlements in Bosnia and the Krajina. On the other hand, Russia and the EU seem to be more interested in trading sanctions for incremental steps towards peace, and the Front Line States are increasingly unwilling to bear the burden of sanctions.

The key question for the Principals to address, therefore, is whether, in terms of our overall strategy in the region, it makes sense for the U.S. Government to press the Western Europeans, Russia, and the Front Line States to strengthen sanctions enforcement as a way to push Milosevic and the Pale and Knin Serbs towards the sorts of negotiated settlements we seek.

The Principals could also review the specific points in the attached paper if there is time. If not, I recommend that the Principals remand those issues to the Deputies for decision and implementation.

Attachment:

Sanctions Options Paper

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SUBJECT: Sanctions Improvements -- Practical Steps

Sanctions fatigue has set in but in an unexpected way. Fatigue is most evident in the West where political will is flagging and the focus is on trading sanctions for incremental, often reversible, progress in negotiations. Front-line states are maintaining enforcement in proportion to the degree of cohesion they perceive in the West and the West's pressure on them to maintain effective sanctions enforcement. Unfortunately, even the U.S. Government's message has been inconsistent, with too little emphasis on the continued importance of sanctions.

Sanctions can still provide significant leverage by isolating Pale and Knin (the "Inner Ring" of sanctions) and convincing Milosevic (the "Outer Ring") that sanctions will continue to bite unless he can help bring about negotiated settlements in Bosnia and the Krajina. By making effective sanctions a priority and devoting increased resources to enforcement programs, the U.S. and the Western Europeans can increase pressure on Pale, Knin, and Belgrade within existing sanctions authority.

This memorandum lays out the components of a program for enhanced sanctions enforcement. Many of the steps should be matters of routine sanctions maintenance. However, given flagging Western European support for sanctions and extremely lax enforcement in certain key countries, significant progress is impossible unless the USG puts political weight behind its efforts.

I. Main Problem Areas

A. General

1. Flagging Western European support for the sanctions effort is our main obstacle. The EU has not made sanctions a priority in its relations with the front-line states. EU members have sought to weaken sanctions in the UN Yugoslavia Sanctions Committee, leaving the U.S. isolated. Greece and Italy are unwilling to comply with mandatory UN resolutions or even EU directives on sanctions. European governments are also slow to provide necessary resources and support for the sanctions program. (See item II. A.)

B. Outer Ring

1. Fuel, the most critical commodity in both the outer and inner sanctions rings, continues to reach the FRY and the Bosnian Serbs. The main source of leakage is fuel from Italy and Greece entering the FRY from Albania. Significant smuggling also takes

place across the Danube from Romania and from Greece and Bulgaria through FYROM. Romania has not fulfilled commitments to limit the amount of jet fuel supplied to empty Yugoslav airline (JAT) aircraft shuttling between Timisoara and Belgrade. Hungary has not controlled the "ant trade" of fuel smuggling in private cars and buses and auxiliary tanks on trucks. (See items II. B, C, and G.)

2. Cypriot, Russian, and Greek attitudes towards sanctions continue to create problems. Serbian firms in Cyprus, Russia, and Greece conduct business virtually unimpeded by sanctions, earning hard currency and arranging sanctions-busting trade. Cyprus has proven unwilling to take effective enforcement measures. Russia has yet to pass laws necessary to bring sanctions into effect, and existing decrees are not meaningfully enforced. Russian trade and economic cooperation with Serbia continues. Russia has also taken positions in the Sanctions Committee that prevent closing loopholes. (For example, several of the front-line states will not take stronger steps to control cross border traffic without instructions from the Sanctions Committee, but Russia has blocked Committee action.) Serbian activities in Greece, especially Thessaloniki, continue to flourish. (See item II. D.)

3. Serbian exports through Macedonia of manufactured and agricultural products earn hard currency and support barter trade. Imports via FYROM keep key industries moving. The Macedonian government has no meaningful controls in place at the border with Serbia, and Serb-origin shipments regularly receive false documentation as Macedonian products. FYROM's neighbors -- Albania, Bulgaria, and Greece -- shrug off responsibility for FYROM's trade with Serbia, even though the bulk of goods involved transit, and often originate on, their territory. (See item II. C.)

C. Inner Ring

1. FRY implementation of its border closure with Bosnian Serb-held territory has declined significantly since its high point before renewal of limited sanctions relief in January. At the same time, the ICFY monitoring mission is in financial crisis. ICFY has already cut staffing, and Owen and Stoltenberg threaten to shut down the mission altogether if financial problems are not solved. The U.S. and EU must provide the resources necessary to restore ICFY effectiveness. However, these resources will be wasted, and the ICFY mission's hard work will have no meaning, unless the international community is willing to take a hard line in response to clear Serbian testing at the inter-Serb border. On the other hand, revocation of Phase

I sanctions relief could cause Milosevic to end his embargo of the Bosnian Serbs altogether. (See item II. E.)

2. The "back door" remains a major source of supply for Pale and Knin Serb forces. Fuel, military supplies and other goods transiting the Dalmatian coast reach Bosnian Serbs through Croat-controlled (and maybe even Muslim-controlled) territory in Bosnia. Diversions to and exports from the Bosnian Serbs through the UNPAS could become a major loophole if economic confidence building measures between Zagreb and the Krajina Serbs are not accompanied by requisite sanctions control. Already there is evidence that goods shipped on the Zagreb-Belgrade highway are diverted to/from Bosnian Serb-held territory. There are only seven Sanctions Assistance Monitors (SAMs) in Croatia -- not enough to cover the Zagreb-Belgrade highway on a 24-hour basis or to monitor commerce through Dalmatia. (See item II. F.)

II. Proposed Actions

A. Establish a united front with Western Europeans on both inner and outer ring sanctions. Take joint and bilateral action to maintain and improve sanctions enforcement. Ensure that front-line state governments understand that sanctions remain an important part of the West's strategy toward the former Yugoslavia and that their performance on sanctions matters to us.

- U.S. officials at every level should stress the importance of sanctions in all appropriate fora. Failure to do so sends the message that sanctions no longer count.
- The USG should press for a U.S.-EU mission to the front-line states to discuss the need for strict implementation and recognize instances of good performance. U.S. Ambassadors to EU and front-line countries should regularly brief host governments on sanctions issues.

B. Control oil smuggling through Albania to the FRY.

- Get the EU to join in pressing Italy and Greece to control oil shipments to Albania through a pre-verification system that allows shipments to legitimate Albanian end users only.
- Jointly press Albania to do a better job.
- Have the NATO-WEU force (SHARP GUARD) cooperate with Albania in stopping oil tankers that have not been pre-verified (may require a change in the current UN mandate).

C. Persuade FYROM to limit trade with Serbia, and get other countries to control shipments to and from FYROM.

- Press Albania and Bulgaria to cooperate with SAMs to help monitor their trade with FYROM, since much of the FYROM-Serbia trade enters or exists via Albania and Bulgaria.
- Press the EU to do a better job of controlling its trade with FYROM since a substantial portion of FYROM "exports" actually comes from Serbia. (This complements the action above and helps alleviate the burden on Albania and Bulgaria. Serbian exports can be identified, tracked, and caught at the final destination.)

D. We and the EU press Russia, Cyprus, and Greece to control FRY-interest firms operating in their territory and to stop other practices that violate sanctions regulations. We and the EU press Russia and Greece to desist from taking positions in the UN and EU that undermine the effectiveness of the sanctions regime.

E. Decide whether and how specifically to signal that the USG might oppose continuation of Phase I sanctions relief after the current UN resolution expires on April 22.

- Decide whether the U.S. should seek immediate revocation of Phase I sanctions relief if the ICFY mission ceases operation because of financial problems.
- Decide how strongly to protest specific violations of the border closure.

F. Close the "back door" to Pale, starting small by building on what the SAMs have already accomplished in Croatia and on their good relations with the GOC.

- Re-deploy 10-12 U.S. SAMs to Croatia so that the SAM-Croatia can cover the Zagreb-Belgrade highway 24-hours a day.
- Press other SAM donors to bring SAM-Croatia up to 30-35 monitors to cover loading of humanitarian supplies in Zagreb and to re-institute cooperation with Croatian customs on the Dalmatian coast to help prevent shipments of goods to the Bosnian Serbs via Federation territory.
- Provide training and technical assistance for Croatian and Federation Customs. (By helping the GOC and Federation to create the wherewithal to control trade on their borders, we

are also contributing to an important aspect of their national sovereignty.)

G. Tighten enforcement of cross-border trade at the outer ring.

- Press Hungary to control the ant trade and to limit the amount of fuel that trucks can carry into Serbia. Prevent empty trucks from entering Serbia (a major source of smuggled fuel).
- Obtain agreement of EU governments to inspect and seal -- at loading -- UN authorized shipments bound for the FRY. (Almost all authorized shipments for the FRY originating in Western Europe cross at two sites in Hungary. A pre-inspection system would greatly reduce the burden on Hungarian customs and SAMs, thus freeing resources needed to counter smuggling.)
- Press Romania to control the ant trade in fuel, stop the FRY from importing aviation fuel via flights of empty JAT airliners to Timisoara, and stop supplying electricity to the FRY.

H. Resolve outstanding sanctions issues in ways that reinforce the overall sanctions regime.

- Seek front-line state cooperation on implementing a transit route for perishable agricultural products around Serbia as an alternative to pending requests for transit corridors through Serbia. Work with Bulgaria and other front-line States to address overall land transit issues as part of a comprehensive approach that identifies needed enforcement improvements as tradeoffs.
- Identify conditions under which Serb-owned vessels engaged in cabotage (internal trade) can use the Romanian side of the Iron Gates locks while the Serb locks are under repair. Conditions might include ending illegal Danube tolls and other interference with Danube shipping.

I. Decide whether the U.S. should modify its own sanctions regulations to implement Phase I sanctions relief through the sale of repair parts for U.S.-built aircraft being flown by JAT and/or allowing U.S.-FRY sports and cultural contacts.

TAB H

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001h. letter	Alija Izetbegovic to UN Secretary General (1 page)	03/22/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Drew, Nelson/Bremner, Sue)
OA/Box Number: 696

FOLDER TITLE:

PC/DC [Principals Committee/Deputies Committee] Meetings on Bosnia, March 1995
[1]

2012-0798-F
ke3039

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

TAB I

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
--------------------------	---------------	------	-------------

001i. paper	Re: Options for Bosnia - Fighting Escalates in the Spring (3 pages)	03/00/1995	P1/b(1)
-------------	---	------------	---------

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Drew, Nelson/Bremner, Sue)
OA/Box Number: 696

FOLDER TITLE:

PC/DC [Principals Committee/Deputies Committee] Meetings on Bosnia, March 1995
[1]

2012-0798-F
kc3039

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001j. paper	Re: A Possible Strategy to Extend the Cease-fire (2 pages)	03/00/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Drew, Nelson/Bremner, Sue)
OA/Box Number: 696

FOLDER TITLE:

PC/DC [Principals Committee/Deputies Committee] Meetings on Bosnia, March 1995
[1]

2012-0798-F
ke3039

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~SECRET~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9520407
RECEIVED: 29 MAR 95 12

TO: AGENCIES

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 01 APR 95
SOURCE REF:

By KDE NARA, Date 04/06/15
2012-098-F

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
PC

CROATIA
SOC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 28 PC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA

ACTION: ~~RECD STATE APPROVAL~~
RECD SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES
STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK

DUE DATE: 01 APR 95 STATUS: C

LOGREF:

FILES: IFM

NSCP:

CODES: BOS CRO

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BERGER
JOSHI
KERRICK
KRECKO
LAKE
NSC CHRON
SODERBERG
VERSHBOW
WOLIN

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJDA

CLOSED BY: NSJDA

DOC 2 OF 2

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

RECORD ID: 9520407

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 LAKE
001
002

Z 95032916 FOR DECISION
X 95040114 LAKE APPROVED RECOM
X 95040114 RECD STATE APPROVAL

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

002 950401 FUERTH, L
002 950401 BRILL, K
002 950401 MCALEER, R
002 950401 INDERFURTH, K
002 950401 GARTHOFF, D
002 950401 PATRICK, T

~~SECRET~~

PROOFED BY: _____

LOG # 20407

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG PP A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Reed	3	TWP	
Dohse	1	W	
Sens			
Soderberg	copy		
Berger	2	Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	gon 3/1	D N
NSC Secretariat			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: _____

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette _____

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS

Initials: LDL Date: 04/06/15

2012-098-F

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9520407
DATE 01 APR 95

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 28 PC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA

DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

DATE

TIME

SIGNATURE

MR. LEON FUERTH
OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
VIA LARRY BRANSCUM
ROOM 290, OEOB
WASHINGTON, DC 20506

PRINT LAST NAME: _____

COPY: 1 _____

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
2201 C STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

PRINT LAST NAME: _____

COPY: 1 _____

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC SECRETARIAT, ROOM 379 OEOB

PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. fax	Fax coversheet [partial] (1 page)	03/00/1995	b(7)(C)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Drew, Nelson/Bremner, Sue)
OA/Box Number: 696

FOLDER TITLE:

PC/DC [Principals Committee/Deputies Committee] Meetings on Bosnia, March 1995
[1]

2012-0798-F
ke3039

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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~~SECRET~~

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

WHSR CONTROL
TIME OF RECEIPT

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS

Initials: VDE Date: 04/10/01

2012-098-F

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE

- ☐ FLASH
☐ IMMEDIATE
☐ PRIORITY
☐ ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DATE/TIME: _____

MESSAGE #: _____

109#

20407

FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: SOC of Meeting for BOSNIA & CROATIA PAGES: 4

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
<u>USUN New York</u>	<u>Mr. Rick Inderfurth</u>	<u>212-415-4016</u>	<u>(b)(7)c</u>

[002]

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

~~SECRET~~

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: KOF Date: 24/00/15
2012-098-F

RELEASER: _____

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO.: _____

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

TOTAL: 4
(PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK
(NAME)

(202) 456-9425
(PHONE NUMBER)

WH SITROOM
(ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: SUMMARY of CONCLUSIONS FOR
PC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA 28 MAR NSC LOG # 20407

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

~~SECRET~~

20407

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

White House Guidelines,

April 1, 1995

September 11, 2006

By KDE NARA, Date 04/06/15
2012-098-F
MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

AMBASSADOR RICK INDEFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the U.S. to the United
Nations

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State


MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

COL. T.R. PATRICK
Executive Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Principals Committee Meeting on
Bosnia and Croatia, March 28, 1995 ~~(S)~~

Please pass to the Principals the Summary of Conclusions attached
at Tab A. ~~(S)~~


for Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee

DATE: March 28, 1995

LOCATION: White House Situation Room

TIME: 3:20 - 4:25pm

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting
on Bosnia and Croatia ~~(S)~~

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair

Anthony Lake

USUN

Madeleine Albright

OVP

Leon Fuerth

Chief of Staff

No representative

State

Warren Christopher

Robert Frasure

CIA

Admiral William Studeman

DOD

William Perry

JCS

General John Shalikashvili

NSC

Alexander Vershbow

Summary of Conclusions

Croatia: Mandate for a New UN Peacekeeping Force

1. Principals reviewed the progress of efforts underway at the United Nations to enact a UN Security Council resolution containing the mandate for a new UN peacekeeping force in Croatia, as well as companion resolutions on peacekeeping forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Principals agreed that Ambassador Albright should be provided flexibility to secure passage of a framework resolution for the new Croatian force before UNPROFOR's mandate expires on March 31, recognizing that the UN will need to conduct further consultations with the parties during the first weeks of April to iron out the details of implementation. Principals discussed the value of meetings at the UN involving the Krajina Serbs and the

Contact Group, as proposed by Russia, and agreed that such meetings would be counterproductive to ongoing efforts.

(Action: USUN/State) ~~(S)~~

Bosnia: Preventing Renewed Fighting

2. Principals agreed that we should continue our efforts to prevent or contain a reescalation of fighting in Bosnia as the end of the cessation of hostilities approaches. Noting the Bosnian Government's request for a more robust UNPROFOR posture before agreeing to extend its mandate, Principals agreed that we should immediately approach the British and the French on measures to make UNPROFOR more robust. To this end, Principals requested that a strategy be developed to begin immediate consultations with the British and the French, using the menu of options in the OSD paper "Options for Bosnia -- Fighting Escalates in the Spring." (Action: State with DoD input) Principals also directed that the Bosnian Government be informed of our efforts with Allies to encourage a more robust UNPROFOR posture, in order to help secure passage of a new UNPROFOR mandate in Bosnia. (Action USUN/State) ~~(S)~~

Sanctions

3. Principals discussed options to tighten the "outer ring" of sanctions against Serbia-Montenegro and the "inner ring" of sanctions against the Bosnian and Krajina Serbs. They decided not to press at this time for a general tightening of the "outer ring" of sanctions, given the need to focus allied attention on measures to make UNPROFOR more robust, and taking into account Bosnian President Izetbegovic's request that we extend phase-one sanctions relief for a third 100-day period. They did agree, however, that we should explore steps necessary for NATO and WEU naval forces to assist in enforcing a pre-verification system on Albanian oil imports, in order to reduce the transshipment of oil to Serbia-Montenegro through Albania. (Action: State/OVP) ~~(S)~~

4. Principals decided that we should tighten the "inner ring" of sanctions by strengthening sanctions enforcement against the Bosnian and Krajina Serbs and by working with Croatia to close the "back door." This effort should be delayed for one week, however, while we attempt to persuade Allies to make UNPROFOR more robust. (Action: State/OVP) ~~(S)~~

~~SECRET~~

20407

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

March 29, 1995

By YDE NARA, Date 04106115

2012-098-F

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *N*

FROM: DON KERRICK *(C)*

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Principals
Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia,
March 28, 1995

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Principals is the Summary
of Conclusions from the Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia
and Croatia held March 28, 1995.

Concurrence by: Rick Saunders *(C)*

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andrew Sens to sign the memo to agencies at
Tab I.

Approve *[initials]* Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memo to the Agencies

Tab A Summary of Conclusions

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9502082
RECEIVED: 16 MAR 95 09

TO: WEBSTER, B

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

FROM: LAKE

September 11, 2006

DOC DATE: 17 MAR 95

SOURCE REF:

By LOE NARA, Date 04/01/15
2012-0288F

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
UN
SP

CROATIA
DEFENSE POLICY

PERSONS: SHALIKASHVILI, J

PERRY, W

SUBJECT: SP FOR PRES BRIEFING BY CHAIRMAN OF JCS

ACTION: ORIGINALS RETURNED TO NSC/S

DUE DATE: 20 MAR 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
HILLIARD
KERRICK
NSC CHRON
VERSHBOW

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSASK

CLOSED BY: NSMEC

DOC 2 OF 3

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

RECORD ID: 9502082

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 LAKE

Z 95031620 FOR SIGNATURE

002

X 95041115 LAKE SGD SP

002

X 95042611 ORIGINALS RETURNED TO NSC/S

003

X 95041115 WEBSTER RECEIVED MEMO / ACCEPT

~~SECRET~~

National Security Council
The White House

REC'd 3/16
4:10 PM

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 2082
URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT
BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG [Signature] A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Reed	<u>1</u>	<u>JWR</u>	
Dohse			
Sens			
Soderberg	<u>2</u>	<u>copy</u>	
<u>nm</u> Berger	<u>3</u>	<u>nm</u>	
Lake	<u>4</u>	Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>5</u>	<u>18K 3/17</u>	<u>N</u>
NSC Secretariat			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

CC: _____

COMMENTS:

How about 30
minutes?

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

~~SECRET~~

2082

By KDE NARA, Date 04/06/15

2012-098-F
Schedule Proposal

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

date 3 / 17 / 95

 ACCEPT

 REGRET

 PENDING

TO: Billy Webster
Director of Scheduling and Advance

FROM: Anthony Lake

REQUEST: Briefing by Chairman of JCS.

PURPOSE: To obtain Presidential approval for
plan for U.S. military participation
in possible NATO-led operation to
support UNPROFOR withdrawal from
Bosnia or Croatia.

BACKGROUND: In December, President approved, in
principle, U.S. participation,
subject to review of the plan and
consultations with Congress. NATO
planning has matured sufficiently to
brief President and begin
Congressional consultations. No
decision to withdraw UNPROFOR,
however, has been made.

PREVIOUS PARTICIPATION: Recurring and frequent.

DATE AND TIME: Open

BRIEFING TIME: TBD

DURATION: 60 minutes

LOCATION: Cabinet, Roosevelt or Situation Rm.

PARTICIPANTS: TBD

OUTLINE OF EVENTS: Briefing and discussion.

REMARKS REQUIRED: To be provided by NSC.

MEDIA COVERAGE: WH Photographer.

VICE PRESIDENT'S ATTENDANCE: If available.

RECOMMENDED BY: NSC

CONTACT: BG Don Kerrick, X69151.

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

cc: Stephanie Streett

~~SECRET~~

2

ORIGIN OF THIS PROPOSAL: NSC

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

2082

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

By KDE NARA, Date 04/06/15
2012-098-F
ACTION

March 16, 1995



MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *W*
FROM: BG DON KERRICK *(W)*
SUBJECT: Schedule Proposal for CJCS Briefing on OPLAN 40104

Schedule proposal for CJCS briefing on 40104 to POTUS attached. Following your lunch Tuesday with the Chairman, we contacted his office to determine timeframe for briefing. They request one hour, but cannot identify time until SECDEF availability is determined.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the schedule proposal after discussions at the Friday PC.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment
Tab A Schedule Proposal

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR