

FOIA MARKER

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Folder Title:

PC/DC [Principals Committee/Deputies Committee] Meetings on Bosnia, January 1995 [2]

Staff Office-Individual:

European Affairs-Drew, Nelson/Bremner, Sue

Original OA/ID Number:

697

Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:	Stack:
33	2	6	2	V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. fax	Fax cover sheet [partial] (1 page)	01/00/1995	b(7)(C)
002a. memo	Don Kerrick to Samuel Berger, re: Papers Tasked by Deputies on Bosnia (1 page)	01/31/1995	P1/b(1)
002b. paper	Re: Options for UNPROFOR Withdrawal from Croatia (6 pages)	01/31/1995	P1/b(1)
002c. paper	Re: The Case for Prepositioning (3 pages)	01/26/1995	P1/b(1)
002d. paper	Re: Reinforcing UNPROFOR (2 pages)	01/25/1995	P1/b(1)
003a. memo	[Don Kerrick to Samuel Berger, re: January 25 Deputies Meeting on Bosnia] [incomplete copy] (4 pages)	01/24/1995	P1/b(1)
003b. paper	Re: Likely Sticking Points in Bosnian Peace Talks (4 pages)	01/18/1995	P1/b(1)
003c. talking points	Talking Points for Meeting with President Tudjman (2 pages)	01/19/1995	P1/b(1)
003d. talking points	Talking Points -- Meeting with Bosnian Govt Leadership (2 pages)	01/23/1995	P1/b(1)
004. paper	Re: Threat to UNPROFOR Withdrawal from Croatia (3 pages)	01/26/1995	P1/b(1)
005a. memo	Alexander Vershbow to Samuel Berger, re: Today's Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia (4 pages)	01/11/1995	P1/b(1)
005b. cable	Re: Presidential Letter to Tudjman (2 pages)	01/08/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Drew, Nelson/Bremner, Sue)
OA/Box Number: 697

FOLDER TITLE:

PC/DC [Principals Committee/Deputies Committee] Meetings on Bosnia, January 1995
[2]

2012-0798-F

ke3031

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]

P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]

P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]

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P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

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b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

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b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005c. cable	Re: Tudjman Responds to President's Letter (3 pages)	01/10/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

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National Security Council
European Affairs (Drew, Nelson/Bremner, Sue)
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PC/DC [Principals Committee/Deputies Committee] Meetings on Bosnia, January 1995
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TO: AGENCIES

FROM: ITOH
DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

DOC DATE: 19 JAN 95
SOURCE REF:

By KDE NARA, Date 04/02/15
KEYWORDS: RUSSIA 2002-0708-F BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
KOREA NORTH PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: PC MGT ON RUSSIA / CHECHNYA / BOSNIA & NORTH KOREA 20 JAN

ACTION: SENS SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 23 JAN 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BEYRLE

LOGREF:

FILES: IFG NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

AOKI
BEYRLE
BURNS
DARBY
JOSHI
KERRICK
NSC CHRON
PONEMAN
SODERBERG
VERSHBOW

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJDA CLOSED BY: NSDRS DOC 2 OF 2

~~SECRET~~

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REP

rec'd 1/19
National Security C
The White Hou

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # _____
URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM _____
BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLO _____

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGN

001 LAKE	Z 950119
001	X 950119
002	X 950119

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY RE

<u>DOC</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>DISPATCH FOR ACTION</u>	<u>DIS</u>
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002	950119	FUERTH, L	
002	950119	BRILL, K	
002	950119	MCALDER, R	
002	950119	LAVIN, A	
002	950119	ADAMS, G	
002	950119	INDERFURTH, K	
002	950119	PANETTA, L	
002	950119	GARTHOFF, D	
002	950119	PATRICK, T	
002	950119	STARR, B	

SEQUENCE TO HAS

Reed		
Sens	1/4	A
Itoh		
Soderberg		
Berger	2	C
Lake	3	
Situation Room		
West Wing Desk	5	AR
NSC Secretariat	6	

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R =

CC: _____

COMMENTS: Nom-PC 1/2

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

~~SECRET~~

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: VDE Date: 01/02/15

2012-0798-F

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DTG: _____

~~SECRET~~

MESSAGE NO. _____ CLASSIFICATION _____ PAGES 2

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH ^{WV} (202) 456-2585 West Wing Desk
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION Principals Committee Meeting
20 Jan NSC LOG # 20076

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
<u>Energy</u>	<u>Executive Secretary</u>		
<u>ACDA</u>	<u>Executive Secretary</u>		

REMARKS:

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. fax	Fax cover sheet [partial] (1 page)	01/00/1995	b(7)(C)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Drew, Nelson/Bremner, Sue)
OA/Box Number: 697

FOLDER TITLE:

PC/DC [Principals Committee/Deputies Committee] Meetings on Bosnia, January 1995
[2]

2012-0798-F
ke3031

RESTRICTION CODES

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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~~SECRET~~

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

WHSR CONTROL
TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM.

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: VDG Date: 04/02/15
2012-0798-F

PRECEDENCE

- ☐ FLASH
☐ IMMEDIATE
☐ PRIORITY
☐ ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DATE/TIME: _____

MESSAGE #: _____

NSC LOG # 20076

FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-458-2291 ROOM: WHSR
SUBJECT: Notice of Meeting PAGES: 2

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
<u>USUN New York</u>	<u>Mr. Rick Inderfurth</u>	<u>212-415-4016</u>	<u>(b)(7)c</u>

[001]

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

~~SECRET~~

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

20076

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

January 19, 1995

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

MEMORANDUM FOR

By VDE NARA, Date 04/02/15
2012-0798-F

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

AMBASSADOR RICK Inderfurth
Office of the Representative
of the U.S. to the United
Nations

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. LEON PANETTA
Chief of Staff to the
President

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

MS. ANN LAVIN
Director, Executive Secretariat
Department of Energy


COL. T. R. PATRICK
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for National
Security & International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

MS. BARBARA STARR
Executive Secretary
Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting ~~(S)~~

A Principals Committee Meeting on Russia/Chechnya, Bosnia and North Korea has been scheduled for Friday, January 20, from 2:30 - 4:00 p.m. in the White House Situation Room. Attendance will be Principals only. Principals from Energy, ACDA and OMB will join the meeting for discussion of agenda item III. The agenda is attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~


William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Agenda

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MEETING

DATE: January 20, 1995

LOCATION: White House Situation Room

TIME: 2:30 - 4:00 p.m.

By YDC NARA, Date 04/02/15

2012-0798-F

AGENDA

- I. Chechnya Update
 - A. Conflict: Status/Prospects CIA
 - B. Christopher-Kozyrev meeting State
 - C. Next Steps/Public Strategy..... NSC/State
- II. Bosnia
 - A. Negotiations: Status/Prospects State
 - B. Response to Tudjman Decision on UNPROFOR State
 - C. Congressional/Public Affairs Strategy:
Progress/Next Steps NSC/State
- III. North Korea
 - A. International Support for KEDO State
 - B. LWR Supply Talks with DPRK State
 - C. Congressional/Public Diplomacy Strategy State

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

20076

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

January 19, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: NICHOLAS BURNS/ALEXANDER VERSHBOW/DAN PONEMAN *NB for E*

FROM: JOHN BEYRLE *NB*

SUBJECT: Principals Meeting, January 20, 1995

Attached at Tab A is the agenda for the Principals Meeting to be held on January 20, 1995, covered by a memorandum to agencies.

Concurrence by: Don Kerrick, Steve Aoki *OK*

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Will Itoh to sign the memorandum to agencies at Tab I.

Approve *OK* Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to Agencies
Tab A Agenda

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By KDE NARA, Date 04/02/15
2012-0198-F

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002a. memo	Don Kerrick to Samuel Berger, re: Papers Tasked by Deputies on Bosnia (1 page)	01/31/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Drew, Nelson/Bremner, Sue)
OA/Box Number: 697

FOLDER TITLE:

PC/DC [Principals Committee/Deputies Committee] Meetings on Bosnia, January 1995
[2]

2012-0798-F
ke3031

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002b. paper	Re: Options for UNPROFOR Withdrawal from Croatia (6 pages)	01/31/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

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European Affairs (Drew, Nelson/Bremner, Sue)
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002c. paper	Re: The Case for Prepositioning (3 pages)	01/26/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

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National Security Council
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~~SECRET~~

20085

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

January 23, 1995

By KDE NARA, Date 04/02/15
2012-0498-F

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *W*
FROM: DON KERRICK *(C)*
SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia

Sandy:

*Agencies have been
notified about taskings
on UNPROFOR/Croatia
Withdrawal planning
listed in the agenda.*

Sandy V.

Attached at Tab I is your memorandum and agenda for the Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia to be held on January 26, 1995.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Will Itoh to initial the memorandum to agency counterparts at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to counterparts
Tab A Agenda

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

20085

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

By KDE NARA, Date 04/02/15

2012-098-F

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the U.S. to the UN

LEON E. PANETTA
Chief of Staff to the
President of the
United States

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. T.R. PATRICK
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia

~~(S)~~

There will be a Deputies Committee meeting on Bosnia on Thursday, January 26, 1995, 12:00-1:00pm, in the White House Situation Room. Attendance will be principals plus one. Taskers for papers and agenda are attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Agenda

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA

DATE: January 26, 1995

LOCATION: White House Situation Room

TIME: 12:00pm - 1:00pm

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

By YDE NARA, Date 04/02/152012-0798-FAgenda

- I. Diplomatic StrategyState
 - Analysis of Parties Positions on Negotiating Issues (CIA Paper completed)
 - Mid-Term Diplomatic Strategy (State Should Circulate Tasked Paper NLT Jan 23)
- II. UNPROFOR Augmentation.....All
 - Status of Efforts to Strengthen UNPROFOR.....JCS
 - UNPROFOR Strengthening vs UNPROFOR Funding (NSC Paper to be Circulated NLT January 24)
- III. Croatia Strategy.....State
 - Status of Zagreb-4 Diplomacy.....State
 - Diplomatic Strategy to Respond to Tudjman's UNPROFOR Decision (State Should Circulate Paper NLT January 24).....State
 - Political Aspects of Supporting UNPROFOR Withdrawal from Croatia (State Should Circulate Paper NLT January 24).....State
 - Military Aspects of Supporting UNPROFOR Withdrawal from Croatia (JCS Should Circulate Paper NLT January 24).....JCS
- IV. Congressional and Public Affairs Strategy.....All
 - Strategy to Defeat Unilateral Lift Vote.....State
 - Silajdzic Visit Strategy (State Should Circulate Paper NLT January 24).....State
 - Timing of Bill Perry Op-Ed.....OSD

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003a. memo	[Don Kerrick to Samuel Berger, re: January 25 Deputies Meeting on Bosnia] [incomplete copy] (4 pages)	01/24/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Drew, Nelson/Bremner, Sue)
OA/Box Number: 697

FOLDER TITLE:

PC/DC [Principals Committee/Deputies Committee] Meetings on Bosnia, January 1995
[2]

2012-0798-F
ke3031

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Tab A

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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003b. paper	Re: Likely Sticking Points in Bosnian Peace Talks (4 pages)	01/18/1995	P1/b(1)
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COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Drew, Nelson/Bremner, Sue)
OA/Box Number: 697

FOLDER TITLE:

PC/DC [Principals Committee/Deputies Committee] Meetings on Bosnia, January 1995
[2]

2012-0798-F
ke3031

RESTRICTION CODES

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Tab B

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003c. talking points	Talking Points for Meeting with President Tudjman (2 pages)	01/19/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Drew, Nelson/Bremner, Sue)
OA/Box Number: 697

FOLDER TITLE:

PC/DC [Principals Committee/Deputies Committee] Meetings on Bosnia, January 1995
[2]

2012-0798-F
ke3031

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003d. talking points	Talking Points -- Meeting with Bosnian Govt Leadership (2 pages)	01/23/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Drew, Nelson/Bremner, Sue)
OA/Box Number: 697

FOLDER TITLE:

PC/DC [Principals Committee/Deputies Committee] Meetings on Bosnia, January 1995
[2]

2012-0798-F
ke3031

RESTRICTION CODES

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THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN 118 Kernick

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PER E.O. 13526

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

January 13, 1995

95 JAN 13 All : 27

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Update on Bosnia and Croatia

Deputies met on Wednesday to review diplomatic efforts in Bosnia and to formulate an initial response to President Tudjman's decision to terminate the mandate for UNPROFOR in Croatia. Here's the state of play.

Contact Group Strategy

At Tuesday's Contact Group meeting in Paris, agreement was reached to dispatch Contact Group representatives to Belgrade, Sarajevo, Pale and Zagreb in an effort to get negotiations started. In Pale, the group will be authorized only to discuss "acceptance" of the Contact Group plan as the basis for talks, not to renegotiate the plan. This reflects the Bosnian Government's view that the deal Karadzic struck with President Carter was insufficient. It is not yet clear whether either side is really interested in negotiating, as opposed to using the cessation of hostilities to rest and rearm. Nevertheless, State remains hopeful that a formula can be found in the next few weeks that will permit serious shuttle diplomacy by the Contact Group to begin between Sarajevo and Pale.

We will be reviewing the constitutional and territorial issues in detail in preparation for renewed bargaining, although the U.S. will need to stay close to the Bosnian Government to avoid creating any impression we are twisting their arms.

Tudjman's Decision to Eject UNPROFOR

The shaky peace process in Bosnia is now in danger of being overwhelmed by renewed tensions -- and perhaps a new war -- in Croatia. President Tudjman today informed Boutros-Ghali that Croatia will terminate the mandate for UNPROFOR in Croatia when it expires on March 31. In so doing, he rebuffed a letter sent in your name urging that he reconsider this move, as well as strong pressure from the Germans. (Your letter and his reply are attached.) Tudjman claimed that, in two years, UNPROFOR has failed to produce any progress toward reintegration of the Serb-occupied lands, and that UNPROFOR's withdrawal is the only way to

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Declassify on: OADR

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

shock the Serbs into negotiating seriously. His one concession was to allow an additional three months for a "dignified and orderly" withdrawal.

Before publicizing the decision, Tudjman sent two high-level envoys to Washington to explain his rationale. We urged the Croatians to pull back from demanding UNPROFOR's complete pullout, since this was almost certain to trigger a new war. We offered to lead a reinvigorated diplomatic effort and to work with Zagreb on a new UNPROFOR mandate that would retain only those elements that were performing important functions -- policing the ceasefire, keeping the forces separated, and implementing the recent accord opening the Zagreb-Belgrade highway (Tab C).

In a two-hour meeting with Peter Tarnoff last night, however, the Croatian envoys showed little interest in this proposal. It was clear that they had been sent to inform, rather than consult, with us (and Peter strongly criticized them for this). Tudjman's letter to Boutros-Ghali, while ostensibly revised in response to our ideas, contained little new flexibility. Our Ambassador believes Tudjman has consciously opted for retaking the Krajina by force. The intelligence community, however, believes the chances of success are low -- particularly if Milosevic's forces intervene in support of the Krajina Serbs, as they are likely to do.

We will continue to press the Croatians to reverse course, and we will need to consider rolling back aspects of our bilateral relationship to signal our opposition to Tudjman's high-risk gambit. Tudjman needs to know that his brinksmanship will not be cost-free and that his integration into the West is in jeopardy. This said, we need to be careful not to drive Tudjman into an unholy alliance with Milosevic to carve up Bosnia. Thus we will proceed with ongoing plans to accelerate diplomatic efforts aimed at a settlement that reintegrates the Krajina while providing substantial autonomy for the Serbs.

Attachments

Tab A Letter to Tudjman of January 9
Tab B Tudjman's reply of January 10
Tab C U.S. proposal to Croatian envoys of January 11

Op Ed Piece: Suggested Language on Multilateral Lift

Current policy favors the multilateral lifting of the arms embargo because multilateral action can achieve our objectives without many of the drawbacks of unilateral lift. Multilateral lift prevents serious political splits with allies and sustains the unity of NATO and the international community on this issue. In this regard, multilateral lift necessarily involves the Russians, thus denying the Serbs its most significant ally. Unity among the Contact Group and the five permanent nations on the UN Security Council would provide a powerful incentive for the Serbs to negotiate rather than attack in response to a lifting of the arms embargo. In the event the Serbs react to lift by intensifying the fighting, with NATO's cooperation, more effective airstrikes and other operations by international forces could be provided from European bases. Moreover, with Russia's help, Serbia could be kept out of the war in Bosnia. Multilateral lift is not totally without risks and adverse consequences. However, unlike unilateral action, those risks and consequences are not solely the responsibility of the US. Instead, they are shared with the international community.

Submitted to USDP for addition. Not yet approved

6 Jan 95: 1200 version--with USDP incorporated NSC/JCS suggested revisions

UNILATERALLY LIFTING THE ARMS EMBARGO ON BOSNIA: THE PATH TO AN AMERICANIZED FOURTH BALKAN WAR

When the history of the tragic conflict in the Former Yugoslavia is written, it will be clear that the arms embargo on Bosnia -- imposed in 1991 -- was a mistake. It deprived the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina of the means of self-defense against the Bosnian Serbs' superiority in tanks and artillery drawn from Tito's old arsenals and from some fresh supplies from outside, notably supporters in Serbia itself. An international agreement to lift the arms embargo multilaterally and deal collectively with the consequences would be both wise and just -- and has been supported by the Administration. But for a variety of reasons, no such multilateral lifting of the arms embargo is in the cards for the near term at least.

Some members of Congress, reacting with understandable frustration, are demanding the U.S. ignore UN resolutions and act unilaterally to lift the arms embargo. They claim unilateral lift would ensure that Bosnian government forces receive the arms and training they need to "level the field" and defend themselves. And they claim such a step would do this without drawing the US into the Balkan fighting.

But a realistic look at the facts on the ground and the likely consequences of unilateral US action demonstrate that taking such a seemingly fair, direct, and simple action would be a grave mistake, for both U.S. interests and the people of Bosnia. Among the consequences -- ignored or denied by proponents of unilateral lift -- would be these:

- Unilateral lift could undermine the most successful diplomatic initiative in many months -- the Cessation of Hostilities agreement, negotiated with the help of former President Carter -- which was just signed by all the warring parties, and is now coming into effect. An American decision now to end the arms embargo could derail that Cessation of Hostilities agreement -- and end the hope of negotiations for a permanent peace.
- The Bosnian Serbs would have every incentive to launch pre-emptive attacks, designed to exploit their advantage before American arms supplies reached Bosnia. While the Serbs probably could not totally defeat government forces, it is virtually certain they would occupy the eastern enclaves and renew military pressure on Sarajevo and elsewhere, especially on relief supply routes.
- Current UNPROFOR operations would end as European and many other contributing countries withdraw from Bosnia, seizing on U.S. action as an excuse to end a commitment that has been costly for them in lives, treasure, and involvement.
- UN and most other outside relief efforts would stop, at the very time humanitarian requirements would increase dramatically, both because of the increased fighting and the withdrawal of Serb cooperation. A high percentage of the food reaching the enclaves comes through Belgrade and Bosnian-Serb controlled territory. All airfields and most land routes are within range of Bosnian Serb artillery. Whatever else they did, the Serbs could easily cut off these relief supplies.

The cumulative effect of these consequences would be strong pressure for greatly increased American involvement. The U.S. would have precipitated the increased fighting

and the end of international relief and peacekeeping efforts. Moral responsibility for the resulting desperate military and humanitarian situation in Bosnia would shift to the U.S.

In short, unilaterally ending the arms embargo is not an alternative to U.S. military intervention. It is a way of accomplishing such intervention.

The implications of taking on this responsibility are many and grave. To begin with, the U.S. would have to take over relief efforts, or accept responsibility for the large-scale starvation and refugee flows that would result from the lack of food.

Similarly, unless we were prepared to watch as pre-emptive Serb attacks further battered Bosnian cities and defensive positions, US air strikes would be required to defend these cities and positions. However, the necessary European bases and other NATO support, on which our current, much smaller, air efforts depend, might not be available in the aftermath of a major break with our allies. In any case, airstrikes alone, even with the added planes needed, would probably not halt Serb ground attacks, given the difficult weather and terrain conditions.

Furthermore, contrary to the claims of unilateral lift backers, the "playing field" in Bosnia is not self-leveling. Simply authorizing U.S. manufacturers to sell arms to Bosnia would not get any arms to Bosnia. For lifting the embargo to have its intended effect of allowing the Bosnians to defend themselves, the US would have to undertake a major military assistance program to provide arms -- without the cooperation of our major allies.

The financial costs, though substantial, would be the least of the problems in carrying out such an effort. Upgrading Bosnia's light infantry to confront Bosnian Serb heavy weapons successfully is not a simple task--as earlier US efforts to equip local forces

in other countries from Vietnam to El Salvador have shown. Most important, sophisticated arms -- which the Bosnians would need to overcome Bosnian Serb advantages in heavy weapons -- are ineffective without trained soldiers to use them and a continuing stream of support. U.S. trainers, advisers and logistics support personnel on the ground would be necessary to assist the Bosnian Government in using the arms effectively.

A U.S. decision to lift the arms embargo unilaterally would undermine the most important U.S. national security objective for the region -- to avoid a wider war in the Balkans while seeking a negotiated settlement. Among the most serious potential consequences of unilateral U.S. action would, however, be strong pressures a widening of the conflict beyond Bosnia. There are painfully many scenarios for such wider fighting:

- Escalation of fighting would likely draw in the Serbs from Krajina (as it did in Bihac), thus extending the actual fighting to Croatia.
- The Belgrade Serbs, though very sympathetic to the Bosnian Serbs now are, under strong international pressure, cutting off supplies to the Bosnian Serbs and pressing them to settle on terms the government of Bosnia has accepted. With the U.S. acting unilaterally, over the objections of our allies and the Russians, it would be difficult if not impossible to convince the Belgrade Serbs to hold back in support of their Bosnian Serb compatriots -- unless we were prepared to threaten Belgrade militarily.
- U.S. military confrontation with Serbia could precipitate a sharp crackdown by Belgrade in the Muslim province of Serbia, Kosovo, a development which would have the potential to destabilize the entire southern Balkan region, and which the US has pledged to meet with force.

- Broader fighting could draw Albania, Macedonia, Greece, and Turkey into conflict.

Neither our horror at the destruction brought by this long and brutal war and at the atrocities of Serbian ethnic cleansing nor our frustration with the irrationality of Balkan rivalries and the difficulty of international peacekeeping should be allowed to cause us to forget that much has been accomplished by international action even as the war has continued. The European role, and our cooperation with Europe, has been central to what has been achieved to moderate the suffering in Bosnia and prevent a wider war. The UN, for all its limitations, has saved thousands of lives by its military and civilian efforts. UNPROFOR, for all its problems, has been the necessary element for the large scale delivery of food, and for support of the Sarajevo and Gorazde exclusion zones. NATO cooperation has been essential for enforcement of the "No Fly Zone," the heavy weapons exclusion zones, and the economic sanctions against Serbia. The Contact Group, which includes Russia as well as key European allies, has been the principal instrument for seeking a negotiated solution.

Maintaining that cooperation and avoiding a fundamental break with our NATO allies over the Bosnian issue is, of course, also essential to our broader national interests in European and international security. Virtually every European nation opposes lifting the arms embargo at this time. Thus U.S. unilateral action would be undertaken in the face of vehement opposition of most NATO allies. The resulting rift would undermine the consensus underlying NATO's unified military command and deeply damage the alliance and the U.S. ability to lead it.

Additionally, hopes of a cooperative relationship with Russia on European security would be seriously jeopardized by actions that Russians of all political stripes would see as US intervention not just against the Bosnian Serbs, but against the Belgrade Serbs as well. Russia would likely counter US action by arming the Serbs, thereby raising the ante and reviving U.S.-Russian confrontation.

Finally, while it is fashionable in some circles these days to ridicule the UN and all its works, the US has an important interest in nations not taking unilateral action in contravention of UN resolutions. Such action not only undermines both international law and internationally sanctioned peacekeeping operations, but also it undercuts the US interest in international sanctions being observed. One of the main pressures on the Serbs is the UN embargo on their trade. If the US unilaterally dropped the part of the UN sanctions it finds objectionable, the front line states--Serbia's immediate neighbors--would likely stop enforcing the trade embargo against Serbia and the Bosnian Serbs which they claim has cost them billions of dollars already.

Nor would the effects on sanctions regimes we support be confined to the Balkans. If the US acted alone in this matter, other nations would claim the right to ignore UN embargo resolutions that we strongly favor such as those that pertain to Iraq and other pariah states.

In sum, Congressional action mandating unilateral U.S. action to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia would be a tragic and short-sighted mistake. Unilaterally ending the arms embargo is not an alternative to US intervention; it is a way of accomplishing such intervention. It would mean the Americanization of responsibility for the war, for unilateral action entails unilateral responsibility for the consequences of that action. We should be under no illusion that the US could responsibly simply lift the arms embargo and

walk away. Nor should we do the only thing that would really produce the Bosnian victory many lift proponents desire -- commit US ground forces to solve the problems of Bosnia.

What we must do instead, therefore, is continue to work within the international community to limit the scale of fighting, provide humanitarian relief, prevent a wider war, and seek to achieve an early agreed settlement to this tragic conflict. We recognize that any settlement will not be ideal; it will likely on some scale be unjust. But it will be far better than the consequences of expanded war, division from our allies, and likely U.S. combat involvement that a unilateral lifting of the arms embargo would bring.

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20089

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

January 23, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: NICHOLAS BURNS/ALEXANDER VERSHBOW/DANIEL PONEMAN ^{NB AN DP}

FROM: JOHN BEYRLER ^{JB}

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Principals
Committee Meeting, January 20, 1995

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Principals is the Summary of Conclusions from the Principals Committee meeting held January 20, 1995. This summary covers the discussion on Chechnya and Bosnia. A separate memorandum will summarize conclusions from the discussion on North Korea, for distribution to the wider group of agencies represented in that part of the meeting.

Concurrence by: Donald Kerrick ^{DK}; Steve Aoki ^{SA}

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Will Itoh to sign the memo to agencies at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memo to the Agencies
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By KDE NARA, Date 04/02/15
2012-0798-F

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

MEMORANDUM FOR

By VDE NARA, Date 04/02/15
2012-0798-F

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

LEON E. PANETTA
Chief of Staff to the
President of the
United States

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

COL. T.R. PATRICK
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the U.S. to the UN

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Principals Committee
Meeting on Chechnya and Bosnia on January 20, 1995

Please pass to the Principals the Summary of Conclusions attached
at Tab A. A separate memorandum will summarize conclusions from
the discussion of North Korea. (S)

William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

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Tab A

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20089

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

Summary of Conclusions
Meeting of NSC Principals Committee

DATE: January 20, 1994
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 2:35 - 4:00 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair
Anthony Lake

OVP
Leon Fuerth

State
Peter Tarnoff

DOD
Secretary William Perry

UN
Ambassador Madeleine Albright

CIA
Acting Director William
Studeman

JCS
ADM William Owens

White House
Samuel Berger
Nancy Soderberg

NSC
Alexander Vershbow
John Beyrle

Summary of Conclusions

RUSSIA/CHECHNYA

1. The Principals reviewed the situation on the ground in and around Grozny and discussed the likelihood that Russian forces will continue to face opposition from irregular forces, perhaps augmented by outside mercenaries. The CIA was requested to produce a short (2 pg) paper analyzing the implications of the Chechnya affair for surrounding ethnic regions (e.g., Ingushetia, Dagestan, Abkhazia) and actions those regions may be taking in reaction to Chechnya. **Action: CIA.**

2. The Principals agreed on the need for a careful line of public comment that welcomed positive developments, like the prospect of eventual free elections in Chechnya, while not seeming to cheerlead blindly for what might prove an unacceptable solution, e.g. installation of a puppet regime. Press guidance

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prepared for the President's use was circulated to ensure that comments by Principals or their spokespersons would be consistent.

3. Principals discussed the need to identify points of leverage we may be able to use to influence Yeltsin and other Russian officials to make the right choices on reform issues and in further steps in Chechnya. Such points could include the scheduling of the next summit, or the nature of Russian participation in Halifax G-7 meeting. **Action: NSC and State to develop a game plan.**

4. Ambassador Albright discussed persistent problems with Russian positions at the U.N. which directly counter or challenge our interests, most notably the UNMIH mandate issue. Principals agreed that if attempts over the coming week to convince the Russians to support the U.S. position are unsuccessful, the President should seek Yeltsin's support in a letter. **Action: State to continue diplomatic efforts; NSC to draft letter, if needed.**

FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

Bosnia:

1. Principals reviewed the status of the ceasefire and cessation of hostilities agreement and Contact Group efforts to renew negotiations on a political settlement. They agreed that Deputies should review territorial and constitutional issues that will arise in the negotiations, but that the USG must be careful to avoid any appearance of departing from its commitment to the Contact Group plan. Recognizing the possibility of a continuing impasse in the negotiations, Principals directed that a mid-term diplomatic strategy paper be prepared for Deputies' review as preparation for a future discussion by Principals. **Action: State.**

2. Principals discussed the upcoming Washington visit of Bosnian Prime Minister Silajdzic and the impact it could have on Congressional support for unilateral lifting of the arms embargo. State undertook to circulate a paper outlining a strategy for handling the Silajdzic visit. **Action: State.**

Croatia:

3. Principals reviewed options available for responding to President Tudjman's decision to terminate UNPROFOR's mandate in Croatia when it expires on March 31. Recognizing the important strategic interests that the U.S. has in Croatia, the Principals directed that talking points prepared for USDP Slocombe's meeting

with President Tudjman be appropriately modified to focus on the risks of the decision on the ground, our commitment to a reinvigorated diplomatic effort aimed at reintegration of the occupied areas, and our support for retention of at least part of the UNPROFOR contingent. **Action: OSD/State**

4. Principals discussed the potential difficulties of withdrawing UNPROFOR from Croatia, in the event withdrawal takes place, and asked the Deputies to promptly review the political and military aspects of supporting UNPROFOR withdrawal. **Action: State and JCS prepare papers on political and military aspects of U.S./NATO support for withdrawal of UNPROFOR/Croatia.**

Congressional and Public Affairs Strategy:

5. Principals discussed next steps in dealing with Congress following the previous week's interagency briefings and asked that an unclassified version of LTG Clark's testimony on unilateral lifting of the arms embargo be prepared for follow-up briefings on the Hill. Principals agreed on the importance of defeating a vote on unilateral lift rather than allowing the Congress to put the President in the position of having to use the veto. They also agreed to defer a decision on the timing for publishing Secretary Perry's op-ed.

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20122

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

January 30, 1995

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH:

ALEXANDER VERSHBOW FV(10)

FROM:

DON KERRICK (10)

SUBJECT:

Deputies Tasked Threat Analysis on UNPROFOR
Withdrawal from Croatia.

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

By KDE NARA, Date 04/02/15

2012-0798-F

Attached JCS prepared analysis of threat to UNPROFOR withdrawal from Croatia was prepared in response to Deputies tasking at their January 25 meeting on Bosnia.

Attachment

Tab A JCS Paper: Threat to UNPROFOR Withdrawal from Croatia

cc: Leon Fuerth
Richard Clarke
Rick Saunders
Susan Rice

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004. paper	Re: Threat to UNPROFOR Withdrawal from Croatia (3 pages)	01/26/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Drew, Nelson/Bremner, Sue)
OA/Box Number: 697

FOLDER TITLE:

PC/DC [Principals Committee/Deputies Committee] Meetings on Bosnia, January 1995
[2]

2012-0798-F
ke3031

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
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White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

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By KDE NARA, Date 04/02/15
2012-0798-F

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
DC

CROATIA
SOC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSION FOR DC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA ON 11 JAN

ACTION: SENS SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DUE DATE: 17 JAN 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: VERSHBOW

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002 950117 MCALEER, R
002 950117 INDERFURTH, K
002 950117 GARTHOFF, D
002 950117 PATRICK, T

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National Security Council
The White House

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OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
VIA LARRY BRANSCUM
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WASHINGTON, DC 20506

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
2201 C STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

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WHITE HOUSE
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PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

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(NAME)

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MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: SOC FOR DC MTG ON BOSNIA & Croatia
NSC LOG # 20600

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

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~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20060

January 17, 1995

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By VDE NARA, Date 01/22/15
2000-0798-F

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs

MR. LEON E. PANETTA
Chief of Staff to the President
of the United States

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency


COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

COL. T. R. PATRICK
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of
the U.S. to the United Nations

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia
and Croatia, January 11, 1995 (S)

Please pass to the Deputies the Summary of Conclusions attached at Tab A. (S)


William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

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Declassify on: OADR

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20060

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: January 11, 1995

LOCATION: White House Situation Room

TIME: 4:30-5:55 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on
Bosnia and Croatia ~~(S)~~

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair:

Samuel R. Berger

CIA:

Douglas MacEachin

Ray Converse

OVP:

Leon Fuerth

Richard Saunders

JCS:

Adm. William Owens

LTG Wesley Clark

State:

Richard Holbrooke

Robert Frasure

Amb. Peter Galbraith

UN:

David Scheffer

James O'Brien

DOD:

Walter Slocombe

Joseph Kruzel

NSC:

Alexander Vershbow

Summary of Conclusions

Bosnia: Contact Group Strategy

1. Deputies reviewed the results of the January 10 Contact Group meeting in Paris and prospects for renewed negotiations on a political settlement. They agreed that Deputies should review the territorial and constitutional issues that will come up in those negotiations, while recognizing the political sensitivity

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of the U.S. going beyond the role of facilitator and adopting a formal position on specific issues. (S)

2. Deputies requested two papers for a follow-on meeting during the week of January 16 (papers should be completed by COB January 17):

A) Review and analysis of the sides' positions on the key negotiating issues (Action: CIA).

B) Diplomatic strategy for the period from now until April 30, including possible options for promoting a positive outcome to the negotiations, as well as a recommended strategy in the event negotiations break down (Action: State). (S)

Croatia: Tudjman's decision to terminate UNPROFOR's mandate

3. Deputies considered options for responding to President Tudjman's decision to terminate UNPROFOR's mandate in Croatia when it expires on March 31, and the position that should be conveyed to the Croatian envoys following the meeting. They agreed that we should seek to reverse the Croatian decision, stress our concern about the risks of a new war in the Krajina and the dangers the decision posed for the safety of UNPROFOR troops, and make clear to Tudjman he will be on his own if he chooses the military option. (S)

4. Deputies agreed that, as an initial response, we would we would urge the Croatians to delay a public announcement of their decision (scheduled for the following day) pending further consultations. If this were not accepted by the Croatians, Deputies agreed that we would urge them to leave the door open to a less-than-complete UNPROFOR withdrawal, and to work with us on a new UNPROFOR mandate that would retain at least those elements that were performing important functions: (S)

- monitoring the March 29, 1994 ceasefire and separation of forces agreement;
- headquarters operations for continuing UNPROFOR missions in Croatia, Bosnia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia;

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- implementation of the Zagreb-4 economic confidence-building measures, including the opening of the Zagreb-Belgrade highway;
- humanitarian convoys to Bihac and Banja Luka; and
- maintaining a liaison office in Knin to facilitate negotiations.

5. As part of this proposal, Deputies agreed that we would offer to launch a reinvigorated diplomatic effort aimed at the political reintegration of the UN Protected Areas based on the revised Zagreb-4 plan, and to undertake a special diplomatic mission to key Western capitals to develop a coordinated Croatia strategy. ~~(S)~~

6. Deputies decided that we should not threaten to withdraw the President's commitment to link Serbian sanctions relief to progress toward a Krajina settlement, or threaten other punitive steps, at this time. ~~(S)~~

7. Deputies agreed to review the situation at their next meeting, including the Congressional dimension, in light of the Croatian response to the U.S. position set forth above. A paper laying out a diplomatic strategy, including an inventory of possible punitive steps in the U.S. bilateral relationship with Croatia, was subsequently tasked by the Interagency Working Group and should be completed by COB January 17 (**Action: State**). In addition, the Joint Staff should review the operational implications of a continued UNPROFOR presence in Croatia in support of Bosnia operations in the context of renewed fighting in the Krajina (**Action: JCS**). ~~(S)~~

UNPROFOR Strengthening and UNPROFOR Funding

8. Deputies noted the tension between ongoing efforts to strengthen/expand UNPROFOR and the need to reduce our aggregate UN peacekeeping costs. They agreed to address this issue at their next meeting. In the meantime, diplomatic efforts on UNPROFOR strengthening should continue. ~~(S)~~

~~SECRET~~


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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20060

January 13, 1995



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

FROM: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *AV*

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Deputies
Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia,
January 11, 1995

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By KDE NARA, Date 04/02/15
2012-0798-F

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Deputies is the Summary of
Conclusions from the Deputies Committee meeting on Bosnia and
Croatia held January 11, 1995.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Will Itoh to sign the memo to agencies at
Tab I.

Approve *mlr* Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memo to the Agencies

Tab A Summary of Conclusions

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005a. memo	Alexander Vershbow to Samuel Berger, re: Today's Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia (4 pages)	01/11/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Drew, Nelson/Bremner, Sue)
OA/Box Number: 697

FOLDER TITLE:

PC/DC [Principals Committee/Deputies Committee] Meetings on Bosnia, January 1995
[2]

2012-0798-F
ke3031

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005b. cable	Re: Presidential Letter to Tudjman (2 pages)	01/08/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Drew, Nelson/Bremner, Sue)
OA/Box Number: 697

FOLDER TITLE:

PC/DC [Principals Committee/Deputies Committee] Meetings on Bosnia, January 1995
[2]

2012-0798-F
ke3031

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005c. cable	Re: Tadjman Responds to President's Letter (3 pages)	01/10/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Drew, Nelson/Bremner, Sue)
OA/Box Number: 697

FOLDER TITLE:

PC/DC [Principals Committee/Deputies Committee] Meetings on Bosnia, January 1995
[2]

2012-0798-F
ke3031

RESTRICTION CODES

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